ML20064K278

Affidavit of I Lyon.Actual Emissions of Ar-41 Underestimated by Factor of Several Hundred for Over 15 Yrs.Actual Concentrations Exceed Max Permitted Conditions,Violating License Conditions & Regulations.W/Prof Qualifications

ML20064K278
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	01/04/1983
From:	Lyon I COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
To:
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Text

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UNITZD STATES OF AMERICA O NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION ,.

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/s EEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD eng. 3

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In the Matter of . , ,

" ,',1 ? lgog ", ,JI .

Docket No. 50-142 M o.,

THE REGE!frS OF THE UNIVERSITY ' $ N*,T*/% p CP CALIFORNIA , -

(Proposed Renewal '\. ,

(UCIA Research Reactor)

FacilityLicense) 'x. [3 V l

l DECLARATICN OF DR. IRVING LYON I, Irving Lyon, do declare as follows:

1. I am a research biochemist and consultant in environmental health, with special experience in ma'tters involving radiation from the nuclear fuel cycle and potential impacts'upon human health. A statement of professional qualifications is attached.

2. I am a member of the Southern California Federation of Scientists, and serve on its Executive Board.

3. During 1979 I served as a consultant to the Committee to Eridge the' Gap in an assessment of potential impacts of Argon-41 emissions from the UCIA reactor. I actively participated in the study, the results of which are reported in the CBG publication "The UCLA Nuclear Reactor: Is It Safe?"

j (Cetober 3,1979) and attest that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the mtters contained in that report are true arri correct.

4 As indicated in that report, a review of the record regardin6 the Argon-41 i emissit ns revealed that calibration errors, as well as failure to calibrate monitors at the required intervals, contributed to an urrierestimation of me actual emissions by a factor of several hundred. This error apparently had neo existed without detection during the entire ;rior history of the reactor, j [ga_

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$8 some fifteen years. When corrected, the actual concentrations were found (Dsn g

o to be vastly in excess of the Faximum Fermitted Concentrations, as found in

$$ 10 CFR 20 Appendix 3. ard UCIA was found to be in violation of both its license oo y

conditions and the regulations. Certain other violations were also cited, 8x including loss of the maintenance log with the record for all prior raintenance, ma (D a. o as well as calibration methods; failure to dilute the effluent

2 with 14,000 CFM of air, as required exhaust stack height too short, putting it below both the level required by the license and below the level of the surrounding buildings: removal of an accelerator nozzle, further lowering the effective stack height; and so on. The failure to calibrate at the required intervals was also cited.

5 All of these violations were very significant from a public health and safety standpoint. They caused or contributed to the basic radiation protection regulations teing violated for a period of fifteen years.

6. The response by UCLA to these cited violations was not corrective of the deficiencies. The NRC called an Enforcement Conference because of the asserted " unacceptable response" (unacceptable because UCIA said it would take much of a year before it could fix some of the problems, and the insic violation of ITC would not be resolved).

7. The final action taken amounted to a solution en paper without any change in the actual problem. UCLA proposed not to alter the stack height to the required level, but to alter the required level to the existing stack height; not to put the accelerator nozzle back on, but remove the requirement for the accelerator nozzles and so on. Fost worrisome from a public safety standpoint, rather than reduce the emissions concentrations, which is readily achievable (Argon-41 having a short half-life,1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, decay tanks can be very effectives raised stack height can increase dispersion moving the Fath Sciences air inlet, which results in potential for significant exposures to significant numbers of people within, could mitigate their expcaures),

UCIA proposed to simply divide, on_ taper, the actual emissions concentration by a factor of 460. The response was nost inappropriate, and did nothing to resolve the public health and safety problem.

8. 'Ihus, the conditions first discovered in 1975 remain unchanged today.

9. In order to demonstrate that the reduction factor was appropriate, UCIA was required to undertake a TLD study. Ny review of that study indicates it does the opposite of demonstrate that the exception to the normal GC restrictions was appropriate. The TLD results, even with the poor controls

B (choosing background as ths reading in Sunnyvalo, hundreds of miles cwzy and significantly higher than the TLD placed on Pauley Pavilion, at UCLA, a far more sensible control), indicate unacceptable doses in public areas, far in excess of any reasonable interpretation of ALARA.

lc. The second effort to justify the pretense that the actual concentration was ./460th of that measured was the so-called " Rubin thesis", a student project by one of the UCLA students associated with the reactor.

11. The stated purpose was to demonstrate that the reduction factor applied to the Argon emissions, particularly the component involving dispersion, was appropriately conservative, i.e. that concentrations higher than those estimated by use of the official NRC dispersion model could not reasonably be expected to be exceeded in unrestricted areas. (I understand that UCLA now attempts, as does the NRC Staff, to use the Rubin student project to support throwing out the conservative, official dispersion methodology employed in getting the original exception, using instead the Rubin results.

This is a misuse of the Rubin thesis, which attempted to demonstrate that

, the NRC model was appropriately conservative, not to substitute his sketchy supposedly confirmatory data for the official model it was supoosed to be confirming. Furthermore, it totally misunderstands the pepose of conservative safety analysis.)

12. The Rubin study is filled with flaws. This is to be expected, as it represents merely a student project, not a professional engineering or scientific controlled research study. The thesis cannot be relied upon l to give accurate figures for Mwn= Argon l+1 concentrations at various i

distances from the reactor stack. At best it can be used to give a first impression identification of which locations might be expected to produce the greatest ~ risks to the public, but even that is uncertain, as the radiation exposure from the Argon is not a direct function of the immediate concentration, but of the geometrical configuration, since

)

i the Argon produces both long-travelling gamma and the shorter-travelling beta radiation. (For example, if Rubin estimated concentrations of x l

at waist level on the Math Sciences roof, concentrations many, many times I

higher could readily occur just a few feet above the point where Rubin took his samples. Since gamma travels hundreds of feet in air, the concentration of gamma-emitting material immediately around an individual is not necessarily indicative of the actual dose received-it could be far higher than that estimated on the assumption of uniform concentration, at the measured levels.)

13 The Rubin project did not have, by its own admission, the funds necessary to actually monitor for Argon concentrations. So it used a different substance altogether, SF6 , as a tracer, hoping that the two would behave identically. Bis was not demonstrated.

14 More importantly, Rubin did not have funds for continuous af r-samplir4 devices, i.e. , devices which continuously drew in samples of air over a period of.timo.to integrate the data. Instead, he had some friends stard at different locations and once every half hour pull air into an ordinary syringe. They did this six times at just a few locations. Those six samples, as can be expected, produced extremely wide variations in readings, over several orders of magnitude, (e.g.,14-1417: a range of 7-1277 was found a mile away.) Bus, it would be quite incorrect to say that the Rubin thesis indicated a dispersion factor in a very narrow range. Quite the contrary. The data indicated ranges of several orders of magnitude.

a 15 Yet, despite these very wide variations, no error bars whatsoever are placed on the data, and Rubin committed the massive statistical error of taking the mean of the six retdings. The six readings each, if relevant at all, represented the concentration at one of thousands of possible locations during a period of a few seconds out of an entire year. Yet these samples representing a few seconds were taken to be statistically significant, without error bars and with wide variation between them, and supposedly representative of conditions for an entire year. In other words, samples of a few ceconds are assumed representative of a period of 32 millica seconds (a year's ucrth).

The variation between the samples demonstrates conclusively one could not use the mean for the six samples as statistically significant for a year.

Differ:nt locations, diffbrent atmospheric conditions, diffsrsnt momrntary wind gusts all could produce very substantially higher concentrations.

Rubin's student project was just that. It cannot be used to provide assurance regarding something as potentially significant to public health and safety as radioactive emissions.

16. Yet, even if one were to ignore all the flaws and accept Rubin's data as accurate--which, as indicated, I do not-the results are nonetheless very troubling, from an environmental and public health standpoint. Readings representing a very substantial fraction of the MFC, and thus, many times ALARA, are found in public places. Tne greatest potential exposure-many times what is reasonable under ALARA-- is found within the Math Sciences building, because of the imprudent placement of the reactor stack directly upwind of the main air inlet for the building.

17. Thus, even were cne to accept the validity of the Rubin student project measurements, it would indicate that the reactor was exposing large numbers of people (hundreds or thousands) to concentrations of radio-active Argon, a strong beta-gamma emitter, far in excess of amounts that could be considered ALARA. ALARA is generally taken to mean a very w all fraction of background (on the order of 5%) . The Rubin results, if accepted, would mean doses substantially larger. A research reactor, with a relatively small fission product inventory, fractional operation during the year, and placement on a college campus with a young, more radiosensitive population, including pregnant women, should certainly l

keep exposures to far less than, say, 5 mren/yr. Far larger reactors can f accomplish that. It is reasonably achievable for the far waller UCLA reactor.

18. But the monitoring done to date at the facility is so poor, so badly controlled, and so contradictory, that one cannot know that the ,

exposures are not far higher than the Rubin thesis would suggest. The TLD l data suggest far higher doses. (The argument, incidentally, about the TLDs picking up radiation from the concrete is spurious; the lead brick i

readings indicate, if anything, that the concrete is less radioactive than normal terrestrial background. That TLDs go down when placed on brick is obvious: of course they do, since half of background is terrestrial and comes from below the TLD. Lead nust block it out. But if lead only blocks out 20-30 mr/yr of reading, it is clear the concrete is not the source of the above-

Mckgmind reading, because the dose would have to plummet 40-50 for background plus the arount above tackground the TLD had previously read. The TLD in the crack-in-the-concrete " trick" deserves almost no comments of course putting a TLD in direct contact on several sides with concrete containing thorium, etc., will cause the TLD reading to be above tackground. But that says nothing about whether there is Argon-41 in significant concentrations on the roof of a building elsewhere on campus. Such games, instead of controlled, scientific measurements of the actual dose from the Argon-41, raise substantial questions about the seriousness of those entrusted with radiation protection at the UCLA reactor).

19. I understand that a portable survey instrument was used to attempt to measure, on a single day and at a single, unidentified location on the roof, the Argon contribution. While such attempts are to te encouraged, if there were a several order of magnitude difference in the result between the TLDs and the single reading at a single location on a single day, I would pick the TLDs. A fundamental principle of radiation counting statistics is that probability of error goes down as the number of samples and the counting time goes up. Thus, a score of TLD pairs, placed at a score or so of locations, changed quarterly for several years, all of which produce dose readings in the same range, would te far more reliable than a single shot reading with a portable survey instrument.

20 The most significant facts, in my opinion, are theses the concentration of Argon-41 at the only place it has been measured, where it enters the environment, is several hundred times FTC, the Paximum Femitted Concentration.

Even when averaged over a year, taking into account down time for the reactor, it is still several dozen times FTC. The area in which it is emitted has no physical restrictions and is publicly accessible. The TLD readings indicate unacceptable doses. Argon-41 is readily controllable, through decay tarls and the like. Incralsed dispersion is readily achievable with simply obeying the basic premise of effluent enission that exhaust stacks be substantially above the nearby buildings. Exposure reduction to those in the Kath Sciences Building is readily achievable by moving the air inlet for the building out of the reactor exhaust plume. The nonitoring done at the facility has teen totclly inadequate to demonstrate safety; the measures necessary to protect the public and reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable have not been ta.'p.13 the problems discovered years ago have not been correcteds public healta and safety is at risk so long as these conditions continue.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best or my knowledge and belief.

1 & >

N g'Lyon PhN )

Executed at Ios Angeles California, this day of January, 1983 1

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Statem:nt of Profascional cualificationn DR. IRVING LYCN My name is Irving Lyon. I am a research biochemist and consultant in environmental health, with special experience in matters involving radiation from the nuclear fuel cycle and its effects on human health.

I am also a member of the Southern California Federation of Scientists.

In 1979 I served as a consultant to the Committee to Bridge the Gap and aided in the prepared of the report, The UCLA Reactor: Is it Safe?"

issued by CBG that year.

I received my A.B. degree in 1942 in Zoology and my M.A. in 1949 in Physiology from the University of California at Los Angeles. I received my Ph.D. in 1952 in Physiology from the University of California at Berkeley.

From 1952-54 I was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow in the Medical Sciences at the Harvard School of Public Health. From 1954-58 I was a Research Biochemist, Physiology and Biochemistry of Skin, the Toni Co. ,

Medical Dept., Chicago, Illinois.

From 1958-62 I held a Dual Appointment as Assistant Professor in the Department of Biological Chemistry of the University of Illinois College of Medicine, and as a Research Biochemist, Physiology and Biochemistry of Bone, in the Dept. of Crthopaedic Surgery, Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital, Chicago, Illinois.

From 1962-67 I was Assistant Pro'fessor and then Associate Professor, Eept. of Biochemistry, the Chicago Medical School, Chicago, Illinois.

From 1967-72 I was Professor of Biology, Science Faculty, Bennington College, Bennington, Vermont. -

From 1972-74 I was Senior Visitor Institute of Biological Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen. Denmark.

In 1975 I was Special Consultant to the California State Energy Commission, primarily dealing with environmental impact assessment of nuclear facilities and proposed facilities.

From 1975 to the present, I have been a Consultant on Environmental Health, with a special focus on environmental effects of nuclear fuel cycle co mponents. I was principal researcher for two years for a study on radioactivity in California milk. For the last three years I have been engaged in biomedical research the the Veterans Adr.inistration.

In 1980 and again in 1981 I was a visiting Lecturer at UCLA, teaching environmental effects of radiation from the nuclear fuel cycle.

I have mare than 35 publications in biochemistry and biophysics in professional journals, and have written numerous reports for the State Energy Commission and others regarding draf t environmental impact reports concerning nuclear power projects or other projects involving potential environmental impacts from radioactive materials.

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THE UCLA NUCLEAR REACTOR 4, .

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ISS E SAFE 7 a preliminary report L

Committee to Bridge the Gap 1637 Butler Avenue, Room 203 Los Angeles, CA 90025 (213) 478-0829 October 3, 1979 e

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' Summary 4

o The following report represents the product of a four-month investigation into

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the safety of the UCLA nuclear reactor. Based extensively on documents obtalined' from

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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the rea'Ator staff's own written reports, the Bridge ths Gap study concludes 'th'at 'a history of noncompliance with regulations by the UCLA Nuclear Energy Laboritory (UCLA-NEL) -- and subsequent refusal by the' ERC to enforce th 9se regulahions, -- has pdrmitted continued emissions of rhdioactive Argon gas into populated'breasioE' campus in a manner'that,could readi1y pose a serious risk to the public. The stu'dy 'furYher 'uEges'a shutdoN '8f[til.e ' reactor until 'Its safety can be conclusively demonstrated. ,

N.R.C inspection reports of the UCLA . reactor for the las.t. few years reveal the

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following:

• • Radioac,tive , emissions from the UCLA reactor were vastly underestimated.

fer years.

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• • That actual emissions of radioactive Argon-41 at the reacto$ stack--the only place Argon.has been .directly measured--were fifty times . the maximum concentration normally permitted by the NRC, even when the time the reactor isn't running is' averaged in.

• • That among the reasons UCLA did not know they were exceeding the Maximum Permissible Concentration of radioactive Argon was thct they had not been calibrating the Argon monitor at the required interval and had lost the calibration method for that monitor along with the entire reactor main-tenance log for all years pricr to 1974.

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• • That the construction of tho Math Scienc2s building, downwind from and taller than the reactor - nck, could, in the words of an NRC inspector,

" result in personnel bein; exposed to various concentrations of the gaseous effluent plume. This was because "at one location readily accessible on the roof, it is possible to stand about 25 feet from the ventilation stack and look down upon the stack. Located on other portions of the roof are astronomical observatories, a meteorological laboratory, a seminar room and the upper portions of the math-science: library."

-. . 4

• • That the reactor stack was 17 feet shorter than required and that an

" accelerator nozzle" specified in the Technical Specifications had been removed from the stack, further reducing its effective height.

• n A 1976 study undertab by UCLA graduate student Mark Phillip Ri* bin in stipport

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of an amendment to the. reactor's. operating license (an amendment which the NRC3granted permittingUC(AtocontinuereleasingArgonconcentrationsatthestackinexdEssof the maximum nomally permitted by the Code of Federal Regulations)? states:

• , . :)

Southwesterly winds blow the plume from the ex'haus't stack directly toward a ledge 30 feet away, which overlooks;the stack, and then across the Math Science Complex roof. This roof contains'many astronohy; installations and is accessible to the general'public. . . .':From a radiological safety ,

standpoint, it is unfortunate that the prevailing wind conditions are those that would cause the highest' radiation expegires to the public.

Ru!.in ccncludes: 3 ,,

The highest exposures to the public were discovep'ed ,to be within the Math Science building. This occurs because a main ve'ntilator intak'e for the ,

building was found to be directly in the path of the reactor's exhaust '

plume. .

N'onetheless, the NRC did not even consider the insfde of the &!ath Science building in granting UCLA an exemption from normal restrictions on' Argon-41' releases.

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Ip, part , this was because they had never seen Rubin's thesis. Phen infomed of the ventilation duct / Math Science problem and the Rubin stuily, the NRC radiation inspector for UCLA, R.D. Thomas , admitted he knew of neither. Fe also exnressed surprise to learn that the roof area was not , restricted to the ' ul p ?li.c (there are 7 open doors and

't two elevators opening cn'the reactor complex roof.)

This study demonstrates that nearly every time the NRC expressed concern about ,

i a regulation violation or non-compliance with the reactor's Technical Specifications, l

• l the !!EC chanred the regulation or tech spec rather than require enforcement. In 1

1

short, the NRC's Inspection and Enforcam:nt Division has nalther adrquataly inipict2d t nor snforcad. The conditions uncovered by the URC in 1974 and 1975 remnin EssIntially

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unchanged today--there is stillc50" times thegormally, permitted contration ,of Argon i . . .  ;.,+ .~

coming out of the reactor stack, th'e reactor stack is still below the level of sur '

rounding buildings, the accelerator nozzlh as once 'again been removed, and 'the'" roof remains widely used and openly accessible .to the public. . And further, the h actor .

continues to spew radioactive Argon into a main ventilator duct for the Math Science "

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"In 1974 the annual facility yylcu by the Nuclear Regulatory Cctrmission (NRC)g s

shoucd that previous entimates of the ' ambients of activatedWon gas (Argon 41) besng released to the.cnvironment had been severely undanstimated.'

" Concerned with possibic radiological exposures to the general populace in ex-case of that attooed in the Code ^ of Taderat ' Regulations 110-CFR-20), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission rcatricted the opcrating time on the UCLA reactor and ordered a

• rcvicu by 'the Nuclear Energy Lahdratory (NEL) staff as 'td what steps, must be taken to assure that the UCLA reactor was in compliance uith federat regulations.

" . . . The problem confronted by the NEL staff isas to ensure to the satisfaction of the Nuclear Reputatory Corrmission that at no location beyond the contratted uCi/mt,release the point of the reactor stack, did Argon 41 concentrations exceed 4 x 10~8 tinrit act forth in 10-CFR-20.

. Southucaterly winds blou the plume from the exhaust stack directly towards a ledge 30 feet away, which overtooks the stack, and then across the l'ath Science Compicz wof. This roof contains many astronomy instauations and is accessible to the general public. This is the arca which uas identified as the location of poten-tially highest exposure. Additionally a southocaterly wind uould blow the exhaust This plume directly tasards a major air exditioning intet plenum for the building.

had been identified as another potential danger arca. From a radiological cafety standpoint, it is unfortunate that the prevailing vind conditions are those that would caunc the highest radiation exposurce to the public.

" . . . The highest exposurce to the public ucre discovered .to be uithin the l'ath Science building. This occurs because a main ventilator intake for the building \

uas found to be directly in the path of the reactor's exhaust plume. "

from " Atmospheric Dispersion of Argon 41 from the UCLA Nuclear Reactor", a 1976 Masters Thesis by Mark Phillip Rubin, based on work

" undertaken in support of an Amendment to the operating license for the UCLA nuclear reactor" that,when granted, exempted UCLA from the requirement to keep Argon emissions from the reactor stack to'the Maximum Per-missible Concentration defined in the Code of Federal Regulations.

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, IFEFACE The research upon which the followin6 report is tased was conducted by the Campus Committee to Bridge the Gap, a non-profit educational organization lased, near UCIA.

Some polls have recently , indicated that rany people who support nuclear power at the same time don't want a nuclear facility in their neighborhood.

l Bridge the Cap's research, of which this report is but a first part, indicata-that nuclear power is in our backyards, and that many of these little-known facilities have had a history of accidents, releases of radioactivity, and violations of safety regulations that would worr3 nany cf the staunchest defenders of nuclear development.

Dr. Irving Lyon, a consultant to our project and an expert on the effects of radiation, has of ten said that the medical principle of informed consent nust be applied equally to the question of nuclear development. People have a right to not be exposed to radiation without their knowledge or consent.

But, as we have documented in the report that follows, a significant risk to the public may well have existed at UCLA for years, without students and faculty being either informed or their consent given. The big question one gets fron reading the hundreds of pages of NRC and other documents upon which this study is based is: Who is minding the store? Heither UClA'nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission seem to have been overly concerned with safety regulations. Uhen a regulation is violated, the response has been i to amend rather than enforce the regulation, exempt from enforcement rather than protect.

He hope that our report, the first in a series on local potentially I hacardous nuclear sites in Southern California, will be a smil contribution to exposing a serious problen in a way which pernits an informed ruhlic to chcoce whether to stunt t hai r c.mccn t to Pera Cal osronniu to malation f rom nuclear facili ties.

e ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research undertaken by Bridge the Gap that led to the report which follows was made possible by four months of long, hard work by a team of twenty volunteer researchers. Although their work continues en the next phases of the research into Southern California nuclear sites, some mention of them at this juncture would be appropriate.

Research Director for this project was D'On Voelzke. Research Assistants were Daniel Hirsch, Michael Rese and Fdchael Schwartz. Consultants were Dr.

Sheldon Plotkin, safety engineer in private practice, formerly with RAND, TRW and Hughes and Dr. Irving Lyon, an expert on the biological and environmental effects of radiation / radioactivity and formerly a Special Consultant to the California Energy Commission, a Professor at Pennington College, and a researcher at the Chicago Medical School. The list of others wh7 assisted in the research and development of this report is too long to reprint here, but appreciation is conveyed to each and every person who put in the long hours that made this report possible. Particular appreciation is expressed to the many members of the Alliance for Survival chapter at UCLA who helped with the project.

Bridge the Gap was founded at UCIA in 1970 and has been active in social concerns ever since. Among its purposes are to communicate the concerns of the campus community to the outside community on important insnes such as that of nuclear energy, and to educate the community about ways of

" bridging the gap" between our present world and dwindling non-renewable energy sources (such as oil and uranium) and a necded future world based on safe, renewable resources. Eridge the Gap supports itself solely on individual donations. Connents on the report which follows, questions about other Eridge the Gap ac t ivit im, or re.pmsts to te placed on our trailing list (free) can be aMrensed to : CAMPUS COMMITTEE TO FRIDGE THE CAP (213) 478-0824 163T ' "irr Ave. Roon 203 Los Angcles, CA 90025

I CH M*^~'CV OF EVENTS SICW' JG ARGON-41 EMISSIONS PROM THE UCLA REACTOR i

Construction of the UCLA Nuclear Energy Laboratory (UCLA-NEL) beran in 1959, and operation began in 1960. During the early 1960's, concern was expressed in a series of correspcndence between the Atomic Energy Commission and the UCLA Muclear Energy Laboratory over methods of measuring Argon-41 emissions from the reactor.* This con-4 cern was increased over the years when it was discovered that a new building, Math i

Sciences, had been placed downwind of the reactor stack and that Argon emissions 'had been scverely undercatinated. " ( A-1)

October 1974 On October 15, 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission notified UCLA that during an insp. on September 30 - October 2',1974, "It taas found that acriain o t' your ac-tivws appeared to be in violation of AEC requircments." (D-1) The AEC demanded in writing within 20 days a statement outlining the corrective steps to be taken. They elso expressed concern about "ycur management control system that resulted in these violations. " ( D-2) The violations were identified as:

, 1. Scotion VIII X.3 of the technical specifications requirc that a record k be maintained of the principal maintenanco activitics and the reasons

therefor. Contrary to this rcquirement, the record of maintenanco ac-

' tivitics prior to l'ay 1974 was missing.

2. Scotion II B.3 of the technical specifications requirca that air drawn i from the reactor room he cxhausted to the atmospherc thmugh an accelcra-tion nozzle at 125 feet above grotoid Zevel. Contwry to this requirement, no accalcration nozzic cristed at the cnd of the stack. (D-3)

As the inspection report /!50-142/74-01 stated about the loss of the maintenance

Log- 'The loss of this log vas of particular concern since mcords such as instrument i calibrations ocw not othensiac availabic, and tuo kcy laboratory personnel nith knowledge of previous maintenanec had left UCLA employ. " (D-4) It should be noted

, that "at the time of the inspcetion, the reactor was shut dann for the repair of a 1 vater leak. " (D-4) i

• Source: NRC Biblier.raphy for UCLA-NEL Docket 1

i

Cicewhere in the sare report , the inspector stated in raference to the accelera-tion nozzle , "7Fc lican.?cc Fad no c planation 'cr the abcance of thin device. " (D-2)

He added that the stack was at least 8 feet shorter than required by the Technical 1pecifications.

At the same time that the NRC Inspection and Enforcement Office notified UCLA of the violations found in the last inspection, it sent a copy of that inspection report to NPC headquarters with a cover letter which stated:

The items of noncompliance appcar to bc oversights Ohich indicate a necd for norc disciplincd management. Thin conclusion is reinforced by previous expericnce with this licenecc. Consequently, oc intend to broaden the in-spection effort at this facility until improved performanco is cuident. "

(E-4)

"EC r'Ailti n e' cin11st J.o. Baird inferr ' ' Eri 'co the Ga' th,t he th ucht thic.

"brom'cr ef fert' amounto to cne radiation inspection a year, where previously they had been less frequent. He further said that he believed this policy to be still in e f fe ct . * ,

L'evcmber 1974 .

In a response dated November 4, 1974, UCLA's Environmental Health and Safety Officer, Harold V. Brown, wrote , referring to the lost maintenance log: "It appears that it pill never reappear. " Brown also stated that an acceleration nozzle had been put on the reactor stack in response to the notice of violation (It has since been removed again--see photos in appendix.) There was no specific response regarding the question of stack height. (E-4)

January 1975 i

The first radiation safety inspection in the broadened program took place on January 23-24, 1975, by F. A. Uenslawski, an NRC Radiatir7 Specialist. During this inopoeti.cn. Nenslawski determined that:

t

1. The radiation monitors had not been calibrated as often as required.

t I

i 2. Ventilation exhaust air from the reactor room was not being diluted to 14,000 cubic feet per minute and was not being released at 125 feet above ground level as required.

• In-percon interview with J.B. Baird at the Bridge the Gap office on Sept. 27, 1979.

l

3. That although the corrective actions described in UCLA's November 4, i 1974, letter had indeed been implenented, the ventilation exhaust system

) required additional modifications to neet the requirements of the Technical I . Spe cifications .

! 4 The metho1 of radioactive particulate sample collection in<the ventila-i tion exhaust duct did not appear to assure the collection of a representa-tive sample.

l .

' 5. In what were described as "othcr cignificott findinga," the inspector l

reported that "the licensca has tentatively .found an error v'Iticlucould l . result in previoustat recorded and reported discharge concentrations and quanti, tics being low by an approxina,te factor of- t.cn." (cmphasis added.I G. In an additional "eignificant. finding," the . inspector stated in reference to the' Math Science building, that " extensive construction of nert facifi, tics around the reactor has resulted in a condition thich could conceivablir have l personnet mmersed in Die discharge plume from the ucntitation exhaust

\

stach."

(source: Inspection report 50-142/75-01)

Later on in the same, inspection report, when the NEL representative was reminded that the dilution flow rete through the reactor stack was below the required level. -

j and that the release height was only 108 feet rather than the 125 feet' required, the " licensee reprenantative otated that to date no correctivc action had been taken .

and that funding the modification is a problem. The licensco was unabic-to specif?1

- when the ventilation.sye. tem would be modified to meet .thel technical specifications. "

(G-3) As the NRC Radiation Specialist later stated, "There crists a potential for l

i personnel exposure to the gascous effluent plume from the ventilation exhaust. " (H-1)

He described this potential for exposure as 'rcalistic."

In a key passage of the January 1975 Inspection Report, MRC Radiation Specialist Wenslawski wrote:

Phile touring the roof of Boelter llall-l'ath Science building complex, in which the reactor is located, the inspector noted that the discharge of the ventilation atack cxtenda about 15 feet above the cighth floor roof. Other portions of the building complex cxtend to a partial ninth and tenth floor. M onc location n:adLCtj accMbh en the reof, it L' pouthsc to Yta' hu,t ?5 le?t fkon t%e ventitation stack and fooh down upon tJte stacF. Located on other portions of the roof arc astroncmical observatorics, a meteoroiopical laboratory, a sminar room and the uppe>t portions of tite mant-science Libra >ut. T!ith the exception of the library. access to these facilities is via the roof top. (G-4) (emphasis added)

It is interesting to note that despite Wenslawski's report about ready public access to the rocf, the NRC assigned a 10% occupancy factor to it , arping that 90% of the working day no one is up there. NRC Inspector J.B. Baird later admitted that only

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transit tire was considerei in making that estinate, not any time spent in the seminar mom or laboratories or tire spent eatine lunch on the roof.

Wenslawski continued:

The inspector discussed with the licensee the possibility that the configuration

• of thesc facilities with respect to the ventilation stack could resnLt in per-sannet being expased to various concentraticns of the 9ascous efftuent ptume.

The licensee agreed that exposures toere conceivahte and ntated that they had once considered making portions of the roof a rentricted arca but rejected the concept because it was too impractical. The licensee recognized .that increasing the height of the stach to the required elevation, 17 feet higher, and increasing kJ1e flowrate viitt liketri afleviate tite condition, but not necessaritti climinate it. (G-4,5) (cmphasis added)

And yet, the stack height remains today unchanced, and the flowrate is at correct levels only by virtue of havinc once again removed the accelerator nozzle from the top of the stack. This, despite the admission that public exposures to the radioactive plume were conceivable on a readily accessible roof near the stack. The passage want on:

liovhcit, it uas the licensco 's belicf th'at'due to rapid atmospheric dispersion and limited occupancu times an exposure in exccas of 10 CFR 20 limits could not occur. I'ther than rctatively insensitive radiation surucys (Paragraph 5.d), the licensee couCd not quantitativettj demonstrate tite actual radiofopical cffcets.

(G-5) (cmphasts added)

Nrarraph 5.d. referred to above stated , "Other than a feu contarrination surveys out-side the restricted arca of the facility. .. the licenscc casentially conducts no rou-tinc environmental survcillance. " Later, Wenslawski reports that UCLA considers one of their main sampling techniques "to be somcMhat crude and rceults are only intended to give a 'haZ Zpark ' es timate. " Aud in Paragraph 3.c. of the same report, Wenslawski questioned the representativeness of the sampling technique used by the reactor staff in monitoring for particulate contamination. Upon askinr the reactor staff if they had used a particular Guide ( ANSI N13.1-1969) in desi.pninr their monitoring system, The licanacc stated that he nas unaparc of the ??13.1 standard and after a dancrip-t cn of its ccntent by the incractor, the licensec agreed to coaluate the parti-culate sa"mling systcm in light of the li!SI standard. (G-7) -

Actual Arron Emissions The problem of ready public access to areas near the reactor stack was compounded ts; the di<:c.wery that "p*tevious es timates of .tlte amounts of activated avgan aas ( Ataon u _ _ _ .____ _ _ _ - .

_s_

41) being netcased to the enviter:+ ' tad Fcen sn oda underes trmated." Thic severe underestimation apparently had gone undetected for years. Several factors were in-volved in the error coming to light: 1) the loss of the maintenance log for years J prior to 1974, 2) the failure of the reactor staff to calibrate the Argon monitor at required intervals ( As Wenslawski wrote: "The fnew] maintenance log chats no record of this monitor being calibrated. " (G-6)), and 3) the inaccuracy of the Argon monitor itself (it was eventually replaced. )

.e problem of calibration was severely complicated by the loss of the maintenance log. As Wenslawski wrote in this key inspection report:

Yhen questioned about the validity of the calibration curve and the dctcctor response to Ar-41 versus C-14, the licensec stated that the calibrution curva ruas experimentally generated years ago and that documentation no longer exists tobicit shotos hoto the curve was developed or tchat crror it may have. The licensac stated that a recent calculation performed to compara the expected responsa of Ar-41 to that of C-14 indicates that the existing calibration curve is in chror by a factor of ten. The licensec representative further stated that he is convinced these calculations arc correct. ^ (G-6,7) (cmphasis added)

In the end, it was determined that while the calibration curve may have been off by a factor of ten, reported eniscions had been off .by_a factor of about three hundred.

For example, in 1971 the reactor reported Argon-41 releases of 0.3 Curies *: after detection of the monitoring error, the most recent report was 58 Curies for 1978, a year in which the reactor ran only about 2/3 as often. (Source: UCLA-NEL annual reports for 1971 and 1978). In UCLA's response to the NFC Notice of Violation following Wen-slawski's inspection, the reactor Director, Thomas Ilicks, said about the calibration nethod for the Argon monitor:

The history of the creaticn of the original scalc factor has been lost, bu.t arguments have been fowa'tded to the cffect that the original scalc factor included annual arcmaing andhe pline Ronipation factors. (J-5) (cmphas.is added)

During Henslawski's January 1975 inspection he discussed with the reactor staff the interpretation of two parts of their Technical Specifications that seemed to him contradictory with respect to allowing averagint of radioactive discharges. His in-

• A Curie is a unit of radioactivity (3.7 x 10 10 disintenrations per second): it is the nnount ~ r- M ,ct!.it; 'ssociated with one gran of pure radium or its equivalent.

One Curie is a sizeable amount of radioactivity: in laboratories , one handles even 1/1000th of a Curie with creat care (e.g. , in a lead box at some distance).

.s_

terpretation of Section VIII .!!.1.F . w,, that it . . .

implica that averagin.?; of u :sargc conacntrations is not authoriacd. The licen-see stated that they hava almuc acnnidared averaging to be authorized and ntated that the now-I (w'i p~ sr .D c'w cmcmtv fint . . . is tact 1 abouc de concentration limit of Appendix B, Table II, 20CFR20 [the applicable section

• of the Code of Tederal Regulations 1 and fl1 cit would he unahte to operate if thet] .

didn't average concentAdion6 over a year. (G-9) (emphasis added)

However, the inspector called his superiors and was told to permit averacing.(T-2)

The NRC inspector ended his January 1975 report with a section on what the NEL staf f was and wasn't d6ing to meet the requirements written into their Technical Specifications that emissions of radioactivity be kept As Low As Practical ( ALAP standards , now called ALARA standards for As Low As Peasonably Achievable). ALAP limits are renerally 1/100th as high as the Maximum Permissible Concentration limits that had been concerning the NRC about the UCLA reactor. It is quite apparent that if there were enough concern to worry the NRC that the reactor was exceeding the MPC standards , it was almost certain that the ALARA standards , written into the NEL's Technical Specifications and one hundred times more stringent, were being violated.

Although apparently not required to have ALARA standards written into their Technical Specifications, UCLA chose to, and it is our contention that they are thus bound by the ALARA standards in Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.109 -- the only numerical ALARA standards. There is little doubt they are violating these standards. It is interca t inr to note further that huge nuclear power plants producing commercini olnetricity are required to show that they will Fe able to meet ALARA standards before they will even t e granted a license. The UCLA reactor, far smaller, is apparently unabic to meet the standards set for larre commercial reactors!

Wenslawski wrote at the conclusion of his report , in a section marked ALAP:

Tha licanoce vaa qucetioned vith respect to action taken to meet Section V.D.

j of the Technical Specificat u:n that reicane ot' rtidioactivity from the reaator facility chall bc kept to es r eta a Cevel as prac tical. The licanece stated that

\

j efforta in thia behalf verc prirutvily air:cd at minimizing the possibility of gencrating ? nim and altar:pling M i m ink tha zulease of ,*m >n JWu t1w maa/w . (G 11) (cryha$is added)

I - - - . . -.

cruary and ' fare , 1975 On February 21, 1975, the liuclear Reculatory Commission sent to UCLA a !Jotice of Violation ccvering the concerns discovered by Weaslawski's inspection. (F-2) In a response from Lab Director Thomas Hicks , Hicks wrote that the 'IEL was requesting "a complete improvement project from campus ccu an" to triple the horsepower of one of the exhaust fans , add the necessary footage to the exhaust stack , and provide bracing for the stack. (I-2)

Lespite UCLA's estimate that these improvements could be completed in six to nine nonths , the stack remains the same heir.ht and, indeed , the accelerator nozzle has once arain been removed, reducing further the effective stack height. UCLA included in their response to the flotice of Violation a computer model by Applied Nucleonien cu-ti tlad " Atmospheric Dispersion Analysis of Argon 41 Dischatyes from the tiCLA Nuclear Reactor, (11) dated February 1975 (within veeks of Wenslawski's inspection). The report cencluied that a modified stack would increase dispersion by more than four-fold (I-6 ) , but the stack appears not to have been modified despite these conclusions and

i te the pledra by Lab Director liicks to the t RC in March of 1975 to modify the l ctack Ly, among other things, increasing its height. (I-2)

April 1975 ,

UCLA's proposal to take six to nine months to increase the stack height and flow rate within the stack was deemed by the NRC to be an "unacceptahic rcspense" and an

(

anforcement hearing was convened in Walnut Creek (!!RC regional headquarters) on April l 11, 1975 with representatives of the UCLA-NEL present. UCLA's response to the NRC

!!otice of Violation . . .

van canaidered w:accaptabic f,r too reacena: 1) the c.rtended time perial pwponed in upprude the ventilaticn c.rhaust system nithin Tcchnical @ccifications, and

") the reviacd calibration figurc on the aaneoun effluent monitor had revcaled t hat mutt'al a:Trage dinahrnya censacitzutions pare abouc limits pamitted by the TcJnical Qceif:eations (co:wntially 10 CFR 20 limite). (Y-1)

The NRC tcok the c ort-term action action at the enforcement conference of re-stri tine tho . perat ine. hours of the (fCLA reactor (to reduce Arron emissions by re-l l

ducing the tim tha re actor ran). " a letter dated April le,1975, the NPC's Engelken wrote the UCLA Envirenm^ntal Fealth and Safety Officer, Harold V. Brown, confirming the long-term action to be taken by UCLA:

You uill seek amen &cnt to your Technical Spccificatione in the tuo arcac in- .

volving r:cncompliance. %:ia effort chould proceed on a priority basis.

Essentially, the NRC permitted UCLA to alter the rules to fit their operating -

bahavior rather than alter their operations to fit the rules. As the NRC put it:

Ac a pcmanent solution, the licanace vould pursue uith HRC Licaneing a revised Technical Specific : tion that vould account for the higher level of radioactive gaseous dischargeo. Inherent in this action vould be the need to resolve the discrcpancy hatucen the ventilation exhaust system denign capabilitics and Tachnical Specification requirements. (K-1)

UCLA, in a letter dated April 15, 1975, agreed to keep the annual average Argon-41 releases from exceeding the Maximum Permissible Concentration of 4 x 10-8 uCi/ml in the short-run, and in the long-run to seek an amendment the primary purpose of which "shall be to establish retcase limits .in excess of V CFR 2n fppendix R, Tahte

11. 71w amendmont vill be sought unt'cr the provieic:1s of 10 CPR 20.1GGb. " (J-2 )

(er*phasis added)

This mrendment to UCLA reactor's operating license (Amendment 10) was indeed re-quested under the prdvisions of the Code of Federal Regulations cited above. It per-mits a facility to be exempted from Maximum Permissible Concentration requirements at the release point (the stack) only if:

(1) T'w applicant han made a reasonabic cffort to m:ninine the mdioactivity contained in affluenta to unrcotricted arcan; and (2) That it is not likely that radioactiva matcrial discharacd in the effluent would result in the exposure of an individual to concentmtions of radioactiva matcrial in air or water execcding the limits in lppendix "B", Table II of this part.

A review of the relevant UCLA and NRC documents suggests that UCLA made the bare minimum ef forts to reduce the Argon emissions as required in point (1) above and made culy ballpark cutimates that are questionable at best in order to show compliance with item (2) of the federal regulat ion. The prime attempt by the NEL staff to reduce

-9 the radioactivity in the effluent release was , by their own admission , "over-mbitious and undar-instruented. " (T-35) It, not surprisine.1y, failed.

CorErcialpowerplcatsusedecaytankstoredacetheirradioactivityemissions of short-lived radionuclides like Argon-41 (which has a half-life of 1.83 hours9.606481e-4 days <br />0.0231 hours <br />1.372354e-4 weeks <br />3.15815e-5 months <br />; it Is generally considered to take ten half-lives before a radionuclide has decayed com-

'f pletely ) . The principle is simple: Isolate the radioactive substance long enough so that it can decay away before being released to the atmosphere. There are problems with decay tanks, prirrarily the possibility of exposure to nuclear facility workers and the possibility of an accidental release of the material stored in the tank before it has had a chance to decay. But decay tanks are used as a major way of dealing with the kind of problem posed by the Argon-41 at UCLA.

Thus, it is interesting to note that during a 1979 inspection the NEL staff told the URC inspector that "a change to Section V.E. of the Technical . Specifications %as Leing considered due to a projected increase in the reactor use factor . . . If it is detemined that the increased use factor vill produce an unacceptable increase of hyon-41 ccncentrations, the licensec proposed to une a compressor and decay tank eystem to collect the Argon-41 for storage and relcase after a decay period. " ()-6) And in a 1976 report by the NEL (C-35) we find another anticipated reactor chanre that would increase Argon levels :

In order to attract more businces and to clim::nate our reactor usera ' shopping elsenhere for a higbar neutron flu.r, the reactor may be slightiti altered to go to higher pover levels, i.c., 500 kN or i W. The current licensed powcr level is only 100 kW.

In a meeting on October 1 between the tiEL and Bridge the Gap staffs , Neal Ostrander, the Labor < story Mannrer, confirmed that the MEL staff was indeed contemplating consider-ably incrcasing the reactor use factor (he said they would like to increase it from its present 18.8% lirit to 60-100% use). He said the NEL staff was also considering increasing the power level (although this was " internally controversial") and that, indeed, a decay tank sys te is boine .vnnidere.1 beennea of the inercased !irgou 41 that would be pinduced if such an expansien took place. (It is lateresting to note, as an ,

aside, that Mr. natvander indicated that the NET. staff wished first to get reJicensed--

their present license expires in March 1370--and then request increased operating time and perhaps increased pcwer.)

The logical questicn that must be asked is if UCLA is now considering putting in a d; cay tank to limit emissions because it wishes to increase oreratinr time er pcwer .

to attract more business , uhy wasn't a decay tank put in when the NRC initially cited them for exceeding maximum permitted concentrations of Argon in their stack effluent?

Althourh we Jo not necassarily en'crse the decay tank .rption , we must ask : If it could be done to attract more business, wny hasn't it been done to protect public safety?

And why did the NRC grant UCLA Amendment 10, permitting it to exceed required limits at the reactor stack , when the Code of Federal Regulations requires that the licensee r~ake reasonabic effort to minimicc radioactivit!!" released to the atmosphere before censidering an exemption from the requirement to keep releasec beinw Maximum Permincible Concentration levels? We will see that the second requirement that must be met before m excention can be granted--that the public cannot receive exposures in an unrestrictec are, in excess of MPC--was also inadequately examined, both by the UCLA staff and the

'IRC.

The._ Rubin Thesis In surc ort of the requested amendment to the HEL operating license, a graduate student , Mark Phillip Rubin, undartook a study using sulfur hexafluoride (SF6 ) as a

' tracer to estimate air dispersion factors and thus estimate argon concentrations at i

various sites around the reactor stack. Rubin indicated in his master's thesis ,

)

)

which reported on the results of his study, that instruments that could measure the mual argon eeneentrat ions at locations beyond the stack were not available at UCLA f Tn- that money was not available for purchasing or fabricating then. So, by using another substance, Srg , that he could measure , Rubin hoped to be able to simulate Arron dinpersien. As shown in the passage quoted at the beginning of this report, and in the two plume diagrams contained in the Appendix, Rubin found that the pre-

r vailing winds create two areas of createst public expo..ure -the roof of Math Sciences ,

with the astronomy and retecroloc' ul installations and ready public access , and the inside of Masn Sciences, because a main ventilator intake for the building was found in the path of .the - exhaust plume. The highest exposure figures Rubin found were inside the building. However, by averaging operating time and, for the roof, also using a 10% occupancy factor, Rubin was able to argue that the MPC was not likely to be ex-ceeded in any populated area.

We find eeny problems with the study. Only three days of tests were conducted, and each test only three hours in duration. Only three locations inside the building uere tested, each only once , one on one day and two on another. Vast variation in readings were found in the samples taken every half hour (air pulled quickly into a syringe)--variation of up to 600:1 in the six samples taken over a three hour period, explained by Rubin as being due to air shifting when the wind gusts. He admitted that a device which slowly pulls air into the syringe over a half-hour period would have resolved that problem, but didn't use such equipment. Studies suggesting that heavy molecules like SF 6 behave over short distances similarly to lighter molecules like Ar41 are mentioned, but there is no citation for that. No probability of error is given for his concluding statistics--no doubt because six samples in one location over three hours would not be considered a large enough sample to be given any statistical significance in making a judgment about yearly average concentrations. One relatively high reading (given the distance) was reported on Hilgard Avenue , yet we find that Hilrard was also eiven a 10S occupancy factor (this despite the fact that people re-side in homes on Hil, nard!) The 10% occupancy factor for the roof araa in the teath-Science Boelter complex seems particularly suspect , given the 9 open entrances and i

(There is apparently so nany ptblic facilities on those roofs described previously.

much use of the roof area that there is a restroom up there. )

And, at one point in the thesis Rubin indicates "that the current NFC model for atwarheric dispersion . . . predicted levels of Arycn t?hich tecre 15 to 105 timen l

t

higher than the cercr{ mentally defen-ined vaZucs. (A-31) Yet, it was on the basis of the NRC dispersion model that UCLA was granted an exemption from the !TC-at-the-stack limitations and permitted them to continue riving out Argon there in concentra-tions way in excess of normal limits. If the NRC model predicted levels15-105 times higher than Pubin found, and since Rubin found levels inside Math Sciences (averaged over tr a year) that were 12% of the MPC, then it would seem reasonable that the NRC ,

model's predicted values for inside the Math Science building would be considerably in excess of the Maxirum Permissible Concentration and the Amendment should not have teen granted, if it was on the basis of the URC model that the amendment was granted, but the NRC did not take into consideration the inside of the Math Science build-ing in granting the Amendment! This was confirmed to us by J.B. Baird, NRC Radiation Specialist. It was not considered apparently because the NRC did not know about the oroblem with the air-conditioning duct. The amendment was granted without considering the area Rubin concluded was that of hirhest likely exposure--the inside of the Math Science building! And .he NRC's own model would apparently predict levels therein in excess of the maximum permissible. Yet UCLA was granted an exemption from the normal requirements and has continued to give out Argon-41 in about the same concentration it has for the last decade or two.

l The TLD Program The Amendment was granted on the condition that a thermo-luminescent dosirectry program be established to measure , not Argon, but general radioactivity. TLG's--a kind of film that shows radiation exposure--have a reputation for* considerable inac-curacy. The kind UCLA used, Ca-Dy sulfate , particularly so. While we 'iave not yet to ic ecmpleted our analysis of the TLD study done by the NEL staff--we have as yet ceive the raw data uncn which the summary results we have were basad--the fo.11owing facts raise quastions about the validity of the TLD study:

1. Of the twenty or twenty-two dosimeters placed (the reports differ as to the -

total), the results from about half were considered by the NEL staff as

'anomolously high" and thus disnissed, arcuing they were picking up radiation from the concrete on which they were placed. (X-20,24) 1 l

1 -. - -__

i

[

2. Their TLD study indicated that a few dosimeters 'berc Zost to birds and l possibly to curious indiv!'aa!a. ' (X-20) Thus , the sample size was further reduced.  !

l

3. In the end, of the twenty originally placed dosimeters, about one third were '

used in the final calculations. The study added, however, that "even if the readings of concrete-mounted dosimaters are rejected, the remaining data are not free of ambiguous interpretation. " (X-24) ,

- 4. It should be noted that even if the concrete-mounted dosimeters were left in the sample, the levels reported are still relatively low. But, surprisingly, virtually the same low reading is reported by the TLD on the reactor stack, where we know the Argon concentration is considerably in excess of the MPC.

(NEL reported concentration at full power is 1 x 10-5 uCi/ml and the MFC is 4 x 10-8 uCi/ml, 250 times higher. Even averaging in operating time the concentration at the stack is still well over the MPC level.) The reading from the TLD on the reactor stack is about the same as that reported by the TLD's 100 feet away, where the dispersion factor is .oiven by Rubin to be about 250, more according to the official model. The concentration should thus be much 1ess on the roof than on the . stack, the NEL argues ; but the TLD figures at both places are quite close. Even with differences in plume configuration out of the stack and on the Math Sciences roof, it seems clear that one or both TLD's are not giving accurate readings , calling into question the entire program.

5. 5 of the 7 TLD's whose readinFs were not dismissed were used to give radiation estimates for both regions of the roof--the area near the reactor stack (considered a restricted area by UCLA and the NRC*) and the clearly unrestricted areas on the rest of the roof.

f UCLA was granted the Amendment in part by declaring the area directly around the reactor stack a " restricted area", defined in the Code of Federal Regulations Part 20.3.a.14 as "any area acccen to chich is controlled by the licennec for so mMation and mdioactive

. purpoacc of pwtection of individuals fwm catwaswo nn changes to the reactor stocA ase, to have it matcrials. " The NEL had to moko to it considered restricted by the NRC; a four-foot wall withIta isn't stepladder next even posted.

i l is all that separates it from the unrestricted area.

i

l 3 .

The Present On August 21,1079, tuo'3ridre the Gap menbers ret in the Walnut., Creek head-d quarters of the NRC with R.D. Thomas, the NRC radiation safety inspector for UCLA.

They discovered at that time 'that Mr. Thomas did not know about the Rubin study, nor about the air-conditioning duct and the possible expcsure inside the Math Sciences .

building, and thought that the entire' roof area was restricted with locked doors.

• We informed him of these matters at that time and urged him to look into them.

~

On September 10, 1979, Bridge the Gap sent a formal statement of concern about the UCLA reactor, enclosed the Rubin thesis which the NRC had not previously seen, and urged that the NRC undertake a surprise inspection of the UCLA reactor to inves-tigate the issues that had been raised. Abcut three weeks later, and. following re-peated inquiries to the NRC by reporters looking into the issue , Bridge the Gap re-ceived a visit from J.B. Baird, another NRC Radiation Specialist. He had been sent down to UCLA to do an inspection--and apparently to convince us everything was OK at the reactor. He had never been to the UCLA reacto= before, had read only a small 1

fraction of the NRC docket on UCLA related to the Argon problem, and spent only a few hours at the reactor during his inspection, but reported that he found no evidence of violations of regulations. He did say that the NRC might look into the question of exposure within the Math Science building.

That is not enough, in our view, to protect public safety when a serious question has been raised about possible hazards. So Bridge the Gap has requested the NRC to hold public hearings into the relicensing of the UCLA reactor--whose license expires in March of 1979--and to grant us formal intervenor status in those procedinns to pre-sent the information we have uncovered. And we urge that the reactor be shut down until its safety can be conclusively demonstrated.

O i

-~ - _.

FOOTNOTES /BIBLIOGRAPQ Key: The footnote system used in the text of the report identifies the document by letter ard the page by number. For example, "F-6" would refer to page 6 of tibliography iten F, below.

A. " Atmospheric Dispersion of Argon 41 from the UCIA Nuclear Reactor,"

a raster's thesis by Fark Phillip Rubin,1976 4 - B." Atmospheric Dispersion Analysis of Argon-41 Dischar6es from the UCLA-NEL Nuclear Reactor" prepared for UCLA-NEL by Applied Nucleonics Company, February 1975 C." Annual Report, Nuclear Energy laboratory, January 1,1976 to December 31, 1976,"by Ivan Catton, Director

, D. RO Inspection Report No. 50-142/74-01, including NRC Fotice of Violation to UCLA dated October 15, 1974

, E. Four items related to UCIA Violations forwanted to AEC Public Document Room by D.H. Engelken, AEC Region V, on November 11, 1974 F.1 Correspondence to H.D. Thornbur6, Inspection and Enforcement Headquarters, NRC, by 15. Book, Chief of Radiological And Environmental Protection Branch, i NRC Region V. Also memo to UCLA by F.A. Wenslawski, Radiation _ Specialist.-

for the NRC, dated February 21, 1975 F.2. MRC Notice of Violation to UCLA dated February 21, 1975 C. Inspection Report No. 050-142/75-01 4

H. "Estirrated Doses from Argon-41 Releases, UCLA,"by NRC Radiation Spulali>40 lenslawski, dated February 21, 1975 I

> I. UCIA response to NRC Notice of Violation, dated Farch 13, 1975 J. Letter to NRC, Region V, by Thomas Hicks, NEL Director, summarining commitments made by UCLA at enforcement conference in Walnut Creek.

K. "NRC Fomo : Enforcement Conference and Subnequent Actions, UCLA, Docket No. 50-142" April 22, 1975, including NBC photos of reactor roof.

E. Inspection Report No. 50-142/76-02 N. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-142/78-02

0. URC Inspection Report No. 50-142/79-01 P. UCIli Nuclear haetor Andnal Roport 1971 Q. Annual Report 1972 R. Annual Report 1973 U. Annual Report 1976 S. Annual Report 1974 V.1976 Annual Report: Appendix i

T. Annual Report 1975 W. Annual Report 1977, UCLA-NEL X. Annual Report 1978, UCIA-NEL

Pote: We've r.oved again! Please note new address:

1637 Butler Avenue #203 Los Angeles, CA 90025 (213)478-0829

~

CAFIUS C0iEITTEE TO BRIDGE THE CAP Nonprofit Organization Permit #30501 1637 Futler Ave. #203 US POSTAGE PAID Los Angeles, CA 90025 Los Angeles. CA i

i February and !! arch ,1975 i On February 21, 1975, the ';uclaar Rerulatory Cornission sent to UCLA a Notice of Violation covering the concerns discovered by Wenslawski's inspection. (F-2) In a

' ' response from Lab Director Thomas Hicks , Hicks wrote that the NEL was rc questing "a corq:lete improvement proicot from carrpus sources" to triple the horsepouer of one of the exhaust fans , add the necessary footage to the exhaust stack, and provide bracing for the stack. (I-2)

Despite UCLA's estimate that these improvements could be completed in six to nine conths , the stack remains the same height and, indeed, the accelerator nozzle has once again been removed , reducing further the effective stack height. UCLA included in their response to the Notice of Violation a computer model by Applied Nuc1 conics cu-titled " Atmospheric Dispersion Analysis of Argon 41 Discharges from the 11CLA Nuclear Reactor, ' (B) dated February 1975 (within weeks of Wenslawski's inspection). The report concluded that a modified stack would increase dispersion by more than four-fold (I-6) , but the stack appears not to have been modified despite these conclusions and despite the pledge by Lab Director Hicks to the NRC in March of 1975 to modify, the stack by , amonr other thiars , increasing its height. (I-2)

NT11_19_7_5 UCLA's proposal to take six to nine months to increase the stack height and flow rate within the stack was deered by the NRC to be an "unacceptahlc responsc" and an en forcoun t hearing was convened in Walnut Creek (NRC regional headquarters) on April 11, 1975 with representatives of the UCLA-NEL present. UCLA's response to the NRC Notice of Violation . . .

van canaidewd unacccptable for two reasona: 1) the extended time pcried pauponed to uppmde the ventilation c.rhaust system trithin Technical Specifications, and

2) the revised calibration figure on ti'c gancorro efflucnt monitor had revealed that annisal awrage discharya cenwitratisns marc abouc limits permitted by the i

Tcchnical ST ecificationa (ennentially 10 CFR 30 limits). " (Y-1)

. The NRC took the short-term action action at the enforcement conference of re-strictine t he operat ing hours of the UCLA reactor (to reduce Argon emissions by re-

f j ducing the time the reactor ran). In a letter dated April 18, 1975, the NRC's Engelken wrote the UCLA Environrrental Health and Safety Officer, Harold V. Brown, confirming the long-term action to be taken by UCLA:

You vill seek amendncnt to your Technical Specifications in the tuo areas in- '.

volving noncanpliance. This cffort should proceed on a priority hanis.

Essentially, the NRC permitted UCLA to alter the rules to fit their operating -

bahavior rather than alter their operations to fit the rules. As the NRC put it:

As a pctmanent solution, the licensee vould pursue with flRC Licensing a revised '.

Technical Specification that would account for the higher level of radioactive 1

gaseous discharaec. Inherent in this action could be the need to rcoolve the

diocrcrancy betvcen the ventilation exhaust system dcsign capabilities and Technical Specification requirements. (K-1)

UCLA, in a letter dated April 15, 1975, agreed to keep the annual average Arron-43 releases from exceeding the Maximum Permissible Concentration of 4 x 10-8 uCi/ml in the short-run, and in the long-run to seek an amendment the primary purpose of which "shaCE he to estahtish relcase limits in excess of V CFR 2n Appendix n, Table

11. k amendment vill l'c cought under the provisions of 10 CPR 20.106b. " (J-2)

'rephasis added)

This amendment to UCLA reactor's operating license ( Arrendment 10) was indeed re-quested under the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations cited above. It per-mits a facility to be exempted from Maximum Permissible Concentration requirements at the release point (the stack) only if:

(1) The applicant has made a rcaconabic cffort to minimizo the radioactivity ecntained in efflucnto to unrcotricted arcan; and (2) That it io not likely that radio,1ctive ~uxteri.12 dieciarged in the effluent vould result in the expmou of an individual to concentmtions of radioactiva material in air or vatcr exercding the limits in /ppendix "B", Tabic II of this part.

A review of the relevant UCLA and NRC documents sugrests that UCLA made the bare mininum efforts to reduce the Arron omissions as required in point (1) above and made ,

en i v b at l l urk cu iraton that are questionable at best in order to show compliance with i tem (2) of the federal rerulat ion. The prime attempt by the NEL staff to reduce

_g_

the radioactivity in the effluent release was , by their own admission g "over-enbitions and undcr-inc trecried. " (T-35 ) 'It , not surprisinaly , failed.

Correccial power plants use decuy tanks to reduce their radioactivity emissions of short-lived radionuclides Jike A ron-4r (rhich has a half-life of 1.83 hours9.606481e-4 days <br />0.0231 hours <br />1.372354e-4 weeks <br />3.15815e-5 months <br />; it is generally considered to take ten half-lives before a radionuclide has decayed com-plete ly) . The principle is simple: isolcte the radioact'ive substance long enough so that it can decay away before being released to the atmosphere. There are problems with decay tanks, primarily the possibility of exposure to nuclear facility workers and the possibility of an accidental release of the material stored in the tank before it has had a chance to decay. But decay tanks are used as a major way of dealing with the kind of problem posed by the Argon-41 at UCLA.

Thus, it is interesting to note that during a 1979 inspection the NEL staff told the MRC inspector that "a change to Section V.E. of the Tccimical Specifications was

!xing considered due to a projected increase in the reactor use factor . . . If it is datcrnined that the increased une factor vill produce an unacceptable increase of Argon-41 concentrationa, the licensee proposed to une a compressor and decay tank system to collect the Argon-42 for s torage and relcace after a decay period. " ()-6) And in a 1976 report by the MEL (C-35) we find another anticipated reactor change that would i n c rease Arron levels:

In order to attract more businces and to eliminate our rcactor uncra ' shopping cleechere for a highar neutw n fistr, the reactor r: art be slightly altered to go to higher pot'cr Icuels, i- c. , 500 kv or i W. The current licenced poiscr level is only 100 kU.

In a meeting on October 1 between the NEL and Bridge the Gap staffs , Neal Ostrander, the Labotutory f4anarer, confirmed that the MEL staff was indeed contemplating consider-ably increasing the reactor use factor (he said they would like to increase it from its present Ifi.8% limit to 60-100% use). He said the NEL staff was also considering increaning the power level (althourh this was " internally controversial") and that, indeed , a decay tank sys ter in beine renn iderra becane of the inercaned liegvu Al that would bo ptnduced if such an expansion took place. (It is interesting to note, as an aside, that Mr. n stranaer indicated that the MEL staff wished first to ret reli censed- --

their pr esent liennse excires in Mmmh 1379--and then request increased operating time and perhaps increased , nr.)

The logical question that nust be asked is if UCLA is now considering puttinc in a decay tank to limit emissions because it wishes to increase oreratine time er pcwer

• in when the NRC initially cited to attract more business, uhy war,n't a decay tank put

(

them for exceeding maximum permitted concentrations of Argon in their stack effluent?

Althourh we .'- not necessarily en 'erse tho 'ecay t ank .rption , we must ask : If it could be done to attract more business,why hasn't it been done to protect public safety?

to exceed required limits And why did the NRC grant UCLA Amendment 10, permitting it at the reactor stack , when the Code of Federal Rerulations requires that the licensee make reasonabic cffort to miniminc radioactivity" released to the atmosphere before censidering an exemption from the requirement to keep releases bolnw ffaximum rermiscih1c the second requirement that must be met before Concentration levels? We uill see that i d an exerotion can be granted--that the public cannot receive exposures in an unrestr cte are, in excess of MPC--was also inadequately examined, both by the UCLA staff and the .

EC.

L.c r ubin Thesis to the NEL operating license, a graduate In support of the requested amendment n+ u 'ent , Mark Phillip Rubin , undertook a study using sulfur hexafluoride (ST6) as a cer to cstimate air dispersion f actors and thus estimate argon concentrations at Rubin indicated in his master's thesis, various sites around the reactor stack.

which reported on the results of his study , that instruments that could measure the w ual argon concentrat ions at locations beyond the stack were not available at UCLA So, by using and that money was not available for purchasinr or fabricating then.

another subntance, Srg , that he could measure, Eubin haced to be able to simulate Arron dic.persion. As shown in the passare quoted at the beginning of this report , ,

and in the two plure diarrars centained in the Apperdix, Fubin found that the pre-l l

l

valling winds create two areas of ;*rc atest public exposure--the roof of Math Sciences ,

~

'th the astronomy and reteorolor ' al installations and ready public access, and the inside of Math Sciences , because a main ventilator intake for the building was found

,- in the path of .the exhaust plume. The highest exposure figures Rubin found were inside the building. However, by averaging operating time and, for the roof, also using a 10% occupancy factor, Rubin was able to argue that the MPC was not likely to be ex-ceeded in any populated area.

We find many problems with the study. Only three days of tests were conducted, and each test only three hours in duration. Only three locations inside the building were tested, each only once, one on one day and two on another. Vast variation in readings were found in the samples taken every half hour (air pulled quickly into a syringe)--variation of up to 600:1 in the six samples taken over a three hour period, explained by Rubin as being due to air shifting when the wind gusts. He admitted that a device w!.ich slowly pulls air into the syringe over a half-hour period would have

- resolved that problem, but didn't use such equipment. Studies ruggesting that heavy molecules like SF6 behave over short distances similarly to lighter molecules like Ar41 are mentioned, but there is no citation for that. No probability of error is given for his concluding statistics--no doubt because six samples in one location over i

three hours would not be considered a large enough sample to be given any statistical significance in making a judgment about yearly average concentrations. One relatively high reading (given the distance) was reported on Hilcard Avenue, yet we find that Hilgard was also given a 10', occupancy factor (this despite the fact that people re-side in homes on Hilrard!) The 10% occupancy factor for the roof area in the Math-

' Science Boelter complex seems particularly suspect, given the 9 open entrances and (There is apparently so many public facilities on those roofs described previously.

- much use of the roof area that there is a restroom up there. )

And, at one point in the thesis Rubin indicates "that ti?c et rrent ?!PC model for at-cacherie dieperaion . . . predicted icwls of Amon ohich tacre 15 to 105 times

~

higher than the crTer cortally dctcrrined values. " ( A-31) Yet, it was on the basis of the NRC dispersion model that UCLA was granted an exemption from the !fPC-at-the-stack limitations and permitted them to continue riving out Argon there in concentra-tions way in excess of normal limits. If the N3C model predicted levels15-105 times higher than Pubin found, and since Rubin found levels inside Math Sciences (averaged over the year) that were 12% of the MPC, then it would seem reasonable that the NRC ,

model's predicted values for inside the Math Science building would be considerably in excess of the Maximum Permissible Concentration and the Amendment should not have been granted, if it was on the basis of the URC model that the amendment was granted.

but the NRC did not take into consideration the inside of the Math Science build-ing in granting the Amendment! This was confirmed to us by J.B. Baird, NFC Padiation Specialist. It was not considered apparently because the NRC did not know about the problem with the air-conditioning duct. The amendment was granted uithout considering the area Rubin concluded was that of highest likely exposure--the inside of the Math Science building! And the 1:RC's own model would apparently predict levels therein in excess of the maximum permissible. Yet UCLA was granted an exemption from the normal requirements and has continued to give out Argon-41 in about the same concentration it has for the last decade or two.

The TLD Program The Amendment was granted on the condition that a ther mo-luminescent dosimetry program be established to measure, not Argon, but general radioactivity. TLD's--a kind of film that shows radiation exposure--have a reputation for* considerable inac-curacy. The kind UCLA used, Ca-Dy sulfate , particularly so. While we Lave not yet to te completed our analysis of the TLD study done by the NEL staff--we have as yet ceive the raw data uoon which the sunmary results we have were based--the following facts raise questions about the validity of the TLD study:

1. Of the twenty or twenty-two dosimeters placed (the reports differ as to the

• total), the results from about half were considered by the NEL staff as

'anomolously high" and thus dismissed, arguing they were picking up radiation from the concrete on which they were placed. (X-20,24)

2. Their TLD study indicated that a few dosimeters 'berc lost to birds and ~

podsibly to curious individuals. " (X-20) Thus , the sample size was further i re duced.

3. In the end, of the twenty originally placed dosimeters , about one third were used in the final calculatiens. . The study added, however, that "even if the readings of concrete-mounted dosimeters are rejected, the remaining data are not free of ambiguous interpretation. " (X-24)

.' 4 It should be noted that .even if the concrete-mounted dosimeters were Jeft in the sample, the levels reported are still relatively low. But, surprisingly,

' virtually the same low reading is reported by the TLD on the reactor stack ,

where we know the Argon concentration is considerably in excess of the MPC.

(NEL reported concentration at full power is 1 x 10-5 uC1/ml and the MPC is 4 x 10-8 uCi/ml, 250 times higher. Even averaging in operating time the concentration at the stack is still well over the MPC level.) The reading from the TLD on the reactor stack is about the same as that reported by the TLD's 100 feet away, where the dispersion factor is .aiven by Rubin to be about 250, more according to the official model. The concentration should thus be much less on the roof than on the stack, the HEL argues; but the TLD figures at both places are quite close. Even with differences in plume configuration out of the stack and on the Math Sciences roof, it seems clear that one or both TLD's are not giving accurate readinns, calling into question the entire program.

5. 5 of the 7 TLD's whose readings were not dismissed were used to give radiation

~

estimates for both regions of the roof--the area near the reactor stack I (considered a restricted area by UCLA and the URC*) and the clearly unrestricted

. areas on the rest of the roof.

I

• UCLA was granted the Amendment in part by declaring the area directly around the reactor stad: a " restricted area", defined in the Code of Federal Regulations Part 20.3.a.14 as _ "any arca accean to uhich is controlled by the licensee for

? +<= mMation and nidioactive purposco of protection of individuala fivm calmm changes to the reactor atoch ovaa to have it nn materials. " The NEL had to moko a four-foot wall with a stepladder next to it considered restricted by the NRC: It isn't even posted.

is all that separates it from the unrestricted area.

_The Present Cn Xugust 21, l'179, t io 3ridre the Gap members cet in the Walnut Creek head-quarters of the NRC with ?.P. Thoras , the UFC radiaticn safety inspector for UCLA.

They discovered at that time that Mr. Thomas did not know about the Rubin study, nor abcut the air-conditiening duct and the possible expcsure inside the Math Sciences .

building, and thought that the entire roof area was restricted with locked doors. ,

'Je informed him of these matters at that time and urged him to look into them.

On September 10, 1979, Bridge the Gap sent a formal statement of concern about the UCLA reactor, enclosed the Rubin thesis which the NRC had not previously seen, and urged that the NRC undertake a surprise inspection of the UCLA reactor to inves-tirate the issues that had been raised. Abcut three weeks Inter, anr! followinP re-peated inquiries to the NRC by reporters looking into the issue, Bridge the Gap re-ceived a visit from J.B. Baird, another NRC Radiation Specialist. He had been sent down to UCLA to do an inspection--and apparently to convince is everything was OK at the reactor. He had never been to the UCLA reactor before, had read only a small fraction of the NRC docket on UCLA related to the Argon problem, and spent only a few hours at the reactor during his inspection, but reported that he found no evidence of .

violations of regulations. He did say that the NRC might look into the question of exposure within the Math Science building.

That is not enough , in our view , to protect ptblic safety when a serious question has been raised about possible hazards. So Bridge the Gap has requested the NRC to hold public hearines into the relicensing of the UCLA reactor--whose license expires in March of 1979--and to grant us formal intervenor status in those procedinrs to pre-sent the Information we have uncovered. And we urge that the reactor be shut down until its safety can be conclusively demonstrated.

L

FOCTNOTES/ BIBLIOGRAPHY j

l Keys The footnote system used in the text of the report identifico ths document by letter and the page by number. For example, "F-6" would refer

! to page 6 of bibliography item F, below.

A. " Atmospheric Dispersion of Ar6cn 41 from the UCI.A' Nuclear Reacter "

a raster's thesis by Fark Phillip Rubin,1976

.i B." Atmospheric Dispersion Analysis of Argon-41 Dischar6es from the UCLA-NEL

Huclear Reactor" prepared for UCLA-NEL by Applied Nucleonics Company, l

,. February 1975

C." Annual Roport, Nuclear Energy Iabcratory, January 1,1976 to December 31, 1976 "by Ivan Catton, Director D. RO Inspection Report No. 50-142/74-01, including NRC Notice of Violation to UCLA dated October 15, 1974 1

E. Four items related to UCIA Violations forwarded to AEC Public Document Room by R.H. Engelken, AEC Region V, on November 11, 1974. .

F.1. Correspondence to H.D. Thornburg, Inspection and Enforcement Headquarters,

NRC, by HE. Book, Chief of Radiological And Environmental Protection Branch, URC Region V. Also memo to UCLA by F. A. Wenslauski, Radiation Special.ist -

4 for the URC, dated February 21, 1975 i

F.2. NRC Hotice of Violation to UCLA dated February 21, 1975 l

C. Inspection Report No. 050-142/75-01

', H. "Estirated Doses from Argon-41 Releases, UCLA,"by NRC Rndiat.1on Spocialbt Wenslawski, dated February 21, 1975 I. UCIA response to NRC Notice of Violation, dated Fnrch 13, 1975 f

J. Letter to NRC, Region V, by Thoras Hicks, NEL Director, sunnar.izing commitments made by UCLA at enforcement conference in Walnut Creek,

d. "NRC Memo : Enforcement Conference and Subacquent Actions, UCLA, Docket No. 50-142" April 22, 1975, including URC rhotos of reactor roof.

E. Innpection Report No. 50-142/76-02 U. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-142/78-02 O. MRC Inspection Report No. 50-142/79-01 F. UCLA Nuclear Rnactor Andual Report 1971 l

Q. Annual Report 1972 R. Annual Report 1973 U. Annual. Report 1976 i

S. Annual Report 1974 v.1976 Annual Report Appendix l

T. Annual Report 1975 W. Annual Report 1977, UCIA-NEL X. Annual Report 1978, UCIA-NEL l

L

Note: 'de've rr.oved again' Please note new address:

1637 Buticr Avenue #203 Los Angeles, CA 90025 (213) 479-0829 9

CAFTUS COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE TIE CAP Monprofit OrganizatioiI '

Permit #30501 1637 Futler Ave. //203 US POSTAGE PAID Ios Angeles, CA 90025 Los Angeles, CA E

COMTF2;TICN VII p  %

RESFONSE '"O STAFF'3 ASSERTED FATERIAL FACTS 44 y

1. "The causes and corrections of all events termed abnor urr @ es and unscheduled shutdowns at UCLA have been investigated bf(JR ec s."

• f

\d E DISFUTED W. }k 4 M

[ y @

(Plotkin refers todeclaration the period for VII1976-80)I5;notealsothattheStaffcitaton

2. " Unscheduled shutdowns are common at research reactors used in student training."

DISPUTED, although noted that the statement is really 100 VAGUE TO RESPOND 10.

(Howfrequentis" common." Is it being asserted that the frequency of unscheduled shutdowns at UCIA is no more frequent than at other research reactors?)

(September 9,1981, letter, NBC's J.M. Felton to CEG's Eark Follock, "Due to the variance in design of nonpower reactors, the NRC does not have comparative statistical data, at present, which uould evaluate the performance of different research reactors as to unintentional scrams, abnormal occurrences and violations."; also, Johnson,13, Morrill,15-7--neither of Staff's citations mentioris the fact attributed to them.)

3. "No accidents have occurred at the UCLA reactor causing damage to property or harm to persens."

DISFUTED (Plotkin declaration as to VII,19; Plotkin declaration as to III, liv, 5,9; Eonosson declaration as to IV, 12-3,10-11,14-21; Hirsch declaration as to X , I.4-3 and attachnent)

4. "No events posing a threat to public health and safety have occurred at the UCIA research rmetor during its tuenty years of licensed operation."

DISPUTED (Flotkin declaration as to VII, 15-10; Flotkin as to III, I iv, 1-39; Monosson declaration as to IV, entire; Hirsch as to X, I4-5; Foster, I 3-26; Lyon,I4-7,20; Coopernan,I3-5, Decket 50-142)

5. " Reliability of reactor operation is not part of the Commission's regulatory responsibility absent a ufety consideration."

LECAL CCTCLU5ICN

VII-2 l

I PE3FCNSE TO UCIA'S ASSERED FACTS

30. "The UCIA reacter facility has experienced no accidents which have harmed any r. ember of the public."

DISPLTED (same citations as to Staff " fact" 3 above)

31. "None of the unscheduled shutdeuns or abnormal occurrences which have occurred at the UCIA reactor facility are of safety significance."

DISPLTED (Flotkin declaration as to VII, E5-10; Norton as to V,169) o

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