ML20063A683

Comments Opposing Immediate Effectiveness of ASLB 820727 Partial Initial Decision on Cheating.Decision Failed to Resolve Issues Re Ability of Licensee Personnel to Operate Plant Safely.W/Notice of Appearance & Certificates of Svc

ML20063A683
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/20/1982
From:	Blazey D PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
NUDOCS 8208240449
Download: ML20063A683 (12)

Text

i s -

. ~

?. ,

TED UNITED STA'IES OF AIERICA C NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMISSION -.

BEFORE EE COMISSION .

~~

Q23 kh*f3; In the Matter of: ;Oh[(f((S ,y MEIROPOLITAN EDISON 004PANY, ) chANCd

) Docket Ib. S0-289

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No. 1) ) '

O@t0tMEALE OF PENNSYLVANIA'S 00f1ENIS ON EE IMMEDIATE mu;nVENESS OF HE ASLB PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (REOPENED PROCEEDING), JULY 27, 1982 I. INITODUCITON By order dated March 10, 1982, the Comission invited the parties to suhait coments on whether the Licensing Board's partial initial decision on operator cheating (hereafter "PID") should be made 4 M intely effective, if the decision was favorable to restart. The PID issued on July 27, 1982, was favorable to restart. For the reasons stated below, the Carmonwealth urges the Comission not to grant 4*4nte effectiveness to the PID. The PID failed to resolve issues regarding the ability of certain of Licensee's personnel to operate 'IMI-l safely. To the extent that these personnel are allowed to cperate TMI-1, or that criteria are not in place to ensure adequate corrpetence in training instructors, the Cormourmalth opposes granting iMinte effectiveness to the PID.

II. DISCUSSION l

'Ihe standard for granting 4Minte effectiveness focuses on whether l

granting imediate effectiveness is in the interest of public health and safety. The interest of public health and safety will be served by

1. References to the PID will be by paragraph. (PID 1 ).

l l

f 8208240449 820820 ,1 PDR ADOCK 05000289 -

C O PDR

, 3 {' ' )

'A .

permitting M -1 to restart only when all critical safety concerns underlying the original suspension order have been met. In the following respects, the PID demonstrates that the concerns expressed in the

! Cbmission's August 9,1979 and March 6,1980 Orders have not been adequately resolved with respect to the integrity and the conpetence of certain menbers of Licensee's operations staff.

In its August 9,1979 Order, the Comission identified particular safety concerns, including guestions about the management capabilities of the Licensee, necessary to be resolved prior to restart. The rh miasion anplified on these standards in its Order of March 6,1980. Of partimlar relevance was the issue of whether the operations and technical staff of Unit 1 is qualified to operate Unit 1 safely.

A. The Licensing Board Would Allow The Licensee To Operate 1NI-1 With Operators Who Iack The Requisite Integrity Ib i

Perform 'Iheir Duties Safely.

The em=nnwealth rm- +-Aad in its proposed findinga of fact and conclusions of law that five indiviamla should not be permitted to operate 1MI-1.2 These ram-nandations are based on the principle that i an indiviaml who has deonstrated lack of honesty should not be entrusted with the responsibility of operating a nuclear power plant. High-level managment officials of the Licensee agreed in sworn testimony before the reopened hearing that integrity is essential to the safe operation l of a nuclear power plant. Tr. 23,611-12; 23,616 (R. Arnold); Tr. 23,983; l

l 24,082 (H. Hukill).

2. These individuals are G, H, GG, ID, and U. Sm Cannonwealth of Pennsylvania's Proposed Findings of Fact and 72 inclusions of law on Issues Raised in Reopened Hearing on Operator Cheating (January 18, 1982) at 47. (Pursuant to a Stipulation of Confidanciality among the parties, Licensee's operators were identified by letter designations. Confidanciality was subsequently waived or otherwise daamad inappropriate with respect to certain individuals.)

While this concept is difficult to challenge from any perspective, the Comorwealth has a partienlarly focused interest in the integrity of Licensee's operations staff. During an mergency, the Comorwealth receives critical public health-related information from Licensee's operations staff in the reactor control recun. On the basis of this information, the Governor and other Cocmorwealth officials make key public protective action decisions, such as whether to order evacuation.

Thus, the Conmxwealth's ability to fulfill its responsibility of making rational public health and safety decisions depends on its ability to receive trusted, reliable information from Licensee's operations staff.

h Licensing Board itself appears to agree with this principle of deanding the integrity of Licensee's operations staff in the future.

In its criticim of Licensee's procedures for certifying candidates as eligible to sit for NRC licensing examinations, the Board states:

the senior management official charged with signing the certification to the NRC is obligated to review the candidate's personnel file and to take into consideration any information reflecting on the candidate's integrity and attitude.

2351. Such steps, when inplemented, should eliminate the possibility of certifying candidates for the NRC examination who have cheated on internal examinations on one or nore occasions.

PID 112350-51 (ephasis added). See also id. 12059. Obviously, the Board has concluded that integrity and attitude, in addition to knowledge ard competence, are essential attributes for a reactor operator.

Yet the Board failed to apply this inportant principle' retrospectively.

h Board found on the basis of the evidence heard in the reopened hearing that control room operators G and H were guilty of cheating on internal company examinations.3 PID 112096-2121. Yet the Board sinultaneously found that an acceptable reedy would be a "two-week suspension without pay in lieu of an action against their licenses." Id. 12120. The Mard explains this result by stating, in part:

We do not believe that the overall results d eonstrate a poor understanding of the course material. We have, then, a question of ethics, not of coopetence. G and H have passed their NRC examinations under properly monitored conditions.

PID 12119 (mphasis addad). The Board's conclusion is inconsistent with its own statements on the importance of attitude and integrity in granting a license to a nuclear power plant reactor operator.4 .Ihe Cocmomealth is at a loss to understand why in the future an operator who has cheated would not even be permitted to sit for the NRC examination, while operators who have cheated in the past would still be allowed to operate 'IMI-1.

In addition to cheating, operators G and H also appear to have provided untruthful testimony before an NRC Hearing Examinm- (as well as an internal company investigation). See PID 112114-15. It is disturbing that the Licensing Board failed to appreciate the significance of rendering false or mislaadirig testimony in an NRC proceeding. Agsdi, such conduct calls into question the fundamantal integrity of the persons in question.

l i

h Board did not find, as urged by the Cocmonwealth, that individuals U and DD were guilty of cheating. Where the Licensing Board views a marginal factual record differently from the Commonwealth, the Cmmonwealth does not take exception to the Board's adjudication.

3. h Connonwealth notes that control room operators were tested repeatedly and that the testing sequence negatively affected operator norale and cast suspicion over the competence. and integrity of the operators as a group. The acknowledgement of these difficulties does not, however, imply that the Conmonwealth tolerates cheating on the examinations in any way.

l l

4. It may also be argued that cheating is an indication of lack of l<nowledge j or competence, since the person (s) involved felt it necessary to cheat l to pass the examination.

i

Yet even based on the Board's findings of fact, it is difficult to comprehend the lack of sanctions applied against DD (Mr. Husted). Mr.

Husted, in addition to holding a Senior Reactor Operator's License, is a training instructor at M-1. 'Ihus, &. Husted's attitudas are parHcularly significant, since these attitudes may readily be transferred to other operators. Although the Board found no direct evidence that Mr. Husted cheated, it directly found that Mr. Husted provided " incredible" testimony at the hearing. PID 12165. In addition, the Board concluded that Husted:

refused to cooperate with the NRC investigators.

Moreover, later when he provided some information, he continued to withhold information within his knowledge; and he provided an incredibly inconsistent account of his reasons during the hearing.

His testimony on the matter was not only unbelievable, but it gave the sense that he didn't care whether he was believed or not.

PID 112165-66. Moreover, the Board concluded that "if Mr. Husted is representative of the M-1 training department, his attitude may be a partial explanation of why there was disrespect for the training program and the examinations.

we question whether he is able, or if able, willing, to impart a sense of seriousness and responsibility to the M -1 operators.

PID 12167.

Despite these far-reaching findings, the Board raemmands no sanction against Mr. Husted, who renains a training instructor at M. 'Ibe Board explains this result by stating that "Mr. Husted's conduct during the investigation and his testimony is not related to his status as a licensed reactor operator." PID 12168. 'Ihis directly contradicts the Board's opinion that, prospectively, attitude and integrity are clearly related

to licensed reactor operator status. Integrity and attitude are equally clearly related to &. Husted's status as a training instructor. He managanent audit of Licensee's training department proposed by the Board should not only focus on Mr. Husted (PID 12168); the audit should foruulate specific reWtions as to whether Mr. Husted should be re~ined.

We Qxtronwealth has no quarrel with the Board's argument that license suspension or revocation actions with respect to individuals must be consistent with principles of due process and establiabM NRC regulations. See PID 12116. If such is the case, proceedings may be instituted in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 555.40. Bis does not mean, however, that operators subject to such proceedings may operate the plant in the interim. %e emnission clearly has the authority, where public health and safety is jeopardized, to take license suspension action'. in advance of any required hearing. 42 U.S.C. 52137, 5 U.S.C.

5558(c).

B. Flaws In Licensee's Operator Training Program Should Be Corrected Prior To Restart.

%e Ommnwealth proposed no findings of fact regarding the inplications of the operator cheating incidents in terms of Licensee's operator training program. During the initial managanent phase of the hearing, however, the e-mnwealth voiced concerns regarding Licensee's training and staffing practices. %ese concerns ultimately were resolved through negotiation of license conditions with the Licensee. %e Cannonwealth made clear, however, that it expected major concerns about the training program to be renedied prior to restart.

Having deferred to the Special Master and Licensing Board to make findings of fact on this issue in the reopened proceeding, the Cannonwealth

I

< is conpelled to confront the implications of those findings. If the Board's findings are accepted as correct, the deficiencies in Licensee's operator training program should be corrected prior to restart. This result is mandated by the fact that operator retraining was included as a short-term item in the rkmiasion's August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing, i.e. an iten that uust be satisfied prior to restart.

The Board proposes four conditions on the restart of 'IMI-l to i

remedy the deficiencies it 4danH fied in Licensee's operator training program. These conditions are to be fulfilled within tuo years after l restart authorization. PID 12347. Conditions (1), (3), and (4) are clearly prospective ranadies.5 The emmnnwealth does not couprehend, however, why the second condition should not be required prior to restart 1

l (parHenlarly in light of the Board's findings regarding Mr. Husted):

(2) Licensee shall establish criteria for qualifications

of training instructors to ensure a high level of competence in instruction, including knowledge of subjects taught, skill in presentation of knowledge, and preparation, adminiatration, and evaluation of eaminations.

The Board's findings that major improvements were necessary in Licensee's training program are inportant. 'Ihe Board questioned the

5. 'Ihese conditions state:

(1) There shall be a two-year probationary period during which the Licensee's qualification and regim14fication testing and training program shall be subjected to an in-depth audit by independent

, auditors, approved by the Director of IRR, such auditors to have j had no role in the 'IMI-l restart procaadings.

1 (3) Licensee shall develop and implement an internal auditing procedure, based on unscheduled C' surprise") direct observation l of the training and testing program at the point of delivery, l' such audits to be conducted by the Manager of Training and the Supervisor of Operator Training and not delegated.

(4.1 Licensee shall develop and implement a procedure for routine sanpling and review of examination answers for evidence of l cheating, using a review process approved by the NRC Staff.

i . . . - - - - _ - - __ -_ . --.-_-- - . _ - _ . _ - . - - - ----

" quality assurance and quality control over the delivery of instruction at 'IMI-1" and raised doubts about the " quality of instruction (including delivery of instructional material, composition of examinations, and grading)." PID 112332, 2334. These criticisms are fm%tal to Licensee's training program. Based on his analysis of the same findings, the Special Master concluded that Licensec's training program did not constitute an adequate response to the Comission's August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing. Report of the Special Master (April 28, 1982) 11251, 336.

There is a clear difference of opinion between the Special Master and the Licensing Board regarding a question of Licensee's cogliance with one of the restart conditions established by the Comission. Such a substantial difference of judgmit should be resolved prior to restart.

III. CONCLUSION The Comanwealth believes that the above-discussed judgmmts reached by the Licensing Board on the basis of its own findings of fact, constitute an abuse of discretion. The issues presented involve matters of public health and safety that are too important to be left to resolution after restart.

The Comonwealth urges the Comission not to grant 4Miate effectiveness to the July 27, 1982 PID.

Re3 ectful submitted ,

tkkW) uf L:pQ,Q DOUGIAS R.sBLAZEY Chief Couns'el PA DepartmentN Enviruuue.ntal Resources Attorney for the Dated: August 20, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMISSION BEEDRE THE COEISSION In the Matter of:

METROPOLITAN EDISON 00fAtti, )

) Docket Ib. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No.1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Copies of the attached "Comotwealth of Pennsylvania's Coments on the Twinte Effectiveness of the ASLB Partial Initial Decision (Reopened Proceeding), July 27, 1982" were served on the parties on the attached service list, this 20th day of August,1982, by first class mail, postage prepaid.

<T .m I /

/ , .

{ ,, J ' I, ,A ' '_\OA ., [

s ROBERT W. ADLER

. Assistant Counsel Comotwealth of Pennsylvania Dated: August 20, 1982

UNITED STATES OF MERICA IUCLEAR REGUIATORY C0ttHSSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFEIY AID LICEISIIU BOARD In the Matter of:

IETROPOLITAN EDISON 00MPAIN, )

) Docket l'b. 50-289 (Three title Island Ibclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit tb.1) )

SERVICE LIST Docketing and Service Section Henry D. Hukill,'Vice-President Office of the Secretary GPU Ibclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P.O. Box 480 .

Washington, D.C. 20555 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire, Chairman Ms. Marjorie M. Aanodt '

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel R.D. #5 U.S. thclear Regulatory Comission Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Gail Bradford

• Dr. Walter H. Jordan Anti-thclear Group Representing York Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 245 West Philadelphia Street 881 West Outer Drive .

York, Pennsylvania 17404 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Chauncey Kepford & Judith Johnsrud Dr. Linda W. Little Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 433 Orlando Avenue 5000 Hermitage Drive State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Raleigh, ! brth Carolina 27612 Ifr. Steven C. Sholly

. George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Union of Concerned Scientists

. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

! 1800 M Street, N.W. Dupont Circle Building, Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20036 James A. Tourtellotte, Esquire Ms. Iouise Bradford Office of the Executive Legal Director 'IMI Alert U.S. thclear Regulatory Comission 315 Peffer Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Ellyn R. Weiss John A. Ievin, Esquire.

Harmon & Weiss Assistant Counsel -

1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comission l

Washington, D.C. 20006 P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire (PANE)

Harnon & Weiss Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire 1725 Eye Street, N.W. , Suite 506 Attorney for Newberry Township

}

Washington, D.C. 20006 T.M.I. Steering Cmmittee' 2320 lbrth Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 l

t i

i

. . . _ _. -. . . - . . - = .._-- . .

Judge Gary J. Edles, N 4rman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Ibclear Regulatory Conmission

, hhington, D.C. 20555 Judge John H. Buck i

Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Ibclear Regulatory rmnission hhington, D.C. 20555 Judge Christine H. Kohl Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission hhington, D.C. 20555 Judge Reginald L. Gotchy Ahnic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Ibclear Regulatory renission bhington, D.C. 20555 Nunzio L. Palladino, N irman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C. 20555 John F. Ahearne, Conmissioner U.S. Ibclear Regulatory emniasion hhington, D.C. 20555

Thomas M. Roberts, Conmissioner i U.S. tbclear Regulatory emniasion hhington, D.C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, Conmissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission

hhington, D.C. 20555 James K. Asselstine, Conmissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Professor Gary Milhollin 1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711 t

l l

l l

i w

-i, p. - - - - - ,- --.-+yvt t-- -ms-- e-- -<w -

evg=*- w - *'4wy w- = * *-u"r '

-w7'-'S *C"PN "" -'""' '~*"^"'"*# ' ' ' -- '

'4 , 4 BEEDRE 11IE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .' ~ ghIC IUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tHISSION

.2 ,, +.

.N O 23 k0:23 T

In the thtter of: .

MEIBOPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ) SC

) Docket Ib. 50-289 ' " hky{a nag8W

~

[c[R (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart) .."

Station, Unit tb.1) ) ,..- 'iet q; c, I M ICE OF APPEARANCE -

tbtice is hereby given that the undersigned attorney herewith enters an appearance in the above-captioned matter. In accordance with 52.713(a),10 C.F.R. Part 2, the following infonnation is provided:

Narne Douglas R. Blazey Address Department of Errvirotraental Resources 514 Executive llouse P.O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Telephone Ibmber (717) 787-4488 Admissions Suprene Court of the thited States U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Sixth Circuit U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Name of Party Cormo ealth of Pennsylvania

\

\bkh *[

DOUGLAS'R BL\ZEY A NDA k

- Chief Cotd,isel Departmenth{Environmenta , ources Dated at liarrisburg, Pennsylvania this 20th day of August,1982 l

- _- -