ML20069D876
| ML20069D876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1982 |
| From: | Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8209220303 | |
| Download: ML20069D876 (13) | |
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4 LIC September 20, 1982 00CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNM 0F EC3ETr.R D: 0ETEi & EEfrn' Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board E A:J;;
In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)-
Station, Unit No. 1) )
LICENSEE'S ANSWER TO AAMODT MOTION FOR THE NRC STAFF AND THE LICENSEE TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND/OR REOPENING OF RECORD By Motion dated September 3, 1982, the Aamodts movel!
that absent adequate explanation by Licensee and the Staff of their actions surrounding the discovery of unsecured radiation worker tests at TMI in May, 1982, the record should be reopened to explore this subject. Licensee opposes the Aamodt Motion.
In a recent Board Notification, the Staff provided to the Appeal Board and parties an NRC Inspection and Enforceme~t n 1/ The Aamodts' motion to reopen was filed with the Licensing Board; coincidently they filed related pleadings directly with the Commission and with the Appeal Board. It is not clear that the Licensing Board, rather than the Appeal Board, should enter-tain and decide the Motion to Reopen. Compare 10 C.F.R. S 2.717 (a licensing board has continuing jurisdiction until finality attaches to an NRC decision) with 10 C.F.R. S 2.718 (a licensing board has explicit authority to reopen a proceeding at any time prior to initial decision). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB- -
598, 11 N.R.C. 876 (1980) (following an initial decision and (Continued Next Page) 8209220303 820920 -
{DRADOCK 05000289 PDR kSY
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15 Division (I&E) inspection report. The inspection report concerned, inter alia, an incident in early May at TMI where radiation worker examination materials utilized by Licensee's training personnel were found unsecured in a training super- j visor's office. The report discusses Licensee's discovery of the examination materials and Licensee's and NRC's actions subsequent to the discovery. The inspection report concludes that adequate corrective action was taken as a result of the incident.
Based on the inspection report and on information and belief, the facts surrounding this incident are:
(1) Licensee employs as an independent quality check on radiological matters at TMI an individual called a Radiological Assessor who has freedom to surveil and inspect (Continued) briefing of exceptions but prior to oral argument on exceptions, Appeal Board reopened proceeding upon a party's motion). It is clear that the Licensing Board, in the first instance, has the inherent right and duty to determine its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-591, 11 N . R.C . 741, 742 (1980). The Appeal Board, in a similar setting, observed that the licensing board at this juncture in a proceeding is much more familiar with the record already developed than the Appeal Board. See Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-597, 11 N.R.C.
870, 874 (1980). We expect this to be the case here. In any event, we urge prompt disposition of the Aamodt Motion. If the Licensing Board determines that it has jurisdiction, then we would ask that it decide the Motion as quickly as possible; if, on the other hand, it decides it does not have jurisdiction, we ask that the Motion and responsive pleadings be forwarded direct-ly to the Appeal Board for its consideration without further pleadings or delay. Outstanding motions to reopen carry a pall which lingers over a proceeding so long as the motions remain un-resolved. Every effort -- obviously consistent with procedural ,
safeguards and due process -- should be expended to avoid unneces-sary delay in deciding the Aamodt Motion.
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all facets of radiological training and practices at TMI and report his observations directly to the highest levels of GPUNC management. The Radiological Assessor also provides, at management direction, routine written reports which are dis-tributed to management and directly to NRC.
(2) On May 5, 1982, the Radiological Assessor uncovered radiation worker training examination materials in a brown file folder on a shelf in the office of the general employee training supervisor and in a drawer in an unlocked file cabinet .
in the same office.
(3) His observations were reported immediately to upper management in the radiological controls department and as well the next day to training management.
(4) On May 6, 1982, the general employee training super-visor was confronted with these facts by training management.
His explanation for the examinations' not being better secured was judged inadequate and he was specifically instructed to adhere to examination security requirements.
(5) On May 7, 1982, training management inspected and again examination materials were found inadequately secured in the same individual's office. The materials were imme-diately removed by management and secured.
(6) The supervisor involved in this incident was severely reprimanded and shortly thereafter chose to resign from GPUNC before final disciplinary action had been taken.
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(7) All subsequently administered examinaticns of the type involved were rewritten. These new exams and their '{
grading keys have been kept locked when not'in use.
(8) Licensee completed on May 7, a survey of e:iamination If 'r i s "\
security practices throughout the TMI Training Department. ;
Itwasdeterminedthattheincidentinvolvingtyheg,cceral y N
employee training supervisor did not represent any other iN S \s '
training sections at TMI, and thatithe incident appeared yo be an isolated one attributable to a single individual?s prac ,
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tices. Through the audit, Licensee did identify general areas for continued improvement in exam security. The more general concerns identified were (a) need to review physical arrange- s ments of cubicle offices and locking arrangements; . (b) ne'ed 4 3,
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to upgrade word processing system security; (c) need'to handh l ? .
carry all examinations; (d) need to develop questionchanks; y \ ; '* \ \,
and (e) need to review and revise plant proced,ures'on e,xamina,-Jy
, d' M .x tion security. .
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w (9) A subsequent audit by Licensee Quality Assurances
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personnel confirmed that throughout the training' department 1 9
_s\.i 5 all file cabinets containing examination questions, graded -
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.s examinations and records are bar-locked. ,
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(10) Licensee's Radiological Assessor in his routine report 6 L
of observations on May 11, 1982, informed on-site NRC,inspec- s
,,a tion personnel of the incident and discussed the details of 'the a r in :ident with them at that time. ;.
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,411) During the period May 11 through June 8, NRC I&E personnel conducted an inspection of Licensee's activities at j TMI-1. One of the items inspected was the incident involving i s theunsecuredfadiationwcrkerexaminations. NRC reviewed
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the incident and Licensee's responses. In a Report (Inspection 4 g ;. 4 50-289/82-07), dated July 1, 1982, NRC concluded that Licensee's i
response was adequate both to the specific incident and to the more general concerns'which Licensee had identified during its e review of all training sections between May 5 and May 7.
(12)' In a Board Notification (BN-82-84), dated August 17, -
, 1982, the Staff forwarded Inspection Report 50-289/82-07 to
' a,the Appeal Board e ities reporting that l't " considers that N( ),, ,
b ,adeguate corrective actions were taken by the Licensee as a yy -
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v bn result of this incident'.'"CJ i a
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< Citing the Board Notification as their basis, the,Aamodts i
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now seek to reopen ..o (the,recor'd in this proceeding.2/ ,As we
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' understand the Aamodts'g argument, it is'two-fold. First, they E drgue that this o isl "naw information which directly relates to ,
aspecific, issue,[f$hereopenedproceeding,totheissuesof the reopened proceeding in general, and to the Board's confi-dence that quality assurance practices, conditions to restart, 2_/ The Motion actually would have the Board' require Licensee and NRC to make a number of?what the Aamodts characterize as " good cause" showings; unles's 'those showings yere sufficient, the Aamodts argue, the record should be reopened. In_any event, the Aamodts maintain "the information" [ sic] should be entered into the record by stipulation. The Aamodts put the cart before the horse. It may ,
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- bethatLicensee}ortheStaff) would have;thepurden of proof I (Continuhd Next Page)
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g will be institu(ed."
- Motion, at '1//There is no identific,ati$n of the " specific issue," issue,s "in general",or " conditions to
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restart" to which the Aamodts are referring, nor how those .
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issues are impacted by t.he /new inforaation. To be sure, i di '
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examinations and testing were the; general subject matter of the se - '
Reopened Phases.of this proceeding, but beyond that we are 1 eft ,
< >, , o, to, speculate'as to the Aamodts' views. Second, the Aamodts
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a51ege that this matter " raises questions of ,the integrity of, (the Licensee's upper management -
and the NRC Sta.f in th.}t ,- _
1 this information was witihNeld#frodt the puryiew of the reopened
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proceeding for over three mon 6hs." ,The ' '
facts are that Licensee's
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+ Radiological Assessor,. acting on instructions by Licensee's
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management, promptly in May rbported the incident to NRC and
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Jj y that NRC'in concert with its ongoing inspections of Licensee's activitics at TMI-1 in a number of areas, specifically reviewed s -e this incident and Licensee's res9Cnsive actions. The Staff's filing of its Inspection Report in the Public Document, Room ,
, a on July 22, 1982 (see notation "820722 . . . PDR,"J pa,ge 1 of -
Attachment 2 to Aamodt Motion) and/ the<date ofsits I rd Notifi-cation as August 17, 1,982, hardly seem consistent with a design to delay notice to the A modts until after comments and reply i ]
comments on immediate effectiveness were due to the Commis'sion.
(Continued) ,
on issues admitted in a reopened hearing, and it may be as well that the issues in any reopcaed hearing would be as broad as the range of issues the Aamodts suggest are appropriate in their Motion (at 2) . The record, however, has not been reopened at this
- juncture. Whether to reopen the record is the issue and it is the Aamodts as the proponents of reopening who have the burden. See pages 7-10, infra.
The standards used in determining whether to reopen an evidentiary record are well settled in NRC case law. The pro-ponent of a motion to reopen has a heavy burden. In order for the moving party to prevail, the motion must be both timely presented and addressed to a significant safety or environmental issue. Additionally, it must be established that a different result would have been reached initially had the material sub-l'
, mitted in support of the motion been considered. Kansas Gas i
and Electric Company, et al. (Wolf Creek Generating Station,
/ Unit No. 1), ALAB-462, 7 N.R.C. 320, 338 (1978), and cases cited therein. See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company -(Diablo
,J
! Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-05, 13 N.R.C.
361, 362-63 (1981) (endorsing these principles as "long-standing Commission practice").
The Aamodts' Motion falls short of this mark. Accepting the representation that the Aamodts first learned of this incident on September 2, we do not question the timeliness of the Motion. It is, however, inconceivable that a different result would have been reached in this proceeding had the incident occurred earlier and the information been before the Board for its consideration with other evidence in the reopened proceeding.
The Board found that administrative procedures Licensee put in place subsequent to the disclosures of cheating, as supplemented by administrative safeguards imposed by Board condition, are well designed to protect the integrity of r --w ,,
company-administered examinations. PID 1 2068. In this regard, the Board took care to point out:
[The procedures] must be enforced, however; thus we are not satisfied that the new pro-cedures alone are adequate.
Id. The Board went on to outline as conditions a system of additional safeguards it believed should be imposed, including independent auditing over a two-year " probationary" period, -
internal auditing of training delivery and establishment of criteria for instructor qualifications. Id. See also PID 1 2421.
Licensee has in place new administrative procedures to safeguard the integrity of the examination process. Although the independent audit called for by the Board's decision has not yet been conducted, Licensee has instituted its own quality control checks on training procedures.S! The dis-covery of unsecured radiation worker exams was an isolated incident attributable to a single individual's practices and not representative of security conditions in other training sections. The discovery was made by Licensee personnel exhibiting Licensee's keen awareness of the need for security.
3/ We emphasize that these actions were not confined to radia-tion worker training, or to licensed operator training, but spanned all Licensee training department sections. Nor has Licensee viewed the Board's conditions, requiring audits and instructor criteria, as confined to one or another training sec-tion. Licensee is proceeding with its administrative upgrading, audits and instructor qualification criteria development through-out the training department. Thus, to.the . extent the Aamodts view the May incident as requiring reopening because it involved <
a radiation worker examination rather than a licensed operator examination, their argument is without substance.
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Management's response was swift and appropriate, indicative of Licensee's appreciation for the seriousness of any break-down in procedures to safeguard examination security.
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Although there is no indication that examination security was breached, new examinations were immediately developed and thereafter administered; the individual was severely reprimanded and subsequently resigned. Licensee immediately initiated a review of all training areas to determine whether any other training section or whether any other individual employed less than the optimum practices, and subsequently had con-ducted an audit of its training sections by quality assurance personnel as a further check on examination security prac-tices.4/ NRC was promptly informed of the incident and their inspection concluded Licensee's response was adequate.
This is not the response of a naive, disinterested or negligent management. To the contrary, the incident displays an awareness of the need for examination security and prompt managemc.it reaction both as to substantive exam requirements and training personnel's need to adhere strictly to safeguard-ing practices. Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that the Board's decision, even had it included consideration of the May incident, could have resulted in a determination unfavorable to restart.
, 4/ It is these same factors which led Licensee to content itself with promptly notifying NRC on-site personnel of the incident and not to deem the incident as sufficiently significant to warrant Board notification. Licensee has on a number of occasions pro-vided notification to the Licensing and Appeal Boards of changed -
circumstances warranting such action. See Licensee letters of June 4, 1981; october 1, 1981; November 3, 1981; March 11, 1982; April 22, 1982; and August 10, 1982. _
For the above reasons, Licensee opposes a further reopen-ing of the record in this proceeding and urges that the Aamodt Motion of September 3, 1982, be denied.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 By: [' '" I- -
Ernest L. Blake, Jr. _
Counsel for Licensee DATED: September 20, 1982.
1 LIC September 20, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
! (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)
Station, Unit No. 1) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I
L I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing LICENSEE'S ANSWER TO AAMODT MOTION FOR THE NRC STAFF AND THE LICENSEE TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND/OR REOPENING OF RECORD was served this 20th day of September, 1982, by hand delivery to those persons on the attached Service List designated by an asterisk (*) preceding their names; and by deposit in the United
< States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to all other persons on the attached Service List.
[ h )' ?.' $64.,f l Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
SERVICE LIST
- Administrative Judge
- Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Ivan W. Smith, Chairman .
Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge
- Administrative Judge Walter H. Jordan John H. Buck Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing 881 West Outer Drive Appeal Board Oak Ridge, TN 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrative Judge Washington, D.C. 20555 Linda W. Little Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
- Administrative Judge 5000 Hermitage Drive Christine N. Kohl Raleigh, NC 27612 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety & Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Jack R. Goldberg, Esquire (4)
Office of the Executive Atomic Safety & Licensing Legal Director Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
' Docketing & Service Section (3) Robert Adler, Esquire Office of the Secretary Karin W. Carter, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorneys General Commission 505 Executive House Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 2357 <
Harrisburg, PA 17120
John A. Levin, Esquire Ms. Gail Phelps Assistant Counsel ANGRY /TMI PIRC Pennsylvania Public Utility 1037 Maclay Street Commission Harrisburg, PA 17103 Post Office Box 3265 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire Fox, Farr & Cunningham Mr. Henry D. Hukill 2320 North Second Street Vice President Harrisburg, PA 17110 GPU Nuclear Corporation Post Office Box 480 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire (1)
Middletown, PA 17057 William S. Jordan, III, Esquire (1)
Harmon & Weiss Michael F. McBride, Esquire 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 LeBouef, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Washington, D.C. 20006 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100 Mr. Steven C. Sholly Washington, D.C. 20036 Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Ms. Louise Bradford Dupont Circle Bldg., Suite 1101 TMI ALERT Washington, D.C. 20036 1011 Green Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 Chauncey Kepford Judith H. Johnsrud Mr. Norman Aamodt Environmental Coalition on R. D. 5 Nuclear Power Coatesville, PA 19320 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16801 John Clewett, Esquire The Christic Institute David E. Cole, Esquire 1324 North Capitol Street Smith & Smith, P.C.
Washington, D.C. 20002 2931 Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Michael W. Maupin, Esquire Hunton & Williams Administrative Judge 707 East Main Street Gary L. Milhollin Post Office Box 1535 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Richmond, VA 23212 4412 Greenwich Parkway, N.W.
t Washington, D.C. 20007 C
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