ML20063J916

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Cdm & Ssar Markups Addressing Open Item F14.3.2-1 Re ACRS Concerns on Fires & Floods,Including Michelson tunnel-related Issues
ML20063J916
Person / Time
Site: 05200001
Issue date: 02/11/1994
From: James A
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Poslusny C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9402240369
Download: ML20063J916 (50)
v • d • e


Text

. ,

i 5 Y  ;

GE Nuclear Energy r;wnw n a:nc ren;:r, m cwene ss . - c:. , vs February 11,1994 Docket No.52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate ,

Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Schedule -

Response to Open Item F14.3.2-1 l

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are CDM and SSAR markups addressing the subject open item pertaining to i ACRS concerns on fires and floods, including Mr. Michelson's tunnel-related issues.

Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Tom Boyce, Butch Burton and Jim Lyons, i Sinceryly, 1 7 .

/

T\

A. J. James N & \ .

Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Alan Beard (GE)

Medhat El-Zeftawy (ACRS)

Norman Fletcher DOE)

Jack Fox GE)

Joe Quirk GE) 9 gC 60 180072 1i JNi%019 9402240369 940211 PDR ADOCK 05200001 F PDR ,

e g

l. i

.i A_BWR DESIGN CERTIFICATION i

NRC FSER OPEN ITEM NO.14.3.2-1  !

GE CLOSURE PROPOSAL .

CONTENTS t

1. OPEN ITEM TEXT
2. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CDM SECTION 2.15.6 TO REFLECT ACRS FIRE ISSUES
3. PROPOSED CHANGES TO SSAR PAGES 9.5-27 and 9.5-74 TO REFLECT CDM USE OF A FIRE HAZARDS REPORT
4. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CDM SECTION 2.15.10 AND 2.15.12 TO ADDRESS ACRS FLOODING CONCERNS
5. PROPOSED CHANGES TO SSAR SECHON 3.4 TO REFLECTTHE USE OF A FLOOD ANALYSIS REPORT
6. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CDM SECTIONS 2.15.10, 2.15.11,2.15.12,2.15.13 AND 2.11.9 TO REFLECT ACRS CONCERNS ON TUNNELS
7. PROPOSED CHANGES TO SSAR PAGE 3H.5-2 TO REFLECT ITEM NO. 6 l

(

1 t

't i

JNFW419

N s

NRC ABWR FSER OPEN ITEM 143.2-1 ,

i I

TEXT The staff is evaluating ACRS comments regarding the ne-ed for .!

verification of fires and flooding analyses in the ITAAC for  ;

buildings. This is Open Item F14.3.2-1.

  • 1 f

I l

i 1

t 1

i I

l 1

JNpus olo i

s - - .

ROPMS GW66T v - ,~

EFLRIW/2$ Cdh)CEdME n -m-.-

, 3yyy- - ~ - - /

.' ABWR corosedoesina nourier 2.15.6 Fire Protection System Deisign Description The Fire Protection System (FPS) detects, alarms and extinguishes fires. Fire detection and alarm systems are provided in all Sre areas. The FPS consists of a motor driven f pump, a diesel drive pump, sprinkler sptems, standpipes and hose reels, and portable extinguishers. The foam systems are also used for special applications. The basic "

configuration of the FPS water supply system is shown on Figure 2.15.6. The FPS provides fire protection for the Reactor Building, Control Building, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and other plant buildings.

Areas covered by sprinklers or foam systems are also covered by the manual hose system.

Areas covered only by manual hoses can be reached from at least two hose stations. A .

hose reel and fire extinguisher are located no greater than 30.5m from any location within the buildings._ >

The FPS is classified as non-safety-related. The sprinkler systems and the standpipe systems in the Reactor and Control Buildings and portions of the FPS water supply system identified in Figure 2.15.6 remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) . These portions of the water supply are separated from the remainder of the system by valves as shown in Figure 2.15.6.

Fresh water is used for the water supply system. Two sources with a minimum capacity -

3 of1140 m 8for each source are provided. A minimum of 456 m is reserved for use by  ;

the portion of the suppression system used for the Reactor and Control Buildings. Both the diesel driven pump and motor driven pump independently supply a minimum flow -

of 1890 liters / min at a pressure greater than 4.57 kg/cm2 g at the most hydraulically .

remote hose connection. The two fire water pumps provide 5670 liten/ min flow each at a pressure of 8.8 kg/cm28-A fire water supply connection to the Residual Heat Removal System piping is provided from the portion of the FPS used for the Reactor and Control Buildings to provide an AC independent water addition system mode of the RHR System for reactor vessel injecdon or drywell sprays.

Automatic foam water extinguishing systems are provided for the diesel generator I rooms and day tank rooms.

Fire detection and alarm systems are supplied with power from a non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply.

The FPS has the following displays and alarms in the Main Control Room (MCR):

(1) Detection system fire alarms. j Fire Protection System 2.15.6-1' n

y ----

y..

4

" ' ' -' 25A5M7 Ryl. 2 ABWR m e ,;,, m,1,1 (2) Status of FPS pumps.

/_

/ Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria

/

8 Table 2.15.6 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together  !

with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Fire Protection j System.

b  :

\

14 l ant re ]ugurlo & to u Pob"M 4 hi og - ,- A f4 -

,p, pv4 4 L ,  % o-  % diMyh# & .

-th ruwy g%dn bak $G estes a n ,G,yd poji, celd akw% condcon  ;

Eccl pa,hdi t %a d

h cu m u t d is ~

Fk 3 s Qeurt, i

I t

2.15.6-2 Fire Protection System

I l

s 25AS447 Rsv. 2 ABWR coronedeasie useriet l.

I 4 --- ]

< r-LA I. "l a,

-w 8 -- H --s ' E'5 ' . G l@e !  !

> 0 l

$b qr > 9P o$$E

~

y 4-- Tes i R"5Oy m gyw"z ge r-VM.

. cm eg a.g mg

< i_ L _yg i _ ,

i.

O -- M -- ) l E l l > l 7 ~

cz W  ;

Ik g O$' >

l k 2b k3 6 1 I M 2

N JL- y $ .

Q da ga i r li l

$2 O g2 db 3 a2 ,2 e

.9 i 19 ' 3 iP I Jb 4 6 2 1

2 L

l

,_ _pt_ _ _ _ _ _ .;

I &

I W W .

b l d

ok 2 jg 7sh 9 P 746 9 P

, j, j

> L

-g n Al lgr j

g 1 a I Z

g

> *d

> N g 02 3- .

I 0 m E 4 $ "E

!2 E $ -OM -

0 $

28 El

~

5 > $

22

  • o y 0C Y j
  • Tm 2.15 b 3 Fire Protection System i

U Table 2.15.6 Fire Protectiori System lh

" tD I Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria "*

Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses

1. The basic configuration for the FPS is 1. Inspections of the as-built FPS will be 1. The as-built configuration of the FPS is in defined in Section 2.15.6 conducted. accordance with Section 2.15.8.
2. Fire detection and alarm systems are 2. Inspection and testing of the as-built 2. The detectors respond to the simulated provided in all fire areas. detectors will be performed using fire conditions.

simulated fire conditions.

3. The FPS for the Reactor and Control 3. Tests will be conducted of the as-built 3. The FPS for the Reactor and Control Buildings supplies a minimum flow of FPS. Buildings supplies a minimum flow of 1890 liters / min at a pressure greater than 1890 liters / min at a pressure greater than 4.57 kg/cm2 g at the most hydraulically 4.57 kg/cm7 9 at the most hydraulically remote hose connection, remote hose connection.
4. Automat!c foam-water extinguishing 4. Inspections of the as-built foam-water 4. The automatic foam-water suppression ,

systems are provided for the diesel extinguishing systems will be conducted. systems are present and initiation logic is generator and day tank rooms. The automatic logic will be tested using actuated under simulated fire conditions.

simulated fire conditions.  ;

5. The sprinkler systems and the standpipe 5. Seismic analyses of the as-built FPS will 5. An analysis report exists which concludes k systems in the Reactor and Control be performed, that as-built sprinkler systems and the Buildings and the portions of the FPS standpipe systems in the Reactor and water supply system identified in Figure Control Buildings and the portions of the 2.15.6 remain functional following an FPS water supply system identified in SSE. Figure 2.15.6 remain functional following an SSE.
6. The fire detection and alarm systems are 6. Inspections of the as-built FPS will be 6. The FPS is supplied with power from a supplied with power from a non-Class 1E conducted, non-Class 1E uninterruptible power uninterruptible power supply. supply. p g 7. MCR alarms and displays provided for the 7. Inspections will be performed on the MCR 7. Alarms and displays exist or can be k y FPS are as defined in Section 2.15.6. alarms, and displays for the FPS. retrieved in the MCR as defined in Section kg y 2.15.6.

n a-=

8. Two fire water supply system pumps 8. Tests will be conducted of the as-built FPS 8. Two fire water supply system pumps

[ provide 5670 liters / min flow each at a E ta provide 5670 liters / min flow each at a pumps in a test f acility.

pressure of 8.8 kg/cm2 9, g.

} 3 pressure of 8.8 kg/cm2 g.

E F

_j b A- M l\_C,{f 4 i

.. . . 1

    • .wm -

g O _

l i _.

g. __

' ' ~

y t ,[

s. y - _ _

~

'[ s.

^

v.- ss q. .

~

,<. a <.

} 1. j G 4+3N M M. 3 i y_- . _ _

m j _

j c 3.q_g .

n _;L. _ _.

) 4 C ,W . _ .. .._? _ __.

g ~M~~ '

,,MM,

=+#s s - .9e em -

- * -d-* ele'8M.e-d'- h - ^^ E- - * * * - - - -

. .w. e "U.N

g. g 3- j

[ .. ._ . - -, .. _ . . - .

7 x ~

~

M. iklN _ _ t__ ^

-fts s 4 s4 i i

1 3 < s. i j i 7,-9 Elg$ l i  ;

! T 1

-cng j q  ;

.% } 1 _l 4 [I' i4  % l i i 4 1 ,1 + 9 .i 3 4;  ;  ;

_v &

~

[ k1 Fi

] Ti t

_k

&%3 13 5 # M .y 8 " &

i i

.s So y? e -

A-f;

k. 4 _,

gI J!

_J {__ 4.._.. _ _ _

_. 4 ,

L_i d_.y._ _ .__ q_

_n __

V

  • j ta 4 '

LL) o i' s

_4 di E i

,6 '

)

- r g dj < .M S

  • . li -4 '~! r -e qngi
e Sj  !
i

-y

. .Y-n J -

Y k k 'C

, , , l l l

j

^

. ,~ 23A6100 Rsv. 3

^

l ABWR studerd)derrmTRis asport Y fl*~(

xy m- ,

level; therefore, the approach for the analysis was to review the system piping and i instrument diagrams (P& ids), and to prepare a database which listed every device that 'l could be adversely affected by fire.

If the reviewers knew or became aware of something that would eventually be in the ,

plant design but did not appear on any drawing at that time, it also was added to the list and assigned a special MPL number. This got the device into the database for tracking. l If possible, each device was given an electrical safety division assignment and the assigned division was entered into the database.

If a device appeared on the building arrangement drawings,its actuallocation by row, l column and elevation was entered into the database. For all other identified devices, an 4 estimate oflocation by row, column and elevation, based on experience and the known  ;

location of nearby devices, was entered into the database. The validity of the location l information for each item was indicated as being determined by reference to a drawmg ,

or by estimation. _,

1 The Fire Hazards Analysis was then performed on the verified or assumed plant design  ;

as documented by the database. This made it possible for a Fire Hazards Analysis to be  ;

performed on a specific plant configuration. It makes a record of the configuration .

analyzed available for use as a guide in completing the plant design. Also, at some time i near the end of the design pF w. the assumed information in the database may be  ;

compared to the actual design to confirm that the original Fire Hazard Analysis '

conclusions are still valid for final plant design. Any discrepancies may be analyzed and resolved at that time. , fj ,c ym N 4  :

(;w wdl PWt A C18.

Wj Colapr"ar1 mart conduct a compliance review of the as-built esign against the assumptions and requirements stated in the Fire Hazard Analys' y non<ompliance ,

must be documented as being required and acceptable. S- 9%~ " " " " %

c~ " - en, The basis of the overall plant design with respect to the effects of fire is to assume that all functions are lost for equipment, including electrical cables, located within a fire --

area experiencing a fire. Redundant equipment is provided in other fire areas. A fire .

area by fire area treatment for the Fire Hazard Analysis evaluates the compliance of the j design to this requirement for redundancy. Compliance was confirmed or the need for corrective action was identified and initiated to achieve compliance to the overall plant j design basis. Therefore, the most serious consequence of a fire is that it may l incapacitate one safety or safe shutdown division. This is consistent with the single failure design criteria used throughout the plant. Regardless of the location of a fire, j sufIicient operable equipment is assured for use in safely shutting the plant down.

The Fire Hazard Analysis assumes that the function of a piece of equipment may be lost if the equipment is either involved in fire fighting activities or subjected to fire i l

Other Auxiliary Systems - Amendment 33 9.S-27 ,l l

l i

I h/ Mi

. This %

n with Table 9A.6-1 (database) and Table 9A.5-2 (special cases). In include addition, the[:omparisyi;%:

erv sddemonstrate that multiple high impedence fa those circuits described in Table 9A.5-2 resulting from a fire within any one fire area will ,

not negatively impact other equipment fed from the same power source. Any non-pitance shall be documented"as being required and acceptable on the basis of the Fire Hazard Analysis (Appendix 9A) and the Fire Protection Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Appendix 19M) (Subsection 9.5.1.4).

[n a bb an bvi,lh

(&cnc;}lnhon Hd y N C :Il l

l l

23A6100 Rsv. 3

'ABWR m ~~

~~ ~ Stand:rdSafetyArlysis R:part b h j3.f2 -

n e,ev (3) Minimum isolation zone and protected area illumination capabilities cannot be defeated by sabotage actions outside of the protected area.

(4) Electromagnetic interference from plant equipment startups or power transfers will not create nuisance al' ms or trip security access control systems.

9.5.13.12 ire Hazard Anal s Compliance R law The COL a icant will perfo compliance review of th built design against the assump ' ns and require ts stated in the Fire Haza alysis (Appendix 9A).This inct es comparison Table 9A.61 (database id Table 9A.5-2 (special cases n a ition, the CO pplicant shall demonstra at multiple high impedenc uits of those circuits scribed in Table 9A.5-2 re ting from a fire within any o tre area will

, not negati y impact other equipme fed from the same power s cc. Any non-comp!' ice shall be documented being required and accep e on the basis of the Fir azard Analysis (Appen 9A) and the Fire Protecti 'robabilistic Risk JLssessment (Appendix 19h (Subsection 9.5.1.4).

9.5.13.13 Diesel Fuel Refueling Procedures The COL applicant shall establish procedures to verify that the day tank is full prior to ,

refilling the storage tank. This minimizes the likelihood of sediment obstruction of fuel s.

lines and any deleterious impacts on diesel generator operation, 9.5.13.14 Portable and Fixed Emergency Communication Systems The COL applicant's design of the portable radio communication system and the ftxed emergency communication system shall comply with BTP CMEB 9.5-1, position C.5.g(S) and (4). The COL applicant will supplement Subsection 9.5.2.6 accordingly, as applicable.

9.5.13.15 Identification of Chemicals The COL applicant will provide protection features for liquid insulated transformers and will identify the type and location of chemicals as required by SRP Section 13.2.2 (Subsection 9.5.1.2).

9.5.13.16 NUREG/CR-0660 Diesel Generator Reliability Recommendations Programs shall be developed to address NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations regarding training, preventive maintenance, and root-cause analysis of component and system failures.

9.5.13.17 Sound-Powered Telephone Units The COL applicant shall provide the sound-powered telephone units to be used in conjunction with the system described in Subsection 9.5.2.2.2.

9.5-74 Other Auxiliary Systems - Amendment 33

iff%W CH ANGcEs To R EFLTCT AC(LSf.

C0UC[y'2U l  % 60l)t Al C, " " * * '

ABWR W- .. - esoosin uatoriar  ;

1 2.15.10 Reactor Building  :

Design Description  ;

The Reactor Building (R/B) is a stmcture which houses and provides protection and  ;

suppon for the reactor primary systems, the primary containment and much of the plant safety-related equipment. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.100 show the basic 1 configuration and scope of the R/B*.  ;

i The R/B is constmeted of reinforced concrete and structural steel with a steel frame and reinforced concrete roof. The R/B encloses the primary containment. The R/B l slabs and fuel pool girders are integrated with the reinforced concrete containment ,

vessel (RCCV). The R/B slabs are supported by columns, shear walls and beams to carry verticalloads to the basemat and transfer horizontalloads through the RCCV and R/B shear walls to the basemat and R/B foundation. The R/B, together with the RCCV and j the reactor pedestal, are supported by a common basemat. Inside the RCCV, the ,

basemat is considered part of the Primary Containment System (PCS); outside the j RCCV, the basemat is part of the R/B. The top of the R/B basemat is located 20.2m i 0.3m below the finished grade elevation. l The R/B is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and electrical equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation racks. Inter-divisional ,

boundaries have the following features: {

(1) Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour l fire rating. l (2) Watertight doors in the basement to prevent flooding in one division from propagating to other divisions.

(3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6 meters thick or greater.

i Watertight doors on Emergency Core Cooling System rooms have open/close sensors with status indication and alarms in the main control room.

The R/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the R/B divisions does  !

1 not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement floor is the collection location point for floods. The building configuration at this elevation is such that even for a l

flooding event invohing release of either the suppression pool or the condensate storage tank (CST) water into the R/B, no more than one division of safety-related equipment is affected. Except for the basement area, safety-related electrical, )

instrumentation and control equipmentis located atleast 20 cm above the floor surface. l

  • The overall building dimensions provided in Figures 2.15.10s through 2.15.10o are provided for information only and are notintended to be pan of the certified ABWRinformation. l 1

2.15.10-1  ;

Reactor Building I

m- ,

~

  • . 25A544717:v. 2 l -

ABWR certma cesian uarias l . _ , .

l $

l The Q is protected against external flood. The following design features are provided:

(1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6 meters thick to prevent ground water seepage.

(2) Penetrations in the extemal walls below flood level are provided with flood l

protection features.

1 (3) A tunnel connects the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building and Reactor Building for the liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the l

l tunnel to the Reactor Building will be watertight.

The R/B is protected against the pressurization effects associated with postulated rupture of pipes containing high-energy fluid that occur in subcompartments of the R/B.

i The R/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed and constructed to j accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various  ;

i loads and load combinations which form the structural design basis.The loads are those _

associated with:

(1) Natural phenomena-wind, floods, tornados (including tornado missiles),

earthquakes, rain and snow.

I

k. (2) Internal events-floods, pipe breaks and missiles. l h

4 (3) Normal plant operation-live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and

~,

~

\ building vibration loads.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.10 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the R/B.

Reactor Building 2.15.102 l

l

. l 5

)h /

[oW) fQ dQ 0lk w &  %/e mt MRots ,- wouwm s+v, e

- M]Aal M-L fo'21f.al 4'I g g b 64 d- u- po44ra p % /p S w CuyvIo r n or - ou ha ./upy (yus)co,opooeto douM a h P- lB or honn u % d J(h m li y .e v e t o . EaA ponAdxW f crby .tnat c, slo e v n t ui a

, ;Q / A kwrt+ mind N6%v-sh4 ce cAA kd C& N h OvvA h0e /0d n , h 4 6 a a f , all alJ)own eod t o- .

pi'noJ powa< .

6ffn2 .

t

3 Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building (Continued) b -

E tD a inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 33 5 8. The R/B is protected against external 8. Inspecticns of the as-built structure will 8.

floods by having: be conducted. a. External walls below flood ievel are

a. External walls below flood level that equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to are equal to or greater than 0.6m thick prevent ground water soepage.

to prevent ground water seepage, b. Penetrations in the external walls

b. Penetrations in the external walls below flood level are provided with below flood level provided with flood flood protaction features.

protection features. c. Penetrations from the tunnel to the

c. Watertight penetrations to the Reactor Reactor Building are watertight.

Building from the tunnel that connects the Radwaste Building. Turbine Building and Reactor Building for the S liquid radwaste system piping. E

9. The R/B is able to withstand the structural 9. A structural analysis will be performed 9. A structural analysis report exists which  ;

design basis loads as defined in Section which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built R/B is able to  ;

2.15.10. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis 4 Section 2.15.10. loads as defined in Section 2.15.10.

q y Dj) ytw' 9f 10 ADA ld &

R B.

P a.

9

& =

5 m

8 a:

e

m-Q 1

~

5 3 h. '.e -g1  !

c

~

J ei4 i .; .e m3 l 0

j 0 d '

l33$ d '. l ed { s tJJ 6

? d 4, L 2C j {b 4 1

b

} l cl e Iafh 5g

} 4%36 , .

_ h$ ' E ,.

c e

~44$d Pt28 52 l

g _

E] ts q) 4 dg b 4 l Ec e

fw -

_e e# %x e #(.

J el4A 8  !

- , \ n)

{ Ql p3 46 d 1 4 l l '

,13 -

o e 2

ja 2w

-3 4 f +g . <-

,i 2 1 A a s 4 .3 ~c l ,f s .

.5 g E .

w "3 73 a k p 3l u?441*a+}eg uWe 3j i1

$3  %

e 1- qy .+ <  !

I ,lilh.'

+ $  !

P ,*d EE M %,d3c4 [

  • T 8 9 =$ b ;

y ! r.

[ Pi2 oposeo cnmua es ro 2sAswnu 2 a ercer Art? s ABWR FLO0D YU0 l0Al[$# c & l M a m er erwe 2.15.12 ilding .

Deelgn Description The Control Building (C/B) is a structure which houses and provides protection and support for plant control and electrical equipment, batteries, portions of the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System, and C/B heating, ventilating and air conditioning equipment. The C/B is located between the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12h show the basic configuration and scope of the C/B.*

The C/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel. The C/B is a shear-wall structure (which accommodates seismic loads) consisting of the perimeter walls, the steam-tunnel walls and the connected supporting floors. Columns and walls carry verticalloads to the basemat. The top of the C/B basemat is located 20.2m 0.3m below the finished grade elevation.

The C/B, except for the main control area envelope, is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and electrical equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation and control equipment (including batteries). Interdivisional boundaries have the following features:

(1) Interdivisional walls, floors, doors and pen etrations which have three-hour fire ,

rating.

+

(2) Watertight doors to prevent flooding in one division from propagating to other divisions.

(3) Dhisionalwalls in the basement are 0.6m thick or greater.

The main control area envelope is separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating.

Watertight doors between flood divisions have open/close sensors with status indication and alarms in the main control room.

The C/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the C/B dhisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement floor is the collection point for floods. Except for the basement and main control area envelope, safety related electrical equipment and instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 centimeters above the floor surface. Level sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical divisions. These sensors send signals to the corresponding

  • The overall building dimensions provided in Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12h are for information only and are not intended to be part of the certified ABWRinfonnation.

Control Building 2.1s.12 1

. suswax.a

. ABWR cuawedouin unennt ,

q[

divisignis of the Reactor Service Water (RSW) System indicating flooding in that division of the C/B. These senson are located no higher than 1500 mm above the C/B basement floor.

The basement area level sensors are powered from their respective divisional Class IE power supply. Independence is provided between the Class IE divisions for these sensors and also between the Class IE dhisions and non-Class IE equipment.

To protect the C/B against an external flood the following design features are provided:

(1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage.

(2) Penetrations in the external walls below flood level are provided with flood protection features.

Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnelinto other areas of the C/B. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m.

l l The C/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads are those

-) associated with:

(1) Natural phenomena-wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles),

earthquakes, rain and snow.

l (2) Intemal events-floods, pipe breaks and missiles.

[

(.5) Normal plant operation--live loads, dead loads and temperature effecu.

i The steam turmelis protected against pressurization effects that occur in the steam .

tunnel as a result of postulated rupture of pipes containing high energy fluid.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteris l Table 2.15.12 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Control Building.

i 1

I 2.15.122 ControlBuilding l

o e

a I

&ph~ /uaw, a co paca, tous k hN L/B mt (Jua pg ,, ,ag;v,__

-sh,al m fro % % k u m& fa-y, u, o\l<r'ni M

5) " ium fChQkmul hpg Su Gwyv1o r nor-ouh a gy (yus)compowto b udal a h CfB

'Or hTow\ { ot'~b1 d '0 n vli i 3 M.ty,f.o , GMA t

t uut e, jo wntv s po+Loe) 1% 4 06,ott MId$ lbvra ak*iu

, PQ f~ h c~ n d SAM N h OvvA hb W n , A a, A k a 4 , u ld 6 % a s t.o-pl\

<\0 / 8 $4 fOW14-

j

& Table 2.15.12 Control Building b k, inspections, Tests, Anaiyses and Acceptance Criteria inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criterie f 1.

Design Commitment The basic configuration of the C/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will 1. The as-built C/B conforms with the basic shown on Figures 2.15.12a through be conducted. configuration shown on Figurita 2.15.12h. through 2.15.12h. r' y*

2. The top of the C/B basemat is located 2. Inspections of the as-built structure will 2. The top of the C/B basemat is located 20.2m i0.3m below the finished grade be conducted. 20.2m 10.3m below the finished grade elevation. elevation.
3. Inspections of the as-installed inter- 3. The as-installed walls, floors, doors and
3. Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and penetrations in the C/B have a three-hour divisional boundaries will be conducted. penetrations that form the inter-divisional boundaries have a three-hour fire rating.

fire rating.

4. The C/B has divisional areas with walls 4. Inspections of the as-built walls, and 4. The as-built C/B has walls and watertight and watertight doors as shown on Figures doors will be conducted. doors as shown on Figures 2.15.12a ,

2.15.12a through 2.15.12h. through 2.15.12h.

5. The main control area envelope is 5. Inspections of the as-built structure will 5. The as-built C/B has a main control area y separated from the rest of the C/B by be conducted. envelope separated from the rest of the  ?

walls, floors, doors and penetrations C/B by walls, floors. doors and [

which have a three-hour fire rating. penetrations which have a three-hour fire rating.

6. Main control room displays and alarms 6. Inspections will be performed on the main 6. Displays and alarms exist or can be provided for the C/B are as defined in control room displays and alarms for the retrieved in the main control room as Section 2.15.12. C/B. defined in Section 2.15.12.
7. Except for the basemat and main control 7. Inspections will be conducted of the as- 7. Except for the basemat and main control area envelope, safety-related electrical built equipment. area envelope, safety-related electrical equipment and instrumentation, and equipment and instrumentation, and control equipment is located at least 20 control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface. cm above the floor surface.
8. Level sensors are located in the basement 8. Inspections of the as-built equipment will 8. Level sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical be conducted. area of each of the three mechanical .

divisions. These sensors are located no divisions.These sensors are located no g higher than 1500 mm above the C/B s higher than 1500 mm above the C/B basement floor, basement floor. ,

_ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . - . . _ _ . .,. . . - . - .. - - - - -. _. . . . - _ _ . _ _ ~

.. 4 9

e Table 2.15.12 Control Building (Continued) b

" ID 9 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria C

Design Commitment !nspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

@. The basement area level sentors are 9. 9.

powered from their rsspective divisional a. Tests will be conducted on the as-built a.

Class 1E power supply. Independence is sensors by providing a test signalin The test signal exists6M.

IE division under test.

onlyin h ' !

provided between the Class 1E divisions only one Class 1E division at a time, for these sensors and also between the b. Physical separation or electrical Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E b. Inspections of the as-installed Class isolation exists between Class 1E equipment. 1E divisions will be conducted. divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E equipment.

10. The C/B is protected against external 10. Inspections of the as-built structure will 10. The C/B is protected against external floods by having: be conducted. floods by having:
a. External walls below flood level equal a. External walls below flood level equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water scopage. prevent ground water seepage.  ;
b. Penetrations in the external walls b. Penetrations in the extemal walls I below flood level provided with flood below flood level provided with flood protection features. protection features.
11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no 11. Inspections of the as-built structure will 11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel into be conducted. penetrations from the steam tunnel into other areas of the C/B. Other areas of the C/B.
12. The concrete thickness of the steam 12. Inspections of the as-built structure will 12. The concrete thickness of the steam tennel walls, floor and ceiling within the be conducted. tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the i C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m. C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m.
13. The C/B is able to withstand the structural 13. A structural analysis will be performed 13. A structural analysis report exists which design basis loads as defined in Section which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built C/B is able to g n 2.15.12. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis y g g Section 2.15.12. loads as defined in Section 2.15.12. g.

=

! Q E

  • R i

g g $ llP M/l~( @ dIO

~

< mt 3 41  !<

T - s' 34. 47 % 2 x i

{a e

k 9a4 .

j k k, y] w y

s s b

z , ,

f v{ <{Ls

  • g s

{ l9 '

d~.-1 .L{ wd2 L +Q

$ $, k i l hih hd-

- c%

o

, >1 ts Ec dj=4 4 d o) x 1

e

.e At o

1 w

s i

_g 1c&j

j "

S 1 g aA i S ed m 1 e4 a

4 ,< -

a le 1 44

~$ *, 3 I t. 3 I 9sq

.s 5

a m

2= i -4 i wi e

! 3 9I .r c *i $5(ah t-Z 3 d 1 11 7 4 s 4 < 4 41 iy i

e T ~ejeA_ H 3 14 3 +

Q1b $ $

q

~

m}{1 glkjT4bN uk k se [*{a i}sk a

( 6 23A6100 Rsv. 2

~ '

. ~ ABWR staid:rd S:f:tyAn:Irsis R:pitt 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design Criteria for the design basis for protection against external flooding of an AB%R plant site shall conform to the requirements of RG 1.59. The types and methods used for protecting the ABWR safety-related structures, systems and components from external ,

flooding shall conform to the guidelines defined in Regulatog Guide RG 1.102. The design criteria for protection against the effects of compartment flooding shall conform to the requirements of ANSI /ANS-5611 (Reference 3.4-2).

i The design basis flood levels and ground water levels for the ABWR standard plant are shown in Table 3.4-1 as specified by Table 2.0-1. For those structures outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant (e.g., the ultimate heat sink pump house), the COL applicant will demonstrate the structures outside the scope meet the requirements of Table 2.0-1 and GDC 2 and the guidance of RG 1.102. See Subsections 3.4.3.1,3.4.3.2, and 3.4.3.3 for COL license information requirements.

3.4.1 Flood Protection This section discusses the flood protection measures that are applicable to the standard l ABWR plant safety-related structures, systems, and components for both external ,

flooding and postulated flooding from plant component failures. These protection measures also apply to other structures that house systems and components important to safety which fall within the scope of specific plant.

l 3.4.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Structures The safety-related systems and components of the ABWR Standard Plant are located in the Reactor and Con trol Buildings which are Seismic Category I structures. Descriptions of these structures are provided in Subsections 3.8.4 and 3.8.5. The ABWR standard plant structures are protected as required (Table 3.4-1), against the postulated design basis flood level specified in Table 2.0-1. Postulated flooding from component failures in the building compartments is prevented from adversely affecting plant safety or l posing any hazard to the public.  ;

Table 3.4-1 identifies the exterior or access openings and penetrations that are ,

provided with features for protection against floods.

3.4.1.1.1 Flood Protection from External Sources The safety-related components located below the design basis flood level inside a i I

Seismic Categoy I structure are shown in the Section 1.2 building arrangement drawings. All safety-related components located below the design flood level are protected using the hardened protection approach described below.

WBief level lf100d) oe$ign - Amendment 32 3A7

I W S & 7 (k)

%D li amu &iu 6 Se dn -hv;lt M m k om & 19p4 am t, W bt 0e .un y Lt w n,ha,9 p4 mtua%+. mM w ;iI LJoa.  % as M t a f u v % be AccunNNS& IW IOst,& $PN.

6 T b p e H 'o n )

Te u f n t w ;(( A &n y> a.utom f1 <

Jour, no n - tctmpl i W W "

Md$2.U: W

,t S M E-c vn) mH" h2 an %dll [ubl4}

66.% g-~;~3 4

n - <o ss-p(4+%h h a~m) -

xr s w;ne nw ; %c A [0 ws/~w.Hps.li%w+~

& { J. n wat <h # p,twLn M esau.

h//o-g

}

. ., 23A6100 Rw. 2 ABWR stamsattywrsisn:mt I e

Seismic Category I structures remain protected for safe shutdown of the reactor during all fl.ood conditions.

The safety-related systems and components are f ood-protected either because they are located above the design flood level or are enclosed in reinforced concrete Seismic Categog I structures which have the following features:

(1) Exterior walls below flood level are not less than 0.6m thick.

(2) Water stops are provided in all constructionjoints below flood level.

(3) Watertight doors, equipment hatches and penetrations are installed below flood level.

(4) Waterproof coating is applied to external surfaces exposed to flood level, and is extended a minimum of150 mm along the penetration surfaces.

(5) Roofs are designed to prevent pooling oflarge amounts of water in accordance with RG 1.102.  ;

~

Waterproofing of foundations and walls of Seismic Categon I structures below grade is (

L accomplished principally i:v the use ofwater stops at expansion and constructionjoints.

In addition to water stops, waterproofing of the plant structures and penetrations that l

house safety-related systems and components is provided up to 8 cm above the plant ground level to protect the external surfaces from exposure to water.

The flood protection measures that are described above also guard against flooding from onsite storage tanks that may rupture. The largest is the condensate storage tank.

This tank is located between the Turbine Building and the radwaste building where there are no direct enuies to these buildings. All plant entries start 30 cm above grade.

Any flash flooding that may reruit from tank rupture will drain away from the site and cause no damage to site equipment.

Additional specific provisions for flood protection include administrative procedures to assure that all watertight doors and hatch covers are locked in the event of a flood warning. Iflocal seepage occurs through the walls, it is controlled by sumps and sump purnps. Deterioration of exterior building wall penetration seals will be detectable by visual seepage. Corrective actions can be taken in a timely manner to control the rpf5blem. The COL aM will review the use of penetration seals below grade and develop procedures as necessay to protect the plant against the effects of seal W gaw will k & M A T4 h0M N J

p g (c n e 3,k,I) a J w:H & &, e* h*" kt Water Level (Flood) Desian - Am=&ent 32 342 mwr @

=

i A, c & akeh% 5 Hvfy hA l m$s && &' gi , uU Nkn '

i a r & M J k- < *a a) & l w 4 tioc en 14% d44k*<b 7l g6h o^ M

,upu m y.de & pk unps -

pin n N6 fo'fkA! d-

  • N Yws '

}{ m i llmf ,

I 5

A

, , 23A6 NOR N.3 ABWR s=adard sateryA= lysis R: port  !

l i

3.4.3.3 Flood Protection Requirements for Other Structures l The COL applicant will demonstrate, for the structures outside the scope of the ABWR  ;

Standard Plant, that they meet the requirements of GDC 2 and the guidance of RG l 1.102 (Subsection 3.4). , -

y- V KJ f) - ' i& (t 6 ~I 0D 3.4.3.4 fenetration Seal

[ The COI pplicant shall demon te that penetration seal f ' re of an exterior l buil g wall below grade wi ot resultin a loss of the ty to safely shutdow e t by either the use o ighly reliable seals or the velopment of eme

  • cy rocedures to respopd'to the failure of a pene on seal. (Subsectio .4.1.1.1) 3.4.4 References 3.4-1 Crane Co., Flow ofRuids Thmugh Values, Fittings, and Pipe, Technical Paper No.

410,1973.

3.4-2 ANSI /ANS 56.11, Standard, Design CntenaforProtection Against the Efects of Compartment Rooding in Light WaterReactorPlants.

l 3.4-3 Regulatory Guide 1.59, Design Basis RoodsforNuclearPowerPlants. (t l

1 l

l 1

Water Level (Flood) Design - Amendment 33 3+14

~

E\/ isi o A/ Fvf 25AS447 Rtv. 2 I u A/ /VE L I

ABWR cenmedcesianwrerial

.15.10 Reactor Builcling lg Design Description f

,D The Reactor Building (R/B) is a structure which houses and provides grotection and t

support for the reactor priman systems, the primary containment and muc* -4the plant safety-related equipment. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.100 show the basic configuration and scope of the R/B*.

5 The R/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel with a steel frame

+

4 and reinforced concrete roof. The R/B encloses the pnmary containment. The R/B slabs and fuel pool girders are integrated with the reinforced concrete containment y vessel (RCCV). The R/B slabs are supported by columns, shear walls and beams to carry vertical loads to the basemat and transfer horizontalloads through the RCCV and R/B

.g shear walls to the basemat and R/B foundation.The R/B, together with the RCCV and the reactor pedestal, are supported by a common basemat. Inside the RCCV, the basemat is considered part of the Primary Containment System (PCS); outside the

{ -+-

3 RCCV, the basemat is part of the R/B. The top of the R/B basemat is located 20.2m t c

iC 0.3m below the finished grade elevation.

b e--

_f The R/B is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and electrical

$ equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation racks. Inter-divisional boundaries have the following features:

j 'n m _-

(1) Inter-divisional walls, floons, doors and penetrations hich have three-hour h

v "l fire rating.

,p \

g I (2) Watertight doors in the basement to prevent flooding in one division from

'\ propagating to other divisions.

(3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6 meters thick or greater.

Watertight doors on Emergency Core Cooling System rooms have open/close sensors with status indication and alarms in the main control room. ,

The R/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the R/B divisions does j

not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement floor is the collection location point for floods. The building configuration at this elevation is such that even for a flooding event invohing release of either the suppression pool or the condensate storage tank (CST) water into the R/B, no more than one division of safety-related l

equipment is affected. Except for the basement area, safety-related elecuical, instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface.

  • The overall building dimensions provided in Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.100 are provided for information only and are notintended to be part of the certified ABWRinformation.

2.15.10-1 Reactor Building

25AS447 R1v. 2 ABWR corrisesoestan uorenst The_R/B is protected against external flood. The following design features are provided:

(1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6 meters thick to prevent ground water seepage.

(2) Penetrations in the external walls below flood level are provided with flood protection features.

(3) A tunnel connects the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building and Reactor fj \ Building for the liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the tunnel to the Reactor Building will be watertight.

jf Ib k i

I The R/B is protected against the pressurization effects associated with postulated rupture of pipes containing high<nergy fluid that occur in subcompartments of the R/B. (Q g jl hqa (gM" v

_; The R/B y classified as Seismic Category I. hesigned and constmcted to i accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads argthose associated with: g hg l (1) Natural phenomena-wind, floods, tornados (including tornado missiles),

earthquakes, rain and snow. 1 (2) Internal events-floods, pipe breaks and missiles.

\

(3) Normal plant operation-live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and l g

b building vibration loads. l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria l 1

1 Table 2.15.10 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together l with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the R/B.

l Reactor Building 2.15.1V2 l

l

M-O l

. i i

%em 1L+a c(i ? ! A o ~ > aprwo%L

" o" s* w -

P r*r

%sp (os4) GpAy yipq ,% l*e M ca o tor y % k # % rn a.

Yb Y b0 9 fud oil dk

&  % vot uw- v h4 e R/a bov~ Lug .

%4 1h ord,3 ck Yo a de f1mnt w Jt; o m > pad ~LA fn%by & ut-w opfast wea 1 amt <7  !

l l

l 1

1

b - ( M m v /t (Nd pbMa Ii 0% ,-

'~

' 9,

$, Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building ( _ Io (ch M9h?

4- m T

4 5'

2

=

Inspections Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Crite Acceptance Criteria g 3

'd Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Inspections of the as-built structure will f 1. The as-built R/B conforms with the basic D'

y

1. The basic configuration of the R/B is 1.

shown on Figures 2.15.1% through be conducted. configuration shown in Figurey 2.15.10a ]

l through 2.15.100.

2.15.100. h

2. The top of the R/B basemat is located v
2. The top of the R/B basemat is located 2. Inspections of the as-built structure will 20.2m i0.3m below the finished grade be conducted. 20.2m 10.3m below the finished grade k@g' elevation. elevation.

+

J 5

Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and 3. Inspections of the as-Installed inter. 3. The as-installed walls, flocrs, doors and 3.

penetrationsMave a three-hour divisional boundaries gl be conducted.

penetrations that form the inter-divisional boundaries,have a three hour fire rating.

[ +

5 fire rating.  %

In's pections of the as-built walls and 4. The as-built R/B h'bTws1Ts and watertight

4. The R/B has divisional areas with walls 4.

watertight doors will be conducted. doors as shown on Figures 2.15.10a y and watertight doors are as shown on p through 2.15.100, Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.100.

5. Main control room displays and alarms . Inspections will be performed on the main 5. Displays and alarms exist or can be k control room displays and alarms for the retrieved in the main control room as &

provided for the R/B are as defined in Section 2.15.10. R/B. defined in Section 2.15.10. [

6. Inspectior.s will be conducted of the 6. Penetrations (except for watertight
6. A flooding event involving release of either the suppression pool or the CST divisional boundaries shown on Figure doors) in the divisional walls are at least water does not affect more than one 2.15.10c. 2.5m above the floor level of -8200 mm.

division of safety-related equipment.

Except for the basement area, safety- 7. Inspections will be conducted of the as- 7. Except for the basement area, safety-

7. related electrical, instrumentation, and related electrical, instrumentation, and built equipment, control equipment is located at Icast 20 control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface. cm above the floor surface. n E

h

~.. g

, 7 0NN @EN00nw N4 tA h.o) Q N

$ %lIn 4 a n),,' Y $*

- x ~

h (omi a2 y

a

P Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building (Continued) b E 03 a inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria h Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria  %

d 8. The R/B is protected against external 8. Inspections of the as-built structure will 8.

floods by having: be conducted. a. External walls below flood level are

a. External walls below flood level that equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage.

are equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage.

M fQ b. Penetrations in the exterral walls

b. Penetrations in the external walls ( [ ] below flood level are provided with below flood level provided with flood protection features.

d} ApVS flood protection features.

s c. Penetrations from the tunnel to the

c. Watertight penetrations to the Reactor - Reactor Building are watertight. ,

Building from the tunnel that connects p' y the Radwaste Building, Turbine [- yn d o Mb Building and Reactor Building for the (M 0 I( YY liquid radwaste system piping.

A structural analysis will be performed IO A structural analysis report exists which  ;

is,eble loadsto aswithstand the structural [0 which reconciles the as-builtconcludesdata with

[

f design basis 2.15.10.

defined in Section 1 structural design basis as defined in that the as-built R/B!ais able to withstand the structural design basis y

u Section 2.15.10. loads as defined in Section 2.15.10.

0$f -f t/n aat D

a.

!i?

y E v 5 5

o E-

~

- 5 t 2 4 Et

-L S

~ .

+

l' k 3 L[2  % __a O

4

\

T - -..- - . -

& =..

+

q_q 4

w 5 4 e2 1

'2 -

\

5k Us m

< l I

\

~

Qh

@  : i

..j_ _ _ -

D I

%@ N p$

Z ) k  ??

2 as *s .

4Ty % $ ')

\

% {-

6

~S 3 te 5

{ .h *% 4 *&5 sC 4 s 2

q v

%( o D "g.

o i

s. .

] D 5b}It i ywA d

h I 3

+E 153 "

374 :e. a 4l a

  1. 4 j' $ I  %

v46 Ro 4 a1 ___

~'

25A5M7 Rsv.2 j casadossinuarmt

. 'ABWR l chm / 6 8 F7pL Tt/A/N6t6  !

l 2.15.11 Turbine Building Design Description The Turbine Building (T/B) includes the electdcal building and houses the main turbine generator and other power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. The T/B is located adjacent to the safety-related Seismic Category I Control Building. With the exception ofinstmmentation associated with monitoring of condenser pressure, turbine first-stage pressure, turbine control valve oil pressure and stop valve position, there is no safety-related equipment in the T/B. The electrical building houses various plant support systems and equipment such as non-divisional switchgear and chillers.

A tunnel connects the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building and Reactor Building for the liquid radwaste system piping. Th penetrations from the tunnel to the Turbine BuildingtWG Jwatertight 7'N A t&hrE kO M*JJ M- hlhAtf -

w Flood conditions in the T/B are prevented from propagating into the Control Building (C/B) via the Service Building. This is achieved bylocating the access from the T/B to the S/B at or above grade level and providing a flood control doorway at the access location.

The T/B is not classified as a Seismic Category I structure. However, the building is  !

designed such that damage to safety-related funcdons does not occur under seismic loads corresponding to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground acceleration.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i

Table 2.15.11 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with asacci ned acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Turbine Building.

t

)

'l l

l l

Turbine Building. 2.15.11 1

-l

_ 2

9 t Table 2.15.11 Turbine Building b *

!" 10 I Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The basic configuration of the T/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will 1. The as-built T/B conforms with the basic described in Section 2.15.11. be conducted. configuration described in Section 2.15.11.
2. The T/B is designed such that damage to 2. A seismic analysis of the as-built T/B will 2. A structural analysis report exists which safety-related functions does not occur be performed. concludes that under seismic loads under seismic loads corresponding to the corresponding to the SSE ground SSE ground acceleration. acceleration the as-built T/B does not damage safety-related functions.

9 i

ss 4

h b-N

!e E 5

e i E.

e.

p

25A5487 Rsv. 2 ABWR .ff""cutsdouiuarmrius

!(H yhUc, es Foft Tc/ y A/6_ s '

(R , ,p-% /w l

2.15.12 Control Building Y Design Description N

v The Control Building (C/B) is a structure which houses and prosides protection and y support for plant control and electrical equipment, batteries, portions of the Reactor ij Building Cooling Water (RCW) System, and C/B heating, ventilating and air y conditioning equipment. The C/B is located between the Reactor and Turbine  !

O Buildings. Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12h show the basic configuration and scope of i

@O the C/B.

gy 5 -

The C/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel. The C/B is a shear-wall stmcture (which accommodates seismic loads) consisting of the perimeter walls, l 1+ the steam-tunnel walls and the connected supporting floors. Columns and walls carry vertical loads to the basemat. The top of the C/B basemat is located 20.2m d0.3m below f the finished grade elevation.

{,g d 4 Z p The C/B, except for the main control area envelope, is dhided into three separate y c divisional areas for mechanicd and electrical equipment and four divisional areas for i j O instrumentation and control equipment (including batteries). Interdivisional y boundaries have the following features:

! (1) Interdivisic,nal walkfloors, doors and penetrau hich have three-hourSre

! $D rating.

- 3 (2) Watertight doors to prevent flooding in one division from propagating to m other divisions.

(3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6m thick or greater.

The main control area envelope is separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, floon, '

doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating.

Watertight doors between flood divisions have open/close sensors with status indication and alarms in the main control room.

The C/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the C/B dhisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement flooris the collection point for floods. Except for the basement and main control area envelope, safety-related electrical equipment and instrumentation and control equipment is located atleast 20 centimeters above the floor surface. Level sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical divisions. These sensors send signals to the corresponding

  • The overall building dimensions provided in Figuirs 2.15.12a through 2.15.12h are for information only and are notintended to be part of the certified ABWRinformation.

2.15.12 1 Control Building

25A54471ily.2

. ABWR ceasedassig, unteru

(

divisions of the Reactor Service Water (RSW) System indicating flooding in that division of the C/B. These sensors are located no higher than 1500 mm above the C/B basement floor.

The basement area level sensors are powered from their respective divisional Class 1E power supply. Independence is provided between the Class IE divisions for these sensors and also between the Class IE divisions and non-Class IE equipment.

To protect the C/B against an external flood the following design features are provided:

(1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage.

(2) Penetrations in the external walls below flood level are provided with flood protection features.

Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnelinto other areas of the C/B. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m.

The C/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed and constructed to l I accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with:

(1) Natural phenomena-wind, floods, tornadoes (including tomado missiles),

l earthquakes, rain and snow.

[ (2) Internal events-floods, pipe breaks and missiles.

(3) Normal plant operation-live loads, dead loads and temperature effects.

The steam tunnelis protected against pressurization effects that occur in the steam tunnel as a result of postulated mpture of pipes containing high energy fluid. ]

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.12 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together  ;

I with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Control Building.

1 1

2.15.12-2 Control Building

Avy( bdoeww I M

( ( flb w ik Yo c o n n.c <k n' k VA IVbo, j ,

~

~ ~' ~

? Ta le 2.15.12 Control Building \ b '

8 W

g inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Chlteria y Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria h

J

1. The basic configuration of the QB is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will i 1. The as-built QB conforms with the basic shown on Figures 2.15.12a through be conducted. configuration shown on Figures 2.15.12a 2.15.12h.

through 2.15.12h.

2. The top of the QB basemat is located 2. Inspections of the as-built structure will 2. The top of the QB basemat is located 20.2m 10.3m below the finished grade be conducted. 20.2m i0.3m below the finished grade elevation. I elevation.
3. Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and 3. Inspections of the as-installed inter- 3. The as-installed walls, floore, doors and divisional boundaries will be conducted. penetrations that form the inter-divisional penetrationsg(have fire rating. a three-hour boundarle ave a three-hour fire rating.
4. The QB has divisional areas with walls 4. Inspections of the as-built walls, nd 4. The as-built QB has walls and watertight and watertight doors as shown on Figures doors will be conducted. doors as shown on Figures 2.15.12a ,

2.15.12a through 2.15.12h. through 2.15.12h.

5. The main control area envelope is 5. Inspections of the as-built structure will 5. The as-built QB has a main control area y separated from the rest of the QB by be conducted. envelope separated from the rest of the @

walls, floors, doors and penetrations QB by walls, floors, doors and [

which have a three-hour fire rating. -

penetrations which have a three-hour fire rating.

6. Main control room displays and alarms 6. Inspections will be performed on the main ' 6. Displays and alarms exist or can be provided for the QB are as defined in control room displays and alarms for the retrieved in the main control room as Section 2.15.12. QB. defined in Section 2.15.12.
7. Except for the basemat and main control 7. Inspections will be conducted of the as- 7. Except for the basemat and main control area envelope, safety-related electrical built equipment. area envelope, safety-related electrical equipment and instrumentation, and equipment and instrumentation, and control equipment is located at least 20 control equipment is located at least 20 E cm above the floor surface. cm above the floor surface.
8. Level sensors are located in the basement 8. Inspections of the as-built equipment ill 8. Level sensors are located in the basement 5 area of each of the three mechanical be conducted. area of each of the three mechanical $*

ge divisions. These sensors are located no divisions. These sensors are located no in higher than 1500 mm above the C/B higher than 1500 mm above the QB E basement floor.

?!

~

basement floor. (=

-/ ~

7G nhoul Zdl puhdW L g w ,u,,sY44

/

3 Table 2.15.12 Control Building (Continued) b +

5" tD 5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23

9. The basement area level sensors are 9. 9.

powered from their respective divisional a. Tests will be conducted on the as-built a. The test signal exists oniv in the Class Class 1E power supply. independence is sensors by providing a test signal in 1E division under test.

provided between the Class 1E divisions only one Class 1E division at a time.

for these sensors and also between the b. Phys.ical separation or electrical Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E b. Inspections of the as-installed Class isolation exists between Class 1E equipment. 1E divisions will be conducted. divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between those Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E equipment.

10. The C/B is protected against external 10. Inspections of the as-built structure will 10. The C/B is protected against external floods by having: be conducted. floods by having:
a. Extemal walls below flood level equal a. External walls below flood level equal to or greater than 0.6m thick to to or greater than 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage. prevent ground water seepage.  ;
b. Penetrations in the extemal walls b. Penetrations in the external walls I below flood level provided with flood below flood level provided with flood protection features. protection features.
11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no 11. Inspections of the as-built structure will 11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel into be conducted. penetrations from the steam tunnel into other areas of the C/B. Other areas of the C/B.
12. The concrete thickness of the steam 12. Inspections of the as-built structure will 12. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the be conducted. tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m. C/B is equal to or greater than 1.6m.

D

13. The C/B is able to withstand the structural 13. A structural analysis will be performed 13. A structural analysis report exists which g design basis loads as defined in Section which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built C/B is able to g 2.15.12. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis t:

{e Section 2.15.12. loads as defined in Section 2.15.12.

J.

h b R  !

a e

.-- m s

_ -, 4 _ _ m ._ _ _ _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . - - _ . _ ~ _ _. . _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ . _-

i

~ *

< 25AS447 Rzv. 2

ABWR radedDesign Mnedel ItAff (4 6 Ft)( Tv A/ ivEl f i o -v.

2.15.13 Radwaste Building Design Description ,

The Radwaste Building (RW/B) is a structure which houses the solid and liquid l

radwaste treatment systems. The RW/B is classified as non-safety-related.

Flood conditions in the RW/B are prevented from propagating into the Reactor .

Building and Turbine Building by providing the penetrations in external walls below t flood level with flood protection features.

A tunnel connects the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building and Reactor Building for ,

the ligad radwaste system piping. The netrations m the tunnel to the Radwaste BuildmgMwatertightf Am/

i ea herud h F4 I'ANA']. V aM  !

The external walls of the RW/B below grade and the basemat are classified as Seismic Category I. The extenor walls above grade, the floor slabs, the interior columns, and the roof are classified as non-seismic. l The external walls of the RW/B below grade and the basemat are designed and constmcted to accommodate the dynunic and static loading conditions associated with - l the =rious loads and lomi wmbinations which form the stmctural design basis. The [

loads are those associated with:

(1) Natural phenomena-wind, floods, tornados, earthquakes, rain and snow. l i

(2) Internal event-floods.

(3) Normal plant operations-live loads, dead loads and temperature effects. [

The extedor walls above grade, the floor slabs, the intedor columns and the roof are l designed such that damage to safety-related functions does not occur under seismic .  :

loads corresponding to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) gmund acceleration.  !

i nopections, Tests, Analysss and Acceptance Cdteris l l

Table 2.15.13 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyus, together. Lj with associated acceptance cdteda, which will be undertaken for the Radwaste Building.

1

. e

\

IW/b _

" h

%% kehn s

%;Icbr3 mi

\

P>v\cfr~;,

/umb k$d  % Pc

& &n wh & k Mml1a xM ~b% -reGtd / rtuW, Am a o~ w a - u a _saa:,y fu 0

h& Sf

%+.

tw^ DudLh { 46 C)enovd Rrnky &Sk>Fu d p/1,f %

M xN pc to~um, e p ts. .

s.

k

N , u U Table 2.15.13 Radweste Building b "

0 tg

% Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The basic configuration of the RW/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will 1. The as-built RW/B conforms with the basic described in Section 2.15.13. be conducted. configuration in Section 2.15.13.

I

2. The external walls of the RW/B below 2. A structural analysis will be performed 2. A structural analysis report exists which grade and the basemat are able to which reconciles the as-built data with the concludes that the as-built RW/B is able to withstand the design basis loadings as structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis defined in Section 2.15.13. Section 2.15.13. loads as defined in Section 2.15.13.
3. The exterior walls above grade, the floor 3. A seismic analysis will be performed. 3. A structural analysis report exists which stabs, the interior columns and the roof concludes that under seismic loads are designed such that damage to safety- corresponding to the SSE ground related functions does not occur under acceleration, the as-built RW/B does not seismic loads corresponding to the SSE damage safety-related functions.

ground acceleration. u i

4 kiasG:e u d< 4, A okap4 esp g .

s.k % %hAs Mw P>v +d):3, w;H k m[ 7,u, g.p,4 pm mLg w,(,LL TurWBuh g W d4 v4 4-A b*

%fbc %dir k wyrmonh y h h W Q p4 od u<d w kon, h

% 15 mh=ko*  % J % ed /ume '

,n ul & H=< r ntw& pMn a g m p& /amfd syJEu( "'g " " " * . "cW~~ ln.

, ,5m%y w ur i o cc ud v &Ali~ k - T~h d ^ $.

5. l@ toiwpo& q }

k Yo lLe e d v1 Juw+ g*

spw 9 (W) gov ~(

Wu. -

n

. 25A5447 Rav. 2 p- ~~

ABWR cenisesoesigausterior k(vtMovil Fu -

TvUWC1 2.11.9 Reactor Service Water System Design Description The Reactor Senice Water (RSW) System removes heat from the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System and rejects this heat to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).

The ponions of the RSW System that are in the Control Building are within the Certified Design. Those ponions of the RSW System that are outside the Control Building are not in the Cenified Design. Figure 2.11.9a shows the basic system configuration and scope within the Certified Design. Figure 2.11.9b shows the RSW System controlinterfaces.

The RSW System provides cooling water flow to either two or three of the RCW System heat exchangen in each division. On a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) signal, any closed valves for standby heat exchangers are automatically opened and cooling flow is l provided to all three heat exchangers in each division.

For each division of the RSW System, the heat exchanger inlet and outlet valves close upon receipt of a signal indicating Control Building flooding in that dhision.

The RSW System is classified as Seismic Category I and ASME Code Section III, Class 3 and consists of three separate safety-related divisions.

Each of the three RSW divisions is powered by its respecthe Class IE division. In the RSW System, independence is provided between Class IE divisions, and also between the Class IE divisions and non-Class IE equipment. Each mechanical dhision of the RCW system (Divisions A, B, C) is physically separated from the other divisions.

The RSW System has the following main control room (MCR) displays and controls:

control and status displays for the valves shown on Figure 2.11.9a. The RSW System components with status displap and controlinterfaces with the Remote Shutdown System (RSS) are identified in Figure 2.11.9a.

The motor-operated valves (MOVs) shown on Figure 2.11.9a all have acthe safety-related functions to open and close under differential pressure and fluid flow conditions.

Interface Requirements Pan of the RSW System that are not within the Certified Design shall meet the following requirements: l (1) Design features shall be provided to limit the maximum flood height to 5.0 meters in each RCW heat exchanger room.

Reactor Service Water System 2.11.9-1

1

  • 25A5447M2v.2 r ,_

l ABWR cuanedansigaauseenst (l

(2) The design shall have three divisions which are phpically separated. Each l division shall be powered byits respective Class IE dhision. Each division shall be capable of removing the design heat capacity (as specified in Section l 2.11.3) of the RCW heat exchangers in its division.

i (3) Upon receipt of a loss-of<oolant (LOCA) signal, components in standby mode shall start and/or align to the operating mode.

(4) RSW System Divisions A and B shall have controlinterfaces with the Remote Shutdown System (RSS) as required to support RSW operation during RSS design basis conditions.

(5) If required by the elevation relationships between the UHS and the RSW System components in the Control Building (C/B), the RSW System shall have antisiphen capability to prevent a C/B flood after an RSW System break and after the RSW System pumps have been stopped.

(6) RSW System pumps in any division shall be tripped on receipt of a signal j indicating flooding in that division of the C/B basement area.

/

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i

/

/

Table 2.11.9 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analpes, together

[ with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the portions of the ,

R5W System within the Certified Design. .

n~~------ --

/y pg n , J s r m r- ~ > u d to & '

k b"

%vJ G$w Of d " W" h i k

MdrfAddA cg % C.wMA5 ,

\

g w wJHom ddl & jucduM.

e  :

/

/

/

2.11.9-2 flenctor Service Water System

~

, s 23A6100 Rzv. 2 l ABWR standardsatoryAnalysis Report For material properties and dimensions, assess compliance of the as-built structure with design requirements in the Subsection 3.8.2 and in the detail design documents.

Construction desiations and design changes will be assessed to determine appropriate disposition.

This disposition will be accepted "as-is," provided the following acceptance criteria are met:

a The structural design meets the acceptance criteria and load combinations of Subsection 3.8.2.

e The dynamic responses (i.e., spectra, shear forces, axial forces and moments) of the as-built structure are bounded by the spectra in Appendices 3A and 3G.

Depending upon the extent of the deviation or design changes, compliance with the acceptance criteria can be determined by either:

(a) Analyses or evaluations of construction deviations and design changes, or (b) The design basis analyses will be repeated using the as-built condition. k 3H.5.3 Structural Analysis Report For The Reactor Building, Control Building and Radwaste Building Substructure (in dyf 6 u, k Cdsp .b IM A structural analysis report will be prepared. It will document the following activities associated to the constniction materials and as-built dimensions of the building:

(1) Review of construction records for material properties used in construction (i.e., in-process testing of concrete properties and procurement specifications for structural steel and reinforcing bars).

(2) Inspection of as-built building dimensions.

For material properties and dimensions, assess compliance of the as-built structure with design requirements in the Subsection 3.8.4 and in the detail design documents.

Construction deviations and design changes will be assessed to dete:Tnine appropriate l I

disposition.

This disposition will be accepted "as-is," provided the following acceptance criteria are I rnet:

1 m The structural design meets the acceptance criteria and load combinations of j Subsection 3.8A.

3H.5 2 ,

Structural Analysis Reports -Amendment 32 i

1

l 9 ~

GENuclesEmegy ABWR Date 2blfGk1 To b"1 E*I(G V"l 'VHl'E FUG No.

Pn; (3o)) S 04 -2 26g This page plus page(s)

From [ . dd A # b Mail Code 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Phone (408) 925- FAX (408) 925-1193 or (408) 925-1687 Subject P1Pwn 0&c Message

'fD%

' I) T l d ( (T C O d # G T (1 C ECW

'r10BEA 5 tre 0;s cvs5Ec

./ (( ,

M \ \ .2/"/no  ;

v/ I i

f O t' O b C D L 11 H ^JL -

T C > - nG S CONC _ ER

, ADWR casedoesig uaww t

3.3 Piping Design Deinign Description l Piping associated with fluid systems is categorized as either nuclear safety-related (i.e.,

Seismic Category I) or non-nuclear safety (NNS) related (i.e., nonoeismic Category I).

The piping shall be designed for a design life of 60 years. Piping sptems that must '

remain functional during and following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) are designated as Seismic Category I and are further classified as ASME Code Cass 1,2 or

3. The piping design requirements identified in this section e' compass piping sptems classified as nuclear safety-related and unless otherwise specified in this description, piping systems means nuclear safety-related piping systems. Piping systems and their components are designed and constructed in accordance with the AShE Code requirements identified in the indiddual system Design Descriptions.

l Piping systems shall be designed to meet their AShE Code class and Seismic Category I requirements. The AShE Code Cass 1,2 and 3 piping systems shall be designed to retain their pressure integrity and functional capability under internal design and operating pressures r.ud design basis loads. Piping stresses due to static and dynamic loads shall be combined and calculated in accordance with the AShE Code and shall be shown to be less than the AShE Code allowables for each senice level.

For ASME Code Class I piping sptems, a fatigue analysis shall be performed in accordance with the AShE Code Cass 1 piping requirements. Environmental effects shall be included in the fatigue analysis. The Class 1 piping fatigue analysis shall show that the AShE Code Cass 1 piping fatigue requirements have been met.  ;

For ASME Code Class 2 and 3 piping systems, piping stress ranges due to thermal expansion shall be calculated in accordance with the ASME Code Class 2 and 3 piping requirements. The piping stress analysis shall show that the ASME Code Cass 2 and 3 piping thermal expansion stress range requirements have been met. For the AShE Code Cass 2 and 3 piping systems and their components which will be subjected to severe thermal transients, the effects of these transients shall be included in the design.

Feedwater lines shall be designed for thermal stratification loads.

Piping systems shall be designed to minimize the effects of erosion / corrosion.

For those piping systems using ferritic materials as permitted by the design specification, the ferritic materials and fabrication processes shall be selected to ensure

. that the piping system is not susceptible to brittle fracture under the expected senice i conditions.

Piping Design 3.3-1

m.

e n 25A&M7 Rev. (Draft) l ABWR cenised ce@n Materiai i m those piping systems using austenitic stainless steel materials as permitted by the design specification, the stainless steel piping material and fabrication process shall be ,

selected to reduce the possibility of cracking during senice. Chemical, fabrication, handling, welding, and examination requirements that reduce cracking shall be met.

Piping system supports shall be designed to meet the requirements of ASN1E Code Subsection NF.

For piping systems, the pipe applied loads on attached equipment shall be calculated and shown to be less than the equipment allowable loads.

Analytical methods and load combinations used for analysis of piping systems shall be 4R referenced or specified in the ASME Code Certified Stress Report. Piping systems and their supports shall be mathematically modeled to proside results for piping system >

frequencies up to the analysis cutoff frequency. Computer programs used for piping system dynamic anahsis shall be benchmarked.

k( \-

Systems, structures and components that shall be required to be functional during and following an SSE shall be protected against the dynamic effects associated with -

postulated high energy pipe breaks in Seismic Category I and NNS piping systems. In o k addition, structures, systems, and components that shall be required to be functional during and following an SSE shall be protected againstiiEemironmNnal cucus 01 spraying, flooding, pressure and temperature due to postulated pipe breaks and cracks in Seismic Category I and NNS piping systems. Each postulated piping failure shall be documented in a Pipe Break Analysis Report which concludes the reactor can be shut down safely and maintained in a safe, cold shutdown condition without ofTsite power.

The Pipe lireak Analyses Report shall specify the criteria used to postulate breaks and the analytical methods used to perform the pipe break analysis. For postulated pipe breaks, the Pipe Break Analysis Report shall confirm: (1) piping stresses in the -

containment penetration area shall be within their allowable stress limits, (i?) pipe whi >

restraints andjet shield designs shall be capable of mitigating pipe break loads, (3) loads on safety-related sys ems, structures and components shall be within their design ,

l loads limity 'iping systems that are qualified for leak-before-break design may exclude

. gn eatures to mitigate the dynamic effects from postulated high energy pipe breaks.

j Piping systems shall be designed to provide clearance from structures, systems, and components where necessary for the accomplishment of the structure, system, or component's safety function as specified in the respective structure or system Design Description.

t The as-built piping shall be reconciled with the piping design required by this section.

, i  ;

332 Lea Piping Design

g,.

a @) M sg ,J aid , +7 a pa a n

suoyaa kni,a3 e sse ax p idut Mn vi trL ois L ds sgaest 6 qph}Ob'o-w kJ4 wa)A w axvir o a aud=J u S oa I no bis mAy fvudon fM d' 9-

% W Pg k pu n ,Ro nd -

1 1 r l'

+% '.

.- g-

'- ,. *s 9ga

  • 25ASM7 Rev. 2 pg ABWR cenisedDesign nessenet i l

-i Inapections,. Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteris  ;

Table 3.3 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated '

acceptance criteria, which will be performed for ABWR nuclear safety-related and NNS l related piping systems; , - T 2_ -- ' ,2: ' "- :7 P-- , _ _ a. Table 3.3 may ,

be completed on an individual system basis.

i k & s a ,'v:c M Non1 n+9 y 4 Jmtr>,

& \kan un o y ,

< J l 4

t

'%Qi kg-DI l g

)

t i

P Mping Design 33'3

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20063J916&oldid=2668136"