ML20065P619
| ML20065P619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1982 |
| From: | Cole S, Erikson K, Jerrica Johnson, Joihnson J, Kanen A SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, YALE UNIV., NEW HAVEN, CT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065P624 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8210260232 | |
| Download: ML20065P619 (339) | |
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s . UNITED STATES 0F AMERICA ....',7 NUCLF.AR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOLMETED USNRC Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ,
'82 00T 22 P/
0F 5ECRETt ~
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In the Matter of ) '[hkfghERV -
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1) )
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ANDREW C. KANEN, DR. JAMES H. JOHNSON DR. STEPHEN COLE AND DR. KAI T. ERIKSON ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING
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CONTENTIONS EP 2B and SB (TRAFFIC CONGESTION ISSUES)
I October 12, 1982
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B210260232 821012 (DRADDCK 05000322 f
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Summary Outline of the Direct Testimony of Andrew C. Kanen!
Dr. James H. Johnson, Dr. Stephen Cole and Dr. Kai T. Erikson on Behalf of'Suffolk County'Regarding-Contentions'EP'2B'and EP 5B In EP 2B, Suffolk County contends that LILCO has failed to demons.trate adequately that ground transportation is capable of conveying contaminated injured individuals to Central Suffolk Hospital under such traffic conditions as may exist during a radiological emergency. In EP 5B, Suffolk County contends that .
LILCO has failed to address or take into account the possible effects of traffic congestion upon the ability of offsite per-i sonnel, necessary to augment LILCO's response in the event of an emergency, to respond promptly to the Shoreham site.
The LILCO emergency plan calls for various LILCO person-nel, who may not be on-shift, as well as personnel from offsite agencies, to respond promptly to the Shoreham site in the event of an emergency. The plan also calls for. ground transportation to convey contaminated injured individuals to Central Suffolk Hospital. In the event of a radiological emergency, however, a number of factors are likely to result in substantial traffic congestion on the roads in Suffolk County. Such congestion, in turn, is likely to impede travel by necessary augmenting per-sonnel to the Shoreham site, as well as travel by ambulances or emergency vehicles to Central Suffolk Hospital.
I One of the factors contributing to tra,ffic congestion in the event of an emergency is voluntary evacuation by persons i who are not advised to evacuate. This is known as the evacua-tion shadow phenomenon. The anticipated evacuation shadow i
phenomenon in Suffolk County in the event of a radiological l emergency is such that approximately 432,000 families in Long Island are expected to evacuate even if only approximately 30,000 families are the subject of an evacuation recommenda-tion. The impact of such an evacuation shadow phenomenon on traffic congestion is discussed in this testimony. The sub-stantial number of cars likely to be on the road as a result of the expected voluntary evacuation and other traffic-related conditions which are likely to arise in the event of an emer-gency will cause substantial traffic congestion and are likely to impede travel to the Shoreham site and to Central Suffolk Hospital.
LILCO's plan does not address or take into account the evacuation shadow phenomenen or the other factors contributing to traffic congestion that could impede a prompt emergency re-sponse or travel of emergency vehicles.
EXHIBITS ATTACHMENT 1 Resume of Mr. Andrew C. Kanen ATTACHMENT 2 ,
Attitudes Towards Evacuation: Reactions of Long Island Residents To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant
l ATTACHMENT 3 Resume of Dr. James H. Johnson; Jr.
ATTACHMENT 4 Evacuation From A Nuclear Technological Disaster; by l Donald J. Ziegler, Stanley D. Brown, and James H. Johnson; Jr.
ATTACHMENT 5 Table showing Percent Intending to Evacuate by Distance From Plant ATTACHMENT 6 Table showing Percent Intending to Evacuate By Direction From the Shoreham Plant ,
ATTACHMENT 7 Table showing Comparison of Actual Evacuation Behavior at TMI and Intended Evacuation Behavior at Shoreham (Scenario 2)
ATTACHMENT 8 Tigure showing Distance Decay Evacuation Curves ATTACHMENT 9 Table showing Behavioral Intentions And Demographic And Attitude Variables ATTACHMENT 10 Resume of Dr. Stephen Cole t
ATTACHMENT 11 Shoreham Evacuation Survey O
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l UNITED STATES.OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j Before the Atomic' Safety and Licensing Board
. )
In the Matte'r of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1) )
) ,
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ANDREW C. KANEN ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY; REGARDING CONTENTIONS EP 2B and EP 5B Q. Please state your name.
A. My name is Andrew C. Kanen.
- j. Q. Mr. Kanen, what is the purpose of this testimony?
3 A. The purpose of this testimony is to address con,tentions EP 2B and EP SB, both of which concern the effects of traffic con-gestion during a radiological emergency upon the ability of i LILCO to provide an adequate emergency response. They read as follows: .
f EP 2: Medical and Public Health Support 3
B. Furthermore, LILCO has failed to adequate-ly demonstrate that ground transportation (Plan at 6-16) is adequate for conveyance of contaminated injured individuals to Central Suffolk Hospital under the congested traffic or radiological conditions that are likely to i exist during a radiological emergency. Thus,
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LILCO has failed to satisfy 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; Item IV.E.6; and NUREG 0654; Item II.I.4.
EP Sa' Offsite' Response Organization and Onsite' Response Augmentation Suffolk County contends that LILCO has failed
< to provide reasonable assurance that onsite assistance from offsite agencies will be forthcoming in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham site (see, e.g.,
Plan at 5-8 and 6-15',. LILCO has therefore not met the requirements of 10 CFR ((50.47 (b)(1),(2),(3),(8),(12) and (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Item A; and NUREG 0654. In addition, LILCO has not demonstrated ade-quately that it will be able to augment its onsite emergency response staff in a timely manner (see Plan, Ch. 5). LILCO has also; therefore, failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR $50.47(b)(1) and (2). Thus:
B. LILCO has not adequately demon- ,
strated the possible effects of traffic congestion during evacua-tion of the population upon the ability of offsite personnel and/or onsite augmenting personnel to re-spend promptly to the Shoreham site.
This testimony will address two concerns raised in contentions EP 2B and EP 5B. Those concerns are (1) under emergency conditions, ambulances and emergency vehicles moving from the Shoreham site to Central Suffolk Hospital may be sig-nificantly delayed by traffic congestion; and (2) traffic con-gestion may impede augmentation of the emergency response by delaying LILCO personnel or offsite agency emergency workers from reaching the Shoreham site in a timely manner.
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l I. Background O. What is your occupation?
A. I am vice-president of PRC Voorhees; a transportation plan-ning consulting firm located in McLean; Virginia. PRC Voorhees is part of Planning Research Corporation. By profession, I am a civil engineer specializing in transportation planning.
O. What is involved in transportation planning?
A. It*is a discipline of planning that provides transportation and traffic analyses for both private and public agencies. For.
example; transportation analyses may include estimating the l
magnitude and direction of traffic that would be generated under a variety of circumstances. Traffic analyses may include determining the need and effectiveness of control measures to 1
expedite traffic flow.
1 Q. Please describe your experience as a transportation plan-ner.
A. I have worked in various positions in the field of trans-portation planning since 1959. My professional responsi-bilities have included the design, planning; construction su-pervision, and winter maintenance of secondary road networks, the performance of large scale transportation planning studies for urban environments, new t'own planning, and conducting traf-fic analyses for commercial and industrial clients.
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I joined PRC Voorhees as a Principal Planner in 1977; and in the fall of 1981 was appointed to my present position as vice-president. A more complete statement of my professional qualifications and experience is set forth in my resume which is Attachment 1 to'this testimony. , ,
Q. Have you performed transportation planning in the context of emergency planning for radiological emergencies?
A. Yes, I have. PRC Voorhees began to perform evacuation time studies and public alert systems analyses shortly after the TMI i
accident in 1979. I have been involved in examinations of those types performed by PRC Voorhees at approximately 13 or 14 nuclear power plant sites. I have participated in the develop-ment of offsite emergency response plans for local governmental entities in connection with the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant in California and the North Perry Power Plant in Ohio.
Some of this work is still in progress. I am also involved in PRC Voorhees' work related to the preparation of a local emer-t gency response plan for suffolk County.
II. Causes of Traffic Congestion O. Please describe in more detail the services you and PRC Voorhees are providing to Suffolk County.
A. We have been engaged by Suffolk County to assist in the development of a radiological emergency response plan that will allow the County to take the most effective protective measures l
i feasible for the population within Suffolk County that may be at risk as a consequence of an accident at the Shoreham plant. l l
Of relevance to the issues raised in contentions EP 2B and ,
i EP 5B are tha analyses we have conducted of the roadway system in Suffolk County and related matters such as traffic condi-tions that may exist during a radiological emergency and their impact en certain anticipated actions that may be necessary in the event of such an emergency.
Q. Why are,those analyses relevant to the issues raised in EP 2B and EP 5B?
A. As I noted above; those contentions address the effects of traffic congestion on transportation to. Central suffolk Hospital; and on augmentation of Shoreham personnel;.in the event of a radiological emergency. In this testimony I will first identify the general traffic conditions that could exist in Suffolk County in the event of an emergency. - Then I will discuss the potential impact of traffic congestion on transpor-tation to Central Suffolk Hospital and the augmentation of Shoreham personnel. My discussion is based on the analyses described above.
Q. Please describe the traffic conditions that are likely to exist in Suffolk County in the event of a radiological emer-gency at Shoreham.
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A. In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham; assuming there is a public notification of an emergency involv-ing an evacuation recommendation; there is likely to be signif-icant traffic congestion in Suffolk County. Such congestion might also occur in advance of a specific recommendation to l evacuate if voluntary evacuation takes place. Traffic conges-tion occurs when the number of vehicles using a roadway exceeds roadway capacity. (For a discussion of data concerning the number of families and vehicles likely to be using the roadways in Suffolk County as a result of recommended and/or voluntary evacuation during an emergency; based on the results of a sur-vey of Long Island residents, see the direct testimony .of Drs.
Johnson, Cole, and Erikson on contentions 2B and 5B.) The consequences of traffic congestion are traffic queues, stop and l
I go flow conditions; and travel time delays significantly above normal.
There are four factors that will cause those congested conditions. The first factor involves the traffic circum-stances which would immediately follow the public's awareness of any response to a radiological emergency. During the period immediately following public announcements, the population at work would leave their places of work and return to their homes. If this occurred in the middle of a normal working day, large numbers of people and accordingly, vehicles, would be i
engaged in such travel. The result would be the creation of a level of. traffic congestion that would be at least equal to; and prekably more intense than; what one would expect during the afternoon rush hour.' This is based on the assumption that the workers' departure from their places of business in the event of an emergency would be within a shorter time frame than the more staggered departure intervals that would occur on a normal workday.
Second, it may be necessary to establish a perimeter s around the identi5ied area at risk. The purpose of the perime-ter would be to alert the transient populaticna not to enter the risk area; and otherwise to screen.those persons having no legitimate need to enter the risk area. The establishment of this perimeter would create significant traffic congestion just outside the perimeter as a consequence of the following actions that would have to be taken. Firsts those travellers Who rea-i ched the perimeter, but Who did not reside within the risk t
area, would have to be warned and diverted from entering the area of potential risk. This activity would result in signifi-i
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cant congestion since it would involve the re-routing or rever-sal of direction of the vehicles. In cddition, those travel-1ers who reached the perimeter and who resided within the risk area (such as those Who left their places of work in response to a public emergency notification) would most likely wish to
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return home to join their families inside the areas to be J
evacuated. Those travellers would have to be screened and cleared at the perimeter. Such activity would further increase the intensity of congestion at the perimeter points.
The third factor involved in the creation of congested traffic conditions would arise following the preparation for an evacuation. The volume of traffic leaving the area to be ava-cuated would escalate rapidly as the actual evacuation pro-coeded. As a result of the large number of vehicles on the roads; as well as the fact that such vehicles would; by and large, be moving in the same direction on a limited number of evacuation routes; widespread and extensive congestion would be likely throughout the area to be evacuated.
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The fourth factor involved in creating traffic congestion-
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may arise as a consequence of a high level of voluntary evacua-l tion,by persons in areas not within the designated evacuation zone. Such evacuation; by persons who have not been specifi-cally advised to evacuate, is often known as the " evacuation shadow phenomenon." Such voluntary evacuation during an emer-gency could place a significant number of vehicles on the road-way network in addition to those that would be on the roadway ,
as a result of an evacuation order.
O. Within what time frame following notification of the public to evacuate would you expect the four factors that you have named to have an' impact upon traffic conditions?
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A. Following public notification; it can be expected that the work-to-home tra'7el would commence within ten or fifteen min- ,
utes from the time of notification. It would probably extend for a period of 30 minutes to one hour. It is anticipated that the work-to-home travel would be essentially completed at about one hour and one hour and fifteen minutes following the origi-nal notification of the population at large. The methodology used in my analysis is consistent with the methodology used in NUREG-0654; Appendix 4; Figure 4.
The secor.d level of congestion is associated with the establishment of the perimeter I mentioned earlier. Assuming that the perimeter points would be manned within 30 minutes of notification to evacuate; at those locations, congestion would commence immediately following the activation of the perimeter security points. So that outside the perimeter the congestion would commence very shortly following the initial notification.
The congestion associated with the evacuation of the popu-lation is estimated to commence at about one'our h and 15 min-l utes to one hour and 30 minutes following notification. The methodology used in my analysis is consistent with the methodo-logy used in NUREG 0654'; Appendix 4; Figure 4. At that time, significant levels of congestion are expected on nearly all major routes within the designated planning zone.
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non:enon would, of course, most likely occur in the same time frane as the evacuation of the population from the designated areas.
However, the four conditions that may lead to the traffic congestion discussed above are not all chronologically dis-tinct. Thus, for example, it is conceivable that workers may still try to get home while other families are already leaving the area.
Q. In general, how would the four factors that you have just mentioned, and the congestion they produce, affect traffic mov-ing around the Shoreham site?
i A. The congestion expected to occur within the areas designa-ted for evacuation would impede traffic traveling away from the plant site. This is because the evacuating traffic will be the most significant cause'of such congestion and it will be tra-veling away from the plant. Just beyond the limits of the areas designated for evacuation, however, the congestion could have the opposite effect of significantly impeding traffic traveling towards the plant because of the perimeter security which I previously described. There is also a difference in the directionality of the congestion depending on whether the l
location under consideration is east of the plant or west of the plant. In addition, if significant voluntary evacuation
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were to occur, then congestion is likely to exist beyond the perimeter of the designatd evacuation area. This congestion could impede travel both toward and away from the plant.
Q. Mr. Kanen; have the four factors you have identified been incorporated into the traffic analysis you have made of the area around the Shoreham site? .
A. In our analyses, which are underway at this time; we have been cognizant of th'ese factors. Specifically; we are esti-mating the extent of congestion of the evacuees. These esti-mates are being made using a computerized traffic simulation technique.
We hcve made some preliminary estimates of the level of congestion at the perimeter points; which indicates potential l
queue lengths of several miles on major facilities such as the Long Island Expressway. Queue lengths.on secondary roads will vary according to traffic volume. We" nave also analyzed and continue to analyze the traffic impact of the evacuation shadow phenomenon under different scenarios.
Q. Would you describe in more detail how the evacuation shadow phenomenon would affect traffic congestion?
A. As a simple example, let us say that there is a recommenda-tion that a limited area surrounding the plant be evacuated.
If the population outside of this area responded by taking sim-ilar actions, the actual traffic load on the roadway network l .
could be significantly larger than that which would occur if only the people responded for whom recommended protection actions were advised. Those voluntary evacuees outside a designated area would take up some of the roadway capacity which might otherwise be utilized by those evacuees leaving from the designated area for evacuations. ,, ,,
O. Please describe how you are analyzing the impact on traffic congestion of the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
A. Suffolk County engaged the professional services of Dr.
Stephen Cole; Dr. Kai T. Erikson; Dr. James H. Johnson, and others to conduct a survey that explored the evacuation shadow phenomenon; among other things; by obtaining data concerning the intended response of persons in Suffolk County to various accident scenarios at the Shoreham plant. Consideration of that phenomenon and its inclusion in our traffic analysis is based on the findings of that survey; entitled " Attitudes .
Towards Evacuation: Reactions of Long Island Residents To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant" (Attachment 2 hereto). For more detail on the survey and how it was conducted, see the direct testimony of Drs. Stephen Cele, Kai T. Erikson and James H. Johnson on contentions EP 2B r.nd EP 5B. Using the findings of the survey, we are performing computer simulations of traffic conditions in Suffolk County during an evacuation.
Q. In your opinion would the evacuation shadow phenomenon have a significant impact upon traffic congestion in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham?
A. Based upon the preliminary results of our analyses; if peo-ple respond in accordance with the findings of the survey, there will be a significant impact on congestion gtemming from the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Naturally, a greater number of automobiles using the limited number of evacuation routes in Long Island during an evacuation will increase congestion.
O. Mr. Kanen, let me refer you to page 6-16 of the LILCO plan where it states that " injuries requiring hospitalization will be transferred to the Central Suffolk Hospital by ambulance."
Have you studied the routes between the Shoreham site and
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Central Suffolk Hospital?
A. Wehaveestimatedthetrafficcircubstanceswhihwould exist along that arep of travel as part of our evacuation' ana-lysis.
Q. Where is Central Suffnik Hospital located?
f A. Central Suffolk Hospital is on Route 58 in River'aer.d, New j York, approximately 10 miles southeast of the Fboreham site.
Q. Would the traffic conditions ycu have identified and, in particular, the four factors which could leai*. to r,cngestion, have an effect upon.the a.bility of ewargency vehicles, especi-ally ambulances, to travel between the site and ths Central Suffolk Hospital?
A. Yes; the traffic conditions would have an impact on ambu-lances traveling in that corridor. The extent of this impact is dependent upon (1).the time period in Which such travel by an ambulance would take place, and (2) Which sectors are recom-mended for evacuation since this might determi.ne the extent of traffic in that particular sector of the planning area.
Q. What is the significance of the time period in which the travel would take place?
A. I discussed above the time periods in which congestion peaks are likely to occur. Ambulance travel that would be nec-essary during the time' periods When congestion was the most severe, would be the most significantly affected by the traffic conditions.
I Q. What is the significance on ambulance travel of the loca-
. tion of evi- 'ation areas?
A. Traffic conditions would have the most adverse impact on travel of emergency vehicles between the site and Central Suffolk Hospital if the evacuation area were to the east and I
south of the plant. This is because evacuating traffic would be on or crossing the routes that an ambulance would be re-quired to travel. In that case, the congestion would begin to l
l have significant impact approximately one to one and a half hours after public notification. This is because the evacua-l tion would, by that time, be under way. The specific impact would, of course; be dependent upon specific routes and specific intersections. Based upon our analysis, tha delay likely to be experienced by a single vehicle could range from 15 minutes to one hour of congestion time. This type of delay could be experienced by an ambulance attempting to transport an injured person to Central Suffolk Hospital.
Q. Have you reviewed the impact of traffic conditions on the i
ability of LILCO emergency personnel and offsite agency person-nel to respond to the Shoreham site from offsiteiareas?
l A. Yes. Chapter 5 of LILCO's plan particularly section 5.2 -
and Table 5-1, describes the augmentation of LILCO response personnel. Presumably such personnel must travel from offsite locations to the plant site and the Emergency Operations Facility. In addition, the LILCO plan, at page 5-8, calls for
! the response of offsite agencies; such as fire and ambulance services, to the plant site. As discussed above, there are sev-eral levels of congestion likely to exist in the environs of the plant. Those traffic conditions could have a significant impact on the time required for them to reach the plant site.
A. Specifically, offsite personnel would experience the great-est congestion and delay under two circumstances. First, if offsite personnel had to travel to the site from the areas beyond the designated area for which protective actions were recommended, those persons would be subject to the congestion i
that would occur at the perimeter. Second, if offsite personnel had to travel to the site at any time subsequent to approximate'ly one-and-a-half to two hours after public notifi-cation of an emergency they would encounter substantial conges-tion resulting from the general population evacuation; both ,
recommended and voluntary; which would then be in progress.
Q. To what degree might offsite personnel meeting such conges-tion be delayed?
A. The range of the congestion level is extremely broad. The delay could be as low as ten or fifteen minutes on some of the the secondary roads to upwards of one to one-and-one-half hours on the major arteries.
Q. Does the LILCO plan address the potential impact of traffic I
congestion on the ability of ambulances or other emergency ve-hicles to travel from the Shoreham site to the Central Suffolk Hospital?
A. There is no evidence in the. plan document that such impact has been considered.
Q. Does the LILCO plan address the potential impact of traffic i
congestion on the ability of offsite personnel to to respond promptly'to the Shoreham site?
A. The LILCO plan does not contain any information that c'on-firms or supports the capability of expeditiously moving such offsite personnel to the plent site. There is little evidence 16 -
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in the plan that the impact of traffic conditions on such capability has been taken into account.
There is, however; a brief discussion of travel routes and travel times to the Shoreham site from east or west of the plant, contained at page IV-83 of the Radiological Emergency Evacuation Plan submitted by LILCO to the NRC on Septesher 1; 1982. Travel times to the plant are estimated ~in that document
- to be 27 minutes from the east and 16 minutes from the west.
The plan contains little information concerning the basis for these estimates. There is no indication that all the factors that I have identified as contributing to traffic congestion were taken into account in deriving these estimates.
Furthermore, the travel times are from the edge of a 10-mile EPZ to the site; there are no estimates for those personnel who would have to travel from beyond 10 miles.
Q. Does the failure to adress these issues have an impact upon the overall adequacy of LILCO's emergency plan?
A. Yes. If LILCO has not assessed in its plan, the ability of ambulances to travel to the Shoreham site and then to Central Suffolk Hospital, the plan does not assure prompt medi-cal support to those who may be injured and contaminated at the site. Similarly, if LILCO has not assessed the actual ability of emergency staff and other offsite personnel to reach the plant in the event of an emergency, the plan does not assure j
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l that necessary personnel augmentation can be accomplished.
Each of these inadequacies in the LILCO plan could have an impact on the effectiveness of LILCO's overall emergency re-sponse.
Q. Does that complete your testimony on these contentions?
A. Yes.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before'the Atomic Safety and Licensing' Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1) )
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR.
ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING~ CONTENTIONS EP 2B AND EP 5B Q: Please state your name.
A: My name is Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr.
Q. What is the purpose of your testimony on Suffolk County emergency planning contentions EP 2B and EP 5B?
A. The purpose of this testimony is to explain the evacuation shadow phenomenon. In his testimony on Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B, Mr. Andrew C. Kanen stated that this phenomenon may be a
- major factor that, during a radiological emergency, could cause serious traffic congestion which, in turn, could impede ambu-lance travel and the timely augmentation cf emergency person-nel. In particular, I will explain how the phenomenon would put a significant number of people from outside a designated evacuation area onto the roadway system, and I will describe in detail the survey conducted on this issue by Suffolk County.
I See Attachment 2, " Attitudes Towards Evacuation: Reactions of 1
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Long Island Residents To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant [ hereinafter " survey"]. My testimony is intended to provide the necessary foundation to Mr. Kanen's use of the survey results in his analysis of traffic conditions on Long Island as they might exist.during a radiological emer-gency.
I. Background Q: What is your occupation?
A: I am a social geographer by training. My research specialties include energy policy and evacuation planning. In connection with these specialties I have been trained; and have gained expertise in, survey design and sampling procedures. I l
l am currently employed as an assistant professor in the Department of Geography at UCLA; and have held this position for two years. My professional qualifications are staksd in more detail in my resume, which is Attachment 3 hereto.
Q: What is a social geographer?
A A social geographer is concerned primarily with decision-making processes underlying observed graphic patterns of indi-vidual and/or group behavior in response to different kinds of social and environmental stimuli. My work has focussed largely on how people respond to man-made hazards and disasters; in-cluding actual or potential radiological emergencies, and the decision-making processes behind observed or predicted patterns of behavior; such as the propensity to evacuate.
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II. The Evacuation Shadow' Phenomenon Q. Please explain What is meant by the term " evacuation sha-dow phenomenon."
A. The " evacuation shadow phenomenon" is a term used to describe the tendency of people to evacuate in the event of a radiological emergency,' even though they have not been advised or ordered to do so. It is one form of overreaction to a t
crisis situation.
O. Why is that phenomenon relevant to an analysis of the effects of traffic congestion that would arise in the event of a radiological emergency?
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- I am of the opinion that the phenomenon has a significant impact on planning for a radiological emergency. In particu-lar, if one ignores the tendency for people beyond a designated danger zone to evacuate, then one cannot adequately assess the ,
traffic conditions that are likely to exist during a radiologi-l l
cal emergency and particularly an evacuation. Private automo-biles will be the prime mode of transportation during any eva-cuation. If one does not plan for the added number of autos that may be on the road network as a result of the evacuation shadow phenomenon, then any assessment of traffic conditions or evacuation time estimates are likely to under-estimate traffic congestion and the actual time it takes to evacuate the popula-tion in the danger zone. That is because people evacuating l
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outoido that zona may ba using tho camo routso that tho pnoplo in the danger zone will have to use. This is an especially critical problem on Long Island where there are only a limited number of potential evacuation routes. Therefore, I think it is imperative that the evacuation shadow phenomenon be taken into account in any radiological emergency plan.
In my opin-lon, a plan that does not account for the evacuaEion shadow ..
phenomenon is inadequace.
Q. On what do you base that opinion?
A. It is based on the actual response of residents of south central Pennsylvania to the TMI accident in March, 1979; and on the results of the survey which was conducted on Long Island to elicit an expression from the residents of Suffolk and Nassau counties as to how they intend to respond to an accident at Shoreham. Before discussing the details, it is important to explain the background which led to the realization that the eva'cuation shadow phenomenon is an important consideration with respect to the adequacy of the LILCO Emergency Plan.
In collaboration with two of my colleagues, Dr. Stanley D.
Brunn, of the University of Kentucky, and Dr. Donald J.
Zeigler, of Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, I conducted one of the first social surveys investigating the behavioral responses of the south central Pennsylvania area residants to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in March, 1979.1/ Our survey focused on (1) attitudes toward 1/ In September of 1979, Drs. Brunn, Zeigler and I published the results of our survey of Three Mile Isle.nd area resi-(Footnote cont'd)
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nuclear power before and after the accident, (2) behavioral responses to the accident, and (3) perceived social and environmental impacts of the accident.
The most significant finding of our TMI study was the high degree of over-reaction to the accident. Specifically,_during the emergency the state of Pennsylvania advised evacuation of I
all pregnant women and pre-school age children within a five--
mile radius of the plant. If only those people who were ad-vised to evacuate had done so, about 2,500 people would h,ve evacuated. Instead, approximately 144,000, or approximately 39 percent of the population within a 15-mile radius of the plant, actually evacuated. Further, our survey revealed that nine percent of the population in three communities beyond 15 miles of the plant also evacuated. This fact led my colleagues and I to coin the term " evacuation shadow phenomenon" to describe the tendency of people to evacuate, although they have not been advised or ordered to do.
l Three-Mile Island was not the first time that the evacua-l tion shadow phenomenon was identified. Previous studies of (Footnote cont'd from previous page) dents in a monograph entitled Final Report On A Social Survey of Three Mile Island Residents. In January of 1981 l we published an excerpt from that monograph entitled Evacuation From A Nuclear Technological Disaster, which appeared in the Geographical Review. A copy of the arti-cle appears with this testimony as Attachment 4.
l l
{
l human response to non-radiological disasters have noted a tendency for some people to overreact in crisis situations.
However, the proportion of the population who tend to over-rec' .. ring natural disasters has generally been relatively small. The significant finding of our TMI study was that a sub-stantially. larger proportion of the population tended to over-react to the nuclear accident at TMI than had been observed in other kinds of emergencies.
In addition to the high rate of " spontaneous evacuation,"
we noted in our TMI survey that the TMI evacuees tended to travel distances much greater than had been observed in pre-vious studies of evacuation behavior. At TMI the median dis-I tance travelled by evacuees was 85 miles. The implication of these findings is'that any radiological emergency response plan that is to be capable of implementation must account for such behavior and take steps to accommodate or mitigate that'behav-ior.
Q: Were the results of your studies of the TMI accident cor-roborated by any other studies of the accident?
As Yes, they were corroborated by at least two other studies; one conducted by Mountain West Research, and the second one conducted by a team of geographers at Rutgers University.
Essentially, their results were very close to our results, par-ticularly with respect to the estimates of the number of people
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,- , . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ , . _ _ _ , ~ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ __._ ._ _ _ _ _ _
who evacuated and the factors contributing to their decision to evacuate or not to evacuate. Although they did not call this phenomenon the " evacuation shadow phenomenon;" these other studies observed the tendency of people to over-react beyond the designated zone of danger.
III. The Long' Island Survey O. Please describe the purpose of the survey conducted on Long Island.
A: In light of the actual human response to the TMI accident; my colleagues and I conducted a survey of the residents of Long Island for the purpose of eliciting from these residents an expression of how they intended to respond to an accident at Shoreham. Suffolk County retained us to design and conduct this survey so that the County could determine, among other things, what people actually inter.ded to do; and whether to anticipate an evacuation shadow phenomenon, in the the event of an accident at Shoreham.
l Q: Who were your colleagues in this study?
! A: Professor Kai Erickson, Dr. Stephen Cole and I were the l
l- principal investigators of the study. We were assisted by Dr.
Donald J. Zeigler, a geographer at Old Dominion University, Dr.
Walter C. Farrell, Jr., a geographer and public health expert at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee; and Dr. David Stevenson; a sociologist formerly with the Department of l
I i
Psychiatry at the University of Chicago; and now on the faculty at Oberlin College. Dr. Cole; a profe'ssor of sociology at Stony Brook and president of Social Data Analysts; Inc., an opinfon research firm; administered the survey. We worked together to design a survey instrument that would ascertain perceptions; attitudes and behavioral intentions in response to a hypotheti-cal accident at the Shoreham plant.
Q: What do you mean by a survey instrument?
A: That is the actual questionnaire that is used in conduct-ing a survey.
Q: How was the survey instrument formulated?
A: The entire team contributed to the development of the instrument, although basically, Professor Erickson and myself were in charge. In the final analysis, however, Dr. Cole develbped the survey that was eventually used to sample the Long Island population.'
He took the instrument that the team put together and formillated .the questions in a fashion that was conducive to telephone interviewing; and we then reduced the length of the instrument so the telephone interviews would average about 15 minutes. That was the maximum length of time we wanted to keep people on the telephone.
Q: What occurred after the instrument was developed?
A: Once the instrument was developed, it was pre-tested by Dr. Cole. That is, a dry run was conducted to determine if the i
questions were clear and distinct and that the survey wasn't excessively long. After the pre-testing; Dr. Cole consulted with Professor Erikson and'myself once again to discuss the results of the pre-test. Then; Dr. Cole proceeded with admin-istering the final draft of the survey.
Q: How was the survey administered?
A: Dr. Cole discusses this in some detail in his direct tes-timony on Contentions EP 2B and 5B. Briefly, it was adminis-tered to a sample of the Long Island population. A sample is a representative group of a larger population. The survey was administered to about 2500 persons; which is a very large sam-ple of the population of Long Island when you consider that public opinion polls of the entire nation are normally based on a sample of around 1200 to 1500 households.
Q: Was the sample a random one of the entire population of Long Island?
A. It was a stratified random sample. We sdratified the sam-pie into two five-mile distance zones, the first stratification being zero to five miles from the plant, the second stratifica-tion being six to ten miles from the plant. Beyond ten miles, we surveyed a sample of the households to the east of the plant and a sample of householdc to the west of the plant in both Suffolk and Nassau counties.
l l
Q: What was the basis for stratifying the sample in that man-ner?
A We were interested in developing data about the evacuation shadow phenomenon and were interested in looking at expressions of intended behavior beyond ten miles of the plant. We also wanted to gain specific data regarding the probable actions of persons living near the plant who have no viable evacuation option to the east. We stratified the sample by direction be-cause we were concerned about the people who live east of the plant. If they had to evacuate, (either upon County order or voluntarily) they might have to move toward the plant. We
, therefore wanted to look at the probability that people to the
! east of the plant might take such action.
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l Why were the individuals west of the plant also su'rveyed?
O:
A: Again, because we wanted to assess the potential impact of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. The population becomes more dense as you move further west from the plant. If there was a' propensity for people west of the plant to evacuate, it would put a great number of people on the roads. This could cause increased traffic congestion through substantially greater road usage and, in addition, could have a detrimental impact upon evacuation by persons to the east, including those persons close to the plant who might be directly ordered to evacuate in an radiological emergency.
l n --- .-
0: What kinds of questions were asked to determine whether the evacuation shadow phenomenon would occur -- and, if so, to what extent -- in Suffolk County in' the event cf a radiological emergency? ,
A: .Three scenarios were presented to each person interviewed.
The first scenario read as follows:
Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear plant.is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested'in knowing what you would do if J there was an accident at the plant.
Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at Shoreham.
All people who live within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors. Do you think that you and the other members of your family would:
- 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
t The.second scenario stated:
Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. All pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the plant were advised to evacuate and everyone living between six and ten miles from the plant were advised to remain indoors. Would you and other members of your family:
- 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
I -
l
This scenario is similar to the circumstances that occurred at TMI.
4 The third scenario stated:
Suppose that you and your family were at l home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. Wculd you and other members of your family:
- 1. go about your normal business; or
- 2. stay inside your home, or
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
Q: What was the purpose of presenting three different sce-narios to the sample?
A: We wanted to get some idea of how people would respond to accidents of different magnitudes. We were particularly con-cerned with the number of people who expressed an intention to evacuate under the different scenarios. This information was ,
deemed important for Suffolk County's planning purposes in ,
order to determine, among other things, what traffic conditions might exist during an emergency and further to develop realis-tic evacuation time estimates that would reflect those condi-tions.
0: Would you describe how these scenarios were chosen?
A Basically, we used the evacuation scenario at TMI (sce-I nario 2) as the benchmark, so to speak. Then we chose one i
l l
l
scenario that was less severe than at Three-Mile Island (scenario 1) and one that postulated a more severe accidcnt (scenario 3). ,
l Q: What were the results of the survey relative to the eva-cuation shadow phenomenon?
A: Under seanario 1; where an advisory of sheltering within five miles was given; we found that 217,000 familias, or 25% of the total population of Long Island (including both Suffolk and Nassau Counties) said they would evacuate. Under scenario 2; which was evacuation of pregnant women and pre-school age chil-dren within five miles and sheltering within ten miles; an estimated 290,000 households said they would evacuate. That is 34% of the'Long Island population. Under the third scenario, evacuation within ten miles of the plant, fully 432,000 fami-lies, or 50% of the Long Island population, said they would evacuate. Thus, the people who indicat,ed they would evacuate live as far as 50 miles from the plant. For the details of the percent intending to evacuate by distance and direction from the plant, see Attachments 5 and 6. In the survey results for all three scenarios, the evacuation shadow phenomenon is evi-dent and is highly significant in planning for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
0: Can you be more specific as to how the survey results evi-dence the evacuation shadow phenomenen?
As Yes. Take as an example the second scenario; which is the TMI type of situation. As I mentioned earlier, at TMI ,
about 2500 people would have evacuated if only the people who were advised to evacuate had left. Instead; a total of 144,000 people, as far out as fifteen miles from the plant. evacuated.
Now, if one compares that ' result with the Shoreham evacuation survey responses, we find that not only is there a high degree of evacuation within five miles of the plant, where nearly half of the people would leave, but there is also a high degree of evacuation outside that zone. In fact fully two-thirds of the population that are likely to evacuate under the second sce-nario would leave from outside the five mile designated mone.
That is the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
In addition, if one compares the actual evacuation behav-ior at TMI, and the intended evacuation behavior at Shoreham as shown in the survey; in terms of distance from the plant, the results are very similar within ten miles of the plant. For example, at TMI approximately 59% of the population within five miles of the plant evacuated. In our Shoreham survey, the com-parable figure was 57% of the population. Within the six to ten mile zone at TMI, fully one half of the population evacuat'ed.
Our survey reveals that 53% of the population is likely to eva-cuate in the event of the accident at the Shoreham plant.
Outside the ten mile zone; the results at Shoreham suggest an even larg> evacuation shadow than at TMI. Specifically; within ten to fifteen miles of TMI; one-third of the population evacuated. At Shoreham; an estimated one-half of the popula-tion within the ten to fifteen mile zone is likely to evacuate; according to our survey. If one compares actual evacuation behavior at TMI and intended evacuation behavior at Shoreham i
beyond fifteen miles of the plant, one finds that within the 15 .
to 25 mile distance zone at TMI, only about 12 percent of the population evacuated; at Shoreham, approximately 33 percent of' the population in this distance zone said they would evacuate.
Outside the 40-mile zone; less than one percent of the people at TMI evacuated, but one-fourth of the population on Long Island said they would evacuate. For further comparisons, please refer to Attachment 7.
Q: How do the survey results affect anticipated traffic con-ditions in the vicinity of the Shoreham plant?
l A: For planning purposes, and given the actual experience at TMI, I believe it is reasonable to take people's expressed intended behavior as.their actual anticipated behavior. In the event of an actual evacuation notification to people within ten miles of the plant, therefore, at least 432,000 families will .
be on the roads in Long Island. Using the conservative assump-tion of one car per evacuating family, this means that t
15 -
4 approximately 432,000 cars will be on the roads in a scenario 3-type notification. Corresponding figures for a scenario 2-type notification and for a scenario 1-type notification are 290,000 cars and 110,000 cars, respectively.
Q: How do these numbers compare with the numbers of cars that would be on the road if there were no cvacuation shadow pheno-menon.
A: There are approximately 31;126 families within ten' miles of the plant. This means that under scenario 3; there would be approximately 31,126 vehicles on the roads. We estimate that there are 2;535 families with pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the plant. This means that under scenario 2, there would be approximately 2,535'vehi-cles on the roads. Scenario 1, of course, does not contemplate any vehicles being on the road absent an evacuation shadow phe-
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nomenon.
0: Did the survey results indicate what factors; if any; had a significant impact upon evacuation behavior and the evacua-tion shadow phenomenon?
As Yes. Distance from the plant was a significant variable.
Responses to the three scenarios reveal that people residing within a 20 mile radius of the plant are more likely to eva~
cuate than those outside, although there is still a high pro-pensity to evacuate outside that 20 mile radius. Our survey
shows that beyond 20 miles from the plant, the percentage of the population intending to evacuate under the three scenarios ranges between 30 and 50 percent. See Attachment 8 for the plots of evacuation by distance from the plant. In addition,
- in our analyses; we found that age of the household head, whether or not there were children in the household, their awareness of nuclear power issues, the level of trust in public and utility officials, perceived risk, and the fear of nuclear power were also determinants of evacuation. See attachment 9.
However, perceived distance from the plant was the strongest predictor of who is most likely to evacuate in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Q: Dr. Johnson; what are the implications of the results of the Shoreham survey for the purpose of emergency planning?
l As Clearly the results of the Shoreham survey underscores its
' importance in developing an emergency plan; particularly in analyzing potential traffic conditions and related travel
- times. Thus, for example, in his testimony Mr. Kanen discusses the congestion that is likely to arise when workers leave their jobs to gather their families to evacuate. This effect is un '
derscored by the survey which shows that 86% of the people will wait for everyone in the family to assemble before evacuating.
Potentially further aggravating traffic congestion is the expressed preference of many people to pick up their children
= . . . .,- - - .-.-.-.._: -- __-_ _ ._. - - -
from school themselves; instead of having the children bussed to a shelter outside the evacuation area or brought.home by some other means. Moreover, if the evacuation shadow phenomenon is ignored in analyzing traffic conditions; then the analyses are likely to underestimate the severity of potential traffic conditions and the impact of such conditions upon emergency response. This is because the routes designated for the people who live in the danger zone which is being evacuated may also be used by a substantial population outside that danger zone.
l As noted earlier; fully 25%'of people living more than 40 miles away from the plant said they would evacuate. This could have the effect of creating congestion; thereby threatening the health and safety of those households who are trying to eva-cuate the designated danger zone and preventing amargency work-ers from reaching their appointed stations.
0: Do you have an opinion as to the efficacy of a plan that does not address the evacuation shadow phenomenon *.'
A: In my view, a plan that does not address and plan for the evacuation shadow phenomenon is likely to threaten public health and safety.
Q: Dr. Johnson, have you reviewed LILCO's on-site emergency
{
plan?
A: Yes, I have.
i t
Q: Io thoro cny indication in that documsnt or in any othcro that you have reviewed; that LILCO, in formulating its plan; has accounted for traffic conditions as they may be affee.ted by the evacuation shadow phenomenon?
A: In my review of the plan; I saw nothing that dealt with the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
Q. Does this conclude your tastimony?
A. Yes.
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the' Atomic-Safety and Licensing' Board 2 )
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1) )
)
Direct Testimony of Dr. Stephen Cole, on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B Q. Please state your name.
A. Dr. Stephen. Cole.
O. Dr. Cole, what is the purpose of your testimony on Suffolk County's emergency planning contentions EP 2B and EP 5.B7 A. The purpose of this testimony is to provide a foundation for discussion of the traffic congestion concerns raised in those contentions by describing how a survey was conducted for Suffolk County to analyze evacuation behavior on Long Island.
The survey results are compiled in Attachment 2, entitled Attitudes Towards Evacuation: Reactions of Long Island Residents to a Possible Accident at The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant [ hereinafter survey]. Both Andrew C. Kanen and Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr. have referred to the survey in their testimony on contentions EP 2B and EP 5B. As they have testified, the
results of the survey indicate that in the event of a l 1
radiological emergency at Shoreham, a very large number of peo-pie in both Suffolk and Nassau counties would attempt to eva-cuate; even if it were not recommended that they do so. Mr.
Kanen has testified that the increased number of cars on the road could result in serious traffic congestion that could, in turn, have an adverse impact upon the mobility of emergency vehicles and emergency personnel. My testimony is intended to provide the necessary background information to' support the use j 1
of the survey results in an analysis of traffic conditions on Long Island in the event of a radiological emergency.
I. Background Q. What is your occupation?
A. I am a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook; and I am president of a research com-
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pany, Social Data Analysts; Inc. As a professor of sociology; my primary duty is to teach courses in sociology. I have fre-quently taught courses in sociological research methods to both i
undergraduates and graduate students. In these courses, I emphasize the methods associated with survey research. I also teach courses on sociological theory and the sociology of sci-ence, which is one of my research specialities. I would esti-mate that I have personally conducted more than 150 surveys.
i For further details of my professional qualifications and
background; I refer you to.my resume Which is Attachment 10 hereto.
Q. Please briefly describe the nature of business in Which Social Data Analysts is engaged.
A. Social Data Analysts is a smal'1 company; incorpo, rated in the spring of 1977; that does applied sociological research and specializes in conducting public opinion research for a few clients. Our major clients are newspapers and non-profit edu-cational institutions; such as universities.
Q. Has Social Data Analysts ever performed any consulting work for the Long Island Lighting Company?
A. Yes. W'e conducted three different surveys for them in 1981.
II. The Survey Q. Dr. Cole, please describe your involvement in and the pur-pose of the survey conducted by Suffolk County.
A. Social Data Analysts, under my direction; conducted in May and June, 1982; a large random sample survey of Long Island residents. Its purpose was to find out how Long Island resi-dents would respond to a nuclear accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, and to determine if their response would evidence the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
Q. Please describe briefly how the survey was conducted.
A. The survey was conducted on the telephone. We interviewed i
a total of 2,595 people. One of the primary variables l
l
influencing the reaction of residents to a possible accident at the shoreham nuclear power plant.is the distance between the j respondent's home and the plant. In order to make sure that we had an adequate number of respondents living both within a five mile zone of the plant and a six to ten mile zone of the plant and on the East End of Long Island; we used a stratified random sampling technique. We completed 527 interviews among the 10,066 telephone subscribers living within a five mile radius of the Shoreham plant. We completed 551 interviews among the 21,060 telephone subscribers living within a six to ten mile zone of the plant. We completed 543 interviews among the 59,870 telephone suscribers living more than ten miles away from the o plant, but east of the plant. We completed 458 interviews with Suffolk County residents who live more than ten miles away from the plant and west of the plant. There were 325;381 residen-tial telephone subscribers in this area. And, among the 451,075 residential telephone subscribers in Nassau County we completed 516 interviews.
Q. Was a questionnaire prepared for this survey?
A. Yes. It is attached hereto as Attachment 11. The ques-tionnaire was prepared under the direction of Dr. Kai Erikson, a professor of sociology at Yale University and Dr. James H.
Johnson, Jr., a professor of geography at the University of t
l l California at Los Angeles. I worked in collaboration with them i
l l -- l
in preparing the questionnaire. Dr. Walter C. Farrell of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Dr. Donalt ,aigler of Old Dominion University; and Dr. David.Stevenson, then of the University of Chicago and now on the faculty of Oberlin College, also participated in the preparation as consultants.
O. Please describe how the survey instrument was constructed.
A ,. The primary purpose of the research was to find out how many people in each of the zones described above would evacuate if there was an accident at the Shoreham Muclear Power Plant.
In order to form conclusions on that question, we first had to know whether or not the individual would be likely to evacuate under different conditions. Therefore, we developed a. set of questions which would measure what the reaction of an indivi-dual would be to an accident at Shoreham. These questions on '
evacuation were the heart of the survey. (Questions 30, 34, and 38 of Attachment 2). These questions asked the respondent what ne or she would do under three different scenarios. In addition to those questions; we determined it would be useful to know some other information; such as the attitudes of the respondent toward nuclear energy in general, the attitudes of l the respondent toward the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant in par-ticular, the amount of information that the respondent had about nuclear energy, the level of fear that the respondent had about radiation from nuclear power plants and other possible
environmental hazards, and a series of basic demographic characteristics such as age, education; marital status, the age of their children; and how many children they had. We deter-mined that all these factors might be important in interpreting the.results we obtained from the survey.
Q. What did you do after the questionnaire was developed?
A. We pre-tested it. In a pre-test, you conduct interviews using a draft of a questionnaire just as you would do When you conduct the actual survey. A trained interviewer or researcher calls somebody at random and goes through the entire procedure of interviewing just as would be done with regular respondents.
The purpose of this type of pre-test is to find out Whether the l
! questions are worded in such a way as to be intelligible to the typ'ical respondent.
Q. What occurred after the pre-test?
A. After the survey had been pre-tes'ted, the questionnaire was finalized, we trained our interviewers according to our normal procedures, and we did the field work.
Q. Dr. Cole, you stated that 2,595 people were interviewed during this survey. Is that a large sample size?
A. That is the largest survey that I have ever done out of the l more than 150 that I have conducted. It is a very large sample for a survey of this type. Generally, surveys of the entire nation done by companies such as Lou Harris or Gallup involve approximately 1200 to 1500 interviews.
l
Q. Does the size of the sample have an impact upon the accur-acy of survey findings?
A. Yes. What's called " sampling error" for surveys is highly dependent upon the size of the sample. In a survey that is based upon a random sample, you interview a randomly selected group of people. Yo u then look at What those people say in order to make generalizations from the sample to the popula-tion. In this cases the populat' ion would be residents of Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The sample was the 2,595 people whom we interviewed. The larger the sample size is, the smal-1er the possibility that the actual percentage of people having a certain attitude in the population will vary significantly from what is indicated in the sample survey. For this survey, the sampling error for the entire sample was plus or minus 4
three percentage points. That means that if you were to repeat this survey one hundred times, in 95 out of 100 times the pro-
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portion of people who say they would evacuate under a particu -
l lar scenario; for example, would be within three percentage i
! points of what our survey indicated.
O. In your opinion as a social scientist, is that an accept-able sampling error?
A. Yes, that is generally considered to be a relatively small sampling error. The purpose of this survey, I might point out, was not to measure precisely whether it might be 30%, 31% or .
32% of the people that would evacuate. Rather;.the purpose of this survey was to obtain some general estimates of the size of the group that would evacuate. So I would say this survey is highly accurate for purposes of making generalizations from the sample to the population.
Q. How were the respondents in this survey selected?
A. Telephone numbers were randomly generated by computer accord.ing to the method set forth in detail in the Technical Appendix, on page 45 of the survey ( Attachment 2 hereto) .
O. Were any other techniques utilized in structuring the sam-ple?
A. Yes. When the interviewer dialed a number, he or she interviewed the person who came on the telephone if that person was 18 years old or over. In order to make sure that our final sample had an approximately 50-50 sex distribution, we employed a sex quota. This is necessary because in most areas of the country, women are more likely to answer the telephone than
[
men. Therefore, if we interviewed the person who came on the telephone all the time, we would end up having perhaps as many as 60 percent of the sample being women. In order to prevent this from happening, we maintained a quota. Each interviewer could not get more than two women ahead of men. If an intervie-I wer has interviewed two more women than nen, that interviewer must interview a man on the next interview, even if it means
_g_
turning down a respondent. We have found this to be an effective way of obtaining a proper sex distribution in sam-ples.
Q. If you had not attempted to maintain an approximately 50-50 sex distribution; would the results of the survey have been changed in any way?
A. Possibly. Men and women have different attitudes towards
- nuclear energy. Women have more negative attitudes toward nu-clear energy. It turns out that people who have more negative attitudes towards nuclear energy are more likely to evacuate under a given scenario. If we had not used this sex quota, and the proportion of respondents who were women had gone up to 60 percent, we would have found; most likely, an even higher pro-portion of people saying that they would evacuate.
O. How many telephone numbers were actually generated by the computer?
A. There were 10,948 telephone numbers that we generated for the sample for this study.
l Q. Why is there a disparity between the number of interviews-completed and the number of telephone numbers generated?
A. For several reasons; many of which are quite obvious. They i
^
are listed in Table A-3 on page 55 of the survey (Attachment 2) j but I will summarize them here. First, if you pick a random sample of telephone numbers in Which the last four digits are-t l
1 randomly generated; for approximately a quarter of those numbers you will get a ring; but no answer. There ere several reasons for this. One is that people aren't home. Another reason; and an important one to consider; is that in random digit dialing; of Which we used a variation, you cannot differ-entiate between a residential number and a business. If you call a business in the evening; and there is nobody there, the number will just rin,g, and there is no way to know that it is not a residential number. We called 2,588 numbers for Which we did not receive any answers. Many of those numbers were proba-bly business numbers.
In addition; it is typical that you get telephone numbers that are busy. We tried every number three times. Sometimes you'll get numbers for Which you cannot find an adult at home.
We do not usually interview children in surveys. For this sur-vey, there were 1;345 numbers for which we either got a contin-uous busy signal each of the three times when we attempted to call them or for Whom we could not find an eligible adult at home.
l When you do random digit dialing surveys; you frequently include in your list of telephone numbers those which are not actually working numbers. That is, they could be numbers which
~
have not yet been assigned within a working b1ock, or they could be numbers Where the service has been disconnectad, Where
the person has moved, or whatever reason. Again; this is very typical. Generally, you find approximately a quarter of the telephone numbers in random digit dialing to be not working numbers. For this survey; we found 2,391 numbers that were not actually working telephone numbers.
Of the people we actually reached in this survey; some refused to par'ticipate. For this survey; there were 1,550 peo-ple Who refused to be interviewed. If you look at the number of eligible people Who were contacted, the number of refusals is approximately one in three. Again; this is a very typical number that we find on most of our surveys. We generally find refusal rates varying between 25 and 40 percent; depending upon the topic of the questionnaire, and the time when the survey is conducted. The more technical the topic of the questionnaire is, the higher the refusal rate is going to be. Energy, nucle-ar energy and evacuation are relatively technical topics; and
therefore it's not surprising to find slightly more than one-third of the people refusing to participate in this survey.
l There were several other reasons why we could not complete some interviews. For 261 te'lephone numbers, we could not obtain an individual of the sex required by our quota system, usually a man. For 180 telephone nuubers; we found people with what we call language or psychological problems. Primarily, these are people who do not speak or understand English and i
therefore; cannot be interviewed by English speaking interviewers. Very occasionally, you get people who are will-ing to be interviewed, but Who just do not seem to understand the questions and do not give answers that relate to the ques-tionnaire. These people are usually very old people.
Occasionally you can get an alcoholic person or mentally unsta-ble person. We do not complete interviews with people who obviously do not understand What we are telling them on the i
telephone and who do not respond to our questions.
There were 38 numbers that could not be completed for a variety of other reasons. It is my opinion that the number of telephone calls for Which interviews were not completed did not significantly affect the accuracy of this survey. I believe thattheresultsforthissurveyaretyppealofthemanysur-veys that I have conducted on Long Island.
Q. How many days did it take to conduct the interviews?
A. The interviewing was done over 14 days. It started on May 19 and was completed on June 10. The interviewing was done between the hours of 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. There were between 25 and 30 interviewers working on the study.
Q. After all of the interviews were completed; What was done then?
A. After all the interviews had been completed, and they had all been checked over by the supervisors, the interviews were given to a keypunch operator who entered the data directly from the questionnaires onto a computer. We then verified the data entry to make sure there were no data entry errors, and we tab-ulated the responses using a computer program.
.Q. Please describe briefly the results of the survey with re-spect to the questions regarding evacuation.
A. The results of the survey are compiled in Attachment 2. I refer you especially to pages 3-6 of the Executive Summary.
See also Dr. Johnson's testimony on Contention EP 2B and EP 5B.
Q. Dr. Cole, were all of the responses that you received accorded the same weight?
A. No. In tabulating responses, we employed a weighting scheme to make sure that all geographical areas were equally represented. The weighting procedure is described in detail in the survey at pages 46-48 (Attachment 2). Given the weighting scheme that we used, we can say that the survey results are representative of the entire Nassau/Suffolk community.
l Dr. Cole, the survey instrument that you used for this sur-Q.
vey asked individuals what they would do under certain circum-stances. Are the answers to such questions a reliable indica-tor of what those individuals' actions or behavior will be under those or similar circumstances?
A. Ye's. Although surveys such as this one cannot be used to predict precisely what an individual will do if there were an
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I accident at Shoreham; they are good general indicators of what people will do. The survey for suffolk County was conducted according to the highest profesional standards. I can state with great confidence based upon the survey that if there was an accident at the Shoreham plant a substantial portion of Long Island residents would try to evacuate. I,would not want to guess the precise number.
Let me briefly address the general question of the relia-
! bility of surveys as predictors of human behavior. Not all surveys on all topics will be accurate. Any study with serious
- methodological or procedural flaws might be inaccurate.
Surveys which try to predict " normative" behavfor; i.e., behav-iorforwhichsocietybelievestheretobearightorhwrong, might be inaccurate. For example, if you asked people whether they intend to vote in a school board election and budget vote, ,
you will probably get a substantially exaggerated number of people saying that they will. This is because people are
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expected to vote even though most do not.
I In general, however, surveys are highly reliable predic-tors. The fact that millions of dollars are spent every week i
in the United States cn survey research shows that business, 1
I the government, the media, and academia all have faith in this l
method. This faith is not blind. For most topics, surveys are highly accurate predictors. Let me give a few examples from my
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own experience. In 1978; based upon a survey, we predictei l that the Democratic candidate would win the gubernatorial elec-tion in Maryland with 71 percent of the vote. He,obtained 71 percent of the vote. Generally; even those election surveys which are " wrong" are off by only a small amount.
In 1980, based upon a survey, we predicted that 20 percent of Long Island households would buy a new car in 1981. In 1981, 20 percent of the households on Long Island did purchase a new car. 12 1981; based upon a survey; we predicted how many Long Island residents would buy a new morning edition of Newsday. This prediction turned out to be correct within a few percentage points.
Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
A. Yes.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before'the-Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
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In the Matter of ) ,.
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1) )
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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DR. KAI T. ERIKSON ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTIONS EP 2B and EP 5B i
j Q. Please state your name.
A. My name is Kai T. Erikson.
Q. What is your occupation?
A. I am a professor of Sociology at Yale University and edi-tor of the Yale Review. In addition, since 1968 I have had a joint appointment in the American Studies Program. My profes-sional qualifications and experience are set forth in greater ,
detail in my direct testimony on contention EP SA.
Q. What is the purpose of this testimony?
A. The direct testimony of Mr. Andrew C. Kanen and Drs.
Stephen Cole and James H. Johnson on contentions EP 2B and EP 5B, in discussing the traffic congestion concerns raised in those contentions, refers to the results of a survey; conducted
on behalf of Suffolk County to study how people might react in the event of a radiological emergency. I participated in the formulation of that survey and have reviewed the results, which are contained in the survey report " Attitudes Towards Evacuation: Reaction of Long Island Residents To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant" (Attachment 2 hereto). I have also reviewed the testimony of Drs. Cole and Johnson regarding the survey results and their implications with respect to the LILCO emergency plan, and I fully agree with the statements made in their testimony on those subjects.
The purpose of this testimony is to provide additional informa-tion concerning the purpose of conducting such a survey, and its value for rational emergency planning; as part of the foun-4 dation for Mr. Kanen's use of the survey findings in his analy -
sis of traffic congestion on Long Island.
Q. What was the purpose of conducting the survey?
A. In order to have,a workable emergency plan it is essential to know how the human beings on whose behalf the plan is being developed are likely to respond. A number of emer-gency plans developed elsewhere in the country; in my opinion, are inadequate because nobody has consulted the people whom the plans are supposed to protect. The survey was conducted in an effort to make sure that the same mistake was not repeated with respect to the Shoreham emergency plang. One can have an
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emergency plan that will describe what appears feasible on paper; however, one can never know whether or not that plan will be effective until one has actually interviewed the people involved or has tried in some other way to ascertain what it is reasonable to expect from them in the event of a crisis.
Emergency planning that doed not involve the kind of data and' analysis I have just mentiened is; in my opinion; inadequate.
O. Dr. Erikson; are the responses that you received to the survey questiens asking people what they would do in the future, given certain accident scenarios; a reliable indicator of what those people actually will do in the event that thc. e circumstances occurred?
A. Yes, I believe that the survey responses are a relia-ble indicator of what Long Island residents are likely to do in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. On the whole, surveys do a good job of predicting behavior. A few small studies have been done in the social sciences, mainly on the topic of prejudice, suggesting that people sometimes act differently than they say they will, but those studies have tended to be quite narrow in scope. The overwhelming majority of surveys that ask people to predict how they are going to act at some time in the future turn out to be quite accurate.
Thousands of surveys are conducted every year concerning how people will cast their vote or spend their dollars and almost
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1 all of them prove to be accurate within a few percentage points. See the testimony of Dr. Cole on contentions EP 2B and EP 5B for a further discussion of the reliability of survey results.
One more important point should be made. Survey data are the best data -- indeed the only data -- available concerning how the people of Long Island intend to behave in the future.
Those data; therefore; are the best approximation of the truth one can find. When human safety is at issue; as it is with re-spect to the emergency plans developed to deal with an accident at Shoreham; it would be irresponsible to ignore that evidence.
Q. Does that conclude your testimony on conte,ntions EP 2B and 5B?
A. Yes. -
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Att0 chm:nto To Tha Diract Tactimony of ,
Andrew C. Kanen, Dr. James H. Johnson, l Dr. Kai T. Erikson and Dr. Stephen Cole i On Behalf Of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B (Traffic Congestion Issues)
ATTACHMENT 1 Resume of Mr. Andrew C. Kanen ATTACHMENT 2 Attituaes Towards Evacuation: Reactions of Long Island Residents To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant prepared by Social Data Analysts, Inc.
ATTACHMENT 3 Resume of Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr.
ATTACHMENT 4 Evacuation From A Nuclear Technological Disaster by Donald J. Ziegler, Stanley D. Brunn, and James H. Johnson, Jr.
ATTACHMENT 5
. Table showing Percent Intending to Evacuate by Distance From Plant ATTACHMENT 6 ,
Table showing Percent Intending to Evacuate by Direction From the Shoreham Plant ATTACHMENT 7 l
l Table showing Comparison of Actual Evacuation Behavior i at TMI and Intended Evacuation Behavior at Shoreham (Scenario 2)
ATTACHMENT 8 Figure showing Distance Decay Evacuation Curves ATTACHMENT 9 Table showing Behavioral Intentions And Demographic And Attitude variables .
ATTACHMENT 10 Resume of Dr. Stephen Cole ATTACHMENT 11 Shoreham Evacuation Survey
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ATTACHMF.LNT 1 NAME ANDREW C. KANEN BORN 1930 CITIZENSHIP Canadian EDUCATION University of Toronto, B.A.Sc.
Georgia Institute of Technology, M.Sc.
PROFESSIONAL 1977-to date EXPERIENCE Vice President, PRC Voorhees, McLean, Virginia Manages the Transport Logistics and Emergency, Planning group within PRC Voorhees. Directed mass evacuation and public notification studies at thirteen nuclear power stations. -
Managed the overall emergency preparedness plans for local communities surounding three nuclear power stations: Diablo Canyon, California; North Perry, Ohio; Shoreham, New York.
Managed the PRC Voorhees Boston regional office from 1978 to 1980. -Was responsible for-plan development, design and construction supervision of urban street, traffic signal control, and parking projects. Most projects were developed as part of major planned changes in the urban infrastructure.
Participated in the test application of a pedestrian simulation
' model in the downtown area in St. Louis, .lissouri.
1976-1977 Regional Manager, IBI Group, Washington, D.C.
.- 1972-1976 Vice President, Traffic Planning Associates, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia Directed transportation planning studies such as the trans-portation plan development for the Middle Georgia Planning and Development Commission, the comprehensive traffic operations study for Columbus, Georgia, the transportation -
plan for a planned new town near Austin, Texas. Cc-directed a study to identify the significant economic, social, and environmental parameters which may be impacted in the development of a multimodal transportation corridor from the l
t southeast Atlantic Coast to Kansas City. Participatad in the evaluation of a 1900 KM trunk system to determine a priority road construction program as part of an update of Nigeria's Five Year National Plan.
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Kanen, Continued 1969-1972 Senior Transportation Planner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., San Francisco, California Managed the comprehensive traffic operations studies (TOPICS) for,the cities of Savannah and Albany, Georgia; participated in the department reorganization study of the Traffic Engineering Division of the State of North Carolina .
Highway Department.
4 Co-directed the Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study which involved a comprehensive review of development options for an urban region adjacent to Toronto, and included analyses of transportation, land use, municipal services, regional government and tax base projectionss.
1967-1969 Senior Transportation Planner, Peat, Marwick, Kates and Co.,
Liverpool, England .-
i Technical direction of the Liverpool area land-use/
transportation study involving the formulation and evaluation of alternative urban development strategies and the develop-ment of a transportation Infrastructure plan to complement and Induce the development of the selected urban plan. The i
technical direction included the validation of several major '
travel surveys, and the development and application of travel forecasting techniques. .
i Managed the transportation town of Milton Keynes (U.K.) plan development for the 250,000.~ The planning process was structured to allow for major variations in development densities, highrise develop-ment and employment concentrations to assure that future development aspirations within the community would not be unrealistically constrained by the transportation infra-i structure. Participated in the review of ground transportation implications for four alternative sites for a new London (U.K.)
airport.
1965-1967 2 Transportation Planner, Traffic Research Corporation, Toronto, Canada 1
t e
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Kanen, Continued Participated in the development, calibration, and application of an urban travel simulation model for the Toronto Planning Commission; managed the passenger projection studies for the Bloor Street subway line and potential extensions to the rapid transit system in Toronto; managed the passenger projection studies for the suburban Toronto GO-train service; managed a study to determine the direct economic impact of tourist travelin the Province of Alberta; managed the completion of the Metropoiltan Winnipeg urban transportation study.
1959-1963 Assistant County Engineer, Weiland County, Ontario, Canada Was responsible for design, contracting, and field supervision of roadway design; participated in the development of winter patrol and maintenance schedules; developed complexity and operations interaction factors for the department's labor force
-as an aid in union negotiations.
AFFILIATIONS / Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario REGISTRATIONS Society of Sigma Xi(Research Society)
Institute of Transportation Engineers -
Professional Engineer, New Hampshir: ,,
' PUBLICATIONS Auth'or or co-author of research papers and reports on urban transport planning procedtires, traffic flow and traffic safety.
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ATTACHMENT 2 P
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ATTITUDES TO' FARDS EVACUATION: REACTIONS OF IONG ISLAND RESIDENTS TO A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT AT THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER ?LANT June, 1982 I
I Prepared for Suffolk County.
by Social Data Analysts, Inc.
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TABLE OF CONTr.NTS About Social Data Analysts, Inc.. ...................... 2 Executive Summary....................................... 3 TABLE 1: Answers Given to all Survey Questions Broken Down.by Geographical Zone...............ll TABLE 2: Evacuation Plans by Subjective Distance From th e P 1 a nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 TABLE 3: Correlates of Evacuation Attitudes............ 34 Technical Appendix..................................... 45 '
Sample.......'...................................... 45 I:1terviewing...................................... 48 Design of the Questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Analysis.......................................... 50 Tables............................................ 52 Tape Description.................................. 56 Questionnaire i
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' ABOUT SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS, INC.
Social Cata Analysts, Inc. is a Long Island based research and polling company that has conducted more than 100 social surveys in the last ten years. Clients have included Newsday, The Boston Globe, The Baltimore Sun, Gannett-News Service, Brookhavan National Laboratories, Columbia University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Long Island ,
Lighting Company. Socisl Data Analysts is a member of the National Council on Public Opinion Polls and the American Association of Public Opinion Researchers. Dr. Stephen Cole is President of So.cial Datq Analysts. Dr. Cole, who received his Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University in 1967, is also a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at 1
I Stony Brook. He is the author of seven books, including a popular research methods text and more than 25 articles published in journals such as Science, Scientific American, and
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Public Opinion Quarterly. Ann Harriet Cole is Director of Field Research. She received an M. A. degree in sociology from l Stony Brook in 1975 and has more than 10 years of experience conducting social surveys.
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i EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
l Jn order for the Long Island Lighting Company Shoreham nuclear power plant to receive an operating license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a satisfactory evacuation plan providing for the safety of community residents must be filed.
In order to help the County and its consultants prepare such an i
l evacuation plan, Social Data Analysts, Inc. conducted an atti-
! tude survey among 2,595 residents of Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The primary aim of this survey was to find out how many and what types of residents living in different locations would evacuate under different proposed scenarios. One of the primary variables influencing the reaction of residents to a possible accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant is the distance between the respondent's home and the plant. In order to make sure that we had an adequate. number of respondents living both within a five mile zone of the plant and a six to ten mile zone of the plant and on the East End of Long Island, we used a stratified random sampling technique. (See Technical
! Appendix) We completed 527 interviews among the 10,066 telephone subscribers living within a five $dle radius of the Shoreham plant. We completed 551 interviews among the 21,060 telephone subscribers living within a six to ten mile zone of the plant. We completed 543 interviews among the 59,870 telephone subscribers living more than ten miles away from the ,
plant, but East of the plant. We completed 458 interviews with Suf folk County zesidents who live more than ten miles away from
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the plant and West of the plant. There were 325,381 residen-tial telephone subscribers in this area. And, among the 451,075 residential telephone subscribers in Nassau County we completed 516 interviews.
Answers given to all the questions contained in the questionnaire, broken down by the geographical zone of the respondent, are presented in Table 1.
In orde. to find out how Long Island residents would react to a possible nuclear accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant we asked them what they would do in three different sco-narios. For the first one we asked the following question:
" Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear power plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plard.. Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at Shoreham. ,
All people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors. Do you think that you and the other members of your family would go about your normal business, or stay inside your home, or leave your home and go somewhere else?" Clearly the responses to this ques'tkon must be looked at separately for people living in different areas. Among the approximately 10,000 families living within a five mile zone of the plant we found that 40% said that they would evacuate and leave their home to go someplace else. Thus, approximately 4,000 f amilies living within the five mile zone would attempt to leave under a condition approximating that described in the
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first scenario. We also found that 40% of those people who lived within a five to ten mile zone of the plant, or approxi-mately 8,000 families from that area, would evacuate. Among I
those residents of Eastern Suffolk 22% or approximately 13,000 i families would evacuate under conditions similar to those described in scenario one. Among people living in Suffolk County, but more than ten miles away from the plant and West of it, fully 34% (or approximately 110,000 families) said that the,y would evacuate And, among Nassau County residents 18% or approximately 80,000 families said Ehat they would evacuate under.. conditions similar to those described in scenario one.
If we combine all the data and look at Long Island as a unit we find that 25% of Long Island residents or approximately 217,000 families would attempt to evacuate under conditions similar to those described in scenario one.
For the second scenario we asked the respondents the
- following question
- ',' Suppos e that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power i
l plant. All pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the plant were advise'd to evacuate and i -
everyone living between six and ten miles from the plant were advised to remain indoors. Would you and other members of your
- family go about your normal business, or stay inside your home, or leave your home and go somewhere else?" For this scenario we found 57% of people within the five mile zone ('5,700 families),
52% of people in the five to ten mile zone (11,000 families),
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. s 30% of people in Eastern Suffolk (18,000 families), 44% of people in Western Suffolk (142,000 families), and 25% of people i in Nassau County (113,000 families) saying that they would eva-cuate. For the Island as a whole we find 34% or approximately 290,000 families saying that they would evacuate under con-ditions similar to those described in scenario two.
For the third scenario we asked the respondents the following question: " Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power -
plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. Would you and other members of your family go about your normal business, or stay inside your home, or leave your home and go somewhere else?" Under these con-ditions fully 78% of those living within the five mile zone (7,800 fauilies), 78% of those living within the five to ten mile zone (16,000 families), 46% of those living in Eastern Suffolk (27,000 families), 63% of those living in Western j
Suffolk (205,000 families), and 39% of people living in Nassau County (175,000 families) said that they would evacuate.
considering Long Island as a whole we find that fully 50% of the respondents, orh2,000 familieh said that they would attempt to evacuate under conditions similar to those described in scenario three.
As the data reported on above indicate, the closer people actually live to the Shoreham nuclear plant the more likely they are to say that they will evacuate under the various sce-
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i narios described. People living within a five mile radius of the plant are the most likely to say they would evacuate, and people living in Nassau County are the least likely to say that they would evacuate. Somewhat surprisingly,, a relatively high proportion of people living in Western Suffolk, but more than ten miles away from the plant, say that they would evacuate under the various scenarios described. Geographical zone is a variable based upon the actual location of the repondent. We also asked the respondents to tell us about how far away from the Shoreham plant their home was. An analysis of these data i separately by zone showed that the subjective assessment of the respondent of how far away their home was from the plant had very little ef fect on evacuation plans of people living within ,
the five mile zone, the ten mile zone, and the East End. ,
(See Table 2) Also the subjective distance- that the respondent lives from the plant had no significant effect on evacuation plans of Nassau County residents. Among Western Suffolk County residents, however, the respondent's perception of how far away they lived from the plant was strongly correlated with their attitudes towards evacuation. For example *, if we consider only the first scenario we find that among those people who thought that their home was within a ten mile radius of the plant, fully 59% said they would evacuate, among those who said that they lived between 11 and 20 miles from the plant 40% said that ,
they.would evacuate, among those.who said they lived between 21 and 30 miles from the plant 18% said that they would evacuate,
-g-among those who said they lived more than 30 miles from the plant 28% said they would evacuate, and among those who said that they did not know how far their home was from the plant 44% said that tney would evacuate. Similar results were found for the other tuo' scenarios.
Using answers given by the respondents to the question on the first scenario as an indicator of whether the respondents would evacuate, we cross tabulated this question with other questions included in the survey which might influence attitu-des towards evacuation. (See Table 3).
- The data in Table 3 lead to the following conclusions:
- 1. The more people are worried about the effects of all types of environmental conditions on the health and well being of their family the more likely they are to say they will evacuate. The effect is particularly ,
strong for worry over rediation from a nuclear power
. plant. People who believe that living near a nuclear power plant is very dangerous are significantly more likely to say they would evaucate than those people who believe that living near a nuch. ear power plant is not too dangerous.
- 2. Attitudes towards nuclear energy itself is correlated with evacuation plans. People who are opposed to nuclear energy are more likely to say they will eva-i cuate than people who are pro nuclear energy. This may
, be a result of the fact that opponents of nuclear
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l energy are more likely to fear the effects of nuclear energy than are supporters of nuclear energy. Thirty six percent of Long Island residents favor the comple-
' tion and operation of the Shoreham nuclear. power a
plant, 46% oppose this, and 184 have no opinion.
j Among those who favor completion 164 say they would l
evacuate under conditions. resembling those described in scenario one, 34% of opponents and 21% of those without opinions say that they would evacuate.
- 3. People who have relatively low levels of knowledge about nuclear energy are more likely to fear nuclear energy and are therefore more likely to say ' that they would evacuate. People are relatively well informed about what took place at Three Mile Island with fully 66% saying that "no one was hurt although the long term effects are unknown." However, knowledge of what took place at Three Mile Island was not correlated with whether or not the respondent would evacuate.
- 4. We asked the respondents how much they would trust various officials to tell the truth about an accident.
We found generally low levels of trust for all the officials we asked the respondents about. The most trusted official was one from the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the least trusted official would be one from LILCO. The more trust an individual had in officials the less likely they were to say that
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they would evacuate.
- 5. People with children living at home are slightly more likely to say they would evacuate than people without children living at home.
- 6. Young people are significantly more likely than older people to say that they would evacuate. Other demographic variables such as education and income were not significantly correlated with attitudes towards evacuation.
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. l TABLE 1 ANSWERS GIVEN TO ALL SURVEY QUESTIONS BROKEN DOWN BY -GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE 4
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- AREA ,,
Five Mile Six to Ten Eastorn Westorn ,
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total i.* Considering where you live ;
now, how worried are you about the effects of toxic waste from garbage dumps on the health and well-being of your family?
21% 20% 221 21% 234 224 very worried 32 37 34 30 33 30 y somewhat worried 47 46 40 43 46 not too worried 47 1 1 1 1 1 don't know 1 994 1001 100% 1001 1011 1004 TOTAL ,
- 7. Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of air pollution on the health and well-being of -
your family?
144 181 144 181 204 191 very worried 30 37 46 41 somewhat worried 35 37 ,
45 56 45 34 40 not too worried 51 1 1 0 0 0 0 don't know s 1011 1011 1001 1001 1001 1001' TOTAL J. Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of crime on the health and well-being of your family?
374 31% 46% 53% 484 very worried 29%
35 -36 35 31 33 somewhat worried 36 28 33 18 16 19 not too worried '35 0 1 0 0 0 don't know ,
.0 1001 1001 101% 994 1001 100%
TOTAL ,
a . . . - ci a e a a-% ea meewwwa@ Oa OVmaco m moe01cmCixaitro. First five columns were used for
AREA Five Mile Six to Ten Eastern Western Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total
- 9. Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of radiation from a '
nuclear power plant on the health cnd well-being.of your' family?
very worried 53% 44% 39% 36% 28% 32%
somewhat worried 18 25 25 25 26 26 not too worried 28 30 33 38 45 41 don't know 1 1 3 2 1 2 TOTAL .
100% 100% 100% .101% 100% 101%
. 01 Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of a fire in your home on the health and well-being of your family?
very worried 21% 24% . 19% 26% 24% 24%
somewhat worried 33 33 34 40 39 39 not too worried '. 46 42 46 34 37 37
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don't know O O O O O TOTAL 100% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100%
- 11. In general, how dangerous do you . .
think it would be to live near an cirport?
very dangerous 74 6% 8% 5% 9% 7% >
dangerous . 25 28 30 29 36 33 not too dangerous 67 64 61 65 55 59 don't know 1 2 1 2 1 1 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 101% 101% 100%
AREA Five Milo Six to Ten Eastern Western f Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total
?. In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a '
msntal hospital?
very dangerous 44 54 54 84 64 7%
dangerous 23 25 24 27 34 30 not too dangerous 70 67 68 62 59 61 don't know 2 3 3 3 2 2 (")
TOTAL 994 100% 1004 1004 1011 1004 5 In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a con 1 fired power plant?
very dangerous lit 14% 94 10% lin 10%
dangerous 34 30 35 40- 40 39 not too dangerous 50 52 44 45 44 44 don't know 6 5 12 5 6 6 TOTAL 1014 1014 100% 1001 1014 1004
- j. In general, how dangerous,do you think it would'be to live hear a .s
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nuclear power plant?, .
very dangerous 464 .
46% 50% 48% 53% 51%
dangerous 25 28 29 31 30 30 not too dangerous 25 25 19 19 17 18 don't know 3 2 2 2 1 1 TOTAL 994 1011 1004 100% 1014 1004 W
a Fivo Mile Six to Ten Eastorn Wastorn ,
Zona Milo Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nasecu Total 2
. Would you describe yourself as: ,
a supporter of nuclear power plants as a means of providing electricity. 251 244 184 20% 234 22%
an opponent of nuclear power plants, or 40 43 44 40 34 37 you haven't made up your mind 38 39 43 41 I yet on this issue. 35 34 .
TOTAL 100% 1014 1004 99% 1001 100%
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Fiva Milo Six to Ton Eastern Wsstorn <
Zono , Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nncocu Total ,~
B. Do you think that LILCO should complete and operate the Shoreham nuclear powe. plant? -
yes 351 38% 29% 38% 37% 37%
no 54 51 55 49 42 46 don't know 11 12 15 13 22 18 TOTAL 1004 101% 994 100% 1011 101% g. ,
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- 9. Which comes closest to your opinion on nuclear energy?
all nuclear power plants should be shut down 211 234 22% 214 19% 20%
those plants which are currently operating ehould be allowed to continue to operate, but no new plants should be built 51 46 55 57 58 57 we should continue to build new -
nuclear power plants 22 25 16 17 19 18 don't know 6 6 7 5 5 5 TOTAL -
100% 100% 1004 1004 1011 100% _,
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@. During. normal operation, which type of electricity plant pollutes the air the least an oil-fired plant 134 144 124 140 134 13%
a coal-fired plant 8 7 7 7 8 8 a nuclear-fired, plant 45 48 37 43 43 43 you're not sure 33 30 43 36 35 36 all about the same 1 1 2 1 0 1 TOTAL 100% 1001 1014 101't 994 101%
AREA ,
Fiva Milo Six to Ten Enstorn Wsotorn '
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nacocu Total .-
). During normal operation does a nuclear ,
power plant give off dangerous level of radiation? e yes 214 17% 241 224 221 221 no 55 60 46 54 51 52 don't know 24 23 30 23 27 26 TOTAL 1001 1001 1004 994 1001 100%
). When the nucl' ear accident took place at Three Milo Island which of the following happened?
no one died but some people became ill 51 51 5% 54 51 5%
only a few people became ill 6 6 7 6 6 6 no one was hurt although the long term effects are unknown 68 69 59 67 67 66 you're not sure 21 21 29 23 22 23 TOTAL 1001 1011 100% 101% 1001 1001
- 1. Do you believe Chat technical experts cro able to accurately evaluate the risks of nuclear power? \ s,
)
yes 43% 43% 35% 43% 40% 41%
no 51 51 56 52 52 52 don't know 5 6 9 5 8 7 TOTAL 991 1004 1001 1001 1001 1004
. Doss LILCO currently have an operat-ing nuclear power plant on Long Island?
lit 13% 124 184 17% 17%
yes no 78 76 67 69 61 65 don't know 11 11 21 14 21 18 92EWL 991 1001 1001 101% 991 1001
O '
Fiva Milo Six to Tcn Eastern Wcatorn
- Zona Milo Zona Suffolk Suffolk Naccau Total
.. LILCO is currently completing the Shoreham nuclear power plant which is in Suffolk County about 60 miles from Nsw York City. Suppose that LILCO completes this plant and begins to operate it. If there was an accident at the plant how much would you trust tho Governor of New York State to tell the truth about the accident? , - .
a great deal 9% 8% 9% 71 61 74 somewhat 44 39 42 46 46 45 not at all 43 50 45 45 45 45 ,
don't know 3 4 . 4 2 4 3 TOTAL 994 101% 1001 1001 1011 100%
). If there were an accident at the '
Shoreham plant how much would you trust a LILCO official to tell the truth about the accident?
a great deal 84 61 74 54 3% 44 somewhat 28 27 30 34 39 36 not at all 62 65 60 60 57 58 1 2 2 ,. -)
don't know 2 ,- 2 4 TOTAL 100't 1004 1014 1004 1011 1031
l l Fivo Mile Six to Ton Eaotern W2ctorn ,
- Zone Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolt Nnoccu Total
. If there were an accident at the Shoreham plant how much would you ,
trust an official from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission to tell the truth about the accident?
o great deal 194 191 184 191 171 184 somewhat 47 44 45 50 52 51 not at all 30 33 31 30 28 29 don't know 4 3 7 1 3 3 TOTAh 1004 991 1011 1004 100% 101%
. If there were an accident at the Shoreham plant how much would you trust the Suffolk County Executive to tell the truth about the accident?
a great deal 16% 161 151 131 131 134 somewhat 46 41 44 48 48 48 not at all 31 37 35 37 35 36 don't know 6 6 6 3 5 4 TOTAL , 991 1001 1001 1011 1011 101%
3 i
O 9
9 %
Fiva Mile Six to Ten Eastorn Wastcrn ,
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nasscu Total :
-28 As the crow flies, about how many miles do you think your home is .
from the Shoreham nuclear power j plant?
O to 5 miles 71% 104 11 14 On 11 6 to 10 miles 23 46 4 11 0 6 11 to 20 miles 5 35 21 34 2 16 21 to 30 miles O 5 20 30 19 23 ,g 31 to 40 miles 0 0 19 14 30 22 41 to 50 miles' O O 15 4 25 16 more than 50 mfles 0 0- 11 0 15 8 don't know 1 3 ,
9 5 10 8 TOTAL 1004' 994 1001 99't 1011 101%
s
. Would you consider moving if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant-cd LILCO a license to begin operat-ing Shoreham?
yes 274 214 144 16% lit 131.
no ,
68 75 81 77 84 81 don't know i 4 5 4 7 6 6 .
~
TOTAL 991 101% 991 100% 1011 1004 D
9
?
Fiva Milo Six to Ton Eastern Wsatorn .
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total -
- 00. Assuming that the Shorehsm nuclear power plant is licensed and begins to
- operate, we are interested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at Shoreham. I All people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay ,
?
indoors. Do you think that you and the other members of your family would:
go about your normal business 44 84 224 20% 40% 30%
stay inside your home 52 49 50 43 39 42 leave your home and go somewhere else 40 40 22 34 18 25 don't know 5 3 5 2 3 3 TOTAL 101% 100% 994 991 1004 1004 s y-4 9
l l
l l
l
Fiva Milo Six to Ten Eactern Westorn ,
~
Zona Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nasacu Total .-
- 1. Where would you go?
someplace in Suffolk County 204 10% ,
lot 6% On 44 someplace in Nassau County 15 14 3 14 1 8 someplace in New York City 17 26 7 22 30 24 some other place 34 36 61 50 49 49 don't know 14 15 19 9 10 14 TOTAL 100% 101% 100% 1011 1001 99%
'2. In terms of miles, about how far '
i away is this place from your home? .[
10 miles or less 64 .3% 14 34 11 21 11 to 20 miles . 8 6 3 3 6 4 21 to 30 miles 13 ~8 4 7 14 10 31 to 40 miles 6 6 7 13 7 10 41 to 50 miles 10 17 4 14 4 10 55 59 81 60 64 62 m9re than 50 miles 5 2 don't know 3 2 1 1 TOTAL- 101% 1011 1011 101% 101% 1001 l3. Which of the following would you ba most likely to go to? ,
.y somebody else's ho'e m 'g 63% 67% 46% 65% 534, 594 -
a public shelter 9 6 13 5 5 6 a hotel or motel 12- 10 18 18 21 19 i somewhere else 9 7 13 3 8 6 don't know 7 9 10 8 13 10 TOTAL 1004 991 1004 994 1001 1004 e
y Five Milo Six to Ton Eastern Western Zona Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk Naccou Totc1 -
- b. Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an cecident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. All pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the plant were advised to evacuate and every-one living between six and ten miles from the plant were advised to remain indoors. Would you and ,
other members of your,fa.mily: '
)
4 51 194 13% 314 234 go about your normal' business 24 45 42 41 41 stay inside your home- -~ 38 39 leave your home and go some- .
30 44 25 34 where else 57 52 5 1 3 3 3 3 don't know -
994 100% 100% 101%
100% 99%
TOTAL
- 05. Where would you go?
94 84 11 6%
214 10%
someplace in Suffolk County 15 5 14 3 9 someplace in Nassau Coonty 15 19 15 22 8 18 23 someplace in New York City 37 63 51 50 51 some other place -
36 16 14 15 15 20 22 ,
don't know '
994 1001 101% 994 1011 TOTAL 101%
Fiva Milo Six to Ton E00 torn WactGrn '
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total -
'6. In terms of miles, about how far away is this place from your home?
10 miles or less 51 3% 21 34 21 21 11 to 20 miles 7 9 4 7 5 6 21 to 30 miles 12 8 4 5 14 9 31 to 40 miles 7 8 5 10 6 8 41 to 50 miles 11 12 4 14 3 9 more than 50 miles 55 50 79 59 65 63 don't know 3 3 2 2 5 3 .
TOTAL 100% 1011 100% 1004 1001 1004 p.
I b e
e t 4
i O O
l Fiva Hilo Six to Ten Etatorn Weatcrn ,
Zona Mila Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nuescu Total
- 37. Which of the following would you be most likely to go to? .
i somebody else's home -
64% 69% 46% 66% 51% 581 a public shelter 10 6 12 6 5 6
, a hotel or motel 10 9 19 18 21 19 somewhere else 10 6 13 5 6 6 don't know 6 10 11 5 17 11 TOTAL 1004 1004 1014 1004 1001 1004
.I
- 38. Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. Would you and other l members of your family go about' your normal business it 24 - 144 74 25% 164 stay inside your home 18 17 36 29 34 31 i leave your home and go somewhere else 78 78 46 63 39 50 don't know 3 3 4 2 3 3 g
\
TOTAL 1004 1001 1001 1014 101% 1004
- 39. Where would you go?
someplace in Suffolk County 194 134 13% 74 14 5%
someplace in Nassau County 17 16 5 15 2 9 someplace in New York City 14 20 8 23 23 22 some other place 35 36 56 47 57 51 don't know -
16 16 18 9 17 13 TOTAL 101% 1011 100% 1014 1004 1004
Fivo Milo Six to Ton Ecotorn Wactorn Zona Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nnceau Total , . ~'
h0. In terms of miles, about how far .
. cway is this place from your home? I l
10 miles or less 54 34 34 44 24 34 7 9 7 3 4 4 1
11 to 20 miles 21 to 30 miles 9 10 6 5 13 9 10 7 5
- 13 5 9 I
31 to 40 miles 11 12 5 14 3 9 41 to 50 miles more than 50 miles 55 56 74 59 ' 69 64 s 3 4 1 2 -
4 3 don't know TOTAL 100% 1014 101% 100% 1001 101%
- 01. Which of the following would you be most likely to go to?
somebody else's home 63% 67% 454 68% 54% ,
611 a public shelter 11 10 15 6 8 8 a hotel or motel 11 9 18 17 19 18 9 6 12 4 7 6 somewhere else don't know 6 8 10 5 12 8 TOTAL 1004 100% 1001 1001 1004 101%
- 42. When you heard'the advisory to evacuate would your leave immediately , 224 144 144 12% lit 12%
wait until everyone in your '
family could assemble and then leave 76 83 82 ,
86 86 86 3 4 4 2 3 3 don't know TOTAL 1014 1014 100% 100% 1004 101%
~
9
Five Milo Six to Ton Ecotorn Wastern "
Zona Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk Nncecu Total -
- 43. In the course of your lifetime, have you ever had to evacuate your home in the face of danger auch as a hurricane; flood, or any other danger?
yes 164 174 24% 164 144 16%
no 84 83 76 84 86 84 TOTAL' 1004 100% 1001 100% 1001 100%
' 44. Do you have children under the age of 5 living at home with you?
yes 24% 30% 14% 234 171 19%
no 76 - 70 86 77 83 81 TOTAL 100% 1001 1001 100% 100% 1004
- 45. Do you have children between the ages of 5 and 17 living at home with you? .
~
yes 36% 42% 26% 47% 304 37%
no 64 58 74 53 70 64 TOTAL 1001 1001 100% 1004 1001 101%
( Fiva Milo Six to Ton Eaotorn Wrotorn ~
- Zono Mile Zona Suffolk Suffolk N2cocu Totcl .
l l
- 46. If there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant and your children were at school in an crea that had to be evacuated, would you prefer that your childrens be brought home or to a neighbor's by bus 184 244 194 204 161 194 be bussed to a shelter outside the evacuation area 36 32 28 31 39 34 y be kept at school until you -
49 41 could pick them up 43 41 44 -45 don't know 3 3 9 1 4 3 TOTAL 1001 1001 1001 1011 1001 1011
/
O
Five Milo Six to Ten Eastern Wactorn Zona Mile Zono Suffolk Suffolk Ncsocu Totni ,c'
' 4 7. Do you currently work full time (30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />) a week or more) for pay? -
49% 58% 51% 60% 59% 58%
> yes 41 42 no 51 43 49 40 l
1001 101% 1001 1001 1004 1001 TOTAL l48. About how long does it usually
take you to get to work in the morning?
38% 34% 59% 35% 354 374 less than 15 minutes 30 30 15 to 30 minutes 33 33- 29 30 19 20 6 22 21 20 31 to 60 minutes 11 9 6 6 3 7 61 to 90 minutes 3 4 4 7 3 7 more than 90 minutes 1001 100% 100% 1011 1001 1004 TOTAL .
- 49. Are you currently 71% 76% 634 744 71% 72%
married 90 17 14 le 1? 13 olugle 6
',' 9 3 12 6 5 widowed 7 4 6 -m divorced or separated 6 5 7 1004 99% 1001 1004 1004 101%
TOTAL
- 50. Does your spouse currently work full time (30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> a week or more) for pay?
55% 59% 49% 64% 61% 61%
yes 39 39 36 no 45 41 51 1001 1004 1004 1004 1004 1005 TOTAL
~~
i Fivo Milo Six to Ton Eastern Wsotorn l Total Zono Mile zona Suffolk Suffolk Nasceu _ ,
l
- 51. About how long does it usually take your spouse to get to work in the morning?
314 28% 57% 25% 30% 294 less than 15 minutes 29 33 38 31 23 39 15 to 30 minutes 31 27 19 25 10 25 31 to 60 minutes 7 8 7 5 8 5 61 to 90 minutes 4 2 3 8 8 6 more than 90 minutes 1011 1001 1014 100% 1001 1004 ,
TOTAL
< 52. What is the last grade of school that you completed? ,
11% 8% lin 54 54 64 some high school or less 36 38 31 32 33 42 high school graduate 25 24
.' 24 25 24 23 some college 34 32 34 35 33 30 college graduate 1001 1004 1014 100% 1004 1004 TOTAL
- 53. What is your age category?
94 124 124 124 131 134 under 25 32 25 28 25-35 36 38 21 '
25 32 22 34 23 27 36-50 14 28 22 12 11 21 51-65 8 10 10 over 65 19 8 24 1014 1011 1004 100% 994 1001 TOTAL
- 54. What is your total family income?
124 14% 271 144 144 15%
under $15,000 25 28 30 27 33 31
$15,000 to $25,000 25 25 25 32 18 27
$26,000 to $35,000 19 19 15 18 14 19
$36,000 to $50,000 14 9 9 10 18 over $50,000
~
. 7,
- "" a@o D @@o. D@DO B@Bt . 1011 1011
? Fiva Milo Six to Ton Ecstorn W;ctern
~~
Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Total
- 55. Would you conside'r yourself to be
~
politically: g liberal 204 22% 214 174 224 20%
middle-of-the-road 45 50 50 48 49 49 conservative 35 28 29 35 30 31 TOTAL 1004 -1001 1004 100% 101% 1004
/
- 56. What is your race?
white ~ 98% 96% 95% 974 '95% 961 black 1 2 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 other TOTAL 1004 100% 1004 100% 1001 1004
- 57. ,
What is your religion?
614 54% 434 58% 50% 53%
Catholic Protestant 26 26 37 25 19 23 Jewish
- 3. 9 6 7 22 15 5 5 6 3 4 4 other none s 6 6 8 7 4 6
/
TOTAL 101% 100% 100% 1004 994 101%
- 58. In general would you say you are: .
very religious 224 174 184 194 -
151 174 somewhat religious 62 64 63 59 64 62 not religious at all 16 19 19 22 21 21 TOTAL 1004 1004 '
100% 1004 1004 1004
._ ._ _ _ N
Fiva Mile Six to Ten East'orn Wectern Zone Mile Zone Suffolk Suffolk N2ssau Tctal -
$9. Ilow long have you lived on Long ,
Island?
all your life 35% 37% 43% 394 34% 37%
more than 20 years 30 26 31 26 32 30 10 to 20 years 18 20 15 22 19 20 5 to 9 years 9 11 4 8 7 7 less than 5 years 7 6 6 6 8 7 g-TOTAL 994 1004 994 1011 1001 101%
$0. What is your sex 7 ,
male 48% 53% 51% 50% 47% 49%
female 52 47 49 50 53 51 TOTAL 100% 100% 1001 100% 1001 100%
s o
0
,- s
, \. ; ,
TABLE 2 Evacuation Plans by Subjective Distance from the Plant
% saying they % saying they % saying they Subjective Distance would evacuate would evacuate would evacuate From the Plant under scenario 1 under scenario 2 under scenario 3 (Question 30) (Question 34) (Question 38) 5 Mile Zone 1 to 3 miles 40 58 78 4 or 5 miles 41 61 85 6 to 10 miles 38 49 72 moro than 10 miles 41 58 77 Don't Know 42 77 77 6 to 10 Mile Zone 1 to 5 miles 38 61 82 6 to 10 miles 40 51 80 11 to 20 miles 42 52 77 moro than 20 miles 34 48 66 Don't Know 34 48 71 ETot End 1 to 15 miles 25 37 56 16 to 25 miles 22 32 44 moro than 25 miles 21 27 43 Don't Know 28 36 48 Waatern Suffolk 1 to 10 miles 59 72 94 11'to 20 miles 40 52 70 21 to 30 miles 18 25 45 more than 30 miles 28 37 56 Don't Know 44 61 83 l Nacoau County .-
30 miles or less 18 29 48 31 to 40 miles 17 23 34
, 41 to 50 miles 19 26 38 moro than 50 miles 13 20 35 Don't Know 26 30 45 i
l
b ^
f ne
' . v. -
_34 TABLE 3 CORRELATES OF EVACUATION ATTITUDES l
l -
b G
9 e
e
~
- Percent saying they would evacuate ,
if tnere was an accident at Shoreham l and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
6.* Considering where you live now, how worrici are you about-the effects of toxic waste from garbage dumps on the health 'and well-being of your family?
very worried 33%
somewhat worried 24 not too worried 21 don't know 23
- 7. Considering where you live -
now, how worried are you about the effects of air pollution on the health and well-being of your family?
very worried 31%
somewhat worried 25 not.too worried 23 don't know 4
- 8. Considering where you live ,
now, how worried are you about the ef fects of crime on the health and well-being of your family?
very worried 27%
somewhat worried 23 not too worried 24-don't know 0 i
- Question numbers correspond to those on questionnaire. First l
j five columns were used for identification.
l
,- rs
(; Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham
'and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 9. Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of radiation from a nuclear power plant on the health and well-being of your family?
very worried 36%
somewhat worried 26 not too worried . 16 don't know 11 TOTAL
- 10. Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of a fire in your home on the health and well-being of your family? -
very worried 284 somewhat worried 25 not too worried 23 don't know 55' TOTAL
- 11. In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near an airport?
very dangerous 25%
dangerous 28 not too dangerous 24 don't know 16 .
i t
9
. 't. -
Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to i stay indoors.
~
- 12. In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a mental hospital?
I very dangerous . 31%
dangerous 26 not too dangerous 24 don't know 21 TOTAL
- 13. In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a coal fired power plant?
very dangerous 35%
dangerous 27 not-too dangerous 22 don't know 21 TOTAL
.14 . In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a nuclear power plant?
very dangerous 31%
dangerous 23 not too dangerous 11 don't know 8 l
- 15. Would you describe yourself as:
a supporter of nuclear power
~
plants as a means of providing electricity. 134 an opponent of nuclear power plants, or 32 you haven't made up your mind yet on this issue. 26 l
Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 16. Do you think that LILCO should complete and operate the Shoreham nuclear power plant?
yes 16%
no 34 don't know 21
- 17. Which comes closest to your opinion on nuclear energy?
s11 nuclear power plants should be shut down 30%
those plants which are. currently operating should be allowed to continue to opertte, but no new '
plants should be built 24 we should continue to build new nuclear power plants 13
. don't know 26
- 18. During normal operati)n, which type of electricity plant follutes the
( air the least:
an oil-fired plant 32%
a coal-fired plant 30 a nuclear-fired plant 19 you're not sure . 28 all about the same 31 e
0 S
I
_39_ - .
Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 19. During normal operation does a nuclear power plant gise.,off.dangerons level of radiation?
yes 34%
no 24 don't know 20
- 20. When th6 nuclear. accident took place at Three Mile Island which of the following happened?
ao one died but some people became ill 27%
only a few people became ill 32 no one was hurt although the long term effects are unknown -
24 you're not sure 25
- 21. Do you believe that technical experts are able to accurately evaluate the risks of nuclear power?
yes 22%
no 28 don't know 19
- 22. Does LILCO currently have an operat-ing nuclear power plant on Long Island?
yes 27%
no 25 don't know 21 l
l 1
' N. '
Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 23. LILCO is currently completing the Shoreham nuclear power plant which is in Suffolk County about 60 miles from New York City. Suppose that LILCO completes this plant and begins to operate it. If there was an accident at the plant how much would you trust the Governor of New York State to tell the truth about the accident?
a great deal 16%
somewhat 24 not at all 28 don't know 10
- 24. If there were an accident at the Shoreham plant how much would you -
trust a LILCO official to tell the
. truth about the accident? g a great deal 144 somewhat ,
17 not at all 31 don't know 17
- 25. If there were an-accident at the Shoreham plant how much would you trust an of ficial from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission to tell the truth about the accident?
a great deal 20%
somewhat 23 ~
not at all 32 .
don't know 20
, _41 .
l Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 26. If there were an accident at the Shoreham plant how much would you trust the Suffolk County Executive to tell the truth about the accident? .
a great deal . 21%
somewhat 25 not at all 27 don't know 27
- 29. Would you consider moving if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant-ed LILCO a license to begin operat-ing Shoreham?
yes ,
47%
no 20 don't know 45
- 43. In the course of your lifetime, have you ever had to evacuate your home in the face of danger such as a hurricane, flood, or any other danger?
yes 31%
no 24
- 44. Do you have children under the age of 5 living at home with you?
yes 34%
no 23 O
-43 I
i 4 Percent saying they would evacuate
- if there was an accident at Shoreham 4 and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to t stay indoors.
i 51.. About how.long does it usually take your spouse to get to work in the morning?
l less than 15 minutes 24%
15 to 30 minutes 27 31 to 60 minutes '
31 61 to 90 minutes 38 more than 90 minutes 22
- 52. What is the last grade of school that you completed?
some high school or less 194 high school graduate 24 .
- some college 27 l college graduate 27 1
- 53. What is your age category?
under 25 38%
25-35 33 36-50 28 51-65 14 over 65 9 l -
- 54. What is your total family income?
, under $15,000 -~~ 21%
$15,000 to $25,000 27 S26,000 to $3.5,000 26
$36,0s0 to $50,000 26 27 over $50,000 ,
O e
42-Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people who lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors.
- 45. Do you have children between the ages of 5 and 17 living at home with you?
yes ,
31%
no 22
- 47. Do you currently work full time (30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />) a week or more) for pay?
yes 27%
no 22
- 48. About how long does it usually -
take you to get to work in the morning? .
less than 15 minutes 27%
i 15 to 30 minutes 29 31 to 60 minutes 28 61 to 90 minutes 23 more than 90 minutes 27
- 49. Are you currently:
married 26%
single 23 widowed .. 18 divorced or separated 26 l
- 50. Does your spouse currently work full time (30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> a weck or more) for pay?
l yes 28%
no 22 A
( ~.
Percent saying they would evacuate if there was an accident at Shoreham and all people wno lived within five miles of the plant were advised to stay indoots.
- 55. Would you consider yourself to be politically: ,
liberal 29% .,
middle-of-the-road . 26 ,
conservative 22
- 56. What is your race?
white . 24%
black 25 other 53
- 57. What is your religion?
Catholic 27%
Protestant 21 Jewish 27 other 16 none 27
- 58. In general would you say you ares very religious 25%
somewhat religious . 25 not religious at all 27
- 59. How long have you lived on Long -
Island?
~
all your life. 234 more than 20 years 21 . ,
- 10 to 20 years 27 5 to 9 years 46 l 29 less than 5 years
- 60. What is your sex?
l male -
25% .
female 25 l
k
^
,. . ( '.c l TECHNICAL APPENDIX Sample The survey is based upon a stratified random sample of telephone subscribers. The variable upon Which the sample was stratified was distance from the shoreham nuclear power- ,
plant. We wanted to interview approximately 500 people Who lived within a five mile radius of the plant, approximately 500 people who lived within a six to ten mile radius of the plant, approximately 500 people who lived more than ten miles away f rom the . plant, but East of the plant, and approximately 1,000 people who lived more than ten miles away from -the plant, but West of.the plant. Since telephone exchanges do not correspond -
precisely with thase geographical zones, we used the telephons exchanges only as a preliminary means of designating the respondent's actual geographical location. We decided to use zip ecdas as the method of determining in which zone a re'spon-dent lived. Zip codes, although they do not match perfectly the designated geographical zones we were interested in, do correspond relatively closely with them. .The zip code infor-mation was obtained from the respondents in the course of the survey. In Table Al we present a list of telephone exchanges t
l used in generating the sample for each zone. The procedure used as as follows. First, we determined what exchanges would cover a particular zone. Then we found out What blocks of num-bers within each exchange had working residential listings.
,---.7. _ , . , - - . , -, ,- , , - - - - . - . . , . - -
- n I e
. , we .
This information was obtained from the cole's Directory for j Nassau and Suffolk counties. Then using a random number generator, we generated telephone numbers using the exchange and four' randomly generated digits within the working blocks. We gen'erated numbers within each exchange in proportion to the number of residential listings in that exchange. Thus, for. example, if within the five mile zone approxima' c ely two-thirds of the residential numbers have the exchange 744, our sample was generated so that approximately two-thirds of the sample were drawn from the 744 exchange.
Using the random digit generating technique we were insured of including unlisted phone numbers in the sample.
The sample can be censidered. to be representative of all resi-
~
dential subscribers living in the designated areas.
The exact designation of the respondent's location was determined by zip code information provided us by the respon-l dent. In Table A-2 we list all the zip codes that were used in l
I designating the five mile zone, the ten mile zone, and the East End. We also list the number of residential listings in each zip code and the number of interviews completed. Data on the number of residential listings in each zip code were obtained ,
~
from Cole's Directory. In order to make sure that all geographical areas were equally represented we employed the following weighting procedure: we divided the number of inter- .
t views completed in a given zip code into the total number of .
residential listings existing in that zip code. If we consider -
l .
- s. (~
s 1D
. the number of residential listings to be a rough approximation of the number of households in an area, then the weights employed represent the number of households per interview in each zip code. There were relatively minor differences in the weights used for each of the four zip codes which make up the i
zero to five mile zone and moderate differences in the weights used for the nine zip codes which were designated as making up the six to ten mile zone. There were significantly larger dif-ferences in the weights used for each East End zip code. Some of the East End zip codes straddled the ten mile zone and were thus over sampled. Some of the East End zip codes were undoub-tedly under sampled as a result of summer residents who main-tain residential phone listings not being in residence at the time when the survey was conducted. There was one zip code for i
which no interviews were obtained. This was taken into con-siderat .on in computing the weights for the other zip codes- in the East End.
Because Port Jefferson Station (zip code 11766) in Western Suffolk had the same telephone exchanges as several areas in the six to ten mile zone,it was impossible to avoid over sampling this particular area. All interviews in Port Jef fersor Station were weighted down so that they would not be over represented in the sample of Western Suffolk residents.
With the exception of Port Jefferson Station all other zip codes in Western Suffolk were given the same weight. All zip codes in Nassau County were given an equal weight. Because of
~ ~
l i .- . , .
the weighting procedure used, the entire sample may be taken as representative geographically of all of Nassau and Suffolk Counties, 'and the sample within each geographical zone may be taken as'being representative of all areas in that zone.
Interviewing All the interviewing was conducted from two rented' telephone facilities in Farmingdale and Melville, New York.
The interviews were done by telephone between the hours of 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. on the evenings of May 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and June 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10. The majority of the inter-viewers were experienced and trained people who had previously worked for Social Data Analysts, Inc. Before the survey was begun the interviewers participated in a one hour training session in which the questionnaire was gone over several times and explained to the interviewers. During .the interviewing, there was always at least one trained supervisor present on the floor to check the questionnaires for accuracy and to' listen in f
i on interviews to make sure that the interviewers were in fact following the designated interview schedule,. .
In Table A-3 we show the number of telephone numbers dialed and the outcome for each zone. Altogether the sample consisted of 10,948 telephone numbers. On approximately one quarter of these numbers (2,588) we received no answers after J
three call backs. Since the random digit . aling technique is not able to differentiate between residential and business .
5 phone numbers with the same exchange, it is possible that a
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significant portion of these numbers were actually businesses
- Which were not open during the evening hours in Which the sur-vey was conducted. For another 1,345 numbers we found either a continuous busy signal or were not able to find an adult at home after three' call back attempts were made. A significant portion of the numbers selected, using the random digit dialing technique, (2,391) turnout not to be working telephone numbers.
This is because not all numbers in active blocks are actually assigned. One thousand.five hundred and fifty people refused to participate in the survey. Thus, approximately one out of every three eligible respondents Who were contacted refused to participate. In 180 cases we found people Who either did not speak English or were unable to communicate with the inter-viewer for some other reason. In order to be sure of obtaining an approximately 50-50 sex distribution we employed a sex quota system. Each individual interviewer kept track of the number of l men and women that she interviewed and was not allowed to be l
more than two women ahead. If an interviewer had two more women respondents than men her next interview had to be with a male respondent. Thus, 261 people were not interviewed because we could not obtain a maA= respondent. Thirty eight numbers were unable to be completed for a variety of other ~
l reasons and 2,595 interviews were completed.
Although there is no way to be positive that those people who refused to participate in the survey do not differ signifi-l cantly from those Whom we interviewed, we were able to compare
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the sample characteristics of this survey with known population parameters and sample characteristics of other surveys we have conducted recently on Long Island. In general, there is a close matching between the sample characteristics of this sur-vey and both population parameters and sample characteristics of other surveys. We may, therefore, conclude that this survey is representative of the population of residential telephone subscribers on Long Island.
. Design of the Questionnaire ,
A draft of the questionnaire was formulated in con-sultation with the consulting committee headed by Dr. Kai Erikson and Dr. James Johnson. The committee met on May 1 to formulate the first draft. Then each committee member sent questions which they wanted to include in the survey to Dr. ,
James Johnson Who forwarded them to Social Data Analysts. We then constructed a second draft of the questionnaire Which was modified'after consulting with Drs. Erikson and Johnson. A L pre-test was then conducted with approximately 16 Long Island residents. Based upon the results of the pre-test and further
{ consultations with Drs. Erikson and Johnso the final draft of the questionnaire was formulated.
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Analysis After the interviews were completed, the data were entered directly onto the computer and then verified for entry errors.
A preliminary analysis of the data has been conducted using the, SPSS statistical program.
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e t-Computing the sampling error for any particular result in this survey is complicated by the use of the weighting proca-dure. The sampling error for results in the five mile zonc, the six mile zone, and the East End is approxi'mately plus or minus fourpercentagepoinh.s. The sampling error for Western Suffolk is approximately plus or minus five percentage points, and for Nassau County plus or minus four percentage points.
Treating Western Suffolk and Nassau as a unit the sampling error would be plus or minus three percentage points. The sampling error for the entire sample is approximately plus or minus three percentage points. These computations assume that the survey was conducted under ideal circumstances. Since there are a large number of practical problems in conducting social surveys, it is possible that the actual size of the sampling error could be larger.
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- i TABLE A-1 ZONES AND TELEPHONE EXCHANGES Zone Exchange Numbers 5 mile 744 821 l
929 6-10 miles 331
. 473 924 928
- East End 267 653
' 283 668 288 722 298 725 323 726 324 -
727 325 728 369 734 477 749 537 765 i
' All other Suffolk exchanges Western Suffolk ,
All Nassau exchanges
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f TABLE A-2 NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS COMPLETED IN EACH ZIP CODE Number of Number of Res.dential Interviews Zip Code Listings Completed Weight Zone 5 mile 11778 3,724 206 18.08 11786 1,234 77 16.03 11792 2,158 120 17.98 11961 2,950 124 23.79
~
TOTAL 10,066 527 10 mile 11727 6,082 134 45.39 11764 2,602 69 37.71 11766 1,898 58 32.72 11777 2,596 62 41.85 11789 2.100 85 24.71 11933 1,481 36 41.14 11949 1,383 33 41.91 11953 2,129 55 38.71 11980 789 19 51.53 TOTAL 21,060 551 EOst 11901 6,054 90 69.50 11930 1,791 12 ,154.21 11931 - 625 6 107.62 11932 1,276 12 109.86 11934 1,924 11935 1,368 15 94.23 11937 6,991 49 147.41 11939 513 2 265.02 11940 1,043 2 538.82 11941 517
. 5 106.83 11942 1,732 18 99.42 11944 1,794 20 92.68 11946 5,205 47 116.18 11947 528 14 38.97 11948 323 3 111.24 11952 1,990 34 60.47 11954 2,182 15 150.30 11955 236 1 243.84 11956 219 6 37.71 11957 489 6 84.21 11958 360 7 53.14 11959 1,119 4 289.04 11960 664 7 98.01
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i TABLE A-2 Continued.... ,
Number of Number of Residential Interviews Zone Zip Code Listings Completed Weight East 11963 3,729 29 132.86
, O 11964 1,607 11 150.94 11965 124 7 18.30 11968 6,478 52 128.71
-1197 0 287 1 296.53 11971 2,585 27 98.92 11972 325 6 55.96 11975 376 3 129.49 11976 856 6 147.40 11977 815 7 120.29 11978 3,336 18 191.49 TOTAL 59,870 543
- No interviews obtained Wastern Suffolk Port Jefferson Station 11776 5,908 121 48.83-All other zones 319,473 337 947.99 Nassau County 451,075 516 874.18 s
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TABLE A-3 NUMBER OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS DIALED AND OUTCOME BY ZONE ZONE 0-5 6-10 East Western Outcome miles miles End Suffolk Nassau Total No answer (probably business) 444 432 774 376 562 2,588 Busy, no adult at home 271 306 310 218 240 1,345 1
Not a working number 501 471 560 446 413 2,391 Rsfusal 3,06 335 340 257 312 1,550 Language or psycho-logical problem 40 16 58 20 46 180 Could not obtain correct sex 69 69 29 20 74 261 Other 23 5 10 - - 38 Completed interviews 527 551 543 458 516 2,595 Total 2,181 2,185 2,624 1,795 2,163 10,948
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l SHOREHAM EVACUATION TAPE DESCRIPTION 9 TRACK 1600 BPI FIXED BLOCK UNLABELLED LRECL=80 BLOCKSIZE=3200 i
FILE l= DATA -ASCII- 2595 RECORDS FILE 2= SPSS SETUP, -ASCII- 101 RECORDS FILE 3= DATA -EBCDIC-2595 RECORDS FILE 3= SPSS SETUP -EPCDIC- 101 RECORDS x
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ATTACHMENT 3 ,
CURRICULUM VITAE l
James H. Johnson, Jr.
i Mailing Address Home Address Department of Geography 11811 Venice Blvd. #218 University of California Los Angeles, CA 90066 Los Angeles, CA 90024 (213) 397-4093
- (213) 825-1415 / 825-1071 Birth Place and Date: Greenville, North Carolina: June 4, 1954.
EDUCATION: B.S., Geography, North Carolina Central University, 1975.
M.S. , Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison,1977.
Thesis : Innovations in Flue-cured Tobacco Farming and Their Implications for Energy Use. (C.W. Olmstead, Advisor)
Ph.D., Geography, Michigan State University, June 1980.
, Thesis : Incumbent Upgrading and Gentrification in the Inner City: A Case Study of Neighborhood Revitalization Activities in Eastown, Grand Rapids. (S.D. Brunn, Advisor)
- FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION
- Teaching and Research -
! Systematic: energy policy and planning, urban, social geography off the inner city.
Methods: research design, theory and methodology in geography.
~
. SPECIAL HONORS: I Recipient of t'he Theodore R. Speigner Award for the h}ghest academic average, Department of Geography, North Carolina Central University,1975.
Suma Cum Laude Graduate, Department of Geography, North Carolina Central Universi ty,1975.
Selected as an Outstanding Young Man in America by the Jarycees in 1976.
Graduate Fellow, Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975-77.
(
Recipient of the first place award ($100) for the best graduate student paper i presented at the East Lakes Division of the Association of American Geographers Annual Meetings, Michigan State University, September 15-16, 1978.
l JOB EXPERIENCE:
! Job
Title:
Engineer's Assistant
! . Location: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, i Durham.-North Carolina Duties: Run Chemical Analysis for double alkali scrubber systems Years: 1972-75 (Stay in School Program) l Job
Title:
Junior Computer Operator '
location: Duke University Computation Center, Durham, North Carolina Duties: Command IBM /360 Years: February 1975 to August 1975.
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e James H. Johnson, Jr.
Page 2 Job
Title:
Field Laboratory Technician Location: Air Pollution Monitoring Field Project, Tulsa, Oklahoma Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, Durham North Carolina Duties : Operated and maintained two air pollution monitoring field re-search stations; analyzed data from 0 3, NO, and NO 2 monitors j daily.
Job
Title:
Teaching Assistant (Half Time) location: Department of Geography, Michigan State University .
Duties: Range from directing discussion sections to lecturing in the following courses:
Future Worlds - Fall 1977; Spring 1978 Geography of Culture - Winter 1978 World Regional Geography - Winter 1978 American City and Region - Winter 1979 Quantitative Methods in Geography - Spring 1978; Fall 1978; Spring 1979.
Advanced Quantitative Methods - Winter, 1979.
Years: Fall 1977 to Spring.1979.
Job Title Research Assistant (Half Time) location: Departments of Geography and Agricultural Economics, Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State University Duties: Research and writing of reports and presentations to legislative and consumer groups regarding Electric Utility Rate Reform in Michigan (under contract #71-3698)
Years: Summer 1979 to Spring 1980.
Job
Title:
Research Assistant (Quarter Time)
Location:' Center for Urban Affairs, College of Urban Development, Mich1gan
' State University -
Duties : Computer analysis of data for various projects Years: Sumer 1978 to Spring 1980 Job
Title:
' Research ' Assistant Location: Michigan Departmant of Commerce, Energy Administration, Lansing Duties: Review grant pro, ials for schools and hospitals for energy con-servation assistance. Research on vanpooling.
Years: June 1980 to August 1980 Job
Title:
Assistant Professor Location: Department of Geography, UCLA Duties : Teach, courses in urban, social, and cultural geography; and en-vironmental quality. -
Years: 1980 to present P,ROFESSIONAL AND CIVIC AFFILIATIONS:
Church: Member, St. John Missionary Baptist Church Falkland, North Carolina Other Organizations:
Gamma Pi Chapter, Gama Theta Upsilon ,
Association of American Geographers Triangle Geographers Association Mississippi Council of Geographic Education Association of Pacific Coast Geographers
Jamas H. Johnson, Jr.
Paga 3 .
t Western Social Science Association Key Club International RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:
"Vanpool Programs: Their Evolution and Potential Improvement Through the Appli-cation of a Location-Allocation Model." (submitted for publication consideration)
"The Role of Community Action in Neighborhood Revitalization: A Study of the Eastown Community,' Grand Rapids." (submitted for publication consideration)
" Impact of Electricity Utility Rate Peform in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan." (submitted for publication consideration) 1 " Neighborhood Revitalization in the U.S." (submitted for publication considera-tion)
" Implications of Electric Utility Rate Reform Legislation for Low Income House-holds in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan." (submitted for publication
- consideration) ,
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" Technology As Hazard." AAG Resource Paper for College Geography, to be published in 1982.
"Towards a Geography of Technological . Hazards."
" Perceived Health Effects of An Abandoned Wast Dump in Fullerton, Cali.fornia."
"The NIMSY Syndrome: Public Reactions Towards Hazardous Waste Disposal Facili-ties."
"A Note on the Similarities and Differences Between Natural and Technological '
Hazards."
" Activity Specqs of the Homeless in Santa Monica, California."
"An Empirical Test of the Public City Hypothesis."
" Hazardous Materials Incidents in the U.S.: A Geographic Analysis."
\
_ PUBLICATIONS:
1977 " Black Migration as a Response to Social Psychological Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," Proceedings, New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society, Volume 6, pp. 42-46 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1978 " Black Migration as a Response to Social-Psychological Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," The Geographical Survey, Volume 7, pp.22 ~(with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.); a revised version.
1978 " Black Philadelphians: A Factorial Ecology," Proceedings, Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, Volume 52, pp. 91-95 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.
and John D. Oliver).
1979 "The Quality of Afro-American Life in Houston, Texas: A Geographical Pers-pective," in J. Pilzer, W. Pinder and R. Proctor, Perspectives on the Urban South: Selected Papers from the Fourth Annual Conference, pp. 207-221. Norfolk, Virginia: Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University, 1979, (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr. and Patricia Johnson).
1979 "Recent Methodological Developments and the Geography of Black America,"
Jam:s H. Johnson, Jr.
Paga 4 The Pennsylvania Geographer, Volume 17, pp.19-30 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1979 "Phenomenology in Geography," The Geographical Survey, Volume 8, pp. 3-9 i (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1979 " Educational C6ncern of Inner City Black Parents," ERIC Document (Spring
> 1979), # to be assigned (with Walter C; Farrell, Jr.).
1979 Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents.
Department of Geography, Michigan State University, May 1979 (with Stanley O. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler).
1979 Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents.
Department of Geography, Michigan State University, August 1979, 220.pp.
(with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler).
1979 Preliminary Review and Analysis of Eelctric Utility Rate Reform: Implica-tions for Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan. Report for Michigan Community Action Agency Association and Oakland-Livingston Human Services Agency, under contract #71-3698. Departments of Geography and Agricultu-ral Economics and Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State Univer-sity, September 24,1979 (with Bradley T. Cullen).
1979 " Spatial Patterns of Alcohol Outlets in the Washington, D.C. Black Comu-nity," Proceedings Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, Vol. 53, pp. 89-97 (with Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1980 " Residential Preference Patterns of Afro-American College Students in Three Different States ," The' Professional Geographer, Vol . 32, pp. 37-42, 1980 " Spatial and Behavioral Aspects of Co0nterstream Migration of Blacks to the South," , in Brunn, Stanley D. and James 0. Wheeler, eds. , The Ameri-can Metropolitan System: Present and Future. New York: John Wiley and Sons, cripta Series in Geography, Victor Winston Publisher,1980, pp. 59-75.
1980 "Locational Conflict and Public Attitudes Regarding the Burial of Nuclear l Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experience," East Lakes Geographer, Vol. 15, pp. 24-40 (with Stanley Brunn and Brian McGirr).
1981 " Evacuation from the Nuclear Technological Disaster at Three Mile Island,"
The Geographical Review, Vol. 71, pp.1-16, (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). -
1981 " Household Energy Consumption in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michi-gan: Some Patterns, Alternatives and Policy Implications. A Report for l the Michigan Community Action Agency Association and the Oakland-Living-ston Human Service Agency. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 65pp.
(with L.M. S6mmers, G.A. Woods, and T.C. Miller).
1982 " Implications of the Black Move to the South," Black Enterprise, Vol.12, pp. 21. .
1982 " Gentrification and Incumbent Upgrading: Benefits and Costs, CAAS News-l letter, in press.
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James H. Johnson, Jr.
Paga 5 .
PRESENTATIONS:
1976 Prairie View A&M University, Department of Economics, Geography, and Social -Science and School of Agriculture, "The Effects of Mechaniza-tion on the Production of Flue-cured Tlbacco in the Coastal Plains of North Carolina," Prairie Veiw, Texas.
1976 Annual Meeting, New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society, Black Migration as a Response to Psycho-Social Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters," , Salem, Massachusetts.
1976 Annual Meeting, Association for the Study of Afro-Amerif;an Life and History, Commentator for session " Considerations in Culture," Chicago, Illinois.
- 1977 Annual Meeting, Popular Culture Association, " Folk Reasons for Early i 20th Century Black Migration," Baltimore, Maryland (with Walter C.
! Farrell, Jr. and Phillip Kitchart).
1977 Cheynty State College, Urban Studies Department, " Data Gathering Tech-niques in the Social Sciences," Cheyney, Pennsylvania.
1978 Annual Meeting, Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Con-l ference on the Urban South, "The Quality of Afro-American Life in Houston, Texas: A Geographic Perspective," Norfolk, Virginia (with Walter C.
Fai rell , Jr. ).
i 1978 Annual Meeting, Michigan Academy of Sciences, " Factors Influencing the Decline of White and Non-White Operated Farms in the Central Coastal i Plains.of North Carolina, 1945-1969," Ypsilanti, Michigan -(with Walter C. Farrell , Jr. ). ,
1978 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science, " Black Philadelphians:
A Factorial Ecology," Champion, Pennsylvania (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
! 1978 Monthly Meeting, Woodbridge Neighborhood Citizens Council, "The Process of Neighborhood Revitalization: A Case Study of the Woodbridge Communi-ty Research Proposal," Detroit, Michigan.
i 1978 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Division, Association of American Geographers.
" Spatial Variations in Attitudes Toward Nuclear Waste Disposal in Alpena, Michigan," East Lansing, Michigan (with Brian J. McGirr).
1979 Annual Meeting, Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Confer-ence on the Urban South, " Black Migration to the South: A Focus on Dur-i - ham, North Carolina," Norfolk Virginia (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1979 Sixth Annual National Conference on the Black Family, " Searching for Elbow Room: A Perspective on Southern Black Migration," Louisville, Kentucky (with Wal ter C. . Farrell , Jr. ).
1979 Annual Meeting, Michigan Academy of Sciences, " Urban Homesteading and Historic Preservation: Problems and Prospects," Mt Pleasant, Michigan (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
i
James H. Johnson, Jr.
Page 6 PRESENTATIONS (cont.):
1979 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science, " Spatial Patterns ]
of Alcohol Outlets in the Washington D C. Black Community," Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania (with Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
1979 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Division. Association of American Geo-graphers, " Electricity Utility Rate Reform or Maintenance of the Status Quo?" Akron, Ohio (with Bradley T. Cullen).
1979 Quarterly Meeting, Michigan Community Action Agency Association, " Pre-liminary Review and Analysis of Electric Utility Rate Reform: Implica-l tions for Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Lansing, Michigan.
1979 Monthly Meeting, Oakland-Livingston Human Services Agency, " Benefits and Costs of Lifeline Electric Utility Rate Reform," Pontiac, Michigan.
1979 Annual Meeting, Southeast Di. vision, Association of American Geographers, "Locational Conflict 'and Public Attitudes Regarding the Burial of Nu-clear Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experience," Nashville, Tennessee (with Stanley D. Brunn and Brian J. McGirr).
1981 Faculty Seminar Series, UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies, " Spatial Perspectives on Counter-stream Black Migration to the South."
1981 Annual Meeting, Western Social Science Association, " Electric Utility Rate Reform: The Significance 'of the Spatial Factor," San Diego, Cali-fornia. -
1981 Annual Meeting,- Southwestern Economics Associa' tion, "Combinational Pro-gramming Solution to a Park and Ride Mass Transit Problem," Dallas, Texas (with Bradley T. Cullen).
1981 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, " Location-Allocation Model of Vanpool Park and Ride Sites: The Lansing, Michigan Example,"
Los Angeles, California (with Bradley T. Cullen and Lawrence M. Somers).
1981 Spring 1981 Faculty Lecture Series, UCLA Bi-Centennial Symposium on the Human and Physical Ecology of the City, "The Ghettoization of Blacks in Los Angeles," UCLA.
1982 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, "Regionalization As A Step Toward Developing A National energy Policy," San Antonio, Texas. ,
1982 Evacuation Plans for the Diable Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Testimony prepared on behalf of the Joint Intervenors, San Louis Obispo, Califor-nia, January 26, 1982.
1982 Annual Meeting Association of Pacific Coast Geographers, " Activity Spaces of the Homeless in Santa Monica, California," Long Beach, California, June 13-16 ,
James H. Johnson, Jr.
Page 7-PRESENTATIONS (cont.):
1982 Annual Meeting, California Council for Geographic Education, "An Empirical Test of the Public City Hypothesis," San Diego, Cali-fornia , April 30.
MEDIA INTERVIEWS AND PUBLICATIONS:
1977 " Incentive to Poor?" response to editorial "No Free Abortion," Tulsa World (August 26, 19770, p. 5.
- 1978 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Nuclear Waste Disposal in North-
! eastern Michigan." .
1979 " Lifeline Bill Will Not Aid Poor," The State News (October 9, 1979) with Bradley T. Cullen.
~1979 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald Zeigler) 1979 WELM, Channel 11, East Lansing, Michigan. " Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D.
Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler)
ARTICLES WRITTEN BY OTHERS ON VARIOUS TOPICS:
1978 Fran Murray, "Alpena Residents Still Oppose Nuclear Waste Site," press release, Department of Information Services, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, September 21, 1978.
1978 United Press International. "Alpena County Still Against a Waste Dump Site," Detroit News (September 24,1978). A number of other Michigan cities' newspapers carried accounts from the original news release.
1979 Fran Murray, "Res'idents of Three Mile Island Area Fear Impact of Disaster,"
press release, Department of Information Services, Michigan State Univer-sity, East Lansing, Michigan, May 18, 1979.
1979 Fran Murray, "U Survey of Three Mile Island Area Issue," MSU News Bulletin
- (October 31, 1979), p. 2.
1979 Ellis Cose, "In the Aftermath of Three Mile Island," Detroit Free Press
- (October 31, 1979), p. 10A.
. 1979 Karen Zurawski, "Eastown Community Association Study Movements of People,"
Photo Reporter (October 1, 1979), p. 1.
Jamnc H. Johnson, Jr.
Page 7 ADDENDUM ,
Publications:
1982 "A Note on Black Migration to the South," Geographical Perspectives, in press.
1982 " Implications of Electric Unility Rate Reform Legislation for Low Income Households in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," The Social Science Journal, in press.
1982 " Impact of Electricity Utility Rate Reform in Oakland and
, Livingston Counties, Michigan," Journal of Environmental Systems, in press. .
1982 "The Role of Community Action in Neighborhood Revitalization,"
Urban Geography, in press.
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l ATTACHMENT 4 Made la United Stat s cf Americ2 e Reprinted from GEocmarwicAs. REVIEW Vol. 71, No.1. January 1981 Copyright @ 1981.by the American Geographical Society of New York
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- l EVACUATION FROM A NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER
- DONALD J. ZEIGLER, STANLEY D. BRbNN, and JAMES H. JOHNSON JR.
A' unique States in peacetime the spring of technological 1979: an accident disaster occurred plant.
in a nudear-generating in northeastern United i
Because of the proliferation of nuclear power plants throughc44 the world, the possibility of comparable disasters Isewhere increases. We chc,se ;
to examine one aspect of the 1979 American disaster: evacuation of the affect-1 ,
population. The nudear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisbug, Pennsylvania, on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, dramatically emphasized the need to broaden the range of evacuation studies to indude technological dis-asters, particularly ones of nudear origin. The crisis at Three Mile Island pro-vided the first opportunity for an empirical examination of the evacuation pro-cess in the aftermath of an unexpected and unprecedented nudear disaster. We used it as a case study in order to seek a foundation for geographical research in the nascent field of evacuation behavior and planning in response to tech-l nological disasters. Our objectives are to identify the spatial and temporal di-l mensions of evacuation behavior among TMI residents, to offer a conceptual model of evacuation-decision making in respcnse to a nuclear disaster, and to suggest the role for geographers in evacuation planning. Because of the unique-ness of the case ' study, we offer generalizations and models to explain the t decision-making process for nudear evacuation not as definitive condusions -
l but rather as hypotheses for future studies.
l Joseph Hans and Thomas Sell compiled a list of more than 500 natural and technological disasters that required evacuation during the period 1960 to 1973.8 Their figures indicated that'an average of almost 90,000 persons per year were
, forced to evacuate their homes because of hurr canes, floods, train derailments 2
t
- We thank Cyula Pauer, director of the Cartography Laboratory, University of Kentucky, for con-l structing the graphics.
l ' Joseph M. Hans Jr. and Thomas C. Sell, Evacuation Risks-An Evaluation (Las Vegas, Nev.: U.S.
, Environmental Protection Agency,1974), pp.101-153.
i e Dn. ZEict.Em is an assistant professor of geography at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508. Dn. Baunn is a professor of geography at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506. Dn. Jounson is an assistant professor of geog.
raphy at the University of Califomia, Los Angeles, Califomia 90024. .
Copyright @ 1981 by the American Geographical Society of Neto York l
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I J 2 Tux cuocRAPHICAE. REVIEW involving toxic chemicals, and other types of disaster. Evacuations from tech- .
nological disasters accounted for only one-fourth of the incidents listed by -
Hans and Sell. In terms of affected area and population each technological
- incident lacked the large-scale effect that characterized natural disasters.8 Part-l ly because of thi.s limited scope of impact, study of evacuation from techno-1 logical disaster has been neglected / Such evacuation has traditionally been
- viewed as a mechanistic problem, merely a question of logistics. In this article !
we hope to advance understanding of individual behavioral patterns during '
evacuation from a technological accident. This understanding will allow public
' oHicials and planners to base emergency-evacuation designs on documented behavioral responses rather than on assumptions derived from the experience of evacuations from natural disasters. ,
The data for this study, hereafter referred to as the Michigan State Univer-
' sity (MSU) study, were obtained from a survey questionnaire mailed to a strat-
~
ified random sample of 300 households in south central Pennsylvania approx-imately one month after the accident at TMI. The sample included 178 households within fifteen miles of the plant and 122 households in Carlisle, Duncannon, and I,ancaster, three communities beyond the fifteen-mile radius that we chose to include in the sample. Of the 267 questionnaires that reached their destinations,150 were completed and returned, a response rate of 56 ,
percent. A detailed description of the survey design and a copy of the ques- ;
tionnaire appear in the final report on the TMI incident that we published j
elsewhere.8 In this article we make reference to two other surveys of TMI area 4 residents, although the f' mal results of each survey are yet to be published. I One survey was conducted by Mountain West Research for the Nuclhar Reg-
- ulatory Commission (NRC), and the second was.done by a group of geogra- l;
, phers at Rutgers University.* '
t These three TMI studies provide the basis for examining the emergency-planning process in general and evacuation planning in particular. Methods of
' Harry Estill Moore and others, Before the Wind: A Study of the Response to Hurricane Carla, !
Disaster Study No. IS (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences / National Reseanh Coun-cil,1963); Thomas E. Drabek, Social Procewes in Disaster: Family Evacuation, Social ProHems, Vol.
16,1%9, pp. 336-349; E. M. Beck, Communication in Crisis: Explaining Evacuation Symbolically, Communications Research, Vol. 2,1975, pp. 24-49; Earl J. Baker, Predicting Response to Hurricane l Wamings: A Reanalysis of Data from Four Studies, Mass Emergencies, Vol. 4,1979, pp. 9-24; and i
Ronald W. Perry, Evacuation Decision. Making in Natural Disasters, Mass Emergencies, Vol. 4,1979,
, pp.25-38.
' 8 Stanley D. Brunn, James H. Johnson Jr., and Donald J. Zeigler, Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents (East 1.ansing, Mich.: Michigan State University, Department of Geography,1979), pp.19-25.
- Mountain West Research, Inc./Three Mile Island Telephone Survey: Preliminary Report on Pro-cedures and Findings by Cynthia B. Flynn, prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
I (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Covemment Printing Office,1979); Mountain West Research, Inc., with
! - SocialImpact Research, Inc., The Social and Economic Effects of the Accider.t at Three Mile Island, by Cynthia B. Flynn and James A. Chalmers, prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Covemment Printing Office,1980); and Kent Bames, James Brosius, ,
Susan Cutter, and James Mitchell, Responses of Impacted Populations to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Accident: An Initial Assessment, Discussion Paper No.13 (New Brunswick, N. J.:
Rutgers University, Department of Geography,1979). The NRC study was conducted by telephone in July and August of 1979, and the Rutgers study was based on a questionnaire mailed in April
- l of 1979. In general the results of the MSU, NRC, and Rutgers studies are mutually supportive; j ,
> major differences are in the conceptualization and the spatial analysis of evacuation behavior and
- decision making, topics that are most fully developed in the MSU report.
l '
I I
l l
. - . , . . , , , . , , . _ - , _ , -- - , _ ._ - e.- ,._ , _, .- ., . , - m - _.. _ __ ._.___ ___ __ -
l EVACUATION FRoM NUCI. EAR DISASTER 3 coping with the consequences of nuclear disasters are certain to attract consid- '
erably more interest than they have to date for several reasons. The TMI acci-dent demonstrated that " societies using nuclear power today must accept major accidents not only as a theoretical possibility of no practical consequence, but -
as a risk to include in actual planning."5 The results of state and nationwide opinion polls conducted since the accident at TMI indicate that supporters of nuclear power, though.now insisting on higher safety standards, still outnum-ber persons who oppose it.' Nuclear-generating .acilities in the short run, at least, will probably continue to operate and to proliferate. Of the existing and planned reactors in the United States,85 percent are sited within sixty miles i of a metropolitan core and thus cast a nuclear threat over a large proportion of '
l the population in the country.' ..
EVACUATION-DECISION MAXING Our study of the Three Mile Island evacuation was one of the first attempts '
to document the process of evacuation under the threat of a severe technological disaster. We designed the questionnaire to ascertain whether the respondent evacuated and to identify the factors that influenced the decision. The results of the survey indicate that 53 percent of the population within twelve miles of TMI evacuated, while only 9 percent beyond this limit left their homes.
We propose a tentative model of the evacuation decision-making process and the spatial outcome of those decisions (Fig.1). The first question posed was whether even to consider evacuation; 21 percent of the sample never considered this question. The remainder considered evacuation, but only31 percent of the sample d,ecided to evacuate. Several external constraints on the flow of deci-sions existed. Some poRntial evacuees were undoubtedly dissuaded from leav-ing by temporal,(when), spatial (where), and operational (how) constraints.
The relationships in the diagram should thus be interpreted to present a system of interlocking decisions rather than a series of unrelated options. Further re-search on evacuations from' nuclear and other technological disasters may sug-gest revision and refinement of the decision-making model and, perhaps even ,
l more importantly,' may help to identify the critical factors that influence the decision-making process. . i Two spatially distinct population groups were identified on the basis of their reaction to the TMI incident. One group, composed of individuals who remained in their usual place of residence during the crisis, may be called the residual population; the other group, comprising the individuals who de-parted, is the redistributed population or evacuees. The MSU study found no l statistically significant differences between these two groups in terms of oc-cupation, income, age of household head, length of residence in south central Pennsylvania, and political ideology. Similarly the NRC study found that dif-ferences in income, education, and occupation had no significant bearing on
. an individual's decision to evacuate.8
- Bent Sorenson, Nuclear Power: "Ihe Answer That Became a Question, Ambio, Vol. 8,1979, p.17.
- Robert C. Mitchell, Public Opinion and Nuclear Power Before and After Three Mile Island, Resources, Resources for the Future, January-April,1980, pp. $-7.
' Policy Research Associates, Socioeconomic Impacts: Nuclear Power Sitin5 (State College, Pa.:
Policy Research Associates for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1977), p. 43.
- Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 24. ,
4 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW l
EVACUATION DECISION MAKING Decisions to be Made SpatialOutcomeof the -
Decision-Making Process .
Consider (no)
Evacuation?
Remain should we at Home Evacuate? ,
(Residual t"- Population)
< A V
Should . What Part _
of Family, ,
E ntire Family (no) Should Evacuate?
Evacuater o o n
< ves When
- Should We Cof si f* Travel to and Where Arrival at
- Should We Cof Destination
~
6I (Evacuees)
It How Should We Cof
[
When Should We Return?
Fic.1-Evacuation-decision making.
Beginning with the study of the population affected by Hurricane Carla, studies of natural disasters have repeatedly confirmed the hypothesis that a family is the unit making the decision about evacuation.' Evacuees from sud-den natural catastrophes typically leave the hazard zone in family groups and remain together during the crisis. The results of our survey suggest that while the majority of evacuees left in complete family units, the proportion of partial
" Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p. 7.
e
L -. -
L EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 5 i e
families fleeing the disaster was larger than would be expected from the con- ; .
clusions of natural-hazard research. In charting the basic patterns of evacuation 4 behavior and in planning many phases of the evacuation process, the concept j of an evacuation unit, as opposed to the individual or the family, may best 4 serve as the fundamental analytical entity. We define an evacuation unit as a j single individual acting alone or a group of individuals acting in unison during i the evacuation process. Because the members of a household may be unable to agree on a decision or on procedures, a single household may generate f
N several evacuation units. In the MSU survey, partial families composed one- dL third of all evacuation units, but in the sample communities beyond fifteen 5 miles from the plant, evacuation units were more likely to be partial families j than complete families. Within six miles of the plant, complete families out- g numbered partial families by more than three to one. The high percentage of S partial families evacuating the TMI area may be accounted for by the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the accident itself and by the inability of
}1 either individuals or public officials to gauge accurately the magnitude of the i malfunction at the plant. %
In his study of the sudden and unexpected impact of the Denver flood of .
1965, Thomas E. Drabek demonstrated that evacuation is not always the result -
of a simple scenario in which families receive a warning, seek to confirm the $
danger, and decide to evacuate.Instead he proposed four separate evacuation .
processes: evacuation by default, evacuation by invitation, evacuation by com- g promise, and evacuation by decision. Although Drabek's classification scheme g was sp'ecific to forced evacuation in response to a natural disaster, we propose ? r a similar, but somewhat modified classification system specific to voluntary y evacuation in response to a technological disaster. In terms of the response of d families in the Three Mile Island area, evacuation seemingly resulted from three $
different pr_ocesses: evacuation by division, in which some members of a family 9 decided to leave while other members decided to remain; evacuation by con- :
f sensus, in which the whole family decided that evacuation was the best course h of protective action to follow land evacuation by compromise, in which a dead- g lock was resolved by a dominant family member in favor of evacuation. Dra- A l bek's model of evacuation by default would be applicable only in the event of d a forced evacuation.
- The principal factor motivating TMI residents to evacuate was concern about h personal safety: 94 percent of the evacuees gave this reason (Table 1). Conflict- {
ing reports from governmental and utility-company officials were another crit- gj ical factor. One-fifth of the evacuees indicated that the news media played a T role in their decision. The NRC study also cited the perception of danger and the volume of confusing information as the major reasons for evacuation."
f
. The reasons given by members of the residual population for not evacuating $y#.
were varied (Table II). The most frequently given explanation was that no order to evacuate was issued. The NRC study also found this response to be the most E.f e frequent argument for staying." The existence of many conflicting reports was @
s a Drabek, footnote 2 above, pp. 345-346.
" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.18.
)c
" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 21. 2
- i ,
E nymies.-
V
6 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW TABLE I-reasons Fva EVACUAUNG FERCINTAGE oF EVACUAT!oN e reasons UNrts Concemed about safety , 91 Conflicting reports from govemment and utility-company officials 48 ,
Conflicting reports from utility company officials 26 Conflictin reports from government officials 24 News me 20 Everyone was evacuating 7 Ordered to evacuate 4 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3.
taste II-rec. sons roR NoT EVACUAUNC FERCENTAGE oF reasons NoNEVACUEES No order to evacuate was issued 62 Too many conflicting reports 42 No apparent reason to evacuate 38 Home was a safe distance from plant 31 Fear of looting 24 No children involved 23 Could not leave job er business 21 No one else in area evacuated 16 NeeJed to take care of farm livestock 6 No place to go 5 Too old to evacuate 3 Handicapped 2 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3.
the second-most frequently cited reason for not evacuating. Paradoxically this was also the second-most widely cited reason among the persons who chose to ei icuate. Conflicting information was thus used by some residents to justify a '. cision to leave and by others to justify a decision to stay.
THE GEOcRAPHY oF EVACUATION FRoM TMI On the basis of the redistribution of population in the immediate aftermath
! of the Three Mile Island disaster, we were able to delineate two distinct but overlapping regions: the zone of evacuation and the evacuation field. The first zone comprises the areas left by the eva.cuees, and the second was the area to which the evacuees fled.,
zone oF EVACUATION ,
l , The pattern of voluntary evacuation from Three Mile Island clearly reveals l a distance-decay relationship that illustrates both the effect of governmental l
directives and the evacuation-shadow phenomenon. The distance-decay func. '
l tion shows a sharp discontinuity approximately twelve miles from the plant
, (Table Ill). Within a twelve mile radius of the disabled reactor,53 percent of the sample reported that at least part of the household evacuated. Beyond -
l twelve miles, only 9 percent of the sample reported evacuation. The sharp ,
1 i
i O
. -- - ~. . - -. . - -- -- . - . ~. _ -
4 1
f IVACUATION FROM NUCLEAR DISASTER 7 TAeLa IE-DisTANCs ANo EVACUAnoN Raspowss rancawrAca or assrowoiwo ,
onstawes sows noussmotos raou wnica
.. rsou run r,ows usussas sVACUArsO 1 to 3 miles 55 4 to 6 miles 56 7 to'9 miles 53 10 to 12 miles 47
. 13 to 15 miles 13 l More than 15 miles 9
- Total sample 31 Sourer
- MSU Survey, text footnote 3. ,.
I discontinuity in the vicinity of twelve miles reveals the impact of two directives
, issued by the office of the governor of Pennsylvania on Friday, March 30. In l ,. the first, everyone within a ten-mile radius was advised to remain Indoors, an action known as sheltering. In the second, all pregnant women and preschool 4 children within a five-mile radius of the plant were advised to evacuate. The
- first directive seemed to establish the critical evacuation boundary in the minds of area residents. Beyond the ten-mile limit the proportion of respondents who 4
evacuated declined sharply.
The evacuation shadow phenomenon is the term used to describe the ten ~
dency of an official evacuation advisory to cause departure from a much larger area than was originally intended. The evacuation shadow cast by the public announcement of a very limited evacuation order extended well beyond the zone to which the order applied. If only the persons advised to evacuate had left the area, the number of evacuees would have been limited to approximately i 2,500 preschool children and pregnant women. Instead an estimated 144,000
- persons, or 39 percent of the population, evacuated their homes in the area as l far as fifteen mile <, from the plant.88 Although the evacuation-shadow phenom-
! enon may be a m.nor consideration in evacuation planning for natural hazards, l the impact of the phenomenon needs to be emphasized in planning for future l nuclear accidents precisely because delineation of the geographical scope of an
, invisible danger such as ionizing radiation is difficult for public officials and j private citizens to determine. In planning for an evacuation from a nuclear i'
disaster, it can therefore be projected that any order to evacuate will cause the departure of residents not only from a designated zone but also from its periph-eries. The planning process should accommodate responses from the two areas.
IVACUATIoM FIELD In order " analyze the spatial patterns of evacuation behavior, we asked each evacuation unit to indicate its destination. Taken together, these desti-1* nations constitute the evacuation field of the survey respondents (Fig. 2). The
. spatial pattern, as inferred from the locations of these sites, suggests a calm
!; and orderly movement rather than a hysterical flight. Evacuees fled a median distance of eighty-five miles from 'Ihree Mile Island. In the NRC study the
, median distance was found to be one hundred miles from the plant."In com-a Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. J.
Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17.
N O
I 1
8 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW t , \ .
DESTINATIONS OF TMI EVACUEES h .
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M c parison with the list of evacuations compiled by Hans and Sell, the median ::
$, flight of evacuation from Three Mile Island is the longest on recc,rd. The longest ll C median distance given in that study was eighty miles in response to Hurricane 3 Carla in 1961. r.
5 Half of the evacuation units in the MSU survey chose destinations between ;!
forty-five and ninety miles from the plant. We define the area in these limits K
- f. as the zone of perceived safiay far from the nuclear site. The inner boundary J of this zone, shown on Fig. 2 by a dashed line, suggests that the evacuees 0 f
0 sought destinations far enough from the' plant to put a territorial buffer between b
E themselves and the source of possible danger. The outerlimit of the zone seems 11 to imply a reluctance on the part of most evacuees to venture any farther than ,
F necessary from home. The zone of perceived safety represents the spatial out- l-come of the tension between centrifugal forces generated by the perception of
{y danger and centripetal forces generated by the attachment to home.
j 6- A strong directional bias, similar to that identified in studies of the intra- y urban mobility process, appears to have influenced the configuration of the b
(. 8
?
. " Hans and Sell, footnote c rJc re, pp. 83-90. l r .
I e :
I I 4
EVACUATION rROM NUC1. EAR D!sAsTER 9 evacuation field. Although only one of every ten evacuation units chose des- i tinations in the quadrant southeast of TMI, almost half chose destinations in ;
the quadrant northwest of the crippled reactor. The directional bias was the [
consequence of several interrelated factors. The most important considerations .
seem to have been a preference for a site upwind from the plant, a psychological (
attraction to the m'ountains in time of danger, and a reluctance to select a ;
- destination in the more densely populated metropolitan areas to the east. These i factors, and possibly cthers, require further investigation before behavioral i models of the evacuation site-selection process can be constructed. }
In addition to sketching the configuration of the actual evacuation field, we =
attempted to delineate a potential evacua' tion field for all r spondents. Everyone lE was asked to supply a choice of destination, if a presidential order had required a full evacuation of the area. The map of potential sites displays a galaxy of l destinations to the north and the west of Three Mile bland and an evacuatka i hollow, an area shunned by evacuees, around the reactor (Fig. 3). The maps l of actual and potential fields are similar in many respects, although the map s of potential destinations has a less clearly defined zone of perceived safety. The i potential destinations were also more widely dispersed, and some were not $,
shown on the map because they were as far away as California, Arizona, and [.
Florida. f H
EVACUATION QUARTERS p The homes of relatives and friends proved to be the prehm' aevacuation - [
quarters among both the actual and the potential evacuees. The MSU survey y found that 81 percent of the evacuees stayed with relatives and friends. The j comparable figures were 78 percent in the NRC study and 74 percent in the [
j Rutgers study.88 These proportions exceed those characteristic of evacuations [4 l
from natural disasters." Despite the ubiquity of hotels and motels in the evac-uation field, their use by evacuees from Three Mile Island was limited, in all !
likelihood, by the financial strain that such accommodations would have im- i posed on family budgets. The use of the designated evacuation shelter in Her-
{
shey, ten miles from the plant, might have been limited by the perceived social l stress of life in mass quarters and by the perceived locational stress that evac- $
l uees would have experienced in a site so close to the threatening reactor. No }
respondent in either the MSU or the Rutgers survey reported utilization of the $
l public shelter in Hershey, and only one of the 1,500 households surveyed in i {
the NRC study used the evacuation shelter.The maximum number of persons j who u*d the shelter in one day was estimated at only 180, a situation that j seems to confirm the finding that " shelter centers are used only if nothing else .
is available or if one cannot financially care for himself." A reasonable con-
. clusion is that the low utilization of the shelter at Hershey was partially the -
I V
l " Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17; and ,
1
, Barnes <nd others, footnote 4 above, p.17. t
" Moere and others, footnote 2 above, p. 93; and Thomas E. Drabek and Keith S. Boggs, Families /
In Disaster: Reactions and Relatives, fournal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 30,1968, pp. 443-451. [
" Barnes and others, footnote 4 abos e, p.17; and Mountain West Research,Inc., with Social !mpact i Research, Inc., foctnote 4 above, p, ii. ,
" Har:s and Sell, footnote 1 above, p. 52: and Mountain West Research, Inc., with SocialImpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 25. .
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10 Tus cEoGRAPHICAL REVIEW 54 7
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result of its location in the ten. mile zone from the reactor. Within ten to twelve lg miles of TMI,47 percent of the survey respondents evacuated. g The pattern of evacuation was influenced by both spatial and temporal y processes (Fig. 4). In this diagram each prism of the cube represents the average j behavior of evacuees originating in each of the six distance zones used in this u analysis. The distance of the home from Three Mile Island was found to be 3 directly related to the destination chosen by an evacuee. In general, persons &
living farther from the plant fled to more distant locations than did individuals r j
living close to the plant. The same tendency was observed in the NRC study.2' g This finding adds a new dimension to evacuation behavior that has not been y previously observed or predicted, and several explanations may tentatively be - I. .
offered. First, persons living closest to the plant were likely to be the most }
concerned about the safety of their homes and property. They were therefore j inclined to remain as close as possible to home. Second, only in the closest '
j distance zones were residents with high personal evacuation thresholds suf. g ficiently motivated to abandon their homes. If these evacuees lived a few miles 4 Y
Mountain West Research, Inc., with SocialImpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17. 3
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't p . . _ _ . . . . . . . . .
svACUAMON FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 11 SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS .
OF EVACUATION I
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Fic. 4-Spatial and temporal dimensions of evacuation.
I further from TMI, they probably vould not have evacu ted at all. Third, resi- '
dents who live far from the disabled reactor would be expected to shun evac-uation sites in the closest zones because they would offerlittle or no improve-ment over the conditions of the home site. It can be hypothesized that evacuees originating at great distances from Three Mile Island would include the seg-ment of the population with low personal evacuation thresholds that would consequently be likely to seek more distant destinations. Fourth, because evac-uation units residing more than fifteen miles away were predominantly women ;
and children, many constraints on evacuation might have lessened. .
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- l 12 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 3 y,
k..j The temporal dimension of evacuation is along the third axis of the evac-
@ uation cube and represents the date and the duration of evacuation (Fig. 4), '
The length of the hinges on which the prisms hang denotes the average du- 3
%n' r
ration of evacuation, while the position of the hinges denotes the average date
- Q of departure and return. The length of stay away from home among respon- 3 dents ranged from one to sixteen days, but 54 percent of all evacuation units
%g returned home two to four days after departure In the three-mile zone closest * {
6 g
v to the reactor,58 percent (none of whom had preschool children) stayed away
}$
three to six days, and 42 percent (all of whom had preschool children) were
- i absent nine to thirteen days. As distance between home and plant increased $
up to the fifteen mile radius, the duration of stay away from home decreased.
p@i $
An increase in the duration of evacuation was observed in respondents from b the three sample communities that were outside the fifteen-mile limit.
4 The majority of evacuation units (54 percent)left on Friday, March 30, two M 1 days after the accident and the beginning of what was termed the crisis-re-sponse period.2' An identical percentage was cited by the Rutgers study, and the NRC study reported 55 percent.28 The departure of so many persons that day can probably be attributed to a combination of factors. First, the governor's
- sheltering and evacuation directives were issued 'on Friday when serious con-sideration of a full evacuation first became public. Second, two major con-k
- ! straints on evacuation were lifted because Friday is the end of both the work-week and the school week. Evacuees living close to the plant were likely to -
leave earlier than those living in the outlying communities. Whereas 77 percent g
of the evacuation units living within six miles of the plant left on or before Friday, only one-third of the evacuation units living ten or more miles away -
Mx evacuated on Friday. All of the evacuees who reported leaving on Monday ,
lived ten or more miles from the plant.
A CoNCEPTUA1. MooEt oP STRESS-IwouCEo EVACUATION ,
g% The decision to evacuate from the Three Mile Island area may be concep-tualized as a behavioral adjustment to the stressful environmental conditions h
g caused by the sudden nuclear accident. Evacuation in anticipation of disaster therefore becomes a stress-management technique whereby an evacuee moves y
K from one location to another in an effort to reduce the strain imposed by the y perception of danger.28 The stress inducing factors during the TMI crisis were y p
y the knowledge that radioactivity had leaked into the environment and, more 2 '
importantly, the fear of an even larger catastrophe, that is, a core meltdown, k
l b
" Russell R. Dynes and others, Report c,f the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force, Staff Report to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Washin5 ton, "
D. C.: U.S. Covernment Printing Office,1979), p. 45. Dynes divided the time after the accider.t in , v the emer5ency-response period from Wednesday, March 28 to Friday morning, March 30, and the h
@3 crisis-response period, beginning on Friday morning, March 30. s
- g' 82 Barnes and others, footnote 4 above, p.17; and Mountain West Research,Inc., with SocialImpact 7 g Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 24. '6; y Stanley D. Brunn, Spatial Causes and Consequences of Psychosocial Stress, in The Geography F
P of Health and Disease (edited by John M. Hunter; Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina, Department of Geography,1974), pp.138-153; W. A. V. Clark and Martin Cadwallader, Lo-d g J' cational Stress and Residential Mobility, Environment and Behat'ior, Vol. 5,1973, pp. 29-41; Harold ),
y
. .c D. Foster, The Geography of Stress, Area, Vol. 11,1979, pp.107-108; and Julian Wolpert. Migration as an Adjustment to Environmental Stress, fournal of Socialissues, Vol. 22,1966, pp.92-102. ll e
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I EVACUATION FROM NUCLEAR DISASTER 13 i
GENERALIZED PERSON AL STRESS CURVES i 1-e oisequil.brium f h
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Evacuarion te,oonse 3s rhreshold E
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Fac. 5--Generalized personal stress curves. 2 t
! l 7
at the plant. Only permanent relocation is a more radical adjustment to per-ceived risk than evacuation. Less radical adaptations surfaced among TMI area f1 residents, for example, modifications of the daily personal routine such as d remaining indoors and constant tuning to local and regional news.
{
EVACUATION-RESPONSE THRESHOLDS At any given distance from Three Mile Island, the propensity of a household j to evacuate depends on the evacuation-response thresholds of individual fam-ily members and on the availability and the desirability cf evacuation quarters q at varying distances from the source of danger. The evacuation-response j threshold is that point along an individual's personal-stress continuum when y the decision to evacuate is made. Individuals with low thresholds will tend to a evacuate even if they live far from the source of danger, while persons with Ij high thresholds will evacuate only if they live very near that source. As distance from the plant increases, the proportion of the evacuating population decreases, I j
and the evacuating population includes an increased number of individuals with low evacuation-response thresholds. The tendency of persons with low 3, e thresholds to move farther from the stricken plant than persons with high j '
thresholds helps to explain the pattern of evacuation-site selection with respect 1 to the two distance variables presented in the evacuation cube (Fig. 4). :I Generalized postaccident personal stress curves offer another temporal mea- ,
sure of responses to the disaster (Fig. 5). The increased perception of stress on Friday is apparent on both stress curves, but only the curve for the evacuees -
rises above the evacuation-response threshold. The precipitous drop in the 1 evacuees' level of perceived stress on Saturday was the result of departing for
14 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW SELECTION OF EVACUATION QUARTERS ,
l Iess e
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l , I k
l Miles from TMt I
i o m as en n to ios iro in iso - tso 500 k
, is 1 su ond m i; l { Hom &$
Family // y( N kj((j g rnends
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6 Nonlocational . 7: Potentional Evacuation Quarters Stress Continuum L Fac. 6-Selection of evacuation quarters. {
t s
t a destination that was considered a safe distance from the plant. Consequently },
I equilibrium was reestablished. (o
! Evacuation may also be motivated by reasons other than the need to alle-l viate stress. Some evacuees' stress curves may peak below individual evacua- l tion-response thresholds, an indication that the persons may have acquiesced 3 j
P i in the decision by their family to evacuate, even though individually thay
! would not have taken the action. Forced evacuation by governmental author- 1 I ities and previously arranged plans to be absent would be other examples of 5 i such a phenomenon. The stress curve of an individual may also rise above the }
evacuation response threshold, but evacuation is not an automatic result. For g example, some individuals may have had no place. to go, may have been con- ,
I fined to an institution, or may have had constraints imposed on their mobility j by a job or other commitment. i r
ne possible evacuation sites that a hypothetical evacuee might consider -
j -
can be entered in a matrix of the search for evacuation quarters, which iden- g
- tifies available options (Fig. 6). Personalized stress curves may be projected g along each axis of the matrix. On the basis of the map of actual evacuation i
destinations, the most desirable locations were between forty-five and ninety a miles from the disabled reactor. ne locational stress curve therefore ap. i f
I pears to dip in this range and to demarcate a zone of perceived safety. A 4 -
personal or nonlocational stress curve, representing the total social and finan-
~
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i- .-
4~
EVACUATION FROM NUCI. EAR DISASTER 15 i .
cial strain perceived to be associated with various types of evacuation quarters, a was drawn to conform to the preferences expressed by survey respondents. ;
I, The cun e peaks at public shelters and diminishes through motels, friends, and relatives. Although the use of second homes and campgrounds would be lim-j g
ited by personal circumstances, they are included as potential destinations. 3
( EVACUATION SPACE-SEARCH MATRIX e
In the space-search matrix the most desirable evacuation sites can be iden-tified by projecting the " lowest" segment of each stress curve into the matrix. $
9 J The area, delineated in Fig. 6 by a shaded border, has three potential sites that would be open to this particular evacuation unit. The final choice under such j
& circumstances would be made on the basis of nonlocational factors that enter J the selection process. While locational factors would prevail to discourage the '
k selection of evacuation sites either very near or very far from the nuclear plant,
~
Z :
d nonlocational factors would influence the selection of a specific site in the 4 geographical zone of perceived safety. Each individual would perceive the
(
stress associated with location and types of evacuation quarters differently.
7
[
This personalized decision-making schema is only a first attempt to analyze 9:
the thinking and the planning by which Individuals and families search in the :
F surrounding territory for an acceptable evacuation destination.
i 0 h
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{g THE GEocRAPHER's Ror.E IN EMERcENCY-RESPONSE Pt.ANNrNo j Until the accident at Three Mile Island, emergency-response and evacuation
- planning received surprisingly little attention from either the Nuclear Regu- E latory Commission or government officials. Prior to the TMI accident, NRC had h required nuclear plant operators to develop emergency plans only for the fa-(p cility itself and the surrounding low-population zone. The zone around TMI J
extended only 2.2 miles from the facility. At the time of the accident, no evac- {
p uation plans existed for the local jurisdictions in the area. Although the three 3
y ;
closest counties had five-mile emergency-response plans on file, only one plan j
{g incorporated a fully developed course cf action. Two emergency plans were j
' developed for the state at the time of the accident, but neither one had been approved by NRC.8* ,
h After noting the low priority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had i :
f-accorded emergency-response planning, the President's Commission on the j I
Accident at Three Mile Island recommended that emergency plans, including evacuation, be designed for existing and proposed nuclear power plants on the ;
@ basis of alternative disaster scenarios for any given plant. Scenarios would
[
c' specify appropriate responses from state and utility-company officiais on the ;
bases of both the magnitude of the disaster and the distance of residents from q -
the generating station. The commission considered a single evacuation plan i
0 based on a fixed set of distances and a fixed set of responses to be inadequate.85 g
t 8' A thorough critique of the plans in effect on March 28,1979 a ,
and of the ed hee planning d ocu-
- c. ments that evolved in response to the nuclear emergency is in Dynes and others, footnote 21 above, pp.101-169. .
- . The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMl (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Covemment Printing Office,1979), pp. 76-77. {
- e
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ^ - -
D~
Tus crocRAPHICAL REVIEW I.'T '
? l 16 E.5
@' [..
In view of the minimal attention to emergency-response planning and the recommendation of the presidential commission to identify appropriate re-y'{.
/ sponses for a range of conditions, there seems to be ample opportunity for
- u.p.
g geographers to contribute to the design and the implementation of emergency-response plans for nuclear emergencies. The role of the geographer in emer- Q iyr' g
i-b gency preparedness is considered most essential in the design of plans for ,
b evacuation and for delivery of emergency services. Expertise in spatial and .W.
k/ locational matters is especially critical in response to nuclear accidents and h other technological disasters. Specific contributions of the geographer include %.
f.E the identification of the areas to be evacuated on the bases of distance and l
direction from the disaster site, the description of the population and settle- C t
ment geographies of the potentially affected areas as a basis for intelligent $%'M decision making, the determination of the transportation routes that would be ky
- f. . most suitable for an evacuation, and the establishment of the locations for
,; i l
evacuation shelters. Additionalimportant contributions that geographers may g g$ make are the prediction of the movement patterns of evacuees in order to ! 4 Q regulate the mass evacuation of an area and to plan for the delivery of emer-
.t g
k gency services and supplies in the evacuation field, the creation of the networks for the communication of disaster information and for the delivery of emer-i '?
g'..
en gency services in the zone of evacuation, and the identificatioa of the locations that would be most difficult to evacuate because of physical constraints, per- b k sonal immobility, or attitudinal resistances.
D
$ In addition to the magnitude of the accident, other factors may require the
$ formulation of contingency plans to cope with the invisible danger and de-j struction associated with a nuclear emergency. Evacuation, particularly if it @h1 - ,
begins as a. voluntary process, will vary according to the season of the year, the day of the week, the specific weather conditions, and the availability of .c gasoline supplies. Factors unique to the affected area will also need to be con- r. 6 sidered in anticipating the public response to an evacuation order, particularly ).E
@ ?%
rural-urban population mix, automobile ownership, ownership of campers,
.E vans, and second homes, available public transportation, proportion of the g
{2} population confined to institutions, location of friends and relatives, obstruc- [@p g$1
! tions in the transportation network, and extent of cooperation among local p
[j governments. A clear understanding of responsibilities and prior planning of f My yQ ! appropriate emergency responses will help to facilitate evacuation from nuclear W ky and other technological disasters.
R.c h R$
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ATTACHMENT 5 I
1 r . , _ - - -
ATTACHMENT 5 Percent Intending to Evacuate by ,
Distance From Plant 1
a 1 I II III Dictance ,
0-5 . 39.9 56.8 77.1 6-10 42.8 53.7 81.7 11-15 39.3 49.5 73.3 16-20 33.8 46.2 62.2 21-25 28.1 36 . 7 48.8 26-30 18.8 28.4 52.4 31-35 23.9 38.4 49.4 l 36 -4 0 18.7 25.9 38.2 l 41-45 26.6 31.8 45.3 46-50 19.1 26.2 42.3 51+ 14.8 -
20.6 37.4 Long Island 25%(217,000) 39%(290,000) 50%(432,000)
S2urce: Shoreham Evacuation Survey, May , 1982.
a I = Scenario 1 II = Scenario 2
. III = Scenario .3 .
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ATTACHMENT 6 i
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ATTACHMENT 6 ,
l Percent Intending to Evacuate By Direction from the Shoreham Plant a
I II III East 24.5 35.8 53.2 West 33.9 45.0 65.4 Total Evacuees 809 1096 1603 Source: Shoreham Evacuation Survey, June 1982.
"I = Scenario 1 II = Scenario 2 III = Scenario 3 e
i.
9
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? ATTACHMENT 7 1
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.; ATTACHMENT 7 Comparison of Actual Evacuation Behavior at TMI and Intended Evacuation Behavior at Shoreham (Scenario 2)
I Shoreham 2
Distance TMI (N W 4) (N=2502) 0-5 58.9 56.8 4
6-10 49.1 53.7 10-15 32.7 49.5 15-25 11.8 33.1 25-40 3.1 29.1 40+ .7 25.2 Source: fFlynn,1979.
Shoreham Evacuation Survey,1982.
=
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e ATTACHMENT 8
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Distance Decay Evacuation Curves .
Scenario 3 Scenario 2 100- -
Scenario i 80-O
- 3 60 ,
a 7
8 40--
o.
20- . -
0- i i i , , , , , , ,
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 - 45 50 55 Distance from plan.t 3
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ATTACHMENT 9 l
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ATTACHMENT 9 l l
. l BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDE VARIABLES I
. VARIABLE N I II III p.
Attitude Toward Nuclear Power Support 551 21.4 49.5 29.0 .0001 Oppose 1007 7.8 37.5 54.7 Indecisive 936 15.5 43.8 40.7 Attitude toward Shoreham Pla'nt yes 873 20.3 49.8 29.9 no 1262 6.74 38.5 54.7 .0001 don't know 354 22.03 38.1 39.8 Evacuation Experience yes 426 14.8 40.4 14.8 NS no 2073 13.5 42.9 43.7
. Children under 5 yes 546 7.7 30.9 61.4 no 1450 15.4 45.7 38.9 .0001 Children 5-17 yes 913 11.9 , 35.7 52.4 no 1581 14.7' 46.4 38.9 .0001 Ma'rital status married 1776 13.9 41.1 45.1 l single 404 13.9 40.8 45.3 .0001 l widowed 116 12.7 64.5 22.9 divorced / separated 148 11.5 40.5 48.0
- l l
Education Some HS or less 205 12.7 51.7 35.6 HS grad 865 13.4 46.8 39.8 .0004 Some college 594 14.8 38.6 46.6 College grad 833 13.6 38.4 48.0 ,
l .
VARIABLE N I II III p.
Income under 15 394 10.4 53.6 36.0 15-25 645 11.9 43.0 45.1 26-35 555 12.6 35.5 51.9 .0001 36-50 359 14.7 37.5 47.9 50+ 213 21.1 39.4 39.4 Age under 25 "
286 10.1 33.9 55.9 25-35 779 10.3 28.9 60.9 36-50 671 13.3 41.9 44.9 .0001 51-65 435' 19.8 57.9 22.3 65+ 322 17.4 63.0 19.6 Political Ideology liberal 479 13.9 38.2 47.8 moderate 1131 13.7 41.9 44.4 NS conservative 739 12.9 46.0 41.1 Race white 2379 13.7 42.7 43.6 black 61 9.84 45.9 44.3 NS other 33 15.2 27.3 57.6 e
Religion catholic 1308 12.5 41.5 46.0 protestant -
649 12.5 46.5 41.0 jewish \ 217 20.2 38.9 41.0 .018 other 115 14.8 46.1 39.1 none 139 14. 4 .- 36.7 48.9 Religiousness very 438 9.36 45.9 44.8 somewhat 1512 -13.8 42.9 43.3 .0022 not at all 455 17.6 36.3 46.4 l
Length of Residence l
all your life 957 13.9 41.5 44.6 more than 20 years 702 15.0 47.7 37.3 .0002 10-20 years 472 14.4 40.9 44.7 5-9 years 192 10.4 32.3 57.3 5 years 173 9.3 42.2 48.6 Sex male 1240 16.3 39.8 44.0 .0004 female 1252 11.3 45.1 43.7
l l
! i N I II III p.
VARIABLE Direction 14.7 47.7 37.6 .0001 scet 696 j 1806 13.3 40.5 46.2 w2ce Cancarn about Radiation from NPP 6.0 36.6 57.3 i
vary worried 1037 14.0 42.7 43.2 gemewhat worried 588 28.3 839 22.7 49.0 not too worried Parceived Danger 52.1 1228 10.0 37.9 vary dangerous 41.3 44.4 .0001 d:ngerous 708 14.2 513 21.6 53.0_ 25.3 not too dangerous Nuclear Opinion shut down all 32.9 61.9 ,
plants 528 5.1 do not build nee 14.8~ 44.3 40.9 .0001 plants 1331 continue to build 20.1 47.6 32.3 plants 492 i Fcith in Technical Experts 36.1
- 1023 16.5 47.4 yss 38.6 50.5 10.9 na 1308 .
Distance from Plant 40.7 55.4 0 939 3.9 '
519 9 . 0 ,- 43.3 47.9 11-10 46.7 32.6 11-20 347 20.8 24.5 43.4 32.2 .0001 31-40 304 j
218 34.4 36.7 29.0 41-50 44.6 20.7 51+
165 34.7 i
Scurce:- Compiled by authors from Shoreham Evacuation Survey, June,1982.
I = Go about business as usual i II = Stay indoors .
III = Evacuate 1
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9 ATTACHMENT 10 9
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ATTACHMENT 10 .
Vita Stephen Cole Birth Date: June 1, 1941 )
Marital Status: Married, two children l Home Address: 1 Evans Lane Setauket, New York 11733 Phone: 516-751-6414 ,
r Office Address: State University of New York at Stony Brook i Department of Sociology Stony Brook, New York 11794
! Phone 516-246-3439 Education: B.A., Columbia College, 1962 1 Ph.D., Columbia University, 1967 Academic Appointments:
1964 Lecturer, Barnard College j 1965 Lecturer, Columbia University
- 1966-67 Instructor of Sociology, Columbia University
! 1966-76 Research Associate, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University 1967-68 Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Columbia University 1968-70 Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 1970-73 Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 1973-Present Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 1977-Present Research Associate, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University Honorary Societies and Awards:
1962 Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum, Laude, Columbia College 1962 Honorary Woodrow Wilson Fellow 1962-63 National Science Foundation Fellow 1963-66 National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service Fellow 1963 Bobbs-Merrill Award 1965-66 John W. Burgess Honorary Fellow of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University ,
1971-72 Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow I.
1976 Sociological Research Association !
l 1978-79 Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship 1978-79 F e l'l o w , Center for Advanced Study in the
! Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California l
l I .
- - . _ ~ . . , , . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ ___ _-_
Stephen Cole page 2 i
Professional Activities:
1966-68 Consultant, Social Welfare Research Council, City University of New York 1970-71 Consultant, Cantor for Research on the Acts of Man, Universi y of Pennsylvania 1973-Present Consultant, Newsday 1973-79 Consultant, Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP), National Academy of Sciences 1974-Present Editorial Board of Sociology of Education, Sociological Quarterly, American Journal ~of Sociology
- 1977 Consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratories 1978 Consultant, Baltimore Sun 1979 Consultant, ' National Bureau of Economic Research ,
~
Publications' BOOKS 1969 The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT. New York: Praeger Press. (Reprinted by Arno Press, 1980).
1972 The Sociological Method. Chicago: Markham Publishers, 1980, 3rd enlarged edition. Chicagos ~
Rand McNally.
1973 Social Stratification in Science (with Jonathan R. Cole). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Paperback edition published in 1981).
1975 The Sociological Orientation. Chicagos Rand McNally, 1979, 2nd enlarged edition.
1978 Peer Review in the National Science Foundation:
Phase I (with Jonathan R. Cole and Leonard Rubin).
. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences-1981 Peer Review in Cie National Science Foundation:
Phase II (with Jonathan R. Cole). Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
1982 An Introduction to Research Methods. Chicagos Rand McNally, forthcoming.
. , , ,_e., , ,- . . _ . , - - - n , . _ . . - - - - , .- ,. . - - , , . - - , . , - - - - - - - - - -
Stephen Cole page 3 i
r PAPERS -
1961 "The Charitable Impulse in Victorian England,"
King's Crown Essays 9, 3-28.
! 1964 " Inventory of Empirical and Theoretical Studies of Anomie" (with Harriet A. Zuckerman). In.
Marshall Clinard (Ed.), Anomie and Deviant
, Behavior. New York: Free Press, pp. 243-313.
. 1967 " Scientific Output and Recognition: A Study in ;
the Operation of the Reward System in Science"
. (with Jonathan R. Cole), American Sociological Review 32, 377-390. Reprinted as a Bobbs-Merrill Reprint and as an XIP Publication.
1968 " Visibility and the Structural Bases of Awareness in Scientific Research" (with Jonathan R. Cole),
American Sociological Review 33, 397-413.
1968 "The Unionization of Teachers: Determinants of l Rank-and-File Support," Sociology of Education 41, ;
66-87. Reprinted in Donald A. Erickson (Ed.),
Educational Organization and Administration.
l Berkeley:.McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977.
1969 " Teacher's Strike: A Study of the conversion of
, Predisposition into Action," American Journal of Sociology 74, 506-520. Reprinted as Warner j Modular Publication R809. Reprinted in Donald 1
Gerwin (Ed.), The Employment of Teachers, Some l
Analytical Views. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing i Corporation, 1974.
l 1969 " Determinants of Faculty Support of Student Demonstrations" (with Hannelore Adamsonc),
Sociology of Education 42, 315-329.
i 1970 " Professional Status and Faculty Support of Student Demonstrations" (with Hannelore Adamsons),
l Public Opinion Quarterly 34', 389-394.
i 1970 " Professional Standing and the Reception of Scientific Papers," American Journal of Sociology 76, 286-306. Reprinted as Bobbs-Merrill Reprint S-678. Reprinted in B.T. Eiduson and L. Beckman (Eds.), Science as a Career Choice. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1973, pp. 499-512.
Reprinted in P. Weingart (Ed.), Wissenschaftsso-ziologie I. Athenaeum Verlag, 1973. l
- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - e. -- - , ,n.. - - - - , . . . - ~
- ~ . - - - -- m -
Stephen Cole page 4 1971 " Measuring the Quality of Sociological Papers" j (with Jonathan R. Cole), American Sociologist 6, 23-29. -
1972 " Continuity and Institutionalization in Science: A Case Study of Failure." In Anthony Obserschall (Ed.), The Establishment of Empirical Sociology.
New York: Harper and Row, pp.73-129. Reprinted. ,
in Wolf Lepennies (Ed.), Geschichte der Soziologie Suhrkamp Verlag (Frankfurt am Main), vol. 4,31-110, 1981.
1972 " Illness and the Legitimation of Failure" (with Robert Lejeune), American Sociolos'ical Review 37, i
- 347-356. Reprinted in Leo G. Reed.or (Ed.), Hand-book of Scales and Indices of Health Behavior, 1977.
Reprinted in Cary S. Kart (Ed.), Dominant Issues in Medical Sociology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1977.
1972 "The Ortega Hypothesis" (with Jonathan R. Cole), ;
Science 178 (October), 368-375. Reprinted in- '
Eire Gebhardt, Sociology of Science.' New York:
Seabury Press, 1980.
1975 "The Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Theories of Deviance as a Case Study." In Lewis Coser (Ed.),
The Idea of Social Structure Papers in Honor of !
j Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, pp. 175-220.
1976 "The Reward System of the Social Sciences" (with Jonathan R. Cole). In Charles Frankel (Ed.),
l Controversies and Decisions: The Social Sciences and Public Policy. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 55-88.
1977 " Peer Review in the American Scientific Community" (with Jonathan R. Cole and Leonard Rubin),
i Scientific American 237, No. 4 (October), 34-41.
l l 1978 " Measuring the Cognitive State of Scientific Disciplines" (with Jonathan R. Cole and Lorraine Dietrich). In Yehuda Elkana, Robert K. Merton, Arnold Thackray, and Harriet A. Zuckerman (Eds.),
Toward a Metric of Science: The Advent of Science Indicators. New York: John Wiley.
1978 " Scientific Reward Systems: A Comparative Analysis." In Robert Alun Jones (Ed.), Research in the Sociology of Knowledge, Science, and Art.
Greenwich, Conn.: Johnson Associates, Inc.
l- pp. 167-190.
8 1
1 Stephen Cole page 5 1979 . "Which Researcher Will Get the Grant," Nature 279, 575-576.
1979 *
"CommentonapaperbyMichae$Overington,"'The American Sociologist 14 (February), 17-19.
1 1979 " Age and Scientific Performance," American Journal of Sociology 84, 950-977.
1980 " Comments on ' Indicators of Scientific Manpower',"
Scientometrics, Vol. 2, No. 5-6, pp. 405-409.
1980 "The Functions of Classical Theory in Contemporary Sociological Research" (with K. Adatto). In i F. Kuklick (Ed. ), Research in the Sociology of l
Knowledge, Science, and Art III. Greenwich,.
Conn.: Johnson Associates, Inc.
! 1981 " Chance-and Consensus in Peer Review," Science i 214, (20 Novocber 1981), 881-886.
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9 ATTACHMENT 11 l
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ATTACb'4ENT 11
-- - "- " t-SHOREMAM EVACUATICN SURVEY -
May 19, 1932 Hello, my name is and I am calling for Suffolk County. We are doing a survey on some current social 1 problems facing people living on Long Island.
2 3
4 5
Considering where you live now, how worried are you about the effects of each of the following on the health.and well-being cf your family?
(Categorias for C. 6 to Q.10) 1=very worried 2=somewhat worried 3=not too worriad DON'T READ [4= Don't Know
[9= Refuse
- 6. toxic waste from garbage dumps 6 .
- 7. air pollution 7
- 8. crime 8
9.radiat. ion from a nucloar powwr plant 9
lO.a fira in your homo 10 In gIneral, how dangerous do you think it would bo to live near each of the following:
(categorics for Q.11 to O. 14) l=very dangwrous 2=dangarous 3=not too dangorous DON'T READ [4= Don't Know
[9=Rafusa 11.an cirport 11 12.a montal hospital - -
12 13.a coal fired powcr plant 13 14.s nucloar pcwar plant 14
15.Would you doseribc yourself as:
1=a supportar of nuclear pow 4r plants as a mocns of providing clectricity.
2=sn opponent of nuclecr power plants, or 3=you heven't mado up your mind yat on this issue?
DON'T READ (9=Refusu
. . 15 1G.Do you think that LILCO should completa and operata the Shoraham nuc1 car power plant?
1=ycs DON'T READ [3= Don't*Know 2=no [9=Refuso 16 17.Which of the fo11cwing comes closest to your opinion on nucloar energy? ,
1=all nuc_acr power plants should be shut down 2=thosa plants which are currently oporating should b= allowcd to continuo to operate, but no new plants should bc built 3=wo should continue to build new nuclear power plants DON'T READ (4= Don't Know
[9=Refuso 17 18.During normal oporation, which typo of electricity plant pollutes tho air tha least:
1=cn, oil-firad plant 2=a coal-fired plant 3=a nucicar-firsd plant 4=you'ro not sura DON'T READ [5=211 about the sr.mo "9=Rcfusa 18 19.During normal opsrstion docs a nuclaar power plan,t give off a 'angorous icvc1 of radiation?
1=ycs 2=no.
CON'T READ C3= Den't Know [9=Refuso 19 20.Whon tha nucicar cccidar.t ock place at Throc Mile Island which of thu following happened?
1=no one dicd but scas pcopis- becam: ill 2=only,a feu p:opls bocame ill 3=no one was hurt although the long term .
affcets are unknown ,
4=you'ro not sura DON'T READ (9=Rafus. 20
1 i
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21.Do you bolieve that technical exports are nblo to securataly evaluate the risks Of nuclear pcwcr?
l=yss 2=no DON'T READ [3= Don't Know
[9=Refuso 21 22.Does LILCO currcatly have an operating nuclear powar plant on Long Island?
1=ycs DON'T READ [3= Don't Know 2=no -
[9=Rafuse ,
22 L5LCO is currently comploting the Shoroham nuclear power plant which is in Suffolk County about 60 miles from New York City.
Supposu that LILCO ccmpletas this plant and,begins to opera 3 it. If thero was an accidant at thu plant how much would you trust cach of the followinc neopic to tall the truth nbout the cccident?
(Catcgorios for Q.23 to 0 26 )
1=a great dual DON'T READ [4= Don't Know 2=somewhat [9= Refuse 3=not at.all 23.the Governor of Ncw York Stato 23 24.a LILCO' official . 24 25.an official from ths fodoral Nuclear Regulatory Commission ',
25 26.tho Suffolk County Exocutivo 26 27-28. As the crew flics, about how cany miles do you think your home is from the Shoraham nuclear powcr pisnt?
DCM'T READ [Ceds Diractly 00 to 983
[ Don't X.*ow= 99 3 27 28 29.Would you censider moving if the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission grantad LILCO r. liccnsa to begin operating Chorchar?
1=ycs 2=no DON'T READ [3= Don't Know ['9=Rafuso
. 29
- 30. Aesuming that the Chorahma nucleer pow:r pinnt is licensed and begins to operato, uo are in-crasted in knowing what you would do if there was cn accident 2t the plant. Supposa that you and your family wuro at home snd there was an cecident at Shoroham.
All people who livod within five miles cf thc plant wcrc cdvised to stay indoors. Do you think that you and the other members of your family would l=go about your normal busincss, or [ SKIP to C.34]
2= stay inside your hcme, er [0 KIP to 0 34 3 3=1cavo your hems sad go semowhcrc else ( .'sS K O . 31)
- CM'T READ [4= Den't Xnew IC=.efurc 7
11A
I 31.Where would you go?
1=somcplace in Suffolk Ccunty 2=semopicca in Nassau C:unty 3=samaplaca in 1:aw York City 4=scmc other placa (specify) 5=ytu don't know [ SKIP to Q. 333 DON'T READ [9=Rcfuse [ SKIP to Q. 333 31 32.In terms cf miles, abuut how far awe.y is this plcea from ycur hems?
l=10 miles cr less 2=11 tc 20 miles 3=21 to 30 miles 4=31 to 40 milcs 5=41 to 50 miles .
6=more thsn 50 miles DON'T Kr.AL [7= Den't Kn:w
[9=Rafusc 32 33.Which of the follcwing would you be most likely to go tc?
l=somebody else's h:.me 2=c public sholter 3=a hotel er nctul 4=somewhere also (specify)
DON'T READ [5= Den't Knuw
[9=Rafusu 33 34.Supposa that you and ycur fcmily wcra at htm: and thera was an
. accident at thc Chercram nucic7r p:ver plant. All pregnant women and pre-scheul chiliron living within five miles of the plant were advised to cvscuct. :7d overy;nw living between six and ten miles
. frcm the plant vcrc civistd t: remain indacrs. Would y:u and cther members of your family:
i l=g: cbcut y:ur narmal basincss, or (3KIF tc C.38 )
2= stay insicc y ar h;na, cr (SKIP tv Q. 38 )
l 3=lec*r0 your h,m: and go scmewharo clsc, (ASK Q. 35) t
( - DCN'T RE.'.D [4= con't Kntw i [c=R4 fuse .
34 l
25.Wharc veuld y:u 3:7 l
i 1=semapinec in Suffclk 0:unty
,2=scm.pl :s 19 X csr. 0:unty 3=semcplac. in :
- Y rk City 4= soma cther pin:c (specify)
S=yee d.n't kn.w i3hI? : Q. 37] *
( DON 'T REl.D [9=fN f uss L'.9EIP to 0 27]
l 35 y
36.In terms of miles, about how far away is this place from your home?
1=10 miles or less 2=11 to 20 miles 3=21 to 30 miles 4=31 to 40 milos 5=41 to 50 miles 6=more than 50 milas DON'T READ [7= Don't Know
[9= Refuse '
36 i
37.Which of the folicwing wculd you be most likely to go to?
l=somobody alsc's hemo 2=a public shelter 3=a hotel or matel 4=somewhere o.lsc
,. (specify)
DON'T READ [5= Den't Know
[9=Rofuse 37
- 38. Suppose that you and ycur family were at hcme and there was an
) ace:fAnt at the Shcroham nuclear powor plant. Everyone living wit'.in ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate.
Would you and.other members of your family:
~
1=go about your normal business, or [ SKIP to 0 43 3 2= stay insida your home, er [CKIP to O. 43 3 3=1cava your home and go semowhere else (ASK Q. 39)
DON'T READ [4= Den't Know ,
( [9=Rofuso o
38 39.Whero would you go?
l= someplace in Suffolk County 2asemaplace ir. Nnssau County 3=semaplace in New Y0rk City
- 4=some oth=r plact (specify)
- 5=yeu don't kn:V [ SKIP to C. 41]
DON'T RE.'.D [9=Rafusc [ SKIP t: Q. 413 39 40.In terms of milos, ab ut 5:w far away is this place from your heme?
1=10 mil;s ;.- Icss 2=11 te. 20 cilas 3=21 to 30 miles 4=31 to 40 miles 5=41 te 50 =iles -
6=ccro thar. 50 miles DON'T READ [7=D:n't Knew
[9=Rwfuse 40
41.Which of the foll wing w:uld you bo most likely to go to?
l=ssmobcdy elsc's hcmc .
2=a public sholter 3=a hctel er m tol 4=semawhore clse
.(spccify)
DON'T READ [5=Dcn't Knsw
[9=Rofuso 41 .
42.Nhenyouheard'thaadviscry't[evacuatewculdyou:
1= leave immediately, or '
2= wait until avsryone in your family could assemble and then lonve DON'T READ [3=D:n't Know [9= Refuse 42 43.In the course of ycur lifetima, hava you aver had to
. evacuate your hcmc in the face of dangar such as a hurricano, flood, er any other danger?
1=yes 2=no DON'T READ [9=Rafuso 43 44.Do you have children under the agu of 5 living at home with you?
l=yes 2=nc DON'T READ [9= Refuse 44 45.Do ycu have children betwecn'the agos of 5 and 17 living at i hema with ycu?
1=yos (ASK O. 46) 2=nc [ SKIP to 0. 473 DON'T READ [9=R. fuse 45 46.If there was an cecident at the Shcroham nuclear pcwor plant and ycur childron were at schoel in an area th:t had te be evacuated, wculd ycu prefer that yaur childrsn l=ba braught hemo er t: a noighber's by bus, er .
2=be bussed t: a shaltar Outside the evacuation aroa, or 3=be kept e.t sch,-1 until you enuld pack them up?
l DON'T READ [4=C:n't Kn:w [9=Rafusu 46 l
---47-.D:. y; u cu rrantly w ;rk full time (30 h urs a weok ..r mare) f.r pay? ,
l l=yes .
2=n; [ SKIP t. O. 493
! DGN'T READ [9=Rcfuse [5KIr t. c. 493 47
'8.About how icng d:es it ususlly take you to get te w:rk in the morning?
1=less than 15 minutes 2=15 tc 30 minutas 3=31 t: 60 minutos 4=61 to 90 minutes 5= mere than 90 minutes' DON'T READ [9= D:n't Know, Refuse _,
48
- .0.Are y;u currently:
l= married [ASK Q. 50]
2= single [ SKIP to Q.523 3=wid.wed [3 KIP t: Q. 523 4= divorced er separatad [ SKIP to Q. 523 DON'T READ [9=Rafuse [ SKIP to Q. 523 49 50.Dces your spcuse currently work full tim'e (30 hcurs a week er mero) for pay?
l =y e s ,,
2=n.: L .g ! g 7.s 4 g DON'T REP.D [9= Refuse]
50 51.About hcw long d0cs it usually take ycur spcuso to get
'to work in the msrning?
1= loss than 15 minutes 2=15 to 30 minutes 3=31 to 60 minutes 4=61 to 90 minutcs 5=mero then 90 minutws DON'T READ [9=D:n't Kncw, Refuse]
. 51 52.What is the last gradc t.f sch::1 that y:u ccmpleted?
1= soma high schccl or loss 2=high sch0 1 Srsduate 3=seme c;11 age
'=c:11oge graduate DON'T READ [9=Refusa]
52 53.What is your age'categ ry?
1= undo: 25 2=25-35 3=36-50 4
4=51-65 5=over 65 r
DON'T READ [9=Rc fuse]
53
54.What is your total family inc;mo?
1=under 315,000 2=S15,000 to $25,000 3=S26,000 t: 535,000 4=S35,000 to $50,000 5=:ver $50,000 DON'T READ [9= Dan't Kn:w, Rcfusc3 54 55.Would y;u considor yourscif te bw politically:
1= liberal 2=middic-of-tha-read 3=censervativo DON' T READ [9=De n ' t Know, Re fuse]
55 56.What is your race?
1-white 2= black 3=other DON'T READ [9= Den't Knuw, Refuse]
56 57.What is your religiun?
1= Catholic 2= Protestant 3 = Jewish DON'T READ [4= ther
[ 5=n.,ne
[9= refuse 57 58.In general w:uld you say y:u nre:
1=vory roligieus 2=semewhat religi;us 3=nst religicus at all DON ' T READ [ 9=D: n ' t Kn;w, Rafuse 58 59.Hcw long havo y u lived on Lang Island?
l=cil y:ur life 24mcra the.n 20 yaars 3=10 t 20 yccrs *
- =5 t: 9 years 5=less than 5 years DON'T RCAD [9=Rcfuso 53 60.What is y;ur sex?
l=malc 2=famale .
60 '
Cculd you plaase givo ma y;ur Oip Ocdc?
61 62 63 6, 65 (Interviewor Pleas + repent back the Zij 0;de t verify carroc-.oss:
THA:IK YCU FOIt YO'd. COOF C.V.TI ~
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