ML20041F908

Affidavit of Wk Schnelker Re 820126 Events.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20041F908
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	03/02/1982
From:	Schnelker W COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
To:
Shared Package
ML20041F882	List: ML20041F886 ML20041F893 ML20041F899 ML20041F908
References
NUDOCS 8203170538
Download: ML20041F908 (29)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AFERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATCRY CCMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of Docket'No. 50-142 THE RECENT3 0F THE (Proposed Renewal of UNIVERSITY CF CALIFCHNIA Facility License No. R-71)

(UCIA Research Reactor) March 2, 1982 AFIDAVIT OF VENDY K. SCHNELKER STATE OF CALIFORNIA ss.

CCUNTY CF LOS ANGELES I, WENDY K. SCHNELKER, being duly sworn, depose and state

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f ^ as fo'llows:

1. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on ;anuary 26, 1982, I was walking from the Nuclear Energy Iaboratory on the second floor of Boelter Hall at UCIA on my way to Kerckhoff Hall, a building to the north of Boelter Ikil. I was walking along the second-floor *:alkway on the outside of the west face of 3oelter Hall.

2. At that time I saw two men and a woman walking from the west towards 3oelter Hall. They were walking along the alley or walkway that leads f::om Westwood Plaza to the first floor entrance d the reacter complex /30elter Hall Building. They walked towards the 3celter entrance and then entered.

8203170538 820312 PDR ADOCK 03000142 O PDR . - - , . - _ -

3. I recognized the woman accompanying the two men as Es. Jessica Laverty. I recognized her because she was formerly Counsel to the NRC Staff in the UCLA reactor case, and I had met her in the summer of 1980 when she and other representatives of the NRC Staff were in Los Angeles regarding the UCLA reactor case. One of the two men was later identified as being Commissioner Thomas Roberts.

Executed this Dday of March 1982 at Los Angeles, California.

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Wendy K.CFbhnelker Sworn and subscribed to before me thi M day of March 1982.

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EXHIBIT LIST EXHIBIT

. P A CONTENTIONS AS ADMITTED B NRC STAFF POSITICN ON CONTENTIONS 9/16/80 FILED BY JESSICA IAVERTY WHEN S}E WAS COU! GEL FOR STAW IN THE UCIA PROCEEDING C SEPIEMBER 25, 1980 PREHEARING CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT, IDENTIFYING JESSICA IAVERTY AS " LEAD COUNSEL FOR NRC STAFF" IN THE UCIA PROCEEDING D STIPULATION AS TO CONTENTIONS DRAFTED AND EXECUIED BY JESSICA IAVERTY FOR STAFF, 12/01.80 E N0 RICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FOR WILLIAM CORMIER, REPRESENTING APPLICANT, SEPTEMBER 21, 1981 F APPLICATION FOR LICENSE RENEWAL FOR UCIA REACTOR, FEBRUARY 28, 1980, COVER S}EEP AND NOTARIZED CERTIFICATE, IDENTIFYING R.R. O'NEILL

- AS APPLICANT'S RESPONSIBLE TFICIAL G NEWSPAPER CLIPPING QUOFING R.R. O'NEILL, OTHERS, AS TO JANUARY 26 EVENTS i

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EIKIBIT A INTERVDiOR'S CONTRITIONS AEMITTED AS AT ISSUE 3EFORE THE ATOMIC SAFEIT AND LICDiSING E0ARD Rer APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF OPERATING LICENSE FOR UCLA RESEARCH REACIOR, PURSUANT TO 30ARD ORDER ISSUED MARCH 23, 1981.

I. The application, together with its supportin6 appendices, is deficient in failing to meet the minimum standards for such applications. Speci-fically: ,

1. The Application reference to experimental vibration of the reactor 1s misleading.

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1 2. The application submitted by UCLA was not " original" in all respects as shown by

a. its submission of a 1980 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) which repeats virtually verbatim its 1960 Hazards Analysis, and i

b. its submission of an environmental impact appraisal which repeats virtually verbatim the language of a 1974 AEC memorandum on " Environmental Considerations Regard-i ing the Licensing of Research Reactors and Critical Facil ities . "

- 3. The application contains the following material and inaccurate statements: ,

a. "The reactor and its supporting laboratories will be l

used for the education of senior undergraduate and graduate students in nuclear engineering and related sciences. In addition to formal courses and demonstra-tions, the reactor will be used to support research at the M.S. and Ph.D levels." page 5.

b. "No structural weaknesses (earthquake vulnerability) have ever been identified." page 7.

c. "No attempt has been made to alter the content and i

provisions of the technical specifications other than l the four changes noted in the forward to the technical s pecifications . " page V/1. This statement is inaccurate because l

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l (1) the excess reactivity limits have been changed from 1 2.3% t. k/k to $3.54; (ii) the definition of ' annual' for the purpose of instrument calibration requirements has been changed frcrn 12 months to 14 months; (iii) the requiren.ent to do heat balance instrumentation calibrations has been removed; (iv) the s eguirement that ALARA be =e't has been removed; and (v) the specification regarding exhausi stack height, flow rate out of the exhaust stack, and access restrictions to the roof area have been removed.

d. "No deep wells have been drilled on the camous of UCLA or in the vicinity of the campus." page III/3-1.

e. " Accidents ranging from failure of experiments to the largest core damage and fission product release consi-dered possible result in doses of only a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines and are considered negli-gible with respect to the environment." page II/3-1.

f. "There are no suitable or more economical alternatives which can accomplish both the educational and the research objectives of the facility." page 11/5-1.

g. "SPERT and BORAX tests showed that plate type fuel elements survived step radioactivity insertions of 53.54." page V/3-6.

II. The Appifcant has applied for the wrong class of license. Applicant has applied for a Class 104 license despite the fact that in the past',

l more than fifty percent of reactor funding and more than fifty percent of the hours of reactor usage have been devoted to the sale of services, rather than research or education. Giver. this h4 tory, and without any indication that Applicant intends to change reactor usage, Applicant under 10 CFR i 50.21(b) and 10 CFR i 50.22 should have applied for a Class 103 license. Specificaliy:

Applicant should apply for a Class 103 license because

a. Applicant's financial statements indicate that more than half of the reactor funding comes from sources other than the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and 2

b. the application indicates more than half of the reactor operating time is spent on commercial, non-educational projects.

III. Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate managerial and administra-tive controls in the application, as required by 10 CFR i 50.34(b)(6)(ii),

and further, has demonstrated throughout its operating history grossly inadequate controls. These inadequacies make it impossible to find that Applicant's managerial and administrative controls are adequate to responsibly protect the public health and safety. Specifically:

1. Applicant failed to provide the information required in 10 CFR i 50.34(b)(6)(ii).

2. Applicant failed to get prior approval from the Reactor Use

Committee or the Reactor Director for changes in reactor systems i

and for non-standard. experiments.

3. Applicant failed to get prior Commission approval for facility changes.

4 The Lab Director and/or Assistant Director were absent for extensive periods of time and provided inadequate supervision.

5. Unlicensed visitors to the reactor facility were invited to oper-ate the reactor controls in violation of 10 CFR li 50.54j, k,1;

" 55.2; 55.3a and b; 55.d and f; and 55.9a and b.

6. Applicant kept inadequate records and , lost a maintenance log, and ,

7. Applicant failed to hold administrative meetings and conduct reviews required by the Technical Specifications. ..

IV. Applicant has been consistently cited for violations of itRC regulations as well as violations of the provisions of its own Technical Specifi-l ca tions . This consistent pattern of regulatory non-compliance and the I lack of assurances that the pattern will not continue in the future indicates that the Applicant cannot adequately demonstrate that future l

! operation of the facility will comply satisfactorily with the regu-I lations to protect the public health and safety.

V. The amount of excess reactivity which is permitted by the Technical Specifications to be installed in this reactor is too great in that it does not provide a sufficient safety margin and thus could lead to a

- serious power excursion which could bring about melting of the fuel cladding and significant release of fission products, seriously endanger-ing the public health and safety. Specifically:

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1. The amount of excess reactivity pennitted at this facility under I its license should be limited to less than the.t needed for prompt criticali ty.

2. The reactor has lost several significant self-limiting features in that

a. the level of excess reactivity has been changed so that it is now higher than that needed for prompt criticality,

b. a deflector plate which prevented repeated excursions has been removed, .

c. the assumption that there is a large negative temperature

. coefficient appears to be wrong in light of information regarding a positive graphite temperature coefficient, and

d. the reactor's power level has been increased from 10 Kw

- to 100 Kw. . _ . _ _ ... .

l 3. The licensed amount of excess reactivity (2.3% a k/k) could cause l melting of the fuel cladding according to the 1960 Hazards Analysis.

4. The reactor's void coefficient has changed since the initial calculations were done.

5. Thrcugh the conversion of 2.3%4 k/k as the excess reactivity limitation in the current Technical Specifications to 53.54 in the l

proposed Technical Specifications and the use of a 5 different from that used in the Hazards Analysis, the Applicant may have changed the limitation from 2.3% to 2.62t, thus presenting the potential for a serious excursion and melting of the cladding.

6. The assumption that Borax I test results can t$e extrapolated to the UCLA reactor is questionable, particularly h the absence of error bars for the Borax I data.

8. The analysis of excess reactivity characteristics of this reactor submitted in the application fails to include a current review of .

the nuclear safety literature relating to the relationship between excess reactivity and destructive power excursions.

9. Applicant's Hazards Analysis regarding excess reactivity is based on unverified and unidentified assumptions which can be used merely to estimate a range of excess reactivity additions and their possible hazard and is thus inadequate to support present licensed limits. Additionally, Applicant has not provided error bars for its canputations and analyses.

l 10. The reactor has a pneumatic " rabbit" system that allcws rapid insertion of excess reactivity. This system did not exis:

when the reactor was built and has experienced frequen:

cperatine problems since installation.

11. The proposed licensed limit on combined experiments (= S3.54) or the current licensed limit (= 2.3: k/k) could cause melting of the fuel cladding.

12. Removal of a beam tube could cause insertion of excess reactivity into the reactor because neutron absorption would be removed and reflection savings would be increased.

13. Applicant has violated excess reactivity limits suggesting it is impossible to prevent possible excursions.

.. 14. Applicant failed to analyze the possib'ility of euctetic melting.

VI. Applicant has in the past and is at present emittine excessive radiation, violating radiation standards, and conducting inadequate monitoring.

Applicant has failed to demonstrate in its application or in its recent performance any evidence that these conditions can reasonably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration, grant of an operating and SNM license cannot be made without undue threat to public health and safety. Specifically:

2. Several conditions which cause present emissions to be in excess of applicable standards have not been changed; therefore, emissions which are in excess of applicable standards can be expected in the fu tu re.

3. Applicant has not in the past nor in the present application been able to reasonably demonstrate that exposure in unrestricted areas is not in excess of applicable standards because it lacks an ade-quate radiation monitoring system 4 Applicant has not complied in' the past and presently does not comply with the radiation standards in 10 CFR li 20.lc, 20.106(b)(1) and (2), 20.106(c), and Part 20, Appendix B.

i 5. Applicant does not now, has not in the past, nor can it reasonably assure that it will in the future meet the requirements of section V.d of its current technical specifications which states that

"[t]he release of radioactivity from tne reactor facility snall be kept to as low a level as practicable."

VII. The reactor has in the past experienced a persistent pattern of numerous unscneduled shutdowns, abnormal occurrences, and accicents. These occurrences are so pervasive that they evince a pattern of unreliability wnien makes it impossible for Applicant to reasonably assure that the

reactor can be operated in a manner which does not endanger the public l health and safety.

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VIII. The analysis of an accident and the calculations regarding the resultant radiation exposure to the public contained in the Applicant's Safety  ;

Analysis Report is based on unrealistic assumptions which tend to minimize the expected public exposure. However, despite the minimi-zation of the hazard the conclusion of the analysis postulates an unacceptably high public radiation dosage of 1800 rems thyroid.

1. The safety analysis is flawed because

a. Applicant assumes a release limited to only 10% of the volatile fission products and none of the non-volatile products,

b. Applicant assumes the reactor has been operated at 10 Kw long enough to have attained equilibrium concentrations of relatively short-lived fission products,

. c. Applicant assumes the reactor is in a two-story building .

with possible exposure to the public occurring outside the building,

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d. Applicant assumes a building leakage rate of 20% of the i reactor room volume per hour for a 30 mile per hour I wind, assumed to be directly proportional to wind l velocity, and

e. Applicant has not adequately tested the assumptions upon which the analysis is based and failed to include a current review of nuclear safety literature regarding dose and dispersion models.

IX. The Applicant in the past has not adequately maintained its equipment nor calibrated its instruments properly, thereby increasing the chances of equipment failures and erroneous instrument reading. Due to this failure, the NRC cannot conclude that the issuance of a license for i this facility will not be inimical to the public health and safety.

Specifically:

l 1. Applicant has failed to calibrate instruments at the required intervals.

2. Applicant's personnel are not familiar with the calibration requirements of their own technical specifications.

3. Applicant has failed to maintain, or has lost, calibration records, making accurate calibrations and data interpretation impossible. .

4 Applicant has significantly underestimated radioactive emmissions for extensive periods of time due to errors in its calibration methods, b _____ _ ,__. _

l 5. Applicant has had continuing problems with heat balance cali-bra tions .

6, Applicant has not devoted adequate time to maintenance and calibration.

X. The relicensing of the UCLA nuclear reactor is a major Federal action which will significantly affect the quality of the human environment.

Therefore, an Environmen.al e Impact Statement nust be prepared by the NRC. There are suit 5ble alternatives to the operation of this reactor which would not involve a significant impact on the environment.

2. The relicensing of the UCLA research reactor will significantly affect the quality of the human environment because l a. A design basis accident at the reactor is likely, and would expose great numbers of people to dangerous radiation dosages,

b. The reactor is located on a densely populated campus with classroom and office facilities enveleping the reactor build-ing on three sides and above the building.

c. The reactor lacks inherent and engineered safety features,.

including the lack of a containment structure.

d. A design basis accident is likely because of the reactor's use as a training facility and because of the history of lax administrative controls, abnomal occurrences, unscheduled shutdowns and minor accidents.

e. The facility is sits! in a seismically active area and suf-fered significant damage in the 1971 earthquake.

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f. The facility utilizes highly enriched (935) fuel and is vulnerable to criticality accidents.

g. A design basis accident would result in fission product

, releases in amounts that would endanger the public healt..

l and safety.

3. Therefore, the NRC must prepare an EIS which considers the fol-lowing alternatives:

a. Training, research and education could all be accomplished p

5 at other existing facilities located in southern California.

j b. The reactor could be used as a simulator without fuel for the training of reactor operators.

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c. Commercial users of the reactor could rent reactor time at other facilities in southern California.

4 The benefits provided society by the reactor do not outweigh the costs of operating the reactor because

a. Only a very small percentage of the reactor operating time is devoted to training operators and educating students.

[ b. Mast of theimportant and significant research done at UCLA

% which utilizes nuclear reactors is accomplished at other Q facilities.

c. The research that is done at this facility could be accom-plished at other facilities in southern California.

d. A major percentage of the reactor operating time is devdted to commercial projects for paying customers.

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e. The reactor costs the University over $150,000 to operate and would cost over $750,000 to decommission in 1980. '

f. Over the proposed twenty year license period the beneficial uses of the reactor are likely to decline while the risks and costs associated with its operation are likely to increase.

J YII. The safety features of the UCLA reactor are inadequate to protect the public health and safety. Certain engineered safety features are lacking; particularly lacking are features that are redundant and independent. Specifically:

1. The reactor is surrounded by a housing rather than by an adequate containment structure. ..

. 2. The high level radiation monitor system which activates the scram system is inadequate.

3. The reactor does not have an adequate baron-injection system, a radioactivity removal system, emergency liquid and gaseous emissions holding tanks. HEPA filters, an emergency core cooling system, or spare control blade motors.

4. The reactor lacks adequate shielding and access restrictions in areas where the public might be exposed to radiation.

5. The reactor has inadequate or non-existent interlock systems.

6. The reactor lacks missile shields, particularly for control blade drives.

7. Graphite used in reactors undergoes physical changes and tnus poses a hazard. -

8. The reactor has a history of fuel failures, particularly tie bolt failures.

9. The reactor's control blades are inadequate.

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XIII. Tne information which Applicant has provided regarding tne special nuclear materials license is inadequate to meet the requirements of 1.0 CFR.J0.22(a)(7) and (a)(8) and 70.24(a)(1), (2), and (3)./ Furtheg33

. more, the enrichment level requested and the quantity requested of U are excessive and thus pose an unnecessary threat to public health and sa fe ty.

XIV. Applicant in its Safety Analysis Report has failed to analy::e problems common to Argonaut typed reactors. In the absence of such an analysis, Applicant cannot reasonably assure that the operation of the reactor will not endanger the public health and safety.-

XV. The operating license for this facility shoul.d'not be renewed because the adverse consequences which flow from,its location and siting are too great. The following circumstances have exacerbated the adverse conse-quences of a facility accident and.af normal operation. Specifically:

1. The density of the population in the unrestricted area immediately surrounding the reactor and within a ten mile radius of the reactor makes the probable consequences of an accident at the facility unacceptably great. This population density has increased greatly over the past twenty years. -

2. The reactor building which was originally separated from any other structures is now enveloped on three sides and above by classroom and office buildings. These buildings house a large population dur.ing working hours in close proximity to the reactor.

3. The heating, air-conditioning, and air-flow systems of the new buildings enveloping the reactor building interface directly and indirectly with those systems at the reactor facility.

XVI. The UCLA reactor and the principal component pieces of reactor equipment are so old that relicensing the reactor, particularly for a twenty-year period poses an unacceptable hazard. Because of the age of the reactor it is very difficult to obtain spare parts and key safety features required of never facilities--specifically, an emergency core cooling system and a containment structure--are lacking in this facility. In addition, the following items of equipment are unreliable, difficult to repair and/or replace: reactor instrumentation and console instrumenta-tion.

1. The reactor was built in 1959 :,y a canpany which is no longer in the reactor business.

kne reactor equipment is old and outdated and ceteriorating. The Applicant nas not devoted the money to properly upcate or maintain

ne equipment in the past and without a enange in Applicant's practices the equipment will continue to deteriorate witn age.

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XVII. The UCLA reactor should not be licensed because the physical location

- and site characteristics of this reacter unacceptably endanger the public health and safety. Furthermore, the license application does not con-t tain current infomation and analysis conceming the site related safety problens sufficient to support the issuance of a license. Specifically:

1. The reactor is located on one of the most seismically active regions of the country.

) The reactor sustained significant damage in the 1971 earthquake.

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4. The existence of three floors of classrooms,and offices, supported on' columns, directly above the reactor structure creates a signifi-cant danger of collapse through the reactor building roof and onto tne reactor itself in the event of an earty, quake.

5 The application does not contain the current infomation en siting required by 10 CFR 50. $ (b)(1).

XVIII. The Applicant does not possess and cannot give reasonable assurance '

n of obtaining funds sufficient to cover the costs of operating the V facili ty. Given this lack of assurance. Applicant fails to qualify financially for an operating license. Specifically:

1. Applicant has deferred maintenance in the past due to lack of funds.

2. Applicant, as a public institution and subject to yearly funding, cannot reasonably assure that it will obtain sufficient funding for operation of the reactor from year to year.

. 3. If Applicant, as contended by Intervenor, is operating a facility described in 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 50.22, Applicant has not met the requirement of 1~0 CFR 50.33(f) that: Applicant possess or have reasonable assurance of obt.?ining the funds necessary to cover the estimated cost of operation for the license period, plus the estimated cost of permanently shutting down the facility and maintaining it in a safe condition.

XIX. The Application's Safety Analysis is flawed because it does not includeananalysisofthe'maximuncredigbleaccident' cr a

' design basis accident'. In providin6 sucn an analysis the followi 6 hazard scenarios for the facility have not been considered.

1. Sabotage, such as explosives being thrown at or placed on tne reactor itself, causing major damage anc broken fuel plates.

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2. , Airplane crash such as a DC-10 or Boeing 747 scheduled to arrive at LAX or Burbank airports crashing into the reactor rocn, or into the void area above the reactor, causing the building or portions thereof to collapse breaking apart fuel assemblies and releasing radiation.

3 Multiple failure modes-worst possible series of event's.

l 4 Operator error which leads to design basis accident.

XX. Applicant has in the past and is at present taking inadequate fixed site physical security precautions to protect against radiological sabotage as well as protection against theft and diversion of the special nuclear materials it possesses pursuant to 10 CFR 73 60 and 73 76, thus indicating that the Applicant's physical security plan is inadequate and its implementation of said plan is inadequate. Applicant has failed to demonstrate in its recent performance any evidence that its physical security measures can reasonably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration grant of an oper-ating license and a SNM license cannot be made without undue threat to public health and safety.

1. Applicant has at its facilities areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear matr. rials, areas which should be adequately protected against possible acts of radiological sabotage or attempts at theft or diversion of SNM, and to which access should be adequately controlled. Specifically:

a. the reactor room, .

b. the control room,

, c. the third floor equipment room,

d. the fresh fuel storage area, and

e. the " restricted area" immediately surrounding the reactor stack and exhaust fan on the eighth floor 'of Boelter Hall.

2. There exist areas adjacent to the above-mentioned vital and material access areas which should be sufficiently isolated and secured to prevent them from being used as penetration points or staging areas for penetration of the vital and material access areas.

Specifically:

a. The " access court" used for truck loading and unloading,

! located between the reactor building and the Engineering Suilding to its west,

b. the Tokamak lab adjacent to the reactor room,

c. the main entrance (reception looby) to NEL,

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d. the presently unrestricted roof areas of Boelter and Math Sciences adjacent to the " restricted area" around the reactor stack,

e. the rooms within Math Sciences whose windows open to the

" restricted area" around the reactor stack, and

f. tne entryway for the single locked door to the " restricted area" around the reactor stack.

3. Applicant's physical security measures for its vital and material

1. ' access areas and the areas adjacent to them have been in the past and are at present inadequate to properly protect, isolate, and control access to those areas in that

a. presence by guards and watchmen is too infrequent;

b. methods for detecting concealed guns, explosives, or incendiary devices that could be carried by peopic enter-ing these areas, and SNM that could be carried by people leaving these areas, are inadequate; -

i. Applicant lacks mechanical devices to detect firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or SNM and ii. Applicant fails to routinely search visitors and staff for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or SNM

c. physical barriers to penetration are inadequate;

i. fences and walls are too short, lack barbed wire at the top, and otherwise fail to fully. enclose the l area to be protected l

l 11. windows and doors in walls that are to act as physical barriers are made of construction and fastening of insufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is lessened by the opening provided by the l

windows and doors tii. dual or redundant barriers are lacking; penetration of these areas can be made by breaching a single

( ba rrier

d. security measures with regard to keys and locks are inadequate; and .

l 1. doors that should be kept locked have been lef t open

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ii. locks are of insufficient construction and strengtn to prevent tampering and penetration iii. too many keys to areas that are supposed to be locked have been given out iv. control of those keys is inadequate in that copies can be made, keys can be lent to unauthorized person-nel, and keys that are signed out are not reouired l

to be returned when not in use

e. procedures to control access are inad, equate.

1. groups that are too large for adequate supervision are given tours of the facility by one or 240 staff

' people alone i

ii. these tours include visits to vital and material i access areas iii. NEL personnel unassociated with the reactor have ready access to vital and material access areas through egresses connecting their parts of the NEL .

complex with the parts of the complex utilized by the reactor. .

XXI. Applicant's present hergency Response Flan is insufficient to demen-strate that the plan provides reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency to protect public health and safsi,y and prevent dama68 to property. . .

1. The prohibition against notifying non-university individuals until instructions to do so come from the Campus police unnec-essarily delays emergency response.

2. The requirement that the evacuation of Boelter Hall and the Math-Sciences addition be cleared through the Vice Chancellor's office entails unnecessary delay.

3. The plan does not adequately provide for alternative personnel with evacuation authority.

4 The plan does not provide for alternative personnel with the authority to carry out the role of Health Physicist, as general director and supervisor of emergency response.

S. Applicant does not have adequate radiation measuring devices to accurately determine the extent and seriousness of an accident which would make the University initiate its emergency response plan.

5. There is no indication tnat a viable plan for evacuating the entire campus exists.

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7 The plan does not provide for any emergency centers other than the UCLA Medical Center, despite the fact that it might be shut down in the event of a major accident.

8. The plan fails to indicate which equipment and what quantities of it are available at each equipment location listed in the plan.

9. The training exercises and drill specified in tne plan are not carried out on a regular basis and therefore the plan will be ineffective in the event of an actual emergency.

XXI,II. Applicant, in its licens2 application has improperly dealt with intended changes to its faility. Specifically: ,

1. Applicant improperly relies on an intended future action--

installation of decay tanks--in defense of its ALARA perfomance.

a. Present and past observance of ALARA or other radiation standards cannot be defended by An action not yet taken.

j~ b. Promise of intention to reduce the emissions in the future if relevant at all to the issue of license renewal, cannot be based on an action applicant asserts it intends t,( to undertake in the future but has not yet proposed as 9

an amendment to its license.

2. Applicant makes statments in its application regarding intended

.d futura actions that are contradicted by the facts and by each other.

a. On page V/3-11 of the application Applicant incorrectly states that an Amenoment will be prepared and submitted prior to September 1,1990, to authorize the installation of hold-up/ decay tanks. No such Amendment was submitted prior to September 1,1980.

b. The statement on page V/3-11 is further contradicted by a statement on page V/7-1, indicating the preparation of such a license amendment will " commence upon receipt of infomation confiming the acceptability of the present application."

3. If Applicant is pennitted to rely on future intended actions in defense of a claim that relicensing will not likely lead to emissions unduly hannful to tae public healtn and safety, then all intended ,

future actions linked to the decay tanks should be included, not ~

merely those future actions whien might tend to reduce emissions.

a. The intention to increase the reactor use factor which Applicant has corr.. licated to the Commission and public as being tied into the installation of decay tanks, and which would tend to increase emissions.

b. The intention to increase reactors maximum pemitted power, wnien Apolicant has publicly stated its intention to do and wnich would likewise increase emissions.

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EXHI3IT 3 v9/16/80 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility 0F CALIFORNIA ) License)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

NRC STAFF'S POSITION ON CONTENTIONS OF COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP.

A. Introduction Pursuant to a notice published in the Federal Register on April 25, 1980',

the Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG or Petitioner) filed a timely petition for leave to intervene requesting that a hearing be held and that Petitioner

..be admitted as a party to such hearing on the application of the Regents of the University of California (Licensee) fo,r renewal of the operating license for the UCLA Research Reactor. On July 21, 1980, the f.omic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board or Board) assigned to the proceeding issued an order scheduling a prehearing conference in the matter for September 18, 1980. Pursuant to Petitione.r's request, the prehearing conference was -,

l rescheduled for September 25, 1980 in a Licensing Board Order issued on August 11, 1980.

The Licensing Board's August 11 Order provided that Petitioner could, if it so desired, supplement its petition to intervene by August 25, 1980. Responses

C. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Staff concludes that CBG has submitted at least -

one good contention and thus should be admitted as a party to this proceeding.

The Staff urges that the Licensing Board rule on the admissibility of CSG's contentions in a fashion consistent with the Staff's position in this document.

Respectfully subm'itted,

% we.s . Nu'd J ssica H. Laverty Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 16th day of September,1980 i

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Exhibi + C.

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THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) DCCKET NO 50-142 OF CALIFORNIA ),

) (Proposed Ranewal of e;

((UCLA Research Reactor) ) Facility License)

DATI: Sectember 25, 1980 PAGIS: 1 thru 75 AT: Los Anceles, California I

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_U_DERSM '

' REPORTLTG  !

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l UNITED STATES OF A!! ERICA .

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (h

2 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

3 i In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-142 4 ) $

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of a OF CALIFORNIA ) Facility. License) 5 U ,

)

j 6l (UCLA Research Reactor) ) (Pre-Hearing Conference) n

~

7

~ - Room 324 5 8 Federal Courthouse 300 N. Spring St.

]:i Los Angeles, Cal.

9 2 Thursday, September 25, 1980 C

$ 10 . ,.

z I< 11 Met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.

}

4 12 BEFORE:

ELIZABETH S. BOWERS, Esq., Chairman N l! a 13 EMMETH D. LUEBKE, P,h.D., Member OSCAR H. PARIS, Member

,y 14 APPEARANCES:

2 15 '

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF: .

16 JOSEPH R. GRAY, Esq.

3 A JESSICA LAVERTY, Esq.

p 17 HAROLD BERNARD

1. l G 18 ! FOR THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA:

y CHRISTINE HELWICK, Esq.

! C 19 l !

GLENN R. WOODS, Esq..

NILLIAM H. CORMIER, Esq.

A l 20 l FOR THE COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP:

21 DAN HIRSCH JOHN BAY 22 ! JOE BRADLEY, Esq.

i MARK POLLOCK, Esq.

I 23 i i

(:g 24 l 25

' i

/B fl n F8CO Nl LMFJE6)RTI M cMM P ^ ' P' ' ' t r' .

. ;e 3 3 -

I gg He has a distinguished career in private industry as an expert 2

on nuclear reactors. He also is a full-time member of the [

3 Atomic Safety and Licensing Panel, and has been for the last 4

ten years. And Dr. Paris joined us in 1976 as a full-time member.

5 3 Now, the reason I am saying " full-time member" is, n

3 6 1 l you see, our panel consists of 53 people and about 14 or 15 of a

n 7

those are full time. And the other people on the panel are at N

8 8

'". universities or the national laboratories, and they serve on .an y #m.

c 9 g- ad hoc basis, and they are either nuclear engineers or physicists o

F 10

$ or environmental scientists. Some are lawyers and economists,

=

5 11 j because in our responsibility we not only have health and safety d 12 .

E and environmental considerations, but we also, since 1970, have

( h b 13 been involved in antitrust hearings-.

E E 14 jj Let me call, before we get into the matter today, for

'} 15

@ appearances of the parties. If the Applicant is he're, for the .

~

j 16 Regents?

l i

617 a MS. HELWICK: Yes, we are. We are represented by

~ h 18

= Christine Helwick and Glenn R. Waib, who will be joining me 19 l shortly. And to my right is Mr. William Cormier from the UCLA 20 .

campus.

21 MRS. BOWERS: And the NRC staff?

" 22 l I am Joseph Gray, counsel for the NRC staff.

MR. GRAY:

23 i I am accompanied today by Jessica Laverty, lead counsel for the

\

I NRC staff is this UCLA Research Reactor operating license 25

! renewal proceeding, and by Mr. Harold Bernard, who is the l

a su~ ..,c

CX1fI3IT D 12/01/80 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i

In the Matter of )

) '

Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF )

CALIFORNIA ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility

) License).

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

STIPULATION -

The NRC Staff (Staff), the Regents of the University of California (Appli-cant), and the . Committee to Bridge the Gap (Intervenors), by their respective attorneys or authorized representatives, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

1. A hearing having been granted with respect to the above application and Intervenors having been admitted as parties to the proceeding by the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order dated October 2,1980, Intervenors agree that the sole contentions they are asserting in this proceeding are those set forth in Attachment A (Stipulated Contentions) and Attach-ments B and C (Unstipulated Contentions), subject to the reservation set forth in paragraph 6 below. The renumbering and wording of the ,

contentions set forth in Attachments A, B and C supercede that set { bh , .

forth in Ir.tereenor's Supplement to the Petition to Inter /ene Sated 5 C.l_,

August 25, 1980. E i . ?"

~

r9 E . _ .

7. Nothing contained in this Stipulation:

(a) shall be deemed an admission by the Staff or the Applicant of the merits of any contention or the validity of any allegation "

of fact or law stated in any contention; nor, (b) shall be construed as a waiver by any party to this Stipu-lation of any rights with respect to the admissibility of evidence pursuant- to 10 CFR i 2.743 of the Commission's regulations. .

4

. 8. Each party to this Stipulation expressly reserves any right to move for summary disposition pursuant to 10 CFR i 2.749 of the Commission's regulations in regard to any contention advanced by Intervenors and ,

admitted by the Licensing Board.

~

• ~ '

i

'f-(Date) Mark Pollock - -

Counsel for Committee to '

Bridge the Gap -

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(Da te) Jessica H. Laverty Ca}4een P. Woodhead Counsel for NRC Staff Counsel for NRC Staff JV 54%./Afd (Date) William 9Connier ,

Representative for Applicant e

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

~

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFITY'AND LICENSING BOARD v.

In the Matter of ) .

) Docket No. 50-142 r .- THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewa'l of Facility OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-711:

' )-

(UCLA Research Reactor) ) September- 21, 1981

)

. 8 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Notice is hereby given that.the undersigned attorney her,ewi;th '

enters an appearance in the above-captioned matter. In -

accordance with 5 2.713 (b) , 10 CFR Part 2, ,the following f information is provided:

Name -

William H. Cormier Address -

Office of the Administrative Vice Chancellor Room 2241 Murphy Hall '

University of California, Los' Angeles

. 405 Hilgard Avenue

. Los Angeles, CA 90024 Telephone -

Area code 213 - 825-4010 l Admission -

Supreme Court of the State ~

of California Party -

Applicant Dated: September 21, 1981 u-gCcw William H. Cormier i

l , UCLA' Representative for Applicant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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. rXi: < r x -

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1 0 APPLICATION FOR A CLASS 104 LICENSE ,

FOR A RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITY

& a Based on .

. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 c-to i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comis'sion -

q;  :- _

s .

n '

R. R. O'Neill, Dean School of Engineering and Applied Science l

University of California Los Angeles February 1980 _

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-.. . ,.- - , . . -.. .--( . _ . . - - -. .,n.. --. . _ - ,- -. , - - - . - . , , - . , . . - -

CERTIFICATE l s ,

The applicant or any official executing this certificate on behalf

.,,') & ,

of the applicant certify that these applications are prepared in <

conformity with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 50 and 70, . 1 and so solemnly swear (or affirm) that all information contained herein,,

including any supplements attached hereto, is true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief.

On .'A .2 / .Fv , before the undersigned, a Notary l the State of California, personally appeared S fl. /6,P,up,z.ic),or e. ,

known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within .

instrument, and acknowledged tha he executed the same.

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A*.,9%W <W Laci.8 ' ><f

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• 6:f:M u h h 3 W -.w w w w M y g f, 8 / Of flCIAL SEA 1. /

f/ DDROTHY CRAWFORD ! )

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8) u# com'm$io$$f f R. R. 0'Neil1, De'an f ',,6 eh-A.2w.uw.awwd,I r fN.'.$2.i School of Engineering and Applied Science

'. , -:4 On A- C- V (' , before the undersigned, a Notary Public for the State of California, personally appeared (_ t , f Lda-rr-known to me to be the,pcrson whose name is subscribed to the within li instr ent, and ackn wiedged that he executed the same, d

_____ _ _ _ _3Q

', j _OmC!AL SEAL A '

. VIRGINIA SAVO!E $

I  : NOTART PUBUC.CAUFORNIA

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}1 (.,M ut Commission Espires Sept.12,1932,.

LOS ANC(LES COUNTY

b.

. wa- mmmmwm:w..? W. F. Wegst, Director ,

Office of Research & Occupational Safety On 2 - A '7 - %" O , before the undersigned e the State of California, personally appeared . Ld .$,.a

. Public Notar \.for o f, '. : r. ,

known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and ac'f'owledged that he executed the same.

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'$a fI' hp/A VIRGINIA y., / SAVOIE

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7, . j Y U' W A..-w

$ kY,k rNOTARY " J. W. H bson, Vice Chancellor PUBUC.CAuf0RNIAu and commsonrSpSfis$U.*iEi -

w .. w er.<.. % . %~ p' Responsible Officer

~

University of California, Los Angeles

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Boelter attorney may have violated legal procedure ,

By Andrew Basingo Robert, is one of lise NRC not enough f unds." O'Neill said grade uranium inadequately craticised f or being too sor) siert wriier board members who osersee the lie added he kneu a meetinF to protected from theti or sabo- wit h 't he ind ust rs si is to The attorne) representing licensing huand hearing the discuss the reastor without the tage, among other reasons. regulate." Hr adge t he G.ip "Ihe NRC has long been member Wendy Schnelker said.

tiCl A in the Hoelter llall Boeltcg Itall case. presence of the contesting party nuclear reactor relicensing Although a Bruin staff write would havc been alley 41 battle may have violated federal obsersed Cormier meeting the "I think we understood you're legal procedure 'I ucsda) by NRC othc als shortly after 9.20 not supposed to do that, and we meeting with, members of the , a.m. in O'Neill's administratise observed that to the letter, for Nuclear Regulatory Commis- office and reported that the that would he. inappropriate."

sien while the relicensing's group was still meeting behmd O'Neill said.

court-appointed intenenor was closed doors when he icit at 9 -10 N RC of faciais were a150 not present. a.m.. Cormier later denied that responsible for the violation.

Attorney William Cormier a 20-minute meeting had occur- Ihompson said, adding that the violated es parte rules bs not red. lie later told Bridge the siolation was another example includmg a representatise from Gap President Daniel llirsch of the NRC's practice of letting the Committee to Bridge the that he had only greeted the only the unisersity express its Gap. the intersenor, when he. NRC official and that the opinions to the NRC com

NRC Comrmssioner Thomas greeting lasted only 10 minutes missioner.

R obert s. two NRC aides and from 9:50 to 10 00 a.m. lie "During the tour of the School of 1.ngineering and said that af ter the FreetinF. he reactor, we were forbidden to Apphed Sciences Dean Russell escorted the NRC represcnt- gise the commissioner any O'Neill met in O'Neill's othee atises to the reactor's emrance mformation or espress to him before a scheduled tour of the for the tour. our contemions." T hompson -

.cector b) N RC of ficials. Ilsidge O'Neill also denied a meeting said. "We spoke through Ihe Gap attorney Dorothy had taken place but agreed that Wilham ( mmier throughout."

Thompson said. they had Frected NRC olhcials Roberts would not make an)

As court-appointed inter- for about 15 minutes. "We did comments to l he Hrum while senor, the Committee to liridF e not discuss the reactor contro- sisiting LICl. A. lie was appoint-the Gap. the group oppoung the versy, but the crisis in engineer- ed fise months ago hs I resident g retctor's relicensing. takes part ing too man) studenis and Reagan, and , toured U Cl. A's O in pre-hearing and hearing reactor alter returninF trom a portions of the relicensing y (. , . ,

Q:, sisit to the San Onofre nuclear procedure. Hridge the Gap n y *><~_*

% power plant near San I.uis allowed to present its own ~? Obispo.

information regarding Ihe W liirsch said he was angry that retctor's sales) and to submit , t, llridge the Gap could not questions challenging inf or- inform Roberts of any reactor

• mition UCl.A ollicials present  % 'A. safety issues during his sisit.

in testimon).

"An es parte siolation occurs -

f? [ g M ,. "We were permitted to be ihere during ihe tour but

.-l UCIA Daily Bruin, Jantaary 27, 1982 when the decision-makmg hod)

(the NRC in this caselin a legal ';* /' '

couhin't point :mything out to, the commnuoni e;" linwh said.l contest meets one ude of the .i v Roberts also relinedea liridFe contest without the other ude 1 -- [ the Gap sequest f o r a t w o-being present." I hompson said. A - 4 mmute meetmF helore the tour eddmg that Hridge the Gap will P \~ -

s' % to discuw lir id ge t he G a p's file a formal complaint with the . . -

O contentions. Iluwh said NRC about the siolation. "We [ @f # ? Hridge the Gap n challengmg '

udl consider asking fer the -[ p- I i

h the reactor's relia nurq bt-disquahtication of Commisuori-er Roberts from sittingin on the [A

• b,l . X cause, it contends, the reactor -

                                                                                    . generates an escessise lesel of no0mpsinq3rocen." she said.                      RUSSELL O'NEIL                     argon gs and emplo)s bomb,

 .                                                                                                    l o

UNITED STATES CF A!' ERICA NUCIEAR REGUIATORY COFJ4ISSION EEFORE THE COMMISSION

      - In the Matter of                      )
                                              )             Docket No. 50-142 THE REGEN'IS OF THE UNIVERSITY                                     ..

OF CALIFORNIA (Proposed Renewal"of Faci 1%tY l License) ' l (UCIA Research Reactor CERTIFICATE & SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF COMMISSIONER THOMAS ROBERIS" and "REIATED AFFIDAVITS AND ATTACHMENTS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States rail, first class, this 13th day of March,1982: Commissioner Thomas Roberts Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead U.S. Regulatory Commission Counsel for NRC Staff Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Nunzio Palladino Chairman John H. Frye, III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commissioner John Ahearne Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge Commissioner Victor Cilinsky Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washir.~ ton, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Peter Bradford Dr. Oscar H. Paris l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrative Judge Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission William H. Cormier , Washington, D.C. 20555 office of Administrative Vice Chancellor University of California Ms. Jessica Iaverty 405 Hilgard Avenue Legal Assistant to Commissioner Roberts Ios Angeles, CA 90024 Office of Commissioner Roberts l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christine Helwick Washington, D.C. 20555 Glenn R. Woods Office of General Counsel Office of the Secretary 590 University Es11 Docketing and Service Section 2200 University Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Berke , CA 94720 Washington, D.C. 20555 ft w Ihniel Hirsch President _ _ __ __}}