ML20064K321
| ML20064K321 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1983 |
| From: | Aftergood S COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064K001 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8301180361 | |
| Download: ML20064K321 (14) | |
Text
s t-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA s NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION g 9- -
BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARIC
- sl4g l
?lQ ~I 11 V "'jeg In the Matter of % p N '
THE REGE!ffS CF THE UNIVERSITY 0F CALIFT)RNIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility License)
(UCLAResearchReactor)
DECIARATICN CF STEVEN AFTERGCCD M T_0 CCNTENTION VIII I, Steven Af tergood, declare as follous:
- 1. I am an environmental researcher with the Committee to Bridge the Gap and a member of the Southern California Federation of Scientists.
A statement of professional qualifications is attached to my declaration for Contention I.
- 2. In cooperation with colleagues at the soithern California Federation of Scientists I have calculated dispersion factors ard dose estimates for tuo classes of credible accidents at the UCIA reactor. One category assumes release of iodine isotopes in the quantities estimated for a fuel handling accident by Hawley, Kathren, and Robkin in their report " Credible Accidents for Argonaut Reactors" (NUREG/CR-2079). The other category assumes a more substantial release, the amount suggested in the American National Standard for Research Reactor Site Evaluation (ANSI /ANS-15 7-1977).
3 For both categories of release I have followed the assunptions rade in the Hawley report as to atmospheri: conditions, duration of release, dose conversion and breathing rates, and core inventory and proportional mix of iodine isotopes. The primary diff dispersion factor ('X/0) of .01 s/m>grence is that, whereas at an unspecified distanceHawley downuindassumes a and calculated doses accordingly, I have calculated dispersion factors for a range of distances from the source.
4 Using the standard NRC Re I have determined that the F/gulatory Q used inGuides for dispersion the Hawley report is during an accident, applicable at a distance of approximately 100 - 200 meters from the reactor room. Loses c2cser to the reactor, therefore, will be far higher than the 43 3 rem to the thyroid estimated in the Hawley report for the fuel handling accident. Loses near the reactor facility 'courdary will be approximately 9000 ren to the thyroid for the release presuned by Hawley. Doses will exceed the 10 CFR 20 linits out to approxicately 600 meters. Tens of thousands of people are within 600 neters of the reactor facility virtually eve ry day.
8301180361 830112 DR ADOCK 05000142 PDR
5 For the second case considered--a release of 25% of the equilibrium radio-iodines, as opposed to the .2% censidered in the Hawley report--doses exceed the 10 CFR limits and the ANSI /AUS site criteria out to tens of kilometers from the reactor site, an area including many millions of people. Maximum doses in unrestricted areas exceed a million rem to the thyroid.
- 6. The methods employed rely largely on the standard NRC Regulatory Guides for dispersion during nuclear reactor accidents. The results obtained can be scaled up or down, for example, from the figures obtained for the 25% release, to estimate maximum individual doses and the size of a required Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for different categories of presumed accidents.
7 These data are surprising in light of the general assumption that research reactor accident consequences would be minimal tecause of the relatively small radioactive inventory. However, the particular characteristics of the UCLA reactor--particularly the lack of containment structure and complete absence of an exclusion zone--significantly compensate for the smaller starting inventory. Furthermore, the high population density uith no low- population zone results in a total population dose that could likewise be quite high, were there a credible means of release of a few percent or so of the core radiciodine inventory.
The Hauley Fuel-Handling Accident
- 8. The first category of release examined is that put forth by Hawley for a fuel-handling accident involving one of the reactor's twenty-four fuel bundles.
Hawley assumes that this accident will result in release of .189% of the core radi dines, xenons and kryptons, and release of no other fission o products. The release is characterized j similarquantitiesoffourotherlodines.:gy4.4curiesofiodine-131,and
/ Such a release, Hawley asserts, would result in a dose equivalent to the thyroid of 43 3 rem to an observer at an unspecified distance downwinJ, assuming a one-hour release during highly stable atmospheric conditions.2/ While not specifying the location of the ob downwig as 10- s /mgerver, Hawley
, uhich he does terms "an indicate conservative extremely a %/Q at thevalue."
point of the observer
- 9. 4/Q is a relative concentration factor, a measure of the degree of dispersion of atmospheric pollutants over distance. Aparticular$/Qvalueisaccurate only a particular point downwind from a source. A particular ')t/Q value cannot, by definition, be assigned irrespective of the distance from the point of release, because it represents dispersion over distance. The greater the distanco from the source, the greater the dispersion and the smaller the l concentration at that point. Conversely, if %/Q is, say, .01 at a particular
! location downuind from the source, it must, by definitien, be larger than that l closer to the source, and the concentrations thus greater as well.
1 M The Hawley report, in footnote (a) on page 48, indicates that the assuned release represents 2.7% of the gaseous inventory of one bundle containing 7%
of the core inventory. (.027 x .07 = .00189, or .1895.)
2/ Table 4, p. 48, Hawley report.
M ibid., p. 51, indicates that in the derivation of the equations used in the Hawley study, and reproduced in my calculations, the time of exposure " drops out."
i Thus, says Hawley, "the calculations uould be valid irrestective of the time base for the release, and would fit a puff or instantaneous release as well an a protracted release."
l - _ -- -
- 10. In order to attempt to assess the location at which the 43 3 Rem dose estimate is valid, CBG submitted an interrogatory to the authors of the Hawley, et al, studya Interro6atory 91: T/Q uas determinei for what distance for an observer downwind?
Answer by R. L. Kathren (one of the study's authors): Thet'/Q value of 10~2 was selected as being the maximum credible values the downwind distance at which this value might occur is site and time specific. The report assumed that this value to occur LsicJ at the location of a downwind observer irrespective of the distance of that observer from the point of release.
(emphasis added)
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, a particular '%/Q value cannot be assigned " irrespective of the distance" of the observer from the point of release, because it is a function of dispersion over distance. Althou6h the above interrogatory answer did not provide the information needed, we were able to determine the location downwind at which a 4/Q of .01 would be valid by turning to the standard NRC Regulatory Guides for dispersion during accidents.
~
- 11. Reg. Guide 1.4 puts %/Q at 10 at a distance 200 meters from the source for a ground-level release for a time period of 0-8 hours. The Hawley assumption of a,1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> gelease would fit in this category. Reg. Guide 1.145 indicates a /Q of 10- a t just under 100 meters for the UCLA corditions. The University orida Argonaut, in its application for relicensing, estimated a Y/Q of of 10-{at .1 miles (161 meters) for a release less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in duration, using the standard NRC meteorology (see Figure 4). Thus, the dose of 43 3 rem thyroid estimated in the Hawley report would be valid for people about 100-200 meters from the reactor, given dispersion out-of-doors (as opposed to within the building, which is a special case discussed in Fr. Pulido's declaration) ard the standard NRC dispersion models.
- 12. Since Hawley indicates the value chosen was "an extremely conservative value," it would probably be more appropriate to choose the 200 meter distance as the location at uhich that observer would receive the dese, but in my calculations I have used the less conservative (from a safety standpoint) assumption that that dose occurs at about 100 meters, using the less conservative methodology of Reg. Guide 1.145 13 Reg. Guide 1.145 was then used to determine the downwind distance at which thyroid doses of 5 rem and 15 rem would occur. These correspond to the bourdaries for emergency planning for re ch reactors (5 rem) and site evaluation (15 rem) of both NRC and ANS.
4/ NURIE-0049 and ANS 1516 Draft II (Table I for toth) indicates a 5 rem thrycid dose as the ~d eterminant of the size of the EFZ for research reactors.
ANSI /ANS-15 7 states,that dose commitment in the event of a design basis accident to persons within the site bourdary shall not exceed 15 rem to the thyroid ard to persons at or beyond the urban tourdary shall not exceed 15 ren.
The site boundary is defined as the limit of the area "wherein the reactor administrator may directly initiate emergency activites." The urban tourdary "means the nearest bourdary of a densely populated area or neighborhood containing population of such nunter or in such a location that a complete rapid evacuation is difficult or cannet be accomplished within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> using available resources." The 15 rem dose ccrresponds to 10 CFR 20 limits.
14 As seen in Figure 2, using the standard Reg Guide (1.145), the site boundary, emergency planning zone, ard urban boundary (10 CFR 20 limit) would occur at 170 meters, 300 meters, and 600 meters respectively, for the release assumed for the Fawley fuel-hardling accident. In other words, even for the fuel-handling accident assumed by Fawley, doses in excess of the 10 CFR 20 and ANSI /ANS limits would occur out to 600 meters, a large section of the University campus containing many thousands of peoples furthermore, an EPZ of 300 meters radius would be required, again requiring the ability to tale emergency actions on behalf of thousards of people. This result obtain ed from use of the standard Reg. Guide for dispersion.
15 As that Reg. Guide is designed for dispersion at distances greater than 100 meters, alternative methodology must be utilized in estimating the doses closer in. This is presumably because no power reactor has an excl. -ion zone smaller than 100 meters, so dispersion at distances less than that are not ..cluded in most dispersion models used for nuclear accident consequence modeling. This appears to be the source of the Havley error discussed above (i.e., choice of a .01 K/Q irrespective of distance. ) While it is true that a 7/Q greater than that is not likely in a power reactor accident, where the unrestricted area tegins in excess of 100 meters, that would__not be the case in a research reactor accident such as one at UCLA where there are thousands of people within 100 meters and no exclusion zone at all.
- 16. For the purpose of a first orier approximation of the concentrations within 100 meters of the reactor, Halitsky's" stretched string" model was utilized (Halitsky 1963: cited also in Mosker.1982,p.36, ard in Li, Eeroney,Feterka,1982,p.3ff).
The results are indicated in Table 2 and graphed in F16ure 2. Doses of 9020 ren thyroid are indicated three feet from the reactor room wall, for the fuel handling accident release.
U. The in-close estimates correspond closely to other computational method s.
For example, for the fuel-handling using the release, resultsvery produces of the UCLA close 1960 Hazards results. Analysish.
(see figure 2 adjusted
- 18. Some points about the initial Hazards Analysis estimates are in onier at this. point. CBG has pointed to the thyroid dose estimates (e.g. ,1800 rem)
! in that Analysis as basis for its concerns about potential consequences of an accident. It has since been argued by the Applicant, in withdrawing its own analysis, and the Staff, that the Fawley study supersedes the 1960 Hazards l
Analysis in that fuel melting is supposedly required to prMuce the doses estimated in the original Analysis. Such arguments miss the point.
- 19. The IQ60 Hazanis Analysis assumed, in estimating an 1800 rem dose, a smaller radioactivity release to the environment than did Hawley for his fuel-handlins accident. Hawley assumes release of 4.4 curies of I-131.
The Hazards Analysis (p. C-4; or p. III/E-4 of the 1980 Application) assumes a leak of .37 curies /hr of I-131 to produce an eight-hour exposure of 1800 rem (p. 6). In other words, the Hazards Analysis, with its 1800 rem estimate,
( was based on a 3 curie release of iodine-131 (.37 curies /hr x 8 hrs = 2.96 curies),
whereas Hawley assumes a dose of only 43 3 rem, from a release 50% larger.
-5
- 20. The discrepancy is readily explained. Asshownabove,the%/Q utilized by Hawley is applicable at a distance of about 100 - 200 meters from the source. The Hazards Analysis estimates doses in the range of Eauley's In other words, 43 rem at a distance somewhere between 152 and 302 meters.
the unrealistically low estimate by Hawley is due to estimating the dose quite some distance from the facility (relative to the number of people closer in).
- 21. In summary, for the 4.4 curie release assumed by Hawley for his fuel-handling accident involving one bundle and representing a release of .189%
of the assumed radiciodine inventory, maximum doses of about 9000 rem to the thyroid are indicated, and levels in excess of 10 CFR 20 and ANSI /ANS site criteria uill exist out to 600 meters.
The 600 Curie Release
- 22. The industry standard for research reactor site evaluation (ANSI /ANS-15 7-1977) indica ^es 25% of the radiciodines and 100% of the noble 6ases should be presumed released. This is the fraction of release assumed by the University of Florida in its 1981 Safety Analysis Report for its Ar6cnaut reactor.
As indicated in Dr. Kaku's declaration, a 25% radioiodine release is a realistic estimate for several different accident scenarios at- UClA, and there are credible accidents which could release a more sizeable fraction. (25% is approximately 600 curies of I-131).
23 Using Reg. Guide 1.145, as with the 4.4 curie release, for the dispersion greater than 100 meters produces the results in Thble 1 and F16 ure 1.
Doses are 5200 rem at 100 meters; an EFZ out to 23 km is indicated by the 5 rem dose at that distance; and an urban boundary of 75 km is indicated by doses in excess of the ANSI /AN3 site criteria and 10 CFR 20 out to that distance.
There are obviously millions of people within both zones because of the placement of this particular reactor in the midst of one of the largest cities in the ucrld.
- 24. Using the Halitsky model, dose estimates for +he close-in areas of the unrestricted zone near the reactor were made for the 600 curie release.
These are recorded on Thble 2 and in Figure 3 As is seen, doses of about 1.2 nillion rem to the thyroid are found about three feet from the reactor room wall, i.e. the unrestricted public area outside the reactor facility.
25 That this estimate is reasonable can te verified by estimating concentrations and doses within the reactor room
- f there were a 600 curie release. The room volume is approximately 1500 m . 600 curies of I-131 (and the standard assortjent of the other iodine isotopes) would produce a concentration of .4 Ci/m of I-131. On page 48 of the_2Eauley)of et al, report, I-131 will it is j ndicated that a plume concentration of 1.2 x 10 C1/m produce 21.7 rem to the thyroid from the iodine-131, for a total of 43 3 rem when the other radiciodines are added in. The reactor room cencentration assumed above is 33,000 times higher than the concentration assumed by Eauley some distance downwind for the 4.4 curie release. The dose inside the room after an hour's exposure would thus be about 1.4 million rem at the reactor room wall.
- 26. In conclusion, using the official liRC reg, guides and the Hawley assesment, both categories of accident examined--the ANSI /AUS 25%
radiciodine release and the Hawley 4.4 curie release--result in extraordinarily high doses in unrestricted areas. The fuel hardlir4 accident postulated by Hawley yields doses of about 9000 Rem to the; thyroid at the facility boundry, ard doses exceedirg the EFZ ard site criteria are found out to 300 and 600 meters respectively. The large release yields an EFZ of 23 km and doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 and ANSI site criteria out to 75 km. Maximum thyroid doses near the facility of over a million rem are indicated.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoin6 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
4%
[t ,% m 'I s Il Steven Aftergood (
Executed at Los Angeles, California, this 12th day of January, 1982 I
l
Documents Referenced
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.145, " Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Fotential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Fower Flants", U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1979
- 2. NUREC/CR-2079, " Analysis of Credible Accidents for Argonaut Reactors",
S.C. Hawley, R.L. Kathren, M. A. Robkin, April 1981
- 3. ANSI /ANS-15 7-1977 (N379), "American National Standard Research Reactor Site Evaluation", American Nuclear Society, 1977 4 Safety Analysis Report, University of Florida Training Reactor, by Nils J. Diaz, William G. Vernetson, University of Florida,1981 5 Halitsky, J., "Cas Diffusion hear Buildin6s", ASERAE Trans. 69, #1855, pp 464-485, 1963
- 6. Hosker, R.F., Jr., " Methods for Estimating Wake Flow and Effluent DispersionNearSimpleEleck-like3uildin6s",NUREG/CR-2521, ERL-ARL-108, 1982
- 7. Li, W.W. , Meroney, R.N., Feterka, J. A. , " Wind Tunnel Study of Gas Dispersion Near a Cubical Model Building", NUREG/CR-2395,1982
, 9 Affidavit of R.L. Kathren in :NRC Staff Supplemental Response to Intervener's Interrogatories", Docket No. 50-142, April 19, 1982
- 10. Sagendorf, J.F., et al, " Diffusion Near Buildings as Determined from Atmospheric Tracer Experiments:, NUREG/CR 1394, NCAA TM ERL ARL-84, 1980
- 11. Safety Evaluation Report, NRC Staff, Docket No. 50-142, June 1981
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DISTANCE DIFFUSION COEFFICIENTS (sec/m )
0-8 hours 8-24 hours 1-4 days 4-30 days (miles) 0.1 1.0 E-02 3.0 E-03 1.3 E-03 3.5 E-04 0.2 4.5 E-03 1.0 E-03 5.6 E-04 8.5 E-05 0.3 2.2 E-03 6.4 E-04 2.7 E-04 4.4 E-05 0.4 1.4 E-03 4.0 E-04 1.0 E-04 2.5 E-05 0.5 8.0 E-04 2.6 E-04 7.0 E-05 1.6 E-05 Figure 4 from University of Florida's SAR 2-60 e
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