ML20052H198
| ML20052H198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1982 |
| From: | Eddleman W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8205200055 | |
| Download: ML20052H198 (263) | |
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UNITED STA TES OF AME*ICA ,* 7 - -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEESING BOARD In the matter of ) Dockets Nos.
i ) 50-LOO and CAROLINA POWER AND LIGliT CnEANY, ET. AL. )
)
50-hol 0.L.
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and ?2 ) May 1h,1982 SUPPLEMENT 'IO FETITION TO "C TVEFE by Wells Eddleman, pro se I
Under 10 Code of Federcl Regulations
("CFR") Section 2.71h (a)(3)(b) and the Order of this Board (Glenn O. Bright, D=.
1 James H. Carpente , and James L. Kelley, Chairman) dated Auril 2,1982, I, Wells Eddlenan, (presently at 325 E. Trinity Avenue, Durham, NC 27701; on May 17,1962 ny address will be 718-A Iredell Street, Durham NC 27705 for service of all motions, orders and other documents in this proceeding --
g parties please take note; my new home is almost exactiv the same distance from the harris nuclear niant site as is i
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325 E. Trinity, on which my lease is exoiring, and the ove na changes none of the other natters in ny original petitien b El to intervene) hereby:
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(1) file this supplement to my petition to intervene v8E f Y listing contentions which I seek to litigate in this natten
@@ and the bases g
en thereforp (including the defiritions and Mi n"
BB incorooration by reference as set forth below), fully FE h
- n< reserving the ri Eht to amend' or expand this filing of 55 18 NE y
L m" contentions on the basis of infornation not now known or =
E C, _ available to me, such as that contained in documents that
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were not in the Local Public Document Room (either at Wake .
County Library or Chapel Hill Public Library), which I have requested from the LPDP Branch of the NRC on or before May 14, 1982 and which were not delivered to either or both named LPDRs and available there to the public, myself included, en or before May 1h, 1982, and i such as is contained in any amendments to the Aonlicants' Application, Final Safety Analysis Renort (FSAR), Environmental Report (ER), Applicants ' file s and corresnondence, and/or in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report or Environmental State-l ment (SER or ES) or the Advisory Committee on Reactcr Safeguards' (ACRS') review of theHarris ulant, which have yet to be f51ed in this proceedinE or which were not available to ne at home, in eerson, or at one or both of the above LPDR's on or before the close of business on May lb,1982; or for any cthe" good cause as I may hereafter denonstrate under the Board's orders
! or 10 CFR Section 2.71h(a)(1).
In sunoort of the above, I hereby address the 5 factors enumerated in 10 CFR 2.71h(a)(1) with respect to the above l ma t t ers insofar as it is cresently possible to do so:
(1) It is clearly good cause for failure to file "on time" (i.e. by May 14, 1982 per the Board's Auril 2,1982 Order) that the information on which a filing is based did not exist at that time or was not available to me at or before daat time. How can I predict accurately and specifically enought to satisfy the requirements of 10 CPR 2.71h(a)(3)(b), what infornation is in documents I have never seen, never had available, and/or which
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have not been written and de not even exist as of the May 1h, 1982 ,
"on time" deadline for contentions to be filed in this case o Clearly I cannot be expected to do the imnossible, euch as the preceding sentence would require me to do, so I have shown Eood cause for later filings.
(ii) There are no other means whereby my interests can and factas described above be nrotected with resnect to mattersf,not existing or not known ,
and not available to me by the May 1h, 1982 deadline. The Board r
on its on motion, or tne Commission itself, might choose to order that such matters be considered, but I have no control over that, If they do not do so voluntarily, or rule the matter (s) and anended and/or additional contentions admissible, I have no recourse. Certainly, if I am not nermitted to file additional and/or amended contentions on natte.cs as described in sections (1) and (1) above, there is no neans whatsoever for me to protect my own insterests.
(iii) since admissible contentions must be matters affectinE Aonlicants' ability to operate their Harris nuclear plants with-out harm to the nublic health and safety, or matters affecting the cost-benefit bal ance of the project under NEPA ,10 CFP 51.21, and the Calvert Cliffs case (cited with relevance explained below),
any admissible contention filed late for the reasons cited above must be of use in developing a sound record by fully exnloring the known issues on the basis of known information as of the tine of the hearing, and not on the basis of information as of May 1h,1982 and issues identified only from that part of the information existing at May 14, 1982 that was actually available to me on or before that date.
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Omitting issues and contentions that directly add =ess the requirements on NRC and this Board under the Atomic Energy Act '
and the National Environnental Policy Act and nonlicable court decisions will lead to an unsound record, not a sound one.
Therefore additional contentions based on the nattens cited above (or for other good cause under 10 CFR 2.71E(a)(1)) should be adnitted, provided they meet the requirements of 10 CFR 2.71h (a)(3)(b), in the interest of develoning a sound record.
(iv) If the Board treats all Parties fairly, as I fully ,
expect it will and must under the law, ny interest in having contentions based on the matters cited above in (1) and (1),0N Ki )
not existing, or unavailable to ne as of May 1h, 1982 cannot be any better represented by any other party. This is because fairness requires daat if I can't raise contentions af ter May ^
14, 1982 based on these natters, neither can any other narty.
(And if I can, they must also be allowed to. )
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the other narties will exist at some future date, on will have continued to be parties to this nroceeding, when additional infornation becomes l available on which I might file additional or amended contentions in this proceeding. If other parties do exist, and do have
! the right to file contentions based on such information while l I do not have any such right, there is likewise no guarantee that any of then will file and nursue such contentions as will protect my interests under the Atomic Energy Act and the nublic interest and my interests under the National Environmental Policy Act. The remedy for all this uncertainty is to grant all parties the =ight to file additional and amended contentions (as I have requested above) and for the Boa-d to then
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-5 consider the admissibility of said contentions under 10 CPR ,
2.714(a)(3)(b).
(v) Of course, raising a newly discovered issue or conten-tion (or amending a c ontenticr based on new information) broedens the issues. But the extent to which an amendment to a contention broadens the issues is de mininis (trivial, very very small) in the context of a proceeding es extensive and ,conclex as licensing two large nuclear power stations to operate. Co nsider the 20 thick volumes of the Auplicants ' FSAR, the 3 thick volumes of their ER, and the volune of additional documents which nay ,
yet be filed in this proceeding (comparable to the volume of additional amendaments and docunent s filed in other nuclear operating license Acases after the initial contentions have been filed). Compared to this enornous volume of information and issues which the Board nust consider even in the absence of any Intervenors or Petitioners at all, even a large number of entirely new cententions, based on infornation not nrevfous-ly available to Petitioner (s)/Intervenor(s) and otherwise admissible under 10 C.F.R 2.71h(a)(3)(b), is not significant, much less anenda.d cententions.
Moreover, one nurnose of anending contentions is to make them more specific, which can serve to excedite the heaving.
And if a new or anended contention can be brought to hearing
! earlier than scheduled and end the proceeding if resolved (see request for exuedited hearing on certain groucings of contentions, below), it can actually speed up dhe hearing process.
Finally, in a proceeding not even set to have a hearing for two years or more from the present, the extent to which any new contentions or amended content'ons filed more than apnroximately 5 months before the hearing date (30 days for filing, answer and resnonse nlus 30 r. ore for the Board to rule on admissibility under 10 C.F.D 2.71E(a)(3)(b) if it needs that long to rule, plus 30 more to file discovery, 30 mo"e to answer (at most; shculd be erredited late in the nrocess toward hearing) and 30 more for Fetitioner/Intervencr to prepare evidence) should have no effect whatever on delaying the proceedings.
Even closer to the hearing date, a bilancing of the 5 required factors cited from 10 CFR 2.711(a)(1) indicates that delay caused by one or more additional or anended contentions will be de minimis in comparison to the extensive issues raised in this troceeding and the iroortance of protecting the public health and strety under the Atonic Energy Act and public and urivate interests unde- NEPA. To be admissible at all, a contention nust be s:ecific enough and relevant enough to the issues in this case to assist in developing a sound record by being hecrd. There are no other means, other than raisinE such issues when the new information becones available (I would re:uest 45 days thereaf ter, to preclude Applicants flooding ne with more material than I can possibly read and eva'uate in less time _
and file contentions or mmended contentions based the" con),
whereby my interests can be protected, in:1uding the other narties acting in my interest, whidh they earmot be guaranteed n -
If 1' to do.
Since a new contention or amended one could be heard later in an ongoing hearing, more time would be available to deal with it. For a sufficiently innortant new issue or new aspect of any omntention, a later hearing night be set just dealing with that issue (s) in the Board's discretion.
Therefore, having shown under 10 CF? 2.71h(a)(1) why I should be allowed to file additional and amended contentions after May 14, 1982 based on information as set out under (1) above, I request the Board to order that any new or amended contentions filed by ne as set out under (1) above be ruled on pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2 71h(a)(3)(b) et dates to be established by the Board, but in no event earlier thEn l!$
days af ter the information becomes available to me; that I be allowed those sane 45 days in which to fi'.o such new or amended contentiens pursuant to (1) above; a 2d for such other relief as the Board shall consider fair, just and necessary to the preceding and/or to other petitioners and/or to other parties.
In making the above statements about 10 CFR 2.714 )(1)
I in nox way imply or state that the Borrd has to consider the 5 facto *s listed therein unstmba in order to allow amend-ments or expansion of contentions af ter lh May in982 in this case. The requirement of 10 CFR 2.71h(b) (ow (a) (3) (b) as it is listed in the LPDR cony and cited above) is for
" reasonable specificity" in contentionsE accepted.
l' S It is self-evidently unreasonable to require exact citations or detailed N ecifics about documents that do not I
yet exist but are required by NRC rules to be filed in this case, such as the SER, Environmental Sattatement, AC?.S 0.L.
hetytpr recort,fresconsestotheTMIRAction?lan,olansfcrfire protection, environmental qualification of electrical equioment, Harris ulant and site security, emergency resoonse pland, evacuation olans, technical snecifications not yet listed, new rules the N90 may adout or change, c restonses to future nuclear accidents that haven't yet hannered, letters and nemoranda Apolicants haven ' t yet written, etc . In such cases, " reasonably soecific" nust nean as reasonably srecific as one can be expected to get, and fcr docunents that do not yet exist, any contentions now filed are reasonab17 specific if they say in what areas of ways the docunents and filings yet to be nroduced may be or are exuected to be deficient or otherwise in error, defective, wrenE, and so on.
Indeed, even if by a miracle a petitioner such as nyself could accurately and with great soecificity credict deficien-cies, erro's and so on in these future docunent$(e.g."I contend that when the SED is filed it will use 26014 usig as the maximun crimcry system pressure to be exnected in an AT'dS, whereas the correct figure is 6298 psi as described by Dr. Snith in NUD.EG-198h, published August,1983 at nages hh2-2130") such highly specific predictions would be of no use except te tell the recort writers what mistakes to avcid. There would be no way to assu o that all serious, material nroblens in the futuve
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could be so identified as deficiencies.
And a highly specific contention about a document not yet existing nrovides an easy escane without addressing the issue:
simply change the docunent, as it is being written, so that there is sone gwaund, howeve" na*=ou, tn a=gue that the highlv specific predictive contention does not annly. While a resnonsible and safety-minded official of Annlicants or IPC Staff or AC"S or other body nrencring such a renort night well address the soecific uredictive contention and co rect any errors, non-concervatisns, and deficiencies the contention identifies, no one can be sure that this will be done av that ,
all such nroblems will have thereby been found and cor"ected, heavy nuclear industry and Congressional Moreover, there is 3 nressure on IRC Staff to license nuclear (e.g. the intar.1dets of all h PC &SC senatnrs to get McGuiren.
olants ranidly, and pressure on Anplicants to justify the Ha=*is project Huclear Station licensed in 1961 h m even though Annlicant CD&L's chairman Sherwood Snith admits (Releigh News and Observer, 9 May 1982, nages 1D and 7D) that if CP&L was starting the Harris nroject today it wculd not be built as a nuclear nlant, is likewise intense in view of the 41.b billi on CVAL clains (ibid. ) to have sunk intn the project. Thus there is reason to believe thn.t, unde = this sort of uressure to sinmly get the license done, NDC Staff and Aonlicants night use highly specific contentions of a n= edict $ ve nature as guides to how to avoid the issues those ce ntentions raise in this nroceeding, without takinE the tine and effort to oronerly analysze the issues involved and nrotect the oublic health and safety and connly uith ?F"A,10 CFD $1.21, and Calvert Cliffs (cited below).
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If a4 In spite of these sensible argunents, I feel conpelled to file a good nunber of contentions based on the yet-to-be-filed documents such as the SER, ES, enendments to FEAR and E9, etc, because the Board ni Eht not allow any more contentions to be filed af ter lh May 1982, er nisat make it impractical for ne to do so by imnosing excessive requirements at the behest of Applicants and/or NRC Staff, which might be actinF under the pressure to s5 mnly Eet a license done, as nentioned above.
mhus, Wh!.la I ha ve made good fe' +h eccorte to be reecanabl*
specific, I have not attemnted to nredict exactly the content or to describe in great detail the eroblems I anticipate, but only to provide that degree of snecificity that is reasonable in the light of the information available to me (includini at the LPD?s) on or before lh May 1982 which is the. deadline for filing contentions in this case. I cannot be exoected to de more now, but will certainly clarify and amend contentions to hexb the best of ny ability vhen the necessary info" mat' on to do so, either new documents, discovery information, or other information, becomes available te me, and all I have requested is adequate time to review this information and file new, anended or more snocific contentions. I have tried to exnlain hou and l construct 6on, why Anplicantst ulans, designs, staff, analysis, filings, etc.
in +hi s n=nceadi ng e.we in e""o", deficient, etc. unde" the l
Atomic Energy Act, NEPA , etc (see " Definitions" below), and l l to cite examples of how certa'n events could hannen and what i kinds of nroblems, defici encies, erro"s and so on exist, without saying in any case that I have specified each and every such
! problem, deficiency and evror that is within the scope of my
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content' ion or contentions w"itten herein.
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I have also endeavored to frame contentions so that they do not attack the ranidly changing NPC rules, though in sone instances it appears to me that the rules are so arbitrary and capricious (e.g. discussion in contentions on cancellation of Harris 2, need for pouer, financial qualification of Annlicants) that they deserve attack and I want to lay a basis here for doing so through the Courts. Even in these instances, I have carefully framed contentions or s ub-cententions the.t have nothing to do with the existing or recently revised rules, so that these sho'0 6 be admis sible b" themrelvas , o= e.ct a= delat* rr ce*ta' n parts of the contention.
I thus believe I have satisfied the recuirement of reasonabl.e snecificity under 10 CFR 2.71h(b) (or (a)(3)(b), and ny conten-tions d;ould be allowed unicss they are shown to be unreasonably unspecific ink light of information actually available to ne (includinE actually being in the LUDu files at "aleigh or Chanel Hill) at or before lh May 1982, and in the light of how detailed one can be exnected to make a contention in terns of' snace and time limitations. For this latter nurnose I have incornorated by reference many contentions into otners so that I won 't have to repeat definitions, e.inlanations of how certain accidents, deficiencies and errors can hanpen, examples to specify the sort of thing I an talking about, etc , but can sinnly refer to those in other contentions whe*e these natters are fully set out. I ask the Board to accent these references for the nurnose of showing exanples, definitions . snecific ways d
things such as accidnt potential, deficiencies, errors, le.ck of good f aith,special needs , specific needs, harm to the publ5 c's health, safety and property, violation of AEA or NZPA,
t* O' incomplete or insufficient information, incomnlete or insufficient analysis or plans or data, lack of up-to-date information, lack of use of relevant experience and tests, and so on auply. By using incorocration by reference I hope to nake this set of contentions much -shorter, and sufficiently and reasonably specific, usinE the incornorations as if fully set out where they are noted.
I believe these contentions set out below are reasonably specific enough to nut Auplicants and staff on notice at least generally of the matters I intend to have litigated herein, esneci. ally M nce all thase cantart*nns a"e sub iact tn e"$ne-mont and revision at the tim.e of the final pre-hearing confe"ence in this case, which nay be 2 or noweI/years sway .
I ask the Board to take judicial notice of ALAB-664 (TVA, Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant) which aiiows the Board '
discret!on to defer rulings on any contention whe=e the document or information needed in order to assess a contention has not yet been nroduced or made available to Petitioner /Inte"venor .
a My nosition is 5 that this discretion anplies to information to ?i be obtained on discovery also, $
and that discove*y for the M purpose of rendekng contentions more specific or ad equately a specific in the light of additional information obtained ther ey b n E
(reasonably specific in the light of information actually D available to netitioner/intervenor) be allowed to me in this %E case on all enntenti.ons. 5
!T I also ask the Board to take judicial notice of NEDA EM 3
section 102 and of secticn 189(a) of the Atonic Energy Act ,
5 providing suecifically that environnental questions be onen m
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"to the fullest extent nossible" throughout the N"C 8s review process (which obviously includes dais case and the hearing on the coerating license for Harris 1 and 2). And the AFA provides that if contentions are filed urior to discovery, there is a right to hearing on an operating license. (BPI v.
AEC, 502 F2d 42h',197h) Obviously this right includes the right to discovery about the contentions (else why have the contentions filed before discovery); and the NRC's own rules
./. allowing and tractic e refinement and revision of contentions at the final .
pre-hearing conference clearly contennlates that contentiens may be revised or refined before then, but after filing (e.g.
after discovery concerning then). Since the conten-ions as filed and the discovery reonest reasonably inforn A nlicants and N?C Staff of the natters at issue, they cannot 94558avgue that the reauirements set in Philadelnhia Electric Co, 8 AEC 13 (197h) are violated provided netitioner has at least one contention that is reasonnb17 snecific in view of tha situation at the time thct centention is filed, and that netitioner seeks appropriate discovery to nake any such centention nere soecific (thereby in nutting then on more detailed notice of what is at issue and what petitioner seeks to litigate) and nakes said contention more specific wituin a reasonable time based on adeouate information obtained through discovery. A need to establish greater specificity in a contention which can only be net tharough information not available to netitlener/ inter-venor urior to the contention f311ng deadline is not " lateness" within the meaning of 10 CFP 2.71h(a)(1) since the lack of that information is outside the cent ention-filer's contrel. And $ n
.} ny case I have . nade considerable efforts to Eet nore 'nformation
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E' 4 made available to me, which is another point in my favor on thi s me tt e", in the t I didn ' + ,4ust let the inc o mation be un-available , but have tried to get it.
Statement of Eeneral anulicability incornorated by refe*ence intn each and eve"* conterti nn e' led he"ef n (including any to be filed later in this proceeding)
A. If the Board considers any of this contention, or any part thereof, as an attack on any rule or regulatien of the commission (NRC) or any orovihion therenf, or as a collateral attack uoon a pending rulemaking, petiticr.er resnectfully reouests the Board to:
(1) exclude only those carts of contentions that in those parts specifically attack any such rule, regulation, nrovision, or nending rulemaking, letting any other narts of the contention stand indenendently; (2) specifically identify the rule (s), regulatirn(s), .
nvovision(s) or rulenaking(s) judged to be attacked, end explain how and why, in the Board's view, such contention or na-t of an* contantinn attacks xarl each s uch thing s"ec4
- ice 117 identified by the Board; (3) that petitioner be permitted to seek an exception to or a waiver of the annlication to this oroceeding of such iten snecifically identified by the Board under (2) above, narticularly with resnect to ruules and regulati ons not i n effect as of 26 February,1982 when petitions to intevene in this uroceeding were due to be filed, and a s to any other mat +ers considered innermissible a'ttacks by the Board unde" (2) above.
(h) that the Board certify for anpeal te the ASLAB and/or f
the full Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as a coropriate, an appeal as to any contention entirely rcjected by the Board under (2) above, and all suchy contentions, in an excedited manner so as to avoid prolonging this nroceeding and so as to avoid the possibility of remanded hearings later, if reouested by this Petitioncr/Intervenor to do so.
- 3. Although some of the contentions set forth herein are sufficient in themselves, to deny the One*ating License Amnlicants seek hawain (e.g. the cantant!on that the coats of the nro ject exceed the benefits; and the contention that the cost-benefit difference becomes an even greater excess of costs ove" benefits if only Units 1 and 2 awe connleted; and the contention that the excess of costs over benefits _
is still greater if only Unit 1 is built; the last 2 also -
contending that the excess of costs over benefits wi.11 be 3
greater if the oroject is commleted and onerated than if it is abandoned now), in ny view,it is all cf the contentions taken together that constitute ny overall reason why the license sought in this case should not issue. Therefore, each contention stands heve as a cartial reason why the ;d one*ating license should not issue, and should be accented b if proving such contention or part of it would wenigh aEainst issuance oc Q an onerat* ng licence e es nr Ha**is unfts 1 and 2.
}L C. Petitioner wants and hereby reouests an expediated pu s hearing on certaih contentions (nunbers b f 20Nh NilfW 13
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including those mentioned in~ B above) because if p" oven, l2A ""
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i they would finish the case by themselves. But in the event Es 15 such expedited hearing 5 s not grnnted, the contentiens men-
tioned in this part shall stand for hearing later (as admitted, if they are), I believe the Board should grant expedited hearirE on each and all of thema contentions named in this part C, since they fall under the recuirement of Section 102 of NEPA that environnental questions shall be ooen to consideration to the " fullest extent possible" throughout the "eview process s2 any federal agency (such as NRC). Since if evoved, these contentions together or separately will show that the Harris project should be abandoned axs a way of cutting the losses since its costs will exceed its benefits, it is necessary to consider them now, at the earliest uractical time for a hearing.
(I suggest October, 1982, to allow tine for discovery and
"*C eta *f, o the" va~t* e r and Dernaration of ny case and to allowA nnlicants time to n=enarre A
also.) Waitiv to hold thase hearings on these issues will simnly result in nove money being scent on the Har-is uro ject, which will be an increase 4.n the losses that nunt be borne since the net excess of costs over benefits for the connlete Harris project is greater than the $1.4 billion already snendt on it. Neither this Board nor Auplicants nor NRC is authorized under NEPA to imnose such a monetary loss on the nublic or anyone en a project where federal pernits are required to continue the project. Tnerefore I hereby move that the Board suspend construc tion on the Harris project, effective as soon as you can issue an order, pending an excedited hearing on the above ment &oned contentions in this part, on in the alternetive to set oral argument on this notion to suspend construction for the snecial pre-hearing conference now set for June 111-15, 1982.
The reasons for this motion, includirg those set out $ n the
contentions listed above, are basically that bv CP&L's numbers, as filed herein in their E9 of December 1981, the net loss on the Harris 1 and 2 project is nen"17 $2 billion; that if errors refe"enced and onissions listed in the contentionsjpn this nart are covrected, the net loss will be even greater; that if CS&L for whatever reason does not build or connlete and onerate Ha ris Unit 2, as seens likely or at least possible in the wake o c the December 1981 cancellaticn of Harris 3 and h, the losses net will be greater still if Harris 1 alone is connleted and onerated; and that the expenditurc of $1.h billion to date on the Harris oroject, together with penal ies for cancelling construction, is less than the nost credible of these loss fi ures, E and very likely less than the $2 billion excess of costs over benefits connuted by using CP&L's own figures as filed with UFC.
Therefore the only way to choose the alternative that naxinizes cost-benefitz as required by NEDA is to nininize the loss, since the*e whill be no net benefits. The loss is minimized by stoncing construction now (or 5n the alternative at the earliest possible date).
Further and secarately to be considered as another notinr, the above reasons are why expedited hearing on the contentions named herein in part C should be granted by the Board, in order to comoly with NEPA to the extent that is nossible, by nininizing the loss.
(EYj1aCSY Petitioner further contends j that CPEL is estopped from pleading on this natter that the data sunulied by CP&L in the y?
is incorrect, s!nce CP&L filed it December 1981 (tinely), has filed no updates on'it,' and 10 CFP. 51.21 requires all new and
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chanSed information available be filed in the Onerating License Stage Environmental Renort. Thus, if the data is incorrect, CP&L's Anplication herein shoul d be dismissed for lack of compliance with NRC rules (co-Applicants should also be dismissed for failinE to exercise their resnonsibility under 10 CFR 51.21 to file accurate and up-to-date information in their Annlication Tnvironmental Report at the 0.L.
stape). CP&L knew when Harwis 3 and 4 were going to be cancelled, and undoubtedly did studies 6f how this action by CP&L would affect the costs and benefits of the Harris oroject. Not filing such informaticn is a bveach of good faith as well as the NPC rules cited above, if CD&L had the infornation or any such information. Therefore, if CP&L contends the present anplication is pronerly before the Board unde- the N90 rules , CP&L will have to stand or fall on the nunbers they filed in dae anplication and its associated EP, or give a good and sufficient ernlanation of why they have waited at least 6 months to file infornation noct relevant to this proceeding under NEPA, or withdraw the Annlication and re-file.
(D) With respect to any natter er utrt of any contention that the Board does not believe it has jursidcition over, petitioner respectfully requests that the Board:
(1) excluded from consideration in this case only such part or parts of contentions as in thenselves clearly go beyond theBoard'sjursidffhion; (2) for each such excluded contention or nart dhereof state specifically the exact legal basis fo* the exclusion; (3) for any and each such natter excluded, including i
antitrust ouestions, state whether any odaer part of N90
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-19_ 1 including the Atomic Safety & Licensing inneal Board or the Commission itself or the Director of 13R or any other uart, division, section, directorate, person, subgroup, branch, '
etc. within NRC has jurisdiction over the natter excluded;. s ___
and (1) 4 to certify for aupeal to the A3 LAB or NPC as -
annropriate any such exclusion that netitioner reaue sts an ..
exception from for the purnose of conductinE a full and fair i hearing in this case, developing a sound record, or for other ,
good cause.
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(H) With resoect to each o-ission, use of erroneous data, or deficiency withholding of infornation, error, or failuvepalleged in this or any contention herein, I request the rignt of discovery not
'; - only to suoply accurate, conolete and up to date informat$ on
.; _:'_. on the noint(s) covered in thium the contention, but also h discove"y as to the reason (s) if any for the onissien, error, withholdinE of infornation or failure or deficiency, including
~
o access to the f'iles cf Anplicants and U'C Staff.
(I) I have in nany contentions nade a long list of specific problems in order to neet the reasoncble soecificity requirenents of 2.71L(b ) of N"C ': rules. But should the Boa *d believe that any cuch list, iten, er navt of any such listing is too soecific (or is overly br:sd), I hereby recuest the
, on"ortunity to anend said contention to remedy the over-snec3 -
ficity, over-broadners or other defect arising fro- the listing of suecifics. which is identified bv the Bocrd. Because nany
- contention's in cast cucce have been rejceted by Boards for lack of specificity, I an trying to be seecific in sene detail herein. 'but it is net ny intent to cause mroblems b~ beinE too snecific or detailed, but s'--ly to F've exannlas of how the contenti ons a rly, to that they nonly, how ce-ts*= things alleged or stated 'n cententiens can hannen, what ne" wesult,
~
and diat these rela te to NEPA o- AEA considerations unde-those acts, 10 CFR 2,10 CFR 50.jh,10 CFo $1.21,10 CF9 50 and its uppendices and the natters covered therein, and othev applicable rules of KRC and other a,nliceble law, e.g. Shermen Act, court decisions such as Calvert Cliffs, etc.
~
s . -
DEFINITIONS As used in this entire supolenent, die following words and phrases, in addition to their plain neaning, also include the following meaninEs in full, wherever such neaninE is annlicabic:
if " accident" or " nuclear accident" or " release (ing) radioactive
$b" material" mand includes the neaning:"the event (s) listed or a
[h similar event or combination of events wnich will, or which will have the notentialir to, release radioactive naterial fron the Harris nuclear plant site and harn the health and safety of the nublic, including releases from the event (s) desc-ibed which or local water or ground water reach the atmosnhereysthrough containnent uenetrations, valves, vents, vining, gas n-ocessing systens, ducts, bvoken walls or roofing which are open due to earthouakes, fires, human er-or, bypassing of sLfety or control systens for maintenance or tests, failure of isolation systens to fanction ,ronerly, tornadcas, acts of sabotage or terrorisn, filax failu c of control wirinE or power wiring or electrical or nechanical er air-cont"c11a6 systens, notors and eculpnent necessary to isolate the radio-active naterial from the outside ai- (or from water or ground water), collapse of filters, (due e.g. te overuressure, tr-9sure rurges , collapse of franes holding the filters due to any of the above causes), failure of blowers or air-handling equip-ment due to any of the above causes, or any other failure not actually explicitly analyzed in docunantanitailable in the LPDR for the
, docunents vailable Harris plant on or before May IL,1982 and after January 27, 1982, as may be snecified in no e detail in future amendnents, refinements and revisions te these contentions.x And, where anplicable, the neaning "rlelease of radioactive naterial fron spent fuel transoort casks or other trans7 ort cortainers, due to accident, sabotage, terrorisn, earthxcuake while the container is on a bridge or overcass or under a stnucture which by falling, can ruuture it or nrevent its cooline systen fro norkinso"
1
. . i 23
" Harris plant", "SHNPP", " Harris", "nucl ear pla nt", "nlant" ,
" Plant site" " Harris units 1 end/or 2" refer to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, units 1 and 2 and associated buildin6s and equipment including the f uel nandling, auxilinry, materials storage and other buildings on the 10,000+ scre site of said nuclear plant, the cooling towers and associated piping, boilers, generators, transformers, electrical wiring, instruments, controls, connuters, ele ctrien1 equinment, insuletion, seals, filters, radioactive waste nrocessing systens, crcnes, hoists, reactors, steam generators, nressurizers, valves and all other items of the nlant either as built or as describad in the FcA" or Gr' or 29 or ES o* othe" document whare annro-oriate, which nlant is up for cra-ating licensirg in this case.
"special needs" and "snecific needs" with resnect to energency n1anning, radiation protecticn, and radioactive releases and their health effects (including death and disease) includes the meanings: "any particular needs for additional nrotection agains t radiat.' on, special evacuation crocedures, additional protection aEainst radir. tion if the nerson(s) canrot be noved in the event of radiological releases fron the plant, which result from: unusual senshivity to radiation, as for the fetus, young children (under age 18), older persons, or resultinE fron e.
medical conditions includinE resniratori disea(se)s,MMoM, liver nal-c$Ibel, LOW p
GI(WS\es BCuCNc doftctS orlaN.htWth2[c!efct(s,ef W'O func tions , recove,ry f rc n surgery, or weakened condition,8 or Q'Ubo#<
which involve the ability to nove such nersons safelv in th'e event hb hehd&
4jg evacuation is necessary, including natients at hosoitals, mental hospitals , and nursing hones who are unable to ca e for and move thenselves, or who require life sunnont or nedical treatnent
whend being noved, or who are trisoners or otherwise confined so that they cannot evacuate on their own initistiTe, and who are in the custody of legal authoritias; or who because of handican or disability (e.g. percons in whe&lcht'rs due to paraplegia , quadriplegia , naralysis, broken hin(s ), arthritis, or other causes) are unable to move themselves; me sons whose hones'or places they are in (e.g. schools , werk cli ces, houspitals, nursing hones) cannot be adeouately seEled against infiltration of radioactive gases or narticles or toth in the path or a radiological release clume fron the :li .t, in order to nrotect their health and safety from Eenetic damage, thyroid damage, radiation sickness, death or cther injury caused by lonizing radiation or by ingestion of rad!oac-ira material through breathinE, catinE food exnosed te the radiclogical release materials (or grown in soil se exnosed), drinkir; viter ther radioactive includes such naterials, through open cuts on thei skin or other enithelial tissue); or who cannot be evacusred due to traffic bottlenecks from the design of street s 'a.g. nee."
Dix Hosoital in P.aleigh, throughout the municipali:v o' Cary, near Menorial Hosrital in Chapel Hill, and Duke Hosnital an d VA dosoital in Durhan, all of which are on narrow roads that will be carrying heavy t"affic in an evacuation in addition to Dersons being evacuated frnn the above-mentioned institutf ons and from homes nearby (which newsons have srecial needs as defined herein); and which needs are not adecuately orovided for in the event of a naximun accident uu suant to NoC rules for defini.ng the EPZ, LPZ, exclusion area, or other arrron"iate Z designaaion of areas with respect to radiologica; eensequences
.g
3 k of plant accidents, in the energency resconse clars as developed, [.{
5 g
documented and tested per 10 CFR 50.157 and Anpendix I the=etor., .=:
e by State, FEMA, Auplicants and/or other annropriate energency c olanning agencies as orovided for in NFC rulcs, as they now !@
r exist, or as they exist at the time tl.is contention is heard b g
in a hearing before the Board."
Ult J5vhtY > "lA)CrCca v$
[
" defi c i ent" , "defi ciency" ,"f ailure"n ,,"f ail (s ) (ing) to take into y, account", " error"," lack of un-to-date(infornation) (data) on (tests)" E
=
Includes the meaningsm: "Havin6 or being insufficient to orotect E
the health a nd saf ety o f the nublic , or to accurately weigh E
costs and benefits under NEPA or 10 CFR $1.21 or 10 C?? $0 31' ?
or 10 CPR 2.10h or other annlicable regula tions, whethe" due to
+
lack of information, lack of un-do-dat e and accurate information, Z lacir of t est* ng , lach o." use o# n'c"nenal a-"e"ience at ether nuclear facilities as a test or sou"ce cf informat'on "elevent, errors in calculation or analysis or nodeling or tyning, use of wrong or inaunlicable or outdated date or assumntions ,
f ailure to provide means to protect the health and safety of the nublic against the events deceribed (*ncluding modifications to plant, eouinment, technical snecificEtions , onerating nrocedunes, the onerating license , the c ons truct* cn nermit, or other annlicable documents and/or systene and ec.uinment and s tructures and piping, valves , controls , control logic, innact-computer programs , seals , shock-absorbing systens, absorbing devices, heat removal devices, nuclean *eaction cont-olling devices and systems includinE prinary ecolant and boration, security plan (s) and nractices , power supnlies, vedundant sa'ety syste9s , sa'ety-related e c.u? mner.t , ned ecuinnent Whose nroper functioning is necessary for the functioning of safety .
?. ..
related equinment, devices and systens for radiatior nrotect$ on !$
S inside and outside the plant, general and norsonal, including .
E gas nasks, filters, protective clothing, Eas processing systens, g?
filters and equionent, radiation nonitoring devices, liquid d.
=
f5 rad waste processing sy stens , flite-s, nolishers , ion-exchanFe e isii resins, chenicals, preci.pitators , energency response plans, Pf m
E equinnent to be used to transnort energency response ne"sonnel or to transnort evacuees , nedic al and other equipment including Ep that listed above related to speciel or snecific needs of g evacuees, comunications enuinnent used in controlling the [
g nlant, its wadiation emissions , o- in di recting and informing p L
ene"gency response nersonnel, adecuate numbe=s of cualified
[$
personnel for plant oneration in nor al and energency situatienc ."
3 includ* ng nuclee" e c cidents , sab W.re ind 6,e w "'s a[a'nst snent [
i fuel shinnents on or off tlc niant si te , adaquata training of all nersonnel including plant oneratoas, radiatten nonitoring
}
nernonnel, site securit), energency resnonse nevsonnel, cont"e c tor ~3 personnel on site during outages or repairs on ncdifications to g the nlant, assurance that onerators and others do nct cheat on NRC or other apolicable exaninations including those for reactorx onerators ("O 's ) , senior reactor onerator s (S"O's),
w lers, niperitters, electricians, niunbers and equ'.nnent orarators , and verification of the background and cualifications of each and every such nerson described above whose work affects or whose failures in work or omissions therein may a rect c the health and safety of the oublic adversely inz connection with the normal and abnornal (including nuclear accidents) operation d
of the Ha*ris nuclecr nient, and does not nvovide adenuate neans including equinment, information, nrocedures , testing and yebAOY L 19Drsonn_el and training, to assu-e the accuracy of the factsgeM6fA
^
1
. . A bd 27 E
=a gy t
and/or the health and safety of the nublic." 150 "No PWR4d) experience" or " lack of PWR(e) experience" 15 hh or"PWR(e) construction experience" includes the neanings: el
" prior to assuming this person's duties at the Shearon Har~is ss 5
this newson 55 olant site, or sone od:er job on-site at Harris , 55 did not have, cecordin6 to FSAR knended section 1313 ete !?
b g;
of 1982 or as that person's cur-iculun vita now stands, E E-actual work exnerience in the construction of uressurized n.
water reacters for electricity uroduction , or exnerience $
b g
in designing or onerating such reactors, excent as explicit 1v E stated herein or in the FSAR, and is thus not sufficfently I well cualified for supervisory position (s) such as this ne son [;
now holds, in construction of a najor pressu" ired un'.er "eactor Ir i
ulant for electvicity nroducticn, which is of a design and size nuch dif rerent fron naval reactors."
L L
T a
o . -
, , y E
5 E
Contentions pa6e hbh( h
=
- 1 Applicants should be required to install real time =
E
. radiation monitors canable of reading ganna, beta and alpha 5 radiation levels continuously and renotely in order to fW provide emergency resconse nevsonnel with the infornation required to make decisions necessary to reasonably assure 5 U
the health and safety of the oublic under conditions of h f
radioloEi cal releases (radioactive materials ) fron -he Harris L
[
nuclear plant to the envi*onnent. ~$
Thermoluminescent dosineters (TLDs) are on1v accurate within aonroximately clus or minus 30% and only tel'_ phat has hanpened in the past, not what is happening now. CIDs have to be etcked up from their sites and read, delayin6 the access li of energency resnonse personnel to infornation they need on a l most pronpt basis. -
Further, a report of the FC Radiation P=otectic n Section cnd the Radiation P otection Comnission (December 1:31 and Jan uary 21, 1982 letter fron RPC chairnan 9av Murray to NC Legislative Committee on Agency Review, with attachnents) reno-ts at nage h "Due to equinnent deficiencies and nersonnel shortages, environmental radiation surveillance around nuclear nower nlants and statewide is below ninimum adequa te levels. . Activities around the two operating nuclear olants are having to decline steadily and there is no abil$ ty to provide such surveillance for the Shearin (sic) Harris Plant which is now under construction."
- c.
. ~ . -
. a t
y h
Purther, at page 5, the car.e report says: "During 1930-81, h i
DER (Dept of Human Resources) had had to curtail its insnection, k i
enforcenent, training and environnental surveillance activities.
- Reduction in surveillance at C P & L's and Duke Power's nuclear power plants is n'ow almost a semiannual occurrence." and refers to " lack of adequate funds and resources to adequately sunnort -
i ever. the existing staff". It als: says (ibid)"D H R is having $
to becone less resconsive in the areas of nublic education, radiation user tra' ning, consulta:" on and energency resnander training." CP&L Vice President p. Howe is a nenber of the "PC and must surely be aware of dais situation (see letterhead of Murray 1/21/82 letter). It is thu.a very evident that this systen is needed specifically for the CP&L Ha ris nuclear nicnt.
- 2 ~
CP&L should be required te hsve instelled on its rmin kin ts [an stack releasinE radioactive Eases to the enviromment two (2) .
pressurized-ionization nonitors or equivalently canable equinnent that can analyze not en_7 the rate of enissions in gross ter.ns (counts per second, etc) but the precise radio-nuclides being enitted and in what quantities. Such ecuinnent should also be regulwed on every discharge noint for radioactive Eases at the Harris plant, for analysis of radf onctive liquid effluents befo*e discharge, and at least ten such nonitore.
in the environnental nonitoring systen cround the clart, in order to be able to determine what radionuclides the nlant l is emitting in order for the Radiction Protection Section, l Dept of Hunan o esources, State of 50, and EPA and N90 and energency response personnel to better nrotect the health and safety of the public by obtc'ning tinely and accurate t
~
n ,
~w -
information conce ning the specific radionuclides being released by the Harris plant and the quantities of such being released.
The two mnitors on the stack are to provide continuous carability for nonitoring while one nonitor night be malfunctioning, being serviced, or otherwise unable to give accurate readinFs, concerning the radioactive naterial being emitted by the plant.
I also believe that all towns and cities within 30 miles of the Heyris plant should receive such nressurized-ionization monitors paid for By CP6:L for the use of town personnel includ!ng emergency resnonse newsonnel (fine, nolice, nublic safety, nublick health and emergency resconse nlan decisionmake"s) to assu"e accuwage and connlete information on "adioactive naterials en the loose at any givc.n location duri ng a major radiological release, for the use of the emergency resnonse personnel, heal th officials, medical nersonnel, and others, and to assure the nublic it is getting accurate information and thus to prevent panic.
All of this is necessar" to nrotect the nublic health and safety 'n such a na jor "elease, as is:
All such nonitors should have both low and high-rance canability so that they will not just "go off scale" if a najor release o6 curs, 'out will simnly be able to shif t to another range on thei- readout and cont' rue to give accurate information either "emotely (by telephone line, for examnle) or to personnel on-site whe=e the monitoring devices are.
ice 5 NCYtbeb W S W fiP DE@ ~
(> 2. k o k n v et~oIi o P
+ are ytws uvadequale)fke_ Oban crdevar M-
<* . 4
31
- Carolina Power and Light Comnany lacks the management capability to safely construct and operate Harris 1 and 2 due to a combination of all the following factors, and perhans others to be found on discovery: 8 Sk h6 ff M M' hati,9 h cli op G[ r d kMjesnM GA " fg-g (A) of the supervisory nersonnel on the Harris site, listed # '^
bq ve{'m with their vitas (qualifications, e ducation, work exnerience, etde )
at no.13 1 3-1 to 11; of the FSAR anendment #2 just filed in 1982, only the site nanager has PWR(electric ) construction and onerating experience. The others have only ~ the PWR ccnstruction exnevience Cfs t$ wgwp w gained at their jobs on the Harris site ( P ^ 1, rrt _ y on-th e -
job tr$ning of top site cons truction nanagers). Site Manager Barsons ,
for all his exnerience, can't do or directly sunervise eveT",rthing hinself (and there's no evidence he is closely s uoervising the work or all his assistants), and all his too assistants lack P11R construct' on experience at any other job.
Specifically, C.R.
BGibsonassttothegene=alnanajerhasno PWR or olant construction exnerience in nuclear.
Startup and testinc Supt. C.S. Hinnant had no PWR overating or construction exnerience, though he snent 13 nontha at Babcock (c Wilcox, Lynchbu g VA as an engineer some years ago and had a one month Navy orientation to nuclear et Newpor.t News in 1969.
Operations supervisor JD Thompson III has nc D'IR cens truction experience tho he was a Senior Reactor operator for 2 years 1977-79; his B.S. degree is in Textile Technology.
Startup supervisor N S Blair has no electric PWA experience
) > :
though he had 13 nonths of US Navy nuclear powe~ school.
Startup supervisor T.C. Morton ha9 no PWD(e ) experience.
Harris Mantger of Technical Sunport E.M.Stueudel has A BS
-in electricc1 engineering and an MBA but no P'nbxnerience. He had Navy nuclear training in 1965
.- s
$$2-Engineering and Chen Supervisor Heln Lipa has no PWR(e) ;
experience, but did have US Navy nuclear power training and nuclean nropulsion prototype training. Lipa appears well qualified in S/CM chenistry, but his qualifications in nuclear engineering are uncler.r at best.
fl3f) DfM k & & Et!D VEbU5E 'SMC -
Admin. Supervisor L F Hancock has no PVR(e ) exnerience before Harris (like the others), and has an Associate of Axxnnlied Science deg"ee in nethanical technolocy and an ICS diniona in mechanical engineering.
Maintenance ncnger R.B. Van Metre has 20 years in the nuclear navy but like the othere he has no PWR(e) exnerience before Har"is.
He is well educated, B.S. in general engineering fren Annanolis and MS in personnel management. He also went to Navy nuclear nower school Manager plant onerations, J L Willis has a BS2r fron Annanolis and 18 yaars in the US Navy. Like Van Metre he has no nrevious VVR(e) experience but has completed Navy nuclear power school (in 1958).
These are the ten site norsonnel CP&L has at Harris now.
They appear well qualified to onerate a nuclear submarine, but excent for the site manager they do not have a y '"'(electric) cons truct'on experience before Harris.
(B) Likewise, CP&L's VP of Nuclear cons tructirn and creration, S.D. Smith, lists no TWR construction exnericnce at all in his quali fications .
(C) CP&L has failed to use up-to-date inforration, in many cases information that was readily available to CP&L or originated from CP&L, in their FSAP and E9 flied December 1981. This not only violates lo CrF 51.21, lo CPR so.57(a) 1 thru h and (b), but it raises serious questions of CP&L's honesty in withholding information such as the 12 31.80 cost estinate of SHNPP units land 2 from b
1 g , b the official analysis of the plant's costs and benefits, and by l CP&L's withholding of other information known to it. CP&L's failure to use up-to-date information and actual onerating and other exnerience from other nuclear niants in its ER and FSAR further raise questions of CP!:L's competence. If they can't use and up to date accurate 'nformation in these docunents that they decide when to file, how do we know that they are giving the N"C un to date and accurate information now, or that CP&L will de so as a nuclear plant operator? If CP&L can't keen its own license apnlication otrai Eht and accurate, how can the!r nuclear construct'en and onerations be of sufficient quality to nrotect the nublic health and safety?
(D) Nuclear expert consultant A. Ronald Jacobstein, retained by the Public Staff of the NC Util' ties Connission (his renort filed in NCUC Docket E-2 sub h28 was Afdkcielly noticed by the UCUC nanel in Docket E-2 sub 446, Feb.17,1982) has this to say about CP&L's '
brunswick operations: "During the nid-70s, CP&L nanagement, nerha7s under the influence of the relatively good record of the Robinson plant or for other unknown reasons, did not oreperly address the staffing needs of the Brunswick station, As a result they were unable to respond to the acute needs of BSEP (Brunswick Stoan Electric Plant) during the per3 od 1978fl980. A backlog of nroblens developed during this tine that simnly overkwhelned the exis ting s taff.
These included:
Main condenser failure TMI-rela ted nodificctions Torus nodifications Pipe suonort evaluation and nodification Radwaste failure Main Stean Valave and recirculation nuno problens.
(Jacobstein report a t page 7-3, 1982)
F V
gy Jacobstein goes on to say that problems continue to be addressed slowly because of runsgenent decisions to restrict nanpower at the (brunswick) site for construction forces needed to backfit necessary maintenance items . Planned outeges will thewefore be longer and more frecuent than otherwise possible, and above indus try norms.
Jacobstein's report, which he discussed with CP&L Drior to filing it, is just part of the evidence of CP&L mismanagement at the Brunswick plant, which it chould be noted was the first nuclear plant that CP&L was actually in charge of buying and sunervis-
.ing construction on. In the 1979 NRC remr ad hearinEs on nanagement capability of CP&L, CF&L witnesses and NRC staff testified that CPEL was more heavily involved bv far in dae construct $ on of the Brunswick plant then of the Robinson plant (their other nuke nlant) which was a Westinghouse txxzk turnkey project.
To cite a counle of e.xamples Jacobstein didn 't detail:
Fire protectirn at Brunswick is cuite weak. Brunswick's electrical controls were designed prior to the Brown's Ferry fire and are thus more vulnearble to common-node failures caused by five.
In an August 20, 1974 meno, C.E. " Doc" Murnhy, head construct *on insnector of URC Region II, laments the failure of various nuclear plants in Region II (including Brunswick) to meet Droper criteria for fire protection and electrical control installation then in effect (prior to Brown's Ferry fire in 1975 which alerted NRC to take the probalem more seriously ). The fire at Brown's Ferry almost caused one unit to lose cooling -- water level dronned to within 1 inch of the top of the core according to IEEE, or h8" as FRC admits.
Yet CP&L in lobbying to get N90 fire nrotection regulat.* ons delayed. This suggests a cavalier attitude toward safety. Jacobstein makes a similar point when he observes that when Health Physics inter-fered with onerating Drocedures to keen the plant on-line, the
d
'c .
1 35 operating prodedures usually took nrecedence at the Brunswick nuclear plant (e.g.pp5.12-13,Peport, ibid" Investigation,CP&LBhunswick Steam Electric Plant by A. R. Jacobstein).
Jacobstein's section 3 is a record cf CP&L 8s bungling, under-staffing and nismanagement during repairs and outages. It hardly auggests a competent utility or one interested in strety or officiency or oublic health. i
([) Furuner, CP&L is the only nuclear olant operator in the nation j 1
to be caught dumping low-level radioactive wastes in local landf 511s.
l When the NRC found out about this situation (inadvertently), it ordered a chech of all othern nuclear plants for this situation, y
I but CPhL was the only violator found. CP&L's Brunswick plant is also a very high nroducer of low-level radioective wastes, indicating a dirty nlant and sinony oneration. Jacobstetg, sect'on 5 n 12 and 13 describes how the design and reunir dexficiencies in the Brunswick 3d p-@ Ny h .
niant led to unusual and abnormal j modes of operation (because CP&L t
wouldn't leave the plant shut down until the croblens could be fixed) _
resulting in unusual conter.ination conditions diat health ohysics had to deal with and even anticipate as d ey chanEed. This again indicates sloppy nanagement and placing a nriority on electric generation over plant maintenance and renair and health ohysics.
l A Brunswick internal meno states that CP&L's clant there nroduced the highest amount of low-level waste (total and ner size of clant) of any nuclear power plant in the US, and suggests " clean trash" (not very radioactive) be segregated and disrosed of as regular trash if its radiation levels are measured low enough. No suggestions to assure that the levels of the radiation from the " clean" waste are carefuliy and accurately neasuwed to avnf d c recurrence of the radioactive-waste-to-landfill enisode are mentioned
in the nemo, whose main focus seems to be avoiding embarrassment to CP&L's nuclear progran.
The careful observer will also note that the period 1978-80 if inability to resnond to uroblens at Brunswick goes beyond the period 1976-78 when inspector Flyoyd Cantrell of NRC had sinilar concerns about Brunswick as that nlant's chief insnector. In th e 1979 remand hearings, CP&L said they had those uroblens solved, and NRC staff tended to agree. But Jacobstein, in an indenendent review, says the problens continued. This issue needs the examination of a hearing, for if Jacobstein is c orrect, CP&L was at least playing fast and loose with the truth before the ASL3 in Raleida in 1979 in those renand hearings, and the NPC staff may have been asleep axt tneir guard oost witt. Cantrell gone back to Atlanta and TMI haopening to distract their attention. If Jacobstein and others are correct, C?&L's credibility and safe management canability are vewy nuch in doubt due to the m ntinuing slocoy operations at Brunswick, nismanaganent (such as liniting the number of construction wo"kers on sitc, noor outage n1anning, numerous nistakes in repairs, etc.), and hav$ng stated unde" cath to the ASL3 in 1979 that C?&L wa s solving the nroblens at Brunswick and nad things betten under contrel.
(Some of the evidence from that hearing. e.g. CP&L's taking 17 months to install alarns on 2 waterti Eht doors protecting the RiiR systen fron flooding in the plant, to assure they were closed, strongly succest otherwise. This nroblem wcen 't finally fixed until during the hearings in 1979 -- NRC renand to ASLB -- and nrobably under pressure of the hearings. This doesn't suggest coc7etence, cee Dr. - J.V. Leeds ' ouestioning of C"&L witnesses about nicking up a spare wire, e tc. , Tr. (1979)
G b Moreover, CP&L's conpetence in constructing and repairing l the Brunswick plant has been public1v challenged by neonle who have worked there, e.g. Ronald Shackelford of 105 Kentauxwood Ave, Wiltington NC 28h05, nhone 919-762-8530, and others in CP&L E-2 sub h16 even'.ng hear'ng in U'Inirton, NC in 1901. A renowter in the area got a job at the olant as an ironworker with no cualifications and was told to hide when the " white hats" (insoectors and supervisors) cone around, by his foreman.
Lack of supervisory personnel inside the plant uas one o f the nanagement weaknesses at Brunswrick raf sod by F. Cantrell and others at _the remand hearings on CP&EL's safe nanage ent carability Shackeldford alsc renorted being hired as a Her-is welder after in 1979.
A failing the test for that ' job.
4he\os j
All of the areas cited above {ndicate that CP&L was and is weak in nuclear plant mana6enent supervision at tl.e gHar"is and Brunswick sites. CP&L lacks the mana gement canability to run even the 3 nuclear plants it now has, nuch less 2 more, and the above evidence plus nore te be obtained on discovery will likely be able to prove it. The Harris 0.L. should rn+ issue because the cuestion of CP&L's managenent canabili ty rena' ns in doubt for at least all of the a bove reasons, h})CP&L'sconpience, good fai th, maragenent organization, attention to deta$1, and conn 11snee with statenents nede to NRC and At fic Safety and Licensing Boards (e.g. that i n the 1979 renand hearing on managenent canability in this case) are called into cuestion by the following exanule( and similar failures to carry out actions pronised, required, or inclied by actions of CP&L, NPC Staff, and the ASLB's in this case:
A
In the 1979 remand hearings au referred to above, one large question was where the "SRO desirable" qualification requirement fer senior Barunswick plant staff cane from, and why CP&L didn't generally comely with it (i.e. nost of Bruns-wick's senior staff didn't have SRO's licenses -- see NDC Staff testimony, e.g. that cf Cantrell with attachment outlining ton managenent at Brunswick and whether they had So0's). Toward the end of those hearings, J.A. Jones (chief operating office" then and now, and nou Vice Chaire.an of CP&L) testified that the "SRO desirable" resuirement cane fron him, and that it erobably should be deleted (though that doesn't near such qualifications are not desirable for serninr nuclear nient manaEers ) See Tr. at -
(1979, Dockets 50/h00-h03)
(before the ASLB at Raleigh NC , I. Smith , Dr. J.V. Leeds and Glenn 0. Rat Bright ) .
Yet in the Harris FSAR, Tigure 13 2.1-1 " Training Schedule" for SiDTPP, we find tha "SRO B9ckground for license, desirabic" is attached to the General Manager, Manager Dower Production, Plant Manage", Perf. & Test Sunervisor, Engineering Supervisor, Sucevini'endent nain(enance) and others. Of those costs yet filled, it 6:es not aurear thtt any of then (FSAP 13.13) has or is qualified fcr an SRO, the aperations supervisor (another post,not listed above) being the only one identified in 13.13 as having held an S?O cr being qualified or having the background for same.
The questions this whole matter raises are: If SRO's are really desirable for these jobs (or background for the license, whatever that neans ), why don't more of the neonle CP&L is begg getting into these jobs (senior Harris plant manaEenent) have then? Is CP&L seeking to duolicate its coor performance
% %=
39 at Brunswick by similar means? and If the "SRO desirable" qualification really should have been alxx eliminated or modified, why can't J.A. Jones, the most senior operating official of CP&L, who originated the qualification h1mself (so he testified), get it changed or, if it stands (as Txkla Fig.13,2.1.-1 indicates ), Eet the CP&L hiring nrocess to conn 17 with it? Answering these and similar questions is innortant to detern' ning CP&L's manacenert i canability for an addit $ onal 2 nuclear nients when thev al ecdy run 3 (with very questionable results and nractice at 2 of then, i.e.
Brunswick 1 and 22).
(H2) CP&L's management canability filings consist nostly of organization charts and clans. Without seeing the actual individuals who fit into these boxes, charts and nlans thei r ,
qualifications, how well they work together, and wahether these individuals are (or can be proved to be) able to run the Harris pro ject l together with the other nuclear onerations b
CP&L's general office is resnonsible for (Brunstwick & "obinsen2) i i
(this last acplies to the general staff, the Harris clant staff [
night have to be diverted to deal with continuing unsolved f
problems at Brunswick and/or Robinson 2, e.g. stean generator E renla c emen t ,
torus modificat$ons, fire orotection, radiation t 5
protection) in a manngr that orotects the nublic health and e E
safety, such plans cannot be realistically evaluated. Therefore 5 at this [
time I contend that the levels of staffing snecified s are insufficient for Harris and the CP&L connany as a whole in 5
{
view of CP&L's record of continuing and worsening nuclear nlant oroblens (including all those at Brunxswick, radiation n otection and steam genera tor leaks at Robinson 2, etc. ), that [
the individuels
to be named to fill those positions open in the staffing charts subnitted by CP&L are or will be insufficiently qualified by .
training, experience, tennerament, psychological stability and ability to work effectively with others on difficult problens, to deal with the level of nuclear problems that CP&L can reason-ably be exnected to be having, based on CP&L's record at Brunskick, its deteriorating operation at Robinson 2, construction and design defects at Harris (including the results of using workers with lowered corale due to pay cuts, unoualified welders, insnectors
-- who, e .g. , can ' t read bluer-ints a ccurately, or jus t check off what tools are used -- installation of nonconfovnin6 natevial on the next shift af ter it had been rejected on a nrevious shift, narticularly early in construction, at it annlies to rebav, weldnents, drains, niping, wiring, containment linen, basc mat, equipment sunnorts (esnecially for safety-related loads), and such other defects and deficiencies of construction and design as are now known (e.g. defective stean generators, vibration problen in Westin5 house model D8s, corrosion, denting, ninchinE, nitting, " green grunge", leaks etc. in stean generator tubing, likelihood of na jor steen generator repairs or renlacement bein5 required based on the recond of Surry, Turkey "oint, Robinson 2 and other ule.nts and on failure of water chemistry changes to solve the corrosion nroblen, binetal co-rosion between the alloy in the tubes (Inconel at Harris -- I've requested the exact alloy info fron NRC) and tybe sheets (steel),
t SMs %ious %>* hpe and nininj' and generator casinEs F(5nt Td steel)
^ &2.36 directly and mediated )s owe ovantsW- QCft&{
by feedwater and by nrinary coolant, also affected by zircaloy #*
in prinary systen, another major netal surface that can effectSftGW 4ME or increase bimetal corrosion on the 9.G. tubes ) or may be discovered. .
CCNTENTIONS ac pig-f yd8 'I 'ago f
[ d$5 Annlicant C.'&L, by giving a tennorary 15% nay cut to hundreds of its employees now being transferred to the Sheavon -
Harris nuclear plant (statement of CP&L snokesnan Mac S. Harris, reported e.g. Durhan Morning Herald, V/9/82--discovery may be required to pin down the extent and nature of these transfers, the neriod of the pay cuts, if its end is known, etc. ) is precipitating there the same kind of situation which, at its Brunswick nuclear plcnt in 197h-75, precipitated poor staff morale, high staff turnover, and an inability resulting from those. and other factors (including inadequate management and inadequate resources) to make necessary renairs to and onerate the 'runswick plant in a nanner that nrotected the health and safety of the public adequately, instrenahindrer&Liuu Further, CPEL at 3runswick in 197h was unable or unwilling and did not have E.e necessary staff to renair safety elated problems and deficiencies faster than they occu" ed, leading to a growing backlog of nroblens unfixed ano unsolved, failure to conduct nroper safety reviews of repair work, forced overtine that comnounded staff fatigue and poor norale (narticularly when conbined with Day cuts). Such factors contributed, e.g.
to the January 1976 exD1osion and effective destructicn of the augnented of f-Eas (ACG) systen at Brunxswick, which has st'11 not been returned to service as ot 1982, resulting in hig.her levels of radioactivity being released to the atnosnhere and contributing to the radioactive cesium contanination of the i
beach across the river from the Srunswick D1 ant, at a state park, in 1980. l Obviously, pay cuts cogincident with transfers to the Ha-ris site will not result in Ecod associations with work ,
u
f I
on the Harris nuclear plant. Such dissatisfaction will lead to slonpier construction and startun testing nractice, and to an accumulation of unsolved oroblems that can affect public health and safety adversely, as they did at Brunswick.
Further, this action chows CP&L managenent has not learned the lessons of their understaffing, underpaying, causi ng high turnover and noor morale at Brunswick. The Brunswick plank still have at least 3 nore years of extensive modifications ahead, even if CP&L succeeds in gettf ng out of the FSC rules on fire protection as they seek to, according to CP&L's 1981 form kl 10-K filed with the Securittes and Exchange Commission (SEC), see under " Nuclear Matters". These include torus modifications to withstand accident blowdoun loading and/or earthouakes, recairs and wetlacenent of condensers, and fixing numerous other design defects and chficiencies in that plant.
CP&L's treating its Ha ris worke=s in 1982 as it did its Brunswick workers in 1974-75 is likely to nrecipitate the sane sort of conditions at Harris that led N"C insnector Floyd Cantrell to raise serious questiens as te the managener.t canability of CP&L to operate nuclear nlants safely, e r of 1976-78.
CP&L's pay cuts for Harris emulvyees as they nove to work at the site indicates that CP&L is willing to precinitate s$nilar problens at the Harris site. This action nay have the sane sort of cause in that in 1974-75 a large anount (uo to 103%)
of CP&L's earnings was AFUDC (not real cash) according to then-Chairman Shearon Harris. Present CP&L chairman Sherwood Smith testified before the NC Utilities Cennission $n 1981 that s
above 80% (97% as I recall) of CP&L's earnings $ n one recent period had been AFUDC. But for CP&L to reneat, in a similar,
1 and a don 't care abitude anong workers on-site, resentnent of ta other workers whose pay wasn't cut, and result! ng conflict, '
distraction from good work practice, and a general willingness to overlook or cover un construction errors, nonconnliance with codes and URC regulations, (e.g. for welds, wiring, conoleting the containnent done, sealing containnent nenetrations, testing the integrity of the urinary systen, leak-tenting piping and pressure vessels, etc.). Pressure fron ton nanagement to cut costs will compound these problems by further lowering norale, and since it almost always costs more to go back and fix work done in error, pressure to cover un such ewrors and nonconoliances tas listed above will increase. The result will be a nower plant with a greater nunber of safety-related defects concealed in it, due to the influence of CP&L management policy a s exemnlified by the nay cuts coincident with transfers of hundreds of e nnloyees hired for Harrin but trained at odaer locations to the Harris site, and other pressures to cut corte.
The difficulties of CP&L's Brunswick ulant, which c ontinue today, illustrate well the long-tern results of such diont-sighted CP&L cost-cutting nolicy in 197h-75.
If Harris ;
conttruction is airo rushed to save noney (as CPEL 1i did on Brunsswick 2 in 1974) the se nroblens will be further compounded at Harris just as they were at Brunswick. The nore a conpetent workers will be nere likely to seek jobs elsewheve, '
due to the pay cut, or to nerform less well, due to resentment ,
if they stay with CP&L.
The result will be an overall degradation ,
of the quality of CP&L's Harris workforce and its nevrornance, '
as the result of CP&L nanagenent actions. That, in turn, will 3 d
d conpronise public health and safety protection at Harris and 2
l LQI increase the orobability of nuclear accidents there, due to concealed nonconnliances with anplicable x codes and regulat5cns, lower staff morale resulting in more hunan error, and so on.
These effects are difficult to snecify in greater detail now, since they have not but just begun to hannen and little if any information on their extent is available, excent the -
results of what C?&L did at Brunswick in 197h-75, which is swell docunented in the renorts of Centre 11 and othe" N"C insnectors at Brunswick, and in the transcript of the NPC 1979 renand hearings on CP&L's safe nanagement canability held in Raleigh. One striking exannie fron that hearing was CP&L's repeated failure to Get door-onen alarn li hts E run from two watertight doors necessary to orotect the Brunswick PHR systen fron floeding (shorting it out so it wo uldn 't ucrk,e.g. )
a t the -17 foot level, up to the control roon, so oneraters would know when cf.cse doors were left open, over a ner'od of sene 18 nonths. :nsnector Cantrell cited CF&L several times left for violations in regard te these doors being openn and nede reconnendations or. what 07&L should do to fix then -- which CP&L didn't do for nany nany months. The pressure of other things going wrong at the nlant was cited bv CP&L mad Cantrell as a basic reason things like this at Brunswick didn't get fixed in a tinely manner. That CP&L should take steps at Harris that are just like steps that led to this situation at Brunswick anoth er indicates unsound nanagenent, not capable to construct a nuclear plant and cperate it safely vhen they can't even run well the 3 niants (nuclear) CP&L already has.
~ .
l h
cash crunch situation, an action that led to widesnread morale and staffing orc 51 ems at Brunswick in the 1970s, which trobicms .
have not been resolved to date (see, e.g. F.enort of Investigat'on by A. Ronald Jacobstein, consultant to NC Util. Commissien Dublic Staff, sections 3, h and 7, Feb.1982, Docket E-2 sub h28 and judicially noticed in Do eket E-2 sub kh6 en Feb.17,1982),
indicates management that cannot 1 carn fron its errors.
Jacobstein describes deficiencies and mistakes in nianninEs record-keeping, outcge scheduling, radiation trotection, maintenance, and other fields (contention (3h_ cn managenent canability gives nore details en this and is incornorated herein by reference). CP&L, evidentiv feeling nressure to cut costs, put Brunswick into thir situation when concleting it and be51nning operations in 197h-75 Connleting Harris under sinilar conditi ons in 1982-85 is not consistent with good nanagenent, high cuali ty nuclear construction (" quality must be built in, it cannot be inspected in" to n clear plants -- NRC Chairnan N.J. Pall adino , 1f 981 ) ,
or avoiding eerds in ccns truction and design. Pryxertume pressure to cut costs will lead to cutting c orne*s in const=uc-tion, concounding an already deteriorating situation (see, e.g.
, ... Building a 'Sargain Basenent' power olant, Western Wake Herald,1981, rcoorting charges made by vorkers at the clant site, includinF . rampant drug use, innroner installation of naterials, inanectors who can't = cad blueprints, unoualified welders and other personnel at work on the site, etd.)
Specifically, in addition to the above, lower norale among workers caused by the nay cuts and by those nay cuts cen$ng when they move to the Harris site will lead to sabotaEe 4 f#' '#
% CD/ S 4 ha e { SH(J('f +o 4ff eI (al, Ic sfatJdped3, n< ies ( YPffm&,
- (f -
Applicants' " safety analysis" is deficient and insufficient to protect the health and safety of the oublic because it cssumes (in general) only a signgle failure at any one time. The issue .
! of multiple and common-mode failures is not addressed in any
} comprehensive or inclusive manner in the FSAR. This issue is particularly relevant to the Harris ulant due to the large number l
of errors and renortable occur"ences in enEineered safety systens, 1
cmergency cooling systems, and other systens at the Brunswick nuclear i
plant, which CP&L was more heavily involved in buildi n6 than its Robinson plant (which was a Westinghouse turnkey nro ject built fo" CPEL)
-see J. A.
Jones testimony in remand hearings on safe nanagement capability in this docket, Tr. (1979); because most of the Harris onsite sunervisory and management personnel naned in Amendment
}
the Harris job (nuclear powerplant construction management and sunervision on-site is not a place for on-the-job trdning for the s
senior rnnagers) -- as detailed in contention 3 incoroorated b herein by reference for specificity and detail; because there 4
is no evidence that Aunlicants have nlans or xxx procedures for dealing with nultiple failures; because an Integrated Control "
G h System (ICS) connutcr & rela ted equienent without a backup conputerSvV :
l;5 h A ,
which is not qualified for fire or accident conditions nor for :.
carthquakes, }
is surely capable of nroducing erroneous signals that -
cause multiple failures; because the Harris control room is a very old design, out-of-date with respect to both instrunentation end hunan factors, as well as with resnect tn TMI lessons leerned; g
and because the Harris clant itself is an outdated design having h
p been delayed many years by Anplicants' icek of financial cancbility to construct it and lack of need for it, and thus the olant design ~
includes less protection against con,on-mode failures thaa chah
N ,
' kf -
of more recent design; because Applicanta CP&L, at its Brunsyick' plant (upon information and belief) has been more than once unable .,
to determine what to do to control and oper' ate that nuclear -
1 plant safely, and has had to call in exnerts fron the nearby G.E.
nuclear fabrication and fuel facility to show them what to do' (and
& && ON what not to) -- I'll need discovery to conpletoAthis one, and probably a set of subpoenas to G.E. --
but there is no Westinghouce facility full of PWR experts close enouFh to the Harris plant to provide the same " bailout service for incomoetent nuclear utib ties" u
'that CP&L has been receiving at Brunswick from the G.E. facility at
/
Wilmington. Upon info'rmation and belief, nending discovery, the incidents at Brunswick could have had quite serious conseauences if not brought under control within 30 ninutes to a few hours, which CP&L with its own personnel and resources was unable to do, exoosing the uublic 's health, safety and prouerty to serious risks. '
i B
e s
a'
/
%[
8
+
.s
\'
s , %
e N$'
- b An operating license for Shenron Harris Nuclear tower Plant units 1. and /or 2 mayl not issue because under the Atomic Energy Act, the U.S. Constitution and M M _- - ~- -^
TH+fn*r U.M.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (to which the US is a treaty signato7 , which incomorates th4 Dacla"ati.on as the " sun-ene law of the land" under the Constitution), neither Congress nor the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission have the authority to authorize any w
setivity which kills' citizens, wreaks genetic damage on then, causes diseasec, or infringes their civil liberties. See C//dFY NdM #"lE2 ) ~u U.S. Court of Aupeals, DC Circuit, 1982. h
- An operating li. cense for Shenron Harris ' Nuclear Powe" Plant units 1 and/or 2 may not is. ue because. Apolicants Carolina P0wer and Light Company and NC Eastern Mund:cinal . Power Agency
("NCMPA #3 until December 1981) are incornorated under the laws of North Carolina and as auch are not and cannot be authorized to violate the protection of Section 19 of the NC Constitution which n=ovides tha semo o"otectian of "15ee, libewt* and n one=ty" as does the US Constitution. Neither NSC nor the U4 Congress nay by any law (such as the Atc~.ic Energy Act) overrule' this nrovision of the North Carolina Constitution, nor mar N"C or Congress order or authorize any North Carolina co coration(s) to vi olate the North Carolina Constitution. The court decision cited in contention j above (incoroorated herein by reference) clearly affirms that 1
the provisions of the US Constitution re taking of life, liberty or' property (identical to the provisions of .the NC: Constitution cited herein) without due process of law arpiy to the licensing of nuclear power plants. Since the coeration of the Harris nuclear
v' have the effect of killing som persons and in.juring others, without du,e urocess few those persons snecifically killed and/cr ,
injured (see, J e.g.1"JREG 0880 at xviii, ALAB-66h re 30 or h0 NU9EG-0757 re un to 67.5 deaths /1000 IGle-yeav:
radon-induced deaths ner 1000 MWe reactor-year or even Tnble S-3 which does not include fully the health effects of effluents from the nuclear fuel cycle). These numbers are not censervative, in my view, but the noint is that even one death from the Har=is oneration would violate the North Carolina constitution. No
, North Carolina Cernoration(s) such as CP&L or NCEMPA (" Agency")
the annlicants in this case, can be authorized to vi olate the North Carelina Constitution. Nor can any federal agency, such ar NRC, authorize the, to do so. Therefore the N.C. Constitutier on cor7crations etc.
and N.C. law nrchibit the ,oueration of the Harris nuclear nouer :
A.
olant -~ units 1 and 2; and the NRC is unable to override this urohibition.
/
e
.6 9
~ d
.h .
^
y \
aad & s eg
- Applicants' " safety analysis" is deficient and insufficient .
to reasonably protect the health and safety of the public due to its .
lack of a comprehensive f ailure nodes and effects analysis (e.g. as described by Demetrios Basdekas of NRC in his differing professional opinio6 N 80' lh k h CN Nfe. S/-I MM, I 3GWG Qfublie k&UM 3GN an WDSh h VfM20%f$0 Why Q W %grelmsen;g}g fa,ture swdes
- [TheFSARandSERandESandEISandE4aredeficient hw y) ed< r[%p because@fhey do not comply with NDDC v. f/[2C , US Cou-t of Anneals ,k '
DC Circuit, decision & by Judges David Bazelon & George Edwards, /
Auril,1982, invalidating Table S-3 of lo CFR 50.(B)he T health bwsf^$
g 4
effects of the effluents mentioned in the table need to be fe4%a%
g ,. I6;t - -
S taken into account whether this decisicn is affirmed en rehearing or further anneal or not. This is narticularlv true in the light of the 11 million year neriod in which spent fuel is more radiotoxic than the parent are fron which uraniun was nined for the nucle ar fuel cycle (B. Cohen, Drof, U. Pittsburgh) and because of the high efficacy of certain radionuclides such as Ra-222, Pu-239, Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60, F1-59 and others released in the nuclear fuel cycle in lodging in the hunan body and causin6 cancer, either when absorbed from nuclear activities directly (including tailings and plant operation) or when concentrated as exnlained in tric translation $20 in the food chain. he NDC 's cresent analysis of food chain concentration is wronE and fails to urotect the health and safety of the nublic in that it is based on fakad fudged AFC experim.ents involving (1) the use of soils known not to abscvb or adsovb nuch of radioactive particles in the air (2) the baking and ultraviolet-light sterlilization of such soils to nrevent nicroorgn: 'sms from mobilizing radioactive naterial in the tests ,
as they will and do do in reality (3) the transnianting or
1
-g/-
fully grown plants into said soils so sterilized, nreventing uptake of nutrients including radionuclides as wcu14 be norral '
from plants grown from seed in rurg soils contaiminated with radionuclides emitted by the nuclear fuel cycle (h) removing said plants after as little as 3 days and analyzing sane, which is totelly unrealistic in view of the 20 to 200 dav '
growing neriods of many food nlants, e.g. whea t, beans , c orn ,
vegetables, notatoes, nuts and others. (DkJVC's analysis is furthew not conservative in that it does not use the larger or largest values for concentration of radionuclides obtained bv scientific
- 66) research, e.g. those summarized in NRC translation 520; ana g in that it systenatically underestinates not just the radiation doxses from internal and external emitters for all the above reasons and others, but also underestimates the health effects of radiation doses actually received, as detailed e.g. in the wo"k of Gofman (see, e.g. "adiation and Hunan Health, 1001) re cancer doses, genetic defects, underestimation by the
" threshold hypotheses" and the "linearity assumotion"; Mancuso ,
St{Qkaat and Kneale re health effects of lou-level radiation (1979-80); K.2. Morgan, J. Motblat, E. P.adford and others
(
who suonort on health effects grounds a lowering of the occuna- i t'.onal exnosure standa"ds for radiation h= a facto" of 2 to 10; $
and othe .
cunnent literature in the field of radiation health ,
effects. t w
E-E Ei i
t
[
u
&2 --
Ele ctrical Equinment for the Harris Plant, nor was the renort referenced in 3.11C available at the L?DP nrior to lh May 1982.
Therefore I contend that the qualification of electrical equipment (including controls , wirinE, notors, valve onerators instrumentation, etc. required to perforn such vital safety fuhetions as initiating the ECCS an d RER sr.etens, running the reactor coolant nunps, onerating relief hvalves, establishing in-core pressures, tenneratures and radiati on levels, knowing the nositions of valves in the nain stean, primary, ECCS, borated water, nressurizer rel' ef, reactor relief, and other systens, to cause the control rod drives to onerate (reauired for SCD.AM and safet shutdown), knowing whether valvas fron containnent to etnosnhere or to auxiliary buildinE(s) are onen er are closed, isolating contaf nnent in the event of a radioactive release inside containment, sunnlying feedwater to steen generators, and operating controls and instrunents in the control room that denend on the infornation conveyed,by, or the eneration of, any of th e above, which is necessary to nrotect the health and safety of the n ubli c , is not suff$cientiv established for Harris by the PFAR and ED and SE" an d ES ,
is deficient, in error and' lacks up-to-date infornation, both in the FSAR, whers. secticn 3 110 onits discussicn and makes broad, blanket assertions unverified and unvewiriable on the basis of now-available information, and narticularly in those renorts referenced above, and others , which do not now exist, and for which sone of the up-to-date information as of thei" date of publication (e.g. operating exnerience n -
of nowelectrical exist. equipnent at "WRs in Decenber 1982) does not
l e ,
~~ hb -
- f[) The naterial incorporated by reference 'n FSAP sectinn 1.6, as listedTable there1., contains 6-1 less thanxztwo dozen iten(sou*foroftnerec~
,a hundtours edO)ISC-
<d dating later taan 1977, while most date f"on 1975 or before.
Anplicante and FPC staff have not proved that this infornation is now uo-to-date and accurate enough for use in vrotecting the henith and safety of the public. Obviously, nono of these studies before 1976 takes account of the operat' ng histo"y of k Westinghouse in ge P'JRs such as Ha=~is (g eate- than 700 MNe)
F.G. WCAP-8768 incornorates no such, from 1976 to the nresent. WCAP-8587 Pcv 2 and sunnie,ert i to UCAP-8587 date from before T:E, as do the analytical nodels of WCAP-8785 corno"ation, and WCA?-8720, t!CA P-818 uCAP-8678,f 2 vev.8 nany of' the" st CAP-8330etc.
udies, Wastinghouse a uthors o has a vested interest in selling nuclear nower nlants which may lead its researchers and auu: ors to bias their enorts in such a way as to (1) reduce the cost of saf ety-related modifications recuired for such West'nghouse-scid nuclear nlants (ones using a Westirghouse 1;SSS), thus increac' ng salebility but risking
'WhukR6W493) g M.
Ne uNiNEaYtbeg gpy n[ggjgpMyyl hfEn0"E.E*EE"sdRf61e'2 d
A nens of design descisions made by Nest'.nghouse and its sub-contractors, in o-der to avoid enbarrassnent, out of favoritian for the contany and thair oun vork, or in order th[ void exnentive 3-modifications referred to ' n (1) above which uno14 -aduce tha salaoility cf Nestinghouse nuclee reactors and thus th eaten the jobs of the author (s) and researcher (s); and/or (3) because of direct or indierect oressure from thei" sunc"iors for any of the oreceding reasons; and/or (b)in order to nrevent nublic knowledge or, or concern over, defects in the design of West-inghouse nuclear olan ts. Any or all of the above factors can and do comovonise the nublic health and safety. E.g. WCAP-8976 underestinates the likelihood I haven 't got WCAP-8682 & effects available of centrol
- WCAP-8663 rod logic $"nilu*es of Dec.107 does not influde the effects of re-racking to store nore fuel.
in spent fuel pools.
i
. I
-p- ,
I believe the above considerations also apoly to WCAP-8581: '
' and WCAP-8760 or 51/76 ve engineeved safeEuards actuation for PW3s, but without seing the proprietary version (as in other cases listed here$ n, e.g. WCAP-8682 is propvietary) I carnot determine if the oublic version is as truthful as the nroprietary version. NCAP-9230 and NCAP-8h2h and t? CAP-9166 are also subject to the above factors for n'ninizing the effects of accident conditions to the detriment of the health and saf ety of the oublic.
In addition, according to Table 1.6-1, NRC Shnff has not conoleted its re91ew of most of the above-named documents, nor others vital to the safe functioning of the Harris plant.
These are synbolized "U - Actively under fornal NPC review" in section 1.6's legend to the Table 1.6-1 of the FSAR.
These reports, though veferenced "in suppo*t of this and sir'lar applications" are not in the LPDP as of 5/lb/82.
The Staff's not having co mleted review of these venorts neans that they hr.ve not been accented as adeo.uate to orotect the nublic health and safety. In view of the transrfer of IRC versonnel to licensinE activity from such otber act$ cns as reviewing these renovts, there is a likelihood that NPC review will not be t$nely enough nor accurate ernuch nor thorough enough to assure the nubli c health and safety in connect.4.on with tho Harris oroject, particularly since Hav=is that it nav is such an old notde3 ,recegve En ron s{9gcient attegionupgaongvedtonorhggggg as sonew e and <-
noderr since Apnlicant CP&L is in such financial straits due to the $N hi Eh cost of SENPP and its high amount of AFUDC in earnings that it has given a 15% nay cut to ennloyees being sent in the hundreds to the Harris site at the time of this filinc, thus preventing CP&L from conducting nere extensive review .
g . of these safety natters also.
b O To make this contention more specific will require discove~y to NRC Staff concerning review status of the above-nentioned renorts, number of personnel assigned to then, their work loads, their procedures, their oninions of the a decuacy of the reviews, and any anonymous studies of such oninion (where the onirions can be given without having one 's nane attached to it, such as NBC has done with IE inspectovs, see reco"d in 1979 renand hearings on S. Harris /CP&L nanngenent capability, Board notification referred to therein, and IE reports of its insnecto~s views).
And discovery to CP&L to #ind what furthe" reviews o" checks of the above-nentioned docunents CP&L is ccnducting or has conducted (generally, I have found none in the FRAF whe~e such docunents are feferenced. FSAD Section 15, e.g. at 15.6, refers t o the renorts as basis for the " analysis" which 's of ten sinnly a descrintion of the reno-t's results with ne cr*ticise of the renort 's accuracy, assunntions, etc. ), what such further reviews consist of, who does then, what thc.*r o.ualio ficietions are (and has CP&L got neonic. in their er.nloy who are qualified, in CP&L's oninion, to conduct s uch further reviews ),
how much time they snend on it, where it fits into their job description (s), what nriority it has in their vork schedule, what results and renorts they have nroduced, and to get conies of sane. Many of these same questions are of course annronriete for discovery to NRC Staff about their reviews of the docunents mentioned above.
Y o
- fb-
- ff Auplicants' FSAR and the SER and ES are deficient and in error because they do not take account of the fact that polyvinyl chloride (used for cable jackets in nuclear nients, including inside the containnent in high gamma radiation flux areas such as those near the reactor, hot and cold leg niping of the primary system, reactor urinary coolant pumos, etc. )
and polyethylene, used as cable insula tion , dete".4o-ate nuch more ranidly under long-tern doses of ganna radiation than they do when exposed to the same total dose over a nuch shorter neriod of time (which is how these ne.terials, PVC and PE, are tested for service in nuclear plants), as shown by the wo=k of E. Gillen and R.Clough of Sandia Laboratories. The tests these ucrkers conducted show that the cable jackets and insulation become enbrittled by the radiation's breaking chemical bonds in these polymers (which are long grouns of linked chemical units called "mers"), allowing oxidation of the clastics PVC and PE which nakes then brittle.
This accelerated enbrittlement in the nresence of ganma radiation and oxygen raisec many significant cccident and loss-of-control nossibilities, due to anythin6 that suddenly shocks cable s and could thus cause embrittled insulaticn to fall off (e.g. earthquakes, water hammers as MSIVs close af ter a SCRAM, steam hammers, a worker brushing against daem or strikirs them e.g. with a mop handle). Or the insulation could fall off under the influence of vibration, e.g. from the reactor coolant nunns, or when extrenely embrittled, could fall off of its own weight.
Where cabales carrying control signals, power to notors for the ECCS, RER and nrimary coolant, _ power to centrol nilot-operated values , or si Enals from incortant instrunents inside centsinment,
@ ~
])-
loss of cable jacketing or insulation would lead to short circuits and dbus: erroneous infornation transnitted, failure to transmit control signals or information and infnz=xtin instrument "eadings through shorted-out wires, failure to transnit nower to vital safety equinment, e.g. to the RHP nunns, FCCS nunns, or reactor coolant pumps or any or all of then af ter a SC"AM, water hanner, earthxouake, reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of feedwater, or any other event that causes vibration (e.6. normal oneration of RC nunnus, beginning oneration of ECCS punos or "H9 nunps, EPCI or LPCI) or suddent shock. Such failures of controls, inst"unents and nunos would clearly connound nany accident secuences, escalating trivial incidents tc the Clast IX level in nany cases.
For exannle, if an ordinary tu"bine trip led to a reactor trin and the water hanmer as the MSIV closed caused cable jacketinE to fall off cables sunnlying newer to one or nove reacto coolant and the cables sho-ted out (ver* likaly if hare )
nunos or controlling theiv operation, the nunns would go off, the reactor temperature wnuld "ise, and tne ECCS would autonatically turn on and a relief valve onen to ston cressu e wise on the nrimary systen. The h vibration of the ICCS nunns sta-ting could cause nore cable insulation to fall off, navticulawly on wires near then like their controls and nower sunnly. If either control or pouer sunply to the "CCS nunns f ailed, the undercooled reactor would not be gettinE nuch addit $ onal
(
i coolant. Moreover, shorted wires could erroneously signal the operators that ECCS punns and reactor coolant nunns were i
operable and working, when they were not. High radiation levels inside containment would orevent anyone fron gof ng in to look, as urinary coolant escaped through the open relief valve to veduce tencerature and nressure in the prinsry systen. As a 1
result the reactor could serious 137 evanh
e- %
rhb" voids in the core (further reducing effective cocling) and E l ve the operators reading it another case of "2 failu*e rodes the likes of which have never been analyazed" as at Three M31e Is1cnd unit 2. In this case, provided the core pressure-ten,eratuwe monitoring instrument lives had not also shovted out, the signals from then would indicate rising tennerature and falling nressure; neanwhile the erroneous signals from sho-ted wires would be indicating the ECCS pumps were on as we=e all the reactor coolant pumps. It is unlikely that the onerators could diagnose the soon enough to prevent serious damage to the cc"e.
situation accurately. Under cost-TMI instructions, they night f
consider it enough to leave the ECCS "on" cs it was indicated to be. In such a case, the overheading core would soon ret hot enough to release substantial radioactivity to nrinary coolant (and thus to containment via the onan vent valve, standard urac-tice now being to laave the ECCS on and blow the excess fron a " solid" systen out the relief valve) and to react the zircalcy fuel tubes with remaining wate" and steen (about 1990 F I think--
can amend this to cor"ect it) to fo"n hvdrogen. Add hydrogen to the sho-ted wiring and you get an ennlosion which wc 21d cause containment penetrations scaled with emoxy to fcil suddenly by reverting to the 2 chenicals which conbine tc nake the emnoxy.
Heat, noisture, pressure and radiation can all cause egnoKy to fail in this way, and all would be present inside containnent l
under the conditions described, especially during and af ter the pressure spike of a hydrogen ignition /exnlosion. P.ad!osctive stean, halogens, noble gases and odner radionuclide including
^
cesiun, which would be boiling out of the core at tenneratures above 2000 F as the core continued to fail to be cooled, would then escape through the failed containnent penetration (s) to
+ .
\
- S q-the auxiliary building and/or directly to the etnosnhere, perhans penetrating to the control room also through cable trays and nathways, thus compounding difficulties for the operators still more. The potential damage to public health and safety, and the release of radioactive material to the atmosahere, easily equals or exceeds dbat at Th ee Mile Island under this scenario.
It is incortant to realize that where cables are thickly grouned or bunched, o~ inside conduits not subject to visual insnection, embrittlement, c acking and degradation cf control, instrument reading and poue* cables could nct be readily detected, even if it had nrogressed very far. Any stock, even nornal operation of an air pressure line, much less an earthquake, n"arby plane crash, valve operating, c= a worker bunning or pulling a cable on nu nose or accidentally, could lead to a massit short ci"cuit affecting nume*ous systens and instruments all at once. In the event that the initiating event was also pa"t of an accident sequence, the shorted cables would likely conpound the seriousness of the event, and further shocks, caused, e.g. by ecuirnent turning on to nitigate the damage already done and nroblems already cp sed, could caune more insulation to fall off cables on which it had becone embrittled, fu" User connounding the accident. Annlicants' l FSAR and the SEP take no account of this nossibility, do not i
analyze it sufficiently, do not nrovide enough nitigation i for it, do not decree insnection standards for cables that can prevent or detect such enbrittlement before it risks short circuits and their attendant risks as described and examnled ;
! above, do not provide for die use of cable insulation and k jacketing that will not degrade under such radiation exnosune.,
E
1 r * * -
and otherwise fail to adequately nrotect the health and safety of the public. .
This issue is particularly annlicable to the Har-is ulant -
because of its very old design datping fron the early 1970s in which nany cable paths are not adecuately senarated (raising the odds tir.t degradation and embrittlemant of jackets and insulation inside a larger bundla of cables won't be detected until it causes an accident or seriously connounds one).
It is also particularly anplicable in that Annlicant Ct&L has a history of delaying and failing to connly with cable senaration and installation standards , e.g. at Brunswick, of delaying and being inadeouate in fire protect 4.cn, and in general of giving production priority over shutting niants down to cure major safety defects, e.g. at Brunswick 1977-78 and 1978-80, and continuins as CP&L petitions USC nany times to delay inclementation of saTety unErades and ecuipment renairs and nodifications at Brunswick; e.g. aise at H.3. Robinson nlant, see NRC inspector's andonynous comments referenced in Staff Exhibit , NRC renand hearing en CP&L safet nanagement capability, Peleigh NC 1979 hA!'/CWh/Af 3 @[ Oh SO 5 ^lGf01112h1 ( j dbt i Y GS la corp'J is 3) on uscwpwdeg N"'t N ])y YekWPAce 675 &rflgy SU dardM h\S Issu w pgj
$fl' h NGms b,a 40 ams taa 4 w,n 05 Show +ls'r Biwswiek Yetoed 4 ofkwaje;e as&ly,(dficret;0 s 9
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I] Apnlicants ' FSAR, ER, the SER, and the ES do not nronerly include the environmental effects of dunninC low-level radio- .
active wastes oroduced at SENPP into the ocean, which EPA has proocsed a rulemaking to allow (1982). This iceue is narticularly relevant to SENPP as a special case beceuse the Stete of UC is not now a nenber of any radioactive waste disposal comoact, has no land burial facility for low-level radioactive wastes, and thus may in 1986 (well within the oneration newiod anti-cinated for Harris 1 end 2) have no other alternative means of disnosing of the low-level wastes nroduced by the Har-is project, othev than ocean disnosal.
- 3 Auplicants' and NRC's Eu and ES and SEP and FSAP dod't orovide oroof that there will be adequate radiation monitoring around the SENPP site, or that there will be adecuate indenendent monitoring to check if C &L is sunulying accuwate figures from its nonitoring to N'C, the public and emergency res,onse planners, in the light of the f acts about inadequate funding in the State of NC for such nrograms as noted in contention #1 above (incorporated herein by reference), cutbacks in EPA funding for radiation monitoring (e.g. as shown in the federel budgets for fiscal 1982,1983,198h,1985 as currently pronosed, and in CED 78-27 (U9 GAO, 1.20.1978) see np 1-v, vi and viii especially p iv and 22-23 re inadequate E?A nonitoring nextwork, i
and other relevant documents available), NC State budget deficits, and the financial difficulties of Applicent CP&L as connlained of regularly in rate increase nroceedinEs before NCUC and SCPSC (e.g. NCUC Dockets E-2 sub 391 (1980, sub h16 (1981) and sub hhh (1982) and subsequent filings to be made). In radiation, what you don't know CAN hurt vcu since tha nublic has no depend r
means to detect it or avoid its harn if accurate montpp. orang ,ent sn't theTF.
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Applicants' Cost-Benefit Analysis under NEPA is scriously [& f G82) in error because in estinating benefits to be derived from the operation of the Harris Units 1 and 2, it fails to take into account both the short-run and the long-run price elasticity of electric demand. When these elasticities are anrlied to the known canital costs of Harris units 1 and 2 (CP&L quarterly CWIP progress renorts to NCUC as of 12/31/80, 3/31/81, 6/30/81,9/30/81 and 12/31/81 nut Unit 1 at $1,999,879,000 in Sect 1985, and Unit 2 at $1,27171Ph,000 in March 1988 or March 1989 (cost not undated for 1 year delay, see Note 9 to 12/31/81 renort), a:1 data Schedule II, n.1 of the referenced renorts), the short-run reduction in demand will elininate the consunntion of most of the outnut of the units; and the long-run reduction in demand will eliminate the entire outuut of the units (or nore) from consumution.
Such' elasticities are given by Lester Taylor, Bell J. Economics Vol . 6, #1, pp 74-110. At nage 88, Taylor nresents Electric Power Research Institute summaries (Task Force 2, Elasticity of Demand, Topic 2, January 31,1977, page 12a ) showinE a rance of showtrun elasticities of 0 to -0.89, and longrun elasticities of -0.0 t6 -2 37 Where comb!ned longrun and shortuun elasticities we"e studied, the range is -0.90 to -2.10. The average shortrun elasticity is about 0.2, which is a useful value for nrojections (see, e . g. te s tinony of D"s .
John O. Blackburn and E. Roy Weintraub, economics nrofe.asors, Duke University NCUC Docket No. E-100 sub 35, July 1979; testinony of Dr. Weintraub, Docket No. E-100 s ub h0, Ma rch,1981) . Virtually all of the longrun elasti. cities given are .51 or me-e negative; the average is about -1. Of 28 studies, only 7 give values of between -1.0 and zero; 2 give -2.00 and -2 37; the rest are between 1.00 and -2.00.
P b . . ,
Although I don't intend to say that this citation is all the xartmen relevant evidence on crice elasticity of demand, it does show that there is a substantial basis in the economic literature and in the testimony of exoerts for considering price elasticities of electric demand about -0.2 in the shor t run and about -1.0 in the long run.
Further evidence re long-run price elasticity of demand was given by CP&L's own witness Dr. Robert M. Spann before the N"C in 1977 in this very docket (ASLB hearing transcript 1729 fff;
.prefiled testimony admitted as if read,1731; follows p.1731 in the record). Attachment 5 to dbat testinony uses Table h of Taylor's "The Demand for Flectricity: A Survey" Bell Journal of Economics 6, 1 pp 7h-110. Price elasticities are as follows from Tavlor: Residential, -1.02 to -2.00; Commercial, -1 36; Industrial, -1.25 to -1.86. spann's esti,ates ("NCUC STAFF" in Attachnent 5) gives price elasticities of .70 for residentisl,
.735 to -1.066 for commercial, and .1 to .5 for industrial.
To sketch the inp11 cations: CP&L's NC retail rate base,
- exclusive of Harris C' DIP, is now about $1.6 billion (NCUC Order, i
Docket E-2 sub 416, Final Order Feb 12, 1982). Adding in the Mayo plant in 1983 (Mayo 1) m1 E ht bring this to as much as $2 billion in 1985, net of accumulated depreciation. Harris #1 will have an NC retail allocation of about 75%, i.e. a $1 5 billion inenease in UC retail rate base, or a 755 increase in fixed charges. Harris 2 would lead to a fu*ther increase in 1989 of about $950 nillion h7.5%
(NC retail), i.e. a 15% further increase in fixed charges' above the 1985 level. (This is done at NC retail because I have the numbers for it. Total systen nunbe"s would be nronationately larger, but the increase in fixed charges due to Haw-is is ouite similar, almost exactly the same nevcentages. Discovery can obtain
l l
all recuisite data to put this on a total-syster basis er any other basis found annronriate for connutation of increased c osts due to
~
Harris units 1 and 2 and their effects on electrici ty demand.
The fixed charges on CP&L's present rate base concrise about 36% of NC retail electric revenues for the Comnany. Thus a 75%
increase in fixed charges above present levels (Ha"ris 1 added) means about a 27% increase in total charges to custoners. A further (Harris #2) 190h-85 47.5% increasej n fi.xed cha ges abovegxxaxant i
j levels will raise total charges to customers at NC retail by about 17% nore, for a total increase of 44% duc to Harris. (These numbe*s are illustrative of the calculation that neads to be ne de in evidence for this content' on when. accented.)
CP&L's estincte of the outnut of the Harris units is 5.5 billion KWH per year each (ER section 8, 70% DE9 canacity factor assumed).
This is clearly too high, but using it for 'llustration, each Haw-is unit would add about 16% to CP&L'r 1981 generation of about 32 billion K'fH. (The generating canability of existing CP&L nlants is about 37 billion KWH/ year, clus about 3 billion KWH fron Mayo 1, to be on-line in 1983 as now planned -- see CP&L FF7C Forn is at pp h31-h32 for 1978,1979,1980 and 1981 -- a total canability from non-Harris plants of about h0 billion KWH. ) Taking the lower figure of 32 billion KWH, each Harris unit at nOst will add about 17% to the system's generation of power.
Using Dr. Spann's estimate of .7 for urice elasticity of denand (industrial sales for textiles are actually decreasing since 1977 on CP&L's systen, so his industrial value of .1 is not used, but rathen
.5 for industry,-1.066 for conmercial, and .7 for residential, overaging on a weighted basis for sal es right about .70, which is considerably less than the values renovted by Tavlor), we have
s 66 that a 27% increaso in f&e cuatoner charges resulta in a deneni (all other f actore the cans, for electricity (sales) of 1/(1.27)(0.7) tines nresent sales, or about an 11% sales increase. However, this is about 3 billion KWH ner year, which will be nrovided b: the Mayo 1 clant already on-line before Harris 1 operates.
If you include Har-is 1 and 2 in the cost increases, th e resulting demand is 1/(1.14 ) ( 0. 7 ) tines the 7 resent sales, or nearly a 1% decrease in sales. As f ar as future demand is concerned, if all other factors affecting denand are the same with or without the Harris units, the effect of long-run elasticities of -0.7 is to cause additional power sales to vanish. Moreover, if nore realistic long-run price elasticities such as -1.0 are used for Harris' olant cost effects on CP&L sales , the result is that sal es would only be about 69% of what they othenwise would have been, due to Harris Units 1 and 2's increased costs reducing sales.
This is again true with all other fac'. ors affecting electrf cf ty demand being equal or basically similar with o* with' ut the Harris nonulatien, units.
There is no evidence daa,t Harris will affectj\incone, prices or suon11es of alternate fue(N@C1/of ls,4 weather, or conservation in such a way as to change this result significantly.
Using long-run ela sticity of -1.0 (supnorted, e.g. by Profs.
Blackburn and Weintraub as referenced above), then, C2&L sales will be ybout 69% of what they would have been without the Havris nlants in the "long run", i.e. about 10 years, which is surely less than the Harris plants ' estj nated depreciat$ on lif e of 25 years.
The Harris plants at best will provide about a 35% rise in CP&L's generating cauability for KWH (under very generaous assumptions as noted above re canacity factor and CP&L generation w/o Harris),
and the sales reducticn applied to the new generating canability cf 1 35 tines nresent gives sales of 1 35 x 0.69 or about 9h% of
o i s
-- dh b$ -
Present, due to inclusion of the Harris plants. This calculation also assumes innlicitly that the demand for the Harris plants' output (5.5 b5111on KWH/ year each at CP&L's erroneously high estimate) would su exis t in the f uture, i.e. it assumes CP&L's sales forecarts are correct (in suite of massive evidence to the centrary, e.g. CthL's own forecasts which keen being revised si Enificantly downward & have dronned from 6.7% peak Erowth per year in 1977 to 2.9% ner year in Dec.1981 projections. ) The point is that this contenticn does not in any way involve errors in CP&L's load forecast, but wather assumes that that forecast is correct and the outnut of the Har-is niants will be fully needed unless the effects of price increases ix for electricity caused by the inclusion of Harris plant costs in rates
~are considered. Once &.ose faz cost increases are considered, the market for the Harris plants' output vanishes.
+ IS U N L )g)
It should be noted herein that naking more realistic assunptions end calculating cost-benefit for only 2 units will nake the costs f ar exceed the benefits. For example, the first 2 units, according to Table 8.2.1-1 page 8.2.1-3 are $1.453 billion and .63h billion in 1984 dollars, for a total of 2.087 billion 198h dn11ars.
(Realistic estima tes as of 12-31-80 give $1.8 billion 198h $ for unit 1 and $790 million 198h $ for Unit 2, as noted in contentions
((4 lb on unrealistic assunntions in the cost-benefit analysis, incorporated herein by reference, which gives a total cost for 2 units of $2.59 billion 198h dollars). The In st " benefits" (power produced by units 3 and h under CP&L's overly generous 70% of design rating for lifetine unit caracity factor) total
$3.505 billion by CP&L's own calculations. With Unit 2 on-line in 1989, the project life is still through the year 201L , or 30 years, so the change in the levelizat$ on period won't make much difference. ,
The result is that you lose about $3 5 billion 1984 dollars of benefits (power production), but you only save 1.554 billion (CT&L's plant cost est of 3 321 billion for 4 units, p . 8. 2.1-1, ninus the cost of 2.087 billion at CP&L's ER estinate for units 1 and 2, source given above) in costs. This nuts the project about $2.2 billicn in the red at CP&L's estimates. If the 12/31/80 CP&L cost estinates for Harris Units 1 and 2 are used in 198h dollars (source is CP&L E-100 sub 38 filing, cuarterly CWIP Progress nenort as of 12/31/80, filed with NC Utilities Commission, Feb 1981 --
see also NCUC Docket E-100 sub h0 where this was made an exhibit) cs above, you only save $731 nillion in costs by canning units 3 and h, but you still lose about $3.5 billion fron the benefits in nower sales clone, putting the nro ject nearly $3 billion in the red.
- f, '
Anplicants ' cost-benefit analysis in sections 8 and 11
- [$~ f of the Environmental Renort (ER) is deficient and inaccurate, as detr tied later. The use of outdated, inconolete and inaccu-ate i
information in this document filed with NPC leads to a question of why CP&L failed to use more up-to-date information available to it, e.E. the plant cost estimates filed with NC Utilities Commission pursuant to Eocket E-100 sub 38 of that Commission (Quarterly CWIP Progress renort of 12-31-80, filed Feb.1981) sinilar estinates filed with FERC on Form 1 for 1980 at page 406, the fact that CWIP charges are in die NC rate base for the Harris units per NCUC Docket E-2 sub 391 decision 'n December,1980 and are thus costs now be!ng l
paid by NC rateonyers, and other material facts noted below.
This contention's data and information will be incornorated by reference into contention 3 concerning whether CD&L's f ailure to use accurate, connlete and up-80-date infornation to comuly with federal law (NEPA) is a natter of inconnetance, dishonesty, or both, and how such failures reflect on cpi:L's ability to connetently manage nuclear construction (and its record-keeoing and material centrol and QA/QC), or an operating nuclear plant, and how truthful and forthcoming CP&L has been to N9C and to others about nuclear management, plant, desiE n, construction, QA/QC and operatinE faults, deficiencies , violations and failures.
Partial detail of inaqcuracies and deficiencies in CP&L's cost-benefit analyn{sf hqW be W Those .
known months prior to 12/18/81 docketing are asterisked -- by known, I mean CP&L had the informatinn and hed officially filed it with sone other regule tory body, ow got it fron public records, orders, decis4.ons etc. of such a body, or other nublicly available information sources.
-gg -
COSTS Should include CWIP on; Harnis noction of $213,79P,000 allowed in o NC retail rate base at a fixed charge rate of an,rox.17.h% in NCUC Docket No. E-2 sub 391, Dec. 1980 decision of NCUC
Future CWIP filings with NCUC, e.g. Harris nortion of $500,000,000 (anprox) applied for in NC retail basbx in NCUC Docket E-2 sub hhh in January 1982.
cShould include Harris unit #1 at actual cost estimate of $1,999,879,000 as stated in CP&L's NCUC E-100 sub 38 filinE with NCUC Feb.1981
- and adjust to 198h dollars aonropriately fron Sept '85 intervice date.
(At 8% per year, CP&L's cost escalation assumption, ER sec 8.2.1, Table 8.2.1-1 cn nage 8.2.1-2, items 1 and 5, this works out to a 1.25 year backward novenent in tine to average 198h dolle s, or dividing the 9/85 fiture of $1,999,879,000 by 1.1016 for a value in 1984 dollars of right at $1.8 billion. This is about $350 nillien more in 198h dollars than the estina te shown on nage 8.2.1-3 as the " Total Cost" of Unit 1, $1p35,523,000 which the Note innediately thereunder on that page states is "The total noninal dollars exeended as of the in-service date were nresentaworthed to 198h".
O Should have used the 1984 present worth of the Shearon Ha"ris unit 2 costs as stated in the above-referenced CWIP progress renort to NCUC as of 12/31/80, adjusting that unith 3/89 PW of $1,271,184,000 by the anoropriate present worth factor (approsinately 0.7 for h 3/h vears which brings the cost back to the 6/84 in-service date used for Unf t 1 in these amtmmf ED calculations), leading to a result of about g7.1 i A
$890,000,000 in 1984 dollars rather than the $63h,502,000 given W'
\
l
. . 1
- 7o - '
- Shott1d have included inte-est during ennstruction at a higher insterest rate than 8%. CP&L has stated in nune-ous rate filings Nith UCUC that it faces bond interest rates above 1k% during 1980 and 1981. An 8% rate through 198k including 1kg in 1980 and 1981 would imply that construction interest would dron to cbout 2 to 3%
per year in two of the years 1982-8h, o* that inte est "ates in those years will average about 1;$ to 5% per year, absu"d conclusions which CP&L could not support if they had any financial sense at all.
- Should have included the construction or rental cost of the Harris visitors center in the costs, since its operation is included as an intangible.. benefit. Certainly the co'st of nroviding a benefit should be in a cost-benefit analysis. Omiss' on o f this ite7 su66ests inconsistency on C3&L's pcrt in comparing costs and benefits.
(Should have updated the Hav"is construction cost estinates to reflect costs of delay in Har-is 2 to 1989 and cancellation of Harris Units 3 and h, ar.nounced Dec.13 or thereabouts, 1981. C"&L obviously knew it was going to beb.g this action to the attent'on of its Ecn&d of Directors for action in December 1981 and could have nrepared new cost estinates and provided then as a pronnt amendment to the ER cost-benefit analysis -- unless we are to assume thrt the C"&L 3 card acted without considering the costs, which is hardly sound or prudent management.
Should have included in the cost-bnenefit analysis cost estinates for avoiding the construction of the units 1,2,3 and 4 by neans of l
load ma nagement, energy efficiency, insulation, reflection and shadinE in lieu of air ccnditioning, etc. This is an obvious alternative that nust be considered under NEPA (even with resnect to --
ccqnleting uits already under construction), as is clearly shown by CP&L's
- /- .
choice to cancel units 3 and h of Harris in f avor of load managenent end conservation programs. Failure to analyze an alternative actually chosen by Anp11 cant CP&L (Annlicant NCEMPA is forced to concur by its contracts with CP&L) is obviously a failure to properly use cost-benefit analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Failure to include costs for thEt alternative likewise violates NEPA.
(It should be noted here that NRC has attenpted to exclude such alternatives by rule . N90 has, however, no authority to overrule NEPA. And the arbitrary and capricious nature of the rule change is obvious from the above -- Auplicants are left free to consider and choose conservation and load management alternctives to nuclear cons'truction if diey (CP&L, or other utilities) so desire, but NPC attempts to bar its own Staff, Intervenors, Petitioners and the ASL3s from considering whethe" such alternatives can be preferable to construction. If such alternatives really do not aonly, N"C should also adout a rule urohibiting anplicants from cancelling or defe=ri.nE construction of nuclear plants without NRC annroval where the reasons for the def6rral or cancellation include no need for the nower, or better and/or cheaner alternatives. In the event the Board chooses to exclude any part of my contentions under such NRC new rule, I hereby ask the Board to certify the question whether NRC can obviate N EPA and leave Applicants free to choose to take actions which cannot be considered as alternatives in NRC proceedings, e.g. cancelling or deferring nuclear plent construction in favor of alternatives like conservation and load management, for appeal to the ASLAB and the full Nuclear "egulabocy Commission. The broad implications of such rule and exclusion for other licensing cases are obvious, as is the likelihood that knuclear construction may still be cancelled desnite the rule, but only at Auplicants ' option, crejudicing the rights of other parties.
I
COSTS continued "
f2 --
- Anplicants ' ER makes no mention of the costs of nuclear waste dienosal as a cost in its cost-benefit analysis, though it does include such costs as a " benefit" in its calculation of per-kilowatt-hour charres to customers . (Table 8.2.1-2, page 8.2.1-L , line under " Fuel Cycle Costs" for " spent fuel storage /disnosal"). Nuclear waste disuosal costs should be included as costs, at nore realistic figu"es than 1.? mills /
- Anolicants ' ER cost-benefit analysis does not include land removed kwh from other use for use in permanent nuclear waste disnosal from the Harris plant.
for nuclear waste d5snosal costs, Aoplicantsa should w etup use it.)a higher Hzo number (Mry$ ew&hr cow 2.I m.tt /kw) for example, DOE'sjnumber is f7788le mills /KWH (see ref. in Konanoff, Power % paganda, p. /O fobtnote E ) and include the amount as a cost Anolicants cost-benefit analysis assigns no value to the lives lost in uranium mining, nuclear fuel cycle otherwise, radon enissions fron nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear olcnt operations and accidents, and nuclear transoort accidents and nuclear fuel disposal. Indeed, these lost lives are not mentioned, nor are any numbers given as to how many persons are exnected to be killed or injured by the effects of the Harris plant, its fuel mining and crocessing, tailings disnosal fron uraniun mills, radon, mill tailings accidents, etc. over the 11 million years it will take the nuclear fuel to decay to the same radiotoxicity as its parent ore, once it has been used in the Harris reactors (ref. Prof. 3.L. Cohen, for 11 m'.111on year number - 3 6 6 hNSq Y 0 US fW (NdL){ )
Since these health effects will continue for at least this long --
as excess deatha due to the existence of the nuclear fuel cycle for the Harris plant, which would not exist absent its operat&on , they must be included as costs in the cost-benefit analysis, and as intagngible factors (which should also include genetic danage) er the long run.
~
COSTS continuod 7bb~~
Auplicants should have used more accu-ate data on the health ofrects of radioactive emissions, short and long-tern, e.g. those provided by John W. Gorman (Radiation and Human Health,1981, see, o.g. Chapter 8, pp 266-288 & Tables 19-22; Chapters 9,10,11; Chapter 12 on internal Emitters pp 417-h28, re beta emitters kl7-18, alpha-cmitters k19, gamna enitters h20-h23, tritiun up 425-E28; Chanter 13 on Radon daughters, ppk29-h68 in its entirety; Chapters lh,15,16 on olutonium hazards; Chaoter 17 nn $21-55h, Table 53 on n.551; Chapter 20 on induction of leukemia by ionizing radiation, Chanters 21-22 on congenital and Eenetic effects of ionizing radiatfon (up 707-853).
I really can't summarize out the nost innortant narts' of this detailed book much better than this -- the entire book is relevant to cost-benefit analysis and radiation effects); Franske et al (NPC translation (see figs 1 to 5, tables 1 thru 6) 520)4 showing that AEC/NSC tables underestimate untake of radioactive material in the ernvironnent by factors from 10 to 10,000 tines due to fraudulent research conducted by AEC for political purposes to minimize the perceived dangers of nuclear weanons fallout; K.Z.
Morgan and J. Rotblat, bulletin of the Atonic Scientists,
); cost estinates for radiciodine releases in a nuclear emergency by L.R. Solon and K. Rosenberg, Bull At Sci October 19811 pp5h-56 which are $10 billion 1979 dollars (89,991,000,000) for outpatient treatment and followun following an accident releasing 10 ren/nerson of I-131 and I-133 to the thyroids of Bnillion nersons.
This is a cost of $125/ person-rem to the thyroid; the 1000000 nerson-rem per year of " technologically enhanced" radiation dosse to the oublic, principally from uraniun mining, found by the Interagency Task Force onIcnizinghgdiationfortheyear1978(ref. Low-LevelRadiation, Just How Bad Is It? Science, p.168(?), 1979 by Jean L. Marx , where the IATF also gives 56,000 person-ren from the 50 GWe of nuclean p wer then in place, per year, at 170 (cony attached)
Costs cont. k-CApplicants inproperly e7clude the co st of the 230 kV power lines she Harris-Fayetteville, Harris-Cary Sw.
from Harris site, e.E. Havris- u boro, Harris-Erwin South, fron cost analysis for the plant cAonlicants inoroperly exclude the cost of the following 500 kV power lines fron Harris site, Harris-Harnett and Wake-Harris.
cAnplicants underestinate the 198h dollar cost of the Harris to other no'.nts transnission lines, in that the right-of-way costs in 1985 (E-100 sub 38 filing as of 12/31/81)' exceed s1L nillion.
The lines thenselves, of course, will cost sonething. M5 ik ose. CO5ts 3ltavId alsa ba \A)c W 6 L, l
l l
l r - --, ,,
- ]Y h " ati in encountered on the job may e.nu
- atom Nimb wrvivors and rhet among the cancer comes from a pielimihary .s va Jhabsah may h.ne died cf can cs other .
Ila: ford w o:Lets. Atom bomb bl.nts t hat of the causes of death of nten who !
i th.m c.meer betine iheir mahrnaneses be- prishwe a lot of radio. active ifint c.eme apparent. Ottier work h.n shown may be inha!cd and ingesied wh thus. worked at the Portunuuth Nasa! S' hip.
ch yard whese nuckar wbmarines have i that people who are declopmg cancer, Stewart thinks that the leukemi.n . heen repaired and refueled since 19.9 especiall> leukemia, whieli was 15e hast descloped early in the sunisois, ma) h., l carwes to desclop in ewcw among the t he stuJ). wl.ich w:n tarried out ! _.
h.ne newlted fsum weh inteinal ra.ha-atom lvmb uns nors, ase moee suscep. t'am. whereas the whd tumors, whih Ihomas %ianar:. a, phydeian who wm then at she Itoston Unoersity Senool of tible to o her euines of ifcath. No esi- deseloped 1.ater, may hase resulted from Medicine. 'I hc6dore s
siense suggesting an ancreaseil de.ith rate the esternal ra.fiation. 'I he ll.mf.u d Medical School, and a group of rrponers ,
~
Isom cauww other th m sarwer in Ihe workers have not been e 5 posed to r. wins-from the llosion Glohr. w,;gested that atam. bomb wrvivors h.n turned up, aetne dust the was the .oom Nimb wa- there was an esceu of~ eecer r deaths b.m es es ,
Stewart alwi suggests .
reason why visors were. am.m;; shipyard workers *ho had centact leukemias weie so nominent among the Another indication that low. level rasfi- . i The Sources of Ionizing Radiation I i
tion to aceclerate its program to reduce unneccuary ex. !
Natural usurces account for much-about 50 percent- posures to medical and dental radiation in order to m of' the radiation to which the general population of the mi/c the risks as rnuch as powihte.
I ruted States h esposed, according to the ErmronmentalRadioactive fallout from nuelcar weapons tests is the
- l'ioiection Ageno. lattle or nothing can be done to mmi-thiid largest wuree of radiation espwure.. but it repre.
me/e esp w m e to thh natural background radiatism. wnb only about 3 percent of the total Most of the fallout l'M5 a'mt roughh one third of which n in the form of cosmic rays pro le,6cd by llX weapons occuirrJ betwecit mates m id 1%2 when the testmg was casrwd out in the atmosphere.
sommg m hom outer spase. The semainl er ongur mium ding wimees web as depwits of minerah, nc u Since the Alminpheris lest l'an, Ireaty of 1%) went into
.m.! ph.npl.are ones. that contain raihoaethe compments. cifect. the United St. ales ;ind the So6ct Union have tested Some ofitie tadina.ctoits mas turn up in common buihlingthen weapons undergroimd. Ihew tesh have released httle ,
matessah, gianite and brick, foi enunple, or may make its l'allout mio'the atmdsphere. Ilut wme of the radioasthe llut the ayer-w.n into eu. art. wates, and thod suppliet matenah in tal lout. including strontium 'Al and plutonium ace esposuse to an instn idual from natural indiation hotopes.aie estremely long hs eJ. Materiah releawd f rom .
som ees h see) ha. a total do.e of about u.1 to 0.2 the atrainpherie tesh are stil1 present m the ensironment sem pee scar. and in our Isidies. Mareover. so me countnew no.ahly ,
\ledical and dental pioecdures constitute the nest larg- China and laba, still occadonally conduct weapons tesh est sa.hation wuree. the) contobute about 40 percent h of in the atmosp. h ere. The doses of radiation recched from the total espware of' tho general popidation. Most of th fallout sar) .with geographes A h>c'.stion. fwple thing irn.
icomes trom the ow of diagn wtie and therapeutie A-rap. mediate!) downwind fron the* test sites uwally get the larg-w uh Ihe remainiter attributed to Ihe use of radiopharmaecu- est doses but weather patterns can carry the radioacthe ticah. Radiopharmaceutieah concentrate in specilie organsmatenah for long distances and they are now spread user and ph f ph) sicians infor mation about the clinic.al condition the entire globe.
of those organs. Ahhough the average exposures of the general U.S. pop-Nicibeat and dental radiation h the largest block of radia. ulation from natural radiation sou:ces are sery small. hu-tion subiest Io human control. Although in use h generally mau aciivities can greatly increase the exptwurss of spec conddered to proside benehh th:st outweigh the thLs. ie groups of people. The actisities include the mining lleahh. I'ducation, and Welfare Secretary Joseph A. Cali- poccuing of ores, uramusii oxide. for example. Mmers tano has necentt>' detected l'ie I inni and thug Admmhtra- and mher workers carrying out these activities and peop thing near the mines and procewing plants are exposed t.au i Aumaics of the radiation esp %mes of the Lt.S. generatlnghyr pip. rmhatjon dosgg that the ge iegal ps puhnion. 'l his ut inini lltita on ia.ltatum estusatrs as senttnt.sti/ed by the Inici- ..technolog . cally enhanced natural radiation" aemuna fo agina lask ibece on Ioniinw Ma hauon] aheut 2.5 percent of the totallimnan expowre m thh wun-penum.icme per ) car tgy.
Nmree On thousands) Another wurce of radiation exposure n the use of nucle ar enesgy to produce electricity. Most of thh expwure o.im concentrated in the workers producing the nuclear fuc Naim.it eu. L gioim.t 17.im lleahng .ms 1.ono and nmning the power plan'n. People living near web fa intmosos.eatt> enhaneca ities are espowd to fewer dosew t .uon ni t .uin l'inaHF . ""ne consumer paiducts enut scry low leveh
.Iiut u.163 radiation. Ihey include luminewent chack or watch diah I)esetopment,is img. an t pn tuenon 36 Nn. tea,cosigs h contammg radmm, wme LinJs of smoke detectors cofo t'onsmnei pinhish tele ons and the glaw used for making eyeglawew
-3. l .. M .
" reiw-, cms" are s.ast. tis <a by - a.ptong st.c so:.a numrx, or tvA esrs. sed hi shew mew inao.Ju.J doses m scias
.N -D G ..
l 1
~~
B"NEFITS -
- Applicants ' ER fails to consider the cuestion of whether the full power output of the SHNPP w11'1 be saleable.
. *Anpifcants' EP assumes a .70h DE* cacaheity factor for the full lifetine of the units , ignoring the fact that no In"ge Westinghouse PWR had (as of 12/31/80) eve- achieved such a lifet!ne faconcity factor to date (large PWRs being 700 MW and over, CP&L's turnkey unit Robinson
\
2 havinE the highest lifetine D R CF ?N at 66.5% as of thatI44VSQ date) b e *Analicants ' ER ignores ~ th e- . of stean generatorgrenairs and reolacement;, C ' N
=O 2Nr"' " Wi : ::&
- m? C-- vr-on the olants'Jelectrical outnut. These effects are large and negative as : shown by the record of suci olents as Surry 1 and 2, E ykth OhGh % Q44- STCum jegafG[WS Turkey Point 3 Q,- and the recent (wint of 19321-82 xperienee, laQ yg of 2 Duke Power Company's Oconee 1,2 ands/ani 3 unitthe (c uroblens -w
.gaw mes &a y p ,f h?ut R&-W, CP&L's Robinson q 2 unit had in sumner 1981, resulting in a limit Apo,# cpg,g, of 50% tiower level until this winter, and a lin't of 75% nover level h
~
at present, innosed by CP&L.
(cana city f actors)
The 12.31.81 lifetime DER CFs of the above units are ao follows (NUR'Ti 002,0;- Vol 6, No.1 of Jan 1982, le test one I have and I subscribe to NRC's doeunent service to get it):
Oconee 1 56.8% (38.6 for the year 1981) 2 60/35 (66.8, ditto )
3 6h'.6% (72.5, ditto
' Robinson 2165.6% (57.1, ditto
--scheduled stean gen. renlacenent, 198$
1985 Surryl 51.4% (34.2, ditto Surry 1, 2 and TP 3 include stean
.2 $3 3% (7h.1, ditto . generator reulacenent
- Turkey: Point 3 59.5 ( 15.0, "
4 6h.8 (74.2, "
. )
N '
Anplicants ' ER ignores.-the effe::t of steam generator design problems of WestinEh ouse nodel D steam generators, e.g. at V.C. Sunner nuclear plant (very similar to Harris according to Harris FSAR), Duke Power McGuire units 1 & 2 (McGuire now limited to 50fr nower by NSC u
ataff order -- Harris has Westinghouse+
model D stean~ generators too
r pr d / tf d fh Aeolicants' Cost Benefit Analycia (given for h units at pc.A6 SziFPP arrt? , it. Section 11.0 of the Environmental ReDort (ER) at f pages 11.0.-1 and 11.0-2 and detailed nore f ully in ER section 8. ,
chows that by CP&L's own figures and assumptions, the costs of the Yur41v
% hm SHNPP (as quantified in dollars, including wages and salaries) j" ".
& tts exceed the benefits when the plant benefits are assumed over the sane j period as the costs are calculated, as shown below.
Therefore, kN un'$er the National Environmental Policay Act (NEPA ) construction should be halted immediately so that no more money will be wasted on an uneconomic project which by the calculations of its prinicipal owner has flunked the main test of a cost benefit analysis as recuired under N MWWW N UWf0fstSF h
NEPA. $yyaw Q.CSkaad -Sydhty? w.tw1.hbtyb bdosj!Jg g $g$g.id.,Gd4
}qg % hyy t j' # y(0 WiIh M According to CP&L (ER, Sec.8, Sec.11)
All figures in 1984 dollars
- Asterisked are converted to 198k $ @8%/yr g[h r%J3#fM.g-f, d #
- 'S o
escalation rate wr ich CP&L gives in Table -
8.2.1-1 of ER, lines 1 and 5 COSTS BENEFITS
$3.h0$ billion-*Pta,_pt, shh
&trans lihes, yard EF 8.2.1-1 Power 22.08x10 9KWH/yr p.8.1-5 $2 sics /wrIOy s 25 yrs (p.8.2.1-1) 3 967 billion -fuel ER 8.2.1-1 $ 7.010 billion 1 360 billion mother'O&M ER 8.2.1-1 Cons tructio n Payroll & Induced Spending (8.1-2)0.966 billion
~,
/ Deconnissioning, Operating Payroll
, Sh2.1 to 51.8 million & Induced spending per unit, 1978 $, (p.8.1-2) 80.753 billion ER section 5.8 0 329 billion *PW'd to 198h $ Taxes 1981-90 0.092 billion
- at 8%/yr, 1.59x * (PW at 8% to 198h of 97.5 million
' ; Higher nunber used over 10 yrs 1981-90) sinco higher nunter p.8.1-6,8.1-2 also used in tax Taxes 1991-2016 0.191 billion
- estimates, see p. *(PW to 198k of 25-yr series of R21m6rmfi ER, 8.1-2 uniforn cayments $31 million each)
This is ^also the p.8.1-2, 8.1-6 cost of method now ulanned,;see NCUC
- Docke t E2 sub 416 where CF&L put these costs into NC rates. TOTAL 9.012 billion $
9.061 billion 3 BEN 91TS TOTAL COST
-- Of course, the construction and onerating payrolls will be less since units 3 and h aren't going to be built. Taxes will be less since Units 3 and h aren't there to be taxed. Fuel cocts will also be less, as will other O&M, but since nost of the savinCs by not incurring these costs occur out in the last 27 years of the period, less than half of the 1984 dollar value of these itens can be saved by canning units 3 and h. Soecifically, the present worth factor for all these costs is about 68% (noving the costs back from 1989 to 198h at 8% per year escalation rate or time value of nonev). The result is you only save 68% x 50%, or 3h% of the fuel and O!:M taxes 14812-90 costs in 1084 dollars. The same factor should annly to em 41,9f u ouyst:i@e:Ob operating payroll costs, and a s'.n41ar one to cons truction payroll. On taxes 1991-2016, you save 50% since these we-e cresent-Likewise for deconnissioning costs. worthed to 198h dollars for all h units equally.pDitto for switchyard & lites. The result of all this, at CP&L's assumntions: COSTS 198h dollars BETEFITS
$2.59 billion Units 1 and 2 Power (70%D"E CTi ' 505 billion
.Oh2billionswhchyard& Constr Payroll 1.038 billicn lines (1/2 cost) & induced effects 2.957 billion fuel Opy Payroll &
0.898' billion O&M other than fuel Taxes 1981-90 0.060 billion 0.16h deconmissioning Taxes 1991-2016 0.096 billion 6.651 billion TOTAL COST TOTAL BEN" FITS h.796 billion benefits a or gQ excessofcost$vertore picst G t ad tkffesek,ekSes <ox $2 billionssts A Correction for the onissions and errors not included hereg ag p g 4 but out into contention (6 and incornorated here4.n by reference ' will sinoly tilt this balance even fu"ther into the red. Therefore> d&u// the Harris nroject f ails the basic NEPA c&t-Nnefit test in the OfYH rY' light of new information (cancellaticn of units 3 and h, and the M plurs ber.c, j factors and errIs incornorated herein bv reference) cer the W1 vert Cliffo dmimigra 414 9 FE llof af II1P,
, analyses end
# L7 The ES, ES and RER otherAd ocuments herein a~e der'cient~
in not taking inte account the fact that, i n constcnt dellcrs , the cost of Harris Unit 1,and Unit 2 even nore, will cont
- nue to rise as shown, e.E. by C. Konanoff, POIF9 PLANT EKI COST E9CALATION (1981) as summarized inanz sections 1.1 (3,h,6),
1.2,13 and section 2 (Chanter 2) therein). Taking such constant-dollar cost escalation into account will tin the NEPA benefit-cost balance further aga'.nst SHYPP on the basis of the new data and analysis in the work of Konanoff and other nuclear nlant cost analysts. This cost escalation also increases the likelihood that Unit 2 wil? be cancelled, therefore this cortention is incornorated by reference into contention $hO re the likelihood of cance31ation of Unit 2 and considewation of that likelihood under NEVA.
# fh The FR, E9 and Annlicants' filinEs # 9n"0De"1" exclude the costs of renairs, modifications, disnosal of nuclea" waste including wovn-out steam generators, lost nove" nroducticn dua to power restrictions, and the enviro, and social-econonic imnacts under NEPA or radic ti.on exnosure to stea~ generctor insnection, modification, repa' r and "eniceenent nersonnel, ac radioactive waste disnosalji of stean generators wovn out or unusable before end of SHMPP's onerating life as Annlicants uro ject it, whether in f act such disnosal will be allowed, and if nog the enviro. innact of longnterm storage of the radioactive effects and steam generators on site, and othe",41 ssues resulting from the defective design of the Westinghouse model D stean generators (Gec. Maxwel] of KRC says ther are Dh 's--FsAn doesn't Vibvd say in so f ar as I can find) at SHNPP with s'nila"Qpe nroblems A(hW' to an d cc- os'on n-oblems S.G.'s at McGuire, VC Summer, 91nghalc , A1xnaraz , ote . A
79 in view of the facts (a ) that s' nee SIP 7e? is not "et eneret'ng , the ention of removing, r enlacing, "edasign* ng or rena* "ing (S.G . 's ) the stean generatons in it in orde" to avoid sa' d vibrttion, cor*asion and other design eroblems, e .g. by "etubing the stear, renerators with tubes le es subject to co""osion, e.g. sta'nless steel tubes; othan me a s ure s to veduce hvibration, co"rosion, cracking, nitting etc of tubes includir6 hoovier wall thickness in new tubos installed; etc. have not baen considered and comnewed to using the defective ".G.'s in niace (b) the consequences of a long-tern limit to 50'I newer one"e ti on are not fcetored into the liEPA co s t-benefit 'onlunce yet McGuive, built & run by CDuke Power Co. a nore co petent util'tr than CP&L, is still under such a li :it thru July h,1982 & cont'.n-uing; the consecuences of a recuired shutdown to nedify or renlace said S.G. 's with defects like those act Mcguire 's S.G. 's or a shutdown "en.uired for safe +" con =ecuences of dete.rioretion of SHNP3 S.G. 's from co"~o sion, vibration, sheet buckling, failure of internal sun-orta er tubes, pitting, denting and accumulation of dexposits inside the tubes , nassive 6ete"icration of S.G. tubcs during shutdown on ot h e"w'.s e (e.g. es tf:t T'E-1) or are inadesquately have not been considered f n the cost benefit balance unde" NF"A,
# h The FSA", SEP, ACPS re" ort 0.L. stage and othe" decunents re SENuo safety & health effects & accidents are deficient in not adeoustely address *ng t Qmgg # G gevibration, extremely ranid corrosionaam tu be ng 20k of thbekness in g 2hgccm hr corrosion eguses of fa lure, e.3. oo bM,p p M codWcnd othe" 3 u#tMcaus s and potention the
- NQ, a nt boun and overheat'ng tvansients (e.g. ATWS, reactor trin), on the release of r edioactivity in a LOCA caused o" cenounded b- ult'ple fa*1u-a in the ".G. tuben o" tube sheets, and en
_ to cool the core wi.th nassive leeks
gD *
- M It is likely that Shearon Harris Unit 2 will not be connleted, considering (a) the cancellation in Decenber 1981 of Harris Unite 3 and h by CP&L in favor of load managenent and conservation accordinE to CP&L (b) NRC's cun estinate delivered to Congress that Unit 2 would not be built (referenced by Environmental Law Project, Auplicants and NRC Staff already in this docket) (c ) CP&L's continuing difficulties in raising the necessary canital for construction of power plants as
- 66 , sub 391(19Eo) shown by CP&L testimony in,e.g., NCUC Dockets W-2 sub 35t1 (1979-80),
E-2 sub h16 (1981) and E-2 sub hhh (1982), narticulcrly the testinony of S.H. Smith (President and later also Chairman), VP Lilly, and others -- particularly noteworthy in this regard is the fact that before Harris 3 and 4 were cancelled, CP&L naintained in Docket E-2 sub$ h16 that the Company would need $6 billion in the ne:rt 10 years to finance new construction (1981), see Application E-2 sub h16 and testimony as referred to above. In Docke t E-2 su'o hhh, filed early in 1982 just after the CP&L connany cancelled Harris units 3 and h, the Company again states (Anplication,p.h that $6 billion will still be reouired over the next ten years for new construction. In other words, cancelling Harris 3 and h lef t CP&L in just as nuch financial difficulty early in 1982 as they were in in 1981 before Fws octwrw b D c ceiling those units, according to CP&L)(In the sam (e)iten(I2o)f ther2py Aonlication, CP&L gives its peak demand growth rate as 2.9, per year. ) p 7d)there exists a substantial surnlus of base load generatirg capability on the CP&L system with total busbar costs well below those f of Harris 2 -- see, e.g. Eddlenan tectinony urefiled in NCUC Docket i No. E-100 sub 40,1981 (Exhibit Eddle=an Renort in the record) (e) CP&L's load forecasts have drooped from 6.7% per year growth in neak demand (1977 -- see Scann testinony before ASL3 in this docket for CP&L, Tr.1729 and following) to 2.9% per year as _ estinated in December 1981 by CP&L. There is every likelihood thai
I g 1 Apolicants ' load forecasts will continue to decline at a sir _ilar rate, for none of the conditionas affectinE the decline, such as rising electricity c osts , increasing use of conservation and load nanage-ment techniques, increased efficienty in the us e of electricity, substituticn of alternative fuels includinE wood, wind, hydroelectr$ c and solar enevgy for purchased electricity from CP&L, increasi.ng co-generation of electricity by industry, etc, shows any sign of abating in the CP&L service area, much less of changing so as to effect the downward trend of load forecasts significantly. (f) There are already feasible on the CP&L systen additional conservation and load nanagement entions the Connany has not nut into effect which would, at a cost of less than $1 billion, renove fron CP&L loads nore than twice the neak outnut of Harris unit 2, and nore than twice its estimated generation at 70% DER canacity factor (ER sec. 8, e.6.). See Eddlenan testinony in Docket no. E-2 sub h16 and Docket E-hh before NCUC in 1981 for details; that testimony and table 6 is incorporated herein by reference to detail the options and their likely savings. CP&L did not cross-exannine this testinony even thou6h I was recognized as an exnevt in energy conservation and in energy systens. h5 In the light of the above information, and other inf ormation I believe CP&L is concealing concerning nlans to cancel Unit 2, which can be develoned on discovery, e.g. hiring consultants ve cancelling uhits 2,3 and it in sunner 1979 or near that time, internal memoranda, etc. , the ER and cost-benefit analysis is deficient under l NEPA and 10 CFR 51.21 in not taking i nto account the likelihood of I l cancellati on of Harris Unit 2 at C"&L's option, and the costs and benefits of the oroject h without Unit 2. The data on Unit 1 cost, couoled with the data on benefits filed by CP&L in its "? as corrected per cententions l( and /6 incoruorated here by reference, it
~~
______-_ m ~
is cicar that consideration of the likelihood of cancelling Unit 2 by CP&L's choice also tilts the cost-benefit balance of the Harris project further into the red. In the light of the cancellation of Harris 3 and 4, and of other units such as WPPSS 4 and 5 which were much farther alonE in construction (anprox 25 and 35% comnlete, I believe) than Harris 2, the cancellation of CP&L's South "ive* nuclear unit:: in 1978, the cancellation of Duke Power's entire 3-reactor Perkins nroject early in 1982, the cancellatior of Surg 3 and h and of North Anna h by VEPCO, etc. , it nust be cient that nuclear units which are the last ones to be built adcording to the ph\tMS N S$htChDr) current /Geduleareparticularlyvuln@21etocancellationhere in the VACAR subregion of 3(!RC. The extensive nuclear deferrals and cancellations by TVA in 1980-82 are further evidence of this acknSee % % Cf FIES Umde fact. This is all information avails.ble now/that cannot be ignored 65 in an operating license ER, EIS, gor cost-benefit analysis under KEPA and Calvert Cliffs. Refusal to consider the likelihood and consecuences of CP&L's cancelling Harris 2 will be a fatal defect in any cost-benefit analysis of the harris plant because Unit 1 has a cost in 1984 dollars of about $1.8 billion $versus about half that for unit 2 Cancel unit 2 and you save only 1/3 the construction costs, but you lose half the benefits (electric nower and operating salaries and taxes) in essence. Thus any likelihood that unit 2 nay be cancelled by CP&L weighs further against the SHNPP project in cost-benefit analysis properly cond6cted under NEPA and 10 cFR 51.21. CP ^l&h>N 11 S f' Y Y ,
# 522 %% A}'OS -
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I 1 S3 l g [ If Harris plant construction were tern'nated a innediately or as soon as practical, this action would enable CP&L to conserve electricity in that if the sunk cost of the Harris construction to (Exh. II .1, 12 31.81 CP&L CWIP prog =ess renort to NCUC, Feb '82) date (about $13 b 111on) were pcssed on to customers in rates, demand for electricity would thereby be reduced significantly over the amortization neriod due to orice elasticity of electricity domand. (The data on nrice elasticity fron contention /N is incor-porated herein by reference for snecificity as to the sources
& general availability of such evidence. )
Since using CP&L's data (contention 5INd thereon is incornorated herein by reference for its informatic nal content) the Harris plant with only 2 units has a net cost-benefit value of about minus $1.8 billion (excess of costs over benefits at CP&L's assumptions), and correction of the errors in CP&L's cost-benefit analysis undo" NEDA and Calvert Cliffs would nake this figure even larger negative, it is clearly in the oublic interest to ston construction now, thus liniting the losses to the oublic at large and to the Connany CD&L. This contention, however, focuses on the electric energy conservation benefits of terminating Harris clant construction. Amortization of the Harris 3 and !4 units is now being sought by CP&L from its retail custoners in NC (NCUC Docket E-2 sub 14h1, 4 prefiled testimony and Application) over a 10 year neriod with i the balance carried at CP&L's fixed charge rate in terms of charges to customers (i.e. earning after taxes at the Comnant's overall fair, rate of return). This fixed charge rate is now abcut
- 20.0% as can be calculated from the NCUC Order in E-2 sub 416, Final Order Feb 12, 1982. Anortization over 10 years at 20% carrying charge results in an annual charge to ratenayers of about 23.85%
l l of the original amount ($1 3 billion), or about $300 million ner year on a total system basis. About .7 of this is NC retail, l or $210 nillion ner year increased charges to custoners.
- gy-CP&L states in its Environmental 9enort, Secti on 1, that it considers price increases a means of causing ene"gy conservation.
Indeed, it's the fi"st one CP&L mentions. (See also the FPC forn annended to section 1.0 of the ER), Since CP&L believes that urice increases help conserve enerEy, it is wholly appropriate to consider the energy conservation effects of price increases resulting fron Harris plant cancellation (assuming those costs are d2arged dirough to ratepayers as CP&L desires, see E-2 sub hhh referenced above). The conservation benefits fron plant cancellation can be had at less conservation cost than thej'bencfits j from znxatramt6ng the electricity nrice increases from constructinE and onerating the $arris units 1 and 2. To illuctrate the calculation that needs to be made in evidence under this contention, the effect of the price increases from cancelling Harris 1 and 2 is about 20% over 10 years (NC base reta.'1 revenues $1 billion, 1981, for CP&L, annroximately$, with anortization costs 8210 s .20 million ner year as derived above). The result in a 112 x-0.2 anproximately or Rh% reductionA J i n electricity sales in dae short run, and a 1h% to 20% reduction in sales in the long run (long run elasticities
.7 to -1.0 approximately, CP&L's and Blackburn-Weintraub xxx evidence respectively). Now, the benefits can be readily calculated as the fuel saved by these reductions in sales (plus savings in variable O&F.).
Tkhe fuel saved will be either oil or coal. Coal costs less, about 1.9 cents /KWH for CP&L at present (Jan 1982 F&O report to NCUC,p.20 line 52, using heat rate from FESC form 1 for 1980, 10,170 BTU /kUH), v. so taking the savings at 4% of total generation the first year, f .+\ g; steady at 4% through 1985, then rising linearly to 20% in 1990, pi and assuming the nriceJtW of W4b coalMin90constant yws/DS Mdollars bd.C# d goes QC.C '.not decrecse,f\C W%r&T1%=f the savings would be .6h x 1.9 cents x 32 billion KWH (CP&L gen. 1980 & 81) Le Hews N6L-GO or about $389.5 milliod$$esent-day dollars, reducing the cancellation loss 's present worth to only about $900 nillion.
\
o hh
# 22,In addition to the cost-bener t errors alleged, deficiencies and mistakes and inconnlete renorts to .be corrected ae set forth
#S IS fbDR W CLff0Med bf fe fe&ce % MdC8&lf in other contentions h6 rein, the followinE contention in addition is set forth with respect to the costs and benefits of the filed 1Lte Mar '82 Harris Project Units 1 and 2, reflecting ER anendment 2 which first becane available at the Wake County LPDR on 10 May 1982 (af ter that LPD3 was closed to the public, nyself included, May 3-9 1982, as alluded to in my nrevious requests fov extension of time to the Bocrd):
(A) CP&L's Amendment 2 fuel cost estimates in Table 8.2.1-2 as amended are erroneously low, as ave the fuel cost lifetine estimates in section 8.2 as amended and section 11 as amended (all in the EP). (B) CP&L's estinates in the amended section 8 of the ER that the payroll at the Harris plant and the construction nayroll bcsed on only 2 units for itjwill not be decreased by an: significant anount, conrnred to the construction end oneration of all b units at the site, is not accurate. Its credibilit" could qualif" then for a section
- 8. Either the estinates filed December 18, 1981 with the originc1 ER (0.L. Sttge) on these matt ers , or the ones filed in Amendment 2, or both are in error, raising c uestions of CP&L's connetence, accuracy and good faith that bear on nanaFenent canability, as well as matters that need to be corrected in the ES and heard before the Board to achieve a prone
- balancing of costs and benefits'(the Board should hear (A) above and the other itens below for the same reason),
as anended , benefits (C) At Table 8.1.1-1,4CP&L connutes the East of nower production from the Harris plant in 198h dollars to be
$F80,387,000 for 5.5 billion KWH (based en 70% Canacity Factor DER). This is 5.1 cents /1:'JH (198h 3). Yet at. Table
. 2
-hb-8.2.1-2, CP&L conrutes the cost of p<wer production fron Harris, levelized 1985-2013, as 78.58 nills per KWH. This is 7.858 cents per KWH. This latter estinate includes cuestionably low fuel cost estinates (conoare the original EP calculation, oven 32 as onposed to 29 years , giving a nuch higher figure for fuel cycle costs), and erroneously high Capacity Facter estinates
(&O DER) as well as assuning thet each unit will o,erate 25 years when in fact enbrittlenent of the reactor vessel (raised reference temperature for nil-ductility), ria'ng levels of radioactivity in the reactor niping that make repairs inoractical fron a radiological standnoint (".g. as at Dresden 1, shut down early 1978, possibly renairable by untested solvent flush by 1986), or other safety or maintenance nroblens such as enbrittled cables for cower, instrumentatien and controls , connuter failure (ICS) or other uroblens can and w311 adversely affect the Harris clants ' service life, holding it below 25 years for any unit. A realistic estinate on these noints would show the cost of nower generation excecdin6 the benefits, when all costs including that of nuclear waste disposal (hgigh and low-level) are taken into account. (D) CP&L's 1985 dollar cost estinates for Harris Units 1 (which were in 198h donars) and 2 essentially confirn nine in the other contention (s) on cost benefit, which were nade without knowledge of this anendment
- 2 which c ontains rame.
i (E) Taking into account Anendnent #? to the ER and correct'ons required by this and other contentions concerning costs and l benefits, the net present_value of Harris costs still er.ceeds the net present value of all benefits fron it by about. 2 billion. Therefore construction should tern'nate as soon a s voss)ible to preclude f urther losses, the cresent investnent be.t.nF_a lesg,7 3a g _
-h2-
# Benefits and costs of Harris under NFDA, the En and the ES have not been oronarly calculated in that Trble 13-1 of the ER, at Txhia Page 1.3-3, shows that a 3-year delay in both Harris units, on the basic of CP&L's most cu=*ent load fevecast, results in a 32.1% reserve (far above the 20% needed) in 1992 (and using CPUL's ferocast, one can calc ulate that reserves would then remain above 20% until 1995 o" ltter -- see, e.g.
CD&L 08-h3 TD ing with NCUC, Mar 31, 1982 at Toble 1, vight ecl. ) Fu-ther, the fact that connanies such c c AVC0 have been selling bulk nower to VACA9 nenbers contradicts CP&L's clain (ER 1.3) that such nower will not be available to neke un for anv lack of CD&L reserves in the inte vening yearr. Purchased nower will cost less than SHNPP's 8 cent /KWH at busbaw outnut.
?,ble 1.3-2, e.g., shows VACAR reserves at 20.0% o'r hirher through 1992 with both Harris unitt delayed 3 years, and at 19.2% or higher (not significantly below 20%) through 1980 if all h SENPP units were cancelled (or "indef!nitely costnoned" On the bacis of the nost current ' rformation, such a s the (i.e. powe" outuut) above, the" benefits"of the Harris clant a e not naeded for at lesst 3 years after construction on the current schedule, and thue h correct calculation of costs and benefits would discount the benefits by 3 years at 8% to 10% (discount rates used by CP&L in the E", e.g. 9.5% escalation on Har-is cons +-uct'en costs), resulting in a discount of 20s to 25% in the benefits in 1985 dollars (on other constant dollars) since the watenaye s fu11y,3 vea-s begin to nay the costpbefore the plant is needed for. VACA' or CP&L by their estinates (best cu-rent estimates).
W.* When this errer is accounted for, the UE"1. cost-benefit
*M %
fyt%f balance is even more against Herris ope-stion. It is imo"te.rt f, to note that this contention does not involve eny allegation CkCJks"} of load forecast evror, but adont 's CP&L's forecast as cuw ent ay ,ff u ..
-9%s 89 - -
- h} General statement aopliceble t all oth er c ontentions re cost-benefit and the Environnental renort: "he An,licants ' IP and cer.t-benefit analysi:: fail to conoly with 10 CFR 51.21 in that it described d'o c s not discuss the extent to which the same natters themxmd in section 51.20 (CP stage environmental report) differ now,nor does it discuss accurately and up-to-date the new information M11ch is now available as to costs, benefits, environnental effects and other natters in the cost-benefit analysis and ER in addition to that discussed in the FEIS for the Harris plant (dating f ron 197h) in connection with the construction termit, succifically the 66l% 0lof GI h WIbDnt@k, biological monitoring $4 meteorological monitoring, aquatic and wildlife monitoring, radiation nonitoring, plant constructicn costs, fuel costs, nuclear waste disnosal costs and land reouired, "adiation exnosure to emnloyees (e.g. fron steam generator insnection and repair) and contractor ennloyees, new information showing increased "isks from radiation and ingestion of radioactive naterial, e.g. NFC translation 520, NRC translation 161, Gofman, Radiation and Hunan Health,1981; Mancuso-Stewart-Kneale studies of low-level radiation (1979-80),
opinion of Dr. Radford, Chairman of 3EIR Connittee re reducing occupational radiation exoosure limit to 500 muren/ year Der person; costs of emer6ency and evacuation planning and training imnosed on other co viunities,' costs of leasing , building and onerating the Harris Visitors Center, more accurate data on actual nuclear canacity factors from Westinghouse "W9s,e.E. as shown in NU VG 0020, Vol 6 #1; actual costs of oower lines being built to and from Hannis site, and new estinates therefore, including land co sts, as shown 5n CPAL E-100 sub 33 filing tith NCUC, as of 12 31.81; plant costs as shown in that sane filing; etc. as detailed in other contentio / h , hlINj Qved incorporated by referency, and that the ER, FEIS, and SER (the last 2 net existin i ely take these matters listed herein
G-f
#}_{Shinnentsoffrei snent nuclear fuel to SHUN? fron Robinson and gaunswick nucl ear pla nts, s/nich Aunlicants have reouested the necessary licenses to do, is inimiscal to the connon defense and nctional securitt in that such shinnents ovovide an excessive numbe o f te*ro*ists using arnor-niercing nortar and cannon (P0nn and un) shells, naecis*on-guided nQnitions and guided and unEuided antitank wea,ons (in-cluding armor-nie cing ones, 3SBT TOW missiles etc), high exnlosives including olcstic exnlosives and/or shaned cha*ges that could be attached to a cask once it Pad bean innobilized, e.g. by machine-gunning (o* vith rifle or semiautomatic rifle fi*e or s h o +- un fire) the cab, tires, radiator, driver (s), guerd(s )
on the waste shionent if by b truck, or b* blowing un a stretch (or by using disabli.nE Sases, noisor gases, c= hal'ucinogens or d*ive s, of rail or loosening a rail te cause a derailnerMend also (spert fuel) guards,lW
**uckl doing any of the above acts to Eaf n a ccess to the wusteAcents'ner trc'n and by doing any or any combinat! cn or all of the above acts, perser.nel ,,r which are well within the canabilf ty0Te cnall g*ouns o* te*rorists connrising only a handful or individuals (as few as 1 o* 2 could use nany of tnese means), brecchinF :ne snent fuel contairer and releasing radioactive nater* a) t- the atmos-here, water of rivers and streans, and E"ound sur*o unding the locatinn of the snent fuel container, endangering the health and safety of the nublic, harning sane, and radioactively contanineting major hiChways o* rail lines in easta n NC end in South Carolina. Applicants ' security clan is inadequate to urevent the above scenarios or one of daen fron occu rinc.
' Anr altznmatixnxtan.tMaxmitcatinnxn:cb:tdskaxnztrecTusiria.hd
# j[( (The description of how terroricts can b*each a snent fuel shionent and harm the public health and safety thereby, frc n 13 the contention4 above, is incornorated heref n by refe ence. )
TO An alternative of less environmental innect than snent fuel shionents frcn Robinsen end Brunswick to Harris needs to be considered, both because of NEPA and because of the unwarranted risks of terrorist activity nosed by such shinnents which provide nunerous almost indefensible targets over long routes and a lon6 neriod of t!m.e for multi,le snent fuel ashinments. Suen alternatives include re-racking of spent fuel (including the use of noison rods made nroof against breakage) snent fuel consolidation (with anuronriete neasures against acciddntil criticalitv, c and/or 4 e= all alternatives he"ein), .exoans .nn it of on-site spent fi el nocls at Brunswick and 9obinson and any other reactor from which snent f uel might bc shi,ned to the Harris site. A further alternative fo= Both Harris and the othe" plants referred to above is t o stowe al l waste (spent fuel) on site for the onerating life of the nlant, and then out it all on one, extrenely well-guarded and concletely unpublicized) unit train for shionent to a final renository, if one exists then. This alternative as suggested by Dr. Marvin Resnikoff of CEP and othern had the advantages of lettent the snent fuel's heat and radioactivitv decay, ove" a ne"iod of many years for nost such snent fuel, resulting
- n less risk to th e nubli c fron eithe" terrorisn o= ace! dents in transnorting the fuel both for the reason of less rad
- onctivity in the snen fuel on terr attack and bc:ause one unit train is less subject to accfden han a la ge nunber of train shinnents or truck shinments.
NEPA requires that such alternatives be fu11v co ns. idered in the ES. They ere not, at least not accurately. I.nd the ! ER discussion of scent fuel transnort is whob1; inadeounte in that it does not consider these alte" natives whigh___ _ _ - -_ - _ --- -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
97 I reduce the radiological risk, te=rorism risk, ard /or cest and/o" environnental innact of snent fuel going to and from the Harris site. It i s nrt enough to say the ir.nacts fcil within Tdble S-4 linits -- you have to ser whv, nrove it, and also nrove that other alternatives are not anvi~onnentely superior under NEDA or sunevior under the connon defense and nrotection of nublic health and safety cs stated provisions of the Constitution 3and 10 CFD 2 Anpendix A VIII (b)(6).
/
# 1h Tne storaEe of spent fue] fron Brunswick, u nbinson.
or other reactors at the harris site would ba ininical te th e common defense and the nublic health e nd safety in that it would nrovide mo=e radioactive naterici to be "eleased bv a te"vorist attack on the snent f uel building at Har=is, which Annlicants' security nian does not assure would not succeed in breaching said building and "aleaning $ ts radioactive centents into the air, wate", and s u"woundiac land area, nerhans also ; rendering the Harris units inonerable due to radioactive contaninati on (e.g. the cooling towers night not be allowed to function if their draf t was lif ting red'occtive os=ticles from a breached snent fuel building into the atmosshere; i contanination of uiring and rocns inside the plant (e. . contvol y roo7, nuxiliary buiding, night be too servere to ba nractically t l cleaned up or removed so that oneratorn and others crrld sr.fely work the"e and ue"forn their necessary functions to assure the health and saf ety of the nublic in nlant oneration under an onerating license and/or USC rules ) The neans of such a nentioned terro=ist attack include use of the weanons in the centention2,4 2d above this one, "e scent f uel shirmen' tev=crism.
#.[f The ES is defic 5 ent in not considering the' environment 91
innacts o r terrowism againt snant fual in transit or stoved (as detailed, e.g., in the 3 cententions above this orc) at ShTo? , the innects of other te rorism agains* the niant with conventional and/or nuclear weanons as detailed in otha" contentions herein (the means vheweof and a11eSed iMnPCts th6"6Cf and who night do it being i ncor7ovated herein bv *eference). It also nust consider the sociological innacts of such te"=ox"isn and the threat of it , en the basis of the effects therecf on the nublic (and not in connarison to worse threats, e.g. all-out nuclear war, but in connarison tn the no-nlant alternative and not issuing an onerating license or license (s) to transport and store si,ent fuel at harris) in considering the costs and bene fits of SH1:PP unde" 1TPA.
# Petitioner centends that Annlicants' reauest for such licenses as necessarv te shin snent fue] fron 3"unswic't and Robinson (fd identified by their Do" license nunhe-s in the Annlication) te Harris and store x it at Ha"ris should be denied because such "ec,uest is overly bacad, vague, unlimitad as "egards the amount of fuel te be shinced to Ha**is or transshitment of f uel from other reactors to Har"is via "obinson and Brunswick as stom.ver or tennerary (even for 1 day or le ss ) stora g ocations, n,t snecific as to the licenses requasted or their conditions, does not sus,17 sufficient infornation in the Rpelicatior, E9 or FRAD to evaluate the environmental and socioecononic innacts of such spent fuel transoort end storage under KFPA, fails to snecify or consider al ternatives theweto under NFDA and their environnental and socioecononic Kinnacts, is ininical to the connon defense and the nublic health and safety as noted in the 14 centertions direct 1.7 above and othr.rs nentioned the"ein, L . invites arbitravy and canricious actf on bv the Bor.=d, and is
42.*he r", Tc, cro, end oth e- se #c'm -ale + c d +h ' a~s 4 r c'.ud'rg SH"PP technical specifi cat'ong, filt c= ca abil' ties , ability of gaseous radwaste systen to Nf gp radioiodine released fren any or all gaseous release noints of SHM?? design or from within the r auxiliare building (where ther could get b~ failure of xiaksi containment penetra tions, e .g. by enbrittlemu.t o* dissociation of seals en sane nade of exnosy cr "VC letting radioiddinec through in a nrascurc surge ( e . g . f ro r. H2 e v."1 sior. l . of sinnly by leakage once released inside containnent e.g. by stean generator tube failuacs or oneration of n= essure-relief vc1ves on primery systen) are deficient in that ther: A. Fail to take account of evidence of Takeshi Seo , G. Steucek, Stuecek, Health Dhysics hl, Aug 198} 3=uce M01 holt et al (sca e.g.goutlineof"c1 holt tes t* nory, U. of M.ssouvi, M111s e-vd.11e I-131 datt 3/16/81) showing underestination of radionuclide exnosure, esn. I-131 and otbe" rediniodinas nt TVI, velezae, P o= no*e ordere of nagnitude (u- to 6h000 Ci) be tohd U"C 's ad-ission of radiciodine release ct TMI, and the hvnothywaldisn, thyroid nodules, thyroid cance*s and other h-alth effects resulting the efven, n9xtr-xczunzte B. Inaccurately estimates the annunts of radiciodines to be released in Class IX accidents at SENPP based on the above and other evidence (e.g. NRC Translation 161, Nrc Trans 520). C. Underest$ mates the radiciodine releases in normal onenation and the health effects thereof. D. Fails to orovide neans, such as potassium iodide nills or cancules, readily available tn citizens around SHNPP in the event of a radioiodine release. E. Feils to nrovide neans to snecifically identifv radio-4.odiras (e.c. r"a9.?uwe-ioritatiar monito-s on e21 synnu gaaeous release with backun monitors of sinilar canability so that
radioiodine *el eases ct anv time can be tronntiv identified and assessed for mEnitude, esnecially when thunde-sto ns or othe" means of delivering such radiool eniss5ons in less dilute form than assumed by nixing nodels used by Annlicants, NRC or in the EP and TS, te exoosed nersons, or when nersons are nearby (e.g. on the lake at SHNPP, if CF&L's unswise & unsere plan to ellow recreat!onal use of sane (E? sectinn 8, e.g.) goes into effect) and nay be exnosed due to inversion conditions in the atmosnhere, wind natterns from the release noint, rainstorns, thunderstorns, or other neans including snow falling tnrough the plume from tne release coint. F. Fails to orovide means of tranning radioiodines from any release coint, once released there, to orevent sane fron injuring the oublic health o" safety, or killing nevsons. G. Assunec e*roneous conclusions about "adioiodine effects on fetuses and 'nfants, such as was demolished in cross-exan'nat'.on of D=. George Tokuhata (Tr 20,099-20,136) as noted in iten 1722 of Pa=tial Initial iecis6on bv AELB in Ti:I reste-t hearings, lh Dec.1o31, and ignores or insufficently conside"s nove accurate conclusions and data, e.g. that of Gordon MacLeod (see, e.g. Anbio 10:10-23, 1931, g ysk Seo, Naul Nuclear Engineering 26 #3, lo79) l H. A13 ows oneration of SHM'? wih+.out eo.uinnent able to reEi ster actual radiation levels being en'tted (see, e.g.b 6 i lack of pressurized ionization detectors or eo,uivalent, and monitors off-scale, cnd N"C not hav'ng TLD's on site tilz 3d
~ daly of TMI-2 accident, all in NU"EG -0600) & delivering same info oromptly to the oublic, energency planning personnel, radiation nwotection officials of State of NC, T"A nnd H90, and others for their use in nrotecting nub 1".c health & safety.
# M N9C's, CP&L's, /.nnlicants ' . State of NC 's and fede=al energency resnonse niens for Harris a=e deficient in that they and nrevide neans te cone withknrevent dancre frc-do not take account of the notential radiciodine releasers no*ed $r the "" avion = enntentior, do nnt "-ovi de the enui" ment, data, nronnt notification of nersons at risk, vadiation nonito*ing data hneluding continuous snecific " cal-tine "eadings of actual anonts of radioiodines being released fron SH"P7 th ough norn91 release noints or from other nenetratiens of stamx containment which nav leak)which is necessaryto nake nrennt decisions to protect the health and safety of the nublic, do nnt assure that active and effective notassium iodido nrenarations (
nhzarnaceutical) 2"e in the noseession cf nercons who might be affected by such radiciodine releases at the highest magnitude exnerienced at TMI according to T. Seo end other work, for their prompt use as uculd be necessary if radio-iodines were "eleased into a wind of the cveraga site snaed (above 7 mnh, see E9) within 3 hours for a) 1 nersons within M milas oc cHuro, $ n +h e - lume na th W cb 9' cht be nnv direction (see the almost cincular wind rose of SHNto site, ro) Within 90 min for those within 10 miles of Shun?, and within 7 hours for those w3 thin 50 niles of ShTPo, all such nersons recuiring EI as descaibcd above in their nossession innossible and at all times SHyPP is one"ating because it is imp"actical to deliver it to them within the tir.es noted above wherein a radioiodine release vnuld reach those ne" sons, na"ticularly. those wo-king on nlaying ou+ side buildings. Work crews, day canc cente"s, school grouns, schools , hosnitals , orisens , jails and other such Erouns within 50 miles of SH9P" nust also ba nrovided GIN
-V9 % C P W5t ( yt.4C b with KI as specified above to potect their menbensjfno, radioiodine health effects in a release fron SHNPP,
// f An711 cants' burden of orncf in this case includes nrnving that FRC Otaff is able to, nas and is going to car"y out its resnonsibilities under the rule s and the AEA to assure the health and safety cf the nu'lic and accurately assess environner-tal and solcoeconomic er'ects (including nsycholoE cal i stress) under NZ"A.
Vetitioner contends U"C *staff seeisnote not below able tofor assu"ek nere nees assess and car"y out the above func tionsf with "es"ect sc SH":3 n"obably /\ for at least one and xxxxthh all of these reasons: e.g. fron '&L, the nuclear indust"", Congress,Deagan (p) ?PC Staff is unden great uressu"efto turn out licenses fr.or nuclear nlants ranidly and has nume ous 0.L. n",licatinns before it; lacks sufficient ste'f te . fully "eviev sane in cccord with the above law, rule s & resmonsibiliti es ; is unable te a ttra ct or retain the mos t conce tent staff due to 3 owen nay i ncreasen, lower no" ale associated with Fovernment service now due te e.g. nublic & nrivate downgrading by the A dninit'"at' on (Penge.n 's ) of the "cle and construc tive ou" noses of regulatory a gencies, RIPscndbudgetcutsatUUCandotheragenciesnoworin* < H ISl4'e Coyfech4 m u m iiipp future does not hcve adeounte procedu es and steff to 'dentif>"1 design, com,truct'on and other errors in SHMPP and the other c1cnts under review sinultaneously koYh by df rect insnection snd checkingr.x of modcle , c alculat! ons , nro je ct'.ons end "eco"de in all cases, as show by the debacle at Diablo Cen"on (sea,e.g. b6LS Partici Initini Decist on in the.t casex, Julv 17, 1981, iten 3 at n.1, iten 12 at p.5, and note 1 at p.3 whe"e the seisnic and Class IX issues were effectively dismissed, due 'n pant to N"C Staff's failure to detect any of the nore than 100 design evners affecting sane issues thct we"e subsenuently identified (see tenth seninmonthly status renort - aecseht toMn WoA bE[m k/Of y liarris LoDR per NRC 1;/7/82 at Apex NC) or to/ a;ccurately _ consider the innac8 () % l v k G"A o i woVrof such erro"s eMwworv as%NRC
#s .h e c smrcStaff
~*w nad e Afound.
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+v c F + 0s 1H 42- l G M r%"" N *"G4 @ h Y co m e, 0 .
(g) NPC staff nas a history of c ollusion with An,11r cants 4 fo%> onerating licenses and othe" licenses including the suncrese'on ##% 9 o i fo tion and views within F'C Staff that nulicants' /J A plans, designs , equiement, persennel, and onerati ons are or
%N '
y will be deficient c= inedecuate to nrotect the nublic health and safety; use of ill-oualified analysists , reviewers and witnesses instead of retaininE or hiring well-qualicied ne" sons for these tasks; deleting or withhold'np 'nformatior " rom Menbers of Startjg onin' ons ASL3's and the nublic including facts andj infornation which sunnovt or tend to sunnort the nositions of net $ tieners/inten venors ; evxmxmdme collusion with annlicantn .n, e.g., rehearsing c=oss-exanination of N"C staff witnesses by annlicants' attorneys with anplicants' attorneys and staff nresent arid narticinating ! n such rehea sal; edontien of An-licants' nosition on issues, due te collusion w/ or innrone" contact w/Anplicents, all of the above be'nE shown, for exannle, in testimony of Steven Sho11a:7 and Bob Pollard of UCS to XRe mer.be=s of US House "nergy & Envirenment Subco rtittce, Middle-town Da, 198P, documenting how the N90 Staff's " mandate to protect the nublic health and safety has been shunted aside". Petitioner believes that Annlicants must prove there is no such and has been nc such collus'on *n an" of the above 9inne*s or otherwise with N90 Staff in connection with this esse.
- such resnonsibilities 'nelude rosonnse to TMI ner PP"G -0660 and -0737, review under Nu"EG-0880 and-08n0, it LA C/)assuring Vefo conn].iance u 1&v4s br Vd re letsers with all matte =s *n 10 CF7 2 App A VITI(b), an d 10 Cro 40. 4 , exp4,. .
10 CFR 51.21, & other annlicable rules including all annendices to 10 'CFR 50 and all of 10 CFR 50, Adn'nistrative "rocedure Act, and regulations recuiring troner conduct of Staff, e.g.10 CFP zero.
-f -
Ear-in ,
- jlThe emergency resnonse ulanning for the nlant is deficient in that it does not take into account accurately and fully, and it does not nrovide means of ureventing, tbsorntion of as gases, liquids and ,
J radionuclidejperticulates into cutus and open wouhds in the skin of nersons exuosed to radionuclides released fron the 1 plant in an accident, including absorpt'.on and dissniving into the bloodstream or Ivnnh or intercellular fluid, adsorntion and denosition in the yound av cut, reteired withing the bodv during and e f te" healing. Such nersons as hunte~s and fishews nec- cHFPP (within 10 miles, and nerhans uithi.n F0 or 100 nilas ) who had accidentally cut themselves, nersons injured 'n cuto accidents du"ing an evacuati on, nercons inju*ed in othe" ways who cre at physicians' offices, ene"gcnev "coms, hosnitals and othe-medical f t{lities around SENPP in the a"aa desc*ibed above, or on their way to such f acilities for treatment, childnen and students and others engaging
- n ninv or sno-tc and sufferine cbrasions and cuts therein, being uitnin said area and e x osed o* notentially exnosed to the ulume or liould vadionuclide "elease (e.g. snill into SH 1ake, swin,ers in 'the lake or in rivens d=aining the"efron),
are not adequatelv protected from the effects denc"ibed above, which can significantly increase inte~nal denosition of radionuclides unless n11 medical and treatment facilities in or outside the LP2 which nar be called on to treat evacuees or nevsons exnosedi-o radiological enleases. as above from SENP? have annrouriate detectrors for ' adionuclide contanination, decontamination couinnent and mate =ials and training and traied nersennel in a deoue.te numbe=s to den 1'
-fk-with the number of nersens exnosed, bandages and othe" meanc of enreventing radionuclide acedess to cuts and onen wounds, notentially radiologicall or."one d and meanF to ensure t hat all cut o* wn"nded newsons/peceive pronnt and effective treatnent cnd nrotection(includ'nr decens tanination) from the rad.'.cnuclides above in a relcsse f"rm SE"PP.
(3) the nlan does not assure that those who nam bc cut or wounded within the a~eas as neted above M: ewe they may be exnosed to rad' ological releares from SENPo are (1) wa"ned of the "isk of radiocctive cor tamination fro a "elease, esn. to cuts and ununda, a nd th e me9n.* nc of ve"n'rF **gn'lF, "'"r"9 etc cod other neans of notify
- ng die, when such a "clense ocou"s; (2) nessessing the .eans and materisls to shield and n"otect wounds and cuts fren exnosure to vedionuclides whetha" ai" borne or waKr te" bo"nc or na-ticulat es on gases, na*ticularly cases such as Kr-90 decayin6 to 53-90; Xenon isotones decaving to Cs-1367 and Cs-13h, and all othe" radioactive gases "elecsed from PHrFP or nresent within it which could be released in an cecident, which decay into solid or liouid elements uithin a half-life of lens thar 10 days and thus are likely to , if a'so"ted or casjjbed as gases within- the body, bacone na-ticulates or solids or licuids therein and be rettined as irternal enitters.
(3) hcving n"omnt assistence, neans and naterials to do samc for them if they are not able to do it fo" themselves b "easor of inju"v, disah414tv, 'ncommetance, "m'P"detint o" otbe" wise, includirg nanic and nsychological stress incamacitation o" shoc' .
# The Es and E7 and FSA9 take fnsufficient account n' the self-ionizi n6 abili ty of rad'onuclides decaying b" beta decay, f([
resulting in increased denosition of same nuclides on ra"ticles g5 p in the air, s u"fa ces in homes t nd build! ngs , Veh! cle s , ' skin , god peg ( and hunan lungs, % -food, (cnd in othew niaces) whe"e ther c an be d_M4-
- toD - ' # l3]Jyupding f'or cdditional legal, exne"t witness, stud ,
research, conying and other costs of n;"t? cineting in this proceeding snould be nade svailable to netit! one-s and f.nte-ve-nors in this proceeding whenever cnd wherever al. lowed or authorired by 1 w or court decision on either or both, and n onptly, so that said netitionews/inte" veno s can fulfill better their role in these hea=ings which is to develcn a sound record e.g. by litigatinr issues of 'n ortance te the environnentc1, soicioeconomic , radiological end hre] th and refety consdauences of SHIPP plant oneratico end cecidents at it, including ener6cncy nienning measures and niant nodi-ficatic ps to reduce the probability, innact, consecuences and effects including syncegistic effects of accidents and trantients and dete"ioratinn or corrosion (e.g. of steam generator tubes reactor vessel nd-ductility tempertture rising) of nirnt ec,uin nent and surnorte therefore, and assurances tha' the 71snt has been constructed 'n secord tith NnC -ules, arolicab3 a codeg, the c onst-ucti on ne- .it , etc. (It hLsn 't due tc uce of unoualified weldinE etc personnel, Ca/Cc fik failu"es like wc16 insnectf on on nine i hange"s and snubbe s on safety-related pining, etc. ) and ths t e.nd problens with the olant, deficiencies therein, E"e co rected in a tinelv and adecuate nanne" to nrotect the ervi*cnnent under NFPA and the health and safety of the oublic under ATA. This is na-ticularly necessavn for FHNP? because Annlicants have used (vs. CCrc and W.ke environment et the CP stage) their large financial and legn1 rescurces to nrevent valid j safety, health and envirennental issues from being heard, e.g. l by flooding intervennrs and their attorneys with legal motions (T.S. Erwin can tell you about it, ~ atty for CCUC -1972--77 otc )
[0/ by using frivelous discussion e.nd legal motions to nrevent intervenor witnesses frc.n testifying fully (e.g. A.B. Lovins, c wktthk4eShy witness for CCUC,1977, who had to catch a clane, wl ose time, see transcrint, wes taken u, greatly with such discussion and with nrolonged and ineffective -- excent in wast!nE tine-- voir dire), and bv generally onnosing, in collusf on with U"C Staff or b' thenselves, xx;r attemnhtc have insues heerd that affect the environnent or the nublic health and safety and are nroner in this nroceeding. I also recuest encronrinte extens'."ns of time be rwanted ne (eso during the 2 years from filing ti.is sunnlenent until hec ~ ins, uten delayn due to such extensions w'11 not tfPect the he ar'ng schedule or the possibic licens.'.ng & oneratf on dates for Harris 1 cnd 2, o" for Har"is 2 as annronvinte ) to resucnd to such flooding of leEa1 notions and recuests, and attenpts to opnose the inclusion of issues centended herein fracr. in the hearings to be held on this license to operate SriFPP and othe" licenses (e.g. rad waste storage and transnort of scent fuel to Harris) reouested by Arrlicants or to be recuested later by Aunli. cants herein. fSL 1 regursF f JRC Steff add ks twkus k grude ass <skdce
% the IN ve~ .sf oikag b such Ocham % F9ph caah as cleswkb l ts+ed a Laos certMg ek<ph cah le j +/ma tlui de cads o%;gg d ctk de cu wts' <vecessq fW s ad vespases o a o ha 1, (tr spe) h cais & fiv .sw h v1%< ass,1tae +
l (Mred o v a rlowe d N 9We o< Wh o ,GS bt&Lf CWe reywekv-iv % ehhiwerM,g'jarite"&
[ h [ ~~~
# h The ES and SED a"e delicient in not 'ncluding and evaluating the effects of "Clas s X events" which, in contrast to NRC's C1 css I through Class IX accident classification, are those events (includinE nelting of the'snent fuel tool, twd[gr i
blasting the suert fuel pool's contents into the atmosnhere 8 r9. lo g re d 5 M . Pool l 9 ora v.,m Rskw;veelM 4&ed with high exxnlosive PGM's, arno"-piercing nunitions or Oh W%J rockets or the like through breaches in the fuel hendlinr buid-
.ing created by sane or by shaned charges, clastic exnlosive, dynanite, TNT or other connercially availebale exnlosives or exnlosives (e.g. nlasti c ernlosive ) that can be svnthesized by a good chemist, which skill could be found (or equivalent skill levels) in a numbew of US and Euronean terrorist grouns, e.g. Weather Unde"grcund, Red 3rigades, and also the PLO and the governments of Libva, Argentina, USSP and its allies, Cuba, etc) (and also includinE sabotage, terrorism and othe" ccts aEninst the reactor, i ts engf.neered safety sys tens, heet sinks , heet "emo val sy stens , stean generators and nrfmr_*y systen, and the containment, by the means desc"ibed above e.E. AR-1.C rifles, g rcNdt3 WA pas (ega M and using weanone or gases (noison, disabling, ha lucinogenic) b to disable security and plant nersonnel o~ get by then to do d:2q these things nececsery to breach containnent and "elease as nuch as possible of the core inventory of radionuclides to the atmost,here intentionally, whether during a refuelinr3_
outage or dur'ng normal nlant oneration (there beirs easier accress to hhe reactor for saboteurs on terrosits or both d,15@ ( working as contre ctor ennloyees during and outage)) [ l
# ,s Annlicants' Secu"ity Plan does not n" ovide neans M to Lggo Co#[b fde kyt'd relie.bly exclude terrcrists and saboteuws fron contractor gg work forces at the SiiNPP during refueling as noted nbove, du"ing repai~s and during steam genevator irsnect".nn & repa _Y
, r -
O ? O * ! (D 0 < all 'or which brine ,o" can bring large nunbers of cc ntracto" cersonnel ontp the SHN?? site and give nany of then access tc the "eacto,5 building containment, fuel handling building, and' ot'hir oarts of the e ite where at any of these niaces acts of sabotage and terrorism endangering the nublic health
' ~"
. (e .g . closing feedwate" .ve.1ves , orening block and safety, fron ninor disabid nEgf safety-releted acuinnent valves )
3
'u5 to and including the Class X events descri6e'd in the above contenticn. Applicants ' security nlan is insufficient to guard agains?, detect and prevent all such acts of sabotage and terrorism as referred t'o above, by centractor personnel on SiiNP? site. It alco does not orevent saboteurs ahid terrorists inciv0* ng agents of hostile' forei n Egove"nnents and ,te*rorist organiza tions, disaffected 'forner CP&L encloyees, me'ntal entienta +
or those who have mental diseases or defects such as nawanoia,
~
negalonania, schizophrenia ete which can lead such hewsons to connit iraational and destructive acts such as the se described above y in this and the inmediately above contentinn, fro
- ga" n'.ng encloyanent with contractors dceing work such as noving snent ts s
,c fuel during refuelin6, transnorting snent fuel, insnecting 3
and/or recair;6g etean generators, and thus es'ning access
- l
[ to the- SENPNd te . wnare they con do any of the abov.g acts s that l endanger ,the health and safety of the nublic. 3 Contrary to NEPA, the'ES and S?" do not give full and
;s,adeouate consideration to Class IX accidents and Class X eventes l s (as defined above ) .
Anpendix D of lo CFP. 30 (s'.nce deleted)
- only exennted the Annlicants fron discussing Class IE acciden'h
'r.thei- M.'
It did not and cannot (nor een any-othew r=C wule
; valid}y) ' exzenot the Staff or the RR ES or SED frcn considering sanof or the" Class $X" events described above, none of wi.ich s s s, i
e
- ( O LI -
could occur absent the existence of SH'?P? and are certainly to be included x as "=isk to health and sefet7 on other undesirable zrr; and unintended consequences" under NrPA. i NEPA requires ~1n pertizanent part that the agency (NSC)
, produce or use in its review of SENPP or any project under the
}1ct (e.g. license to move snent f uel tn SHNP" nr store same there )
-" a detailed statement . . .on. . . envi wonnental 4.mone t of the oronosed act'on." in the c ontext of UrPA, " environmental
-<innact" of SHUPn meand whatever it is about SEN"" that che.nras,
- . clashes with or affects the " natural environnent",11.e. the enviror. ment without SHUPP. Since the risks of Class 9 and
' nmediately Class X events as desc"ibed in this and the above 2 contentions are not port of the natural environment in the zone of inte"est "around SENPP or in Festern NC away f rom CP&L 's Brunswick ulant ,
' it follows that NFPA reoui res a " detailed s tEtement" on the
" risk to health and safety or other undesirable and unintended donsequences" of SHI?PP unde" " EPA . There effects do not have to be "likely" under NVPA since the "likely" environmental effects annly to degradation of the environment, no+ to risks of a ccidents .or "odaer" undesirable and unintended consequences" which Class IX and Class Xevents certaf nly f all uithin. The Act does not. (& could not logically) say "likely risks" or
" likely accidents" s i.nc e i f a risk or accident i s likelv, it is an effect .or degra dati on.
Moreover, the eccident ct TMI-2, and considerable studr ; 1 on nuclear olant terrorism, terrorist attacks on spent fuc1 shinments and'nocls, etc. did not exist in the 1977 C.P. hearing and have not been nreviously considered in the EIS and FTS of AEC on SENPP or the CP decision and hearing. L The 1 C1.2I and on differences from theabove contentions CF FES, C? EP, CPare thusCP FSAS, based SE', on new k ACRS reretts q+c.e eteje. _,.
0 .o A05 1 a nkla>d-f&% Cto f N . The long-tern health danage effects, genetic damage effects, l and othen anvirnnmantal and socciaenrnmic ha*m.a (e.g. r-
- a" at death of a loved one fron cancer, na".n and suffering of the cancen zvicti.n, nsycholoE i cal stress from. fear of radiation-induced cancer o" genetic damage or disease in oreself or loved costs of and ncin fron ones, exDenses of cancer treatment,ponerations to cor"ect or attemnt to correct genetic defects (ar;d recove~ the"efron),
burial expensee. c9ncer insurance exnenses, nedical insurance exoenser, cost of Price-Andevson insurance, cost of nuclear waste ultimate discosal for scent fuel, coc t of isolating nuclear wastes -- as describe below -- from the environnent, increased %fenhet C4uSe5 a[cdeath fsu3centibilitytootherdiseasesjncludingalle=gies. beas, tract.s i asthna, uneunonia y and others, s"nergistic effects of "edioactive natef'ici and radiation in combir,ation with other atzz carcinogenn in the environment such as PCBs and othc" chemicals, asbestos, cice"atte s=oka, cance" v' auses , cadmi nn an d o+he* al a.ert s , et.c) resulting from th e nroductir n of f5 ssion nroducts, activation troducts, transuranic elcnonts, actinides and decar uroducts of all of these (including lead, arsenic, cadnium and othe" chenically roisonous elcments es final, non-adicactive decaw
~
/ .
>GIIof d ickYeSutt V n ef%srh q* n: NmCIM fsssto& Yl?n &}or- Q,$h. *J products) havo not been adeouately addressed or realistically g lyg estinated in the FSAP, ER, ES, SER and other documents to ON be filed or already filed in this proceeding.
Specifically, the estinates of BEI4 and J18NoC d S+aff and Annlicants dxxnat underestinate the nagnitude, nunber and extent of said effecta, and thei.r costs and socioeconcnic and environmental zi.mpacts, in at least the follow'ng ways: hQh /Mbf-(NQfGNC
+aequises +sh1d<&s smce M77 SMice% k Cf)inQaq%h
/f);
8 a (k) -there is no consideration of psychological stress as victims of genetic defects, described above, of pain and suffering .of cancer victins, such as their families and friends and loved ones disease victins and odaers whos e numbers are underestinated also as described below and otherwise; ob the consideration of of victins r,ane is deficient in underestinating the numbe s, unie-valuing the pain, s uffering, grief, rsuchological s tress etc involved. R (Ph.D.) (E) the work cf I.D.J. Bross, Rosalie Berte11 (Ph.D. ) and othe vs showsthat{diationexnoseure increases the risk not en1.y of cancer but a host of other diseases, allergies, and causes of death including heart disease, heart attack, and othens. The estinntes of the numbers of such victins made by the nreceding workers et al are more accurate than the est$ nates (ff any) used by Annlicants or URC Staff or BEIP cnnnitteeg renorts. John K.2. ((?) the wovk of Mancuso , Stewe-t, Kneale, Gefnan , Mo" San and others shows that the cancer-inducing and genetic-danage inducing effects of -adiation are considerably greater than. BEIR-III estinctes, due in nart to socionnolitical cressure c-n- tha nuclean nower industry e r.d tha nuclenw wee' ors industry. The bnderestinates the work of U1e above scientists disuroves result fron incorrect understanding of latencv periods for cancer and fron considering only exnressed dominar.t genetic defects (recessive genetic defecta are thousands of time s nore frecusant and will show un in future generationr, most after the 10th 5eneration following the genetic defect's creation by radiation), fron nodels of radiation effects assuning a threshold or linear-or-less relation of radiatf on diose to resnonse (gene tic , cancer or othcv danage) when at low-doses an sunralinear resnonse is likely and is shown
o
'D in sone cases (the citations of the above authors ' work sunra and below hereing ere incornorated here br reference)
(h) the . ecological and biological concentration of radioactive elements and chemicals - as refe= red to above ins uncerestimated through the use by NRC and otheas of highlv biased, unscientific "exceriments" conducted b~ the AEC under nressure to show that fellout ranm nuci mr weanons "as lasa ha=="ul +han ue now know it is (e.g. fron day =oid cancers and abnovna.lities among those er osed at Rongelan, cancer deaths n=nund St. Gaovge , Utah, and othen arees near nuclear wea,ons tests in the atnosnhe*s and undexrwater) which included: Use of soils known to absorb las.= radioactive naterial than do nost soils in the USA e.nd in HC nea" 93NPP from the a tmosnhere fow the tests : b n Sterilizing such soils by heating in ovens to h00 F, end exnosing the soil to strong ultraviolet radiat!cn, which two things kill nicroorganisns thr.t would be the first sten in the biological concentration nrocess for radianuclides; Using fully grown plants not Erown in such sof.ls or ennosed to radionuclides during their growth, to avoid the faster uutake of naterial fren the soil in early stages of growth; 9emovi ng the n1 a nts a"te on'" 3 da s an d evam' ninF the levels of radionuclides the ein , thus not allowing the tine fo" untake of radionuclides available phen plents grow te naturity mmkambhn,in soils centsmi.nated with anv levels of radionuclides ; all of which factors systenatically reduce the uptche end transfer of radionuclides and the number of concentrating steps it goes throuEh in the environmen' balow realistic levels, reducing the est!netes below realistic calculations (Franke, Bernd, IFEU, Heidelberg W. Ger, NRC Translatior $20) by facto s of 10
- l
?D%
. Q Conic N /W d<ts d W W f>W to 10,000. k SUP?ressing or attennting tca sun'nrcss nublics.tien o#
(h systematically avoi ing,j', cover *.ng un, igroring or otherwise 3 unscientifically and biasedly treatinE data that does not accord witu tne nuclear industry cosition on radiation health effects, and brinSi nE uressure to bear (includinE de-f unding, loss of jobs , personali attackes, etc. as desc-ibed in Mfnan & Tannlin, Poisoned Power; E. Sternglass , SedretFallout,T[qnlin&Gofntn , Ponulation Control through nucl ear nollution, etc. ) on those who find such data, make or attennt to nake o" publish such studies (e.g. case of Dr. Mancuso, hired by AEC, fired for refusing to disnute data indicating excess deaths fron cance" at Hanford nuclear fac ili t y , 'de sh . state, es coquiled bv a study of all death certificates in that State.). One exannle of this is CP&L's moving of a monitoring site near their 1 Brunswick nuclecr plant near Southnort NC which was showing higher levels of strontium-90; another is the "excewinents" described above by AEC on ecological concentratinn of radio-activity; anotner is AEC's inaction for years on vernan data showing excess cancer deaths would result fren) breathing rador bv miners working in uranium n'nes unde
- cond't' ens 1-dRC SMWS a,raroved by AEC; ancher is MoC'sgattemot to nininize the radiation release at Three Mile Island unit 2 in March-Auril 1979, a.g. the radiciodine(s ) released as discussed elsewhere in another contentien, the facts and references whereof are incoroorated herein bv reference. 1
([) by not giving sufficient consideration ta the greate" radiation effects resulting f"on internel enitters, both by incorrectly nodeling how much of radionuclides are
o<
-l D 9-absorbed internally fron a given velease inte th e env' rarnant ,
and bv underest'"ating the health and genetic effects of M 3_%3Q*b71472') alohax, bet and Sche,$, neu tron radiation on DFAHea and on Uk Physics cells' lHP) g 433-y3 menbranes and on enzyme activity. For =cre realistic estinates of internal absorbed doses of Sr-90, CS-137 and I-131 result!ng from operation of nuclear power plants licensed by AEC/NRC and not shut down for excess enissions yet, see Lend Educational Associates Foundation study nublished es a chanter in Methodolories for the Study of Low-Level 9adistion and as "Euclear Wastes: Tine Sonb in Our Bones"; J. Gafman was chief consultant on th.'.s study and is an extrenely well cualified -adiation and nr. dical scientist, M.D. and PH.D. , nunber of patents and award-winning AUTE03 OF MAKY journal articles on radiation health effects, nedical studios, former associate di=ceto= of Lawrence-Live nore Lab, etc. as detdiled in Pcisened Power, and "adiat!on and Hunan Hecith (1981). For a critique of unde"estir.ated effects of elmha and neutvan radiation fron internal enittens sec raners by Karl Z. Morgan, director of health nhysics at Oak Ridge for 30 years, nrefessor in nuclear engineering at Georgia Inst, of Tech, "the fathe" of henith physics", e.e. presentation and seninar at Physicians for Social Resnonsib11tyconference, Rochester FY May 1981, articles in Health Physics, Bullat".n of the Atxomic scientists etc. D". Morgan's qualifications 4.n the field are likewise among the highest and bect, be ing f ormer chair of national and international cenmittee on radiation nrotection (NCP" and ICRP) for many years, winner of nany honors for his work. (f) by lookin6 at the health effects over some arbitrarily short neriod connared to the t' ~e when the radionuclides w'11 actually be causing health and genetic danage based on their
f" experimentally determined half-lives and chemical nature allowing their 1 ncornoration into living tissue. For examnle, a clutoniun aton cold enter my lung, cause a cancer that kills me, and still escape my coffin af ter 300 years, enter ground water, be swallowed by a child who then gets a genetic defect from the U-235 ato ,the Pu-239 has decayed into, and so on down the decay chain with nere damage resultinE as the End by huasn activity and natural processes ! I
, radionuclides become (by entron { inevitably more snread throughout the environment. (for details on the above see, e.g.
papers by pediatrician DW A Helen Caldicott; Gofman , utxx1 ops cit. ) or more Since the hr.lflives involved range un to 80,000 yea =s for soma cueb alements (560 .111.5 on vanns cov U-?3d enantad from Pu-239 alnha decay) these health effects wi13. occua for l l a very long time, and Eenetic effects for an even longe" neriod l as most of them are recessive (see, e.g. Lederberg, J. on this) ! gf I)M Q) Onl (to) MW W e- tecorf%+ca ca f (145 forHr by t'cfecesa l ps,gy ( ) Damage to health and the gene pool is veal and does not have time value like money. Future deaths should not be discounted today. For comncrison, consider how we view the actions of Tamerlane (said to have killed over 1 million neonle in just one ci ty in . Asia) Attila the Hun, or Hitler's Third Reich. Would anyone argue that creating connarable numbers of udeaths is any less wrong if the means fo" killing onerated over 1 million years instead of a week or a few yea-s? Are the deaths themselves any 1ers nainful denending on when they occur? Not seeing the dead bodies before us all at once gives us a wav tn va ti onali z e long -un "adiat'on doeths 9s "not veel'~ thewe". But this is jus'.. as noral in confkering socioeconomic and environmental effect s as was Hitler 's justification for killing Jews, gynsics and his political enemies.
4 D
-l N-One should recall (see, e.g. transcrint of Nurenhevg r Crines Trials, 19h7, 19h6, etc; Rise and Fall of the Thi-d oeich , Sh'reH % T Nazi docters were condemned to death for co nduc *' n c sadistic nedical "experinents" in which neonle vere actually mained or killed. The killing of censons unknown to usx int future generations, or of ce sons el've toda , by nuclear a s from nuclides desc '. bed above , 911 of then, radiation /and its effects, is no less innoral than these :Tazi exoeriments. Such considerations must be weighed in an accurate assessment of the environmental costs and benefits of a oroject such as the liar-is 1 and/or 2 eacto s emerat'ng.
These are real hunar lives in vou- hands, not s tatistics, versonally and uninss you would be w'lling tegkill the n'inbers of hunans which can be established by co- ecting the above-listed enro s accord'.ng to the work of tha scientists, doctorc and others listed above, and others working on the sa e and allied auestions, you should not license this nlant w'th a clear conscience. The fact the t other licenses have been issued is es irrelevant as the number of Jews previously killed before a certain war cr'ninal nu-de ed his lase victim at Da chau,[The above consid e-at@cn (ow Q o@ n red.hi.5 Co*at'.c n heal h e[_ f ec have been systenatically excluded fren the Zo, the ES, and p M.* the data filed by anolicanus in tais oroceedin auf su le s-up C@y@ in e te an innrener balancing of ecsts ani benefits imder IGoa. and insufficient erotection of the oublic health and safety ( under the Atomic Energ-- Act and the US Con 9titutior d..lch was established to " secure to on selves and ou nosterit " the gara-al welfa-a, blass*ncs o# liha-ty, and etha- gaod 'b'rrs which only the living car enjoy, and which these su'#e=" ng f-on genetic da. fee are denied in whole or 'n oa-t. (en-hasis added). idesofabov av e m-oguced by weactor onerat'en and not The rad'.onuc{.cn by construct nucpea olen-S. - e, wi.11 ngt i nue 4 ,.
- n she env* rernart t if the 6.L. #cy 3 Tiro do e s no,o .ssue.
e e
$lf fGS2 C**P 4 b Vef f* Ho CV @ madUe h e N CC
-(l (9) models used b' .
"*C, An-11 cant s and e the-s smr tenaticall--
underestinate o- ev.blu?e means of rhnice.1 concentrat'nt the cbove of,"adionuclides and one" ate in addition to ciclorical and J. foci chain and other means listed in this contention for concent-ating radicnuclides in the environmant ard in the bc e of humar. beings, food animals , and other '.iving beings, including nhysical concentration by o" (1) rain stxx,r, th unders to rms , snnwstorms, hailstovns, and nucleation of ice, snow and rain awo' nd narticulste ma* *n-in tha atmos 7nere ("raincut" cf radionuclides, "he t s-ot s' ) (2) racioactive decay nroducts (e.g. Sr-90 from Xe-90) which have becone ionized during nvevious decay c= in any othe- way (elg. en osure to lightning) attaching themselves by electrostatic attracti r to fine f1v ash ne-ticles emitted by cos1-fired mowe" nients o#' CP&L, Duke Po::a", 'VA, anf othe- cuch nir.nts th-ourhwt the vov1d wh' ch , articles are in the ai- cround the SiO!"? site (v' thin 50 miles o* at greater distances); or radionuclides adsorbed onto such fina fly ash pa-ticles on ebsorbed intc tem ca ohvsically tranved irside then (the st-uc tu e o f nan" is hn1xlow & c c-lex , GL Fisher and sae, e . 6 .j DFS !!atusch, Size Denendence of the Uhvsical and Ciamieni 5"o-a-ties of F1v Ash) AFD the de ositi n of such on the fine (2 micro meters and less, es" atw3.2 Mk Gd radionuclidespin the deen lung or in cells such as alveb..ar macronhages by neens as descaibed by Fisher, !!atusch et al, C. Aranyi et. al. (3) taking insufficient account of inco-late nixing cnd disnersicn of *ad'.nnue'_ ides in gaseous, licuid o- relid fern l G%g%& S Op Di f f 0 1 when ec,,utingf ecn,1:.anc e vi}e. the lution d}t&g ari concentretten limits of 10 CFo part 20; and taking insufficient account of the I above facto *e in said connutation, assessnent, finding o" r"o,4ection, e.g. in connuting "eleases of Easeous & licuid rad.effluants f--msic:P7.
I
$ i
[l} - lH cup b y Vef9 00 (10) Us'ng for co nutst'enal nar oser ir - er sing ti.e 7 ep"sical cnd biclogical cencentrctior cf rad'enuelider : s. found in the environmant th e characteristier of less ee c*ive thenical forrs of the "adienuclides involved, rethe~ then the nore reactive fcrms, e.c. use of Pu(III) or (IV) innteed or unde"estimat'ng the offects cf sdicals inen-noveng such radio = of PU(VI), ignoringj[ree nuclides , excluding ce=ta'n radienuclides '*om the cc--utat'on altogether, and other erroneous commuting, stat's'ical and scient* Tic nrccedures (e.6 as shorn bv IFEU, }RC tr?ns19 tier T90: L AF study above; other sc ien ti"ic na ers on tre nsfe "".c to-s and concentratien cf rad *onuclider; Sternglass' stu"--of F=-90 , erro"s 6"c arcond the Mi11stene , CT nuclear nlant ) . Thecbove)&gcc."ounded by NPC's act'on in discont*nuing monite-ing of nilk fc= S=-90, I-131, Cc-137 etc on a -egular basis, which a events the data en whier to base a me e accurste ascersnen* of the radionuclider released into the envircnment b-r now-one ating nuclear nlante (a to be ex7ectoi fror Car"? on the basis of the cha*acteristics of its radwaste rystems and management n9 ccmrared to now-ona=nting nuclen" n1Tnts, & SE3TP3's cvers11 nroduction of ell t.dionuclidee ' l'.sted above) fren be'ng cc11ected o~ available to ne t' ti-na--
"c. 3 *. nloci c a '
or *o othe" scientists e nd irventicato"F. Inc.deou9teg c *te"irr e at a"oundj pHNPP, befo e oneration & afte , including Cot:L me -ine monitorinn sites tha* show nighea levels of -ad' onuclides (as thev did at Brunswick), Ir ck c f n=es s a*e-loni7a on c= enu' vslent monitoring equi"nent that car identif:' the enact "adionuel' des being "eleased or tresent in the envi~ennent, th ei- cuantitias , e tc. , inadecua te monitc r' ng o f milk , alge e , biota , etc te detect releases (sae, e.g. Pisiello et al on "elease amounts ( i connared to sensitivity limits and accureev of monite-ing i equipnent, mininum detectable releases the efore , & othe-matters above. Fisiello ?sn et al studied TMI .r- o l and other radioactive rele(ases) of gene"al arnlice{vili[o~ *elease_") to SH:.r L
a ,
- llY '
% pic c.kc.s faded -}o dotuaif M.%edemralyMCFf 0;y[yg
# ] Petitioner believes Aeplicant CD&L is engnged in a long-term plans to vi-tually totally monocolize the sale, twansmission distribution f and production of elect"icity in the easter:2 rart of North Carolina (and in other territory where CP&L not onerates, e.g. in &
around Asheville, NC), of which the onerating license at issue Jta fu Such herein is a key cart. 6 & Snononolizati eg,4f7(Cdr Canisse m (Lc SNMtY' t* fjec f n would result fro- v fy,.g taking over the service te ritories of inde endent municinal c Sk;c m3 systens and rural electric cooperatives both 2 in CP&L's service 3
+%
territory, adjacent to it, and in electric se=vice te ritovy now served by VEPCO o" other utilities. Suen a nono'ol: uceld 2g violate the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and othe= US anti- Cve<. trust law by restraininE trade, preventing connetition, N C4 fixing prices , preventing ent*y of connet' tors into the ma=ket k g/qg [ for electricity, and eliminating all (or nost) other sellers of alectricity fron selling to customers in the territories described above excent throuGh CP&L unde" condit'ons essentially set by CP&L or subjec t to veto or effective veto by CP&L directly, under contract, or through extensive and exnensive legal a ct t.cns tc crevent connetitors from selling ,oue- in thoce areas, which legal costs CP&L would ne=el" che ge to its cauti ve custone=s , while conpetitors would have to ca- the cost of legal action themselves thereby being subject to an unrea. con-able barrie" to entrv into the nowe -selling business, all o c l this in contravention of PU9PA as well as antitrust law. l l Key carts of this plan by CP&L include the followleg :
'1) nisrepresent the cost of future constructior urojects such as Harris Units 14,3,2 and 1, the caracity facto s and rower output fron such ami cower plants, the operating and naintennnce costs of sane, the desi En and safety characteristics of same,
4
-{ f h-and the likely cost of nroducing pover frem other sources or of freeing cower resources by neans such as weatherization and insulation of hones and buildings, shading, co-generation, immi tine-of-day rates, interruntible loads, solar energy, baionass, nethane and other ccnneting f uels, and the likel" cost end benefits of other nean s to reduce the elect-ic bills of o- nr' n= to 1991 nunicinalities and rural electric ccoceratives now4 customers of C"&L, VEPCo or o the- util' ties.
(2) by the means in (1) above and bv nisrenresentatien of the likely costs of tower to said custome=s in the fut ure from CP&L (fron 1981 f orward , for exa olc ) , e.6 by not telling them of internal CP&L plans to cancel certa
- n nower olants
! such as Harris h,3 and 2, South River 1 and 2, and others, l induce said municipal and cooperative customers to enter into take-or-pay contracts for the outuut cf certain CP&L benerating p1&nts includins harris 1,2,3 and k whether completed or net, whetner operable or no t, whether delivering any newe" or not, virtually obligating said customers underfany and all conditions to any a uronortional share of the costs of onerating, financing, ranairing, disnosing weste from, fuelinE and modifying the CF&L generating clants mentioned above, which a=e among the highest cost generating niants C?&L has or rians (in terms of fixed costs and of busbar newer uroduction costs). (See, e.g., Exifbits lo, 11 and 12 --ovicinally styled loa, 17b and 10c, contracts between co-Applicant in 50-boo /hol o.L. NCMPA #3 (NCEMPA) and CP&L, filed in NCUC D7cket E-2 sub E36 and NCUC Docket E-kh for such obligations.)
-I/6-(3) retain generating capacity built at nuch lower cost (e.g. Robinson 2 which including stean generator renair in 1965 or thereabouts will have a nuclear canacitr co st of abcut
$h00/kW or 1 css, due to being built at a loss by Westinghouse as a turnkey project for CF&L for about 0126/;Cl; Roxboro units
~
1, 2 and 3 with a canital cost conbined under 3100/kW; A heville 1 and 2, Robinson 1, etc. ) and which is ncre fully denreciated (both of which factors lowe" costs of electrical outputi which C?&L and its direct-served custoners must nay e n* said clants 8 outnut). (h) cancel units referred to in (1) and/or (2) above when i econonically advantageous tr C?&L to do so, sticking the cooperatives and municipalities who are nenbers of NCEMPA cr are negotisting with CPhL to buy nowe" as co-ops (UCI"C, etc.) or otherwise as described above. (y) Thrcugh m.y combinatien of: kncwing the actual high onerating costs, renair costs and o ther costs the customers described in (1) above are obligeted to pey unde" contracts in (2) above if comnuted on a realistic basis (info witi held by CP&L in inducing said custeners to sign said contracts ); innreper naintenanc e and onerating nrectice whicn t esults (by design or as a corsecuence of not being done right or in a timely, conplete or adequate manner) in excessive or in extensive outages of nlants on which the said custone"s are obligated bv Off#aho AsAd/e(' said contreets to nav the J JWAdtgkale f* xed costs; to Pr*4*cf. A ok tM deliberate sabotaggqof said plants; widr. holding adeounte s ta ff , connetent enough staff, sufficient funds , nate"ials and oroner design to repair or correct flaws anc nroblene in said niants which result in extensive outages; scheduling of outages to ce'.ncide with neak demand seasons when
. o H/ - renlacement nower will cost mnre and be 'n sho-te surnl , whether done delibera tely o= through inennpetence or th-ouA ca---ing out and insu'#icient or inadecucte71anning, scheduling and donduct 4 of outs es, rensirs, tests and nodificctions; designing niants with flaws (e.g. steam gene"atcr v'.bration nroblems, netal corrosion problems in steam generators and condense-s, inadt.cuate earthouake protection, core co^11ng, fire n"o tect'on, ele c t ric a.1 centrol, nine and vessal sunnorts and snubbavs, containment, and saf ety related eculonent ) delihe-e tel~ cr no t c o"~ect' rg sa e or concealing sune in orden to achi eve (o= "ceul" re in) c net Afsnatch excessive outages; inurnner dec!sione ta disn_tch sa' 3 d plant s : negligence (ordint-v end tothe-wire ) a eJ 4/4 and othe- actions, including 4canc ell'ng e nv of scid nlants to raise the e csts naid by said customers unde" the t@e-or-naw centracts fa" in excess of the est'~ tes under wh'.ch se id contracts we=e negotiated, c"eatirt a disna 'ty betuean ti.e higher "ates nuid b" said custoners ' dustone"s end the rates (lowe" due to 1cwer-cos t outnut frem over -15.nte maid in (3 ) above retained in full ownershi, of CM-I.) . ca/w onokh loy 1 (6) to then offer, af ter c ustomer di sec t'.sfactionjdue to gg uiswr rates char,ede b sr.id nunicinalities End/or electric bNS cocneratives has built te a resk of ,ressure to lowe- elcetrie lbdu rates, tc bu~ out the el ectric sy sten (s ) of said munici,211ti= s nog and.ior coe,oratives , at a low price due to the u"assuna or n "c% (NQ3 said distributors of electricitv tn lower ratec (wl.ich weakens 4 k their negotiating nosit ion as th eir "etes cont' rue to be raised bv the ne tn.= de s c-ibe d in ( 5 ) abo ve ) or in anv case at no more
$4C.fr.
than the actual value of the dis tribution s s tem involved, 65)y ca 'ng ncthing for the franchise and districuti n syste-beyond the actual value of the dis tribut' nn svetem and thus obtaining a moneroly on distribution of electricitv in
e . lli$- the assigned servic e t errito ry of said municipalit'.' (ies) or coonerative(s) "fo" free" in exchange for relea'ing sFid (s) dis *.ributor of rower fron their take-or-ray cont" acts vidi contracted directly CP&Ijp4:nemmhaor threugh a power agency, "CENE or other cor-oration or asscelat'on or legal fiction) (7) to t"ensfer the ecsts af shown in ($) abote to the financially stronger nenbe=s of cower agencies, ECEMC o othe-fina ncially such entit7 as in (6) abcVe whan the,Aueaker mcrke s ar= forced into default by the higher rates c=ented re- (1)(2)(h) and (F) sbove, th"c ugh n-o vi sion s in the e cnt-s e t e as in (2) above unteb n=nvida tha.t the 5'119 d?.e" gad +6 me~ho"* in default will be caid b o ther nenbe=s, thus raising the r9.tes of t' e financially strcngen distribu'o s in the fi"st 3 liner. of this sect' on "(&7 )" even higher and nrecinitatf ng fc" no e of then the atecayer d'ssatisfaction or inability to cay c~ isis described in (6) above with the same results for the f'.nancially stronge" menbe*s (distributors); (8) to force distributors and membe"s and contractees w'th C?&L as mentioned above into default b~ the means in (F) snf. the conscouences of inability to rar as listed in (6) herein, as well as the means in (7) above which can be used te c= ente a domino-effect (the coblause of one distributor into default 'ncreases the -ressu e on the othews, raisirg the likelihood o= selling out to C?&L rer (6) above of their defaultAshich would inc= ease the tressure on dr_e "est to defevlt o" sall. out 'n CD'L likaviaa. (9) over a period of yea-s, to by these means and by ?i"ect el ctric d'9tribution nurchase ce s uel- .ystem: of suen municipalities and crons as described in (1) above under any other condit'ons, usirg revenues derived frc, +he contracts in (x2) above after cancellation in (h) above or otherwise , to mononolize
. o f$
the retail seie a nd distribution, t rsnsmissien and gene ac t *_ c-of electricig
- n the ter-itorie s deecribed he nein, b-gaining the franchise for dist-ibutinr and -ate'l s91e in such territorien by the means dece-ibed ebove, and by using moncooly nows- and drawn-out legal cetion against co70etito s to prevent the- fron er_te*!ng or cortinuing in tne seneration or transmission basiness for elactricity in the a reas (territories , servic e a"eas , c? 1 be'ng the sure thinE desc-ibed in different terms) desc-ibed or listed he"ein.
-fla pf C. h&s &i/cd b Ccosu/f k frtfHenfMya/yt4ds,Q',
C sL, in violation of the Sherman Act , Clavton Act a nd
#33 4
o*he- TM ar t i-tvua r law, in corea-t v' *h A nnlicent "CE"7a Std h65 Feb6 E4 A SS f*@dj P N 06 4 DFF N#&tS d6figf th [W and o the s , isf estrairine trade , nreventing co neti vion, and charging excessive crices by dive-ting la ge sunss of
& ctaers capital darived from ratecayers of Apolicant NCrMP4 fps such ratenayers nar all costs of bonds ard all orerat f ng ccsts under take-or-par centracts as desc-ibed and efe enced in tha above centent'on under (2) and elsewhere the ein, into the construction and onerat!on of CP&L generatine clants, to the deteinent of investnent in ene"gy d1ternatives that crovide (or avoid the need fer or use of) elect-ical energy (or nake it available for new uses) at co sta Ray less than said ratepayers (citizens, co-owners, etc. included in this tern a s used he ein) will be obligated to ray for 1
I power f rom CP&L ciente such as Har-is 1 and 2, and costs of Ha--is ? e-a b unde cnn'-acts as -afa--ad +n above. This incoses unreesoncble costs above na-ket crices on said ratepayers, and 9. cts (by nakin g 2.en cay said unreasonable costs for el ectricit , raising daeir rates to whatever level necessar:- ta cay said costs , without limit, due tc contracts
e .
-I 2. 0 -
Set u hv OthL and o thars ns-ed o" d ea c a' bad aho"e 'r cu'he-ance cf this consnirac~ in -est-a' nt of trade and te 'm osc highe trices and erevent concetit
- on in the electr' city me:.rket )
or restrain to orevent then fren investing in such neans of veducirg elect-ic 4 consunption, using electricitv nore efficient 1r, insula ting, weatherizing, co-genernting electricity, disolccing ele ctricity with other " fuels" including solar energ , weed and binnass (or reduce the cacital available for ' nvestmant '.n sane), in violation of the above-referenced antitrust law. Said consntracy also reduces th e na"ket f or ene rgy-saving nrod ucts, products using solar, wood and other energy scurces, insulation se vic es and neans to increase efficienc" and other oroducts furthaving co-generation,>veduced elec-tricity consunction and more efficient use the= eof 'ncludinE the means thereof desc"ibed above, thus preventing the growth services af beinasaas to thaae ** eld sgr d ""oduct ? which m id in effect h cencate with CP&L bv " educing the m t-ket for electricity, restra*ning the extent te which CD&L or distributors of power such as NCH4PA and others tiescribed above (e.g. MCIAC) or nunicipalities or elect-ic ccc7e=et" ves exculei raise electricity crices (due to concetiti r fron those businesses, fields, nroducts and services above), and nroviding alternatives to electricity ourchased frc~ CP&L (in its teraitory near said nunicicalities and coons, which night also be served by businesses in o near said nuncipalities and coops u'th the nroducts and services above) or f m n CP&L-vun clants thvough the distributors desc-ibed [ above , e .g. FCE'!?A , NCIMC and nunicipalitie s and =u-al electric cooparatives. All of this violates US antitrust law. 0NO N com t$ m L5se G Sifrifwauf CltslN asofcuu 3 e we ea,wr
'e. IN k S& G &r d+M.
M gtv i upeuse rarepayws g & dw.aw, &s m &ub=c, usel
U 3, Eb; 3ll21-23 i l l- lN CDopora+ eel hary,g rf I contend the Board must raise y s e any sie n ificant se issua(s) under PC'a rules and the 7 nurviews outlines in 10 2 CF*d a"pendix A VIII (b) that are not raised, not known, or not suf.iciently specifically addressed bv the cetitioners raised in contentions (or not adrfrzssed b" U"C "taff) here in this i C OMt- E<'IibbdC' $* 8'dO'"iMC SM'I* 'SG"' (SI f$ *)fbg. b yvugA f h0re b- Boarci, t=>er- ik. be to w ., (rurtherIrecuest the Board to clarifv how the 9taff is expected to =aise issues which could lead to the denial of an ooerating license under the rules as cited above.) ,
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%af s c,a bseeraIMeff'N W s un+cw bv such ifructures (2 ct ctv(5 Yla.-
& keau m 2 fublic (<ga /h7 + 5g,fe Q V l m u' l d ,1 0 0 L Ube DVer i00 oOnw de.sIgp beidj tygyi(ej b y CWVovs av D,qpf CaNycoi '
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Stin<lav s ha4ws 4V Haw &, ou Ichhf iirec swr's lhl0L/$C st'wV f e.tOl4 vies 6>r Sa% fefCe.a,s &f,0(o cc,,, f jaw 47 ch ccj,, bsee e, % .l,5
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# ! Arelicants ' Qf /CC cr@ ogre: grails tobly _with 10 CFR 50.
h &bw w kf?r Ste f 3b (b)(6)(ii,iii,1v a: e[1 ) a-dh,7) andfg?50
- F #Arpendix a in that it f ails to assure that safety-related ecuinnent is crocerly inspected (e.g. the "C " ta6C'ng of defective nine hanger welds at SHi;P'), thoroughly and accurate 1~ analized and documented (e.g. at Et Diablo Can* on, PG&r, a ut' lit-nore co petent than CF&L -- contention jd_r cW_ sbove on nanaganent canability being incorporated he-eing by reference on the natten of C"&L's conretence -- failed to detect over 100 errors in its safety-related ecuinnent and st-ucture design, snalysis and construct'on by the nroresed fuel lond date in October 1981. Only the hand of fate prevented the Diablo Canyon niant being licensed to onerate w'th all these er-o-s and defects being uncorrected, tnanks to the engineer who discovered the switched blueprints and had the guts te call it to the a t tention of suoerios & a '.thorit ies. CP&L has had inscectors at Harris who can't even read bluerrints well of nining and vsssels, encugh to detect such er ors and discrenancies in weldingh design and construction of containnent and othe" walls, su nort structures, etc. and saf etv
- elated nine hange s ),
and correctly built and nrovably so (for reasons noted above, e.g.).
# k[ Annlicants ' training caogran and anerating nie.n is d e#iciert and fails to cenniv wie. 10 CF' 50.3b(b)(6)(iii,1v, vi) and (7) and othe" apolicable rules because it does not crovide the cae"ctors direct neans of analyzing and seein all at once the core , c ooling, radiat'nr n=c te c t'.on & cent rel, & cthe'-
thc neture and conditiory tp all known failure sequencer 54fevg identified in ~44.sh-lhCO and o (8Mu e- IGC/ Arc rudies &c gmM of failure nodems, and because a conprenensive Feilure Modes & F_ffects Analysis (FIEA) of the entire SHNP' design
. c I O as built (and h verified to have beca built t:.is war , inde-endentl-of the regular CA/RC program because of deficiencies in ' t and because cf the kinds of oversights found at Linblo C:.nren, which necessitated bringing in an indenendent o ut sid e c n c ultar.t not ' nvolved in the design of D. Canyon o~ bu'.lding it o neielin e or enalysing it , as rhown in F'.C clan & re orts filed in this docket at LPDF nu su;nn tc h/7/82 neeting at Anex "C, ??'
es referred tc, listed and desc~ibed in the two centertiene e.g. irmediately above ), as described b= D. 31sdexkzas of UTC in BN N '30-15 P and c ohe" workem in the nucletr and aerosnsce safet- field. M 'UTPgaite w SE"PT vithout undue risk t- nublic heal +h &safet"
# k3 CP&L's safet managenent canabilitj and connotence a e in quest' or bcesuse CP&L has not made goed f a' *h, tirely and 'o
- appropriate and/or effective efforts to con,1r t:ith CLI-30-21 en environnen*al qualification of rarety-related el-etrical equinnent, including f ailu e to take act'.or to obt91n, cause to be designed or manufactu ed and del"vered to C?&L ccanonente canable of satisfying the recuire erte of CLI 80-21, NUREG-C580,
? -i c ther a"rlic able *ule s ar d guides. C &L hr.s n,' conduc+ed l
sufficient cualificatice analvsie , testing, enlace-ent c" saf ety related com7onents, and/cr develonnent of n"ocedurec as the above ~ules require.
# hk CF&L's nr.nagenent carability to safely onerate SE"?'
as "cf' d in the centention abcve inco"rorated he ein bv -efa ence re nanagenent comnetence, is in doubt because of CV&L's renented build, insta'.1 and modify fa' lures te design electrical eculpnen* and other s ster.s se A that they are no t culnerable to catastrenhic connen -ode fa'lu-ar caused by fi*ec, xx and because CP&L has fa' led to ccm,17 w'.th CLI-81-12 of 6/15/dl in orovidirg fire orotection at its B~unswick
\.L.
nuclear plant. See C.E. Murphy 8/PC/7h or thereabouts IE xas ; 9egion II nemo re failuret:f iro6er1r install electrical cables at Bi
Sf
# hi SENP? design is deficient fo- nrctecting the health and safe:r of the nublic frc nuclea- accidents because its ri-irg layout and design is so cutdated (due to its bef ng dela ed bv C?! L for M years when CF&L couldn't afford to build it, and its bef ng of about a 1971 design) thut it cannot be ecencnicall updated and redone to conaly with tn' results of the Diant "- ter Hanne-Evne"lence '. Report <PW" S.G . ( s tean generato"), feadwatKIZ
, e=,
ECCS & Main Stean Syster water hanner events evaluation (includir.g systens effect) and ootential resolutiens now being erecared bv N'C., and the C' a: ' TEG enorta on the wate- henner c uest' on. This is sue is na-t".cularl~ a u-licable
%}eJY fMFhp3, te Ha==is because of its outdated desiE n, nate-tals ninire P M d YW#2 M W3 for[
hem **)*$ean gerator e.nd vessels, gg$ flange!', noz:'las etc. nade (f.h4 r.S:-F to outdated Nj III and 7 o5 hen codes ner 6/7/77 letter , 6/28/77 -eniv fron COLL to N'C, 5,'17/77 letter MA McDuffie CP&L to 7usche MSI:C, thc DSA" & FTL" at n. 13-15c, IS-2 and IS-h2a (ntybe these a e 1 3-? e-6 1-b-2 h2a -- hard to read ncge numbers), usa of unoualified welders, advanced stage of construct!on not allowing edesign to cc-nly with !iRC advice per the abcVe s+ udies and docunents ('Fus recui-ing a trade between nublic health and safet" nrotection from accident s , and costs to Annlicants and delar of connletirg
& deficiencies SENP?), and the irregule-ities}{r hydrostatic and othen pressure testing (use of nines welded shut to be n=es suricei while the actual vessel is not unde = oressure, the shut welds in these test tan cipes and b=anches ediae&& shave been ne-ferned by sone of D niel Inte= national and C?&L's best welders) of such systens, and because of inconclete and inaccurate dncunen-tation of testing and narerials o# such eeuinnent at SH:;?t ,
carticularly a s regards the cr.n on -eite prior to Installation.ditions under which it was s te ed
l YD *"
%5&re # hh An711 cants ' FSANeVceficient in that it does nct consider a<e the consecuences of an accident in which the reactor neutren shield falls and blocks coolant flow to the core. The bolts that hold d(s) up the neutron shielf have become extremely embrittled at nuclear nients such as Oconee, "obinson 2 and others, with .aone bolts failfng.
There is no assurance that such bolt failures wer1d not d=on the entire neutron shield at Harris 1 or 2 in such a way that it would block or divert coolant flow from the core, causing core overheating, fuel failura, nossible fermation of steam voids in the co-e, inability of rCc3 systens to deliver cooling water effectively to dr.e core because the neutron shield is blockin6 the entry or exit of such wate=, i inadequate heat renoval from the core because water cannot c rculate i in the loop or loops blocked by the fallen neutron shield (s), release of radioactive material inside containnent as the co=e is vented to relieve overpressure caused by high tenneratures, =elease of radio-active material to the environment caused by fa' lure of containnent valves, gas crocessing eculpment, isclation valves , etc. in the condition described oreviously; partini cove melt with subsecuent release of radioactive materials to the atnosrhere due to reactor su.c cuneing cut irradiated water, or due to the failures cited above; release of "adioactive n&terial tc the auy.111ary building o= to the atmosuhera directly by sunn punping rad'aoactive uo.te" in any of the above c? rcumstances, or due to ceerator erro=, or due to the reacto= vessel lid b=eakirs off and nanetrating containment or other carts of the vessel doing the same due to extrene drermal shock caused bv the core overheating while ecoling is blocked be the neutron enield, or shield s , followed by novement of cellanse of the neutron shield with a sudden inf'ux of cold cooling wate" to the vessel,,or x thermal stress and shock resulting fren cool water
--r2. 6 - l injection on one side of dr.e neutron shilld in its fallen nosition wl.ile the overheated cove is warning the rest of the vessel, intaroducing g=?cter thermal stress and netchanical stress as prinary syrten nressure vises due to rising core tenneratures ,
or by other means, which results in vessel failure and nossibly part of the vessel penetratirg containnent, or the reacto" vessel being pushed off its suncorts b'r th*ust loads from outrusinhing water, stean or core internnis of any combi. nation of these during and af ter the raupture of dae vessel, leading to connlete core melting because no way to bring e' ther cooling unter or borated water to the core will be lef t under these circunstances. This tyne of accident is carticularly arolicable to Harris 1 and 2 in view cf the age of the reactor vessels therefor, their being nade to the W71 AS'E III addenda to the S71 ASME III code, the age of the neutron shields and other ecuinnent mz for the Harris Y'eachv"t/45stle Cwd ninnt, the fact that thej olts b and shields have been in stovsge and therefoae can have deteriorated already before be'.ng nie.ced in the reactors, the fact that storage conditions we=e not designed to nrotect the neutron shields and bolts that hold then ur against aging, embrittlenent, corrosion or othe zzzx stress or attack, l the fact that sinilar nroblens have been found at Oconee, P 'in. of about the same cower as Harris (860 Mwe vs 900 MNe for Har-is), and that hairline fractures in t he bolts hold'ng un the neutron shields can easily go undetected, lettning the shields fall suddenly under later stress from earthauake, water haar.er, no nal clant shu, downs, etc., and the Harris clant has no direct neans to te?1 if the reactor neutron shields are in niace snd fianly held the"e during neanal oceration or transients or other c ecidents.
Annlicants' accident ana y a does not include o sideratior lS d2(haed beccv62 W of fast fracture of the reactor vessel or associated crinary coolant boundary pioing and naterial. B~itish metallurgy expert Sir Alan Cottrell (How Safe Il Nuclear Enere . ?, fuotes he ff ducational Heinemann o-63 '77Books G i London England and Exeter,NH, USA, 1991) who snecifically investigated B=itish clans to xmkr nurchase Westinghouse PWas (S. Harris is Westinghouse PWRs) describes the fast fracture mechanism as follows:
"In many construction naterials there is a critical stage, at a certain depth of penetration, at which a crack becomes unstable and will then run on ranidly in the material, at alnost the sneed of sound, to rip the natevial comnletely acart in a fraction of a second. It is this fast fracture wnich must at all costs be avoided."
e- -- r z _, _= (lyoid.,_ emphasis in original). f 'f; W i fi Q g ; _ }. Z U_
=_ .
A fracture the length of the =eactor vessel (virtually) was detected at the Grohnde nuclear plant in West Germany sone yea =s aFO. Fortunately the olant was shut down at the tine. However, this actual cracA shows that vessel,rupturs by fast fracture _is a real nossibility. ,
~= _ .v -
Soecifically, Cottrell states that with a stean line break, in eressurizer failure, stean generator tube ruuture (contention i 2-re stean generator tube failures incornorated here by reference), er other ECCS-initiating event, the cromet injection of cooling water into the hct oressure vessel could cause fast fracture. "In these circunstances, the ensuing changes of temperature and nressure can reduce the ci'itical crack izx size her initiating fast fracture) down to not much more than one inch in certain cases." (Ibid.) Such a fast fracture could well result in failure of the reactor oressure vessel. Cottrell states that such a failure "could eroduce an accident of imense ferocity, with loss of coolant, break-l down of nost controls, no=sible destruction of the reactor building
~~ f ] b by largo flying nieces {of the zzx vessel ) and ernosure of the core to the general environnent. " (Ibid.)
Another obvious censecuence of sudden vessel ruuture with flying eleces is shrcnnel damage to other ecuinnent and ccrtrol lines inside containnent (and outside, if containnent is breached), (Contention ' 7 on reactor vessel head or other-heavy debris nenetrating the containment and ruuturing it, with release of radioactivity to the external environment, and contentf on
~
air, electrical and other on collateral danage topcontrol lines, coolant nunts, ECCS, the pressurizer, boron injection tank, and lines to nove water and borated water etc. to and from the core, is alsc incornorated herein by reference.) Because coolant injection could (and anould) commence within about 20 seconds of scran (and could also connence af ter excessive blowdown or small or large break fractures in the erinary systen due to overpressure during an ATWS; contention iib re ATWS is incornorated here by reference), core thernal nower at the time of fast fracture initiation could well be above 5% of rated (2775-2900 MWt for harris is rated core thermal nower), and 100% or nore during an ATWS. With the vessel fractured, effective cocling of the core would be imcossible, and a meltdown of the enti e core would alnost certainly result. Aenlicants have rot analyzed this failure mode in the FSAR or any other venort in the LPDR, so far as consequences of the accident are concerned, nor Aonlicants have they\ identified inseection methods for nre-onerati onal and inservice insoection of the vessel that will detect cr9cks cacable of fast fracture initiation under conditions like tnose described above, or under more severe conditions that may obtAin. Cottrall (ibid.) notes that "In fact, tests of the best standard ultrasonic practice on thick steel clate have shown that there
1
}
/29
" is a mere half chance of detecting even a once-inch crack. C2.early, an incrovement in ultrasonic knamxigsms:a technicues and crocedures ,
to well beyond the best standard cractice, is recuired if all notentially 66be66 tally dangerous cracks are to be detected. A ninknun goal here ought to be the oroven ability in practice to detect quarter-inch c=acke with a fai" (e.g. CO na" cent) nrobeM1!t- and nna-inch cracks with a very high (better than 95 cercent) probability." (enchasis gq p,'}Q k CotuhN1*fs *. *,, reced festS of M rebakbQ in original). oc werus,wc ,w c w b s w W k cleae,e N ech_j Cs I-l/Va< Crenw. ts oaks aboVCo% , T1**y,Wh. . he @ c*.&c.1x CA: ICwsud,a c h e % i sQ ,4 The Shearon Harris " safety ~ analysis" is inadeouste because it o does not}7(nPMM
,cohsider fast-fracture accidents, nor their consequences f{g &g.,
M o (either worst-case direct ' release of the core to the atmosehere, or '"+/ ! damage to the core, electrical or air or other contro1x lines , cower lines or stean lines to safety equipnent and other eculonent inside containment, especially the delivery of borated water and cooling water to the core, the initiation of nultitle breaks in the primary coolant boundary due to unn shraonel or flying baroken earts of the vessel, core, or objects they have hit during or af ter fast fracture, fracture or bursting of fuel rods af ter or during vessel fast-fracture, the sudden loading on reactor vessel succorte, the core intelf, and oicing and other conconents attached to the co=e ! (all resulting from the nonentun of escaning water or steam durinE fast fracture and af ter, as well as fron the fracture itself), and other eroblems and difficulties resultin5 fron fast fractu=e nent$oned elsewhere in this contention). Since a raised refe"ence tennerature is inco==c*ated h*=ain k7 refe=ence for embrittlement increases the likelihood of fast fracture, contention lef( y //g The insoection clan (pre-se=vice and inservice) for reactor vessel (s) and associated nrinary coolant niping at Harris is deficient because it does not provide neans for detecting cracks that could cause fast fracture as described in Contention N above which
O J)O is incorporated herein bv reference. This is carticularly relevant , to Harris because the vessels involved are not made to cun"ent ASME III codes for such vessels, and tne vessels have been stored out side exoosed to daily tencerature changes for years, as well as the effects of air, wind, rain, snow, sunlight (including ultrav'olet) N on their external surfaces, &+ "*tg> on embrittler.ent of reactor vessels bv a conbinat".on of heat, nressure, stress, neutron and other radiation, intergranular and other covrosion, etc. is abee N another reason why the insnacticn orogran needs to take full account of cracks that could csuse fast fracture before they reach the sira (1 inch) that cou15 initiate fast fractu"e. It isinnortant to note that fast fracture doen not erovide a leak before fracturing. Cottrell (How Safe is Nuclear Energy, ref'd in previous contention) states that "The e is not likelihood that the vessel would " leak before break"~. The efore, the inspection progran is the only way to detect notential f ast fractures. In view of the extreme consequences of fast; fracture (assured core nelt, possible breach of containment, eccsible fast rantu"e of fuel rods, damage or disabling of controls and safety systens and other systens necessary to centrol the veactor or attennt to cool it or shut it down), only an inspection crogram that nrovides the very highest assurance (greater than the 05% detection n obability suggested by Cottrell) can assure the health and safety of the nublic with resnect to fast fractures. Contention hl ? above is incorrerated i herein by reference as to idtiation, consequences, detection and lack of prevention for fast-fracture accidents. The effect of enbrittlement (raised "eference teno.') of the vessel in-service beinE to increase the erobability of fast cracture, incornorated he-e-and corrosion doing the sane, contentions and a*ejjin by reference.
e W m s s
- 13/
# The SH Nuclear Sower Plant Technical Eredifications a e l I
deficient in that they do not wvide for an inservice ins".ection j progran for the reactor vessiel(s) and associeted primary ecolant and FCCS and borated injection niping which can verify in oractice that these conoonents 4n f act do not contain any cracks which
^
can initiate paramura.imsgsz" fast' fracture as described in contertions and k 7 (inconcorated herein by reference).
,ach a cregram of inspection, including reliable baseline ~
data verifying all cha ks in the vessels and picing es installed, down t7less than 1/h" (or whatever size is necessary technically s to assure that said serack cannot grow, during normal operation includ' rg accidents , shutdowns and unusual events at at least the frequency encountered in',PWo o6erating exoerience, to the size of greate- than 1" --oi whatever other size is late" dets" mined s s-to be capable of initiating fast fracture under any c)n'd! tion that may occurs in thc4 nuclear clant -- which can initiate, fast fracture, during'the nuclear;o'lant (SliNPP 's ) "emaining ernected ,or Projected ocerat!rg lifetime. ) is necessawy for safe ooeration of this nuclear nro je'ct at all tines. The technical specifications do not exist as yet, the suggested ones dor, which de nct address this issue. he diffic ulties of such inscection being, adeouately dcne are detai'le d _ in contentions cand above, incorocrated herein by refe ence. purtner, the tecunical speelfications are deficient in that an ultrasonic" insoection canable to detect all and any cracks in e s the reactor vessiel and orinary coolant, ECCS and borated' water (includingallpa-ts systenspas described aboveh is not recuired to be perfo ed after each shutdown of ' the ree ctor, before sta= tup begins. The TS 's a=e also deficient in not requiring a cold shutdown and conclete ve-
'( inscection for cracks canable of initiating fast fracture,whenever nny evidence (e.g. reassessment of si;>.e, cf encable cracks, fo~ fast c /
/32.
fr.ecture, new data indicating increased likelihood of fornation of such cracles fron the effects of heat, termerat u~e changes in the vessel and oipinE from unhatever cause, -adiatier. ine'.uding neutrons and other for :s of radiation, cowrosion frem any cause, water seray or flooding the outside of the reactor vessel (whethar a= Occurred at Indian Point, NY or otherwise) or for any othen cause) indicates that such cracks may exist undetected in the reactor vessel or associated systems as refe=enced e.bove, where integrity of the vessel or associated systens nLy be lost by - fast fracture. l
]
I i J
/33 g- ji()_ Since there is no evidence that insnections to date have shown that the reactor vesskis for Harris Units 1 and 2 are not al eady containing cracks that could initiate a fast fracture (as described in contentions 'f) and h h above which are incorrorated herein by reference), the doard should order construction on Harris units 1 and 2 suspended until such time as Apnlicants can derminitively shown that the reactor vessel in place in Unit 1, and the reactor vessel for Unit 2, do nct contain cracks that can initiate a fast fracture already. As noted by Sir Alan Cottrell (Hew Safe Is Nuclear Fneagy 7,1981)"an innrovement in ultrasonic techniquest and amantirns procedures to well bevond the best standard nractice (of today) is manantim required if all uotentially dangerous cracks are to be detected." (Cottrell xx out that entire statement in italics for emohasis). Ultvasonic testing nre-service should be use? because the in-service insoections nust have a cc-narable data base to check against, assuming that defects are not found nre-service.
Redaiogranhy on such thick structures as reactor vessels is imoractical, carticularly on curved surfaces such as where oicing enters tne vessel, and tuis is well known. Therefore radiographic inspection of the vessels for Units 1 and 2 would not be adequate by itself to assum that fast-fracture initicting cracks do not altveady exist in them (cracks of about 1" length). The reason to suspend construction eending this vevific a ti on is that if such cracks as noted above are found in the vessels, it will be unsafe to use daen because fast-f-acture accidents i could occur at any time the veactor is operating. Therefo"e no nore money should be scent on construction of the rest of the clant until it is assured that the reactor vessels are not now subject to fast fracture. (If oniv ene vessel were subject to
]3 u fast fracture, construction on the unit incornorating tha vessel not subject to fast fracture at nresent could be resumed. )
reactor A , vessel subject to fast fracture is or'na facie unsafe, since it Il i can burst uncredictably at any time, resulting in total core neltdown i possible release of core inventory of radioactive material directiv
- 1. n to the atrosnhere, and other ccnsecuences detailed in contentions N 7" uq J=% * <15 incornorated herein by refe ence re fast fractuve, thermal shock, vessel embrittlement, or A7ds , e tc .
1 Under the Atomic Energy Act, NFC has no atherity to license ' construction or operation of a nuclear oower plant that is unsafe. Therefo~e construction on Harris Units 1 cnd 2 nust be suspended until verificat*.on that the vessels for those reactors are not now susceotible to fast fracture as shown be the tresence of cracks 1" or longer in them at any noint, or the health and safety of the oublic is no longer nrotected adeo.uately. Further, under HE'A , the ecsts and risks inf fast fracture nust be considered; they are not accurately and connletely considered in the EP o= the C? EIS, nor in the OL EIS uhich doesn't exist yet. Construction nay not nroceed until these risks end costs are included in the E'S, narticularly sirce fast fracture of the reactor vessel could destroy O.e nuclea" l plant itself and snread the core's radioactive centent over nest of Easte"n No"th Carolina (ref. W. Ger. Institute fo" neactor Safety ! Recort #290,(NP.C translation 161), and contention 4 I!$ incornorated herein oy reference). It should be clearly understood that the kind of inspection described herein is better than the standard uractice, and perhaus better than the state of the art for thick, layered pressure vessels. However, verification that no f ast-fracture initiating cracks exist is absolutely vital to the safe operability of any nuclear reacto= oressure vessel, for if it has such c crack it may fail catast*onhically, at any time.
' -)3V fractu~e toughness # h Auplicants8 metal surveillance and fe.tigue test'ns; nrog*ans f ail to meet the requirenents of 10 CF" 50 Accendices G and H in that : _
the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Annendix H section II.C.3.c acoly to Shearon Harris since Apnendix G.V.S. requires that the sturdiam at " basis af or the prediction" used in Appendix H"shall include . , rasults fran nortinent radiation ~ e ffects studies " and that one such certinent study is the fact that the reference tennerature for nil duct 311ty at the CP&L H.3. Robinson #2 reactor is already, cf ter about 11 years of connercial onevation (far less than its l l "excected service life" of that reacter vessel) is between 250 end 290 degrees F and that this is a " conservative (ly demonstrc.ted .. . tost (s) perfarned on conoarable vessels and s teels"within the neaninF of Annendix H section II.C.3.a and b, particularly in that CP&L has stressed the sinilaritv of H3 ocbinson 2 and Shearon Harris 1 and2 in defending its estinate of nuclear canacity f acto" for Harris before the MC Utilities *onnission (Dockets E-100 sub EO and I-2 sub E126,1981), both are 'festinghouse 3'i"s, the Harris 1 and 2 reacter vessels are nade to the W 71 addenda to the S71 editicn of ASI'E III (Letter $/17/77 M.A. McDuffie CP&L to Ben C. Rusche, :EC under oath) .chich is not The Harris that f ar different fron the Robinson reactor vessel. reactor soecinens Cafsu ks
.or su-veillance (APP H II.C .1 and 2 ) do no t nee t i A Veual 9sv kW) l the numerical requirement that there be 5 of then pe"A.. I C 3.c and are not exnesed to pressure and netchanical and tenne-atu e-pressure induced stress fron vessel heating and cooling unde" cressu-e ard from cressurizaticn and decressurization as required 'oy 10 Cy* $0 Arp n II C 2, C 3 d, and fails to neet the recuirenents of 10 CF9 FC Aependix G 7/ (3) or 3 in that accrocriate ellowances for "all uncertaintles" have not been nade, pnrticularly for synergistic effects of corrosion, radiation (neutron and other), cyclin:: un and
l I34 - down in te :ncrature, and cycling in oressure on sinilar raterial to that actually co nta'.ned in the vessel, that further inc~eo'es in reference temmerstu*e have not been accurately allowed fo", that the rate of increase in efe"ence nil-ductill ty at temnerature is not understaed well enough to nske accurate nredictions of its level at the end of 'he service life (enacted b- Annlicants) of the Harris 1 and 2 reactor vessels, carticula-17 in light of the actual rise in =crerence ten erature at iobinson 2 and other lange W.l's such as Oconee 1, ?!I 1, etc, and this leads to an uncertainty in "rojected rafe~ence te .nerature at the end Of vessel service life that has not been accounted for. Also the recuire ents of a 10 CFR F0 Annendix G IV C have not been not for Harris 1 and 2 in that they are not designed to nernit a thernal annealing treatnent to recever naterial toughness orcuerties of ferritic naterials cf the reactor vessel beltlina and no::les, niping connections, inlets and outlets in the vessel. Yet, as shown by the enerience of 2obinson 2 and the other reactors cited above, there is no reasonable basis to predict that the reference te .rerc'ure f or darris 1 and 2 at the end of their ::ervice lives, thether assuned to be k0 years (ne" FSa9), 30 yea"s, or 25
- ears (den"ectation life per FR) will be less than 200 degrees ? when Robinson 2 and Oconee 1 and other ?'.Ps of less core po::er have alrecdy "eached refe~ence of oueration. Alrfe5 te neratures above 200 ? in lessFM2 thanar12 e yeYs" IN Oh n wS En@r fr plw ake reasons 4 c-o Nd ?fDnde a mdsewahk Malysk 0eCessam % ffok @
4Safet mm y sm reactor fasr &(acha'&. % g ab ,c v;c u t % m or s u cK,
- / 3f -
# h Applicants' safety analysis is deficient in that it doen
.5 2 not considea the total co nsecuences of terrorists cennandeering a very large airplane, such as a B-7h7, Airbus A-300, Lcckheed L-1011, of USAF C-$a or C-53 and diving it into the containnent. Tarrorists threatened to do exactly that to a reactor at Oak 9idge in the 1970s.
The consecuences include not just the innact, which the certa '.nnent night not be able to withstand, but also fires resulting fron the conbustion of thousands of gallons of jet fuel diat eculd be ignited, e.g. by soarks from netal scraning on concrete of the centeltrant at or after inoact, by sparks from debris from the clara stvikine each other or other objects such as containment o= the auxiliarv l or snent fuel building , by hot objects such as the jet engines , which l ineact themselves night be thrown or bounced by the tazzt (which would certainly tanks, ruuture the olane 's fuel gank Terrorists using exnlosives or other nonnetallic weanons are able to take over airnlanes desnite the use of netc1 detectors. An enpty airolane being flown by a crew to or fron F. leigh-Durhan airnert, Seynour Johnsen AFB, Greensboro-high Point airnort, Douglas Airnort in Charlotte, or other cities necr , the nlant (in terns of jet flying tine) night readily be connandeered l l by a sna11 group of terrorists or even a single terrorist who got l onto the flight line (e.g. by disguise as regular airline, airnort or nilitary cersonnel or by be".ng one) when nlanes are being flown empty to nick un cargo, for maintenance, or to nove then to a ncint to receive cassengers. Further consecuences of such a clane crash (caused by ter-c-ists or not, as, e.g. an accident causing all a nlane's eng' nes to lose cower in a heavy fog or cloud cover night cause it to crash into the a nuclear plant without warning -- local air controllers should have soecial training to heln prevent this nossibility) include
-43S -
danage to the spent fuel building and auxilliary buildings and release of snent fuel gases end carticulates and halogens tc the aty.oschere, failu e of safety-related ecuinnent including nunrs , contcol wiring, air lines, water lines, and a ccess to the heat sink of the plant, all caused by the olane or debris breaking ocen the
~
b-11 dings, crushing, cutting, cr disabling the kni scent fuel or safety equipnent or control wires or lines; by fire in the wake of the plane crash; or by the plane 's being deliberately on accidentally air.ed at the fuel handling building and fuel nool(s), or the auxilia=:- building, both being unable to resist a niane 's innace as the contain2-ment might. In the event of a large plane crashin:- directly into the scent fuel building, accidental cri ticality among die fuel rods stored there could result fron sudden commaession and crushing SM,[ttp@ed the destruction of noison rods if any are tresent of fuel rods under wate"; the building itself would readily ba breached A a(16-saa a etwec and probably destroyed, in any eventg_t would be una% ble to prevent the release of radioactive material to the atnoschere, which accidental criticality of famiuel assenblics and a subsec,uent fire in the plane 's fuel following the crash would clearly enhance bv nroviding more radioactive material (fission oroducts) and a strong und aft into the air respectively. The Harris plant is close enough to the Raleigh-Durhan airport, in the general direction in which planes take off and land, to nake both accidental and terrorf st-caused plane crashes into the Harris plant a greater conszeern here than for many nuclear nlants. Expansion of Palei gh Durhan airnort is now being begun to accept larger ulanes (e.g.[kh7sandL1011s) on a new runway that is also north-south (south noints in the general direction of d1e Harris plant fron PDU airnort, i.a. the runways are uretty nuch ained at the clant, excent for a new { general aviation runway planned for snall ulanes. The la ge nunber of nearby nilitary bases also provide greater oncortunity for terrorists to divert nilitary planes to strike the Earais nlant.
-G9- RA3tOmh pgh)lTae Haaais olant is ininical to the conmon defense under temnting the U.S. Constitution in that it provides a 2nxgar.num terget in its reactors, spent fuel cool and scent fuel trans-ort is the clant fran other reacters for: terrorists, saboteurs, and hostile nations able to use a"nor-ciercing weanons, nrecision guided nunitions, cruise nissiles, ballistic nissiles , air-to-ground nissiles, nadiation-sceking missiles and othe~ means (with conventional warheads) to extlode the olant's nadioactive inventory in the core (s) on scent fuel snent or both(including f4 uel in t~ensit to the clant ) into the environment of easte"n North Carolina, doin6 unaccentabla danage to the land and neocle thereof, and th=aatening die nilitary facilities at Ft. Bragg, C.mc Lejeune, Noafolk, Seymour Johnson AFB, Cherry Point and others with ser!cus radioactive contaninction, diventing resources that may be needed fo" defense to disaster es11ef, mcking it less nossible to defend eastern North Ca=olina, and causicg other ha~a to the connen defense. The raid by Israel on a nuclear esea ch reactor in Irac, and tne destruc tion oy te=ro"ists in Frerec e of reactor cc7nonents destined for Irag, si:cw that such events are nossible. They would be tenuting to enemies of the U.S.A.
# f Issuance of licenses to crerata th e Harris rence ors, satore scent fuel from othe" "eactors the"e, or t=9nsncrt snent fuel to the Hn'r-is site and store it tnere tre ininical to the co mon defen& sewthat se41n <sAsxk bv use of the-monuelaer wearons on '297-t ne buses designed to fire crecidon-guided convent'onal exclosives into the containment several t'res, followed by n ecis6cn-cuid'.nr Swo % %2. holt N PGPS ar. AVL to con 4arr1 A+1F%m above a nuclea" warhead (H- onb) to the reactor itself (fused to ex71 ode -- proxinity f use and radiation detectors 'o= neutrons ,
-/40-cixhm,bata end ganna radistion attuned to u"anium-239, CS-137, and othe" annronrikte enittens giving a -adiatien signatur e of the reacter core, with annrotriate loEi c -- within a feu neters of tPs reactor vessel) can thus c*eate a theanonuclet*
I exnlosion including fast fissicnin6 of a considereble nort*on of the 100 tons of U-238 in the reactor itself. (It may be necessary to also blast tnrough tne reactor vessel head, cranas, and othe" itens above die core to get the the=90 nuclear benb sufficiently close to the core that a large tronortion of of the cove uranium would fiss* nn, using the core neutron reficcto-s to inc ense the amount of uranium thtt fissicrs. J.691n, this could be acconn11shed usi ng additionci ?G" wa-heads incoroo-ating conventional exnlosives, ard warhaad-guidanc e and deter.n *,f on logic thet exnlode the the- cnuclear device bero e the debris from the other explosiens dancges it. One o',vious ontion to avoid such nroblens would be to strika during a fefueling outage, the schedules for which are aublic inf ormatien in the USA. During refueling, the ecctor vessel head will be off, the core exnosed under water, and the trne of nuclear wa" head used for air-to-sea nuclear denth charges would be acle to penetrate directly to tne core , unich vorld have at least 2/3 of its U-238 nresent in the 2/3 of the fuel rods , not beinE, changed, or substantial amounts (tons ) of U-23 C in any event.) The result of the above scenar'.os is a nucler* exnlosion of nultinegaton tower, involvinE the fission of trns (e.b. to th"ow mo e neutrons forward -- at the core) of U-233, by an anproo=iate]r designed jnuclear warhead de1!ve ed to the reacto" by sn* neans above or other means (e.g. cs?" led in by a saboteur), causing nuch more n ssive destruction and fallout fron a ground burst of this magnitude, not to mentien vanorizing the enti=e radioactive inventory of 2 nuclear coras
/-
and the entive spent fuel rool.
/
'dhile. ( '1v a f ew nct'nns now PGM nossess the Guidance,gand nuclear technrlogv necessar- te do thic (e.g. USSo, Is-ael) the nu~her o." nat'.cns ele te d6 so ty the year 2600 (giving da--is a 15 year life) or 2013 (Co&L(c denreciati nr life for Har-is 2 ende then) will be much g cater.
A small nation or t carorist grnno could nake a tremendous '.mnact QW m Means of discovering the necessa-r techrolggiec enMnnad above emb by suck W are readily available to meny nr t' ons and e ven subna t' anal r Lu-s y,j) R5 such as the Palestine. L*.heration 0 ganizatien (known te enga.ce ggg ytet.$-- in terrorism, though in sc stating I ncke no judgynt as te fl.e gj justness of thei cause, for terror has aise been used ap;a'n=t a IDE tnen). Such nations and greurs include Libvo , A=centina, O I \ra Hfo r yNt
' ~
Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Korec, "aiwan, I-an, Janen, China., f ,4 W and virtually all natinns allied with the US (e.g. in NATO, A""."S) G
,fma0 who u he abla te nroduce *Le devices desca' bed abc"e bv g<b the vea" 201F i not bv 2000. Some such nat' crs a e active 1~ M 65 k Iran, etc he s l e to the US today (Libya, scvt of Czechoslova. kin ^
); ethe-s f#0/#
y 0:ald are unstable (Korea , TPiwan, Argentin9 ) and nay bacome host'le cavvy 4 OsV to the US; still o the s , e .g . US all le c , n~cride a "1r.c e a fMbiN rivcic.y-vhere te- orists could obta' n the nuelca" technolog" end c.at e-isls bouh atack, necessar" te make a nuclea" bcnb ther wr uld then mcVe, be sub- ; te-fuge o" force, ne-t to a nuc1ca" reecto" ce"e 'n- the narrores ad N lha. of extortion er terro" or calling attentien t- their cause. Fanv Rayr gjs+6<f fedofcovg [g technically sanhisticated terroristx grouns new exist, hostile WAM S14GIIs to the US, e.g. Sed Saigades of Italy, who werli not hesitate gl< clear to attack nuclear nower plants in the USA. k)EMos) Ear-is is n artic- '- V had ularly vulne-abic to f oreign terro*ists because it is in ar b lf er / isolated ~urcl location (he-J te make su"e not ene gets ner" it NC D nne nan"
- D o~ -n"' 9e secu-i'~ to tracP eve- -- nien'" o' niaces t w, j fca near it to hide and nrena"e a te"rcrist Litack) "ight next to yf 7 (Realof'a a consmonolitan location (Desearch Triancle ta-k, mafer unive - re Icte ele /dM/el y MX*/ red heh, /.j
/%z sit *es and honnitals, where it is cennon for fo eign nc+' cn91r to cone and go, which har Eood trans,ortatien cornecticrc, and which can be n 7 roached within 1 day 's cer travel of nan- international airno-te and fro 7 NC 's own seanorts, which are sna11 and it ek so"histicated and extensive secu=" ty ro ces ,
or frcn NC beaches on which terrorists could land. As d-ug-runners xhar show, NC is also in -eady reach of the Bahamas, Cuba, Jannica, cawricean nations, Colenbia, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, scne of which nat'.cns nay harbor terrorists er not exe=t full control cver tneir territory (e.c. areas enr-trolled by drag-growers in Colonbia, Jancica, etc . ) and thus j could not n event te ro-ists using their 1cnd as a base for long enough to n-enare the requisite nuclea- device (or
. all its parts) and then transno-t sane to Nnrth Carolina by air o" b' sea, cuite "ossibl-r undetected. The onen a ea.
2"nund the Harris nlant provides nienty of snace fo= a clane to land; a seanlane co uld 1snd on the Ha--is lake; the woods around the Ha"~is site crovide gcod cover 'or te"rorists ; finally, CD&L's gene =al lower connetence, d=ug use aneng guards at Harris, inadeauate secu-ity -lans (which do nct include neans tc Jetect the ac croach of sneciel. nuclea-materials carried into the olant for terrorist nurnoses) and other weaknesses of CD&L nake He-"is a tenntinr targ~et
~
Q4d l' Cl4Af Id e#fJ fo= nuclear terrorism as outlined above. A
I l
. . I I
- / 4_2 -
f Jh Annlicants ' security plan for the Harris site f s deficient A B in that it ( ) nay not now exis t (f)doesnot nrovide adequate defense against terrorists arned with nodern military equinnent which nay come, e.g. from nations backing terrorisn against the USA, such er the USSR, Libya, Iran and others(The USSR has su,nlied anti-ai-craf t rockets to terrorista in Italy. Such rockets could severely danage the snent fuel building and pools, the cooling towers, the auxiliary buildings, the transformer yard and other facilities at Hr.rris, of ble.st open a truck or rail cesk carrying nuclear wastes to or fron the Harris site (snent reactor fuel from CPLL's Brunswick and Robinson reactors is such a waste)) (C) does not cro vide adequate defense against terrorists using redern nilitarv eauinnent dive *ted from military bases in North Carolina including Ft. Bragg (82d airborne and Green Beret units with light and heavy weanons including nachine guns, grenades, mo-tars, subnachine guns , bazookas , antitank nissiles, nrecision guided bonbs, helicanter gunshins, plastic ernlosives, and cuite likely incanacitating gases such as BZ and nerve gases ), CampLe jeune (Marine Corns , stocking all the tynes of wearons listed fcr Ft. Bragg and also equinnent for waterbe-na assaults, e.g. inflatable raf ts ), Seymour Johnson AFB (aircraf t with air-to-ground nis siles, air-to-air nissiles, nrecision guided bonbs and other nunitions), Cherry Point Naval Air Station (same ecuinnent l nlus air-sea rescue equipnent that could be used to mount an attack). We also have. nearby Newport News Va naval base and Fort Jackson, ".C and Myrtle Beach AFB which also stock all of the weanons listed above. l l Weanons thef ts fron U ese nilitary bases do occur. (D) does not nvovide 1 assurance that terrorists will not be able to enter the mient by air, xmanam water or land, e.g. by parachute, heliconter, raft 1 k vehicles, and once Lfoinside bffegdMIdanage ofdestroy ken safety ecul y .- 4 tec4ghet ' or the snent fuel building or the reactor's heat sinks and access to
'/h "
these heat sinks; (F) does not nrovide assurance that control roon eersonnel and clant security can function if the plant is attacked by terrorists using incapacitating gases obtained fron military or civilian sources, donestic or foreign, including halkucinoEens, (( g5 OT+- 6A % Wpg cwt cc.l OWS 6sc & W OsSK4 W N% g,g.,I nerve Bases CS of CN tear ges, nustard gas, chlorine, STP, LSD, DtIT, VCGduza N Sarin, Tabun, or vomiting gases of the tyce used by the US nilitary h0! fM6ued in Vietnan; (F) does not provide means, by security or strenghthur W So uM or otherwise, to prevent the spent fuel pool (s) fron losing their water supply and having their containnent breached by attack with precision-guided nunitions including rockets, anti-tank rockets, guided bonbs, guided incendiary bonbs (napanin, etc), armor piercing rockets, shells and nortar shells designed to nenetrate arnor or reinforced concerete, etc. One credible scenario is for dr.e ter"orists, establishinE cosition anywhere within 3 kn, to fire one PGM or other explosive device to breach the spent fuel building wall or roof, and then to fire others af ter it, going through the hole nade by the first a10r later rounds to wreck the spent fuel itself, releasing radioactive material to the atmosehere. PGM's or other exnlosives could also befired at the water lines supplying the fuel nools, at the oungs for this water sunoly, at the cooling towers (exolosions near the base niE ht well cause collause with only 2 or 3 rounds hitting each i ihm tower, at the autxiliary building, or at tho transforner yard and switchyard (which would lead to loss of off site pcwer) . several rounds of PGM or nortar fire could be fired by only a few cersons within one minute, certa'nly within two ninutes, before security could reasonably be expected to react and ston daen. (G) Aunlicarts ' M security plan fails to take stens to exau%htpaethebrifingofclastic exolosives or other high exolosive onto the olant site by saboteurs t l among Anolicants', contractors', or other eersonnel (e.g. visitors) such exolosives could be olanted next to or on or under punchs,
dh water lines, fuel handling building walls, aia lines, elect-ical control cable trays, or other eculonent outside containnent; during steam generator insnecticn and renairs, orir.ary and secc ndary niring inside containment, the stean generators thenselves, the reacter, t reactor coolang nunps, pressurizer, and cdaer equinnent could be
" mined" witt: exnlosives brought onto site by saboteurs. Such exnlosives, however they got in niace, could then be detenated by chemical or electrical neans including slow chemical reaction fuses, a nowerful spring in acid held bcek by a thin wire the acid eats away, letting the spring hit a dienical detonator, batteries, or even initiation from plant wiring, e.g. when the ECCS cenas on, the control impulse fo start the notors for the ECCS nunn(s) could also have been surroetitiously wired to set off explosives that would- disable the cunn(s) or break the nines car ying cooling water to the reactor or do other damage. All of the above are means of inducing multinle failures in safety-related sys tens and other systens, which can credibly lead to releases of radioactive material to the atnosnhere, e.g. by ores _ venting core cooling leading to a neltdown, by causing na.*sive sudden f ailure of stean generator tubes fron an exolosion inside the stean generator, leading to a LOCA and neltdown, narticularly if it were done on all the stean generators, or by blasting I onen the eculpment hatch in the containnent, under any of the above circumstances, either internally by exnlosives or from the cutside with mortars,- missiles or precisden guided nunit! cns including rockets, armor-piercing and anti-tank "GMs, and precismicn guided bombs.
(H) Applicants cx ' securi SES 0ty planCM*SMG f HGilu f ails to assure OtR W that high exni)csives, poisongases,}or%h th active chemicals of inary ne%a-fRSLS (*) (EesCM rve gases (harnl s r individually but reacting ta forn the nerve gas, which is absorbed through the skin and deadly to anyone without the antidote (atronine sulfate or sinilar chemical) are not brouEh t into the control vaon
14 6 - of the reactor, where all one-ators could be totally
- ncanacite ted by nerve gas, noison gas or explosion released withcut warning, and a seboteur with approcriate ecuinnent and nrenaratien (c.E-atronine sulfate injectien, gas nask nade to exclude the noisen gas used, air nack, etc) would then be free to destroy the control systen of the power plant, turn off circule ting water to the snent fuel pools, or erogran the connuter or nanually onen vents, valves and bypasses to filters, was te gas tanks, liquid waste tanks, etc.
to as to deliberately release radioactive naterial to the atr.osrhere. For exannle , the control rod banks could all be withdrawn, and the SCPj M systen disabled, and the relief valve on the pressurizer opened, leading to an extrene power excursion accident beyond the limits of a normal ATWS (eso if bleek valves to the FCCS and borated water systen were also closed by the asboteur or accennlices ) which dould eitner blast the reactor vessel head through centa!nnent (APS,1975) or release radiation to the atnos here (and ra dica c ti ve natevial) darough valves and vents deliberately onened for that ournose. Pany other such sequences of destructive events could te ca""ied out bv saboteurs, and I an uncble to desc"1be then all, though I have outlined a nunber of neans and events and secuences that cculd hanpen, which the security nlan does not have neans *^ prevent. (I) Anplicants' security plan fails to take sufficient measures 52g [ nnfo N'h Ce T2 -05" af to orevent the use of drugs by personnel on duty,j nc1 ding seccrity 3ff9g personnel, operators, supervisors, technicians and all other persons with access to safety-related ecuinnent or to the controlli lines to and fecn such equienent or to and fran such eculpnent and the IC3 or control reon or instrunentation needed for s afety functions to be cawried out. Soecific drugs that can alter derformance or innair
'l$h' mental functioning or notor functior.ing of cersonnel include alcohcl, PCP, DMT, LSD, STP, rz narijuana, hashish, and cresc-ipti on decressants such as Tainal, barbiturates, and a host of othen readily available legal and illegal drugs. Recortedly, such d=ugs are used on the plant site at present by numbers cf necole an while carrying on cons'ruction work (or before working), and this is evidence that .
the nicnt security systen is unable to detect these daugs being brouE h t onto the plant site and is unable to nrevent their use by nersonnel who nust be alcrt and in full possession of their normal faculties to nronerly do e.eir jobs. The risks of havinc drug-affected personnel controlling a nuclear plant, resnonsible for its security, or nerforning incortRnt functions Such aS tests Dg and natntaining equipment, veading instrunents, onening and closing valves, bypassing safety equipment and controls for tests, etc. are strikingly obvious. Drugs can cause or con,ound hun 9n e=ror, particularly alcohol and hallucinogens and depressants, a s is well known. It is obvious that onerator error could incair the safety functions of the niant, e.g. by hitting the wrong switch, reading an instrunent wrongly and act?.ng on thtt infornation, etc. If en accident occurs and drug-taking personnel have to res,ond to it, they are likely to nake nore mistakes uhich nake the accident ro=e serious. For exannle, an onerator using alcohol or dennessants night fall into a centrol canel af ter a reactor trin, sending any nunber of spurious signals to equipnent, all of which would have to be recognized and cor ected at the sane time that other safetv-related actions required by nroper nrocedu"e wculd have to be taken. The result could well be an error in not taking a reeutred acticn or notcorrect'.ng an erroneous signal caused by the f alling ne son cr, e.6. their arn grabbing for sunport. For exannle , if the reactor trieped .and the falling onerator (or other p erson in the con rol roon)
-Wr-cut off the feedwater to the stean generstors and also caused a snurious water hamner in sor.e control lines, it night be that the s,uricus signals would isolate the FCCS and RER systems sinultanecusly. The operator (s) would have to act very fast with impecccble accu =acy to detect and correct all these problens before the stean generators toiled dry, as thc reacto" oressurizer relief valves wculd also probably be opening due to overnressure in the nr' nary syster.
Certaf nly the oonrators wculd need all their wits about Sae- to avoid another Three Mile Island tyne event. If the odr.er one=atorn had also been using drugs tha t incaired thei= a bilities, ther ".ight not be able te nrevent severe danaEe to t he core and release of ve dio-activity offsite, e.g. through a containment nenetratf on not closed when they were correcting all the other enrows to get the =eactnr cooled again. And of course, drug-taking s ecurity gua-ds wo uld be that much less abic to cope with ter-orists under secticns BCDEyand G here'n. (J) Aeolicants ' s e c'Iri t7 nlanYdoe s not take stens s ufficient
~ ~ GNist%Cy NG f(DCLAsdeS 0*J4 fofilies of()J-L to orevent onerators or other nersennel . ron,using drugs to stay awake, carticularly when they are on trotating shifts that cl.ange their tine of work once a week or once a mc nth or more often.
The US Arny has concluded that the use of such drugs can innair decision =aking ability, leavin6 versons nove panicky and rrone te take sudden and risky ections in an ener6ency. Thus, the ue,e of stimulant drugs (" pard speed", dexedrine, anchetanine, etc., even caffeine in large amounts) can inpair dn e ability of recnie to operate and to control the plant safely.
, Ic l
# e5'!s' 1e 1 =o 181e tu t a aerieee isa ter =1eeer/t?'
=11et ,ieht fire on the Harris nlant with air-to-ground nissiles. Many of these nissiles used by the military are designed tc nenetrate he ad tarFets such as tanks, concrete bunkers, etc. Therefore, these missiles would be able to breach the scent fuel building (fuel hanc ing build".ng) and release radioactivity to the environnent, e.g. by ex,loding inside the scent fuel building on a second hit. (Though nilitary act'.an against the Harris plant is also possible with the sane consequences as noted here, I am referring to actf ons by US or foreign military nilots flying with live wea,ons in neacetine tranin6 or other nissions in this area, where there are seveval air bases -- My-tle Beach AFB, Seynour Johnson AFB and Cherry Point Naval Air Station xx, e.g. --
within shovt flying tines of the Harris nlant si te. Pilot e==or or connuter error could also cause a nissile to take off et the nuclear clant, waxhanxx and if it were a crecis' en-guided missile it would erobably strike its target directly). Such air-to-ground missiles couli also breach containnent and danage on destroy the reactor presser essel and nr1 mary systen. Aanlicants ' FSA9, safety analysis and accident analysis are deficient in not addressing such risks and the consecuences of niss'les hitting the Harris plant or any narts of it, including also the ecoling towers, auxiliary building, water lines to and from the cooling towers (though underground, they could be breached or filled by a collanse caused by an exnlosion on the surface), switchyard and offsite nower transmission facilities. This event nay be incrobable, but s u=ely not below tha orobability that A,nlicants clain attends severe core-nelt accidents breaching containment, which events will hava sinilar ernsecuences to the nublic health and safety as a nissile attack on the Harris nlant by a n'litaay nilot gone insane (at least ten,orar 117) or by erroneous firing of a nissile at dae clant. Class IX accidents includinE the ones described here nust be censidered to nrotect the public.
- '5 0 -
slan is deficient beceuse Anolicants' Br.ergency Resnonse y ,(([7 b rs of d:e nublic - it f ails te nrovide for medical care for nen e ident, a.C. injured by radiation offsite during a nuclear acc 137 af ter a core nelt thoso exnosed to high ganna doses fron CS- l The plan fails to nrovide for such g with breach of containment. Wt clans to utilize caro on a nobile basis during evecuation, gg the niant in case nearer facilities outside a 30 mile radius arcun bec evacuated. facilities themselves are contaninated and quenhave is of to , The nian f ails torelaase takeofinto account the nadical conse nore than 20% of the core inventcry a Class IX accident, i nt (e.g. through a vessel head being thrust fthrough 1975, or conta fren nne as detailed in American Physical Society renort o he vessel f ast fracture of the reactor vessel with h it) orcarts cf t nrovide striking containment with enough force to b*eac
~
hich include: treatment plans for daese nedical consequences w thyroid, burns radiation sickness, iodine-induced injury to the noisoning radiation and inflanmation cf the resniratory tract, uences fron ingesti ng contaninated food or water; and othe" consec ch as the fallout ty,1 cal of la-ce radioactive material releases su The plan does not assure that fron nuclear bonb er. plosions. ilable enough nedical facilities are availa' ole or would be ava s of a Class IX to treat the victims of these nedical consecuence e.g. earthquake, accident as detailed above or f ren any other cause, ilure, to"nado, sabotage , terrorisn, connon node failure , ICC f a I l l ATWS.
-/5/ -
Annlicants ' Energency Resconse nian (and the State of NC/ y jy'}' FEMA elan) for dealing with the offsite effects of nuclear accidents - particularly those veleasing radi: active naterial such as I-131, I-129, I-133, Cs-137, Cs-134, Sr-90, y-90, Rb-90, Kr-85, Kr-87, Xe-133, ?u-239, Em-lh7, CO-60, Ni-59,0c-99 and any other fission products or activatier E nroducts (e.g. C-lh, N-16, Co-60, Nb-9k) found in the erinary coolant , secondary r: actor systen, fuel rods, fuel pelle ts , ninin , /Cr atmo sehere, for coolant and/or filters and* holdue tsnke and ' waste processing tanks
/l in liquid, aerosol, gaseous, particulate or solid form or outside containnent and/or outside the plant site boundary, exclusion zone,, Jow-conulation zone is inadecuate to protect the health and safety of the nublic and is deficient and in error because:
A. It doesn't yet exist
- 3. It doesn't include realistic estir.ates of the effecte of Class IX accidents as recuired by 12xeEMx5fx the fact that such an accident hcs occurred 7 d WNb'la C. The Emergency ?lanning Zone is not accropriately set under lo CFR 50 Anpendix E (see e.g. at I, note 2 "in relaticn to local emergency resoonse needs and cacabilities as the~ are affected by such condit' ons as denograrhy, tonogr$nhy, land characteristics, sanc language at II. )
access routes and jurisdicticnal boundaries", in that it does not address the suecific needs of natients at FC Memorial hosakital(Cnanel Hill), Duke Hoseital (Durhan), Acex hosnital (Durhan) (Apex), Rn Wake Medical in Rale'gh, Durham County General Host. ( who are more likely to be elderly, infants, and with weakened bodily " defenses against radiaticn; does not deal with the snecific needs rison and provide means for evacuation of the innates at Central c (Raleigh), Dix Hospital (Raleigh), and the jails in Durhan, Raleigh
/f 2 -
and chanel Hill; dces not address or nrovide for the needs of and evacuation of and shelter for the students of UCCentral University and Duke University in Durhar., UNC in Chacel Hill, NC State University, Mer6dith College, Shaw University, Peace College and other eclieges and unive*sitiee in Paleigh, these being large concentrations of people under about 25 years of aEe for whom dose connitment fren radioactive releases poses greater risks (as detailed, e.g., in Gofman, Raidiation and Human health, e.g. at P85-2SS and Chapter 8 generally showing higher levels of cancer induction and loss-of-11fe-ex7ectanc7 for those under age 25); does not address or orovide for the special nrotection needs of children unde
- the ages of 6, ne" sons under the age of 18, or nregnant wonen, all of when face much greater cancer risk cer rem or rad received (see, e.g.,
Gofnan's book cited above, Tables 21 & 22 for those age 0 and up, Chanter El pc 707-759 es7. Table 6P, Table 66,pn 738-9 on gestationa] aEe causing nore defects at early part of gestation, also 7h6, and Ch. 22 on genetic and chromosonal effects), greater risk of nental retardation, disease, Senetic defects; does not realistically estinate notification and evacuation times for an accident occurring between P.idnid ht and 6 a.n. , though evidence shows many kinds of industrial accidents ha, pen on the " graveyard shift" during those tines due to imneired reaction and dainking ability of emnloyees -- e.g. TMI-2 accident initiated at h a.m., ergo exoosing the nopulation to greater risk because they cannot be effectively notified and noved as racidiv ~ during the night hours nanad; does not ,rovide for effects outside 10 -iles jas far as evacuation is concerne thoughA Eff Of fDted1hal rmerMum r2tdiafte e edy, 'd.
- Ger. Institute for Reactor Safety 9e9o=N'e#290
[ th31 (FFC translation thth fata -L%Fh161) using Rasmussen assumnt*.cns on core relea%4, drejlects "adiatien 4 4 dose a[31-33,Tobk841*/f exnosed us" sons Tmiles fron the site ( [ + hours clune motion x NC wind steed of 7+ mph (Harris meteorological monitoring
-153-data) vs. Gornan assumd wind socod pe(ps2 of gjh)(,.ep h)Dgcay of radionuclides in the niune is governed by hours in transnort, as is lateral diffusien that increases the width of thek niune l Th# bo&L NOStS GkON [39,an doe s no:Ibrd)
The rana evacuation pi Qftlneeds address the _W of tS40'fE the <RISCPl~$ Town of Chanel Hill as exuressed in the renort of its Mayor's Task //apg Force on the Incact of the Shearon Harris riant, does ne t fund the evacuation and energency planning for ie State and nearby conaunities, thus incosing costs on then without ec .nensation, c.nd Thunzaxmansf7==rgmacgr. failing to recognize their needs as set forth in the Task Force renort for independent nonito"ing, cronnt warning, and sufficient means to evacuate the conulation should that become necessary (all of these due to vadioactive releases fren the Harris plant). D. The olan has other specific deficiencies which can only be deternined af ter I have seen a cony of it, narticularly in terns of cersonnel traxining, nanning of agencies needed to assist in enerFency resconse (e.g. city governments, fire denartnents, Highway Patrol, colice, health, hoscital energency roons , etc) on a 2h-hour basis, tines and nethods of evacuation, means of locating the niune and assessing its dange"s (e.g. because there a-e no cressurized ionization nonitors on'it and no instrudents able to trace its direction off-site in niace f The cost of naintaining and creating energency response l plans for the Harris nuclear clant, testing sane as recuired by 10 CFR 1 l 90.h7 and 10 CFR $0 Aupendix E, has been innronerly a left out of Applicants ' cpst-benefit analysis under NEPA and 10 CF" 51.21. l Inclusion of these costs would rander the clant even more uneconomical I than it otherwise is , and are another reason ! t should not be licensed. l
- 15n
%su% SNMP
- } lh Aoplicants' " safety analysia" is deficient in that it nakes (numerical forobability or rance of rrobabilities '
no attempt to assess the actual likelihood of the named accidents; it uses no data on actual ooerating experience in the nuclear industry or in ohher industries or fields where contarable equienent or oeeratiers and/or similar equipment or operations are carried out; it fails to cor. sider Class IX accidents either in terns of onsite hazards, or of offsite effects, or of evacuation and emergency resnonse planning, or of costs which such an accident could cause both offsite and onsite, or in terms of the effect of such accidents on the safety-related (as defined by NRC) and "non-safety" equipment such as air lines, power supolies, wiring, instrunentation, sytyches,relaysandother equipment and parts inside containment which are necessary to nake safety-related equinment function croperly, or which must not malfunction if safety-related equipment is to operate croperly (e.g. without CauSat,-eag. % kuw Aw in r+sateW:2:s s'4durv of mnovy wNoks interference fron suurious control inculsesjof air, water or electricity, erroneous signals from the Integdated Control Systen; short-circuits; or breaks in control ai" lines, water lines, urerelectric which then transmit erroneous signals or fail to transnit necessary signals; valves which must not stick open or fail closed,e.g. in the water suonlies to each component of the ECCS, and valves controlling flow of borated water to the core). The " safety analysis" further fails to consider the survivability and accuracy of instrumentation in a Class IX sceident. Three Mile Island 2 ("TMI") showed that accurate readings of water levels in-core, tenneratures in-core, urimary system t.' essure and tenperature, and nuch other data is required for appropriate action to be taken (and erroneous actions to be avoided) by the operatxamamors of a pressurized water reactor. Yet there is no analysis and no assurance (based on tests under conparable conditions to a Class IX accident inside containnent --
-/5r -
boron to the core in sufficient amounts to bring the reactor under centrol, resulting in extrer.e overpressure and loss of nrinary conta* nnent integrity or loss of the reacter vessel head or reactor vessel firectuve or stean-Senerator tube or tube-sheet failu=e, all of which Class IX accidents listed on this and the creceding tage would produce high temoeratures and pressures, extrere radiation levels, and possibly other effects such as shrapnel flying in or through the containment (e b .b vessel head and parts of the venetor passing through the containment wall or ceiling), major connonents falling from supports due to support failure or due to extreme loading eroduced by sudden failure of the reactor vessel, nipe breaks, etc. oroducing large thrusts as the primary coolant is released, and othev ' and equinnent severe conditions) that the instruments and controls [4nside containment will be adequate (or adeauately orotected)so that they can brin 6 the reactor under control or contain the radioactive naterip.1 inside containment under these Class IX accident conditions in the event that the accident itself does not breach containnent. In other wo"ds, there is no nttenet to show that the x instrumentation, controls, transmission of control information and instrunent readings, ECCS and other sifety -relate d equipnent inside centainnent can continue [ to function under Class IX accident conditions and br' ng the accident under control or contain radioactive naterial inside containmort if the Class IX accident is not so severe that it destroys centainnent l integrity, or does not permanently breach containment.
IS6 - e.g. fast fracture of the reactor vessel with or without thernal shock; loss of the reactor vessel head due to bolt failure or over-oressure (from ATWS or otherwise fron transients or failure to control pressure in the prinary systen, e.g. by failure of relief valves, whose behavior is not6riously uncredicatable, or by blocking valves being closed at inappropriate times due to human error, valve faflure, or beinE allowed to be closed under the technical specifications or operating activities of the p1Ent when the redundant systen(s) or valves serving the same function fail or are unable to ooerate for lack of oower sunoly, fron erroneous signals > ron human er*orf frcn the effects of corrosionf fron sourious computer-generated x6 signals due to, e.g. a fire in or near the conputer, water soilled or sprayed on the connuter (ICS), coffee or other beverage soilled on the ICS comouter or into it or onto its wiring; failures of comoonents $n the ICS co . outer, e.g. logic circuits, supervisorv orogranning errors, other progran er-ors, inteErated circuits, transistors, diodes, capacitors, inductors, delay lines and other eculonent wearing out or suddenly failing (all these events do hanoen in connuters); sourious signals resulting fron wiring acting as an attenna and nicking up, e.g. radio, television, and 2-way radio broadcasts; electrical inculses fron blasting with exolosives in rock near the site; and o-her causes to be soecified in more detail (as all these can be) after discovery); reactor vessel failure caused by any of the sourtous signals and other eroblens just listed; oice breaks caused by water hamners and/or stean hanmers; steam generator tube-sheet failure; sinultaneous ruuture of 2 or more stean genevator s&ch tubes (or nearly sinultaneous ruuture of 2 or nore gpag tubes); snall-break or large-break LOCAs acconcanied bv failu"e of ECCS; control rod ejection of nore than 2 rods; centrni rod ejection acconcanied by failure of borated water sys ten to function to get
/,$f ) ~~~
#[khManyofthemenbersofNCEastern"unicinalSoverAgency (NC'4?A #3, or Agency) are sns11 tewns of linf ted financial rescurces. As such,
- heir abilitw tn finar:e thei sha-e of coerating and rcrair costs is in doubt, as shown, e.F. by the default orovisions of Agency's contrac*s with CP&L, including one in connact!nn wi'.h the sale of Agenc-'s bonds that orovides for othe nenbens of Agene- to c.sstnc the carnents recuired of earties in default (Rmembers of Acancv) to the e:: tent of 20% of the total onynents required of Agenc*.
To assure the health and s afety of the ,ubli c , An-licar te nust be able to afford in a timelv manner the er sts of renairs, nodifications, training, renlacement and new ca-ts, equinnert, filters, personnel and other things necessarv to o,er .te the Harris clant. Such oaynents ney not be able to be ne ie bv the small members of NCE"?A (witness the default of sc e small members of WPDSS) due to thei- limited financial resources, small coeulations, small industrial base, and relativelv noor aooulations which cannot afford elect-ic b*11s raised te any level necessarv to r cove- nnt oni" harris costs but costs of recairs and modificatiens etc. (as no'ed above) at 3runswick, which AEency owns abcut 18% of, c.s co na ed to just under 16% of Har-is (15.9hd cf Units 1 and 2). The towns of Hertfc-d, Hobgood, Hookerton, Pikeville, Red Surings, Ro berse nvill e , Scotland :Teck, Selna, Southnort, ARR Ay d en , 3enson, Selhaven, Cleyten, Ftrnville, Fremont and Hamilton are anong such nenbers of Agency as may not be able to afford their share of ornjact operating and recair costs for Harris and Brunswick sinul-taneously, this inoeriling the health and safety of the public. and subjecting the nub 13 e to increased risks.
8 0
-/h$- #shfSh:!PD'scoweroutnut is not naeded er the C'&L syste-because; (1) CP&L load coreenets have declined frc~.10.lC ne-year growth crediction ir 1773, to 6.6-6.7% ner vear at the C.P. hearing, to 2.9% cer yea- at thi s time o# the do cket' ng of the E3 and FSAD, and will cont'nue to decline based enn rising , comoetition f"cn othe" erergy ocu ces ,
inability of nuclee." clants to nerform or be reliable on neak searonal denand times in a consistent nanner, and other reasons. The rate of decline in CD&L forecasts can be seen to be 0.85% cer year ne yea.r 3973-77 and 0.926 ne- +ea- ce- vaa- Ic77-81 (0.9% re year 1973-81) under the sane ccnditions that w'.11 crevail in the future. (Note that CP&L's fc ecasts assune the econony will recover fully from the current necession and other recessions and continue to grow significantly -- and all sucP forecasts notec above have made this assunction exnlic'tir er inclicitly). At this lone-run rate of decline in CPel lond forecasts, zero growth will occur in anoroxinately 198h-85: that is, if loed forecasts cont
- rue to decline as they have historically since 1973 for CP&L on a basienlly uniform trend (b.. red on the energy /econony situation n evailing since 1973 and CP&L's esticates as above), CP&L's g forecast of long-tern demand growth w".11 hit eero or below in 198h or 1985.
1985 is the n-ojected first date of oneration -r nar-is, and CP&L reserves w/o dar-is in 1085 are nro,'ected bv CD&L at 20.67 (TLble 1 3-1, T9, the nes t cur ent ' nformatien now ava". lable when this i entention is filed). (2) CP&L's baseload cacability w/o narris will be 9300 eleclareS e MS (eg. E-ICC/32,IW MW by 1983 and 6000 MW by 1991. NCUC M 4 base capab*lity t (gene-ating cr ability inel rese-ver ) should be 50% otal cower reso urces opak loa'ds are not n-ojected of 6 but CP&L_03 less ereserve :-Qg rw , to reach 64 (twice 5300)A before the year 199], nor 12000
($5N? MW 1ess 20% rese"ve (10000 MW peak load) befo"e the year 1997 l ever at' CP&L's current neak pro ject'crs, which tre Sco high 000 or as shewn above in (1). If 1800 MU f"om Ha ris ve-e added to these azzf az base load canabild ties, it vould aeouire a nc4V lotd of 10,300 MW in 1985-99,11800 Ma in 1990 01, and 13000 MW after 1992 for be utilizing Harvis fo~ base load
'unier the NCUC declaramatier. and finding cited above. Such a load (13000 MW) is not crojected f.or the CF&L systen, even at CP&L's current forecast which is tec high, befo-e the ear 201h when Harris's , depreciation life will be over. There is s}innly no naed for herris as banelcad nowe" u' thin its o"erating cnd depreciatinn lifetine ad realisticellr est inated (25 years or less).
(3) CP&L generated over 22 billion KWH with coal in both 1980 end 1981. In 1978, when CPAL's nuclear clants werkei (once) at the 70% cecacity factor CP&L cla* ms they will (it's been down tc the 30% range since), those gene =ated nea-1v 1h billion KdH. CP&L hydro can runo17 nearly 1 billion KWH ne"
- ear, with oil generatien naking un the diffe"ence boxbetween actual hydro Eeneratien and 1 billion. This total cresent generating outnut reasonably exnected if C?hL's esiting nukes we-k as CPh.L clains ther (and Harris) will) is thus 37 billion KWH /rea".
Subtract 6% fo" losses and concany use, you have around 3F billion. The outnut of Me o 1, scheduled for 1983, net of sane 6f loss /cc. use, is estinated to i be about 3 billion additional KWH by CPhL. This b*ings us to 33 billion KdH available for customer use w/o Harris (plus 3 billion move in 1091 ffron Maio 2). CP&L actual sales in 1981 were 30.5 billion KUE and the 1978-81 growth in sales was at 3% uer yea" or less, cennounded, call it 3% linear. At this rate of growth, CD&L has adecuate gene at$nn
[f o - to neet all sales reouirenents f re m its own resources th-ough 1990.without Harris 1 and 2 and wi dr.out Ma o 2. 'dhen "eyo 2 (1991) delive" comes on, CP&L will be abl e to gn:re::txts h1 bill.' on EE year / frr-its existing niants to its cu.=tomers, enough 'or demands th-u 199k at the 1078-81 growth rate in CohL sales. '!o re o ve" , th's growth rate is higher than can be ex sected in the future. C"hL's sales growth " ate has been dronning (as esti ated by C?&L) x just about as f ast as its lord forecase, and should F it zere by 1086 or earlier if the t" ends and condit* cns that cause the , declir,e in CP&L cetinates $ncre efficient use of el ectr' c.!ty, alternatives, connetition fron other energy scu cer, etc.) continue to act as they have 1973-81. (Yes, this assumes 705 nuclear CF fren B"unswick and "obinson in the 1935-9E reriod. CP&L claims it will aihieve same, thru recairs and stean gen. reolacenent, etc. imnroving t ho se clants. I can use C?&? 's c1cins to incesch their 0.L. anulication. And if these niants ccn't achieve 70:1 C.F. then da==is shculdn't be built anyway, because it is even less likely to achieve 70d D " C.F. due to additicnal reguletiens and TMI rec its, which rende" Ha=ris costs create = than its benefits, ns discussed in othe= sens*nte cententions herein) e
[7 [ _
# h() SHNP? concletion fran the cu rent stage of crnstruct'on violates NEPA in that there is at least one alternative (a c tua11r a conLination of citernatives) econonically and anvironnentally superior to said concletion. Said alte" native is a ccnb' nation of insulation, conservation, efficiency-innrovenents in the use of electricity for end-uses such as nr tor drive, heet, ccoling, insulat!ng E:
lighting etc, avo' ding need for hae. ting and enoling viag=eflective roofing, sunner shading, vines, t*cas, sh-ubs annirgs etc., use of thernal storage to flatten daily losd variations (naking existing C?&L baseload carability of h600 !.rd and Mero 1 e t abnur 700 M'J MDC go f arther), use of s cls- heat' ng 'n v' nte , gas cuel to urovide backun heat for electric heat nunns (instead nf electric "esistence backun wLid. greatly reise s reak demand ) with the gas bei ng derived from both conventienal scurcas and renew 9ble s such r s sewage, biomass, etc.; use of clenbc1 fuels and biensss for electricitv nroduction and heating di"ectly, including alcohel distilled vith waste heat frcn e7'9'ing C"&T_ coal-fired neue" elents and o ther neans. See, e.g. Eddleman and exhibits test * ~cnyp in NCUC docke ts E-100 sub LO, E-2 sub h16, E-hl end T-2 sub h36, in all of which I was recorn*7.cd as ar exue-t 'r enewsy syster.s and energv cc rse=vc tion; eee also test' men" cf G.G. Raeves, NCUC E-100 sub 3.< and M-100 sub 78; Cain Enende-Cc . nrcsentation to ECUC, E-100 sub 78, E-1^0 sub 32; A.3. Lovinxs, Sof t Energy Faths , The Energy Cent"ovarsy, reefiled test'~enr before A2L3 in this case (1977, Tr. ), etc. l The c ost cf said above crograms is estincted at $1.1 billion to create over 11 billion KJh o" ene gr savings ard ove" 23n0 MW reduction in neak demand on the C?! L system (E"dicma- Toble 6 and discussion in E-2 sub E16 s unrarizes same ) which is twn
/
g _- Harris units' outnut' at 70% DE" CF (C?kL 's unreal'stically hign acsunntion) and nore tnan 3 narais units cont-ibution to neak (cenerating units -eoui e reae"ves of 20% accc-d'ng to NCUC and Col:L; thuc, a 900 v3 Ha=ris unit eally is only 000/1.20 cont-ibut'or to na9Y Ic* d , or 7[O EfJe ; 3 :- th'. s is 2250 M fe) nheness " educt' ons in ceak load (tha 2300 !TI) recui e no rese"ves. Thus, for the .c billion dollars still to be ex, ended to connlete Harris 1 (assunire cons *ruct' on costs don't -ise f u-th e= 1, abcut 2/3 of the soc vo ene gr c rscrvatinn, eff'c'ance end othe" alte" natives ("cackage" er the ove=sil al te rct've) could be had. For the 1.6 billion no e nere neaded tn ec-,lete both Harris 1 and 2, the ent' e alternative nackage co uld be bought, even if its neice rose ab-ut 50%. ncde available f or new uce t And the alternative Provides no-e ene*gy :n dg o"e a' d in neeting ceak denand tncn could narris land 2 tngetuar ct anti-istic assunntions about their neaformance. Further, the alte" native n .ckage involves lowe" onerating and naintenance costs than darais, n= educes no nuclea- vastes which nust be isolated and eronerly ditnosed of to avoid end2r-gering the health and se f at of the nublic. loverc elect *ic bills (connared to what they would othe-wise be) inster.J of raising then, has less effect on the environnent, wrovides far no e jcbs ( jobs ner dollar 'nver.ted in conse* vat'.on, solr= and ene gr efficiency eve 3 or E times job cer dollar invested in nuclear construction) which jobs are ones "e ui-ing less skill than nuclear ccns truction, and tLus are nore obla tr reduce unennlcynent anong less-skillad and voung wo"kcar and such cersons seeking jobs in Nordr. Carolina, nrovides the benefits of keecing noney in tne NC econeny (CPcL stock is abcut
3 [3_ 6F% owned out-of-$5te whereas the packcge would be owned in-state, provides the benefits cf energ7 conservatien ar d less use cf energy required te neet needs, nrovides the benefit o" ut'11:- ing "eneuable rercurces, the benefit of allowing reo-le and cener.nies and building owners to nore fully centrol thei energr costs and te particinate in meeting the* r energ" needs, " educes treatment f acf lities e nd the collution burden on local were",gsun-lies (by using methane derived fron westes which would othe-wise h9ve to be traated or using nurchased eleckwicity(and/ oxygen) and which w~:1d be ox'i' ed 'n s t=aans and =ive-s tPnt 5= ovide vr'e= te othe-use~s including city we.te- systens), educes the inract of nucisa= waste transnortation and renrocessirg on the environnent b~ reducirg the anount of waste roduced, -aduces or elinine t es the sociological and socioeconenic air.nact of nsychological stress associated v' th e nd causec br the cme-atien of nucle n-nover 71 ants, nrovides narticular banefi*s s ocioeccnonic all" to the noor and those on fixed incenes (whose one gy b'lls e-e a najor cortien of available funds they hcVe, who have te choose now between heating and medication, or between heating and food, many of whon live in electrically-heated housing, ounad or ren ted) who would have energy innrovements in thai = dwellings financed , by the nackaEe, and thus orovides far more environnen*a.1 benefs l (including jobs, income to workers nn the j obs, keaning nnner in the local eccro-r) ani lowe= co s's , and will do no*e 'n sunnlying electrical energ- for new needn and in meeting neak dencnd, th9n connletion cf the Har-is pro ject from whewe it ocw stands can do. The alternative neckaEe being envidently sune=ior unie- N PA to Harris concletion, I nove the Board to (1) susnend Harrir construction ASAP and (2) schedule an exnedited hea=ing or this contention.
ebk- . i wwu %f ? Arnlicants have gx not included ' n their cos t-benefit analysis under FE?A nor in their FSAR, accurate and un-to-date data for the health effects , ganetic danagc, and other denaging ofrects (e.gl lung diseases, sucentibility to allergv, asthna, pneunonia, chest colds, influenza, end other viral and be.c'erial diseases) of redon enissions from the nuclear fuel cycle for the Harnis units 1 and 2 they still clain thev w'.11 build. Due to the 80,000 year halflife of tho=ium-230, pa-ent of Rn-222 once-renoved (via BA radiun-2P6), these health effects will continue pver at least the next 1.6 million yea s (20 half-lives of Th-230). Mining of fuel for the Harris clants will not occur if the plants do not get a license to onerate, or if the" de not onerate. The health effects of En-2P2 resultin6 fron nining fuel for 2 900 IrJe ?'dRe operating at fron h0% to Apnlicants ' clain of 70% capacity factor based on design electrical rating, for fron 10 to h0 years (Annlicants use 25 years as the deureciation life; no connercial PWR of the size of the Harris units is more than 10 years old in the USA to date, and many of these are suringing too many s tean tube leaks at ages of 10 or less, e.g. "obinson 2, 1 2 Ccenee 1,2, and 3, Sur"v 3 and k, Turkey =oint 3 and h) nust be included in any decision al] owing the Hav-is clants to cuerate, since all these health effects over the next 1.6 million vears can be avnited sinoly bv not issuing an cuerating license for Ha"-is. The outuut estinates above give a range of 3.6 to 25.2 G'fe-years
')'4 l
of outnut ner Harris reactor. Gofnan (u.adiaticn and Hunar Health, eL6)G'? shgus that there are 450 radon-induced deaths per G'Je-yeat , elus abuut
,- CCCDC n, tin (e sthis anount ( .1xh.51x10 9/0.7*115,000) fro uraniun left in tailings piles. The result is a mininun 32h0 deaths fren Harris, up to 22,500 deaths , fran Th-230 alone , and 5000 tines these values or more when the effect of uranium lef t in tailings niles is included.
See also C. Keeford, In Resnonse to the de nirinus theorv and A1AB-509, BN".C Dockets Feb. 19, 1979 befere ASIAS for other estinates of 50-320,277,278, radon long-run health effects.
/65-65 The 1 , .g -t as"n he alth eff e e of eden-222, U-233, U-23h itsmIl56%
and other nucli dec ' n Table S-3 Sg pf/4 23 o/ 44Mac-oA'59nt,M.224 'N... .ne no including genetic demage, have not bear edecuat&1" assesead [
- n th e 4F.' a n d vs a r.a r9 9.- i T V. o , 'a cl id ' r;- ir 9u"i c
- er' av d
. 4/.5 0 ar mr.nna wrong snalrsis, " dis ecunt' rg" of f utu~e deathe 'F V ,7 'N and 6enetic danage, ignoring e-nergistic effacts e.g; between ql/g W
[Vfq deday nroducts of raden t.nd tobacco smoke a-d che.icel kt ca"cinegens includ' c s~nthetic chemictis , and othe- e==crs . (q}- These effects nust be correctly acsessed tn veich in ' 'N the o,erating license s tage envircnnental assessnent un3e* EPA and te nrotect the health and safet of the mublic undca AF_'. . lOOWDf ha ed Sh. C 0 N thmaa M ea th, ( w cy pp u.co - we etc) K7 /he efa,v, a oAxs s kaun b
% ah0Ve k c< ( # e @ e d x are udwes eh &whed wsac +umu kw ch wm ,hsc&
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- % w +&,tlys ISOk+u)9 flu fnilag pausrey wwt accecs k m above.
Such canability and equipnent and personnel and training is necessa"" to prot ect the health and safety of the nublic and of tne energenc" rest.cnse e ersonnel, nunbe"s cf whor are volunteer firefighters (ordinary cificens, not fulltime enersency resconse, pc, lice or fire nersonnc1). (k) Aonlicants have f a' led to e eve there will be adeounte radiclogicel nonitor'ng of the snent fuel shinnents to end from Ha""is and the routes along which such shinnents are made, to assure the health and saf etv of the nub 1'c, e.g. in the event of a l eaking cask (caused, e.g. by inadenue te-strength cask -- most existing ones have this eachlen -- sagging under its own weight, flexing unde" stresses of accele"ation and turning and deceleration in transit, going ove" bungs or notholes, tire blowout, or accident as desc-ibed above f n this grouring of contentions ) . SE Of M Ghb(fe t5 <$oC(4 M ov Y IN QUS cf W marvw (desa&:c eF @ ns& veced
% CEPSfxd f%i du @992 &;,"l;'(bl"v%
/7/-
Because Daniel International, CP&L's erine cont-a.ctor I on the Harris unojact, has a histm of building defective base nats and contcinnents (e.g. Cellawav, Wolf ; reek, Fa-ley) Y2 ' a connlete ultrasonic examination of the containnent P nd basen nat, able to detect voids ove" 1 inch in side (cny d'nension over 1") therein, or another tree of eranitation with s'nilar canabilities to detect voids, is necessary before Harris 1 6 Bald SE GA 2s alluwed tc ocerate. Q Q 4'iSe h Vold5gc4 aq,g o e agfenys/ pajfaclj lft14 CGoh@ W M*l g g,, ,,yketu,;% c.fo l<cX % Q; . dos not have the f' nancial Q+ %
# k Antlicants CP&L and NCE'?A y resources to f' nance a cleanun 6f a nuclea accident like brq d/e Three Mile Island, which can easonable be exnected to cost lNcQb- '
dk %4 nva" 41 billion tn do a'nce ??!T is est'na tad to ecst a hill i on Fch dol' arc or nore to clean un (Unit 2) and the job *sn't done yet. Absent a cleanun (essentially resto-ing the clant to (c j de M one-ability or early-decentssioning it or decontaninatinE its h 'Afg site connletely oer dece.nissioning stende-ds fnr residua.1 p 2 ,a radistion levels) the health and safet'; of the oublic will / b,., be endan6ered by the continuing cresence of rad'onuclides h e.g.those listed on contentions 37 & 29&30(including -129) g-above and all other nuclides resulting from such accident, O which will be retained at the SENPD site with the threat of their ranid escape and the certa
- nty of so e sicw escape of then 4cfr into the local environnent (as at TMI now). Or 8 Also, such cleanup should be recuired to remove all b radioactiva contanination of the unit (s) or snent fuel cool (s ) ,
invnived in the accident (s) frna th e s ' ta .
?,
e [}[~ SEN S Db (Npj(SQ'an tS4~skqfem
# There is no assured disrc a1 site to isolate lhe low- 86 bhy b (Nk, yyC-level radiocc tive wastes croduced by nprnal oceration at Harris frem the envirennent e nd the n ublic until s aid waste, x which includes highly toxic (radiotoxic ) and long-lived nuclea- wastes such as Sr-90, Cs-137 and cum-239, has dectred to virtua11 hero levels of radioac tivity and radictoxicity.
The lack of such an assured disnosal site, nlus Crk1's style of oneration at Brunswick which leads thst riant to have unu-suelly high gana*R* ton ^* Inw-lavel warte bc th en--a-ad to tP c canacity of th= nlant and tc its electrical outtut, v' rich stvle of ocerating may well nrevail at Harris, means thtt the iscP of such an assured diseosal d site for low-level Har-is rad wasto endangers the health and safety of the cublic under AEA and needs to be i considered in the environmental balance under NrP/., this conditirn having changed since the CP stage (and CD FES) due to the refusal of SC, NV and '4A stater to continue to accent unlinited anounts of low-level radioactive wastes; and by the encetnent by Congress of laws allowing states to forn comnacts for low-level radwaste disnosal and t o exclude wastes such as 9H:!P? low-level radianctive wastes fron states not members of such h connacts. Sea disrosal is not assured because EPA 's l pronosed rule to allow disnosal of xx low-level radioactive l l wastas in the oceans har. -o* baan enactad, nrd 1* e"9eted j nay be overturned by legal action or act of Congress.
# There is likanian no assurance of di secure disposal fron SENP?
of high-level radicactive westea includinr scent fuel; pcrta of the reector and orima"y systen including activatien l products such as Co-60, Nb-9h, Ni-59 and others; t
. o
-/ 73 -
and for unusable but radicactive stecr. generators, used filte s, (e.g icn-exchange resins with =adwaste) and other waste from SE:!?" operation ce ntaining high a~ cunts and/or high levels of -adioactivity fro- fission nroducts and/ or transuranic elements and/or act.'.nides and/or activation eroducts. ~4hile sone stean generators have been accented by DOE fo" te s t s , it is unlikely DCE will s t'11 be accentinr them fer that pureose b- the tine SHNPP 's can be er ected to wear out (30 days to 15 yecrs af ter ec,mencenent of connercial oueration at full power, bas ed on the ex,erience (as er.emnles) of MegGuire 1, Almara: and Ringhals for the lower figure, and C7&L's H.3. Robinson 2 (es e n exa-nle ) for t he higher .'igure. Surry and Turkey Point, h other stean generatc= cennlete ranle c emants i n Wasti nchnuca renc'nra , wawa at **,m 6+oA years a,pr6ximately of conme clal o,eration when they required it. The anount and total radiotoxicity of all radicxisoto-es in other divisions of SHUPP's high level weste outnut, such as filte s and resins , c" sud. as the snent fuel, is even higher and a more serious threat to the nublic health and safety over both the shert-run (less than 30 years ), the nedian-te.*a uhtil Cs-137 and Sr-90 have run 20 halfliven or more (600-1000 years) and the long term (e.g. 20 to 30 halflives of Put-239 is h80,000 to 72C,000 years ) . Considering the calculation by strongly pro-nuclear prof. Bernard Cohen that the radiotoxicity / biohazard fron scent fuel takes 11 million years to decar t at or below the radiotox'c ity / biohazard of the carent ore before thm.randmar::ennixe.xmimm it was nired, the accects of guch high-level westes ara ve-v lonr-ta 9. Likewise, they involve strong rad' oactivity (alnhe beta and ganna in quantities sufficientto deliver lethal douses in l
.o .
([ -- a natter of nf nutes to anvone directiv exnosed to then, e.g. at a distance of 1 meter or less unshielded. Since we know that the best means of c or ta' nnent for chemicals fail ct enrirically establishable rates, and thct storage tanks and other storage sys tens for high-level wastes have leaked, and that any storage syste udo ted for high-level wastes will degrade over time, and dr.at "In the DOE waste nanagenent progrsns, thcrek has, as yet, baen little emchasis on stadies of basic corrosion mechanisns under si ulated geological conditions" (nud. less actual gecingical c ondition s , see USGS renort 0779) (ouote fron YURrG/CR-32317 3NL-NU3"G-51hh9 Vol 1 Nos 1-2, Container Assessnent-- l Corrosion Study of ELW (High Level 'claste) container M-te*ials , Cuarterly Progrese Rerort Anril-June 1081 at u.1), the lack of assured storage for high-level wastes (censidering their long-te n radiotonicity and healt; effects as demon-etrated by "esesach of K.2. Morgan, J. Gofnen and others as cited in contentions above, e .g. Se-tell and 3ross, Mancuso, S t e **. r t , Kneale, at al) and the effects of its escare into the i environnent nust be considered, at leact on a probabilistic basic or as a risk or in unintended or undesirable effect under NE?A, and ac such wastes ' enistence, storage, arid b.e lock of assured lone -tere. isoluticn from the environnent aut the cresent tine (and the string of harks broken cronises and nissed deadlinas for "sciving" the high-l 1evel waste isolation nroble- that AFC. ERDA, DOE and others l l have conciled, which shed: light en the likelihood of meeting now-axt estinated deadlines fo" establishing s uch an assu*ed-lorg-tern storage for high level w: radioactive vastes such as those f ron SHEP') and their health effects nust be considered under NEPA and AEA.
-- ~_-
I
# 7 The lack of "esearch to date en corresion of nlanned high-level radioactive waste isolation nethods and systems, as demonstrat3d e.g. at n.1 of NU"EG/C7-2317 (.t.hn, Lee &Soo, Brookhaven Naticnal Lab Dept of Nuclear Ene"gy, nublished Decenber 1C01, as cited in 5cre detail in the nrev'ous contentien) 'n anc of itself reaui~es a eassessnent Furthe" cf the SHHPo onerating license. AProductior of such extra-o"dinarily dr.gerous material as spent fuel from E9""is should not be allowed until basic research including the above-refe"enced studies en cor~osion of w2ste dis osal systems has orogressed fa" enousil tc reascnnbly a ssure, on die btsis of actual tests end wesea"ch, not ""ojactf ens or est! mates or confident statenents not s uncorted b*
sclid scientific and eng' neering da ta on the actucl ma terials, sites and conditions to be involved in lonc-ter- isolation er s,ent f u=1 wastes f ~ ~ the envi ronnent and the rublic, (including decay heat, m.ix cf fission orcducts, chcmien1 nature of the various radi:nuclides involved, cencentrat'ons of sane, ncterials of containnent, dimensicns and rm forms and treatnent and fabricatier of sane), that the high-level scent fuel radioactive wastes t be generated by SEKP' if it were licensed te onerate cculd be saf ely disnosed of protectin6 the public hecith and safety and avcidirE undue risk to hunan life and genatic irteg*ity and to th e gene cool of other species (totc1 tc=restrial gene pool, from which hunans derive such berafi ts as dwugs and chen'.ca's synthesized bv mic"o-o"Eani?93 CLd "lants , atmosther' c oxygen in cencentrations recuired fo" human life, aid fren microorganis. in digesting ou" food and nreducin vita-ins , etc.)
# aH:'?? is not in com"liance with and/c= A-rlicants hn re not solved the nrobicms described in])IF infernrtien notice numbe- 812-20 cf 7/13/81 ce failu*es of elec'rical nere- .t-ation assemblies, thus providing an additional means 'or dadicactive material to be released tc the atmes"here, or into the snent fuel (fuel han dling ) building, auxilia-~
building or other parts of SH"? f ac m whi ch i t en n e s c a.,e into the atnoschere and case also Eround and wcte-centatinatien. Anolicants nust show that their contai nment nenetration assemblies as installed w'll n t f ail urde* the test conditions, c= other heat, nressu*e, radiation, noisture e tc. cordit'ons t be ex7ected in a Class IX accident inside containment, a .g. thu a t or above the , 107 rads and other condf tions shown in F3/." 3 11. 0-F nnd -6 and otho" na-ts of FSAT 3 11, which are Class VIII ccrditions. Lack of such assurance innerils the nublic nealth and safety e.g. by allowing releese to the atmosnhe e of radoonuclides > vented to containment b nrincry syste nressure "elief after an o-dina"y turbine trin, reacter trin or loss of feed-vster, or in a " fairly frecuent" overcooling event where much nore radiocctivity hight be released inside containment due to failure of the pressure vessel fron the ma2 shock er fast fracture as described, e.g. by D.L. 3asdeka: b-29-82 presentation to "4C Ccemi9sioners (and attachnants) & by Sir Alan Cottrell as described in "How safe is Nuclear Ene gy?" 1
l
~
/
- fThe temoerature qualification of Ebtsco-curchaced equipnent for SE!PP is net sufficient to meet the demands of a Class TX accident, which has beco w an event one must allow fo= and rian for in nuclear clant noenatine l' censive now (thanks to m'CI-q )
CY svet Se6 *E5 ' Accord *ng to Fl!." 3 11.1-1 and -P, sinc e 4the CP was issued. predicted ass 5>4 tenneratu-es for such couinnent (not fu-ther s,ecified
/
the e)(other than cs scne Ebasco purchased equinnent) under ac cid ent ccnditions the-ein (Class VIII, design basis acciderts ) we~e hi her than the qualificat ion temneratu-es of said e c.uianent . Without ,*cviding sufficient decunentation end tests to establish the assert
- on, the FSA9 cortiruer at the sane pages that the critical connonents of such we-a analyred and in every cace weuld not themselves overheat at the accident temperatures for the piece (s) of enuipnent they ' re in (not otherwise specified there) "in every case". Such anclysis must be provided, with documentatien of nethodclogy of calculation and testing, qu alification of the critical conconents, croof that the eoninnent involvai can funct' nn for its safetv-related uses and " equi ed func tions in an anergency of the Cless VIII or Class IX level, not only for the Class VIII conditions referred to in the F3AS, but also in Class IX condit* ons ac now required, suecifying the equipment, comnonents , f unctions and analys'.s and as su~ptiona used in providing such croof. Odb.erwise , the connonents '
ability to function is lef t in doubt, and the healthf and safety of the nuhlic is not adequately protected, due to > 1ack of verification that this Ebasco nurchased safety-relcred equipment can perforn its se.fety functions unden Class VIII and Class IX accident conditions.
l l
# hCertain safety related equipment for Sr2:P" as specified in FSAR Table 3 11.0-h (op 3 11.0-20 through 23 of FSA"),
including stem nounted limit awitches, DER ou m motor, Boric Acid Transfer Pumo Motor, Centrigugal Cha=g! CF PCMD Motor, Limitorcue Valve Motor Onerators, ASCO Vrive Solen.oid 0 e-r' ors (all on p.3.11.0-23 where it is asse-ted that these nieces or eculonent do not need to verforn their f uncticns to sl ut dcrn the plant -- though that is not cl ear fo r the valve ento" and valv e scienoid operators in liF ht of TMI-2, and certa *niv the "HR is needed to keen the plant shut down safely af te= nan'/ kiris of shutdowns and accidents, and the Soric Acid Twensfer Pump wou14 absolutely be recuired. fo= safet r gg gg during ann n' A745 to which Har*is i= vulnehrble oer '1 CAP
.s h/ - beb
\ (Aiurp - anc the nuclear instrunentatirn systen (p.3 11.0-22) which N likewise is =ecui"ed to functien for safe resolut'on of a W@
%yg TMI-tvne or other ClassIX potentiel event, were manufactuacd to he.-323-1971 which cane out before the cuestion of electric al qualifying saf aty related ecuinnent j to function unde = Accident c ondit' ons was resolved hv "N (the ansua" : ves, it shonid
-be so c.ualified te f unct4 rn unde" sccident erndib' ns).
As Ancendix 3 11A shows, ntabers of irmortm t relifer valves i and other ecuinnent are new quel" fled eer the IETE-323-1971 l standard). Although aste"isks indicate there's mere info j in the TMI Anvendix, they don't sa r where and I can 't locrite any dir- ct reference *o TM-323-197h, just a few state,erts about using " safety Grade" equienent. I de find, however, at eage TMI-78, that the reector head venting systen "will be limited to the makeur cauacity of one high head charging cump" in the event of f ailure -- t'm charging puno towered
by an IEEE-323-1971 notor noted abcVe which the FSAR clain- is not needed for safety in the event of an ace'. dent (e.g. when gases might have t, be vented f"o:: the reactor veseel head due, e.g. t o excess radiolysis of water in the core, wate - zirceloy reaction, stena voids fr aning in tha core, etc.). The50abcre situat'on in att its snecifics is in violntion of 10 CF9f Annendix A, General Design Crite=len h, vequiring thtt safet" s"stens be qualified to functi on du='.ng e ccidents . (I include ny definitien of " accident" hc a e also)(tris is just for enchasis that I nean it ny war as well a s the ""C 's way) Absent a concrehensive review for Har=is s uch as the
?eiate6 Safoty Fvaluation for the F.nvironnental qualificat' en of Safet" j Lle ctrical Equipment at Three Mile Isl and Unit 1 (published renort 24 March 1981, finding that the electrical ceuinnent for at le ast the: ECCS, Core Flood, Contai nment Sorav, Auxiliary Feedwater, Nuclear Servic e ' fate", Cantainment Isolatien, Decay hest Fencval, and Containment Cooling Sys tems es wel?
as the C9DM, Boron Injection, 9eactor Coolant Dunns and Faed'4a'e= systens (ench i ncludire the contrcle and nowe= s un lies and noters and wiring needed to nave it eerfcan its safet -rclated funct'ons in the event of an accident), SENFP she':ld not be licensed to operate. It would be an urqualified plant w".th serious deficiencies that would con"ound an accident bv inpairing and nreventing the funct4.cn of safety = elated equipment unde
- a ccident condit'ons.
l # J 2*he liarris SER, FSA? ar.d ACoS re ort do net establish, based on accurate study,insnectirn and evidence, that 31i'i'" is f t.117 in com711ance with "lPTG-0660, IWG-0737 and otha= updates and narts of the T"I Action Plan. This P1r and all (ES,PS!P) its pa"ts are based on informatien new af ter the CP St9Fe Pe'c't3A and CP issuarce end hearing (the TMIo2 accident and i t r af te=- math and incuiries into its causes and how to nrever nre nuclea= accidents). The TT Annand* x tn the FFA", and othI" documents from C?&L, are full of statements that "we will comalv" o= 'rowds te that effect ( s ee , e .g . pn T"I-2, T'!I-17, ite- 9 ""~e r s uae o inctrument will be n ovided it.ter"; training e nd nrceduras "will be acconnlaished". But ti.eae has tn be panof tha' C'&L
& .p.}; oC wwas 3,3 t, *'lo abwt tsmc"pmc Q Q m (* % y n' c done all this , besed on infenendent investigat'on or ,y'[pl #-
is 4.54 /.si; SiiNP? .ix should not be licensed because, absent comsliarce 4 mC es with the full TMI Action Plan, the heFith an d safet" of the Ch%aD pg'rg k
*rre, oublic is ne t assured in that the l essors lea-ned at T'C he ve 4g4"9 4 %
,r not baen a, plied tc ns. kine. SiFP' safe". Such nonconnliance h
- e. . h,$+.q i t
also violates ALASA ren.uirements fo" staff at SiG"' ard d((4,3 j%f r" M radioactive releases to the nublic by net act'ng to - event / them unde" the TM: Action :19n. (10 CF7 CC.3'4a and #0 3h - Ag! ) %y A (*Tc' i.
# URC is unable to protect the health and safetv of the nublic unde = AEA c nd the en vi"enment under NE'A adeauatelv in this proceeding becau=- NoC is "c t fo ll o'-rin ~ t he *ce n~.~.crxt-dations of the Keneny (Pres' dent!'s Co :~.issico) and nogovin (Snecial Inauiri G*oun) irvesti ;atiors ar ' o thers to chanra -
its bcsic attitudes toward sa#e'tv, W S& Scht Cf Iristead off a'&,,rGilub) f0 and tc er.nand and assist I(CMkJ the role of inte"venors in the licencing mocess to i~nrn re If the e.ssurances of safetv and environnental soundness of r"C-C S+rff hgs -hedcL2pch (r) +o unliveshude licensed crobects b 1.
& (2.)*fD ra%(ne cntwaas O*M.opwrses)
Sevtwsness of Safehr retoM prubte, <sr caps tvleM) ofp Age;euwposQe
/@ / - l p [ An=licants hava not shown that the events and ce ni' tic e des c"'. bed in IE Inforne tien '*oti c a s C l-03 an d 312-21 w'11 not an d tra".snire e.t lie rris (nr. thtt s'niler s condition:. Will n >0 occu") to nrevent ac ce s e c f t ha :.a va's nient u. Its heat w)WC4 Coalb CCwSe.Genous Cooltag e fib (ures, ev'd 0 Cwe.qff, chd .
s ink ,A e .g . b7
' failura of baffles and tubes 'n the mrin @ M' condensers due to corrosien, preseure changes, sudder flan 4 .s40er tedM SkuhicuWy orcaru~e changes aesuit'nr f"on ae ented trinc and transients, 4 g uater chenistr~ changes, etc. Unusual numbe s of t ',s and
[WfW ggtj shatdo.n: could =~ cult f =am t-inc 'n c ontrM. SW'J'" w' th of its defective 1 - designe d stes g en ean *^*e . if one~ 'i 7 f 2r Ng0 a? 75$ or 10$ nowe" range is attemnted, nreeinitatirg more tube leaks in thc S.G.s and rac,ui*'ng no e fre uant tfcoj shutdewns. In a no the pkCdo manne r, the w' nr.e* 1c.81-82 o-era t' rg g . em erience at Oconae, and the sn-ing-sumner 1981 oncratine Og4vr.Q ' er.nerience nt CticL's "obinsen 2 nuclear rian t , sl.m. hov in VCr/T nuclea nie nte of abcut 10 years of age, "enested steen Cot #4f w a6fi-io nal (a gdg gene"a to r tube leaks caus ed 1'.thru t ti.ejd esign defects of gg Shi;?? 's 'destinghouse model D stear generatcre (S.G.s) MM can and de result in repeated plant shutdcurs ever af'er C V fAI N 0Q A C $ y / extensive insu ectic.ns. Coraesive effc ets of b'ocidas M f&tg P^le1J and other chemicals added to ecoling toer wate r.ust g- " also be censidered, and the ,ose' 5' Ai t~ that one or N kQSPS I me e enecies of clam, on ta- or otba" ~9"ina r=awth Codttf4f44p Wagg.p 9e.g. be"nac1c) v'11 nreve resistant te suid blocides Vedfb-and thus able to Erev ard live in tt e Sii'.*?T c rJensers (beirt b"%gl.t the"e, e .g. , on a pai" of 5 6n*;S wc"n 110. ding a* t'u beech b a "e sen w'.o also works a o"nd the c oclirc :c t e-c , or b~ a saboteur, af or frr ~. tLe Harris lake '.n n Weun water, having bean '. nt aduced to e.n 7 strean feedinn that 1che ba
- + creatt Lebas lo neans the similer toand cendensers k the nrecedine) nrevent nlaat and th Afoul access te its blo k uit'na e heat sirk/
we N u.r, .us .4 af e 61 casergwealceY Rs de<e
# The SE3 is d eficient in that it does not exclain hnu 'i.e follawing nroblem can and will be nrevented at SHUP?:
The filed hyd" ogen "ecnnbineas at NiMPP (? ner containnent) are electrically nowered (FSA' 6.2.5) but have to be sta-ted manually on c h"dregen reading of over 36 (6.?.5.3.1 p 6.2.5-11) At p. THI 5? and 53, it is s tated tht t h7drogen nonitons read
- ng 0 to 10% will be 'nstalled insid e centa' nnan+ n t iia =='.s.
3ut bo th tha noNer to the recenb*ners snd the cabics '.a rowe= and take "eedinLs f rem the nonito s for hyd*egen co e th-nuch (PE) enbles and wi~ing ins uleted w' th nolretialene/ and/o= j" cketed with "ol"vinv1 chloride (PVC). (These cables and wires m;" clso be anent the wiriC5 now on-site that is only made tc IEEE-323-1971 standard and is thus unqualified fn- fu : tinning under C1 css VIII or Class IX a cci dent co ndi t '_o ns . ) 1.s the work of 1;. Gillen and ?.. Clou6h cf Sandia Laborat dh(.c hcs sh own , 1cng-tc-m, low-level gamma radiation de ses sud. ne these cables will receive durirg SHNPo onerntion, deE' ides PVC and PE by breakin6 bonds in d.e and thus render nE them t mora cubject t o oxidation which in tu n embrittles tha electrical cable insulation and jacket'.ng et a ud. f as'e" = ate than vauld a large suiden "ad' at'cr dose. This affect " U.1 be even nore pronounced at the lowe= dose "ates (than Gillen 2: Clough's tests ) of much nornal overat' c" at SH"?'. Enbrittlad cabla: and wi"ing can chor t out, narticularl" since they will also be subject tc h v i o-s e.' r f re n n e a "b-nunes , motc=s crerat'.ng , and f ac m chocks a s in ea=thouaken , valve openings and closings (stet, a nd wat er hammers ) , e t c . Such wiring 7a- be g=ouped in cable tears er condui*s wha ~e its brittle nature cannot readily be detected or insnected,
- O T3 e
end be able to short out nove read'ly because of the nresence of other cables arc.nd it witth degraded, e b='.ttled, crocked on reeling 'nsula tion o= jacketir.g. The lo ng-term "adia t' ^r deses resulting, e.E. frn , a sna]1 break acciient where the brcught reactor is kant under centrol but nuch coolant has e sca,ed, ts at Ginna or THI-2, to these cables and wi-in couli *csult in more ranid dete-ioration of same while cleanum naog ease 9 (nr while it is still too radiosctive for neoole to sta- in containment long enough to ccmplete cleanun n-i n r t r vestartinr the reactor), would fu-th e" emb=" ttle, enidiza and dete** o"c.*e such cable insulatior. and Jackats (PVC ard 'Z). Then, if ancther small-break accident (e.6 f"en breeks in one or 9cwe steam senera t.3r tubes , which ce u14 well be a recu"~i,#p rroblem, based en the nature of coraos'.on -- in doesn't ouit -- and exnerience tc de te e .g. at o o binson, TMI-1, Oconae 1 2 and 3, Cinna and o&.e= nlants ) occu=~ed and h-d-ogen was gene ~ated, it is ros sible that *.he no"e" c read *ngs f"om the hyd* ogen nonitors in ce ntainnent at SHliP' would fail due to shcrted-out wiring or deg"aded w ires or cables, due to cr t..at inaccurate read'ngs would be transnitte f r x n s a.'. d causes, prever ting onerators f rom nanually starting ths or hydrcEen recenbiners, and/or the oower cnd/centrols to the "ecombiners (75 K'd each ) could f a il, erevent? ng the "ecnnbirers frcn Werking even though I nsturumentation might indicate they vere ene gized. As a result of these situations, hydrogen levels inside containment might centinue to rise with one~ators e ither unaware of '.t or unable to dc anything about it (high radiatic n levels wculd reclude or hot eining or the),reacto"'s p eat Night , ignite ghe cur.n n2 8 motor vent
- ng conta' nnent and a short circuit runnin
-ley -
creating a nressure nulse that reached un to the fo cc reeded te burst centainnent penetration sea.ls, nary of %.ich are made of materials aise s ub jec t tc radiat'nn-induced degradet*on, such as enor.y vnich can revert to its originel constituents (2 liquids) suddenly if encudh heat and nrcssure ene sy is sucolied tc it, thus releasing nassive otan t' ties of radioa ctivity to tha atmos he"e di rectly or th=ough c 2 ilia"~ buildings. Obvicasly, many variat'ons on the above scenario are nossible and Arn1* can t s naed to 9how tha' none of than are likely on able to release "adioactivim* to the atno=-here and endanger the health and s af ety of the nublic. 9 Anulicants have not shown that radiation-induced insulat'en and jacketing of wires and deterieration and embrit'lement of,gcablas, and failure and shcrting out and chanEes in reciativity and othc= elect '.ca3 i n"onerties af the wives or cables due t- an~ cc -bi nnt # cr c f the degraded ins ulucion, nearby presence cf waten o= steam, presence of nearby cables and electric fields, oir anv of the situations and circumstancesof wires and cables desc~ibed in the above contention and (incornorated here n b~ reference, i but not nere referring te hvd=ngen reenmbiners and hv+ '62n buildun ) which are all credible accident cer dit'ons under 10 CT 50 Annendix A Criterion h (includine LOCAs theveunie") w".11 not crevent the se.f a nre-stinr and shutadour. en abi1*ty unde- C-L and Criterion 17 (er 1 cst navagaa-h ), e.g. b~ the f ailure of nower s unnly, electrical control o" other neaded electriditi (e.g. to nower and transmit vendir.ps frc, instrunents needed to tell enerators what they need to know to actuate n=onar i e I safety related ecninment c= to ave id human e*rds which ec-*ourd i accidents, e.g. turning off feedwater or ECCS too soon aften a SCD.AM) to safety-related ecuinnent including the ECCS nunns l reactor coolant punos, control raod drive nechanians, borated ,wrter ,rm-s l
relief valves and =eactor vessel vents, und feedwate= numrs and iscistion valves for stean generators and steam lines (prinary and secondary syster isolation vilves). To cite a nearly maxinun accident ocasibir caused in tLis nnnner, surcose that e-v condit' on rec': iring a SCoin occurs (a "clatively frequent event at PW7s like Ha-ris ) . If a vibration, o~ assunula tedjeterioration of wir'ng 'nsulation c" cable insulat.'on (a.c. ennm as s'-,le a cenne as a "eason biH i*.c inte it 'ri th a non handle while cleaning, e.g. du-ing efuel'ng, tha 76n h9ndir cad hitting tha cable ;e' ng beh'nd the r e se n s o ' hey don't even know what th ey hit or that it c-acked the enble insu-lation) has caused the certnol rod drives to ba in-,e-ative, you then have A7WS. If further shocks from valves closing and onening (or nunes running oversoeed to try t o c-61 the cora, or at normal sneeds ) then results in a sho*t c' acuit , inadecuate signal trans~is s 'en ncth, or othe r fn' lure to be able to activate the boron injection systen, p"essures in the reactor will ranidly rise becau se there f a now no means to bring the core under control exxcent its negative thernc1 react' vi ty coefficient, which won't ston n~escures n Sfqsul Q Nic Ye A M S of 30C0 to 7000 PSI,from being acnieved, wh'ch nressures could St M veadily blow off the "escto" vassel head', nannaI.linesee it gN APS (176 af rec f through containment, and e'.mosing essentia11" the full core gggf inventory of radioisotores to the envircnnent, n onellinc much of them out behind the vessel head (like t he gas fro-gunnowder behind a cannonball) with the =esctor vessel se-v'ng as a norts e for the nro jectiles the head and nart: er the core. Another scenario: vibrations frcn even a n'1d ee-thquake could induce the "eactor trin and all of the cable shorts needed to cause the above ho rifying accident. l l
? Sh ' coak ks--,- +-
0N N.pr& caiki c esc 8,a
,% ,ae ue-%
e fladig of' [em% C SHid PPvlacxs m ans to avaa a c,4 tst~% , Is Wc est becw at Ve% (or vtr%(Q Coq (e{e) joss af (naf(,l pccw 5 u Ch c<s oc curred af C sta( 160er, O Cocdee, Oy sfer (ree K o< 0 Lac ope <ah@ YEQchrs ja k posl- (bc fer10LS L P1 i p u+es. This ts s u.e ts parhcu$4*IG~ lcwis app n acan sa6
+c Mc ns clue k ds vedJn(+ed s F eieSig@ (lNc a lew+pwpwensw.wezcnLgafu , j cas.fN, fDAhalD ay 0e leC4ble cbaca( s coq)caea
@d hM?
LItA(Weryb,(h"l$Y$$[k- dae ctrcu;ts SD (0) use ofZEZE- 313-I471 ef aufd f CO N LA) < nM3 Nof q aalifeJ uoder Gcc, LMi-R ( b d +ccAs cd (h) \/uloferab \c49
&bvdlled + ox< daw afm m+A0% guy i s 11U duced PVC -
s fol'\ cak oc tace.y eiusuda+kqQ "~d S*l '? Drcais ellstyleMe C4H cause cireuif%k g$'[j'*d A b r fYbfeck e reI s-fz>cu)og '~hD/c
- D k IMdo(vea co,3 l fu g f f fQT ' SufPkl C-tvcui}s, k' tvo ay,ny Gab EAl^ fower sapph in 12wa as I f k kS Ild afhr k deuL +o SlwrF - C-1 rcuif,rivahal cuboff(tulaL)
}}pgl,cag[S' pgg l t- (Dasfntchva of Els: 1%iis n'v coupty tp //cwy<
A y s, ioclaLwy IUu(M G oa w,,,49,ft & 1 (Maitcr w be ()Tos!c SS get ApH'tY or s/ahas Bloc /cout) + ,ts abou+ Joe Wb v're'" tam-wb 30,1983 0. x,4 9i Fe319,662
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l l d
# Anr11 cants' " accident analysis" is deficient in that it does l not consider possible loss of access to the olant's external heat sinP could occur through col e of the cooling towersp--e.g. during an earthquake (D.e s earch-Cottrell, builders of the harris cooling towers, "eceived their contract to do so within months af ter a cocling tower they had under construction in W.Ya. collapsed, killing 51 peonle) o" due to faulty design, faulty constr'tetion (e.g. going too fast as in the co11anse of the Research Cottrell tower referred to previously), failure to nronerly tower collapse caused by a tornado or tornadoes cure concrete '.n the towers, - in each of these cooling tower collanse events, debris from the cb11apsed tower could well: block th e flow of water to the tower's former site directly, by mass of rubble above it, or by rubble or debris or both nenetracting or collansing the water line from the condenser to the cooling tcwar (or to both towers, from an earthquake-induced collanse or a failure with a comor otovytado orb /W* foe 5durvicaAW #A5 caure in both towers such as similarly defective ' design, conckruc%kfabris tion, J or 4
' E - .^ -
reinforcement, concrete curing)f Cr fM O)u. Vk larry ppes haf m avtaat u hm dLta CDad2NJer 4-0 h acK, or causa. k al(qse cp CobliNg fow&vs a nid-fu.ch es().e cceIQ if se kaady tvuck f(f.eS, q o n e. casry189Qleadmc (m-WO s1 e. Ca.s D V /d M Q J M h h Y 1 es o)< ru M caksD was pacng 0 er fM.- oe oe pavu1 abeoe 1 f%m a t-9%.fn shna6gethpaKe vf ha . CPC fahre k rwAre ww nds pass Ovar 7w.se eta ppks has baw dowted Loss of apess + _ coct@g ha>ec- oc ura w .c,wpea ny1. a ww aas e am s <-anet i, A; auctwSct,ded McQ:+s C.{a.ss
, 'f The nixing nodels and disnersion models for =adioactive gas, liquid and othen "ad'ological r eleasas f rc 9 FH'P' unie-10 Cru na-t ?n e "a 6 '" c i e r t in that thav a c au~e mo-a e na le'a mixing and disne=sion of such radionuclides eleased than will actua21y take niace, take insufficient acccunt of ra'rou' of such a release n1une in a small area (ra'n ""eciritstin.7
'hus de ed G16we, %d TSgd the radionuclides ir the n'_une) and rtkarxism satamissar lo CF" 2^. gwhg ith 106Cedd Q p E CMA) D b M b 'b /- -
wtw%) Lo[sa b& 2rn~ M & wRwda 7 w ysu) h elow 3 00 ('e^W M OC * % *b"!M IO & k,Se thWJ
; Annlicants', the S ta t e 's , FE".i 's a nd o th e = emn at.en c~ .A) Wr % /'
ofu rto.J-o resecrse olans as notreved 'or SE'Po are deficient because ther have nnt been tested under 10 CFO 90.h7 and f.,oendix r to oc-t 50, al.thax fu11 scale mz and with the "egula r i rartial tests as suecif* ed therein, 'e' th wesults that show that such "lans w ill adec untelv nrotect the health e nd safety of the nublic during a Class IT accident a xt Tif? P , euch u.e A7'S ^r 'b= "eac*o" vees 0 haed 5' c"' n e-
- h-n nFb containment as desc-ibed 'n Ame'! can 'h tsical Societ r's rcoort on nuclean accident risks of 1975
# An-lican'c ' rre-o-e a ti nal ervirnnmar tal rt diar'c r mo niter
- n.: r=ogram fo" SH"?' and surrounding a eas is de#iciert in that (1) it hns insuffic' ent samnling noints and nu-be"s of sur.nle s *cken over t' me to establish background "adiatien levels and -adionuclide ccccentrations (irclud'.n:- those from nuclear weanon fallout e nd othe ruclea" lents n ead" one- ting) en a statistica11" valla and -eliable basis throughout tha area of cnneern, e.g. within 10 miles fo~ eme gencv es"orce (20 niles as requested by Cit'rens' Task Force to "'C, c'" c'a-31 cf 1x9882) and within 50 n!1es for EPZ .
-l -
(2) It does not establish snacific cenc entrat
- ons of -ad' c-nuclides in tha a'" with the sn e t r e of nrassure-ionicat' n-or centinucus read'ng monito~s thtt will be used (see contentienc 1 and 2 above ) for nost-onerational monito"ing and advis'.ng emergency resncnse personnel of radiclogical releases and vhut and how much radioactive material la 'oe ing relee.s ed .
(3) does not monitor algae and other lowe= forms of life, e.g. in the Ha*='s lehe , which are the f $r st e ten in most acuatic fcod chaing, and does not de sufficient meriteri.:g cf such algae tc establish statistically *eliable baseline ccccentrat'en date on the radionuclide concmentrations (snecific nuclides and enrcentrations for all fissinn nrrducts, tran suran' e s and activation nroducts tc be " reduced b- SEMo', e.g. see scu ce tern FSAP 11, ES 3, etc) so that ce nt amina t' cr fr , ShT?' vill be detectable -eadily, to give ea-1v ws n' ng of radicactive contaminstien from SHN?? to ensure the health and safet c f the public. (h) does not assure thit the monito=s, test sannles and othe-thirge tested have not been " seeded" or contaminated c ccidentallr or delibe-ately w' th rad'onuclides , e.6 fro" trans,catat'n-on US 1 and US 6h (1caks, eccidental releases), fro nearb" nedical and research facilties (resea ch triangle nark, etc. ) (Duke and UUC and NCCU ard UCCentral universitie s, e tc. ) or their radioactiva wastes, in order te show highew than actual background radiat'on levels rear the site. Accidental contaminatien e.g. transnoat of such nuclides on shoes or clothing of samnling personnel who vis't hos"itals , labs and SHNPD rad se m711ng si tes . Delibe=a te , e .g. seading with vadionuclides fron low-level waste by C?hL.
7 RC O - yg c[a 3 / a/#-
# (p biccides ard Theenvironmental*.nnactsofthechlorire,hthic&acunticli'e and othe= bd othe effluents frc , cooling tower blewdown on fish in the A
SHN73 lake and the Cane Fene iver have unrzbeen insuffic' anti-considered in that: (7he ..astes and q"cun'e c~e listed in io Tatic 3.6.2-1) ( A ) ove* flow frc9 C?&L's weste wate= tweatment one nt'.nr on-site may occur during =einstcrms and w'11 oc cu- du ' rp floods : (3) the sensitivity of zi fish and benthic and squ9 tic life forms of all s,ecies cresent 'n the raservcir and ' n the Care Fear kx to the anecific chomicals dische.~ged in colling tower blowdewn and to their resetion roducts in tite lake and river environment (includit.g interaction of chlorine from Si3P' with toxic chemicals end othev wastes in tha Cane Fec" River, result'ng e.c. f rom industriC nollute=s unstre9n en the Haw 'ive" sa far as Gacersbo*o "C, which A9rlicants have ne.t ~~ovad w'11 he lz cleanad un so as to prevent or absclutelv n'ninire such interatt'.nn) has not becn estabi'shed on the basis o' "elisble sciertific
=asearch.
(C ) the biological ce ncentraticn of the c celipp t cwe= blowdoun chenicals and thei recet'e n n oducts in life f orms in the fond chain in the ve servoir and in the Cane Fet", inclu ding creat 'ar of carc'.nogenic chlorinated or6anics , has not been adequately researched or docunented. QL
# UjThe ES is deficient in not takinc inte account the tW' c 2 carc'nogenicgeffects of chemiccis from(,cc.9oling tower blowdos:n c '
at Harris, includirg those re me d by interactirr of the chemicals t o be released ner ES T .ble 3.6.2-1 or co- ettiene to it, with other chenical collutants (eg. cr-enic cho .ica? c , dras, a t e . ) in tha Came Fea- "ive". C*tiae dowre*=anm
draw thei= drinking wate= T or the Co-e Fear. VF. har identi-d
& tcric cver 100 carcinogenic chemicair (mtn r cf th em chlorincted ) a .-
A. n- ' nvitv nn11utante . "qn" no *he w a -* e ' r tF - C o na rn. a C?d:L's disch:.rges will include same of these b" reaction e.monia and between chlo=ine and /t hydrtzine, atz r e .c. . f o"nir.c "h,Cl , 'I.,ii,C1_ c c NnC1 and NCL , a nd othe-s :.c c.. owr ? " Table 3.6. 2-1 but 2 3 not ex-licit 1'r identified the e es tc ch emic el F neiesj +def liunanj; 'ngestien of cuch c;.e-ical'3,sh~drazina it' d='ckingariwote" chemienis v'1'. in the Fu-the r react'en be' ween Cla, Fli. gp;sg % TzcCrn increare the wisk of canc e" and othe- diseases to thn c,u'. e t i c " - drinking s +e" f acm tl e C4e7en, e s e ci 9.11 - d as N ir% ~ tti n of C?.:L's chziorine releares with Nhy , ':2ii h' and the other o"ganic nollutants cresent in the Cape Fenr, fo" exa nle converting phencl-based dye enenicals int: chylo-ina'ed hyd*er're and bichenfis and trichenvis., and toxic and react'ar between "ri3,CLg, *.enolicc. (3) The carcinogenicAefac's in (L) above w.'11 ce si'in11ad by the birlogics1 ecreentrc~ict of the cs c'rc6cnic 2: toxic cha-' c 91= a bc."e , 9c3 M' g = tole cic- g .,. ,'9hin 3.6.9 1 in the benthic and aquetic li'e of the liar-is lake e.rd the Cape Fesr nive", and 'n the fishinr arer.s off the ec' ' of G whe"e Cape Fea" wcte" flows nnd mires. Fat-saluble tc xir - c-d ca cinogens a*e of' great ernee"n ancr; these chericsis beceuse they are s tored, nc* metabolf zed, and thus mo~e concentra ;ed at each sten of the food chain (c) ' n'm1ved . . Eventually the s e chemicals , e t co n c ent"e tf mn r C PI:L ha s r e t nroved te be safe, uill exist in fish, or ste=s, clars, i shainp and other food soecies (oyste"s end clems et ain . pollutante : well as fcci specien fran the wcter) eaten l by nersens, including f! sh from the :ia-is Lake, Cane Fea , and ocean off NC(as noted above), and o"ste"s, clanc, nu9sels
ha""is and other food srecies taka- "-- *be lake, the Cene Fee , A and frcm oyster and cit beds nes- the nuth of the Cane Fea . These inpacts hr.ve not been cdecua tely =esec ched o~ establishe:! by CP&L and hr.ve not been taken inte account, based en new data such as A's studias of carcinogens ' n d"'nking water
-and studier of bloconcentrc*' on of carre'nngens ar.d tcxic chamicala n e=f'o-med a i r c e tha e n n st=uc+ ' c" *a't er' r* E ue=e issued and th e CP her*
- ngs and orde= "c e dane.
C?&L has thus not adecuately nrctected the nublic health uniesivabla f-o its chemical dis chn" gee ar.d t;_:ia " risks $d uninteried
. . . effects"(such r s c 9 ne cr, nett.1 oiscr' ng , and erae t' on of now ca c'nogens by interactior of C'&L's Chloa're and hydrazine with chemical ac11utznts alrendr 'nt tha Canc Fes.*
Siver) as rec,uired under NLPl.. R (The chenical "eact' on mechatisms and/c" fo ns v.nd t- er cf che-icels re9cting to ferm these additiensi enreinebens and nollutants he ein, from (A) above, are 'ncornorated neve by reference. ) ggf ChL MS bd'ed ko +wde 4fO & "NW f age,vt w m,armaa Ash wits Bf om M cwej au ws. sed 3 The ES3s crnsideration nf si fish kills due t, het J74Ib d 4 M /t d water discho"ge inte cHFFo reservei- (lekt ) ir insdequate fff u-as (1) the unne" lethal tennerature limits nt which sig*nif- IN QqMfad Wstu . icant
- inh nortatixity cccurs hv ve ne t S.ean establi she d f4 %
for in-ortant fish snecies (EP 5.1 3-2, arendment 1) 7tv oif"- (2) the time fer which any of the Em 2.22.0 imortert m%,4 fish species (or othe"s found in the he ris "ese vni- (19xke)) can tolerate the high temneratures in the dische ge mixing zone is not established on 'h e basic of er.nev'. mental datn, not have neriods such sneciES of fish (indivi?uals of those snecies ) are likely te scend 'n the n'xing zone bean esthablishad
l S GALL bv.. actual stud or e vre
- ment on those s,ecies in ickea like the SH??? reaervri".
(3) ave-cge, ret neak, nixing zone t er.na-s t u~ a s have b ee n used in the analysis of fish sens* tivit- to t em,errture ' n the mt::ing zene. .,ctually, the "ee> teme rrt u== thaitt enn t iv.c and be ernected durinc the newicd e stab 1f shed by aesenac'r nc a (P) a':ove sho"1d be used in mixx arc,Jecting tha nrobe Y.lity and nu.erien1 occu-"ences of O'sh hills #"nm Ha- *.s cc oling towe= b1m'f 6wn by temne"e ture . Furtha", the eidit'nn of hart b" cocling to"ar 51cwdown above the may'mur te .;a-stures of ove- 31c recorded '.n the a"aa (E" "af. c.1 3-F) or the actual hib hest temreratu~e reccrded ir the rese=v'i" wi*heut the basis cooling tewe= blowdown, n: ads to be mzr.Mirrzt ' n establishing the temnc =atu"es in tha -ixing zone and the craan ove" which these maxinu . tennert turen enn be erc cted t: +n+end thiis for the t'nc and seriods as calcula ted above inA(3) an? (P). (h) tht, additional toxic svnergistic effects of the nresence in ofchlorineYan.eddit*.cnte opia , andelevato'he" ed te-,e=stA'n che-ica13 urecoolin; s ne" (3tcwer
) c bovve Walid /\
blowdown nn fish kills in the mixinc zone muet be c^nside=ed on a conservative basis. The sensitivit;* cf 1.noatant fish snecict mer E" 2.2.0 and o ther fisn snecies found in the reservoir must be este. cliched accurately to the se cambirnt' ens of che ical and te-"c~ttu e ccnditices te be emected. (5) The o"iginal FES did not consid er the ebeve accurate %- because then ShPF was ge 'ng to be once-thrr. ugh coeling '1' th nn cooling towe"s, thur ecoling t:ve- blowdcun chemienis and the mixir ;e nne were ver" diffe ent f an, th a cu--ant elsnt, and alent setuo. The se change s mus t be addressed (as set forth above, e.g. ) in the strikinc of the en. vi-e n - mental balance unde" NDA for SnNPD onera' tin;; licerse issuance, i
s_
# The ES insufficientir conrideas the ns"c'colcgien1 strast the to be 'nduced by the caera t ion of aggE2j{da"-is nuclear "lan".)
V in the nonulation /saround' ng it, ircludirg those served t-electric LGP&L und those sersod by o t!.c 4atilities c.6. Lake Power or NC_!!PA membe=s . Such stress is caused, e.g, by: Kroule dge thtt nuclear nower nla nt operat' ons "au tinal" s "elease "adioective note"lal into the t envive nnen* "hicP would not be the=e absent the auclear niant's ona-atinr; knowledge of nuclan" accidents at Th~ea Mile Island, Tru urm (Jacan ), Ginna (NV ), Brown 's Ferr;- (Ala ), cnd -niistinn -alenses thever"on and visks of na*e seri^us r ecidents du=ing the se accidents cnd from 3:::!PP; knowledge of C'&L's one=atinr "*oblems including noor 7efformance and rc51ati on "eleases at 3-urswick, rcdiation over-excosure et P.chinsor, the la"Ee f'. nes N'C has repeatedly levied aga:nst CP&L for nucle 9" viola t'ons and de-ficiencies; knowledge thet they are (ts CPEL/MCEv7.*, nenbe- " te- , 1 nayers o" ovna"s of TLI. ccons ) being forced tc car fer the marris p1&nt nituout any effectiv perscaal choice in the nat:cr, of (as Duke Power or other electnic utility custo.er) ? e receiving no benafits f ren the Harris plent but a*e sub.ica: to its visks including radioactive " normal" er.iscienc, nuclen= accidents, uaving costs cf energency res-onse olannin , t ra' -iri e and testing (to the extent not raid by C'kL); knowledge or bel *rf that "isks of radiatice to hunent, thei" genes and the envi-on-or nent hus baen underestinated, "alsely dovng aded, Kni covered un , e .g . b" AEC , DOE , government nucla.n= la bo"s t e"lec , nuclo a-industrv including EE: and CP&L, 'destinghouse, Ebasco, Danniel International and taanx others; knowledge o" belief that C W:L ouerations are deficient and /or inconotetent to o otect the
s_
# The ES insufficient 7 c o n.-id e a s the ns"cholcgical strast the to be induced by the caera tior. of eggP9f da==is nucleer "'.ar.tj V
in the nonulation saround'n.~ it, includirg those served t~
/ electric LCF&L und U.cse served by oC.c Aatilities c.6. Dake Power or NCTIPA membe=s . Such strass is caused, e.g, by:
Knouledge thtt ruclear nower niant operat'ons "auti"al" e "elease "adioective note =ial into the t env !"c oment ticP would not be the~e absont the auclear niant 's one"? ticr ; knowledge of nucian" accidents at Th e= Mile Icisnd, Tru ura (Jatan), Ginna (NV ) , Brown 's Ferr:- (Ala ), and ~ciistinn raleases the"ef"on ani visks of na*e serlaus r ecidents du=ing the se accidents and frn" 3:::!PP; knowle dge of C"&L 's one"atine n-oblems including noor 7efformance and radiati on "eleases at 3 urswick, rcdiation over-exeosure e t P.chinse r , the lange f' nes ?PC has repeatedly levied a6a nst CP&L for nucle 9= violations and de-ficiencies; knowledge the t they are (as CP&L/NCEv?A nembe" rnte-payers or owne~s o c 96. ccons) beirg fo=ced tc tar for the aarris p1hr.t ituout any effectiva personci choice ir. the mat:cr, of (as Duke Power or othe" elect"*c utilit~ custo.er) ? e receivinc no benafits frer. the Harris p14nt but a*e subject to its "isks including radioactive "norr.c1" enissione, nucien* accidents, taving costs cf emerEency resnonce einnning, tra' ring and testing (to the extent not raid by C'&l); knowladge or belirr that risks of radiatier to hunent, their genes and the envi on-or ment has been underestinated, "alsely dovngraded, rni covered un, e .g . b" AEC , DCE , Sovernment nucien* 1cbo"stc*iec, nucir.a* industry including EE! and CP&L, 'destinghouse, Ibasco, Danniel International and tamax others; knowledge or belief thae C?ht ouerations are deficient and /or incomotetent to e-otect the
_ -- f nublic health and safety; and nornel human cence ns fe" a gool environnent to raise children in, fo= the health of one 's f an'ly, descendants and loved ones, fear of dangerous mate *ials such as the =adioactise contents of n nuclea- nlant co"e, fen of genetic danage te onesel.' or one's deseandants, fo" the m nii t-and nealthfulness of eating one's food grown near thc S'f;?? (includi g food a nerson grows for her/hinself and family 1 and friends to censume, and local 'ish and game from near Sh"P? ), corcern about whethen one can be evacuated 'n a nuclear acciden?x, especially for those in crisons, hospitsis or vho e=e disablad or who otherwise are not able to control their own t" ens-n~t awar from AMNRRxix Har=is in an accid ent, o~ whr do not have nevsonal vehicles te use in an evacuation, fear o." the long-team consecuencen of environnental nollution *.ncluding *ed'one-tive wastes from the darris clant; feelings of nowe"lessness, anger , f"ustratic n , irritatier , f ear , stress , strain, nain , headachec , ste,ach and diE estive C" set , anathy, "esignation, disgust, mistruct and upset, tensicn, nervousness, or any of these, induced by the above knculadge, beliefs and censider-ations. "excocure te the feared object" as advccated by a nsychiatrists who visited "ab igh and criticized "nuclean ohebia", is no cure for the e bove s tress.. which may only be comnounied by utility and IMC reassurances or clains that
.the basis cf such stress ne;' not be realistic, due to nublic distrust cf nowe" cennany s tatenents (e.g. "our rates are ont i
er.nected to rise faster than in ciation" or "the=e was no danger tc the eublic" in a nuclear accident o~ incident) t and of N?C's truthfulness and disinterectedness and ability to nrotect the nublic f"cm nuclear accident s and nucica" "isks.
CP&L and "oc st9ff hava ra' ,ro ve d *b r.+ tha ev'ert n# aneb s'=nss around the Harris plant site, in the a eas as desc"ibed abcve within 50 miles of SHNPP (for the nu= noses o f this hen"'.nr , or beyond that " zone of inte e st" if the Bo9"d uill allow considerr.t ton of nsychoingieni strest at g=eeter d' stances, e.g. fear for loved ones living near SE7PP, esnecially thesc who do not belf eve it is dangerous e nd the efore night not evacuate nromntly enough in the event cf a nuclerr accident there) is small enough to e.xclude fron the environnental balance eouired at the 0.L. stage under UEFA. Muen of the info 9mation end events lead'.ng to the devel-onment of this nsychological stwess (e.g. TMI accident, Ginna accident, Tsuru6a Accident, new resea ch and "enovts on "adiat' en health risks, ai investigat'ons of Gene"al oublic Utilitian (and 'ts cunad s ubs' die *ia s ) ' "a""n-~r rce e ri rmtthf ulvae s , and ESC 's performance, at the accident at T'!I-2 and in f ailing: to prevent same, 1"ritation att CD&L rate increases (caused in nart b" C'JIP for Ha*ris 1 and m2), data on which the accuracy of nast credictions of radiat' nn safctv is judged to I be wronE (e.g. cancer studier of f allout vict'.ns at St.* Gaowge, - Utah; Mancuso et al study of low-level radict'on health dffects); addit',onal fines aga'nst CP&L; investigation (s) of C?hL nanage-nent and nuclear oerformance, e.E. by Jacobstein fo= NCUC Public Staff and Cresan McCornick & ao get fe r NC Utilities Commission; newe accounts of nuclear industr~ nroblens, 9romutly rie':s and cover-uns (e.g. G?U et a l f a'lu~e to tell NoC e
<\
public ther fuel rods had failed !n TNI-2 core) tr 1;&pr has becone availeble enly sinco the C? FFG and CP hear'ng and 11earsa wawa ec--late d , sna n-e thus r ev t r'o mat'e-under 10 CFR 51.21. See also PANE v. N7C, DC Ciacuit Cou-t of Anpeals, 1982, slip oninion.
'""~~ b Such psvchologieni stress is xxrix a consecuence, theugh nerhaas et o an unin tended of undesirs hle ce ns equence,c." Sh'30 on e-s t '. n n unde- NEtt.. Absent Sh7! n en aas t '. on , such stress should be ccrside= ably " educed. Thur, osvchelegien1 stress as dese-ibad above needs te be baltnced '.n the cost-benefit deteninat" on at the 0.L. ste ge.
- s l
# The ES is deficient in that it consideas as benefits the u s e of the Harris nlant lake and s urrcund' ng area f or "ec=ea
- 4.nn , hunt
- ng and " sh
- ng 'd 'hm't en-= " de-
- rg the following: (4) that such areas should be w' tLin the exclusion area unde" 10E CFR 1CC.11(a ) and (b) and thus ne such use of them should be allowed, due to risk of radiat'en ex ocu~e tc pe" sons in such area (whole body and thyroid ) d urirg bad Class IX accidents -- accidente worse than considered in reviewing plcnt onerations, which now 'nc3 ude Class IX pe" 43 FR LO101. Thus the=e w'11 be no benefits therefan .
(3) Even "f, ccntramry to ( A ) above and the r"otec*' on of the health and safety of the nublic the eby, the above uses of areas in the L?Z are allowed (or if such use is allowed in anv nart of the L?? without referenced tn the matte =s in (A ) nbove on establishing the exclusion area ), tha ES fails to condsider the co sts of e ctablishing adecuat e t=ansuert , us r' nc , "adical t waa tmant e-1 n th e" nmangarc* =a snnn:aa facilitiec, means, nlans and the hiring of trained reasonnel to ce=~7 them out, which are all necessary to assure the premnt evacuatinn and/o" other rrc tectinn cf th3 health and safety of these engaged 'n hunting, fish'ng and rec eation witnin the LPX2 in the event of a nuclear accident at Harris. l Since wind speeds of 7 nph are com9on at the SHN?? site, evacuatier of those within 2 niles unul d be necessar" v' thir 15-20 minutes of the beginning of a release, and thos e within 7 miles within 1 hou" of such beg'.nning, those within 10 mik s within 1{ hcurs , e tc. CPLL's energener response i all nlans fail to assure tha}Apersons engnged in recreation er 10 CS Eb#1
- JDG2.
in the L?2 will receive tinely warningjof raleases from SHrFP and adequate energency resnonse including that descatbed above to nrotect thei" health and safet" and transnoat them out bercre they a"e extosed tc the niune of radiat*or release.
--} j' __ # I The ES takes insufficient e ccount & the destruct' or of wfldlife habitat wh'ch has already bean enused bv the construction of SEMPP, cnd does net include the ecst of restoring same habitat and ite natural, scenic, social, cultural and recreational values (including naking it safa to eat gane and fish free the are.5 of SHOP?) ence SE"PO's operating life is over and SENPP has been deconnissicned.
Tne acove facters nust weign in tr.e onerutint license stage environnental review te c orrect errors in nast assessments and because , if Harris does no t opeas te, tha coste of restoration cf the site as described above will be ccusideaeblv less because no radioactive wastes will have to be removed, such wastes resultinE frr~ fisaier, activation and neutror canture during SE"PP onerat' ons. The lack of actual de-commissioninb eXPe"lence on a la"ge 7'.15 like Ha=~is (with the nos sible exception of T!I-2) neans that uncertainties in assurances that such site restovet'on will be car = led above out adeouate to restore the xxan uses for wildlife and the general public (nreservinC health and safety) need tc be considered in striking tha 0.L. stage cost-betef$t balance unde" NEPA. There are envirennental benefits , as noted above, in not onerating SE:TP P, i n tha t the onen a*eas created b" c ris t"uct'en will exis t, with their benefits , while the radioactiven wastes with their costs, will rot.
# The ES is deficient in not including the cost of measu=cs to restore the SENPP units 3 and h reactor site holes, and 'c prevent then from becening moscuito breed'ng areas and hanaads fron pe" sons fallinE into them, both during SE"Po one-ation and af ter SH1:PP has been decommissioned. These are costs resulting fron a change sinc e the CP & CP FFS (CP6L canning Unite 3 and h of SENPP in December 1981).
- 206 -
? {y ctsPadiat' on monito-ing of SH'7Po site ha s been "nsuf' icier' in that the Stnte of NC's closest monitor'nr s' te f nr radiat'en to Sh"PP is at a's igh NC whe u *h ere i s one moni'c-(DP62-h.,' and indencndent -onito rir s o # "adiet'rn lavelt there is needed to assure the health anl efetr cf the mublic because of CP&L's actinnc et 3runswick e.g. dumrin;; -adf onctive wastes in local landfills, moving at least one radiatice neniter when it gave tco high a reading (samnling locatic" r
changed for SR 0C). CP&L Vicze orecident '. howe (who signed Anendment 2 tc CP&L 's E' und s ca th ) ic n ne mb e r of the NC 9adiartion o rotection CommisFf on and is o" should ba aware of the inadequate monitoring n ogan of nucicer nlant sites ( in NC (as described in contention 1 above, the facts the eo" o being 'ncownorated here by reference) by the State of NC Padint'on Protect'en Sectf en. Yet Howe and C?&L ha ve not acted to ramedy this sitcatior or to get adeounte "e s o urc es and staff for RPS to carrv out its monitoring dutiec which will only be increased by the onereting er SH7??". Since l i budset cuts in NC are likely, the canability of RPS tr I indeoendently ncnitor radiatier levels around SEMPn ma~ ce furtner reduced. CPcL has failed to take action tc assure that RPS can indeoendentiv nonitor the Harris site both before and du~ing oneration of SHEPP, d;us net l adequately nrotecting the health cnd safety of the nublic (and displaying la 'r of concern that such 9 otection e. mist, though it is "e ui cd by law and CP&L of ficiel Howe is involved '.n overseeing it thru "PC 's ove=sicht of "?S 's activities including indenendent nonitoring of nuclea-plant sites for radioactivity).
i s h % % f Q p le m i-
- 201- wic~"n waseehn att~
# , The Harris ECCS, as described in FSAR Table 6.3 2-1, 9 is not able tc deliver sufficient cooling water to the core e (Mervse D0 'fCclpg, in the event of extrene overeressuve accidents (e.g. ATWS) dd, or of accidents in which, by stud belt failure, overnressure, stud bolt fracture fron exrosure to boror akx & borated chemicals, the reactor vessh1 head cemes loose or leaks or is taken off or blown off entirely. The vessel in these latter events uculd be like a pressure cooker with its lid ajar or connletelv cff (resoectively) and would allow 5 !!UCH more wate" d stean to escape than the FCCS can rovide in makeue, resultf.ng in insf!fficient core cooling, nossible meltdown, and p=obable continuing release of renaining core mdicactive material (e.E. as vapor, particlas etc from cverheated core oc"ts er accidentO in any accident which releases nrinar coolant to atmosnhere (phCA or external envi onnent on ground or in liquids, e.g. through 0 CW-)
a pipe break, relief valve being onen, reactor vessel lid inte6rxity & closaure not being conclete (cs above, e.6.) through an ocen valve, vent, nenetration, hole (e.g. f rom vessel head or carts of it Soing through; or fren cracks and voids in containnent) or the main ecuinnent hatch or other access including doors to the containment. Such nerfc mance is insufficient to urotect the health and safety of the cublic.
# The SER is deficient in not analysing thoroughly the potential of accidental criticality in a collaesed, in-iged or degraded core, or carts thereof, such as would result fron locs of core cooling for pericds of 2C minuts to several hou s (e.g. as hapoened at T:II-2, or worse circuns*:ances), from failure of core s uccorts , frc, earthquakes, or f ron exrlo sion outside the reactor vessel (e.g. niaced b-* a saboteur or terrorist) at its wall or nearby. Such criticality cc uld lead to additional
20Z-radioactive releases, nelt control *ods and poison =od O'-MF
/ f0ufods ca which are restraihing or oreventing the rest of the co~e or/eg be,,4 (whether danaged or not in the rpst of it) fro . also go'ng S"of caa.s,af GO,hwal Wrhestutn m f2y care w,th myx ywig Wen critica cause overheeting in the core, confuse onerator's ^T N94 ,
about niant conditions durint a C1 css IX accident, leading O@NE/ then to e nnit errcrs such as turning on or increasing.; ECCS flow as tenverature rises due to such criticality (cooler wate" increases the reactivity of the Harris core) thus 'ncreasing the seve-ity of the c=iticality and the accident, [,duete high radiatior) fo=ce onevatin5 and renai" oersonnel ou of the cor ts'nnan'g area where thei- work wac necessary tn nrevant "adiation -elea ses after a core-danage accident that could lead to such criticelity (e.g. by shifting of core debris under vibration, wate- flow, etc), re-hars months or years af ter the initial accident (the T!I-2 core has net yet been exanined 3 nlus yce-s af te- its accident), and o therwise cause radioective naterial to enscare (the above c. is incornorated here by refe*ence) by the means given in this a nd the abeve centent' ensge n othe" means, or cause add' tional radicact' ve material to so escane, endangering the health and safety of the nublic . t i i
-203 -
# According to p.7 of the Ann 11 cation he ein, C?&L's canital stock and retaine d earnings totaled ann-oxinately
$1,792,160,000 at 9/30/81. CP&L's capital stock and retained earninEs are insufficient to ansure cleanun of a major nuclear accident (Class IX, TMI-2 ecuivalent o-worse) at the Harris nuclear plant. Without such cleanun the health and safety of the nublic will be at risk.
NCEMPA owns le ss than 16% of Har"is, s o even under thei= 2"take or pay" ce ntracts with CP&L and NC7P?. they canm t provide the necessary funds for cuch a cleanup, cs their contribution is restricted by those sane contracts to thei= share (i.e. less than 16%) of the co st s . One has only t o look at the cent'nuing wrangling over Mio un s the cort of the TMI-? cleanup to see that this cuestion is not "esolved.
# h The ES insufficiently considers the cost of nroverty insurance on SENPP, which CP&L has sousLt tc increase, but not undated the cost of accurately as of yet, which accurate costs for SEFPP orocerty insurance have not been included in the envine nnental balance struck for die 10.L. Stage under NEPA, and which results from event: (TMI-2 accident, CPhL's seeking to increase insurance) which occurred af te- the C.P.
FIS and C? license issued Der 10 CFR 51.21.
# Safety-related electrical cable at SENPP includes CPE (a polyethylene vulnerable to no-e ranid deterioration f*o long-tern radiation exoosure as shown e.g. by Gillen & Clough of Sandia Laboratories)(but no PVC as N9C now infonns me, unless info showing PVC is used in s :ch calbe & ni-ing later becones available). Such safety-related (Class 1, etc. )
-209-electrical cable and wirinE includes insurlating mate-ials '
I such as neoprene, Hypalen, glass braid, and CPE for which ! the degree of deterioration under normal onerat'ng and unde" I accident conditions (including Class IX ) is insufficiently established; failure of this tyoe of cable and wiring could urevent the funct* oning of 21xxxxi safety equinnert at SHHPo, or by increased resis tance, changed capacitance o~ inductance, or other chaC6e in electrical crocertien cf the wiring or esbles, cause misreadir6 of vital safety f nstrunentatier, erroneous sigrnis to safety-related eauinment, and other connunication and informatinn transfe*, and nore", feilures which coul d causa enemnn-mode failu=es (n.g. f"c- b*nken insulation c=acked off by the sa .e shock) and ATWS, nower excursien and o the" accidents at SHEPP which endangc= the heslth and surety of the public and which ni 6ht occur se ranidly that the exist
- ng ene gency resnonse plan eculd not go into.
affect, nor the necessarr deterninat'nns and notificatiens could not be nade, befo"e significant quantitites of "adioactive naterial resach the nublic, e.g. due to ATWS and reacto" vessel l head blown through the containnent followed by much of the core l l radioactive contents ( APS , 1975 ) . 4 The Emergency Desconse Plan for SEN?? does net take sufficient account of, or orovide means to deal w' th, accidents that ve=y ranidly build to the gene =al eme rgency level, and which can or do "esult in lavge anounts of radioactive mate-ial escaning the site, e.g. through a =eneto" bu'1 ding nenetration or vent that fails to close due to an elect-icr1 f a' l a"e , e . g . of cable ' ns ula t ie n , centvol logic, short circuit, virin6 overheatinc, a me chanical f ailure (biccked air line or failed closer device notor. Such niens are
-205 -
necessary to orotact the health and safet of the nublic because w'th its outdated reactor vessel and ecuinmant that has had to be redesigned renestedl r due te tPe 1cng 'nterval between commitment to build SHUPD (and the NSSS order and othan safety ele ted equionent being ordcred and nu~ chased) and estimated oneration date, much new info nst'or. cor.ing te light in the interin pe=iod necessitating "enected des *gn charges to assure the sa.fety and health of the nublic, SHKP? lacks the equier.ent qualification and quality assurance /quelit" contr:1 (duc also to CP&L's f ailu=es and d eficiencics in CA/C.C) tc assure that suen rasidly-escaltting accidents cc described 4Arein and in the abcve contention (incornoasted here b" reference) do not oc cur. Thus the Energency Desnonse Dlan nust nrenare sufficiently to pror.ntl" notify plant and emergency resnonse pe=sonnel of such events ('ncluding irstrumentat!.nn te detect same which is not vulne"9ble tc the failu"e0 outlired abC ve ) and clans to orotect the nublic adequatel" f rc~ the "es ult s of these "apid radiological release eventn at SHFPD, Such mee.9u"e nay have to include exnansion cf the exclusion avec and L7Z, elocation. er nearby homes and penal. tien cen ters , and othan a cronriate measures to keep people out of the zone of high rish fron such accidents (ner 10 CFP 100.11, esn. at note 1 to subsec. (a) thereof) to urotect and assure thei" health and safety.
. . 1
- 2D6 -
- Applicant CP&L x chould be required to nrovide, out of the 22000 acres it ourchased for the SENPP site, wildlife habitat to recce that destroyed by the construction of the plant, sone of the best in the area accord #ng to NC Wildlife personnel. Such co .rensatory creatien of new v'1dlife habitat .
to renlace other wildlife habitat destvoyed is reouired unden NEPA and the environnantal nolicy of the United States (see, e.g. Cane Creek Dan p cjcet, OranEe County, NC, EIS unde-wildlife habitat)
- The updating and testing of Aunlicants ', State of NC 's and FE"A's ener5ency plans fer Siiy?" are deficient in not providing for keening the nlan suf ficiently up-to-date (e.g. Identifying the location of all day care centers, residences of all disabled versons, residences of cil nersons without transoortation (or other places te which those without transportation can cone frcn their residences to be transnorted without receiving radiation er,osure in coming there), schools and worholaces and universities and akknx educational institu-tions where the"e will be numbers of nerse ne recuiring trans-portation, o"isons and hornitals Phere not on'.y tvansan"tation but additional nedical cave and guards will have to be h location & identitt and means ta "ethch orovided durin6 evecuation) o evacuate the EPZ around Sli@p(
or take other appropriate energency t'esnonse neasures in ne , 6% M a t'.nely, efficient and effective nanner, under 10 CFR
$6Cf eN 50.5h(t) and 10 CFR 50 Apnendix E IV G.
l 1
-9 D $ (w/ ntres)
# hCP&L'sTrainingScheduleforrencteronerators, su,er-visors anf others (S20s and COs) does not nrovide sufficiant staff for SH'??P control mo . oners t!nns to meat the nininun shift crew recuirements ner FSA? and ??C rules (number and licenses tn fill ocsitiens) necesser" te c"eaate the riant on a continuous basis. The=efore CP&L's tr91ning nrogram is deficient, its n1anning is poor, and CP&L's abil' t~
te 7rotect the nublic health and s afetr in nuclear onerat' ons at least at all t'ncs , ce nnisting is in doubt. Without a nir *.num crev of surervisn", fo~enen, A A senior readtor centrol ooerators ar.d ooerators, annron-iately cualified b~ SCO or 50 license a s necessary, SH'TP? canW be onerated safely ftV (O C(Y W  (O O k E O,5 j OI s
# CP&L's in-containmen t radiological noniters as desc*1 bed in FSA? 13 3 7 3.1.2 (p.13 3 7-5) and in the T?2 A -endix to the FCAS, can onl~ read un tc the radiatien levels exrec-ted in design basis accidents for locations inside certainnent.
Therefore the SEC and design of ShTPP are deficient in that , the radiclogical nonitors ir cont ainnent are r ot e ble to read *adiation levels result' ng from a C1nss 17. e ccidant (e.g. a co"e melt) et the highest levels to be ex7ected in such an accident. CP&L ha s f a' led to take rela t! velv s'~nle stens (e.g. nroviding a second equivalent nenitor shielded in lead to Sc with each nonitor ner the above, thus having a detect' c.n ranp much higher than the unshielded or le as shielded monitoi,.
# MThe on-site cot.nting laboratory at ShTPo is not equipped with sufficient shieldinE 4'ron radiation and shieldinc for sannles to ensure that sanples of coolant (rrin =~)
. o 0%-
and other sannles which must be anal"ged cuick1" to nrevide information to ene rgency resnonse eerscnnel, ninnt pe"sonnel who declare and detem'ne the level of energencv at the SENPP (unusual event, x alert, site or gene-al; or whatever levels are soecified in the cu rent energency clan) @ to orotect the health and se.fety of the oublic, can be analyxzed ranidly encu6h (e.g. withcut being sent offsite for anzslysis at the Me"=is ZE Cente" count' ng laboratorv c r elsewhere ) te nrovide said info *nctim soon enough to activate the ene gency "es once nient and evacunte eersons reouirin6 evacuat'on in the event of a Class IX accident, under 10 CFP 5C Apnendix E IV(C) a- 4 (D)(3) and planning
# hThe SENPP Fnergency Plantutz:p;of acplicants , the Stete of NC, FE~M et al is deficient in that it does not crovide the means of decontainninatin6 famland and hones a"ound SH"P3 in the event of a Class II accident pea 10 CF' 50.5h(s)(1),
(s)(3) and (t) and 1c CFR 50.hD ho f\h94, haul fO9ed4W o[}S9.H~tJ n Appendix s thereto: thx The env' ronmental recort (E" 2.1.3 and Tnble 2.1 3-2) shows tha t the agricultural rroduction within 50 miles of CH"PP is substantial, and that noculatinn (E.". 2.1.2 and Tables 2I.1.2-1 through 2.1.2-5) in the area is also numercus: the energener plans and n1anning cited above are deficient in not adeauntely providing for such decentaninotion of food rand living niaces of large numbers of neonle af ter a Class I:: ac cid_e n t (or " Class X" event er contentions above b hClt W6 pJcovpatek [4fe by V&eace. % C(ass _g faA- J this, a cwdry fLa abs a e><eerF tio Y . vwaw Ime<L wora, s st9nds OS o SqGmhco8&wNW Mb,.
- 204 -
# bk The ES and cost-benefit balance it strikes a=e deficient l
'i n not considering, at nininun, the uncertaf nties in deconni-ssioning costs for Har=1s Units 1 and 2 due to the fact that no SWR of such size has been deconnissione? yet (with the possible excention of Three Mile Island Unit 2, en accident being the cause). Deconnissioning costs considered unde = NEPA should also include additional costs likely if rndiction execsure standards for workers continue to be lowered, e.g.
to the 500 milliren per year linit advocated by 3EIR chairnan Dr. Edward Radford. And Deconnissioning costs should include the cost of providing secttre storage for the narts of the plant too radioactive to be disnosed of excent as nuclear (radioactive) wastes et the time of decennissi6ning, costs of assuring that SHNPP will not release raSionuclides to the environnent or exoose persons to radiatien during any interval bentween the end of oneration and conclete de-connissioning. Tha t any such costs nay be nat d by the tax-nayevs, federal government, etc instead of =atena"ers (who are now being charged by CP&L fer decennissioning of Sobinsor and 3-unswick reactors) is not relevmat under NEPA. Casts are costs and nust be censidered in the envf ronnental balance. New information on weaknesses of radwaste enntainnent systens planned, leaks fron low-level waste sites (e.g. Maxey Flats, West Valley), and new data on rddiation nrotection of workers (e.g. that which Dr. Radford bases his views on) accuired since the C.P. stage of this ernceeding and the C.P. FES rea,uire such reconsideration under NI?A and 10 CF' 51.21. l l l l
-2/o-y[d((The exclusion area and Low Ponulatien Zone (LPZ) for H --is are 'nprope-ly established under 10E CFR 100.11(enti-e) in the light of new and ad':itional infornation including the crediblity ncy of Class IX accidents nore severe than fernerly believed credible (see, e.g. k2x2R hF FR 40101),
the accident at TMI and studies of its consecuences and i particularly of its radioiodine releases by Takeshi Seo, C. Van Middlesworth, B. Molholt and others, including Gordon MacLeod, unich information was not e vallable at the t* ne the CP was issued or when the LPZ and exclusien area were estcblished (or wasn' t enncide-ed n enerly when they were). FSAR 6.2.1-1 and 2 states that the accident used to set the LPZ and exclusion area boundaries (and, engo, distance tc boundary of nearest nonulation cente , e.E. Cary, Anex, New Hill) was a " design basis accident" (CLASS VIII). But note 1 to 10 CFR 100.11(a) says that these distances and boundaries must be " based unon a najor accident . . .that wo uld result in notential hazards not exceeded by these from any accident considered credibic. Such accidents have gererally bean e ssuned to result in a cubstantirl meltdown of the core with subsecuent release of aepreciable cuantities of fission oroduc ts . " While the basis document fer the se calculat'r ns dates fron 1962 (Tech. Info. Document ih0hh, 3/23/62), new bove 04dsab TswrupSe studies ha s co epta data such as th to ve liteax 'f5 FR 4yoI e+c E ht since the CP Stage of this nroceeding. Moreover, even bero-e TMI (and consideratirn of such and worse a ccidents ac heving credibility, e.g. h5 a FR kO101), the ASL3 rulad in 1974 that xmm the y have dis tinguished "betwean the " design basis accidents and the even nere severe hynothetical 1
-2 I( -
accident recuired to be nostulaed by 10 CFW IXMX 100 for the purnese of evaluating site s uitabili ty . " Ferley, 7 AEC 98,#103 (1974). And 10 CFP Part 50 Ancendix D distinguished between the " design basis l events" (Cir ss 3 accidents ) that are sequences of sne-ific failuras, and the"nore severe" Cless 9 accidents which can nelt the core. The design basis events of SENPP end etha" Westinghouse P 3?s te da te (as filed in PSA% and FSA"s) have net been ccre melts or nartizal co e melts -er Table 13.2 of e.e 1977 ShrPP 'E" 10 CFo 100.11(a) foetnote 134;onfinns this as the 33A deges therein are less The fact that TMI-2's accident exceaded its design than thoce in lo CTR basis also excludes such an adcident (C1 css 8) fron being 100.11 used for detern*ning the 10 CFD c art 100 distences to the bounde*ies of the exclusion aven, Lo2 nnd nearest nopulati n center. TH-2 did not have its conta* nnent isolated (cicsed) f or seve al hours 'nte the accident, where xhnra TID its desirn 1h8kEbasis accident (on cit) does. (Max'. nun hvnethetical accident) 6 And TMI-2 *eleased mora Xe-133 then ner its design basis eccident. On the basis of events and data such as the above s' nce the CP was issued, the l' 'ts of the exclusion area, icv norulation sone and limit of the cet (bounda=y) of the nearest nenulation center ne ed to be re-established for SEUPS on the basis of a Class IX accident more seva e than any o ther, and the zonina codes of ' ake, Cha tha~, Lee , Harnett and nonnibiv Durhan and othe~ countiec, as municinalitias nee- SENDP need to bc *evised *
- exclude homebuildinc in the re-established LP' and where such building (including anartnents , huosnitals, schocls, etc. ) wc uld h"*nc a noruittien center uithin the 1 & 1/3 tines LPZ boundary distanc e of SEPPo.
I
- 106 The health and safety of the nublic with resnact to the safe construction and onerat'.an of the Harris nuclear plant is not assured because the USC Staff, for the reasons set forth in cententions 7h (n.190) and ll (n.06) shove which are incornorated he=ein b~ reference for such reasons, is unable to cone with the fa'lu"es of nanagement and que11tv assurance and quality control of CP&L, incitding those In in contentions 3,15,23,k1x51 ho,hl-hD,h3-Lh ,56,57,65,71, 72,73,76,77,7S,79,80,81,89,88,s91,9h,96,97,99,100,101,10P, 103,and 105 above(incornorated by "eference hereing) which and show that CP&L by managenent, staffing, actions , lack of:
xn anpronriate and t' rely planning, design, ins talla tien (e.g. rad nonitoring , safety-relat ed equinnent ) and modification of equinnenj) training, developnent of accca:lishnents and procedures,and othe"wisey making suffic'ent effo"ts to assure the nrntection ce the nublic health and safety; and thus, because NP.L Staff, for the "easons cited and incornorated by reference above, is unable tn co7e with (as described above) CD&L's inadecuacies tn 9"otect the herith ard sacet" of the nublic , including CD&L's history of nA/CC faflu-as e t 3"unswick (where C:&L assuned much more ves,cnsiblility fo construc tion nanaEement and QA/CC, see N"C 1979 remand hearing, testimony of J.A. Jones of CP&L, and cross examinat'on, tr. ) a nd continuing through Harris (a.g. "annroved" defective welds on pipe sunnorts and hangers discovered 1931-82). Thus, N"C Staff weaknesses, attitudes, deficiencies and nroblems (not all of which are NuC Staff's f ault, and no offense intended to invidiuai staff) plus CP&L's weaknesnes as detailad above including incoroorst'ons by reference, cenbine to c cate l "*""*' " # d'""i" b W!tifet"We""#Mifh'e"elWafe""sPf$. "
- 1
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2.1 V - or sanotage or te-rorian, wi.ich harris' security plan falls to l nrovide adec.cate detection of cnd defense aga'nst)(or sabotege i or te=rorism againct *he RH4 o' cti.e= heat renoval cystems off SHM?", which nisc Anolicants ' s ecuaite nlan does not nrovide adenuate detect'e n of, ce defense aga'nst); ()b Safety In-11 cations of Control Sys tens (including failu== s cross-generational (of connute= enui"nt) intc ^e cer , due t o the outdated design, untested sof tvare, nrd vulre-able wirins of HEP"is ' Integrated Contrcl Sys tem and o ther centrolsf th* failures in air lines due to, e.g. getting wate" ' n the- dur' nt-naintenance (CP&L's Brunswick naintenance i: "nown to be slarnr ) or tests, etc); 11ure of h*dro6en co ntrcl neasu-ec , and effects of hyd= ogen burns on sefety ecuinnent (e.g. loss of pe"er o" centrol to Harris's or'y ? hydrogen recr9b*ra s, failure of Harris 's inadecuate inst"unentrt' en to detect H 2 levele so tne recombiners .ill be turned on before an exolosien results, e.g. from onerating notc= snarking); and(N) Pressuriced The" mal Shock (a serious oroblem at Ro binson 2, seep"C doc urente thereon, nil-ductility tem, alread" at 290 F af te= 11 yearr , o e=nting; annlies to Ha="is due to outdated "eactorr7 n" essure vessel, c clant nunns etc made to 1071 AS*T-III codes) all of the above bein6 as described by NRC, e.g. in NUFFG-0606, Vol b No .1, Fe o . 19, 1982 which document's descrintiers of the above unreselved safety issues is inco" orat ed he ein b~ refe"ence to infina show what the issues listed above a~e, through the "nroblen descrintion" in NU9EG-0606 for each issue listed above.(DThe coq ("ns for interaction of such n"oblens A as e7.,ressed, e.g. by D.L.3asdexkas of URC (h-29-8? vresentatier to Cennissione"s and attachxnents thereto) also a-al- to Har~is dae to its old reactor vessel (ASME-1971 date ) and control systems particular. vulnerabilities. Inte" action of s uch
O
- 2.fSI--
weaknesses in the vassel, prima *y systen (as descr* bed en d "ef 'J above, includ' ng contertiens h7 .61 ineca, crated herein bv vefer-ence) and in the cont-c1 systen as desc-ibed abcVe, can co-arand accidents and land to nuch nore serinus ccnsecuences te the oublic health and safety in the form of =cd' nt.* on releases, i.e. a ninor accident or incident like loss of f(edwate" can esenlate through a reactor vessel f rac'.ure and furthea c9nt ol systen failures to a connnletely uncontvolled release of radioactivit- tn the enviro nnent, e.g. by fa*1 ara of contain-ment isolation cont =cis fc11owinr vessel fracture on ATWS cr any other incident (including ond'ncry venctor tri,c that lead to nrinary system velief valvec veleasing "adioectivitv inside centairnent in onder to control ntimary svstem tem - e*atu"e and cressure). Thase natte"s include 3" Stems Inte-ections (Task A-17 of NU9FG-0606, ovoblem descrintion inco norated o" reference anxdanxdiatr.rennap here for Task A-17. i
#108 Annlicants and their USSS vendors, a=thictect-engineer (r) and contractors and consultants have failed te take necessa"r (including research, measu*enent , and testing of comra"e51e cr SE"P?
steps to provide full info nation necessa=y to evaluRt onents) the performance of reactor controls 7 stens and instrumentatinn du"ing normal transients and severe accidents (including Class IX), including dynamic characteristics of neutronic, the rnal , ' hydraulic, hydrodynamic and hydrostructural systems of 9HNPP and its nrima*y systen, danning ratins, f"ecuency resnnnse cha* acte-istics, chase and a gafn narEi ns, stabilitv unde = taansient and accident cenditions, interaction (e.g, throtzh innedance matching o nismatching, mechanical o" electrical or thermal, including thernal and =adiatf or effects on the
^
s onerating varamete*s and cha*setenistics of nower viring and control eouinnent as desc~ibed above, *ncludirc all w* ring and equi 7 ment necessa"? fo" Category I s"rtens IX to oneaste effactively in a C1cs s Il or less seve=e accident. This sort of cerfornsnee needs to be vewified on-site at nerris or a connewable onerating nuclese nlant (e.g. Vi"611 C. Senner, according to FSAR alnost identical to Harris 1 and 2) by actual tests and measu*enents calor to Ha==is s tartur. The characteristics of Harris's defective stenn genere. tors (Westinghouse nodel D's) need te be s'mila-ly dete nined because leaks, sudden fa.*1u=es of multinle tubes (e.g. from vibration at newer of 50$ or above) can initiate shutdowns of the reactor and other transient conditions which can interact with the other ecuinnent dascribed above to cause more severe accidents, e.g. a stean gere=ato" tube leak followed by failure to SCRAM. I Moreover, a comulete record of ooerational erweriences of such sys tens (electrical and hydraulic and air-ectus ted control systens, hydrostructural systens (e.g. resultc of water hanners and stean t hanners), thernal syste m incitding ECCS and reactor cooland an? feedwate= punes , and their controls, has no t been cenpiled by An-11 cants or their above-described vendors to form a basis for annrocriate desiEn nodificatiens to guard against control systens interact'ons that could (as described hereing and in certention 107(entire) above which is incornorated here'n bv reference) cause secicus accidents, including Class IX ones, by means described under the definition of " accident" in this s unnienent , end i n content' nns h7 through . 31,70,71,76,77,78,79,h5,h6,52 thro ugh 5h an d99.93.96 07
-217-here and 102 which are incorcorated, bv reference w.' th resnect to the trues of accidents and nossible ways they car hannen as d e s c ri b e d th e r e irJ;xhan xn st xb nen . Such a "ecord is necessary to assure the health and safete of the nublic in the event of ooerat'on of SHrP? because the above-referenced and described accidants can sexvenely harn the nublic cr.d I
its genetic integrity. available to ne betone 4.1 kh
#10&9 Anrlicants ' FP cnd o ther existing reno-ts a re ino docus te in that daey do not nrovid e s uffic ient ' nformat'on (e .g.
exact chemicals to be released into SHNP? lake or reservofr, identifying all chemical scecies therein or to be exuected therein (in the releases); nature of the collutants (organic and heavy netal and other) to be found 'n the Cane Fear ver which may inte"act with Harris nollutan's to forn no e toxic a nd hazardous and ca=cinogenic chenicals , tenne *atu~e tolerqnce limits for all significar.t fish snecies in asid Icke ("imnortant" s pecies an d othe" significant onec ), a c t ually nee sured background radiatior levels and radionuclide cencentrations around Sli"?? en a stantisatically reliable basis for assuring the concentraticns throughout the site and r?Z before Harris overates, data on the environnental impact of uraniun nining including Th-230 and 9N-272 releasas and the long-tern healt'h effects thereof over 20 to 30 halflives of Th-230, erosion rates by wind of the overbutrden of buried or covered tailings fron uraniun mining, e=os .cn antes d from ra' nstorns (*ncluding gully formation) on sw d tailings overburden on cover), actually neasured (bv nressurized ionization ecuinnent) radicnuclide "eleases from oner9 ting
-218-PWP.s including VC Sumner wh'.ch is virtually identical in design to Henris ) including nuclidec , annunt, -elease wates nvar t*ne ,
etc. in a connrehensive fonn, data on actual denosit '.on of radionuclide releases from onerat' ng nuclear nlants (inclu-d'ng rainout, fallout inanzx snow, ha'l or sleet o" Preez.' ng raf n) including patte*n of such denosition with ademunte neasu"enents to draw iso-nuclide -level lines on a nan with statistical accuracy needed to nredict food chain, direct human exmosure and other radiological innsets of Mornal SH'1?D one-ation and nostuls ted accidental eleases in the Class I2 cetagory including these costulated uer 10 CF9100.11; and other and soeci"y as nar be "ao,uired, information necessary to formulategenvironnental j innect and safety / health innact contentions in this croceeding, including those to be based on new information unde- 10 CFR 2.71h(b).
- 110 Anolicants ' FSAo and the STD ave deficient in taet they fail to nrovide infornation necessa y for the fonnulation on greater snecificatien of cententions ' n this nrnceading, including contenti6ns to be based or nodified on refined or revised on the basis of new information under 10 CFR 2.71h(b).
The above docunents are inco=nlete, inadenuate, inaccu~ ate, do not yet contain resronses to all NPC Staff o.uestions of Annlicants as part of NUFZG-0800 and other NRC review of then, do not - ov'de detailed, Har"is-specific analvsis, test data, test suecifications, nodels and information tc assure t hnt Ha"*is can be enerated safely in snite of unresolved safety issues including those noted in content'on 107 above and the latest editt en of NU'2G- NOhj
-219-fails to connute orobabilities cf accident i secdences end interacti^ns of equinment, c o n t rols , systens and nlant inven-tories of radioactive material accurately (or a t all in some cases, e.g. all of FSAR 15. as now written 5-lh-32 (I checked the LPDo co y for any amendments last right 'n Raleigh, none ffcund)
(I also checked with librarian Hicknan to see if any FcAP amend 4 cents had cone in thr t wera ret 'n the referance conies. Sha says ncne have. ), fills to e decuatelv snecify, list, test, and verify softward and ha-dware co~ onents of the integrated control system and other electrical controls of SE7Po, including infonnation transfer lines, interfaces, buffe s, namory, insula-t' on, and o ther electricci ec~aonents , circuits and infornation (including operator training, oower sunniv chavacteristics, onerating systen, orobability an d teating of hardwnre fa' lu es in electronics and nechanical controls) necessarv t o safeily carry out the func t' ons of the ICS and other saf ety-velated control systems or systems that centrol safety-related equipnent (including IC9), fa'1c tc identify the model and adecuately saecify the characteristics of the stean generatore es desi ned 6 and es they nar have been nodified or will be modified, fails a to p:{ ovide proper analys* s of the eneration and f a' lure modes ? e of th. s team generators and comronents, fails to o" ovide "zerb-defects" quality assurance standards f or fabrication of connonents and ehuinnent at Harris including the nrina"y systen, Category I ecuinnent, cther safety related equinnent and 61 ecuirnent listed c= described above; f ails to nrovide actual test date on harris conta' nnent r enetrations ' , wiring 's , in s ula t' en 's ( including that on cables and wiring f or centvcis , neuer and instrumenta+icr inside centainnent o~ otherwise necessary
-2PO-for the functioring of safety-related systems and enuinnent including the CCPA!!, CRDM, ECCS, beren injection systen and all others necessary to assure the henith and safety of the public, fails to orovide a Frilure Modes and Effects Analvs's and sys tems (FMFA) for d 1 safety-relcted cc conerts and other comroner*:
i\ and systens li sted o= described cbove at Ha==is, f a 'Is to crovide neans to control hydrogen releases inside containment, f alls to nrovide test data on rad
- at'on nonito=s unde = c..rdit' ars connarable to a clasc IX accident, fails te n= ovide adequate test data on the d eter' o=ct' en of insula t'.cn, cont 9?n-nent eenetrations, electrical connectors and ends, and othar all nerformance raraneters including innedance and vib=atien, eouinnent as described above': d egrada t' on 'Aq= f a*1urc rates and nrobabilities from tests of eculor.ent at Hanris or identical to it under conditiens of heat , nressure , noisture , vndiat'en and chemical connonents to be exrect fnnr., or nossible in, nuclear accidents in the Harris contsinment; e rd fe 'Is to provide other necessary information for *he f ornulntion, refine-nent and revisiens of contentions, under 10 CFR 2.71h(b) and other I!CC rules for refinenent and revis'.cn of content'ons (e.g.
10 C7" 2 Artendix A ) . 4110)( The Environnental Statement (ES) for Herris is deficient in thct it also fails to nrovide the info =natinn renuasted in is content'on #108 above (such informatien listinc ncorocrated i herein by rcre ence and other 'nfernatien necessa=v to fu11v l I evaluate the envirenanental innects of SE"PP over the long-run 1 ! (up to the end of its envi=enmental im7 acts at l east 11 nillion
'Jears f ron now) and sho-t-bun, including its risks and unintentional or undesirable effects, includ' ng those f ron nuclear accidents
l
-#221-and scent fuel transnort accidents and sabotage; ani te="crism, sabotage and terrcricr. on the Harrir site on against it, and l
sufficient information necessary to m; alvse the bcsis of such environnental imcacts a s to feasibili ty, probability of occurrence (s), tedhnical accuracy of statements, mndels and calculations therein, author s or authors' judgments and e their cualifications to nake such judgments (including infornation on the accuraev of thei- nast credictions and judgments connrchensively deternined and evaluated for each such author) and other info rmatter as may be necessary t o fornulate, refine or revise contentions 'n this nroceeding under 10 CFR 2.71h(b) and othe" a' nlicable rula s of tha ""C.
#111d31b$"i"ghbsYNNot crovided sufficient indenenicnce of safety and centrol functions in its design of the reactor and naimarr system of SHUP? cnd o ther parts of the Nuclear Steam Sunply System and its controls; Dr. Stechen Hanauer of HFC believes "this is unsafe" and NRC has "no co nrehensive and sy stemstic demonstration that (failure of non-safety grade equienent or structurea should not initiate o- aEgravate an accident)" (NUREG-0585 Absent a comorehensive Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of such interrelated systens in their "large nunber and types" (Hanauer), and aonronriate redesign to avoid f ailures, initiation er aggravation of accidents as NRC requires, Harris cannot be onerated s afely. This is carticularly anolicable to Harris because of its outdated
- design and soecification of a xx prinary systen connonents, l
e.g. reactor vessel, reactor coolant pumos, stean gene =ato c, .eetc. valves and tocontrols therefore, CRDM, etc. which are more Ir%"i I* "~r vulnenable failure in that they dc x not reflect cu-~en* t em knowledge or meet current safety recuirer.ents of codes / or Kfd{G
. . I
-222-
- 112 Because of the design d afects of Wes',irghouse rodel D steam generators as seen at inghals (Sweden) Alnaras (S ein),
McGuire (NC , USA ) , V . C . Sunner (SC, USA, almos* identif. cal c~ tne
. use u.n.
to Harris),ptaL cow,oa of nodel J steaneww sf aIIatwesMS generators narris h S.C,b ue excessive is unsafe due to theAkigh nrobability of sudden, multicle, or sudden nulticle failures of steam generatordubes (e.g. o.c McGuire tube Ic e t 20ll of its wall thicirne s s in 2h hou c f all " cme" , creating a LOCA or succession of LOCAs in onerstien, and 0 d thus releasing radie t' en to the envirennent , ex,osf ng vorkers'N @ to excessive radiatinn levels cleaning un af te" tne LCC A or safety related enuinnent, sunnorts and \ <}c
\W s
LOCAs, nlace st'resses on co nonants (esn af te" reneated LOCA ) qtM he which those connonents were never designed to withstand lt3 4. Wd a4 M f U reneatedly, an otherwis'/5e noIcdecuately oro tectirF the L g4 gpnW O @N nublic health and safety (e.e..g v nroducing large amouhts q g h of ridita nuclear wastes fron cleanun onerations which then , have to be safely storaG and dianosed of outside the normal or radwaste control zad snent fuel storage (as undanaged enent fuel) design, ecuinnent and lo cations at the nlant o= elsewhere , nosing the risk and nossibility of additienal escane of said nuclear wastes; another way is venting roble gases (Xe , or KR-85 and r-8k7 and othe" radioactive nobla gases) frcn continainnent on other locat? cn during or af te= an accident such as the LOCA described above ot other such accident. ) The design of SMP? should renove the model D stean generators and install better stear Eenerators not subject to the above defects, risks and deterioratien (includinE nrobrhi14'- of nulticle renil stean-gererater tube failures) before onoration begins, in orde" to n"otect the "ublic health and safety. W Access to do this exists at Harris. 1315 pot $ gfed
,y, $ g ..s, k1 ftfer1MQ Wm
-2?3-
#113 The materials of the Harris steam generato s (Inconal 600 and othe=s) are subject to corrosion which results in greate" numbe"s of insnections and renairs, increesad nrobnbilit of steam generator tube failune (and resulting shMtdowns, lo ss oxf power outout, and notential accidents. 'clater chenis'ry changes intended to " cure" this uroblen have invariably resulted croblems in other corrosionAor worsened corrosion nroblens, in such stean generstors as Westinghouse ones nede w'th Incenel-600 The eregress of corrosion makes stean generator veriscenent necessary before the desiE n life of the steam gene"ator er reactor is over, in many cases (e.g. ' Turkey ?t. 3,h; surrv 1,2)
(Robinson 2, Prai-ie Island ) . Such corrosion problems and the result? ng nead for nore insoecticns, recairs, and eventually for "e'la canent of steam generators result 'n 1s ger red'.ation doses to -enair uensonnel, increas'ng the nonuletf en genetic danage from these eersonnel and their descdendants, and exrosing the recair personnel e excess risk of cancers and other diseases induced by redistien ex-osure o~ ingestion oxf radioacti.ve na te"ials fcund in nuclear ra dia t.' nn steam generators. The orojected,4d oses from stean generatcrs at Harris over the nlant 's nrojected onerating life do not take account of the leaks , inscecticaks, repairs and ret 19 cements that will be recuired, esnecially if dr.e design defects snecific to Model D stean generators (see centention 11 ? above for descri tion of innact of such defect on McGuire nuclen* niant) are not curad or the stean generators rerlaced with non-defective nodels before Harris onevntes. Such radiat'on doses te workers and contract ennicvees will be excessive w'11 exnose unknovinc persons to radiatfon risk, (e.g. some o,j the nensonnel, all of their desedndants (via Eenetic damage), and nay exnose unde -age
1 1
-22h-nersons to euch radiation and risks as CP&L has done at H.'. Robinson f2. CF&L's weak "ecord on "adiatfon n-otection at Robinson, and weaknesses in its radiation n"otecti^n r orran at B"unswick, both includ* ng niacing eriority on n oducticn of cot.en, not on assuring safety of e*, levees and cont-act workerc (and tne nublic ), nakes this nroblen narticularir ennlicsble to Har-is. Recair and inspect *.on account for the vase majo*tity of worker radiet* n exrosure. Use of the (a)
Ha="is steam generaters in such circunstances is nct AL/."A as "ecui-ed by N'.C rules; (b,) is not nr ner1r wei Ehed yet in the environmental balance of Harris eneration unde" UEFA; and (c) poses undue risk of accident from steam generator and tube failure, trans*crt or storage of radioactive used Harnis stee Eenerators , to the heal th and s afet" of the ,ublic.
- 11h The Virgil Sunner nlant will not be able to one-ete abovve 50% nower cutnut for "e 1cng t tne" acconding tn CCE&G(owner of that nient) officials. "his is a consecuence cf design defects in '.iestinE house odel D stean generators such as harris has, as also seen e.g. at McGuire 1 of Duke towe ,
Alnnraz & 'inghals nuclear clants. Harris is virtually identical in design to VC Summer. Thus the none* outnut loss, reliability loss and kwnit additicnal accident visks of Harris one aon due te these stean generator defects need to be iconsidered in the ES and in striking the envirennental balance under :PF;. for the 0.L. stage of Harris licensing. The above are new information since the CP s' ace under 10 CF' 51.21 in tha' 'hir defect wac not found until the above niants began startun, due t o inad eoun t e t e s ti ng,,bv 'fe s ti n-heu se o f f + ' appan g ene-ators .
$ke uh.hs .k5! r$bl n bf h$ $n n$d5k$$e 2Ckuaranted$on'i.e*.
-225-
#11 5 Applicants and their USSS supnlier have not nro vi de d an available Failure Modes & Effec's .snalysis of An ticinated Transient Wihtout Scran (AT.ls as used h e=ein) xnch including such effects as the cre ssu=e reaching le vels (AEC/?PC saas it can) in the vessel that ti.e he ad is ticun off and through conta inment (see American 'hvsical So cietv *e,ovt of 1974 kg AcAkN8 Plowsee3 beg'ns et on nuclear reactor safety,.. vsun,le"a n t n . S-1 ) ,
( W5 Sw" f ailure of the boron injecti on systen (itr. "unn is not conside ed safety-related e cuinnent Kr At Ha"*is and -ar f a'1 ) d uri*g AT!S, and othe" fa' lu~e ncde s no s sibl e then a t"ansient on event t hat should result in a SCRAM does not , e.g. , failure int the CRDM nove" sunalv, controls or log'c in x m;na te: mis zaxnn tecixtatmMR2ps:: nim cet x".am xn rad from a short circuit or other cause), specific to Harris. The outdated reactor vessel, mcde tc lo71 cedes, '.s mo re vul ne=able t o 40 overpressure l' and ? thernal snock when the ECCS tries tc ccre with ATWS or LOCAs resulting from the overnressu=e ernected or nossible in ATIS, CP&L's defect
- ve steen 6enerators will alsc lead to mera t rancients and "eactor t" ins at Harris.
increasing wear and tear on the SCRA?! systems and increasing thei" likelihood of f ailure. Such an analvsis (F'rA ) of AT!S is necessarv to assure that Har-is can be enerated withnut ikxxri endangering the risk health anc safetr of the ,ublic , through accidents un to and including the extreme Class IX ! event (reactor vessel head through containnent ) described bv A'S, whe=e it is shevn that encugh energy wr uld be available to thrust said ves sel head dr.=c"gh contai nnent , bringing fission products in the c ore into diract ce ntac t wi th , and out into, the environnent around Harris very raridly.
-226- #11 6 The fire urotection and fire sun,ress'en systems at "crris are inadecuate to crotect the he al th and safety of the nublic and xto ensure the safe eneratien cf the ulnn t.
They also fa'l to con 1~ with 10 CF3 50 Annendix A criterion 3,10 CFR 50.E8, and equivalence er better verformance than , requ* red of nlants nrevirucly licensed to nrerate,ne" 10 CF7 53 An,endix R. For exennle, the connuter system is not adequntel-uretected against f'.re, smoke, heat, cable f!"es, 'nfra"ed radiation and against firefighting equinment and chenien1s (including water) necessarv tc f.'sht fires in cri around the cc-nuter(s ), I/O devices , wiring and cables to and from the co nuter (ICS s" stem and lNChid neg~ othe r c.f(;*.s nnute O&MGH cys tens to WWW YfMCOS, insure that the ccc-uterized abi?.ity to moniton the clant 's status , of fsite radiation exuosures, onsite radietion levels, radiation (radioac tive material) rel ecses , and delive" such information te control rocm nersonnel and to anergenc" resnonse dersonnel, ar.d to shut the olant down in the event of unsafe in conditions, is thus not assured. Adecurte redundancy in commuter and w' ring systen.s in the nlant, and adequate fire nrotecti n therefor to assure that the connuterized ability to monito" and delf ver informatf en and to shut down the olent (all as described above) is continucusly available, as is necessar- to inzm?. r"otect the health and safety of the nublic. The ecoling, ventilation and newer supply systens necessary fo~ operat'on of the (qg plant co m ute" systens must be also adequately n"otected or damage f rom fire-fighting l f=on fire damage 4that wruld er could nrevent thei orerating wi thin the proner paraneters te peanit condtinuous co--ute-
&vSi performan ce of the safetf'"\ arc "mergency n1anning -required funct'nns RbrJ4
~ #227 -
fo= Har-is
#117 The energency resnonse olan does not nake adeauate provision fc= nobilising wrecke= t=ucks and othe ecuinnent necessary to keen evacuation routes cles" in the event evacuation is necessarv. I!ot only vf 11 accidents occu"a in any such nassive r.ove .ent of censons, but fear and nanic will nahe them more likely. !!o natter hcw good the roads, cars or truck wrecks blocking the routes will render than useless or too little too late in evacuation. Such wreckers, fire erotection equienent etc must bex able to move to and stru*minxixer :manarrin to d eal with aeeidents invoIving hazardous carEces that hannen to be on the mad at the ti e of evacuat'en and are in or en routes being used or to be used for Harr vacuation. U f l0DuY 8d AC<A N/
Va $1,Qh.Or3 Q QusWe @li he mcyeaSed, 2SfCCoGlQ (-w f CG"JI h
#118 the energency resnonse rien for Harris does ret assure Mk rTGd 09- fu g that hazardous naterials and cargoes abandoned 'n the EDZ during an evacuation will be identified and secured and safegua"ded during and af ter an evacuati on as nay orove nece2-sary af te" an accidental release of radioactive nate=ial fron the Harris plant.
#119 In str' king the envi"onnental belance for 3.Har-is nuclear clant onerations under NEPA, the une **aintv ~
G90'f1*NSVWVh in nuclear accident nrobabilities as sY1own by REG Cf-0@6 Givd elevant operating excerience, and b~ those events which, if they had occurred during accident sequences which have occurred, would escalate those actual sequences to Class IX events or make them even more serious (for those actual events which are censidered Class IX) and the urobabilit! es of those events which would accennlish this escalation and nore serious effectsk, based on the erobabilities of those everts as est:clished bv ouerating axterience of nuclearnower plants, l particularly ones s*-ilar in design to Harris. I \ l
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- 22T-I g/2./ Radiological Emergency Response plans of the Applicant, the State of NhCarolina, and the surrounding comunities have been fomulated without reference to the Draft Environmental Statement, Supplement (NUREG 0534, Supplement) and thus fail to address appropriate protec-tive measures needed to provide radiological protection to all residents in the vicinity of the'~NMERd -PLMrf- wh'o might be threatened with in-jury or death from an accident greater than a design basis accident.
g g The Applicant 31acks the financial qualifications necessary to with-stand the costs of various contingencies, including extended shutdowns of the reactor caused either by problems arising at the Warru p lan)P (up to a maximum of a TMI-type accident) or by' generic problems similar to those which have arisen at existing reactors and which have caused t$. h t. % mm shutdowns at other reactors 4potentially subject to those problems. y y The Applicantslack sufficient " hands on" experience among RSS' E9ded b 9{ AFP reactor operator staff A to safely run the poms nucfwg/g ko$$ gy Unit 1, and no Operating l.icense should be granted until adequate
" hands on" experience is had by the Applicant's reactor operations staff.
fqqTheAppkicanhandthesurroundingcountiesdonotpossessthe l experience and technical ability adequately to plan for emergency pre-paredness, to prepare for a radiological emergency, or the capability for implementing protective measures based upon protective action guides and other criteria as required under NUREG 0654, Rev.1, at II.J.9. 1
-2.3 0 - .seen m m ,3r-F w No reasonable assurance can be had that the facility can be %gg g
operated without endangering the health and safety of the public ( through occurrence of a serious accident, beyond design basis. /&/p% (e, 00 bl'f% S Of stic risk assessment Chiemed k'i serve as a basis c Thej\A)eskprobaba : and standard for finding a reasonable assurance of an acceptable 84g
& \
risk to the public can not be carried out because human errors /gp ! and common mode f ailures are not susceptible to that method of analysis and because the complexity and number of nuclear plant f systems defies such analysis. Such serious issues have been raised and shown regarding the conceptual, methodological, statistical, and data underpinnings of the RSS that its use in licensing proceedings for decision-making is entirely inappro-priate. NUREG CR 0400, the Lewis Report, Supra; Union of Concerned A Review of Scientists, "The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors: the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH 1400" (NURDE475 014) , pp. 113-130. Serious accitents with releases of radioactivity to the environ-ment inimical to the health and safety of the public are now plainly credible after Three Mile Island. . i > Applicants have failed to demonstrate that during the t me i oper-period following a postulated LOCA but prior to effect ve (i) an uncon-tion of the combustible gas control system, either take place in f trollable hydrogen-oxygen recombination would not or (ii) the plant could withstand the consequences the containment, ft of that hydrogen-oxygen recombination without loss of sa e y LQ QQt. W pck CQSS hE EWed
""* MN.(Co Failures in Quality Assurance 4 undermine confidence in t e SCh YTfdM quality of construction of the containment and d the design systems so that no " built in" conservatisms beyon basis should be relied upon to provide a margin of safety.
l
a23/" , Initiating events from outside the station in the fom of loss of' offsite power, or from within the station in such events as feedwater loss as at TMI-2, steam generator tube rupture as at Ginna or electrical insulation combustion as at Brown's Ferry. These accidents have taught i ( us that sequential events contribute to the development of serious
' accidents such as sticking PORY's and disabled' electrical systems. Sub-
\
sequent events can lead to reactor pressure vessel breach, hydrogen release and containment breach, fA as been h operating for 20-15 years. The nil ductility temperature of the reactor pressure yessel has increased to greater than Basel oa CP+L's R.scrwa h t%,gM be 200 degrees F as comonly occurs with reactors of this age.A The @e<3W turbine generator throws a blade, puncturing the turbine case and making the feed water system temporarily inoperative. The' control systes calls for reactor trip but the reactor does not SCRAM due to comon inode failure of SCRAM systems leaving control rod solenoids activated. Pressure builds in the reactor coolant system due to decay heat, load loss and cessation of feedwater flow. The PORY opens, the pressure rises to the set points of relief valves which operate. The ECCS actuates. The accumulators and high pressure injection pumps perfom according to design. Large quantities of cold water entering the reactor pressure vessel chill parts of it to below the high nil ductility temperature. Temperature differentials in the pressure vessel induce higher levels of stress, the effluent from'the core is still at a high temperature. The combination of high internal pressure-high pressure injection pumps still operating, spring loaded relief valves now being closed, and the PORY partially closed - cause brittle failure of the junction of the reactor vessel and cold 1.eg nozzle,
-232-the weld having developed cracks. Vith the reactor breached ECCS flow no longer traverses the core..'The' core heats op, f d T h h f/ h 8 % g QHd. Destum-I3ff yaporite Geld CS-137 kW/A S
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4 */ The economic costs of a severe accident with release of [} 7 radiation to the environment (a so-called Class 9 accident) were not considered in the CP review for fGy'ris. Such an 4Socan eCo.Je meC accident could have enormous cost f consequences especially in the event of an atmospheric release with the winds blowing in the direction of the major population of EAl4ogh NC[eifr Sfggfg Csfehl+kend Q tatf+aes oft'sstY CfCtftS W M M # Ctge4ctes + twasty btasaMtcS (t ()to & C.CteHtt ( gs.c o cuahas s- as we H as Ln. kan of 136,b00
=* ** S ) 0f %evd Descham ((00 E"fie.s S' + Da Ye UHWevtt the.d.s col ceh,000 ct. -12 us,n.
,Y,
& t ll ((Ansi of to C, l%000,s fzits +.2 Coos ' )Q Q,%,'asf Morgr+n *f M I)e.wuysfx yoto, e sMtasG4 cv55bt d $fnut, la CFAs12,s pqm W C'*h eleu) Id fo Q.s 4rPte 40lo t 's agw~
M!*'W hSV ClGss lY a cce w{g g CVt U% Qald- braf The Cod of Scici., M C' b h5 Atust- lo.c. sue y Jual g D S' b ed O Ntt O, L. A;t M y g ,f # hIEPR. g g The Applicant's Environmental Report should provide a full description and detailed analysis of the environmental effects of the transportation of spent fuel shipments to the ' lant P CP+L from other w Company facilities and of the contribution SW PP of such effects to the environmental costs of licensing 6 , the values determined for such analysis for the environmental costs beray Qu,re L- 1^Ih R<. W P4 Cosf-l btdef,f bMAnce & 3 ggpp
. W ' opcratsd without andEngaring the public hoslth and sufoty bacause of(f{'sconsistentfailuretoadheretorequiredCommission operating and administrative procedures provided for in Commission rules and regulations. "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the statutory responsibility for prescribing licensing standards to protect public health and safety and for inspecting the industry's activities against these standards. The Commission does not thereby certify to the industry that the industry's designs and procedures are adequate to protect its equipment or operations." Federal Tort Claim of General Public Utilities, Corp., et al, CLI- . 81-10, 13 NRC 773, 775-776 (1981). At both Mf a)g 4- bMfWpC/( l facilities of d,ft [ Company the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Review Group found "weaknessess in personnel adherance to operating and administrative procedures' and " failure to follow procedures." NUREG 0834, Licensee Assessments, August 1981, No reasonable assurance can be had that the facility can
'[
be operated without endangering the public health and safety because the Applicants' reactor operators and shift supervisors lack sufficient hands-on operating experience with large pressurized water reactors. The resumes of Catawba Plant Supervisors show that only a very few of these individuals who will have primary management responsibility for safe operation of the plant, FSAR, Table 1.9-1, p.2, have experience at large PWR's like hyytL NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, I.C.3. Resumes of Senior Reactor Operators.and. Reactor:: Operators & :- ProaQ W l similar lack of experience.
-]m q
l
- 2.35 -
The license should not issue until and unless the hydrogen [ k
- release consequences from that range and variety of LOCA's which the Applicant is required by the NRC to consider have been dealt with so as to make impossible damage to public health and safety. The igniter system cannot perform this function.
Stations main transformer barns out as it did recently at Duke's Marshall Steam Plant or the transmission line is brought down by a tornado or a heayy lightening strike in the switchyard disables the switch gear. Both reactors are operating at full power. Half of the diesel electric generat-ing capacity fails to start. There is an insufficiency of on site power i for safe shot down. Decay heat removal is inadequate due to inoperable feed water and reactor coolout pumps. This results in excessive reactor temperature and pressure. The reactor vents through the pressurizer spring loaded relief valves. The ECCS accumulator water is soon exhausted. The reactor coolout system continues to vent steam with the result of core exposure and subsequent melt down and core slump. There is massive hydro-gen release, a metal-water reaction at least 80% complete. The air recir-
% H&o,5*J McHe4ers fan g + ssmtvs wof %g
- culation fan is inoperative.jThe igniters do not reach , ignition tempera- o ss ,
V WNW el-Hydrogen accumulates in the containment. Diffusive mixi.ng of ture l j hydrogen and containment air results in a combustible mixture. The tem-perature of the reactor surface is increased by the melted fuel to a tsoperature sufficient to cause ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture. Containwnt is breached, the estimated failure pressure of 67.5 psi being exceeded. The reactor vessel melts through and releases essentially the entire inventory of radioactive volatiles to the atmosphere as the coafnuamwV pwt% tuns k(. 5pecses vokf,lussay a f u{> +o 3500'(o r Mart) Qre recepe+cte v-esenf tru flat. a+mos Lwre fele ese, %se. aewk su tw, ~ ne foo cuhmatet b use or eak ::? fir 1 2 maxs, M see-+ Ag(paaI bests dm + sts castors expMe
i
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% Investment in capitalrather intensive, t.e,$HWPP t
than# labor intennive, approaches to dealing with energy needs p ' in the market to create jobs for residents Nof thereduced m ae
% arJadaulcheItk create. Ofkk -
soc,o e cnen)scbs a putan.s of fka.se +o Rafs
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,seyV e- e Ie c-M u.N) 4-o N(% cup h SeddS (Males +el ud $hblPR.fieIds u/4 f hs 0Csoctefe-L The tus}-
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III. FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VtdStL , , Y g The steam generator tube probles encountered in Westinghouse's D Series Steam Generators is not satisfactorily fixed. The reactor requires , shutdown and restart on a much greater rate than designed for - namely greater than a rata of 200 cycles in 30 years. The resultant fatigue carries an even more rapid. increase in nil ductility temperature than encountered in nomal operation. Cracks develop'in the pressure vessel welds: a comon occurrence as in Oconee 1. The'1sany probless with the aging Oconee reactors and the steam generator problaes at McGuire result in low nuclear plant capacity factors for the Duke systen. To ineet Winter peak Catawba is operated, although a shutdown to deal with nil ductility temperature well in excess of'200 degree F would be prudent. The turbine trip relieves an overload condition. The reactor SCRAMS and is directed toward a cold shutdown. After several hours the~1oad problan is remedied. Parts of the reactor have fallen below the nil ductility tanperature. Restart is too rapid in the effort to.get the unit back on line. The excessively rapid pressure escalation and the excessive temperature gradients result in stresses in the vessel which are suffi-ciently large enough to cause a crack to propogate in brittle failure. Reactor is breached. From this point the scenario is similar to the ATWS scenario - resulting in a PWR d release. hy[t CQd$ hg'g N*V PUN hW S C e N a eto g .s y ct, , M & O bove_ [.Qs) YEGScpa gg eyec+ss % gene,,- o ccuv appy Y be.. Ikarefwe. % g'* Wl%+cah6 wps a [de jy% l *%cnd+#9mssmuu OfyQN,
-23 7-
-237 I
_._ g.3 f-M(3l An AEC licensed plant experienced corrosion induced stud bolt failures. "An Invest.igation of the Failures'of LACBWR Pressure Yessel Closure Studs," S WI-2154-20, December 1971. The fix was.a change in stud bolt alloy composition. }4cif/e5 i
.-p bolts a -M' 1471 ! ^
ensitTy,e to corrosion i by borated water. l The FSAR requires bolts to be moved to a dry area during refueling and bolt holes in the pressure yessel flange to be ' used are defective.
'Tha pnsence of' borate water in.the bolt holes is undetected.
'On nsumed operation corrosion ~ of the. bolts takes place. The
{ intrinsic strength of the' bolting material vary appreciably . e FSAR Tabl 5.3-12. About one year after refueling a turbine trip causes'a pressure ! excursion in the reactor. The' reactor SCRAMS. 'Although the~PORY set I point is not reached the increased load on bolts is sufficient to cause- i the weakest bolt to fail. 'Almost instantly the remainder'of bolts fail doe to load increase from decompression of the flange at a failed bolt j i and the initial load increase in the vicinal bolts. 1the compression of the flange under nomal loading is approximately 0.1" As a inches) i result of the unzippering of the lid closure, the lid becomes a projectile , reaching a velocity of several hundred sph. As a result of steam thrust greater than one million pounds the lid is not deflected by the polar crane and strikes the contafrygent done, brea-hing it. _
~The ECCS is defeated. '
Water pumped in to the reactor yessel flows ,out ept over'the flange 'k from entering the core by steam blocking. The core melts dischargi.ng
"{
yo11 tales and particulates to the atmosphere
. The' release qualifies as a PWR-1. E GVY'tS IS W Y t- b A &
acc< L ggt &ss.,- Qathcv % M h> (O & *I \ epciva afty youh 6 t% N.pbd b he \ M ce4 km h l{' i,ke ib. 44 mms.c,I w,Gegu.sah lo uk.rek +eg g k'Q) & g ref* , i
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) The - control room fails to meet regulatory requirements ld A in NUREG 0660, NUREG 0694, and NUREG 0737 in that the control l
room lacks sufficient instrumentation for detecting inadequate core cooling in case of abnormal events, Applicants have not demonstrated their ability to comply with current NRC requirements for overall control room de5 Gn standards. The hggyg*y control room design and instruments N d have not been subjected to a comparative evaluation of the interaction of human factors and efficiency of operation, and the FSAR fails to document how the plant can or will be modified to meet the new criteria imposed after TMI. QYYlSshould not be licensed to operate until the 4 lM Applicants have developed and demonstrated an adequate security The FSAR does not give plan which complies with 10 CFR 73.55. adequate that all regulatory requirements have been or SEC-See FSAR, 134tSw , Regulatory will be met prior to operation. Guide 1.17, Rev. 1. The Applicants have failed to demonstrate that the diesel generators which are critical to the safe shutdown and control of the reactor in the event of loss of off-site power are designed, constructed and operated at standards sufficiently high that they may be relied upon to reasonably assure that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.
$5 Applicants have made no plans for ensuring that funds will Harri >
be available to safely decommission ammummeP in conformance with 4 NRC rules and regulations.
21(D ADDENDA To contentions (incocorated by reference into the contentions listed or wherever the listed terns occur herein) by Wells Eddleman, 5/1,Wk/82 dherever Class IX accidents are mentioned, a reference 1 to 15 4 FR 140101 (June 9,1980) requiring that Class IX accidants be considered in striking the environmental balanc 3 unde" NEPA, which requirenent is a changed circumstance under 10 CFR 51.21 sinc e the CP stage of this croceeding, is imnlicit as if fully
- set out therein (incorooration by reference, a s a definition).
Wherever ATWS or the American Physical Societ7 reno"t on reactor safety, (1975,Sunnlenent , beginning e.S1) !neluding the accident where the reactor vessel head blows off and breaches containment, or the nrecading accident not "eferenced to AVS is mentioned herein, contention #77, giving 2 wavs both events night hacoe.n, is incornorated bw reference as an exannle of e .I how such events could haopen. j[o Q'fgd Contentions #15, 33 and s f,3p g .n5tC ' by reference
' a e incornoratedf.nte #3 as further instances of CP&L's lack of sef e m.anagenert canability.
Concerning contention #11, SENPP resident insnector George nexwell nas told me (5.12.62 bv phone) tnat some cable and wiatrg is stored onsite at SENP? now, nade to IE7-323-197h standards. In cach of Contentions h7 thmugh 51, the following statenent is incoroc*sted by reference e s if fully set out in each contention: " Applicants have not shown nvcof they are in f ull connliance with 10 CFR 50 Acuendix A criteria lh, 31, 32 and 51 with resnect to the matters he ein at Sh7PP" l YL cl k ys & k U0s&c. b.J2 k l
N LU* W D v 0 Ct ! Y , O r "ve- l a a s e. O 49) v c.wche atena i " ora PoJL 22 I pcluf.gS alSO '. "J };mssw W Pr(We W I'6 "'d **'k "#
- W goted. ypc e dyr s % ,w 'S SdeM ' WMW j" ym nu t,a i a a e medes 'to (ElessS! n ocM no g g M mow wp C 1 wcWdes "er kmu & M caf 2 WW l g calan nave k W m of /s.a 6th an CHM-
gI _.gL ;, b DDENDA % ce~Nov.w ccedekt 4 elugsi%s
% p<<ces, "a ec h6" ww" acc.wI '.
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- fe IGSe. DV e of vada di:bk as ake o r +Ci n u9cs 4acaf'kle or cvacn o<h
;p & k11ing, Cask, vesse 6 6el (Q ke( Me, Sa.I fellel p, peg tue(ds, seals, CD/uh lNW Q AE OY r%MGH S fAfl2-wuch kgkF pvew sus vetease or as g e.
o F v neL p t u c W s 1& t' n eiv V m o % f
- b21^)1 CGu5ed },y Said iscla- Ma 11AQ.CINS v Cvack.. ov y }Ew$5 OY P.A. YQ- 19 /dclo A 'Aj litulf Ch in con s hs<ck6 er<ws in opemkn 1%p repev-arm.d 65V;eSS,srSfvesses C;pl Cb%me cc.( eff$ cir of a comboucka vf tu.6, presswe, raeluhw, Corfos tordlDy ( det fYe rA cludey G htl S Ye of Wosey'$ fk 9s b y itselR "
Add to contention #3: CP&L's nanagement conpetence for nuclear olants is also in doubt due to their record of weak health physicas and radiation orotection programs (a c ontinu-ing problen at Fobinson 2 for many years, and a nroblem at Brunswick also, see Jacobstein, Investigatien, supra) and
'oecause CP&L has been fined at least 6 times in anounts equaling or in excess of ph.0,000 by NRC for a num'o er of violations, this being an unusually large number of such large fines to a utility, particularly when ec7ared to the nunber of nuclear l
l plants CP&L operates vis-avvis utilities such as Duke Dower, l
'EP C O , Co=nonwealth Edison and others and the fires those cr:ranies have been given by NoC.
I
l'
$1-ADDENDA to contentions and definitiens, 3d eage Definition as used hereing: a reference to "urebabilitv" eveds &
ofj 2ccidents not be'ng deternined by An"licants, includes the fac t that without s uch orobabilities , the requirements (i) of10 CFR 50 59(a)(2hcannot be satisfied
" deficiency" includes within its meaning "not in connliance with the an"licable cart (s) of 10CFR 55a", as do "insu"ficient(17)"
" inadequate (ly')" and " deficient" and where "XXX(ld" neands
' "Yv.X" and X33X "XXX17 " 8 furthsr "Take or pay" contracts are defined as"such as referred to at eage 8 of the Apnlication in this case.", wherever the nhrase "take of eay contracts", "take or nay" or reference to such a contract aptears herein.
Any reference to etent fuel transnortation includes by definitien ihm hs used in this suntlement: "as recuested in un 6-7 of the Apelication in this proceedingfer such additional licenses as may be necessary or annronriatexix and autho=12ation tc store sou"ce, special nuclear and bynveduct naterial irradiated in the nuclea" reactors licensed under DPR-23, DPR-62 and 399-71 and subsequently transoorted to the SH:!P? stte" (DP9-23 is H.3. Robinson 2 of CP&L; DX"R-62 &71 ave the Brunswick reactors jointly owned now bv CPhL and lice".?A) Any reference to " fast fracture" or " thermal shock" herein hMtud includes by definitienj a reference to the Anolication, Annendix 3, oplk-15 g&g h &4C W 'W VO plcns" wcwlas Hlak
- k l*y f"*3""") %#Y
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e d266as yy ADPh9b 'Wt Id '. pkas' OYo AirN} Nc ~ k "se canf L d CF R 23, eq $3.35' h@r Ve f-e ' NCWUs y gz "cv h cqich 6 AWW A"'1 Yefve ah IN clu dRS (o CFK gp gy yy gereges Did
%6 of ID Cpft 50 Sm/ In clVb23 C gPP A[also45M6CdM'O pi9h Ybfwwcslv" w upqcale
'yoimasts sMs4ss sped (tal klcsy or of to crF sb epp.hw<>> ev,wwo a fl Gren nfw pce e
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or "W (GC" Mc Max i C M go,1 . 8 9 l l l i l
~
Further definitions aoplicable throughout this sunnlement to netition to intervene: (1) L!herever any deficiency, error, or failure to take into account matters under NEPA is alleged with resoect to the ER or the ES , the mzkx "ER" neans "ER and/or ES" a nd "ES" means "FS ng3n op ng3n and or ER" and either or both includes "and new informatien under 10 CFS 51.21 and 10 CFo 2 Anpendix A VIII and Calvert Cliffs (Calvazt Cliffs Cnoai4 rat *kr On 91+ tee V. AFC, hh9 F2d 1109, which reads at 1128, "NS?A -enuires that an agency must - to the fullest extent oossible under its other statutory obligations - consider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environoiental damage ... Clearly, it is cointless to " consider" environmental costs without also considering action to avoid then." There is no s tatute barring consideration of these matters at the 0.L. stage, ner one that obligates N"C or this Board to avoid consideration of costs and benefits in the light of new informationa now available. CALVEu? CLIFFS reo.uires that such aktax issues receive the fullest consideration nossible throughout the agency review crocess, which obviously includes 64 t is,gyCL 0.L. nroceeding cop /sul*e N w"hich
# ht is nart of/*ll + fa(>" #N. NRC 's review crocessy p and Seabrook %(5 N70 503 (1977) which states at 533 "Indeed, our conclusion substantia 11v denends nn the int =gri*y of the Nr?A process which leads ut to the noint of hearing.
'Jhere that integrity is absent - where time and money have been nisscent - it may be cronar to restrike a NEPA analysis on the bssis of a set of facts no longer existing, i.e. as though those excenditures had not been made." In the liE ht of CV&L Chairnan Sherwood Snith's recent statements (renorted 5.9.82) l 1
i l
~- 2 ).-
that "if we were going to start the Harris nrojec t again . . . it would not be nuclear" and that " coal plants cost about one third of what nuclear nlants cost to build" --I believe he 's cortoaring Mayo 1 and Harris 1 -- the above is clearly annlicable to this case: tine and noney misscent "eouires a "estriking of th e N"DA halar.ce as if the m-na* sunk into Ha==is had never been scent, and in light of cur entiv(lk$1) available information about nower needs in the future on the C?&L and VACA9 nower grids d 7 O [ h Sut the stronger assunntion of Ssabrook, suura, that the UEFA balance can be restruck excluding sunk costs, obviousiv includes the alternative of restriking the NEDA balance including those sunk costs or nart of then, t where the Nr.?A crocess which leads un to the coint of I hearing (e.g. this 0.L. hearing) lacks integrity, as shown by the nunerous new facts and estinates whidh have com.e to light since the C.P. hearing in 1977, and which the forne" Board in tbis case (and N70) have so far refused to hear, e.g. C?&L's own new and n st current load forecasts made October f"o , 2munwhwm 1977 onwa=ds, new cost enti stes ne the Haarts niants, the onerating verfornance of othe" nuclea= reactors of s'nilar manufactu=e and design and size, the energence nf nroblems, such as steen generators wea-ing out at Robinson 2, Turkey coint 3 & h, Suary 1 and 2, g etc. which have high recair costs and adversely affect oower oroducticn and have considerable radiological effects on renai= workers and daru nuclea= waste discosal of the old stean generato=s, the trend of nuclear const"uction costs to ever further increase, reneal of tb 51.21 i HC C'4IP statute, and other new infornation under 10 CFR {
~
The above statenent and definition is incoroorated by reference waarever End whenever the ER, NEPA, or the ES is referred to in contentions herein. /F M %MA The statement below is also incor= orated into each content _onj cs 'f ful tat d every reference to unavailability or -._ ^ AW therein. With respect to availability of documents, not being actually available by (or "on or before") May 1h, 1982 . includes the following: Not being on an accession list actually in the L?DR on or before Februavv 26, 1982; not being on an 31 accession list there on or before March 22, 1982; nnt being on an accession list nublicly available there on on before May 9,1982 ( end of closing to cublic of Wr.ke LPD" May 3 o; reonened May 10); or not being on an accession list oublicly available there by May 1h,1982 and in cor sequence of any of the above (or all of them), not beinE known to netitioner, who can see what documents are nresent and which ones on available accession lists are nissing, but cannot reasonab'y ba exrected to see which documents are not there, pa-ticularly when no listing indicating such document (s) should be there are not actually available to netitioner at the L?D9; and also including e.g. identificatien as such docunents identified generally ( 11 renorts over 10 nages af ter 1/1/80 in the accession list delive=ed & available to me first on May 10, 1982" as stated to PDR, N'C, 5-11-82 by chone) (that being based on search of LPD1 files 5-10-82 using said list) more orgspecifically as by title, date, nature of docunent , accassion number, author (s), etc or any of these, to LPD9 3 ranch or N9C orior to 114 May 1982 which were not actually delivered to the l LPDR and thus actually available to oetitioner on or before lh May, 1982. It is clearly impossible to frame contentions or specify them in nore detail based on unavailable information y ,,a [gz{. : 9 such as the above-described items and tynes of items. I have W 5 requested extensions cf time from the Board to file based on h Ig such docunents, and renew that request here-490 days af ter recelot o c
-247' The tyning and twogranhical e=rors herein are virtually ell my own (excent for sone material recroduced herein) and I apologize for same, the condition of ny tvnewriter, and the numerous insertions and additiens herein which there was not time to retyne in this long sat sunnlenent before the Ik May 1982 deadline since I'm doing all the tyning myself and uroducing the original cony that way (nz 1.e.
having soneone else hele type would result in sicwer nro-duction of tnis document, not f aster), but which it was necessary to add for concleteness, clarification, snecificity, reference to matters known to me, and other good causes. I ask the Board to consider this docunent urocerly filed for the ebove veasons and to afford ne the onnortunity to exclain, correct, retype or have retyeed, clarifv c= tanz otherwise fix any nart of this document or all of it which for any reason is not clear, readable, or otherwise usable in this nroceeding, since I could not reasonably have nroduced and filed it by 1h May 1982 other than in the form it is in and have included the contentions and info ~ nation herein which I believe is necessary to nrotect my interests in the SiiNPP 0.L. I croceeding. f'ekt&&IN$k& Sqpl % : Tk leal cose NDc v. Neg Cm(&
# @ 1Y-l5~e6 ve c-incwr cagr weppaa (Ghf' 99uhu) deO ded 't/2T/'( GTr2 sk.mz>s t%t et(- Tahle 5-3 (c pal va d. L=co, %
9r cwV %f SHNPP l1censy is Laned bn % a we cm (s induLui 6y rJereace. hwem " t$ thS- Ed $1horial inanHtdj of "T~ab le S-3 w "avauu m Ptm.l CyCW o v "Nvc(QW fu.I @ cit OS MSCd N flus S"f!Pg'
-2 Y f Conclu inn nieading on contentions Wid respect to the contents of this sunclenent including all the contentiens and references herein, I reseectfully ask the Soa-d to take note of the follow!ng:
This entire surelenent was drafted by ne While I was ( A ) thatsunacuttantizmmnsantiti-isxdacumenindsunnierrumidn (and still an) going through a learning nrocess about NSC's rules, information, annlicable case law, mix the SENPD and other relevant natters. Therefore, it was necessa=y to nake changes and additions, in nany cases ranidly, to meat the filing deadline fo" this suncienent cer the Boa =d's h/2/82 Orde". I do not have typing assistance and in some ins tances did net have the use of a typewriter when these changes and additions needed to be nade to get th's filing duplicated and se=ved per said Order. Thus I had to use handwritten inclusions herein, all s uch forn an integral cart of this sunplenent as served, and are necessary to protect nr interests in this uroceeding. (3) it is conr.on '.n legal docunents including filings in this case and V?C rules to : (1) nake definitions (e.g. lo CFR h0.5, 55 te .d ncdifF those definitions (e.g. 174 F9 135753 noiifyirs 10 CFR 2.h, 3/31/82); (ii) use incor oratien by reference and cross-reference (see e.g. FSAR see 1.6, or 10 CFD 50.h7 and 10 CFF 50 Anpendix E which reference each othe=; 10 CFo imm 50A?? Ai which references ASEP & other codea); (iii) amend or change an earlier-written docunent in the light of new information or for other rescens, e.g. Amendnents 1 and 2 filed under oath b- CP&L to FSAR (and Andts lend 2 filed sinilarly to F.") and, e.g., 10 CF9 50.2, 50 33, 50.ho and 50.55 ner h7 FR 1325k; and that 10 of the above acts CFR 22 Ut(b) in filing taisdoes not exclude sunplement or prevent per the Board'sany h/2/82 Order.
l Conclusion pleading on contentions continued I respectfully request opportunity to show, by a hearing on the contentions listed hereinabove, and others to be filed later based on new information under 10 CFR 2.71h(b), that Applicants fail to carry their burder of proof under 10 CFR 2 Appendix A VIII (entire %y) snd VI (Ex apolicable excent where the context requires otherwise), and therefore licenses to or own, ouerate, use the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, or to store, possesss and use scent fuel or other source material as requested in thei= Application in this case, should be denied because the grant of any such licenses would contravene the National Fnrironmental Policy Act (k2 USCA Sec. 4332) since the economic, environmental also and other costs, including accident risks and long-term effects of radiological releases and effluents from the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear wastes and spent fuel, including costs of deaths, illness, caring for victims of genetic defects, and other ill effects includirg erecerty damage which result from the operation of Harris outweigh the economic, technical and other benefits of the troject, new and additional information now being available which clearly alters the considerations made at the Construction Dermit stage for this bene fit -cost facility and shows that tne xmatmimatunAlun ratio of the pro ject is below 1 (costs exceed benefits), and said licenses should also be denied because Aonlicants have not demonstrated that , the censtruction of the facility can be completed on a timely basis (esoecially units 3 and h) and in confoamity with the construction nermit and the a nlicatien as amended, the provi-
N sions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the rules of the Nuclear i Regulatory Commission, and that the facility will operate in conformity with the creceding (exceot the C.P. ) and tha t the activities authorized by any such licenses can be conducted withcut endange"!ng or harming the health and safety of the sublic or any members thereof; and that all such activities will be conducted in conformance with N90's rules; and that Annlicants have the necessary managerial and technical and financial qualifications and comnetence to do all of the above; and that the nuclear insurance provisions of 10 CFR 1h0 will be met throughout the term of any and all said licenses; and that the license issuance is not inimical to the comnon and security defense (e.g. by oroviding a target for terrorists and or for nuclear ones conventional bombs and missilespps contended above) or to the health and safety of the oublic (e.g. through short-damage damage and long-term healthA effects and geneticpeffects of radi.cac-tivity released to the environment in connection with nuclear fuel mining, fabrication, and use, or from nuclear wastes or snent fuel, over at least 20 half-lives of each "adionuclide involved
-6 (time to deaay to 10 of initia? anount; 3" half-lives is more amoropriate to nuclides of high radiotoxicity like Pu-239 or those nroduced in large cuantities or released in large quan-
-ance l
tities); and that issuing any such laicenses is in accorqgwith NEPA Section 102(A) (C) and (E) and 10 CF9 Part 51, the "and"s above being justified since I am contesting under each such item's purview in 10 CFR 2 Aependir. A VIII(b) seeking denial If any license is issued, it must be co9ditioned per these contentions under part (c ) the reof,# to rotect the
/!V health &
safety of I W3 11s Eddleman the oublic, 4 May 1982 & ensure com-pliance w/ NEPA. U
1 CERTIFICATE OF SES.VICE I hereby certify that under the Board's Order of April 1982 I have served, by nailing ancess to each, first-class costage l pre l xxxpaid and deconsited in a dencsitor-i under the exclusive cave and custody of the US Postal Service, a cooy of the above Supolenent to Petition to Intervene by Wells Fddle .an (inc1'litrg a'.1 its nants ) , this lhth da? of Mav,1982, addressed to those listed below. fg/g Wells Eddlenan Secretary of the Conni::sien Attention Docketing and Service, 50-h00/401 0.L. USnRC Washington, DC 20555 A tomic Safety and Licensing Board Dockets 50-k00/401 0?L? USNRC WRshington DC 20555 Y George Fox Trowbridge Shaw Pittnan, Potts and Trowbridge 1000,M Street V4 Washington DC 20036
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l l l I hereby certify that Steven Callis is authorized to accept, on behalf of Carolina Power & Light Company, personal service of l the Supplement to Petition to Intervene of Wells Eddleman in Docket ' Nos. 50-400 and 50-401 at the Offices of Universal Printing Company in Durham, North Carolina on May 14, 1982 in lieu of service by mail addressed to George Trowbridge, Washington, D.C. and that such service satisfies the requirements for service set forth in the Order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board dated April 2, 1982. 2
-0 b
%Xn-a 72n
-Samantha Francis Flynn /
Associate General Counsel - Carolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Telephone: (919) 836-7707 Dated: May 14, 1982 I hereby certify that I have this day personally received a copy of the Supplement to Petition to Intervene of Wells Eddleman in Docket Nos. 50-400 and 50-401. l \ e 4x A. ' Y
~*'
$> l' SteV) n Callis /
May V4, 1982 I e.
a , . . i l (including extmau c, .. . . . . , _ . Indix, attached to this and at end of surnienent Stater.ent of S. Flynn of C?&L re acdenting se-vice by hand and refusing service to G.F. T oub-idge en behalf of Apnlicant and NCEMPA and tha t she is authorized to do so, w'.11 be attached if delivered to r.e tinely fo r hand service; else I'll lend her a cony for 1 week to use and nail as she & I discussed by the cony tofor tc1enhone, Trowbridge, services % % l b f G 4 npes. Les / I2ep& Cavalwe Swe4t Le4fCoy R a y ISD Rale <s4 NC 27607 as SA *I Accuss4 r//We2 4 g%,
- ~ 1 1 5/14/82 OMf[
INDEX to first Dockets 50-400/401 o?L? l suoplement to petition to intervene, by Wells EQ signg P' MJ _ Change of address effective 5/17/82 Page 1 Contentions based on new br pre ~sently unavailable information (the info described:
~
up 1-2 (the issue discussed, pleaded pp 2-14 What is reasonable specificity? when and under what conditions? op 7-9 and 12-lh Reasonable snecificity for contentions filed now pp 10-11 Should be allowed if not unreasonably unsnecific p 11 2.71h(a) lateness does not a, ply to things beyond petitioner's control pp 13-1h, see also un 2-6 Incornoration by reference, rationale: pp . 11 -12 Motion te suspend Harris construction, ppl6-17 Statement of general anulicability incornorated by reference into all contentions f! led he rein up 14-2/ Recuest for exnedited hearing n.15 Definitions 22. Contentions (reasons why an cuerating license for Shearon Harris 1 and 2 should not issue, due to any one or any combination of the se reasons) 27 Contentions grouced by subject or connection
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