ML20063B216

Comments on ASLB 820727 Partial Initial Decision on Cheating Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20063B216
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/20/1982
From:	Aamodt M AAMODTS
To:
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8208250281
Download: ML20063B216 (48)

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• l bdes Y UNITED STA TES OF AIGRICA -

NUCLEAR REGUIA TORY COMMISSION . > - , , .

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00CKETED

.3EFORE TEE C0hhISSIONERS: umc Hunzio J. Palladino, Chairman

- ~

John P. Ahearne

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Victor Gilinsky' $ AM 23 P2:45 Thomas M. Rober-ts James K. A sselsfine OFricE OF ;: M ;J.Y-' l GCC C ~ ECVICE l R- H In -the Matter of )

l IGTROPOI,ITAN EDISON COMPANT ) Docket 50-289 SP (Th.ree Mile Island Nuclear ) -  ?' '-

Generating Station, Unit 1) i l

. Alh0DT C0hMENTS CONCERNING THE LICENSING BOARD'S THIRD PARTIAI) '

l IETIAL DECISION (REOPENED PROCEEDING) SERVED JULY 27, 1982 Table of Contents Page:

Introduction .................................. 1

! Inquiry Into Chea ting at TMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Eackground .................................. 3

- Board's Response ............................ 6 The Board's Findings from the Reopened Proceeding ................................. 8 Ex ten t o f C h e a tin g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Additional Management Involvement in Cheating ............................ 10 Licensee's Response to Cheating ....... 10 Management Responsibility for Cheating .10 Certification of Candidates for Licensing ........................... 11 TMI Training Program .................. 12 NRC Examination Process ............... 13 .

Tne Board's Evaluation of the Effect of the Reopened Proceeding on Their First Decision .14 .

Eas Aamodt Contention 2 Been Satisfied by the Board's Findings? .......................... 16 8200250281 820820 /

PDR ADOCK 05000289 G PDR

]

Table of Contents. Contd.

Pa ce Our Findings of the _ Effect. of the Reopened Proceeding on the Board 's First Decision . . . 17 Staffing TMI - 1 with Control Room Operators . 23 Dur Findings From the Reopened Proceeding C onc e rning Licen s e e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Dur Findings from the Reopened Proceeding Concerning.the NRC ............................... 28 Import of Evidence from the VV Issue _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

. Inadequacies of the Board's Conditions for Quality Assurance 'of -the Training and Testing

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of Control Ro om Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 C o n c lu s i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Addendum Attachment 1 - Conclusions of Law (Reopened Proceeding)

Attachment 2-- Meeting Summary on the Open Items Regarding TMI-1 Restart, June 28, 1979

$tt M MAq - AM A 3 e

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' UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA L . .

NUCLEAR REGUIJ. TORY COMMI-SSION i

- . 00CKETED U3NRC BEFORE THE CORhISSIONERS:

Hunzio J. Palladino, Chairman John F. Ahearne ' 52 A?0 23' P4 E.j Victor Gilinsley q Thomas M. Roberts 0FF'"E C: SE CFti'nY '

James K. A sselstine DCC 1.ie- SEnvlCE

h. tit; In the F.atter of )

EETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket 50-289$P (Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Generating Station, Unit 1)

AAh0DT C0hhENTS CONCERNING THE LICENSING BOARD'S THIRD PARTIAI)

INTIAL DECISION (REOPENED PROCZEDING) SERVED JULY 27, 1982 '

Introduction

1. Although the Board's first decision about management (Partial Initial Decision, August 27, 1981) was favorable to. the restart of TMI - 1, the Board agreed that the decision was totally pendant on the outcome of the inquiries into the cheating incident. Tne Board retained jurisdiction to reconsider a number of their findings and conclusions of law. ,

l The 36srd footnoted' specific findings as examples. The Board.

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particularly questioned their findings concerning Lfeensee's management integrity, the quality of its operating personnel, its ability to staff the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC process by which the operators would be tested and licensed. P. I .D. . a t vara gra nhs 4 3-4 5,

, 204 206. 249< 264 268-272. 276. 584 (c) .

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2. The Board has now consid6ied the evidence developed in the Reopened Proceeding concerning che'ating at TMI. Partial Initial Decision (Reonened Proceedinsd. July 27. 1982'. The B,oard has published 180 pages of f5ndings, recommended three penalties and. proposed four additional license conditions.

The Board claims that the issues raised in the R'eopened

' Proceeding have been resolved in favor of restart of TNI - 1 and that the conclusions of their first decision remain in effect.

Id. at 2423.

3a. We find that the Board errs, grossly. We find that the Commission should not make the' Board's decision immediately effeetive. We *woul'd urge the Commission to con 51dsr' the seriousness of the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding which clearly demonstrates the lack of integrity and competence of the management of TMI - 1. We would urge the Commission to rule that TMI - 1 cannot restart under the GPU Nuclear management. ,

.3b. Licensee management, including upper-management, made a number of false statements and misrepresentations throughout the proceeding. We urge the Commission to request a Department of Justice investigation of the false statements identified by Judge Milho111n. Also,' we urge the Commission to order an

,' ' internal investigation by the ' Office of Inspector and Auditor of the decisions in the cheating invsstigati6h and 'tlie:Reopsned Procbeding of. the management of the Office of Inspection and

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I Inforcement. We find OIE's decisions deliberately contrary I

to a full investigation of the cheating incident.

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( , 4. We also urge the Commission to suspend licensing of TEI operators until t'ho NRC examination and licensing process can be demonstrat'ed to assure that licensed operators have the requisite knowledge to operate a nuclear power plant under emergency conditions. We would u[ge the Commission to require testing of all presently licensed TMI operators to determine l their capability to respond appropriately to emergencies.  !

5. The bases for our recommendations are based on the i

evidence of the restart hearing and reopened proceeding and )

are presented in subsequent paragraphs. -

Inouiry c to Cheatine at TMI l

Eackground

. 6. The Board had assumed at the time it issued its first decision that an investigation of the cheating by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (OIE) would be adequate. l J -

PII. at 43-45. Chairman Palladino had ordered OIE to conduct i

a full investigation. Tr. 2 5.279-281 (Baci) . OIE did not do i this. The Board was dissatisfied.and decided to pursue its

' own investigation by opening the record of the restart hearing.

- Memorandum and Order. August 20 1981, at nages 3. 4 : Se ptember 14 1981, a t nare 1. No party objected. Id. The Board appointed Professor Gary L. Milho111n, Esquire to conduct the l

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investigation, dubbed the Reopened Proceeding. There were again no objections. Id. , at pages 1, 3. Professor Milho111n had been an Administrative Judge with the A tomic Safety and Licensing Board since 1976, and had been engaged in the practice of law for seven years prior to teaching legal subjects for ten years, i

l Professor Eilhollin appeared to be well-qualified to preside, 1

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. - his education including a baccalauraate degree in scienco in addition to his legal studies. Id. at A ttachment.

7. Judge Milhollin ' assumed responsibility for the investigation I of cheating on October 2,1981. After two conferences with the parties, he opened the record of the hearing on November 10, 1981 to receive testimony. The hearing was adjourned on December 10, l 1981. Judge Milho111n maintained a brisk pace throughout the I hearing, noting that the acceleration was necessary because "of an institutional desire on the part of the Commission to decide" the matter of the restart of TMI - 1. Tr.24.470571.

. Judge Milho111n was concerned about the abbreviated time to examine a range of issues of importance to the Board and parties.

Id. The Licensee and Staff were satisfied with the expedited hearing, opposing, the examination of all operators and the consultant who discovered cheating at TMI. Aamodt Fronosed Findincs of Fact.' ' January 18, 1982, e t 25. The Reopened Hearing'did not develop a complete record on the issues considered. Id.. at 15 - 22: Renort of-the Suecial Master, at 195. 259: PID. at 2087.

8. Judge Milho111n and the parties did, however, develop over'3500 pages of record testimony. The hearing was convened for five full days each week. Judge Milho111n set a rapid ~~

pace at all times during 'the hearing. He kept his own records, taking notes. continuously, followed-on the cross-examinations of the parties and interrogated the witnesses (searchingly) from prepared plans. He exhibiIted complete familiarity with the pre-filed testimony of the witnesses and nearly all of the documents generated during the discovery period. We found

Judge'Milho' 1 11n to ba a credible judge.

9. Judge Milho11in exhibited this same' thoroughness in his report 'of the investigation. He took nearly ff ve months (instead of two as . originally /indi,cated) to examine and distill ,

the evidence. The report fills [196 pages. Reuort of'the Suecial Master. Avril 28. 1982. Judge Milho111n considered-l - ~,

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all of the evidence developed including the credibility of the w  ;

witne ss es. ,

10. Judge Milho111n's report was extremelyiritical of the operations staff, found cheating exte{sive and present ~

among ths middle and lower management personnel, found the W.I trsining and testing program inadecuate and unresponsive to the Commission's Order (CLI-79-8),II 1(e), and que'stioned ,.

'the inteigrity and the competence of Licensee's management.

Id. 250-251, 304-316. 323-325. 327-331.' 336'. 338.

. 11. Ju'dge Milho111n'.pFoposed ' findings ~ which shou)d have caused,theBoardtoalter'theircon'clusic5isin.their'earlibr ~

deci ion 'and ;reccimmen'doaga' inst the restagt :cf TMI .-1.. The .

Staff '

stated that this would' te. the-reakonable course if the

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Board were to adopt all of Judge Milho1115's' findings, conclusions and recommendations. NRC Staff Comments on the Recor't of the Snecial Master. bah 21.1982, at nages 20, 21.

if thir a Lcensing Board were to adopt all of the, i

.the finings,, conclusions and recommendations of - l

-the Special Master, then certain of the Licensing )

Board'.s prior findings and conclusionr would have _

to be modified 'and the restart of TMI k 1 likTely s could not b6 atthorized with the I,icensee's existing operations staff. This follows from such conclusions by the Special Master as r (1) the overall level of integrity of 'the operations staff is inadequate (Report -at 325); and (2) the operations staff management was involved in cheating, as were the two individuals, Messrs. Ross and VV, who functioned w, 4, , , ' -

as tho 31nks between upper managenent and the operations otaff (Report at 183). In addition, of courno, Mossrs. G, H and Shipman could not

. be used by Licensee to operate TMI - 1, so these individuals' could not be considered in determining whether the Licensing Board 's shift staffing conditione for restart were satisfied. See Management PID at 583(9),. .Since the Special Master found the Licensee's training program to be poorly administered, weak in content and ineffective in its method instruction (Report at 251),

the Licensing Board's prior conclusion that

" Licensee has in place at TMI - 1 a comprehensive and acceptable training program" (Management PID at 276) would have to be modified... Finally, since the Special Master found the content of the NRC's April 1981 examination to be inadequate (Report at 340), the Licensing Board's prior findings to the contrary (Management PID at 272) also would have to be modified...The above effects

- on the Licensing Board's Management PID result only if the licensing Board adopts the' key findings and conclusions of the Special Master roted above. Id.

Board 's Resnonse 12 We were extremely surprised that the Board did not adopt the findings of Judge Milho111n in total. See PID, at 2037. Judge M'ilhollin was their agent at the Reopened Heahing. The Board found no fault with his fairness, capabilities or conduct of the hearing. Id.. at 2034 The Board stated that they had." Informed confidence in his ability and fairness....that his familiarity with education and examinations at a high academic level affords him special insight into the issues of cheating on the NRC and company administered operators examinations and with the associated .

training programs. ..His report is thorough, well-reasoned and carefully documented...It reflects the care and thoroughness with which he conducted the hearing and weighed the evidence...

His report is entitled to great weight." Id.

13. In': view of the Board's assessment of Judge Milho111n, it is not credible that the Board should choose to " independently arrive (d) at its own factural conclusions nothwithstanding some

conclucions to the contrary by Judge hilhollin because...it i,o

. out job to do so. '.' Id.. et 2037. It is'even more incredible in view of the Board's attitude in arriving at their first decision: ,

We have frequently been able to adopt proposed findings as presented . . . our own memories and hearing notes cannot be the equivalent to the

' record research conducted by many interested litigating parties. PID.. at 35,.

In their decision following the main hearing, the Board lifted findings verbatim from the Licensee's and Staff's findings and adopted them, although these findings grossly distorted the record evidence (to favor Licensee). See Aerodt Renly Findines. l l

June 29,1981, at v. Other parties ' findings (Commonwealth of Tennsylvania and Aamodts) disagreed substantially with the

' Licensee's and Staff's findings.1 The Board described the Commonwealth's f_indings as "35 pages of very technical and complex discussions" and "a reliable guide to the' evidentary record". PID. e t 303. Es would point out, if the .

Commonwealth's findings were reliable and in substantial disagreeme' n t with the Licensee's and Staff's finding, then

. the latter could not be reliable. Nor were they valid as was shown by the evidence of the Reopened Hearing. '

14. We cannot find that the Board " independently" arrived at their own cone'lusion in the Reopened Hearing because it was their

" job to do so".

We find that the Board was unwilling to change their previous decision despite the evidence developed in the Reopened Proceeding. Judge Milho111n's severe and wide criticisms challenged the integrity of the Board's earlier decision and favored a decision against restart. We find this to be -the

, only reasonnble explanation of the Board 's failure to accept Judge Hilhollin's findings. -

15. The iBoard felt some further explana tion was needed.

In their conclusions, they questioned whether they had been

" naive" in their earlier. decision. PID. at 2396. It is astounding that, after nearly three years of deliberations, the Board has questioned its ability to view the evidence of 'therhearing:objectivelji(and+at'- the rsamet. time preferred its judgement over Judge Milho111n!s).We can only conclude that the Board has used the ruse of naivete to cover its blatant attempt at distortion of the evidence to favor restart.

The Board's Findings from the Reonened Proceeding

16. The Board, after considering Judge Milho111n's findings and seeking any alternative explanations which would favor the licensee, was unable to dismiss considerable evidence which clearly disputed the Licensee's canagement capabilities and integrity.

The Board 's findings are summarized.by issue.

17 I. Extent of Cheating

, 1. ' Operators G and H cheated on the weekly training

'examina tions. Id. a t 2047, 2096-2097.

2. Shift supervisors O and W cheated extensively on -

the NRC licensing exhmination and auditor-administered 1

" mock" NRC examination. ' Id. . at 204 7. 2090-2091.

3. An unidentified candidate for licensing cheated by' soliciting an. answer _ to she NRC licensing examination.

Id.. at 2039.

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i. _________m___ _ _ _ -

. 4 A c.andidstd for raqualification solicited an

, answar by tolophona from an STA Wn. Id- , at 2039.2

5. Shift Foreman GG and his supervisor W cooperated on a company-administered examination. Id.. a't 2040 2133-2134

6. Unit-2. supervisor TV . cheated by turning in Nr. O's

work as his own. Id. . a t 2040

7. TMI , Station Manag,er Gary Miller filselyqcertified:

. VV for license renewal end iinspite of,-VV's cheating.. J IL ,

8. Ividence that STA MM may have cheated was unresolved.

Id.. at 2131. 2132. 2137.

9. It is not unlikely that Shift Foreman U provided i l an answer to an examinee during the NRC exam. Id., at 2178.

18. The Board concluded that all syspicious "parallelisms" 3

on examinations had been identified, but could not conclude .

~t hat all cheating. had been found. Id. 2041. 2042. 2087.

In any event, .the:Bo5rd found irrefutablesevidence .that 9 of licensee 'i operstions personnel .cHeate'd. and, there:.was strong evidence against two more. Ne do not understand the Board's statement "that some thirty to forty licensed members of the TMI-1 operating staff did not cheat, even though they easily could have..." Id . . a t 204 3. There were thirty-six operations and training department personnel, not all of whom >~

! Footnote 2 - The Board misidentified the examination as

" company-administered".. The exam was the requalification i

exam for 1980 administered by an auditor contractor, PQS Corp'. (the Kelly exam). The Board appeared unaware that this test was used to certify to the Commission the operators' knowledge of TMI - 2 events. Renort of the Suecial Master. at 133, Staff Ex. 28. Encl. 1. PID. a t 22 9.

-Footnote 3 - See page 9(a).

. O

wera or have been licensed, who sat for the licensing examination

. on which cheating was discovered and whose exams were scrutinized.

19. We find the number of cases of cheating among' operations personnel to be alarming. We do nqt know where the Board has identified 30 - 40 licensed TMI - 1 operations personnel untainted by the cheating inquiry. We also find the Board's reasoning faulty when they acknowledged "that we are terminating our part of this proceeding without bringing every miscreant.to justice, and without resolving every uncertainty." ,Id.. at 2087.

We agree. We noted that the mechanism for detecting cheating (scrutinizing exams for obvious parallelisms) would only detect those who took no care to conceal their cheating.

It probably would not detect verbal exchanges, fcr instance, the soliciters of Messrs. Shipman and WW. The Board recognized that info'rcation was difficult to obtain. Id . . a t 2173. 2142 The confessions of Messrs. Shipman, WW and KK were probably:-',

given to protect against perjury in the event of snbsequent disclo sure. We cannot understand how the Board, recognizing the limitations of the cheating inquiries and, at the same time, finding the large number of cheating incidents (outlined in

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para.17 supra) could c,onclude that Judge Milhollin's finding (that the TMI - 1 operations staff 6verall lacked integrity) was not supported by the evidence. The Board simply made an unsupported assertion concerning "30 - 40 licensed TMI - 1 operations personnel". We would also note tha t 9 of the 11 miscreants listed in para.17. supra held management positions.

Footnote 3 - The Board appeared unaware that the Licensee prevailed in objecting to the scrutiny of all weekly examinations or any tests given prior to the TMI - 2 accident (with'the exception of VV's).

conference.

Aamodt Motio'n. October 2.1981 ure-hearing The Board assumed that all company-administered exacs were checked. Id.. at 2043. .

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20. II. Additional Management Involvement in Cheating 1, Plant operating engineer'* Henry' Shipman was probably ,

not truthful in denying knowledge of his soliciter. 2047.2144

2. Unit 2 Station Manager Ga y Miller, with the assent l .

of Metropolitan Edison Vice-President John Herbein, . made Id.. at 2048, a false._ material (tatement to the NRC.

21. III. Licensee 's Response to Cheating

1. The Board found that licensee lacked competence in managing its investigation. Id.. at 2054.

. 2. Licensee's attorney was " naive". Id.. at 2055.

3. licensee was not thorough in its investigation. Id.,

at 2055.

4. Upper-management was uncritical of the " naive" investigation of their attorney. Id. 2056..

22. IV. Kanagement Responsibility for Cheating -

1. Tne' Board found licensee management inccountable for permitting 'an unciaciplined training and examination environment. Id. , at 2118. 2120. '

2. Management was culpably negligent in failifig to

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instill in its operating staff a sense of respect for its training and testing pi ogram. Id.. at 2063. ~

3. ,Mr. Enkill was responsible for failing to instill a .

proper attitude due to his naivete. Id. 2064.

e e

4. The President of GPU Nuclear Robart Arnold woo naive and negligent in failing to instill a proper attitude.

Id. . a t 2065-2066.

5. The incompeten'ce of the instructors in the TMI training department contributhd to the attitude of disr,espect for examination and the cheating. Id.. at 2069.

6. The conduct of the shift supervisors O and W did not

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build respect for the licensing examination. Id. , at 2092

7. Training instructor Charles Husted' lacked seriousness -

ness and responsibility concerning the integrity of the ,

testing program. Id . a t ' 2167. 2168.

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8. F.anagement failed to apply quality assurance and quality control concepts to the training program, as required by )

NRC rules. Id. , a t 2070.

23. We do*not-understand .why the Board would . recommend

. restart of the plant .with a management that they found to be negligent and naive. For instance, the Board noted the Director of Training Dr. -Iong's negligenc.e in implementing adequate testing procedures when the . Commission's directions in this regard were brought to his attention by the Board. Id.,

at 2323. However, the Board would place assurance for the improvement. of Licensee's training program in 'the hands of Dr. Long as Vic.e-President of Nuclear A ssurance. Id. . at 24 06.

24. V. Certification of Candidates for Licensing

1. The Board found Licensee management negligent in j their certification of operators. Id.. 2059.

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25. Thu Boa'rd also found that Licensee (Training Supervisor

, Samuel Newton) mi,srepres,ented their testing procedures to the 3 card. Id. 2067. And Operators 0, W, G and H clearly lied under.. cath...Id.,

at 2092. 2114 $he Board did not specifically refer to the repeated lying of 0 and W to NRC investigators, however the Board adopted Judge Milho111n.'s findings which

......i..:^.. . .

address this'. ' We feel that the Board has not ' factored O's and W's lying into their failure to recommend criminal prosecution.

26.- VI. TMI Training Program

1. The Board concluded that the integrity of Licensee's training program.fbiled._because of improper management.

Id., at 2082

2. The Department of Nuclear Assurance failed to recognize its responsibility to assure that training must comport to the concepts of operational safety quality control. Id. a t 2084

3. Licensee failed to abide by NRC Regulation Part 50 Appendix B vhich requires qualit'y control and assurance of training. Id.

4. The Di' rector of Training, even as of the Board's decision, has failed to abids by this regulation. Id.  ;

5. The quality of instruction for licensed operators is poor. . Id . . a t 2085.

27. We do not understand why the Board would consider restart of the plant with the same management. Also, we '

cannot accept the Board's argument that although instruction

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wa s poor, they have not found that the instructors failed to instruct or that the students failed to learn. Id. . at 2085.

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. . The 3' card is absent any evidence that the operators learned other than the NRC examination process whose validity the Board fcund questionable as follows:

28- VII. NRC Examination Process

1. The Board noted problem's with the substantive ,

content of the exams. Id . . at 2074.

2. The Board noted that Judge Milho11in perceived.

problems with the exams. Id.

3. The above evidence surfaced in the Reopened

', Iroceeding although the Board had ruled against litigation of the substance of the NRC exams.

Id.. at 2363.

4. The Board is concerned with the substance of the NRC exams. Id.. at 2366

5. The Board noted the evidence that the NRC examination process is neither independent nor .

external of Licensee 's training program and thus cannot measure the adequacy of Licensee's program.

Id., at 2373-2377.

_ c. 6.

- The cB~oard~:noted, and encouraged on-going

' efforts of the NRC to assure the validity of their examinations. Id . a t 2371 2372.

29. The Board' did not~ produce'a shred of evidence to supp. ort the validity of the NRC examination i.n the main

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hearing where the Board admit,s that they had jurisdiction to litigate the adequacy of the examinations. . To the contrary, .

,' we found no assurance of the validity or reliability of the tests, and no capability, as presently structured, to test the capabilities of the operators to handle emergencies.

Aetodt Findings, May 15, 1981, a t 26-36.

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1. - . . ~ --, , - . . . _ ,.,..,,--...,.m

e The Board's Evaluation of the Effect of the Roonened Proceeding

., . . on Their First Lecision

30. In view of the .: Board.'s find.ings concerning_certifiestion

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of operators, the poor quality of instruction, the' lack of integrity in the licensee's own testing program, and 'the questionable validity of the NRC ekamination process, we find that the Board has no reliable evidence that the operators at TMI are adequately trained to operate the plant. The Board, however, insisted that it would stand by its conclusions from the main hearing. Id.. at 2395-2410 We find their argument hollow. It depends on lists of courses (the only review of training done by NRC, Aemodt Ren1v Findines.

June 29, 1981, at 31-34, 36) : "We have affirced that their training has included the best possible course content."

?ID. , a t 2410 It depends on the validity of the NRC examination process (of'which.they have no assurance and Judge Milho111h: fouhd evidence to dispute, Renort of the Suecial Master, at 269-287); "We have found that the operators have been reexamined by the KRC. . ." PID. a t 2410. It depends on the organizational structure of the TMI training department and the resumes of these individuals: "We are also impressed with the credentials and experience. . . " Id. . at 2398. (We noted at the October 14, 19'81 Commission confdrence concerning TMI management capability that the Commission was not impressed with organizational charts, Transcrint-at 32).Aamodt Comments. j May 24.'1982. at race 35..)~ It depends on the opinions of licensee's hired experts that evalnatsd'.a" single -training i

program (Operator Accelerated Retraining Program); 1although the Board interpreted these experts testimony as unqualified

_g. 1 approval of the training prograc (contrary to the facts,

- . Jacodt Reulv Findings June 29, 1981, at 126-132), none of these experts ever stated that the operators were competent.

31.We find ~ that the Board has not, put-forth a single convincing argument that the operators are competent.- The Board's arguments were not convincing in their first decision; they are less so in view of the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding. Consider for instance the Board's argument that the operators' abilities to function during emergencies ,

is evaluated: "..while operator candidates' performance under stress is not evaluated directly, it is observed during t

the testing and licensing process. . .the time limits placed on written and oral examinations constitute to the candidates a

. stress which must be overcome for satisfactory completion of

.the examination." PID. a t 24 9. Not only *ss this testimony con,tradicted by one of the Licensee experts upon whom the Board depended { Aamodt Reulv Findings, June 29. 1982, at 53; Tr.12.722(Ke11v)), it is simply not the : truth. Judge I

Milho111n found that, "The questions did not ask the operator to solve a structured problem -- which is a higher form of knowledge -- or to reach to a new situation, which is a still

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higher form of knowledge." The Board described.the oral portion as ".more oriented to evaluating problem-solving'

! and analytical ability of the examinee. PID. at 2364. In 1

Reopened; Proceeding, the Board directed Judge Milho111n to

- find ost how many questions on the NRC oral licensing examination tested the.. operators' ability to respond to emergencies. The f

number of questions ranged from about two to six or eight.

Reuort of the Special Master, at 280. We do not understand l ' .

why the 3oard did not present any evidence to support their opini6n concerning the oral test. Also the Board did not

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- refute- Judge Milho11in's evidence concerning the written test although the NRC examinations were in evidence-. .It is clear that the Board does .not have .any reliable affirmative evidence concerning the competence of the licensed operators.4 Ha s .A amodt Contention 2 Been Satisfied Bv the Board 's Findings?

32. he find that Aamodt Contention 2, accepted by the Board without objection by any party, has not been satisfied.

he envisioned the contention as addressing the competency

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of unlicensed personnel, including management, as well as licensed operators. Aamodt Comments, June 1. 1982 a t ne ces 21, 22 : Aamodt Ren1v Findines, June 2 9, 1981, a t 19-25.

The Licensee's training of non-licensed personnel was evaluated as poor by the NRC and was to be addressed in the restart hearing.

Id.. at 19. This issue received scant attention. Id., at 20; PID', at 164. Sincellicensed and non; licensed personnel are under the same man,agement, it is reasonable.to. assume that the

- training of non-licensed personnel is al'so inadequate. Certainly, there is no assurance.

33. The matter of the competency of the management to manage has been clearly discredited by the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding. There is also the issue, aired in the main hearing, concerning the unfamiliarity with .th6 plant of: the ' TMI _1 managersc Footnote 4 - We would call the attention of the Commission to the bais '.of

• the Board in presenting exculpatory arguments even without record evidence.

• Aamodt Contention 2: It is contended that TMI-1 should not open until the performance of licensee technicians and management can be demonstrated to be upgraded as certified by an independent I

)

. . Aamodt Findines. Kav 15. 1981, at 91., Although the Board

. conditioned their decision for restart upon a commitment by Licensee to conduct a course in plant design for the mana gement, there is no evidence that this has been done.

PID . at 583(7).

There is no evidence ' of the adequacy of the concitment. Aamodt Findines. July 20. 1981. a t 4 5-4 8. Mr. Ross appears to be the only person in a management position above the operators' level who has any knowledge'about plant specifics.

Report of the Special Master, at 276.

Our Findines of the Effect of the Reonened Proceeding on the Board 's First Decision

34. he find that the Reopened Proceeding has fatally effected the board's first decision. According to thb Board's own findings ,high-level persons. in the management of TMI - 1 were negligent and naive in the important area of the l

training and qualifications of licensed operators. We would agree that the Board's recommendation of a monetary penalty is justified, however we do not see how it assures proper management of the plant, and, therefore,. th'e public 's health and safety.

35. In view of the a.ttention the training of operators received after the TMI - 2 accident, it seems hardly possible that TMI-l's management would be negligent or naive in this area. Howeverp they were, and this strongly indicates that they are -not only poor managers of training programs, but sicply poor and negligent managers. A finding of negligence l and naivete could more likely than not be the conclusion of any i

engineering firm. This upgrading should include 100% test performance of job description with provision for retraining and retest, or discharge of those who cannot consistently and con-fidently master all necessary information for safe c~onduct of their job description under all anticipated critical situations as well as routine situations.

l l - - -

investigation of any area of the plant's activity, particularly those areas which have received scant attention. -

36. Why was the Board deceived? We do not believe that they

. were. Their failure to pursue the -issue of misleading inform-ation after the accident TPID. at 491-493), Mr. Herbein's and Mr. Miller poor judgments in leaving the TMI-2 at the height of the crisis (Id.. at 4 96-4 97), Mr. Dieckamp's mailgram to Congressman Udall (Id. . at 501) or to await the Department of Justice . investigation regarding possible falsification of leak rates. (Ta _ _ nt 504-505). indicated to us a Board attitude cor.trary to an in-depth investigation. 'Even if the Board believed that all these issues would be resolved in the licensee 's favor, the board would have gained much greater insight into management than through their shallow methods.

'This was to accept volumes of self-serving pre-filed testimony from Licensee's management which was received si.th: sca'nt questioning unless an Latervenor or the Commonwealth .of Pennsylvania was prepared to question. Then, the Board on1'y permitted questioning on:subheets included in the pre-filed testimony. .

37. Much of the testimony in the main hearing regarding management's competency centered around organization charts,

. persona 3 resumes, .amd job descriptions. The Board, then, based its decision on .this self-serving testimony of Licensee, quoting it verbatim. See PID at 47-54 71-80 88-93. 95.99-103. 107-113. 129-132. 134 136, 140. 143-148. 153-154 156-162.

170-195. etc.

a wm,.- -,q,- , ,n .g..., , , a , - . .g _y ,. _m.

38. The Board also" depended on testimonials from other 124 utility mana gement (Id . . at 120,121) and Licensee's hired experts (Wegner, : Beta Corp. ..). The Board adopted large sections of their testimony verbatim. See Id., a t 87~. 88, 119, 380, etc. Although we did not actively participate 'in the

'~

examination of mana'gement other than those involved with training, we note throughout the first decision the Board's sparse references to cross-examination.

39. The Board also depended upon the NRC inspections. However, we found that the Board 'was totally uncritical, and 'even unob-servant of the quality of those reports. For instance, we ,

were concerned about the NRO review of the training program.

Tr. 20.698 (A amod t) . Between the issuamce of their first.

Safety Evaluation Report and its first revision, the Staff reversed their decision to independently review the Licensee's training program. PID at 204 Not only did the Board appear

1. 15-19 unaware of this decision during.the hearing ( Tr. 20711. Smith ),

in their decision they were also uncritical /of such an indefensible failure to regula te. Id. The same was true regarding the NRC's certification requirements. Id. at 273-275.

. 40. The Board also depended on the opinion's of Staff's witnesses, principally Messrs. A11enspach and Crocker. The Board was aware that these witnesses had "no specific manage-ment training" (Id.. at 64) and based:their judgements upon

" intangible subjective observations". Id.. at 122. . Messrs.

A11enspach and Crocker had authored guidelines for utili.ty canagement structure and technical resources, NUREG-0731, however the Board would not~ permit the guidelines to be l

entered into the record as evidence. Aamodt Renly Findings.

June 29, 1981, at vii; PID. at 116. vnn+-a+= The Board 1a.

claimbd tha t thoso wara no supporting witnesses. S$e Transcript of Juna 30, 1981. That simply was not true.

41. We found that the guidelines, which were intended to be only minimum qualifications (Id. , at 118),. were not met by licensee. Aamodt Reulv Findines. June 29, 1981, a t 11-17 For instance, if the guidelines were applied, Mr. Ross could not serve as the plant manager of operations. Co m na re Id . .

at 154 and 117. If the guidelines were applied to staffing, a minimum of two senior operators were be required on each shift. Id .;lat.".27. Compare the Board's decision (PID. 583(9)(a))

where a single senior operator per shift would be imposed as a condition to restart. How can the Board defend their

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staffing condition or Ross's credentials when they claim

...the guidelines fall far short of providing assurance ..

(?ID. 118) "?

42. The Board. cautioned the Commission that they were

"(not) ideal judges of those intangible qualities needed in competent utility management. " Id.. at 128. This is a serious admission, however it does not explain the Board's obvious errors in judgement.

43. One such error was the Board's assessment of the dependence on Mr. Ross of his superiors. Id . . a t 155. The 3 card failed to properly interpret the evidence of the superiors' lack of intimate knowledge of the plant. The Board was enamored, instead,veith Ross 's knowledge, which should not have. beenidon- -

sidered extraordinary in view of 'his position:as operations manager.

The superiors' lack of knowledge should have been viewed as serious, l

l

e o .

44. The Board ~ failed to conduct its own investigation of Licensee's training. The burden to examine witnesses fell totally on the Aamodts.and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

These two parties filed findings 16 dependently but in essential agreement and. highly critical of Licensee 's training program.

The Commonwealth withdrew its findings under arrangements which we felt allowed the Board to ignore important evidence on the record. Iamodt Findings, July 20, 1981, at 1-27.

4 5. We stand. by our findings and reply findings filed (May 15, 1981, June 29, 1981, July 20, 1981) on the evidence of the cain hearing. We do not find that we were naive. We find that The Board's arguments against them (PID 242-275. 531-554, 572-575)' are"udreasoned and without credible basis., The Board cited evidence that we discredited through questioning

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of the supporting witness. The Board also failed to assess the credibility of the witness according to the objective standards they acknowledged later (PID. nt 2036). In noting Judge Milho11in's judgement of the witnesses' credibility throughout his report, the Board acknowledged that "self-interest biases" are one objective standard by which a witness's testimony should be judged. However, the Board never considered the credibility of testimony 'throughout their first decision. The testimony of Licensee's hired witnesses was accepted uncritically.

46. We find -that the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding has confirmed the error of the Board's first decision.

'The Board 's Recommendations and Conditions  ;

47. The Board has conditioned their final decision that favors restart. (PID. a t 2A2_1) as they did their first decision. Id. , a t 583. We do not find these conditions

l 1

appropriate substitutoo for competent management.

48. We make the added objection that there is no assurance l that the recommended remedies would assure the competence cf ,

the ' bperators.

49. Further, even' if these remedies would assure competence, there is no assurance that the remedies would be in place in the event of restart.

50. The Board has also made punitive recommendations. Ld_.,

d at 2419. We do not find that any of the three recommendations advance the cause of public health and safety. -

51. Two weeks suspension or Operators G and H will not correct weaknesses-in integrity, 'if that is the problem.

Nor will it correct what we perceive to be the genesis of problem: inadequate training. Aamodt Comments. May 24, 1982, at 28.

52. We.are at a total loss to understand how the monetary penalty of $100,000 can " provide reasonable assurance that TMI - 1 can be operated without endangering the public health and safety." FID. at 2420

53. _Lo we understand correctly that the S100,000 need not be paid immediately ("a long-term remedy") ? ' ,Id.

54 In view of the fact that Licensee was found~ guilty, we believe that an' appropriate gesture would be repayment of all costs of all parties, including the Staff, Oommonwealth of Pennsylvania and.the intervenors. .

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'55. We would ask, "Of what punitive value is a fine of , l

\

$100,000?" Licensee only needs to reduce their staff by two operators or a manager in order to overcome this butlay.

_L -

-220-ho find tha Board'o chorectorization of the penal.ty as

. "sytbolic" is unrealistic. (PID, 2412). What could have been more symbolic than the TMI-2 accident? While we would not want the financial resources needed to clean-up TMI-2 ciepleted, we cannot accept the Board's feeling that the S100,000 fine will be remedial.

e e

s 9

1

a . .

56. The Board recommended an NRC Staff investigation of the August 3,1979 certification of VV.' We would have no confidence.ih an'investigati6n by tlie : Office of Inspection Aamodt Findines. ' March 4 1982 at 111-166.

and Enforcement.

Staffine TMI - 1 with Control Room Oterators 57'. We-also' note 'that :the Board' failed to address the high attrition rate at TMI and the dwindling number of licensed operators, particularly senior operators. ( This was an issue in the hearing.) Why? Surely the Board had access to information concerning the numbers of Senior and other operators. Surely the Board was aware of the Commission's interest, in adequate staffing of th plant.

58. The Board referred to "some thirty to forty licensed members of the TMI - 1 operating staff". PID. at 2043.

We question these numbers in view of our findings. Aamodt Findines. March 4 1981. at 32 9. Why wasn't this data put into .the record? .We find the uncertainty of the numbers,

" thirty to forty", puzzling.

59. We considered the staffing of the plant an important issue and discussed the high rate of attrition, evidence of its causes and the effects on staffing with Senior operators in our findings. Id. . at 328-348. We found that 's hift rotation was a major cause of ' attrition. We found tha't inquiry.

hearl'y one-fourth of the operators left following the cheating /

We found that the Senior operators who. have left cannot be  !

replaced due to the experience requirements of the job. _32 . l l

-mo 60.,Ne also discussed the staffing requirements established by the Board (Condition 9 in the PIL, at' 583) and why this.

staffing is inappropriate. We propose a concept of ' optimum' staffing to ensure health and safety'. Id . . a t 34 6-34 8.

Our Findines* Prom the Reotened Pr'oce'eding Concerning Licensee 61.We found that cheating was extensive at TMI -1 and probably included all of the operations staff. In the words of Operator 00, " Cheating was commonplace and accepted".

. According to the findings of the Licensee, test administration practices were " loose". According to the Board, the quality I of instruction was poor. Operators testified that there was talking and " group effort" during examinations. Aamodt Findines.

-20 January 18 /1982, at 35-83: Aamodt Comments. May 24 1982, at nace 15-21: Aamodt Comments. June 1, 1982, at na ge 2-17.

62. We found that upper-management personnel, including Mr. Robert Arnold'.and Dr. Robert Long made false statements and concealed information. A amodt Findines. Earch:4. '1982, -

at 254 270. 274 277-281. 286: Aamodt Comments. May 24 1982, a t na ce 22. 24 : Aamodt Comments. June 1. 1982. at pa ge 18. 19.

03. We found that the Supervisor of Training, Mr. Samuel Newton, and ins,tructors 6ade false statements uhder . oath.

Aamodt Findines. March 4 1982, at 277-281 350. 363-369; Aamodt Comments. May 24 '1982. at nage 23. 31

64. We found other evidences 'of misrepresentation by Licensee's counsel which we believe should be . attributed to Licensee's mana gement. Aamodt Findings, ' January 18, 1982 at 12-16; Aamodt Comments, at/h4f Aamodt Comments, June 1, 1982, at page . -21. Licensee counsel violated the sequestration order, l

.' presinted Licensoe's attorney as an impartial witness, and defended indefensible behavior of Operators G and H, for ins tance . Id.

65. We found that operators gave the NRC I&E misleading information. Not only did Messrs.~ 0 and W deny their obvious culpability, operators mislead the I&E concerning the coverage of the NRC licensing exam by proctors. Aamodt Findines. January

18. 1982. at 35. 36. 38. 110. Operators G and H gave incredible testimony which can only be interpreted as willfully misleading.

Aamodt Comments. June 1. 1982. at page 6.

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66. 'he found that a number of candidates for NRC licensing were not forthright in their testimony. Aamodt Findines.

68. 72. 80-82: Aamodt

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January 18 1982, at 46. 47 48 51 61 Comments. June 1.1982, at ua ce 10-15. We found that a rather general attitude prevailed that " cooperation" during te.sts was not cheating. Aamodt Findings, January 18, March 4, 1982. at 162. 163. Solicitati6ns were made openly, for instance by use of a telephone circuit with a speaker phone.

Id . . a t 150: Aamodt Comments. June 1.1982. at page 16-17.

67. . We found that Mr. Michael Ross, Manager of Operations, was aware and involved in what was going on. He must have.been according to; his own testimohf. Aamodt Findines. January 20 1982. at 81. Ws believe that her was involved in cheating.

Mr. Rosss NRC ^ examination showed a large number of corrections and additiens.: Id., at 76;.. Other independent evidence gonvinced.us that.Mr. Ross made these changes at a later time.

Aamodt Comments. Msv 24 1982, a t 13-14 Id.. 76-79:/ We found Mr.-Ross's testimony incredible in the Reopened Hearing which contrasted to his very credible

tastimony in the main hearing. Id.. at nage 10- This marked  !

change is significant.

68. We fully discussed the Ross issues in our comments to the Board's draft decision. .. Aamodt Comments. May 24

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1982, at page 6-14. We agreed with Judge Milho111n (and disagreed with the Bcard. ) We find that Ross is culpable of attempting to influence the NRC examination process. Id., i Ross told the operators concerning his review of the examination, "I took care of that job." Aamodt Findings. January 20. 1982, at 83. Ross conceded that he made such a statement, and the informant YY reported such a statement. Aamodt Comments. May 25 1982, at 7.5 We would take Mr. Ross at his word. However, even if Mr. Ross was only bragging, as YY allowed, is such behavior appr5'priate for someone in Ross 's position? O 60 We also found that Ross testified falsely concerning his first know1' edge of NRC's discovery of the cheating incident.

amodi Findings. March 4 1982. at 167: Jamodt Comments. May 24.

1982. at race 14 -

Footnote 5 - We do not understand the Board's objections.

PID at . Footnote 240 (nage 82) . Certainly Ross did not deny saying what YY. reported. when questioned.

Footnote 6 - We still find that the Board has treated YY, the informant, in an undeserved, harsh manner. PID. a t 2205.

After all, YY was simply an informant. In view of the Board's interest, in reopening the record, in obtaining all relevant informati'on, the Board should have- appreciated YY's forthright-ness. Although YY's information cut hard against the Board's first decision (PID. at 155), that should not have prejudiced the Board. Although Licensee may not have been able to con-sider restart without Ross, that should not have prejudiced the Board. Whether YY though that Ross was bragging or confessing at the time of Ross's statement should not have prejudiced the Board. We can find no 6ther' bases ~for the Board's criticism of YY's credibility. We found YY very credible, as  ;

did Judge Milho111n. Not noted in the evidence, but know to  ;

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70. We found that the Licensce's investigation into cheating lacked thoroughness and conviction.7 Aamodt Findings.

Januarv. 20. Earch 4 1982. at 200-213.

71. he found that Licensee condoned'cf2 eating. M ilagement was aware of the operators' bitter attitude toward the NRC examination (Id. , at 253), was aware of the " cooperative" way the operators took examinations at TMI (Id., at 250, 254, unnumbered ureceding -255, 256. 257), certified operators (to take the licensing exam) who were not prepared'(Id.. 258),

and failed to train or retrain the operators adequately (L et 259-261) . ' We found that the. training department' management- .

was willfully negligent. Id.. at 254, 255, 263. Management on the NRC exam deliberately facil'itated the operators' cheating /by increasing the number of testing rooms (through the ruse of providing smoking and non-smoking rooms), by ~not assisting with proctorship they knew was inadequate, and by providing small rooms where larger.ones were available. Id.. at 263.

the Board and the parties, is the fact- that YY traveled a long distance to appear before the Board, and, as a degreed engineer,

'YY held a high position in another nuclear plant Further, if the Board doubted YY's honesty (PID. at 2205),

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we find that they should'proce'ed to jrove or disprove their view; a dishonest person (who would "get even") is a threat to the public health and safety in the position that YY holds.

Absent such an action, we find the Board's words an attack on YY to protect Ross.

Footnote 7 - We do not understand the Board's reasoning (PID 2055) that the Sequestration Order .of the Reopened Hearing prevented Licensee from thoroughly investigating before the issuance of the order (November 12, 1981) or thereafter. Nor do we

72 .' Wo found evidenco that the "looso" administration of tests at TMI was not confined to testing of licensed j personnel. Id.. at 265-272.  ;

73. We found that Licensee management deliberately inter-fered with the NRC investigation of.the cheating. Id. , a t 2 74-276.

74. We found that Licensee management had falsified records entered as evidence in the main hearing. Id. 277-281.

75. We found that Mr. Hukill, Vice-president of TMI, did not meet the candidates he certified for the NRC exam in April.

Id.. at 350. He not only. violated'the spirit of the NRC regulation (100FR55), but he ignored the NRC lessons learned Id . . a t 352.

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from the TMI-2 accident.

76. We found that Mr. Hukill's proposed plans for certi-fication are not adequate. Id. . a t 353-355. 358-362.

Ou'r Findings from the Reonened Proceeding Concerning the NRC 77 We found that NRC's I&E did not conduct a full investi-gation of the cheating incident as ordered by Chairman Palladino.

Id. , a t 111-138.0

78. We found that no adeqndte. explanation 1has been entered into the record or proffered for the failure of I&E to exclude Licensee's management from the investigation. Id.s at 124-134.9 un'd erstand how Licensee's lack of thoroughness is excuseable because of the lack of thoroughness of the expedited Reopened  !

Proceeding. Id.. at 2056.

Fco tnote 8 - We note the Board's ' flip-flop' (PID, at 2080) from Ineir stated reason for reopsning the hearing. Memorandum and Order. August 20. 1981. at 3.4: September 14 1981 2-3.

Footnote 9 ~ We find the Board's arguments preposterous. The presumed ignorance or innocence on the part of OIE Director Stello and the willingness of the Board to ascribe such characteristics to a person in Mr. Stello's position is l not reasonable. PID. at 2229-2231

l. _, . . . - -- --- l

79.'- We found that OIE destroyed the evidence of a ' system'

,. of cheating by encouraging the informant to ' launder' the in-formation through Licensee management and counsel before presenting it to the investigators.10 Id., 143-152 l

80. We found that OIE withheld information concerning an instance of reported cheating that involved an instructor.

Id. 157. The OIE reports did not provide all information generated in their interviews. Id., 158 (a) (b) .

81. We found that the opinions of an OIE investigator were deliberately withheld from.the hearin'g. Id.. 128 The record did not reflect who was u'l timately responsible for this action.

82. The OIE investigators held a peculiar view of what constituted cheating. Id. 165. We found that this view clouded their testimony so that it is unclear whether the NRC proctor did or did not notice the extensive cheating of Operators O and W during the April NRC examination.

Id '. 15 9-165. This NRC,rproctor, a prime :witn'ess, .did not . appear in the Reopened Proceeding.

83. We find that these actions (uara. 77-82 suura) constitute sufficient evidence to warrant investigation. .Unle ssTthe ,

investigatory arm of NRC functions in the interest of the public and is competent, we have wasted our time in .this.bedring.

We liave urged the- Commission to order an ' internal investigation of this matter. Para . 3 supra . (We would consider an OIE investigation of the VV - Miller issue a forgone conclusion.)

Footnote 10-- We find such a system was in existence during the A pril. NRC exam. The major hindrance to such a finding by

' Judge Eilhollin was the substance of the question KK wa's pur-ported to have related in his interview. We found that Judge Eilho111n' overlooked KK's uncertainty about the question.

Aamodt Comments. Mav- 24 1982, at page 18-19.

6

, m --y,- -, .-- - - - - , - - - - - - , -

84 .' We found NRC's administration of examinations prior to the cheating incident to be wholly inadequate.

Aamodt Findings. March 4 1982. a t 2 98. We found that 1

NRC has changed - their written procedures for administering  ;

examinations in response to the idhntification of inadequacies Id. 288-300. We found little support for confidence in the implementation of this change. Id.

85. We found that OLB failed to assure that the testing of operators on the TMI-2 accident information was adequate i and responsive to the Commission's Order (CLI-79-8) Item II 1(e).

Id.. 301-305.

86. We found the NRC..examInstior,s invalid measures of operators' competency to operate the plant. Id.. 306-318.

We found that the operators' attitude toward the examination 11 cannot change until the examination is. valid. Id. 319-324

87. We find that this evidence (para. 84-86 suura. )

constitutes adequate support for our position set forth in para . 4 supra . .

88. We found that the NEC did not oversee Licensee's certification of candi'ta t a for licensing as they had planned.

Id.. 356. 357. No tvide ga was presented to indicate any 1

redresslof this laxity.2 '

Footnote 11 The Board noted that there was no evidence of any change.in the operators' attitude. JID. at 2240 Foo tnote 12 - The Board failed to consider any responsibility l'RC might have in regulating the certification urocess. PID, at 2348-2351. "Instead, the B'o ard would " trust"l2351) that improper certifications (such as VV's, O's, W's) would not  !

be made by Licensee.  !

o 9 O

, J J,. '. Import of Evidence from the VV Issue. .

, 4, 89. We would note regarding the VV issue that the Board's

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recommendation (N 2C MP)) did not address all the evidence raised. Some of this ~ evidence did not fit under any issu_e of[the proceeding. . However, the Boar'd was charged by the Commission with providing reasonable assurance that the TMI -1 facility can be operated safely. We find that the Board should have, addressed the additional evidence discussed. in para. 90-91,' l infra . , .

. -r 90 Mr. VV attributed his submission of Fc . O's work to4 his fatigue which resulted from working 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> days, seven days a week for a period of five .to six weeks. 'Ir. 26.662 (VV) .

i Mr. Robert Arnold ; considered VY's!. use. of .0.'s work .to be due Ao; '. ' .'

VV's poor judgement;

" a deficiency in the' reliability of Mr. VV's judgement in various instances and ;in particular situations where 'his judgement was very important to us as a s'upervisor. " Tv- 23 '737 VV stated he as,sumed that he would be caught, he ues willing to be caught, and he was satisfied with what ever punishment the company would deal out. Tr. 22.660.

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We would consider YV's attitude to be poor judgement.

91. The evidence in para. 90 above raised two issues:

Is Licensee's selection and screening of personnel cdequate (in view of VV's position as Supervisor of Operations for TMI-2),

and how'does fatigue affect the judg'ement of control room - '-

operators? We raised both issues in the main hearing, however the Board ruled against their litigation because we were unable g-o demonstrate nexus to the ,TMI-2 accident.-

o" We do not assert that this evidence meets that standard although -

t m , -- , - - - - _ . -

. i .

VV's position was at TMI-2 at the time of the accident), ' "

. , butithe evidence does indicate that either (or both) issues can affect the safe operation of the plant. We find this latter standard the appropriate benchmark, for the Commission's decision.

The Commissi6h hhsf recently supportedsthenextensichlof::workedaysc.

to-16 hours when necessary. In the case of TMI - 1, such extensions may be necessary due to the shortage of operators and Shift Technical Advisors. Therefore the matter of overtine is : nob- solely a generic issue. We propose that the intsstigation of the VV issue be expanded to include consider-

. ation of Licensee's selection of personnel and need to depend on overtime to staff the plant.

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Inadecuaciesfof-the Board's Conditions for Qualitv A'ssurance of the Training and Testing of Control hooom Overators

92. The Board diagnosed the failure of TMI's training ano testing program as a failure of the Quality Assurance 12 department to fulfill their responsibility. PID. 2404.2405.

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We would agree, however, we cannot find that the Board's conditions to assure quality training and testing can be met by this Licensee and/or are meaningful. .

For instance. the Commission must consider the

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93.

Board's condition that the Licensee is required to establish criteria to improve the quality of training instructors.

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Id. 2421(2) H6w:will Licensee meet this condition, if, Footnote 12 - Mrs. Aamodt's testimony in the main hearing a ttempted to bring to the a ttention of the Board. a ' number of variables, including training, which affect the operator and to which the programs of Quality Assurance need to be applied.

Another important variable affecting operation quality is working hours including ovsrtime ' and '

shift rotation.' Aamodt, ff. Tr. 12,931, Chart -

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ O ^

as Licensee testified, Licensesd s ' management. has not been able to attract .appropriath 'tebchers? Tr. 12.223 (Knief) . Clearly, the problem was not one of identification of a weaknsss, but failure of management to solve thE problem.

94. The Board conditioned restart upon Licensee's develop-ment and implementation of an internal audit by training managers. PID. 2421(3). The Board described " surprise" visits to the classrooms. We can hardly imagine that training management has not done this, a practice so common in educa : -

with tional institutions /: ~ which Drs. Long, Knief and Mr. Newton have all been associated. We believe that TMI's training management were well aware of the deficiencies in training,.

but that they chose to hide them. What evidence do we have that these managers would behave differently in the future?

95. Tha Board recommended a probationary period during which Licensee 's training program would be audited by independ-ent auditors. The Board did not speciff who would pay for the audit. Auditors hired and paid by Licensee can hardly be independent. The Board would have the credentials of the auditors approved by the Director of NRR. Id. 2421(1) .

Would these: credentials need to surpass those of the experts who reviewed the OARP?: The Board found that the OARP review committee .had' " dazzling" credentials. Id. 2397. However,_this l

com=ittee did not make their objections to Licensee's training program strong enough to be heard by the Board. Pare. suura.

The Board described the review committee as " independent" experts. We found that they had self-interest in testifying in Licensee's favor as the paid consultants of Licensee.

96. The Board's last condition (2421(4)) to detect cheating is patently ridiculous. First, what operator would engage in word-for-word copying after the focus of the cheating inquiry?

The Staff's review of such a process is even more meaningless.

The Staff permissable _ standards are so liberal that they had no confidence in Professor Trunk's detection of the obvious gopying between Operators G and H. NRC Staff'Prouosed Findings, 1 January 15. 1982, at 70.

97. The quality assurance of Licensee's programs cannot be g obtained through procedures, or as the Board suggested in their

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first decision, organizational charts. The solution lays in the competence and attitudes of the management. We are surprised j at the Board's satisfaction with Dr. Robert Long as the Director of Wuality Assurance since the Board dould h6t '

determine from Dr. Long's testimony that he fully understands that his Training Department failed in its responsibility and that the failure l

was the principal and proximate cause of the breakdown in the integrity of the training and testing program. PID. 2407.

Conclusions

98. We find that our Conclusions of Law filed in our findings from the Reopened Proceeding are valid. They are a tta ched. A ttachment 1

__ _.____ ___ O

99. We"conclnde. based on the evidence of the main hearing, and supported.by the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding as follows:

1. Aamodt Contention 2 has not been satisfied.

2. There is no evide. ice that the GARP increasedcthe capabilities of. the operators' to respond to emergencies.

3. There'is no evidence that the training of the operators in TMI-2 events has been adequate.

4. Licensee retains personnel sho .repbatedly. fail to pass training requirements.

5. The NRC licensing examination process is not b valid measure of the performance of control room operators.

6. The NRC examination process does not test the capabilities of operators (or crews) to respond to a variety of emergency situations.

7. . The facility certification of operators for licensing is meaningless due to Licensee attitude and NRC failnre to .

regulate.

8. Licensee has not met their commitment in terms of training and licensing theinumbers of operators promised three' years ago -in light of the TMI - 2 accident. A ttach-ment @. _

100. We also' conclude concerning the Board's conditions for restart:

1. The conditions of the Board's first decision are inadequate. The required staffing falls below the minimum guideline of NUREG-0731. The training program in Uhit 1 plast design'is not : adequate to raise the,_

. I qualifications of senior management to meet new standards (Draft ANS 3.1-1979) which are responsive to the lessons learned from the TMI - 2 accident. (~Se e Aamodt Findings, July 20, 1981 which discuss the shillowness of these conditions, proposed by the Commonwealth-Lidehsee agreement.) The training and testing commitments concerning TMI - 2 events were shown to be meaningless in the Reopened Hearing. (See in addition to .the comments supra and Aamodt Findings (Id.),

Aamodt Findings. March 4 1982. at 301-305.)

2. The conditions of the Board's last- decision are n:t responsive to the lack of competence and integrity of operhtors and managdment which was clearly attributable to the management of GPU Nuclear.

101. We conclude, overall, that the: management of TMI - 1 has been negligent in meeting the challenges of assuring the safe operation of Unit 1. The Board's failure to so find was either due to " naivete" or prejudice in . favor of the Licensee.

Respectfully submitted,

! sic.Uh 4 'A < LLL%b

[FArheM.Aamodt l

.Q

Addendum We would note that our findings that were filed after the deadline are cited for the arguments and re66rd.: citations they contain. We do not assert that they were timely or considered by Judge Milho111n or the Board. We do~ assert that the lateness of filing was not our own fault. We could not obtain a full transcript of the hearing in time to do our findings. See Aamodt Findings, January 18,1982, at 31(a)-34 (a).

The Board did not find any party in default. In fact, the l

Board invited parties, witnesses'.and. accused:to; file comments concerning the Renort'of the Soecial Master. See Aamodt Cocments, l

Eay 24, 1982, at page.1-4. These remarks apply to Aamodt Findings filed two days after the deadline or January 20, 1982 and those filed Parch 4, 1982.

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A ttachment 1

, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The NRC Staff bears some of the responsibility for the cheating which occurred at TMI. They have continued to administer ' routine' examinations despite warnings and recommendations by the Kemeny Commission. They administered the examinations in a manner that facilitated cheating. They failed to provide a system to prevent and detect cheating.

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2. The NRC Staff constrained their investigation of the extent of cheating at TMI. They permitted the Licensee to in fluen ce the invest'gation i of cheating.

3. Licensee management had knowledge of, encouraged and showed negligent failure to prevent cheating. They were aware of cheating prior to the investigations by the NRC. Licensee management administered tests in a manner which facilitated cheating.

They MaVe attempted.to'.coverrupicheating by biased and incomplete investigations. They have accepted the incredible testimony of operators. They have retained and continue to retain' employees l who have cheated. They failed to prevent cheating on Licensee, auditor and NRC tests.

4. Licensee management was involved in cheating.

Management witnesses presented perj ured testimony. Licensee ,

counsel violated the Sequestration Order of the hearing.

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, '5. The majority of the operators at TMI-1 were '

involved in cheating on tests and/or withholding information. concern-ing checting. A number of operators lied under oath.

6. The hearing did not provide a full and complete ,

record due to (a) constraints to acceldrate, (b) Licensee and Staff A

impediments to hearing adverse and other witnesses, (c) preparation of witnesses, and (d) Licensee's presence during NRC investigations and in Aamodt contacts with former TMI-1 operators.

7. The hearing did not develop a full record c'oncerning the allegations of a system of cheating, due to time constraints, preparation of witnesses and perjured testimony.

This matter deserves further investigation.

8. The issues of the adequacy of trianing, the content of the NRC examinations, cheating on non-licensed personnel tests, and the extent to which cheating contributed to the TMI-2 accident were raised but these issues were not litigated.

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9. The cheating of the first two operators  !

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who confessed was extensive, undisguised and accepted by these {

i and other operators and by management at TMI-1. i I

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. 10. The Board concludes'that because of the clear understanding on the part of Licensee's highest management of the import of cheating on licenstng examinations, deficiencies in the NRC examination process due not relieve Licensee of responsibility for the cheating which occurred at TMI - 1.

11. Licensee had f air warning as a consequence of the TMI - 2 accident and the studies and recommendations which f ollowed to address personnel deficiencies . Licensee has not responded adequately to those recommendations *or to the Commission's requirements. There is no support for any conclusion that Licensee can or will adequately address personnel-related problems.

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1. ': UMTED STATES 3V5acim3n% W E '- ,p' 'g .g * .,NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20*SS Y,'.h,[y.f '

June 28,1979 *

3. ,.

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a i Docket No. 28950 f .

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. LICENSEE: METROPOLITAN EDISON CO PANY (Met Ed/GPUSC)

FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT NO. 1 (TMI-1) .

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

ON THE JPEN ITEMS REGARDING TMI-l RESTART On June 11, 1979 the TMI-1 licensee T.et with'the NRC staff to discuss open items and proposed changes for restart of TMI-1. 4 -

A list of attendees is enclosed.

The subject matter presented by the licensee is as follows: " -

~(a) Retraining Program h.

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s .- .

Procedure Changes (b) .

( (c) Pla'nt Modifications PT I' .I

. C ..

(d) Emergen~y c Plan

{ =  ;

. . , ~ ~; -

(e) Safet. fnalysis & Sturiies . .

c A summary of these items is as follows and further details on the preshntation -

concerning these topics are attached. . .

I Retraining Program ,

The licensee comitted to retrain'ing aoproximately 40 reactor operators needed to cover the operating shifts. Furthennore, the licensee committed to have a degreeo engineer present curing plant operation to assist the shif t supervisor, t As part of the retrainino programs , the operator.s wilI o.e. taking co_LLege _ level technical courses in flui'd flow, heat transfer and inermocynamics. ane statt

. indicated the qualification of the instructors for these courses 'should be addressed. The.. licensee was also advised to contact the NRC Operating Licensing Branch regarding the centent of the technical courses for the operators. A criter, ion for retraining ocarators .should be developed and be made part of the restart report. The orooosad schedule for retraining shows the NRC examination ihphasis,added. (There are three additional.pages to this ' report.)

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• AfrEc[ M D 3 Summarv We have attempted in our comments to illustrate how the Board's third decision following' the cheating inquiry passes over the evidence to favor the Licensee with a recommendation for restart of TMI - Uni.t 1.

The Board admits that a number of operators cheated or probably cheated, and the Board fails to provide depositive evidence - tha t the remainder of the opera tors did not cheat.

The Board only looked et a small segment of licensee's training and testing program (licensed operators') and found wilfull negligence on the part of management from the Director of Training for GPU Nuclear to the instructors at TEI.

The Board is uncomfortable with the fact that the NhC Staff. never reviewed the TMI training program in the intervening years since the accident at TF.I-2 although improper training of operators was a suspected contributor to the accident. The Board found that the NRC examination process, on which they and the Staff planned to depend, appears to be an invalid measure of training or the competency of the operators.

Neither the written or oral portions of the NRC exams tests the responses of the operators to a range of emergency situations. i l

The Board found attitudes of TMI management ranging from the upper levels down to be irresponsible concerning the effect training. of the operator can have on the public health and' safe ty.

F s +

, Summarv. Contd.

The Board hopes to address these problems by a number of tacked-on conditions which management may or may not have the capabilities or inclination to fulfill. Af ter all, a symbolic penalty of a $100,000 fine cannot hope to wrought more change than the penalty of the disgrace and expense of the accident at TMI-2.

The Board notes that they would have expected the Licensee to have been certain af ter the TMI-2 accident that their training and testing programs were models for the industry.

However, the Board still trusts that same management of TEI-1, under the new name of GPU Nuclear, will change their attitudes and mode of operation.

We find that the Board's trust is not in the interest of public health and safety. We find that the Board 's in terest was in restarting the plant despite the health and safety implications. We urge the Commission to delay any decision concerning restart until, and if, assuranc'e, not hopes, can be offered to the public in the vicinity of TMI.

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c9 not 'a 4 UN1TED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _, 9

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7a gh ATOMIC SAFETY AND L-ICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

inichk  !

Ivan W. Smith, Chairman cyig' 00 b ~),s Dr. Walter H. Jordan Dr. Linda W. Little In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) -

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

i i Aamo~dt Recuest i

We understand from your letter of August 6,1982 that the cross-examination plans filed throughout the restart i .

l proceeding can now be made available to the parties. We l

i understand that these plans are now available in the FDR in Washington, D. C. We do not find. that _a suitable arrangement, therefore, we request that a copy be served to us.

j .. Respectfully yours, l

/ ~

j LL4 <.Hh

, E WQY i o Marjorie M. Aamodt

l l 2 l

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- NUCLEAR REGUIA TORY COMMISSION. ; ,

DOC"TED

. L. 4

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In the Matter of IGTROPOLITAN ELISON COMPANY ) Docket 50-289 U I" "  ! /5' (Tnree Mile Island Nuclear cer'" "- ei Generating Station, Unit 1 ) Obd ' T'~k ICE n

Service Document This is to certify that two documents, Aamodt Comments Concerning the Licensing Board's Third Partial Initial Lecision (Reopened Proceeding) Served July 27, 1982 and Aamodt Exceptions to the'. Partial Initial Decision (Reopened

' Proceeding)., July 27, 1982, have been served on the parties of the attached Service List. Service was by hand-delivery to the parties marked (*); the remainder were serired by deposit in the U. S. Mail, first-class delivery.

All services were made on Monday, August 23,.1982 as arranged with the Offices of the Commission and Appeal Board.

' r f Y. Y$$ s wry I

August 20, 1982 Marjoris M. Aamodt t 0 0

0 t

, 44 i

• SERVICE LIST

• Gary J. Edles, Chairman' Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal *Dr. John H. Buck Board Panel j Af.omic Safety & Licensing Appeal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

. . . Board Panel Washington, DC 20555 -U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 I .

• Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal

• George F. Trowbridge, Esq.

Board Panel Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Stret.t, NW U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ,

Washington, DC 20036 Washington, DC 20555

• Administrative Judge Y Michael F. McBride, Esquire Ivan W. Smith LeBouef, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Chairman, Atomic Safety and 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Licensing Board Suite 1100 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20036 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Robert Adler, Esquire -

Karin W. Carter, Esquire Administrative Judge Assistant Attorneys GeIT5ral Walter H. Jordan 505 Executive House Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Post Office Box 2357 881 West Outer Drive Harrisburg, PA 17120 Oak Ridge, TN 27830 Docketing & Service Section .

Administrative Judge Office of the Secretary Linda'W. Little U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atonic Safety & Licensing Board Commission

. 5000 Hermitage Drive Washington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh, NC 27612 - -

' Administrative Judge Ms. Louise Bradford Gary L. Milhollin TMI ALERT Atob.ic Safety & Licensing Board 1011 Green Street 1815 Jefferson Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 Madison, WI 53711 r- - _

4 Jack R. Goldberg, Esquire Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Office of Executive Legal William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Director

' Harmon & Weiss U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1725. Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Commission --- .

Washington, D.C. 20555 .-- . . - - -

....2-Mr. Henry D.Bukill David E. Cole, Esquire Vice Preside'nt i Smith & Smith, P.C. GPU puclear Corporatio'n..

2931 N. Front Street Post Office Box 480 Harrisburg, PA 17110 Mi{dletown,PA 17057

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