Text

Answer Opposing Eddleman Proposed Contentions on Emergency Response Plans.Certificate of Svc Encl
	ML20084E133
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/28/1984
From:	Baxter T; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	OL, NUDOCS 8405020111
	Download: ML20084E133 (113)
	v • d • e

e es DOCHETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UStiRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 MNf -f h!0.21 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Un,its 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO EDDLEMAN PROPOSED CONTENTIONS ON SENPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.

Deborah B. Bauser Delissa A. Ridgway SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Richard E. Jones Samantha Francis Flynn Dale E. Hollar-CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 -

(919) 836-6517 Counsel for Applicants April 28, 1984

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8405020111 840428 PDR ADOCK 05000400 0 PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Index

' APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF CONTENTIONS............................................. 2 1

1. Scope of Hearing Notice............................ 2 1

2. Bases with Reasonable Specificity.................. 2

3. Challenges to Regulations.......................... 7 THE EDDLEMAN CONTENTIONS PLUME EPZ............................................... 8 ACCIDENT BASES......................................... 15 PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING...................... 17 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING................................ 18 METEOROLOGY............................................ 22 COMMAND / CONTROL........................................ 24 COMMUNICATIONS......................................... 26 NOTIFICATION........................................... 27 SHELTERING............................................. 30 RESPIRATORY PROTECTIONS................................ 31 POTASSIUM IODIDE....................................... 31 -

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES.............................. 38 IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION.............................. 54 TRANSPORTATION-GENERAL PUBLIC.......................... 60 TRANSPORATION - SPECIAL POPULATIONS.................... 64

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l PERSONNEL MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION................... 74 RE - ENTRY /RECOVE RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 MEDICAL CARE........................................... 79 TRAINING............................................... 81 EXERCISE............................................... 82 PUBLIC/INFORMATION/ EDUCATION........................... 84 INGESTION EPZ.......................................... 86 STAGE OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT.............................. 88 P LAN MA I NTENANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 EME RGENCY WO RKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 EXPERIENCE / COMPETENCE.................................. 96 ON-SITE PLAN........................................... 97 CONCLUSION................................................. 102 e

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INDEX Eddleman Document **

Contention

and Page Response Page 2* 4/12/84; p. 1 . 17 2-A* 4/12/84; p. 2 18 29-D 5/14/82; p. 93 37 30* 4/12/84; p. 1 31 30-A* 4/12/84; p. 2 -

31 56 ,

5/14/82; p. 150 79 57-C* 4/12/84; p. 4 13 57-C-2* ; p. 4 13 57-C-3* ; p. 5 27 57-C-4* ; p. 5 54 57-C-5* ; p. 6 55 57-C-6* ; p. 6 21 An asterisk (*) indicates that the contention has been revised.

The Eddleman document citation refers to the revised edition of the contention. ,

- The dates furnished correspond to the Eddleman submissions as -

follows: 5/14/82 " Supplement to Petition to Intervene";

6/5/82 " Amendments to Contentions and Additional Contentions";

4/3/84 " Wells Eddleman's Partial Response and Contentions re:

Emergency Plan (Offsite); 4/12/84 " Wells Eddleman's Contentions on the Emergency Plan (2d set)."

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Eddleman Document **

Contention

and Page - Response Page 57-C-7* ; p. 6 79 57-C-8* ; p. 7 79 57-C-9* ; p. 7 24 57-C-10* ; p. 7 30 57-C-11* ; p. 7 37 57-C-12* ; p. 8 31 57-C-13* ; p. 8 30 57-C-14* ; p. 8 60 57-C-15* ; p. 9 8 57-C-(6* ; p. 9 13 57-C-17* ; p. 9 8 57-C-18* ; p. 9 88 57-C-19* ; p. 10 23 57-C-20* ; p. 10 38,39 57-D-1* ; p. 4 38 57-D-2* ; p. 5 38 57-D-3* ; p. 5 22 63* ; p. 10 79 81* "

p. 10 82 -

88 5/14/82; p. 198 67 97 ; p. 204 15 99 ; p. 206 92 100 & 100B "

p. 208 76

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Eddleman Document **

Contention

and Page - Response Page 103 ; p. 207 100 117* 4/12/84; p. 12 55 117-A* 4/12/84; p. 12 55 118 5/14/82; p. 227 56 121* 4/12/84; p. 13 16 124 5/14/82; p. 229 (amended 96 4/12/84; p. 13) 137 6/5/82 ; p. 2 100 139 6/5/82 ; p. 7 64 140 6/5/82 ; p. 8 66 151 4/3/84 ; p. 1 97 157 4/3/84 ; p. 2 99 200 4/3/84 ; p. 2 92 201 ; p. 3 8 202 ; p. 3 8 203 ; p. 3 25 204 "

p. 3 70 205 ; p. 3 53 206 4/12/84; p. 2 86 -

207 ; p. 6 16 208 ; p. 10 82 209 ; p. 11 93 210 ; p. 11 76

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Eddleman Document **

Contention

and Page - Response Page 211 ; p. 12 89 212 ; p. 12 81 213 ; p. 13 28 213-A "

p. 13 90 214 "

p. 14 30 215 "

p. 14 38,41 216 "

p. 14 38,41 17 ; p. 15 38,44 218 "

p. 15 38,45 219 "

p. 15 38,46 220 ; p. 16 38,48 221 ; p. 16 38,49 222 "

p. If 38,50 223 ; p. 17 38,51 224 ; p. 17 38,52 225 ; p. 17 26 226 ; p. 18 26 227 *

p. 18 84 228 ; p. 18 84 -

229 ; p. 19 85 230 ; p. 19 71 231 ; p. 19 28 232 ; p. 20 28

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e Eddleman Document **

Contention

and Page . Response Page 233 ; p. 20 18 234 "

p. 20 18 235 "

p. 21 68 236-A ; p. 21 68 236-B ; p. 21 68 236-C ; p. 21 31 237 ; p. 21 62 238 "

p. 22 31 l

239 "

p. 22 31 240 "

p. 21 74 241 "

p. 22 74 242 "

p. 23 1,96 243 "

p. 23 81 244 "

p. 23 27 245 "

p. 24 93 4

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April 28, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO EDDLEMAN PROPOSED CONTENTIONS ON SHNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS In Wells Eddleman's Partial Response and Contentions re Emergency Plan (Offsite), dated April 3, 1984, Mr. Eddleman amended two proposed onsite emergency planning contentions (Contentions 151 and 157) previously deferred by the Board. In addition, Mr. Eddleman proposed six new contentions,'assertedly based upon the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan In Sup-port of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (the ERP), dated -

February 1984. Pursuant to several extensions of time, Wells Eddleman's Contentions on the Emergency Plan (2d Set) were filed April 12, 1984. In that document, Mr. Eddleman submitted l

"as is" for ruling some previously deferred proposed conten- l tions, " revised" 33 proposed contentions, and filed yet an I

f i additional 41 new proposed contentions -- all assertedly based on the ERP.

APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF CONTENTIONS Applicants have previously discussed at length the general legal standards governing the admissibility of proposed conten-tions in an NRC licensing proceeding. See, e.g., " Applicants' Response to Supplement to. Petition.to Intervene by Wells Eddleman" (June 15, 1982), at 2-19. Accordingly, there is no need to restate in full the Commission's requirements; rather, ,

Applicants simply summarize here the general principles to be applied in determining the admissibility of the Eddleman pro-posed off-site emergency response contentions (as well as the two pending proposed onsite contentions).

1. Scope of Hearing Notice A threshold requirement for an admissible contention is that it address a matter which is within the scope of the issues set forth in the Commission's Notice of Opportunity for Hearing in this proceeding. See Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 N.R.C. 558, 565 (1981); Portland General Electric Co.

(Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-534, 9 N.R.C. 287, 289-90, n.6 (1979); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 N.R.C. 167, 170-71 (1976).

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2. Bases with Reasonable Specificity The Commission's Rules of Practice, at 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b), further require that an intervenor include with .

proposed contentions "the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity."

There are several purposes which underlie the Commission's standard in section 2.714(b):

A purpose of the basis-for-contention requirement in Section 2.714 is to help as-sure at the pleading stago that the hearing process is not improperly invoked. For ex-ample, a licensing proceeding before this agency is plainly not the proper forum for an attack on applicable requirements or for challenges to the basic structure of the Commission's regulatory process. Another purpose is to help assure that other par-ties are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose.

Still another purpose is to assure that the proposed issues are proper for. adjudication in the particular proceeding. In the final analysis, there must ultimately be strict observance of the requirements governing intervention, in order that the adjudica-tory process is invoked only by tnose per-sons who have real interests at stake and who seek resolution of concrete issues.

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 20-21 (1974) (footnotes omitted).

The notice aspect of the " bases with reasonable specif-icity" requirement is a natural outgrowth of fundamental'no-tions of fairness applied to the party with the burden of 6_ _ _ _ _ . ___ _ _ _.. . _ __ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .m___.________ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __m______ _m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______-.__w

l proof. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has ob-served:

The applicant is entitled to a fair chance to defend. It is therefore entitled to be told at the outset, with clarity and precision, what arguments are being advanced and what relief is being asked . . . . So is the Board below. It should not be necessary to spe'culate about what a pleading is supposed to mean.

Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-279, 1 N.R.C. 559, 576 (1975) (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). Moreover, the Licensing Board is entitled to adequate notice of a petitioner's specific conten-tions to enable it to guard against the obstructionism of its processes. As the Supreme Court has noted, in NRC proceedings,

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it is incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their par-ticipation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the interve-nors' position and contention.* *

Indeed, administrative proceedings should not be a game or forum to engage in un-justified obstructionism by making cryptic and obscure reference to matters that "ought to be" considered * * *.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553-54 (1978).

Yet, important as the notice aspect of the standard is, the requirement for bases with reasonable specificity goes be-yond the " notice pleading" allowed in the federal courts, which has been found to be insufficient for NRC licensing r

proceedings. See Wolf Creek, supra, ALAB-279, 1 N.R.C. at 575, n.32 (1975). On the other hand, the regulation does not re-quire the intervenor to detail the evidence which will be offered in support of each proposed contention. Peach Bottom, supra, ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. at 2d (1974); see also Mississippi Power and' Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 A.E.C. 423, 426 (1973); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),

ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 548-49 (1980). In short, the standard falls somewhere in between, and "[t]he degree of specificity with which the basis for a contention must be alleged initially involves the exercise of judgment on a case-by-case basis."

Peach Bottom, supra, 8 A.E.C. at 20 (1974).

There also are certain practical considerations which should play a particularly important role here in the Board's application of the " bases with reasonable specificity" standard to a particular proposed contention -- beyond the question of whether the proposed contention provides clear and precise no-tice of the issues on which Applicants may bear the burden of proof. Fitst, the contention should refer to and address per-tinent documentation, available in the public domain, which is --

L relevant to this facility. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 N.R.C. 175, 181-84 (1981). In the instant case, the Board de-ferred ruling on emergency planning contentions filed prior to r

availability of the emergency plans, pending service of the plans themselves, and accorded intervenors the opportunity to file refined and additional contentions after reviewing the plans. See LBP-82-119A, supra, 16 N.R.C. at 2070-73 (1982).

An emergency planning contention "should be required to specify in some way each portion of the plan alleged to be inadequate.

. . . [W]ithout an adequately particularized contention setting forth how the ' local conditions' referenced in [the contention) are alleged to affect every aspect of (the] plan, we are left to speculate how [ Applicant's] elleged failure to consider these local factors is supposed to render each aspect of its plan inadequate." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-75, 16 N.R.C. 986, 993 (1982).

Thus, the requirement for specific reference to relevant docu-mentation applies with special force to the ERP, but may also include applicable NRC Staff regulatory guides and other pub-lished reports. In addition, there should be either a rea-sonably logical and technically credible explanation, or a plausible and referenced authority for the factual assertions in the contentions. The intervenor's personal opinion alone is not adequate for this purpose. -

In this regard, Applicants have an objection that is ap-plicable to numerous Eddleman offsite emergency response con-tantions. Rather than repeating this objection in response to each of the contentions, Applicants state the objection here, and will only refer to it in specific, egregious instances.

Many of the Eddleman contentions are no more than broad and unsupported allegations that the offsite emergency response plan is inadequate in its treatment of a particular matter. In many instances, Mr. Eddleman neglects to identify specific de-fects or inaccuracies, and fails to provide citations to the ERP or other reference documents. Most of the contentions fault the ERP for its failure to include or consider a fact or an issue; however, often no supporting rationale is offered as to why this fact or issue should be considered. Such bald as-sertions, unsupported by factual detail or supporting legal basis, fail to meet the " bases with reasonable specificity" requirement of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b).

3. Challenges to Regulations All rules and regulations of the Commission, and the un-derlying bases for those rules and regulations, are immune to l

attack in an individual licensing proceeding unless a petition is first made to the Licensing Board for an exception of waiv-er. The sole ground for a petition for waiver or exception shall be that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application -

1 of the specific challenged rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted. The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit in support of that basis for the petition.

r Opportunity is provided for other parties to respond to the pe-tition, including the submission of reply affidavits. If the Licensing Board determines that a prima facie showing has been made in support of waiver or exception, it shall, before ruling, certify directly to the Commission for a determination on the matter. If the Licensing Board does not determine that such a prima facie showing has been made, it must deny the pe-tition. 10 C.F.R. $ 2.758; Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 A.E.C. 79, 89 (1974).

THE EDDLEMAN CONTENTIONS PLUME EPZ Proposed Contentions 57-C-15, 57-C-17, 201 and 202 each assert that the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ is inadequate, and rely exclusively on NUREG/CR-2239, Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development (D.C. Aldrich, et al., Sandia Na-tional Laboratories, November 1982). Contention 201 suggests a 25-mile EPZ.1/

1/ While 57-C-15 does not explicitly reference the EPZ, it asserts the need to relocate (i.e., evacuate) persons already evacuated to beyond the EPZ. In addition, the proposed conten-tion overlooks the relative ease of relocating an assembled population (at shelters) when response organizations are fully activated.

These proposed contentions represent a clearly impermissible attack on Commission regulation 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2), which specifies that the plume exposure pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 10 miles in radius. See, in this proceeding, LBP-82-119A, 16 N.R.C. 2069, 2082 (rejecting i

CHANGE 3), 2084 (rejecting CHANGE 46(e)-(f)); 10 C.F.R. $

2.758.

Further, Applicants note that nothing specific to the Harris site and its environs is raised in these contentions.

They would simply establish a new generic basis for the Commis-sion's emergency response regulations.

The basis for establishing the size and nature of the EPZs set forth in Commission regulations is contained in, inter alia, NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants"; EPA 520/1-78-016 (December 1978). Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, note 2.

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NUREG-0396 was developed by a task force composed of recognized NRC and EPA experts on the effects of radioactivity. In recom-mending th's size and nature of the EPZs, this planning document specifically recognized the possibility of a range of accidents

including worst case Class 9 accidents.

The EPZ recommended is of sufficient size

[10 mile radius] to provide dose savings to the population in areas where the projected dose from design basis accidents would be expected to exceed the applicable PAGs (Protective Action Guidelines] under l

unfavorable atmospheric conditions * * *

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[C]onsequences of less severe Class 9 acci-dents would not exceed the PAG level out-side the recommended EPZ distance. In ad-dition, the EPZ is of sufficient gize to provide a substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) '

in the event of the more severe Class 9 accidents. (NUREG-0396, at 16-17.]

Appendix I of NUREG-0396 further explained that the 10 mile EPZ was designed to provide full protection to the public in the event of any Class 9 accident.

Class 9 accidents cover a full spectrum of releases * * *

The lower range of the spectrum would include accidents in which a core " melt-through" of the containment would occur * * * * (T]he doses from

" melt-through" releases * *

generally would not exceed even the most restrictive PAG beyond about 10 miles from a power plant. The upper range of the core-melt accidents is categorized by those in which the containment catastrophically fails and releases large quantities of radioactive materials directly into the atmosphere be-1 cause of over-pressurization or a steam ex-plosion. These accidents have the poten-tial to release very large quantities * *

of radioactive materials. There is a full spectrum of releases between the lower and upper range with all of these releases involving some combination of atmospheric

! and melt-through accidents. These very se-vere accidents have the potential for caus-ing cerious injuries and deaths. Therefore, emergency response for these conditions must have as their first priority the re- -

duction of early severe health effects.

Studies have been performed which indicate that if emergency action such as sheltering or evacuation were taken within about 10 miles of a power plant, there would be sig-nificant savings of early injuries and deaths even from the most " severe" atmo-spheric releases. [NUREG-0396, at I-6 to I-7. Footnote omitted].

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Commission regulations also reference NUREG-0654, l " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emer-1

gency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-FEP-1, (January 1980), as pro-

viding a basis for selection of the size and nature of the EPZs. 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47, note 1. NUREG-0654, a joint NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) document,2/ adopted the approach recommended in NUREG-0396 regarding the size and nature of the EPZs and noted that its conclusions were based upon, inter alia, consideration of a range of potential acci-dents to include worst case core melt accidents involving a containment breach. NUREG-0654, at 7. In short, Commission 1

emergency planning regulations were promulgated after thorough consideration of, inter alia, accidents of all types, including worst case core melt " Class 9" accidents.

NUREG/CR-2239 presents the results of research performed for the Commission on the radiological source term and other technical issues associated with the consideration of potential changes (via rulemaking) to nuclear power plant siting criteria. *It reflects essentially a sensitivity study for the 2/ NUREG-0654 provides nonbinding guidance on means to satis- i fy the requirements in 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(b). See Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1),

LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1460 (1981), aff'd, ALAB-698, 16 ,

N.R.C. 1290, 1298-99 (1982).

i major parameters important to siting decision making.3/ As the authors state:

This report represents some of the work being done to support the expanding use of probabilistic risk assessment in the regulatory process. The NRC must be care-ful with the results of such analyses, con-sidering the very large uncertainties in the results. The studies shown in this re-port must be used in a manner that is con-sistent with the stated objectives. The results are to provide technical perspec-tive on siting-related issues. Results presented in this report are not signifi-cantly different than results of conse-quence studies that have been available in the open literature for decades. Given the source term assumptions, large consequences are calculated. However, the risks (probabilities times consequences) posed by i such accidents are very small. Therefore, the absolute numbers should only be quoted with the associated probabilities and with the stated assumptions recognizing the un-certainties in the analyses.

! NUREG/CR-2239, Foreward. Consequently, Mr. Eddleman's selec-1 tive references to postulated scenarios and isolated results of attempts to test the sensitivity of siting criteria to extremes of input factors, misuse the report, which was not prepared as a basis to reconsider emergency response criteria.4/ As the 3/ The data of NUREG/CR-2239 compare plants on the same -

basis, but they truly test only site-related matters (demography in particular) and make no allowance for plant-specific accident probabilities or frequencies.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point, Unit No.

2), et al., LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 1032 (1983).

4/ Where it examines the sensitivity to emergency response, all calculations assume the Indian Point population and wind i

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Commission has stated, the basis for 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47 is inde-pendent of specific accident sequences:

Since a range of accidents with widely dif-

! fering offsite consequences can be postu-i lated, the regulation does not depend on j the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact, no

specific accident sequences should be I specified because each accident could have i different consequences both in nature and .

degree.

Southern California Edison Company, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528,

[ 533 (1983).

4 Finally, Mr. Eddleman fails to point out that the authors j of NUREG/CR-2239, the report on which Mr. Eddleman relies, con-1 ,

] clude in their summary that "[ejvacuation before containment 1

] breach within 2 miles, after release within 10 miles, and shel-d j tering from 10 to 25 miles appears to be a particularly effec-3 tive response strategy." Id. at 2-104.

l Revised contentions 57C and 57-C-2, and proposed '

l Contention 57-C-16, differ from the four discussed above only i

) in their reference to weather and meteorology. "The exact size i

and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear (Continued) i rose, and New York City meteorology. NUREG/CR-2239 at'2-38.

i Further, all persons beyond 10 miles were assumed to be exposed l to deposited radionuclides for 1 day, regardless of dose rate.

. Id. at 2-32.

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i power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergen-cy response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such I conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, ac-i cess routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2). The considerations involved in the choice of a 10-mile radius plume exposure pathway EPZ are described in the l

l ERP at Part 1,Section II.A.3(p.1) and in the Evacuation Time

! Estimate. These are consistent with the planning bases dis-cussed in NUREG-0654 at pp. 12-13.

l The prevailing wind direction and its influence on emer-gency planning capability were contested issues on the siting of the Harris plant at the construction permit stage. The pre-siding Licensing Board found that adequate consideration had been given to wind direction and speed in the area of the site, ,

and that accidental radiological releases will be within NRC requirements. The record also showed that doses in areas such ,

as Raleigh (20 miles) would require no additional protective measures even for the most consequential design basis accident, j Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 7, 3 and 4), LBP-78-4, 7 N.R.C. 92, 129 (1978).

' l contentions 57C and 57-C-2, which seek a 25-mile radius ;

EPZ in certain directions, represent a clear and impermissible attack on the "about 10 miles" regulatory requirement of sec-tion 50.47(c)(2). Further, Mr. Eddleman fails to. address the realistic (cf. NUREG/CR-2239) phenomenon of plume dispersal in a situation of high prevailing winds,5/ and the fact that the Harris plant is located in a low-lying area with respect to higher ground in the prevailing wind direction. FSAR

$ 2.3.2.2.2. Consequently, releases would have a tendency to remain in the plant area.

In addition to the above deficiencies, Contention 57-C-16 J employs faulty math. Mr. Eddleman divides the Indian Point i

population by 26 to represent the Harris population. This er-roneously assumes an identical (albeit smaller) population dis-d tribution around the Harris and Indian Point sites, whereas, for example, the resident population around the Harris site is j zero up to one mile, and 45 up to two miles. See Evacuation Time Estimates, Table 3-1. Further, the contention advances no

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j recommended projective actions not included in the ERP.

! ACCIDENT BASES i The general thrust of proposed Contention 97, which is unaltered from its May, 1982 state, is that the plan does not i

"take sufficient account of, or provide means to deal with" 5/ "The radiological doses at the site boundary and beyond are inversely proportional to the wind speed associated with -

the relative concentration values utilized to calculate the dose consequences of design basis accidents. Wind speed higher than one meter per second thus would result in lower doses at the site boundary and beyond, primarily due to greater atmo-spheric dilution. Therefore, a high wind speed considered in conjunction with a design basis accident would result in smaller doses at Raleigh." Shearon Harris, supra, LBP-78-4, 7 N.R.C. at 129 (1978).

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rapidly-escalating emergencies. Mr. Eddleman, however, fails to explain how the ERP is deficient, does not address the ERP, and does not propose additional provisions for inclusion in the ERP. Applicants therefore oppose the admission of Contention 97 on the ground that it is so lacking in specificity that it fails to give other parties adequate notice of the issues pro-posed for litigation.

Proposed Revised Contention 121 asserts that the ERP fails to address' appropriate protective actions for accidents greater than the design basis. Mr. Eddleman does not elaborate on the deficiencies he perceives, or the additional protective actions he proposes. More important, however, the Commission's emer-gency planning regulations already are based upon beyond design basis (i.e., Class 9) accidents. See Applicants' Response to 57-C-15, 57-C-17, 201 and 202, supra. Consequently, the pro-posed contention is without basis.

Proposed Contention 207 asserts that the plan makes no provision for accidents involving radioactive material in tran-sit to or from the Harris plant. Mr. Eddleman cites no regula-tion or regulatory guidance in support of his assertion. The obvious purpose of the ERP is to provide for the use of State -

and local resources in response to an accident at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.1/ The ERP is not supposed to s/ It is assumed that "the plan" refers to the plans of off-site organizations.

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l address transportation accidents. See NUREG-0654 at p. 3 n.2

. t

(unique characteristics of transportation accidents involving radioactive material); General Statement of Policy: NRC Re-l sponse to Accidents occurring During the Transportation of Ra- I I dioactive Naterial, 49 Fed. Reg. 12335 (March 29, 1984) (re- (

sponse to transportation accidents less structured than 1 response for licensed sites; primary responsibility lies with states.). Consequently, Contention 207 is irrelevant and with- ,

out basis.

PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING I

Proposed Revised Contention 2 essentially challenges the emergency classification system in the ERP which, in turn, fol-lows the guidance of NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criteria D and Ap-pendix 1. As a threshold matter, this classification scheme 4

was described in the on-site plan, so this contention is un-timely. See SENPP Emergency Plan, Section 4.

In addition, the contention lacks basis in that it ignores l the emergency response capability mobilized at the Site Emer-gency leve'1, which will facilitate protective action imple-

mentation if and when a General Emergency is declared. See ERP Part 1,Section IV.A. (pp. 32-33). The contention also assumes I that evaluation, in the face of a release is the only protec-tive action available, when in fact a range of actions exists.

t see, id., Section IV.E. Finally, the contention confuses the i

emergency classification / action level scheme with protective action decision-making. The ERP does not defer the assessment of protective actions for the public as Mr. Eddleman contends.

Rather, the decision on protective actions are made, from the outset of the emergency, on the basis of projected or actual off-site of the emergency, on the basis of projected or actual off-site consequences (doses). See, e.g., ERP Part 1, Section IV.E.10 (pp. 41, 50, 52).

Proposed Contentions 233 and 234 should be rejected for the same reasons. The table cited from the county plans is merely a guideline (i.e., it does not preclude earlier consid-eration of sheltering and evacuation). Other provisions of the ERP, not addressed by Mr. Eddleman, make it clear that protec-tive actions are taken on the basis of projected doses, and not the classification system.

RADIOLOGICAL MONI"ORING Revised Contention 2A argues that State and local govern-ments must have independent monitoring capability for the Harris plant, and presumably concludes that capability is defi-cient because it ". . . is [not] put into action in a site emergency until about I hour after notification. . ." and (t]here will be only 2 state teams until about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months into o

-m-

the accident." Mr. Eddleman then asserts, citing Pisello, et al.,7/ that accurate assessment of the plume requires indepen-dent fixed monitors around the site as well as mobile monitors.

Mr. Eddleman's uses of the word " independent" in the pro-posed contention is confusing, although Applicants assume it first is used to distinguish State and local governments from CP&L (and not from each other), and later is used to diStin-guish fixed from mobile monitoring.

As a threshold matter, there is no requirement that State and/or local governments have an accident assessment capabili-ty. See 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(9) (adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency are in use);

Southern California Edison Company, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 N.R.C. 1163, 1202 (1982), motion to stay denied, ALAB-680, 16 N.R.C. 127, 142 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346 (1983) (finding that the utility's capability for radiation monitoring and assess-ment could meet all needs in the plume EPZ and, as a matter of law, can compensate for any deficiencies in the capability of i

off-site jurisdictions). -

l 7/ The citation to "Pinello, et al.," without more informa-tion, is not a sufficient reference to permit other parties to locate it and respond to its use as a basis for the proposed contention. Consequently, the Board should disregard it.

I i

i !

! To be sure, NUREG-0654 recommends a radiological moni- !

l - I

( toring capability for off-site jurisdictions, and the State of f j North Carolina has such capability.g/ NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criteria I.7-I.ll; ERP Part 1,Section IV.C (pp. 36-42). In-

{ cluded in that capability are the assessments of the Radiation l l l I Protection Section (RPS) survey teams dispatched for field ra-1 1 diological monitoring. The plan provides that two RPS survey I l f teams will be activated within one hour and dispntched to the ,

1 !

vicinity of the plant. Two additional RPS survey teams will be i 1

activated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of notification.9/ ERP Part 1, Sec-i tion IV.C.5 (p. 39).

l While the capability for " rapid assessment" is recom-mended, NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion I.8, there is no reg- [

ulatory requirement or guidance on the number of field moni-toring teams or the timing of their deployment. See TMI-1,

{

supra, LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. at 1505 (1981) (as to timing). Mr. [

t Eddleman offers no basis for the implicit conclusion that the I i

ERP is inadequate as to the State's accident assessment l

capability. j l

1 i

] g/ The counties have limited capabilities and resources for F j assessing and monitoring accident consequences. They will rely 1

on protective action recommendat.ons from the plant staff prior !

i to State assumption of command and control, and thereafter on i recommendations from the State. ERP Parts 2-5, Sections IV.C '

i and IV.E.1.

9/ Mr.

Eddleman erroneously converts "within" to "until about." Thors is no basis for assuming that the State cannot

) field these teams as soon as they are needed.

f i t 1

Further, Mr. Eddleman ignores CP&L's important role in providing State and local governments with accident assessment information.10/ See ERP Part 1, Fig. 4 (p. 25) and Section IV.C.5.f (p. 40); SENPP Emergency Plan, Section 4.4. Appli-cants are required to perform this function.11/ See 10 C.F.R.

$ 50.47(b)(5);Section IV.D.3, Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.

To the extent Mr. Eddleman seeks a duplicative capability by off-site organizations, he has advanced no basis for it.

In addition to the fact that no basis is asserted for in-stalling fixed monitors around the site, this proposal was raised and rejected at the construction permit stage. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4), LBP-78-4, 7 N.R.C. 92, 125-127 (1978).

In short, while Revised 2A refers to parts of the ERP, it misreads them, ignores other information, and offers no basis for the independent fixed monitors proposed.

! Proposed Contention 57-C-6 questions the impact on the i

timing of an evacuation decision from the estimated maximum re-sponse times for radiological laboratory support in North 10/ See also Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of -

Joint Intervenors' Contention VI (Monitoring Systems), March 9, 1984.

11/ In its decision on a petition for rulemaking by Critical Mass Energy Project, et al., the Commission rejected the sug-gestion that a licensee's monitoring functions may be delegated to government agencies. 46 Fed. Reg. 11288, 11290 (1981).

1 1 i Carolina. The fundamental flaw in the contention is its as- l sumption that laboratory activation is necessary to provide the information essential to a decision to evacuate. This is not ,

t

, the case. An early decision to evacuate would be based on information provided by the plant. ERP Part 1, Section i

IV.C.S f (p. 40); Parts 2-5,Section IV.E.1. When activated, j the State RPS assessment capability will include use of com-puters for dose estimation and projection, field monitoring teams and a Mobile Radiation Laboratory. Id., Sections IV.C.,

]

IV.E.3, and Attachment 3 (Inventory of Emergency Kits and Ra-diological Monitoring Equipment). The laboratory cupport cited by Mr. Eddleman is identified as sampling air filters, water, 1

i soil, milk, vegetation and food. While such analyses will 1

l serve to confirm dose projections, there is no basis for the

presumption that such confirmation is necessary for early pro-1 tactive action decision-making. In short, Contention 57-C-6 l misapprehends the ERP and is lacking in basis. ,

I METEOROLOGY r

Proposed Contention 57-D-3 questions accident assessment t

capability (i.e., monitoring of the radioactive plume) "if the wind changes direction." Mr. Eddleman states that the plan j does not provide for wind shifts.

Guidance for the capability to acquire and evaluate meteo-rological information for dose projections is provided in 4

1 4

1 i

NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion I.5 (and Appendix 2), which I applies to licensees. Consequently, the on-site plan contains l the information on this capability, and Contention 57-D-3 is untimely as well as lacking in basis. See SENPP Emergency Plan, Section 3.9.5 (capability to display and record wind speed and direction).

Proposed Contention 57-C-19 argues that "(t]he plan takes no account of rainfall distribution or intensities." Again, Mr. Eddleman has not addressed CP&L's on-site meteorological assessment capability described in the on-site plan, and his contention is untimely as well as lacking in basis. See also, Licensing Board Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Motions for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contentions 29/30, 64(f), 75, 80 and 83/84), at 16 (Nov. 30, 1983) (finding for unplanned re-leases and for design basis accident analysis the use of a model not incorporating a rainout factor is still sufficiently conservative).

In addition, Mr. Eddleman quotes from NUREG/CR-2239 out of context. It does not imply that it is important to account for rainfall ih modeling accident consequences for nuclear plants.

Rather, it states that "because high-consequence events are usually associated with rainfall over population centers, fail-ure to adequately model rainfall can lead to large inaccuracies in peak consequences." NUREG/CR-2239 at 2-9. " Examination of individual calculations shows that population centers between 1

l

10 and 20 miles experience early fatalities principally when rain falls on the radioactive plume after it arrives ever the population center. Because this is an improbable event, it af-fects only the CCDF peak and not its 90th, or 99th percentile values." Id. at 2-91 (footnote omitted). In other words, this is one way to get large numbers (for a sensitivity study) at a distance from the plant. Mr. Eddleman has misused the report, and his contention lacks any basis.12/

COMMAND / CONTROL Proposed Contention 57-C-9 asserts that the time to set up SERT (State Emergency Response Team) and to activate a field command post precludes timely action for taking adequate pro-tective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. In making this argument, Mr. Eddleman assumes that timely action to implement protective measures cannot be taken without SERT.

This ignores significant provisions of the ERP.

The plan provides that the time required after notifica-tion to assemble SERT and establish a ccmmand post in the State Emergency Operations Center is approximately two hours.13/ ERP 12/ In fact, the rainfall removal mechanism greatly lowers plume transport and creates a ground deposition problem for which sheltering is an effective protective action. Mr.

Eddleman, in 57-C-19, does not recommend specific protective actions to be considered.

13/ The table cited by Mr. Eddleman (ERP Part 1, p. 72) may be in error since the State EOC will be in Raleigh, where the state employees already are lo:ated.

i Part 1,Section II.B.(p. 4). It also provides for necessary

State actions while SERT is in transition, and provides for j local government direction and control until the State assumes direction and control authority. Id. at pp. 4-6; Parts 2-5, i Sections II.C., II.D. Contention 57-C-9 lacks basis because it i

does not address these provisions of the ERP.

Proposed Contention 203 essentially duplicated 57-C-9, ex-

capt that it references the two-hour period for SERT to estab-l lish a command post. Again, Mr. Eddleman assumes that SERT l

l activation is a prerequisite to implementation of protective

! actions. The State plan provides, however, that initial noti-1

, fication and follow-up messages go from the plant to the l 1

l

! counties' warning points, as well as to the State's. ERP Part j

1,Section IV.B.2 (p. 34). The county plans provide that dur- i ing the initial hours of an emergency, prior to State assump-J tion of command and control, plant personnel will recommend protective response actions, and the Chairman of the Board of

}'

l County Commissioners will take the final responsibility until j SERT assumes control for ordering evacuation. ERP Parts 2-5, f

l Section IV.E. The proposed contention does not address these

)

provisions and thus should be rejected. .:

i I

i 1

1 I

1

COMMUNICATIONS New proposed Contentions 225 and 226 are very similar in j that both challenge the asserted reliance of emergency response l organizations on commercial telephone lines for initial notifi-1 l cation and ongoing communications during an emergency, due to l

alleged large numbers of calls to be expected. Further, in Contention 226, it is alleged that the backup means of communi-cations have not been analyzed to assess their capability to l

l handle the necessary communications if phone lines are over-loaded.

Mr. Eddleman has provided no basis for his implication that emergency response organizations place exclusive reliance on commercial telephones. In fact, SERT headquarters and the four counties' EOCs/ warning points are connected with the Harris EOF by dedicated Automatic Ring Down (ARD) telephone circuits. Back-up communications among these points is via commercial telephone, two-way radio systems. These systems will be provided by expanding the existing systems now operated by CP&L, the North Carolina DEM, and the county Emergency Man-agement Departments. System expansion in all cases will incude the addition of temporary base stations, mobile units, and -

hand-carried portable units. See ERP, Part 1,Section VI.G; i

l Parts 2-5,Section VI.E. Taken together, the communications l

l system incorporates features of redundancy and diversity that

, assure reliable communications among all response 1

l 1

organizations. Mr. Eddleman's concerns about reliance on com-mercial phone lines is thus without basis. Similarly, Mr.

Eddleman has provided no basis whatsoever on which to posit a challenge to the ability of back-up radio accommodate the nec-essary communications among State, local and CP&L personnel.

Accordingly, proposed Contentions 225 and 226 must be rejected as baseless.

New proposed Contention 244 expresses the same concerns identified in Contentions 225 and 226, though here framed in the context of the Harris site plan. Because the Harris site plan was served on the parties on March 29, 1983, the time for filing contentions on its contents is long past. The proposed contention must therefore be rejected.

NOTIFICATION Proposed Contention 57-C-3 asserts that the plan does not

\

have provisions for notifying the public during the night of the need to evacuate. Mr. Eddleman does not address the provi-siens of ERP, Annex C (Public Warning and Notification System and Procedures), which includes the use of fixed sirens, EBS, National Weather Service broadcast system, and emergency ser-vice vehicles equipped with sirens and public address systems.

See ERP Parts 2-5, Sections IV.B.9-13 (Back-up Alert and Noti-fication System). The sirens and vehicles directly address the concern, and the contention should be rejected as lacking in basis because it does not address the ERP.

Proposed Contention 213 argues that "the boater notifica-tion plan "does not include the Harris reservoir and suffers other deficiencies. The ERP citation in the contention is in error. ERP Annex G is " Warning and Notification of Boaters on Jordan Lake and the Surrounding Recreation Areas." The Harris reservoir, however, is addressed at SENPP Emergency Plan Sec-tion 4.5.3, which provides that, in addition to the fixed si-rens, aircraft and patrol boats will be used to alert people in the Harris reservoir where a-propriate and necessary. Mr.

Eddleman does not address this information, so the contention lacks basis.14/ In addition, a contention with respect to the on-site plan is untimely.

Proposed Contention 232 advances the proposition that no-i tification of schools requires unidentified special communica-tions to and between schools. The regulation cited and the i

referenced guidance in NUREG-0654 do not endorse this concept.

1 Mr. Eddleman does not explain why the provisions for notifica-tion, described above in response to 57-C-3, are inadequate for l notification of schools. Consequent./, the contention lacks i

basis and should be rejected.

In new proposed Contention 231, Mr. Eddleman asserts that -

l the ERP fails to " adequately address the need for notification 14/ Further, the information in the Evacuation Time Estimates, Chapter 4, indicates that a maximum of 325 would use the reser-voir area at any time in the summer.

~28-I l

of schools in the (EPZ) or the required communications systems to coordinate their evacuation." However, Mr. Ed.' eman cites no basis for these alleged requirements (other than the general reference to the planning standard requiring a range of protec-tive actions), and Applicants know of no such requirements.

Indeed, the fixed siren system is designed to warn immediately all areas within the 10-mile EPZ (including the schools). See ,

i l e.g., ERP Part 2,Section IV.B.9. Thus, there is no basis for the asserted "need" for a separate communications system for

~

the notification of schools in the EPZ. Nor has Mr. Eddleman T

specified the need for a special communications system to coor-f dinate the evacuation of schools. Accordingly, this part of the contention must be rejected as baseless.

Similarly, there is no regulatory basis whatsoever for the proposed required installation of two-way radios in school buses. Indeed, even the scenarios postulated by Mr. Eddleman do not compel the instal 11ation of such radios. Certainly 1

there is no need to notify buses of route changes due to plume shifts, since sheltering would be the protective action of 4

choice un1'ess evacuation could be " completed prior to signifi-cant release and arrival of radioactive material in the affect- -

ed area." See, e.g., ERP Part 1,Section IV.A.4.

Nor is there a need for two-way radios to enable buses to make multiple trips. Mr. Eddleman has completely failed to suggest what information drivers might need about such trips

that they could not be provided with either in advance of an emergency, or at one end or the other of each trip they make (at the time of the emergency).

Similarly, there is no need for two-way radios to notify bus drivers of an evacuation order issued during pick up or drop off times. As discussed above, the fixed siren system will warn all areas within the 10-mile EPZ. See, e.g., ERP Part 2,Section IV.B.9. Thus, when bus drivers enroute hear the sirens sound, they -- like the rest of the public -- will know to tune to an area EBS station to determine the nature of the threat (tornado, nuclear accidents, etc.) and the appropri-ate protective actions.

Accordingly, because it too is lacking in basis, the sec-ond part of proposed Contention 231 also must be rejected.

SHELTERING Revised proposed Contentions 57-C-10 and 57-C-13 and new proposed Contention 214 all generally assert that the ERP fails to adequately reflect the basis for the choice of sheltering as a protective action. The applicable regulatory standard is

.NUREG-0654 Criterion J.10.m, which Mr. Eddleman cites in Con-tention 214. However, that criterion specifically identifies three reports that "may be considered in determining protection afforded" in local residential units and other shelters -- one of which is " Protective Action Evaluation Part II, Evacuation l

and Sheltering as Protective Actions Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases" (EPA 520/1-78-001B). And the ERP places express reliance on that report, EPA 520/1-78-001B, as a basis for the " evaluation of comparative dose reduction factors expected through either sheltering or evacuation or a combina-1 tion of the two." ERP, Part 1, $ IV.E.10.b. Thus, contrary to Mr. Eddleman's allegations, the ERP plainly meets the regula-

. tory guidance of NUREC-0654. Proposed Contentions 57-C-10, 57-C-13, and 214 must therefore be rejected.

I i RESPIRATORY PROTECTION

! Revised proposed Contention 57-C-12 castigates State and local emergency preparedness officials, asserting that only one of the county pla.4s reflects respiratory protection (i.e., cov-

] ering one's nose and mouth with a cloth) as a protective action option. Mr. Eddleman is quite simply mistaken. All four coun-l ty plans include respiratory protection as a protective action '

to be considered. ERP Parts 2-5, 5 IV.E.5.f; see also ERP 7

Annex D (EBS messages with instructions on respiratory protec-tion). The proposed contention therefore lacks basis, and must be rejected.

L i

POTASSIUM IODIDE Revised proposed Eddleman Contentions 30 and 30A, and new proposed Contentions 236(c), 238 and_239 generally challenge the ability of the State of North Carolina to distribute i

1

l l potassium iodide (KI) to specified populations in the plume ,

i l EPZ. Applicants oppose the admission of these contentions. l r

i

! In accordance with NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion j

. i J.10.e, the ERP specifically provides for the use of KI for l emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the

plume EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult. Specifically, the ERP provides for the coordination j of procurement of KI prior to a radiological emergency by the '

Division of Health Services (DHS), Department of Human Resourc-i es, in order to ensure that "a sufficient number of potassium

iodide units are conveniently and strategically located in the

! l vicinity of the Shearon Harris Plant." ERP Part 1, 5 IV.E.6.

i KI will be stored in each of the four EPZ county health depart-ments under the control of county health officials. Id. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will be informed by DHS of !

l any significant changes in the availability of KI. Id. The DHS is identified as the organization that will determine the number of KI units required for emergency workers and institu- i i

l tionalized persons within the plume EPZ. Id.

I i

Thus,'Mr. Eddleman's complaint that the ERP doesn't specify the radioprotective drug to be used (Contention 30A) is ;

i l'

simply erroneous; the ERP identifies the drug by its generic

i i I name, " potassium iodide." Similarly, contrary to Mr.

Eddleman's assertions (Contention 30), the ERP does specify i

, where the drug will be stored -- in the four county health 1

j l I

. 1 i

I

departments. Moreover, although Mr. Eddleman states otherwise (Contention 30A), the plan does identify the persons who may ,

receive KI -- emergency workers and institutionalized persons.

L Certainly Mr. Eddleman has failed to offer any reason why such persons need be further identified in the plan (e.g., by name).

Further, contrary to Mr. Eddleman's expressed concern in proposed Contention 239 that no one is designated "to make sure each individual at risk receives [KI)," DHS is expressly i

charged with responsibility for determining the number of KI units required for emergency workers and institutionalized per-sons. The ERP thus also provides for the determination of the l quantities of KI needed (Contentions 30 and 30A). Mr. Eddleman has failed to specify even a single deficiency in any of these provisions, i

The ERP also delineates the decision chain for distri- '

bution and adminintration of KI. ERP Part 1, 6 IV.E.7, and Parts 2-5 at $ IV.E.7. Mr. Eddleman suggests that the ;

decision-making process may be too lengthy, alleging simply that it " permits up to 30 minutes delay . . . in the decision" '

(Contention 30). "Jhis part of the contention amounts to noth-ing more than a ba:re statement of fact. Mr. Eddleman has failed to indicate why he believes the possibility of 30 minutes' consideration of such a public health policy matter to be unacceptable. Nor has he specified how he would short-cut the public health policy decision-making process, particularly in light of his acknowledgement (in Contention 239) of the risks attendant to the administration of KI. In any event, Mr.

Eddleman has failed to recognize the bifurcated process for making the decision to administer KI. When total thyroid expo-sure "is suspected, projected, or confirmed to reach or exceed !

15 rems" (emphasis in the original), the State Health Director I

or his agent "is empowered to authorize" the distribution of i 1

KI, _through the decision chain which Mr. Eddleman criticizes.

But, when the exposure "is suspected, projected, or confirmed to reach 25 rems" (emphasis in the original), the State Health 1

J Director or his agent "will recommend" (emphasis supplied) the administration of K!. Thus, the ERP does provide for expedited l

decision-making on the administration of K! when it is l

! warranted by the circumstances. Accordingly, Mr. Eddleman's ,

l !

j concerns here lack both specificity and basis.

Finally, Mr. Eddleman asserts that the ERP fails both to assign anyone the responsibility for distributing K! (Conten-l tion 239) and to identify the means by which K! would be dis-i i

tributed (Contentions 30, 30A and 238). To the contrary, the i l ERP both charges the respective County Health Department Direc- ;

1 '

3

! tors with responsibility to distribute K! and describes the '

)

{ method of distribution. The respective County Health Depart- l

?

ments will be responsible for delivering K! to hospitals and nursing homes, and emergency workers will be provided with K!

1 l at pre-identified " staging areas" (specified in the county ,

t

l l

l plans). ERP Parts 2-5 at Sections IV.E.6.1 and IV.E.7.e. Mr.

l .

Eddleman speculates, in Contention 238, that "[t] ravel to sup-l ply these drugs will surely be difficult during an evacuation, and has not been planned for specifically . . ." Contrary to t

this assumption, the State and the four counties have expressly planned to keep one lane of evacuation routes free for emergen- f i i l cy vehicles and other such prioricy uses. Evacuation Time Es-l timate, $ 2.2 (concurred in by State and local officials). ;

Given this information, Mr. Eddleman's assertion that the ERP fails to provide timely access to K! for hospitals and nursing homes (Contention 236(c)) is patently insufficiently specific, ,

and lacks basis.

Mr. Eddleman also complains that the ERP makes no provi- l sion for obtaining the " informed consent" of persons to whom K!

is to be administered (Contention 239). However, Mr. Eddleman j has provided no factual basis to s'upport the implication that

-- absent such a provision -- the administration of KI in an emergency would be significantly (and detrimentally) delayed to fulfill asserted obligations of " medical ethics." flor is there c

a requiato'ry requirement that the ERP include such a detailed provision. Therefore, these additional allegations must also *!

bs rejected as lacking the required specificity and basis.

In sum, the ERP identifies the group of individuals who might receive K!. In addition, those responsible for the pro-curement, storage, distribution and administration of K! have i l

~ _ . __ - _. - _ - ..- - _ - -- _ - _ . -

been identified in the ERP. The predistribution/ stockpiling of KI in a number of strategic locations within the EPZ, under the control of the four county health officials, ensures that emer-I gency workers and institutionalized persons will be provided with KI if the decision is made to administer it. Moreover,

the county plans describe the plans for distribution of KI, 1

l specifically identifying the staging areas where emergency l

l workers would receive KI, and providing for the transportation 1

of KI to hospitals and nursing homes. Because proposed conten-tions 30, 30A, 236(c), 238 and 239 fail to address or call into question these pertinent provisions of the ERP, and/or because Mr. Eddleman has failed to provide the requisite basis for his allegations, contentions 30, 30A, 236(c), 238 and 239 must be rejected.

In contrast to the proposed contentions discussed above (which challenge provisions for KI for emergency workers and institutionalized persons), deferred contention _29(d) and re-vised contention 57-C-11 have as their general thrust the pro-vision of K! to the general public within the plume EPZ. Pro-posed Cont'ention 29(d) asserts generally that the ERP fails to provide "means, such as potassium iodide pills or capsulen, -

j readily available to citizens around SHNPP." The proposed con-1 tention is completely lacking in the specificity and basis re-quired by the Commission's regulations. To the extent this l

l proposed contention was intended as a challenge to "means" 1

_ - _ _ ____ . - _ - - - ~ ._.- - -. - - - - . .- - - - - -- -

l i

i l

other than KI, Mr. Eddleman was required to identify those l "means" for the Board and the parties. Further, Mr. Eddleman !

l l disagrees with the State of North Carolina's public health pol-1 icy decision not to distribute KI to the general public -- a policy already established for existing operating reactors. He is required to specify why he disagrees with the policy, and to

. provide the reasons or authority on which his position is

! based. This he has failed to do.

l In proposed Contention 57-C-11, Mr. Eddleman alleges that t

l

! NUREG-0654 provides for the administration of KI to the general i

! public when sheltered, asserting that in such circumstances, j the public is a population "whose immediate evacuation may be 1

! infeasible or very difficult." However, that portion of i j NUREG-0654 Criterion J.10.e., read in context, provides only l

j for KI "for emeroency workers and institutionalized _ persons i

j . . . whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very dif-i

) ficult." Thus, there is no regulatory basis for the require- l i

i ment Mr. Eddleman would impose. The law on this point is i clear. The policy question whether -- and, if so, to whom --

1 to distribute K! is a decision that rests squarely with the state. See Union _ Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1),

ALAB-754, 18 N.R.C. , slip op. at 3-4 (Dec. 9, 1983). Ac-1 1 cordingly, proposed Contentions 29(d) and 57-C-11 must be re-1 j jected.

a .

I !

i 1

l EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Mr. Eddleman has proposed three revised contentions

! (Contentions 57-D-1, 57-D-2, and 57-C-20) and ten new conten-j tions (Contentions 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 :

I and 224) which are all -- on their face -- based on the Evacua- l tion Time Estimate, which was served on the Board and all par-ties on December 29, 1983. Under the Board's standing rule requiring the filing of new contentions no later than thirty days after receipt of the document on which they are based, ,

these contentions were required to be filed no later than the [

{

end of January, 1984. See LBP-82-119A, 16 N.R.C. 2069, 2073

{ (1982). Thus, these contentions are late-filed -- and by a 1

matter of months, not days. And Mr. Eddleman has made no at-j tempt to show " good cause" for the late filing of contentions l

J with respect to the Evacuation Time Estimate in particular.

Accordingly, all of the above-listed proposed contentions must i

i be rejected as untimely.

)

! Although proposed revised contentions 57-D-1 and 57-D-2 l

l reference evacuation time estimate figures in the ERP, the fig-i

{ ures in th'e ERP are taken from the Evacuation Time Estimate.

1

] Accordingly, while these proposed contentions do not expressly reference the Evacuation Time Estimate, it is beyond dispute

{ that both are based on that document and are, therefore, l 1

i late-filed. Proposed Contentions 57-D-1 and 57-D-2 also share l .

i other fatal defects. Both have as their thrust the implication I

i i

i

that evacuation cannot be accomplished quickly enough. In this respect, the proposed contentions constitute an impermissible challenge to the regulations. The Commission's emergency plan-ning regulations simply do not require that evacuation be com-pleted within any particular time frame. Rather, the regula-tions require only that a license applicant provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate. . ." See The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2),

ALAB-730, 17 N.R.C. 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Accordingly, pro-posed contentions 57-D-1 and 57-D-2 must also be rejected on this independent ground. Finally, the proposed contentions offer not a clue as to the changes in planning Mr. Eddleman would make assuming the observations in the proposed conten-tions were valid, in effect, the proposed contentions lack a

" prayer for relief," and are therefore rendered wholly non-litigable. Thus, the proposed contentions lack the bases and specificity required by the Commission's Rules of Practice.

For all these reasc..s, proposed Contentions 57-D-1 and 57-D-2 must be rejected.

Proposed revised contention 57-C-20 asserts that most roads to be used in an evacuation are two-lane roads, and al-

leges that "[u]nder conditions of panic accidents can and will happen on these roads." However, Mr. Eddleman has advanced no authority whatsoever in support of the implication that the public would " panic" in an evacuation. Indeed, embracing the f

i

" conventional wisdom" over testimony by intervenors' witnesses l thatexperienceinothertypesofdisastersksireelevantto human behavior in a nuclear emergency, a licensing board re-cently observed:

(S)tudies of human response to emergencies show that panic does not occur during mass evacuations ***.

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2),

LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 957 (1983). Mr. Eddleman han failed to provide any basis to question the " conventional wisdom."

Accordingly, the premise of his contention must be rejected.

Mr. Eddleman also suggests that -- with or without panic

-- an evacuation will involve a significant number of car acci-dents. Again, Mr. Eddleman offers no authority to support his assertions. In actuality, past experience with large-scale evacuations has demonstrated that the incidence of automobile accidents is reduced, because traffic moves more slowly. See Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit 3), LBP-82-100, 16 N.R.C. 1550, 1561-62, 1576 (1982). Because Mr. Eddleman advances no basis whatsoever to support hi's arguments (and certainly nothing to challenge past experience), his allegations must be rejected.

Further, to the extent that proposed content.on 57-C-20 implies that an auto accident might block an evacuation route, Mr. Eddleman has simply failed to recognize that -- in an evac-untion -- roads will be operated with normal two-way traffic patterns, so that one lane will be essentially open at all times. See Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 2.2. This will not only allow emergency vehicles easy access to disabled cars, but it also will permit evacuating vehicles to temporarily use the open lane in the event of a traffic accident, so as to pre-clude total blockage of an evacuation route. See Metropolitan t

Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1),

LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1624 (1981). And the ERP provides for resources for the removal of traffic impediments in an emergency. See ERP Part 1, Sections III.J.1.f, IV.E.8; Parts 2-5, Sectitan IV.E.10.

Finally, Mr. Eddleman asserts that the capacities of evac-uation routes have not been assessed. To the contrary, the Evacuation Time Estimate describes the capacity calculations underlying that document, and provides the highway capacity data for each individual link in the evacuation route network.

Evacuation Time Estimate, Sections 6.10, 9. Thus, these alle-gations have absolutely no basis in fact, and proposed Conten-tion 57-C-20 must be rejected in its entirety.

New proposed contention 215 notes that the Evacuation Time Estimate characterizes two identified vehicle occupancy and !

population assumptions as " conservative," and asserts that these assumptions "may force evacuation time estimates up- ,

wards." However, the proposed contention selectively excerpts the text of the Evacuation Time Estimate. Mr. Eddleman L__ _ - - - _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ - - - - - _ - . _ _ - - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ . . _ - . - - - _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ . _ - - - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ . - - - - _ _ . - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ - - . . _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - -

4 neglects to point out that the vehicle occupancy rates for l

Harris Reservoir and Jordan Lake, which the preparers of the .

} Evacuation Time Estimate considered conservative, were actually I

j supplied by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the State Divi-sion of Wildlife Management, and local emergency preparedness officials. Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 3.2. Nor does he volunteer that the preparers of the Evacuation Time Estimate concluded that double-counting school children would have lit-tie effect on the number of vehicles used to evacuate the per-i manent population (and thus on the evacuation times) since each household uses one vehicle, regardless of the number of people i at home at the time of evacuation. Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 3.4. Finally, he has also ignored the expert judgment of the preparers of the Evacuation Time Estimate, who evaluated i

the impact of the identified conservatisms and concluded that

"[ flor the purpose of developing evacuation clear-time esti-mates, however, these figures are considered appropriate since they reflect the best available data." Evacuation Time Esti-i

, mate, Section 3.4.

Nor has Mr. Eddleman provided any rationale or other ,

i affirmative basis to contradict the Evacuation Time Estimate's *!

assessment of the impact of the two identified conservatisms, or to support his implication that the conservatisms would have a significant impact on evacuation times.15/ Thus, the alleged 15/ Mr. Eddleman's reliance upon "the opinion of expert Paul lloimbeck" (his words) is an insufficient basis for this pro-(Continued Hext Page) l l

! i basis for proposed Contention 215 (taken, as it is, wholly out of context) fails to provide the requisite support for the con-I i l tantion. Accordingly, the contention must be rejected. i i

l The new proposed Contention 216 alleges that the Evacua-tion Time Estimate " fails to divide population data into subgroups (e.g. those using autos and those not using autos

. . .)." Mr. Eddleman further contends that "[t]he exact meth-od and type and availability of transport for those without l autos are not specified, except for schoolchildren." Mr.

Eddleman is simply wrong on both counts. The Evacuation Time Estimate divides the " permanent resident" population of the EPZ into the " Auto-owning Permanent Population" and the "Non-Auto-

! Owning Permanent Population." Compare Evacuation Time Esti-mate, Secticn 3.1.1 with Section 3.1.2. Moreover, the Evacua-tion Time Estimate correctly notes that, of the persons who do ,

not own cars, "many are expected to ride with neighbors and relatives. Some individuals may rely on transportation pro-vided by local emergency management officials." Evacuation

( Time Estimate, Section 6.2.1. The Evacuation Time Estimate (continued) .:

posed contention, particularly where -- as here -- the quoted

! opinion reflects no particularized knowledge of the Harris ;

l area. Mr. Holmbeck is simply a "well-informed layman".

Commonweal _th_Ed1_ son _Co._ (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), initial Decision, 19 N.R.C. , slip op at 368 (January 13, 1984).

l l l l

l i

l further notes that "[s)heriffs' departments, fire departments, and school buses will be used to transport individuals with no l private means of transportation who have not shared a ride with ;

family or friends." Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 8.2.

Thus, Mr. Eddleman's allegations are baseless. Moreover, be-cause he has failed to cite to even a single relevant portion of the Evacuation Time Estimate, the proposed contention lacks specificity. Accordingly, in addition to being late-filed, the proposed contention must also be rejected for lack of basis and specificity.

New proposed Contention 217 charges that the Evacuation Time Estimate " fails to systematically consider the relative significance of alternative assumptions, e.g., weather condi- !

tions, day versus night, peak transient versus off-peak tran-sient populations." Again, however, Mr. Eddleman is simply [

mistaken. The Evacuation Time Estimate fully assesses a wide range of modeled conditions, including alternative assumptions ,

1 as to weather conditions (good weather / adverse weather), time ;

of day (daytime / night time), and peak transient versus off-peak ,

transient population (ranging from peak transient population to no transients). See, e.g., Evacuation Time Estimate, Section -

1.3, Table 1-1, Table 1-2. Accordingly, the contention lacks basis. Moreover, because Mr. Eddleman has failed to address -

any of the relevant sections of the Evacuation Time Estimate, the contention lacks the requisite specificity. For these l

l

l l

l reasons, and because it is late-filed, proposed Contention 217 I e l must be rejected.

! t In new proposed contention 218, Mr. Eddleman alleges that ;

l evacuation times are not provided for each special facility, l

nor are industrial shutdown times considered. There is no reg- l ulatory basis for the requirement proposed by Mr. Eddleman, l ,

i.e., that a separate estimate be prepared for each special !

facility. Rather, NUREG-0654 provides only that each special f facility should be " treated on an individual basis." :

NUREG-0654, at 4-10. The Evacuation Time Estimate does just .

that, identifying special facilities (hospitals, nursing homea, schools, industrial facilities, etc.) as individual units, and locating them into appropriate evacuation planning zones. See, '

e.g., Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 3.3; Table 3-5, Figure 3-3 (hospital and family care homes); Table 3-6, Figure 3-4 (schools); Section 4.0, Table 4-2, Figure 3-2 (industrial fa-cilities). Then, the evacuation time estimates in Section 7 of the Evacuation Time Estimate report reflect each of these ape-cial populations separately. Mr. Eddleman fails to address the i

specific s' actions of the Evacuation Time Estimate which are relevant, and accordingly neglects to indicate why he believes

the Evacuation Time Estimate's treatment of special facilities does not constitute treatment "on an individual basis" under NUREO 0654. Similarly, contrary to Mr. Cddleman's assertions, I the preparers of the ETE did consider shutdown times for 1

l

/

f industrial facilities. Ninety percent of work force departures would occur during the 30-minute period following alerting and initial preparation, with the remaining portion of the work 1

force departing in the next 30 minutes. SENPP Unit I will l

l maintain emergency operations forces and will employ protective 1

measures for those who do not evacuate. Evacuation Time Esti- l mate, Section 6.2.2. Thus, the proposed contention must be re-jected as lacking both basis and specificity, as well as l

late-filed.

The thrust of new proposed Contention 219 is that, because

-- it is alleged - "some parents will go to schools to evacu-ate their children," other assumptions of the Evacuation Time l

l Estimate vil be invalidated. The assumptions which would as- r sortedly be rendered invalid are (1) that the auto-owning popu-lation will evacuate from their homes; (2) that the public will evacuate via designated evacuation routes; and (3) that all school children will be evacuated by bus. The proposed conten-tion must be rejected in its entirety.

Mr. Eddleman has provided no authority whatsoever to sup-port his assertion. Indeed, as another licensing board has recognized -

l (T]he public will comply with a plan and with l instructions; but it is the lack of a plan or i clear instructions that may present a prob- '

i lem. *** Therefore, to ensure the validity of an assumption that most parents will not ;

rush to the schools to pick up their chil-dren, the plans *** must contain clear in-structions for the evacuation of school r

1 i

! children, and the public must be properly ed- i ucated. -

! Consolidated Edison Co. of_New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2),

(

LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 959-60 (1983). Here, Mr. Eddleman

has failed to even acknowledge that, in an emergency, EBS an-nouncements would advise parents of the shelter to which each ,

1 school's students have been taken. ERP Part 1,Section IV.E.4.

1 j Thus, Mr. Eddleman has failed to provide any basis whatsoever i

i for his implicit assertion that the parents in the area around l the Harris plant would ignore the EBS announcements and insist ;

i on driving to the evacuated schools. Nor has he even referred to the extensive provisions for traffic control, which are used l 1 to ensure that the public does not deviate from predesignated i 1 :

j evacuation router, qee m1.q1, Evacuation Tine Estimate, Sec- {

tions 2.2, 8.2 KRP Parts 2-5, Figure 2, Section !V.E.9. Thus, he certainly has previded no basis to indleate that traffic i i control meanuten will be unsuccessful in securing public adher- L

, ence to designate evacuatien Yua*.es. And, finally, even assum- [

i -

i inq oome parent did go to the scho)1s to pick up their chil- ,

dren, Mr. Eddleman has provided no casia t'o support the i

assumption (implicit in the contention)' that the effect of the parents' actions on evacuncion times as a wh' ole would be suffi-ciently significant to affect thezprotective action decision making ptocess.

d l 5 t g

i f

Accordingly, because proposed Contention 219 lacks specif-icity and baJis, and because it is untimely, Applicants oppose its admission.

New proposed Contention 220 alleges, in part, that the Evacuation Time Estimate errs in annuming that auto owners will evacuate from their homes rather than from their workplace, be-cause traffic jams will occur at the workplaces. However, Mr.

Eddleman advances no basis whatsoever for his assertion that traffic jams will occur at workplaces, and -- indeed -- does not even acknowledge the detailed provisions for traffic con-trol, to prevent any such queuing. See, e.g., Evacuation Time Estimate, Sections 2.2, 8.2: ERP Parts 2-5, Figure 2,Section IV.E.9. Moreover, because he has failed to address the role-vant documentation, the contention lachs the requisite specif-icity.

The second part of the proposed contention is also objec-tionable, and evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of the referenced section of the Evacuation Time Estimate. While Mr.

Eddleman interprets the cited section as an indication of the level of actual planning for the evacuation of the Boy Scout camp, that section of the Evacuation Time Estimate actually a pertains to estimation of vehicle demand. Thus, the cited sec-tion does goa assume that sufficient vehicles are available to evacuate the camp, so that Mr. Eddleman has provided no basis for this portion of the contention. The proposed contention l

l 1 i

L.________________._

should therefore be rejected in its entirety, as untimely, without basis, and. lacking in specificity.

The gist of new proposed Contention 221 is yet another un-timely challenge to the Evacuation Time Estimate on the ground that the computer model used to generate the estimates assumes familiarity with the area in exercising driver preference, when

-- it is asserted -- transients would not have the assumed fa-miliarity. However, the " familiarity" which Mr. Eddleman sug-gests is assumed is nothing more than a determination as to "the direction of the outbound links (away from the nuclear plant or hazard area) and the traffic conditions on the out-bound links." Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 6.3.2. In-deed, the Evacuation Time Estimates effectively disavow a gen-eral familiarity with the area - " driver behavior during an evacuation is assumed to be myopic in that only information regarding the immediate outbound links at each intersections is assumed to influence route selection decisions." Evacuation Time Estime, Section 6.3.2. In addition, Mr. Eddleman has not considered the detailed provisions for traffic control, to en-sure that'the public adheres to predesignated evacuation routes. See, e.g., Figure 2, Section IV.E.9. And the evacua- -

tion routes will be marked with signs. ERP Parts 2-5,Section IV.E.ll. Finally, it strains credulity to assert that tran-sients would be oblivious to the stream of traffic of the resi-dent population on its way out of the EPZ. Moreover, contrary

_ . . =. ,- .

I l

to the further assertions of the contention, the Evacuation Time Estimate does consider " human' behavior under stress. See, e.g., Section 6.2.1 (actual evacuee preparation and departure times may vary according to perceived severity of event); Sec-tion 6.3.3 (where residual link capacity is zero, model allows some small capacity for lower-priority approach " sneak-in" ef-fects). For all these reasons, proposed Contention 221 must be rejected.

New proposed Contention 222 is also a late-filed attack on the Evacuation Time Estimate. In this contention, Mr. Eddleman charges'that the Evacuation Time Estimate fails to describe the

" highly individualized means of transportation" for evacuation of the special facilities. To the contrary, the means and availability of transportation for special facilities is de-tailed in the Evacuation Time Estimate. See Sections 3.3, 8.2.

NUREG-0654 calls for nothing more. Thus, this part of the pro-posed contention must be rejected as both out-of-time, and baseless.

Mr. Eddleman also questions the capability for single trip evacuation of the schools. However, Mr. Eddleman has offered not a shred of basis to support his challenge to the capability -

for. school evacuation. Ignoring the wealth of data available in the Evacuation Time Estimate (as well as the ERP), Mr.

Eddleman has not even suggested an estimate of the number of school students he asserts would need bus transportation in an f

emergency, the number of school buses that woul'd be needed to evacuate those students in an emergency, or the number of 4

school buses available to evacuate the students. See, e.g.,

Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 6.2.5 (discussing availabili-ty of school buses); Section 5.1 (describing evacuation routes); Figure 3-4 (showing location of schools); Table 4-4 (listing all schools in EPZ, with numbers of students and staff per school). Indeed, Mr. Eddleman has not even referenced the Evacuation Time Estimate's determination that approximately 100 school buses will be needed to evacuate the schools in the EPZ; certainly he has provided no basis to question that determina-tion. See Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 8.2. Finally, Mr.

Eddleman has failed to acknowledge the availability of supple-mental /back-up buses and drivers. See, e.g., ERP Part 1, Sec-tion IV.E.4.d and f. Given the documentation available to Mr.

Eddleman to frame his contentions, his unsupported charges here should be rejected as pure speculation. Applicants accordingly oppose the admission of proposed Contention 222 in its entire-ty, on the ground that it is late, lacking in specificity, and baseless.*

New proposed Contenion 223 is, again, an attack on the -

Evacuation Time Estimate. Here, Mr. Eddleman argues that the Evacuation Time Estimate failed to consider " highly individual-ized mobilization times" and " time of day considerations" in special facility estimates (particularly nursing home

i l

evaucation times, and the impact of visiting hours thereon).

To the contrary, the preparation and mobilization times for the hospitals, nursing homes, family care centers and schools were developed " based upon discussions with representatives of the health care facilities, state and local emergency preparedness officials, and personnel in the Wake County school system."

Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 6.2.5. Thus, Mr. Eddleman's charge that the Evacuation Time Estimate did not consider indi-vidualized mobilization times, including time of day considera-tions, is without basis. Proposed Contention 223 should there-fore be rejected.

In new proposed Contention 224, Mr. Eddleman claims that the Evacuation Time Estimate is " defective" because it alleged-ly does not assume area-specific weather conditions, does not identify the adverse weather frequency used, and "does not give consideration to the impact of peak population including behav-ioral aspects." However, Mr. Eddleman has not referenced a single section of the relevant documentation; the proposed con-tention thus lacks specificity. Nor has Mr. Eddleman provided any basis Vhatsoever to support his allegations. The substance of the proposed contention is nothing more than Mr. Eddleman's -

parroting of excerpts of NUREG-0654 -- plainly insufficient to meet the Commission's requirements for a litigable contention.

Accordingly, proposed Contention 224 must be rejected as late, 1

baseless, and lacking in specificity.

O

New proposed Contention 205 asserts that the ERP "is inad-

equate for evacuation under snow conditions" for several rea-sons. However, Mr. Eddleman provides no basis whatsoever for any of the charges in his proposed contention. Mr. Eddleman first alleges, with no supporting authority, that "[m]ost Carolinians cannot drive well in snow; panic would contribute to accidents especially for evacuation at night in a snow storm." But there is also no basis for the assertion that panic would occur in the evacuation. Indeed, " studies of human response to emergencies show that panic does not occur during mass evacuations . . .. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 957 (1983). In fact, past experience with large-scale evacuations has demonstrated tha the incidence of automobile accidents is actually reduced in evacuations, because traffic moves more slowly. See Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-82-100, 16 N.R.C. 1550, 1561-62,

! 1576 (1982).

Further, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman is concerned that any traffic accidents that do occur "would lead to bottlenecks and prevent successful evacuation," Mr. Eddleman has failed to -

acknowledge that, in an evacuation, roads will be operated with normal two-way traffic patterns, so that one lane will be open at allt imes. See Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 2.2. This will not only allow emergency vehicles easy access to disabled I

)

l l

l cars, it will also permit evacuating cars to temporarily use the open lano to pass traffic accidents, to preclude total blockage of an evacuation route. See Metropolitan Edison Co.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1624 (1981). Mr. Eddleman's concerns about snow are thus baseless, although -- if weather were sufficiently ad-i verse, sheltering would be selected as a protective action rather than evacuation.

Finally, Mr. Eddleman states that, "under snow condi-tions," there would be insufficent resources to evacuate hospi-tal and nursing home patients and prisoners and person without transportation. But, again, he provided no authority to sup-port his sweeping allegations. Nor does he reference any of the numerous sections of the ERP and the Evacuation Time Esti-mate which address the evaucation of these populations. Thus, this portion of the proposed contention also lacks the specif-icity required of a litigable contention. Proposed Contention 205 should therefore be rejected in its entirety.

IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION Mr. Eddleman has proposed five redundant contentions which address the ERP's treatment of impediments to evacuation.

Applicants oppose all five of these contentions.

Proposed Contention 57-C-4 challenges the adequacy of the ERP's provisions for dealing with ice, snow and fog which might

impede traffic flow.11/ Proposed Contention 57-C-5 challenges the adequacy of the ERP's provisions for clearing debris and vehicle wrecks from the roads. In this contention, Mr.

Eddleman also complains about the insufficient level of detail in the ERP on plans for dealing with impediments. Mr. Eddleman would have the ERP include an inventory of equipment and per-sonnel for impediment removal, time estimates to remove impedi-ments, and an assessment of "whether the equipment could reach places to clear wrecks or debris in the event of either a pan-icky or an orderly evacuation." Revised Contention 117 repeats the concern stated in proposed Contention 57-C-5 about numbers and availability of wrecker trucks and equipment to keep evacu-ation routes clear. Here, Mr. Eddleman also expresses a con-cern about ordinary accidents and accidents of hypothetical hazardous cargo: "What if, for example, a car or truck tries to beat a train to a crossing during evacuation, derailing the train and releasing hazardous material from the train or the truck (or even the car)?" Finally, in Revised Contention 117-A, Mr. Eddleman is concerned about the possibility that trains might block evacuation routes, and faults the ERP for 16/ Mr. Eddleman expresses concern, in proposed Contention 57-C-4, about the possibility of rainout or entrainment of the plume making sheltering less effective and evacuation prefera-ble. Without addressing the merits of this concern, Applicants recognize the need to provide for a range of protective ac-tions, including evacuation of the plume exposure EPZ. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10); NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion J.

1

failing to analyze this possibility. Proposed Contention 118 complains that the ERP does not plan for hazardous materials and cargoes that may be abandoned and block evacuation routes.

j Applicants and state and local governments are required to l plan for radiological emergencies occurring at the Harris .

i Plant. This means that the NRC must have " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(1).

4 One of these protective measures is evacuation. NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion J. However, this does not mean that the

?

State must be able to guarantee that evacuation will be possi-ble under every conceivable scenario.

It would be possible to postulate combina-tions of conditions that would make evacua-1 tion impossible for extended periods of I

time although the likelihood of such events may be remote.

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1581 (1981), aff'd, t

i ALAB-698, 16 N.R.C. 1290 (1982). As the Licensing Board in the TMI-1 case explained in assessing the TMI-1 time evacuation study -- ah important tool used by the State in considering l whether to recommend evacuation - "[T]he objective is to pos- -

tulate and analyze an adverse weather scenario that has some reasonable possibility of occurrence." Id. at 1581; see also Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power i

Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 N.R.C. 765, 785-86 (1982)

~

.,n, , ,,-- --

-w-, -- , - - - , m- v r -,e.,---en-e- < - - - - - + --7

i (time estimates realistically cope with a range of likely con-ditions that might occur during an emergency).

Thus, the State cannot and need not ensure that evacuation always will be feasible, i.e., that it always will be able to deal with impediments, whether far-fetched, such as some of Mr.

Eddleman's examples, or very severe, such as weather conditions which would impede an evacuation. Cf. ERP, Part 1, Figure 11 (recommended protective actions). Rather, NUREG-0654 recom-mends that plans identify impediments to evacuation routes and the anticipated means for dealing with them. NUREG-0654, Eval-uation Criterion J.lO.k.

While the ERP clearly should consider how the State and local governments will deal with impediments to evacuation, it need not specify every detail as to how this effort will be ac-complished. The purpose of the ERP is to delineate the concept of operations in the event of a radiological emergency. See NUREG-0654,Section II.A.l.b. Cf. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 N.R.C. 1076, 1107 (1983) (emergency plans should satisfy the 16 broadly drafted standards of 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(b)). The con-cept of operations establinhes the emergency organizational -

structure , the mechanism for direction and control of emergency response efforts, and the emergency functions that are re-quired. The ERP need not, and should not, contain a large vol-ume of detail concerning how each specific emergency task will

be undertaken by emergency workers. Such details would cause the" plan to become unreasonably burdensome and detailed, and consequently, make it unusable. See NUREG-0654, at 29 (plans should be hundreds of pages, not thousands). Furthermore, if a task is to be performed by support emergency personnel who are being asked to do work that they do in the ordinary course of their job, there is no need for a description of how that work will be performed. For example, in the case of impediment re-moval, the individuals assigned this task already know how to use a tow truck and how to plow snow. The ERP need not include a special provision on the functions. Cf. NUREG-0654, at 29 (plans should include definitions of terms that are unique to the facility under consideration or are given connotations that differ from normally accepted usage).

The ERP contains plans for dealing with realistic impedi-ments to evacuation. The North Carolina Department of Trans-portation (DOT) is one of the principal response organizations identified in the ERP. The DOT routinely moves impediments to traffic moving on state highways. See ERP, Part 1,Section IV.E.8. Section III.J.1.f of Part 1 of the ERP gives to the DOT the responsibility, upon request, of assisting in the iden- .

tification, containment or removal of evacuation impediments during a radiological emergency at the Harris plant. The Coun-ty Annexes to the ERP, identified as Parts 2 through 5 of the ERP, contain parallel provisions. See ERP Parts 2-5, Section

l l

IV.E.10. The State intends to keep one lane of evacuatdon routes free for emergency vehicles and other usages. Evacua-tion Time Estimate, Section 2.2 ( oncurred in by State and local officials). The State Highway Patrol will monitor and i

control traffic, with the assistance of the National Guard, the Division of Motor Vehicles, and county sheriff departments.

ERP, Part 1, Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.h and III.J.2.b; Parts 2-5,Section III.D. In addition, the evacuation highway net-work consists of multiple, interlocking routes. If one route is blocked by an accident, traffic can be diverted to another route. Evacuation Time Estimate, Sections 5.2 and 5.3; see also Annex H to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergen-cy Plan, Rev. 2 (February 1984) (identifies evacuation routes).

To the extent that Mr. Eddleman refers in his five pro-posed impediment contentions to any specifics that he believes should be included in the ERP that are not there, his recommen-dations either are based on hypothetical, remote events for which the State need not plan, see Revised Contention 117 and proposed Contention 118 (wrecked or abandoned hazardous cargo),

Revised Contentions 117 and 117-A (train derailings), or are advocating a level of detail not required in the ERP, see pro- -

posed Contention 57-C-4, 57-C-5, Revised Contention 117. Be-cause the ERP adequately plans for the removal of impediments to evacuation, Eddleman proposed Contentions 57-C-4, 57-C-5, Revised Contentions 117 and 117-A and proposed Contention 118

lack the requisite basis. Accordingly, they should be rejected by the Board.

TRANSPORTATION-GENERAL PUBLIC Revised proposed Contention 57-C-14 characterizes the ERP as " inadequate", becuase of its allegedly insufficient treat-ment of evacuation route capacities, and because it allegedly fails to establish in advance pickup points for people without transportation, fails to assure adequate transportation can get to pick up points "in time," and fails to identify in advance persons without transportation, to advise them where to go for pickup.

Because the capacities of the evacuation routes were first addressed in the Evacuation Time Estimates -- served on all parties on December 29, 1983 -- the proposed contention is un-timely to the extent it challenges the evacuation route capacities. In any event, Mr. Eddleman has not specified his concern about the route capacities, nor has he provided any sort of basis for his concern, whatever it may be. The conten-tion is therefore objectionable on a number of grounds.

Similarly, Mr. Eddleman has not indicated why it is neces-sary to identify pick up points in advance. Nor has he specified a basis for requiring the pre-identification of per-sons without transportation -- except to advise those persons of pre-identified pickup points. Certainly he has not

l I

indicated why it is not sufficient to provide such details to the public as part of the informational message broadcast at the time an evacuation is ordered, as is presently planned. <

see ERP, Annex C, Section C.2.d; Annex D. Accordingly, in the absence of any specific criticisms of present plans, and in the absence of any specified rationale for his proposal require-a ment, this portion of Mr. Eddleman's contention must be re-jected as lacking in basis and specificity.

To the extent the proposed contention could be read to seek the pre-identification of persons without transportation 1

to facilitate advance resource planning for an evacuation, the necessary data has already been compiled. In the preparation

of the Evacuation Time Estimate, census data was used to esti-mate the number of non-auto-owning households in each of the <

four counties. Mr. Eddleman has not even referenced this data; !

certainly he has not indicated any insufficiencies in its use for planning purposes.

Finally, that portion of Mr. Eddleman's proposed conten-tion expressing concern about the adequacy of transportation resources to get to pickup points "in time" constitutes an at-tack on the Commission's emergency planning regulations. There .;

simply is no particular time frame within which evacuation must be completed. See The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 N.R.C. 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). If evacuation could not be completed before the

I a

release of significant radiation, sheltering would be the pro-tactive action of choice. In any event, Mr. Eddleman has pro-l vided no substantive basis to challenge the availability of re-sources for the evacuation of the transportation-dependent

] !

population. See, e.g., ERP Part 1,Section IV.E.4.a (commer-cial buses);Section III.C.3.b(1) (National Guard);Section III.G.l.b (Division of Forest Resources);Section III.H.6 ;

I' I

i (Wildlife Resources Commission);Section III.J.l.d (Division of Highways);Section III, Figure 4 (re: "Transporation"); Section i

IV.E.4.f (listing State organizations which will provide sup-I porting transportation). See also ERP Part 5,Section IV.E.8.d (indicating use of school buses). In sum, because proposed i

I

Contention 57-C-14 constitutes a challenge to the Commission's j

] emergency planning regulations, and because it is lacking in t J

l basis and specificity, the proposed contention must be re-i

, jected.

I Like proposed Contention 57-C-14, new proposed contention i

237 challenges the availability of resources for the evacuation l of the persons without transportation. In addition, proposed Contention 237 also questions whether vehicles could reach pick

)

up points without conflicting with the flow of evacuation traf-

fic, and required for evacuation of this population.

] However, Mr. Eddleman has not even attempted to address

the extensive information on the availability of resources for 1

the evacuation of persons without transportation. See, e.g.,

s

ERP Part 1, Sections IV.E.4.a, III.C 3.b(1), III.G l.b, III.H.6, III.J.l.d, IV.E.4.f, Figure 4 (re: Transportation" ) .

See also ERP Part 2,Section III.L.7; Part 3,Section III.L.6; Part 4,Section III.M.7; Part 5,Section III.T.S. Because Mr.

Eddleman has failed to address the available relevant documen-tation, his proposed contention lacks the specificity required of a litigable contention. Moreover, mere curiosity or skep-ticism alone do not supply a sufficient basis for a contention.

Mr. Eddleman's concerns about the ability of vehicles to travel to pickup points without being caught in evacuation traffic similarly lack basis and specificity. In any event, the concerns are of no moment. In an evacuation, roads will be operated with normal two-way traffic patterns, so that one lane will be essentially open at all times for emergency vehicles (such as buses traveling to pickup points). See Evacuation Time Estimate, Section 2.2. Thus, this part of the proposed contention must also be rejected as lacking the requisite bases with specificity.

Finally, contrary to the assertion of the contention, the time required to evacuate the transportation-dependent popula-i tion is explicitly treated in the Evaluation Time Estimate. -

See, e.g., Section 3.1.2. Therefore, this portion of the con-tention, too, is baseless, and must be rejected. Further, be-I cause this portion of the contation is premised on the Evacua-f tion Time Estimate (which has been available since December 29, l

l 4 !

--a

1983), the proposed contention must also be rejected for lack of timeliness.

Accordingly, Applicants oppose the admission of proposed Contention 237 in its entirety.

TRANSPORTATION-SPECIAL POPULATIONS i

Deferred proposed Contention 139 generally charges that evacuation planning for the Harris plant fails to adequately provide for "the transient population engaged in recreational activities" in the area near the plant. Particularly, proposed Contention 139 alleges that evacuation planning is inadequate to remove the peak transient population, due to a laundry list of alleged deficiencies including "unmonitored releases" and

" inadequate evacuation planning, personnel and equipment."

These generalized assertions -- originally formulated without reference to the emergency plans and never amended -- clearly lack the specificity required of a litigable contention. Nor has Mr. Eddleman supplied any bases for his charges. Thus, the proposed contention must be rejected on those grounda alone.

Further, to the extent that resources are alleged to be insufficient to evacuate the transient population "in time,"

the proposed contention effectively constitutes an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations, by its implicit assumption that evacuation must be accomplished within some particular (albeit unspecified) time frame. To the

contrary, as the Appeal Board has recognized, "the Commission's emergency planning regulations do not specify the time within which the plume EPZ must be evacuated in the event of a nuclear emergency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV, requires only that applicants provide 'an analysis of the time required to evacuate . . .'* * *." The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 N.R.C. 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Accordingly, this aspect of the proposed conten-tion is also objectionable as a challenge to the regulations.

Mr. Eddleman also asserts that "only [the] population within 5 miles of SHNPP is considered" in planning. Again, the contention is framed without reference to any of the relevant sections of the ERP, and is baseless. Annex G to the ERP "es-tablishes the organizational responsibilities and procedures for emergency warning and notification of boaters on Jordan Lake and recreation areas around the lake within a 10-mile radius of the Shearon Harris Plant." ERP, Annex G,Section I (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, these allegations must also be rejected.

Finally, proposed Contention 139 alleges that the recreating population within 20 miles of the Harris plant -

should be considered in evacuation planning since, it is as-sorted, " Class 9" accidents "have their effects reach well be-yond ten miles of the plant." This part of the proposed con-tantion must be rejected as a clear challenge to the Commission's emergency planning regulations defining the plume EPZ. See 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c)(2). Thus, for all the above stated reasons, proposed Contention 139 must be rejected in its entirety.

I Deferred proposed Contention 140 broadly asserts that the emergency plans of Applicants, the State and local governments,

]

{ and FEMA are inadequate because they do not provide for the 1

i " prompt' and safe" evacuation of the recreating populations de-l scribed in proposed Contention 139. Applicants object to that

portion of the contention which e.eals with FEMA, on the grounds '

i

]

that it constitutes a challenge to the Commission's emergency l l

j planning regulations, which recognize that responsibility for the evacuation of the public rests primarily with state and l '

local authorities. See 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(lo) and J

NUREG-0654, criterion J.9. Moreover, to the extent the pro-posed contention relates to Applicants' on-site plan, the con-l tention is untimely in the extreme; that plan was served on the 1

parties in March, 1983, and any proposed contentions based 4

, thereon were due within thirty days.

Final'ly, even as the proposed contention relates to the

emergancy plans of the State and local governments, it in fa- .-

i tally lacking in specificity and basis. Mr. Eddleman's i

broad-brush assertions were. originally framed in the absence of the emergency plans; but the allegations have never been 3 amended to'specify the particular alleged inadequacies with f

1

. . , , . ~ . _ - . . _ _ - - - . - . . _ . . , _ . - _ _ _ . ___

i 1

which Mr. Eddleman is concerned. Accordingly, they are so lacking in clarity and specificity that they utterly fail to put the other parties on notice of the issues for litigation, and must therefore be rejected.

Deferred proposed Contention 88, while cast in terms of cost-benefit analysis, is apparently intended as a substantive challenge to the feasibility of evacuation of the Harris Reser-voir in the event of an accident. However, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman has concerns about " establishing adequate trans-port, warning, medical treatment and other emergency response i facilities, means, plans and the hiring of trained personnel to carry them out," he has simply failed to specify the concerns here. He initially drafted the proposed contention without the l emergency plans; however, he has failed to further specify it in any way although all the relevant emergency plans are now available. Nor has he ever provided any basis to support his sweeping allegations. The proposed contention should be re-jected on these grounds alone.

Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman has concerns I

~

about warning evacuation transportation, and the time required fo* evacuation of Harris Reservoir, his propesud contention is -

late. Both the Harris site emergency plan (served on the par-ties on March 29, 1983) and the Evacuation Time Estimate (served on the parties on December 29,'1983) included informa-tion on these subjects. Thus, the proposed contention should be rejected as untimely.

l l

Finally, to the extent the proposed contention indicates that evacuation of a particular area "would be necessary" with-in a specified time, the contention constitutes a challenge to the regulations. There simply is no particular time frame within which evacuation must be completed. See The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 N.R.C. 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). For all these reasons, Applicants oppose the admission of proposed Contention 88.

New proposed Contentions 235 and 236(A) and (B) largely overlap, and generally challenge the provisions of the ERP for the evacuation of the mobility-impaired. The thrust of pro-posed Contentions 235 and 236(A) is that the ERP allegedly fails to designate transportation resources for the evacuation of the home-bound individuals, nursing home residents, hospital patients, prisoners and the handicapped. To the contrary, non-ambulatory persons (including nursing home residents and hospi-tal patients, as well as the home-bound) would be evacuated via ambulance by the county rescue squads or ambulance services.

See, e.g., ERP Par: 1, 6 IV.E.4.b. And Mr. Eddleman has failed to identify any " prison populationc" tc be evacuated; indeed, he cannot -- there are no pr. sons within the plume EPZ. F1- -

nally, to the extent the handicapped have access to private ve-hicles, they would evacuata as members of the general public.

Those who are non-ambulatory would be evacuated as "home-bound" persons (described above), while those who are ambulatory would be evacuated using vehicles such as school buses (see e.g., ERP Part 5, 5 IV.E.8.d.) and commercial buses (see ERP Part 1, 5 IV.E.4.a.). Thus, Mr. Eddleman's complaints that the ERP fails to identify transportation resources for specified popu-lations are baseless.

Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman suggests that l there are insufficient transportation resources for the evacua- l tion of the identified populations, Applicants press their ob-jection to the proposed contentions' lack of specificity and bases. Mr. Eddleman has completely failed to consult the

! available information in the formulation of his proposed con-tentions. Ignoring the wealth of specific demographic data

) available in the Evacuation Time Estimate and in the plans, Mr.

Eddleman has failed to even hazard an estimate of either the number of ambulatory individuals who would need transportation I

i assistance in an emergency or the number of vehicles available l to provide such transportation. See, a.q., ETE $ 3.1.2 (iden-tifying number of households in EPZ not owning a car); Table

i

! 3-5 (providing estimate censuses for all hospitals, nursing l

i I homes and ' family care facilities, broken into ambulatory /non- i ambalatory). Given the documentation available to Mr. Eddleman -

1 to cr.st his contentions, his allegations here can only be cen-sidered rank speculation.

] Finally, while it is not clear what Mr. Eddleman means by "self transport capacity" in proposed Contention 236, if Mr.

Eddleman is asserting that each subject facility must have the transportation resources to evacuate its own residents or pa-tients, Mr. Eddleman has provided no basis whatsoever for his proposal; certainly he has offered no basis for distinguishing this case from other cases where evacuation plans rely upon the use of transportation resources which are not owned by the fa-cilities being evacuated. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1648-49 (1981). Clearly there is no regulatory j bases for Mr. Eddleman's proposed "self transport capability" requirement, whatever it is.

i For these reasons, Applicants oppose the admission of pro- j posed Contentions 235 and 236(A) and (B), in their entirety. ;

New proposed Contention 204 is virtually incomprehensible. ;

The contention asserts that the "[p]lan, page 13, points out l the lack of radiation protection on National Guard helicopters.

No other method of radiation protected evacuation for victims !

F or patients who need life-support is provided . . ." (emphasis t l

supplied). Applicants cppose the admission of this contention on sevaral grounds l First, the cited basis does not support the proposed con- -

4 tentAon. The referen7ad pt.ge of the ERP indicates that the Na-tional Guard helicopters lack " life-support equipment," not l " radiation protection" as the proposed contention indicates.

Indeed, the referenced page of the ERP is silent on the subject l

4 of the protection factor afforded by the National Guard heli-copters. The contention must therefore be rejected for lack of basis.

In addition, Mr. Eddleman has completely failed to supply

any factual basis whatsoever for the fundamental premise of his proposed contention -- that radiation-shielded transportation for non-ambulatory persons is necessary. Indeed, the ERP indi-

! cates that, to the contrary, sheltering would be the protective action of choice unless evacuation could be " completed prior to significant release and arrival of radioactive material in the affected area." See ERP Part 1, 5 IV.A.4.c. Again, then, the proposed contention lacks basis.

Further, Mr. Eddleman seems to suggest that there are no helicopters available for evacuation which carry life-support equipment. To the contrary, the ERP expressly recognizes the j availability of the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic

! (MAST) program to assist in transporting non-ambulatory persons i

to and from nedical facilition. LRP Parts 3-5, I V.B.6.

Finally, there is no regulatory basis for the impositien

of a requiYement for the provisior, for evacuntton of radiation-shinidad helicopters supplied w3 th life-aupport equipment. Ac- -

cordingly, for all the above-stated reasens, proposed Conten-tion 204 must be rejected.

New proposed contention 230 challenges the adequacy of

" transportation resources to evacuate all schools in the EP3."

I 71

_-_--_-J

The proposed contention is several months late, without the requisite showing of " good cause." Although the proposed contention references the ERP, the Evacuation Time Estimate filed with the NRC staff -- and served on the Board and parties here -- on December 29, 1983, expressly noted that, in an emer-gency, all school children would be evacuated directly from their schools in school buses. See Evacuation Time Estimate, at 6-4 to 6-5. The Evacuation Time Estimate even included a list of the schools in the EPZ, with a breakdown -- by individ-ual school -- of the number of students and staff, and identi-fied the resources required to evacuate the schools. Evacua-tion Time Estimate Table 4-4; $ 8.2. Thus, under the Board's standing rule requiring the filing of new contentions no later than thirty days after receipt of the document on which they are based, proposed Contention 230 was required to be filed no later than the end of January, 1984. See LBP-82-119A, supra, 1G N.R.C. at 2073 (1982). Accordingly, the proposed contentien must be rejected as ur. timely.

Moreover, ignoring the wealth of specific data available in the Evacuation Time Estimate (as well as the ERP), Mr.

Eddleman has failed to even hazard an estimato of the number ef -

school students he asserts would need bus transportation in an emergency, the number of school buses that would be needed to evacuate school students in an emergency, or the number of school buses available to evacuate school students. See e.g.,

Evacuation Time Estimate. 5 6.2.5 (discussing availability of

school buses); $ 5.1 (describing the evacuation routes); Figure 3-4 (showing location of schools); Table 4-4 (listing all schools in EPZ, with numbers of students and staff per school).

Indeed, Mr. Eddleman has not even cited the Evacuation Time Es-timate's determination that approximately 100 school buses will be needed to evacuate the schools in the EPZ; certainly he has provided no basis whatsoever to question that determination.

See Evacuation Time Estimate, 9 8.2. Thus, given the documen-tation available to Mr. Eddleman to frame his contention, the allegations here amount to bold speculation. Accordingly, the contention must also be rejected as lacking in basis and spe-cificity.

Finally, proposed Contention 230 effectively constitutes an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations, by its apparent assumption that some (unspecified) number of school huses must be "available" to evacuate school students within so.no porticular tunspecified) time trame. But the Coin-mission's regulations do not require that evacuation be com-ploted within any particular period of time. The regulations require only that a license applicant provide "an analysis of -

the time required to evacuate. . .". See The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 N.R.C. 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Thus, Mr. Eddleman might conceivably have proposed a contention alleging, e.g., that planning does not provide for the most efficient use of already available transportation resources, or that the Evacuation Time Estimate assumed the availability of more resources than would actually be available in an emergency. But the implication of proposed Contention 230 that some number of school buses must be available within some distance of the plant to ensure timely evacuation plainly cannot be sustained.

l Accordingly, proposed contention 230 must be rejected on the grounds that it is late-filed, lacking in the requisite basis and specificity, and an attack on the Commission's emer-gency planning regulations.

PERSONNEL MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION New proposed contentions 240 and 241 challenge the adequa-cy of the ERP's provisions for radiation monitoring and decontamination of members of the general public. In Conten-tion 240, Mr. Eddleman acknowledges that local governments ere responsible for shelter monitoring, but he asserts that the lo-cations for evacuee monitoring and decontamination are not specified in the ERP. To the contrary, the ERP indicates that radiological nionitoring and any necessary decontamination of members of the public would be performed at each county's des-ignated shelters, which are specifically ideatified in the ERP.

See ERP, Part 2, Figure 6; Part 3, Figure 5; Part 4, Figure 6; Part 5, Figure 7.

Mr. Eddleman further chargos that the counties' "capabili- ,

ties for decontamination have not been' delineated." But each '

of the four counties has designated personnel responsible for ,

performing any necesssry decontaminacion, and those personnel are trained in radiation protection and radiological moni-toring. ERP, Part 2, Sections IV.E.12, VII.C, Figure 6; Part 3, Sections IV.E.12, VII.C, Figure 5; Part 4, Sections IV.E.12, VII.C, Figure 6; Part 5, Sections IV.E.12; VII.C, Figure 7.

~

The North Carolina Radiation Prote'etion Section will provide additional assistance and specially equipped teams if signifi-cant problems are identified at any shelters. ERP, Part 1, Sections IV.G.6 and 7; Parts 2-5,Section IV.E.12. And when !

decontamination is to be conducted, a representative from the Shearon Harris Plant Environmental Padiation Control Unit or I

from SERT will be dispatched to the scene to supervise the decentamination and waste disposal activities, if possible.

Sea ERP, Parts 2-5, Sections IV.F.6 and 7. ,

Finally, Mr. Eddleman expresses concern over the " avail- '

ability of materials for decontamination." However, Mr.

Eddleman h.2s coupletely failed to specify what special materi-als he bellases to be necessary for decontamination, beyond the ,

soap and water available at the identified shelters. Accord-I' ingly, because Mr. Ed31eman has failed to address the relevant substantive provisions of the ERP, and has failed to provide the requisite basis with specificity for his contention, proposed Contention 240 aust be rejected.

u________ ! '- '

Proposed Contention 241 asserts that the use of schools as decontamination sites is " entirely inappropriate" because, it is alleged, the schools will be left contaminated, "where chil-dren susceptible to radiation . . . will be later." However, despite the ERP's extensive discussion of radiological moni- <

toring and decontamination (outlined above), Mr. Eddleman fails I

to provide any basis whatsoever for his apparent assumption that schools would be left contaminated. In particular, he has l not even referenced -- and he certainly has not provided any basis to question -- the monitoring agencies' expressed intent to contain the wastes resulting from the decontamination pro-cess. See, e.g., ERP Part 1,Section IV.G.6. Proposed Conten-tion 241 therefore lacks the basis and specificity required of a litigable contention, and thus also should be rejected.

RE-ENTRY / RECOVERY Deferred proposed Contentions 100 and 1000 and new pro-posed Contention 210 challenge the provisions for post-accident recovery and re-entry to the evacuated area.

Propcsed Contentions 100 and 1* JOB assert that the emergon-cy plans are deficient in that they do not provide for the decontamination of farmlands, homes and food after " Class 9" and " Class 10" accidents, respectively. However, Mr. Eddleman references no authority which would require planning for decontamination of farmlands and homes, and Applicants know of none. Rather, in promulgating the new emergency planning reg-ulations, the Commission expressly rejected requiring such pro-visions, reasoning that "public health and safety should take clear precedence over actions to protect property. Measures to protect property can be taken on an ad hoc basis as resources become available after the accident." 45 Fed. Reg. 55402,

55407 (August 19, 1980). Applicants, therefore, oppose the ad-mission of proposed Contentions 100 and 100B as challenges to the Commission's regulations, to the extent that those conten-tions assert that planning for the decontamination of farmlands 4

and homes is required.

Further, Mr. Eddleman's generalized criticism of emergency planning for an alleged failure to provide for the decontamination of food clearly lacks the specificity required of a litigable contention. Mr. Eddleman has failed to acknowl-edge the ERP's detailed provisions for protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway. ERP, Part 1, 6 IV.F. Nor has he recognized the provisions for " analysis of . . . samples of I

foodstuffs, foliage, and water collected within the EPZ" to continue throughout "[rjecovery, re-entry, and post-accident operations," if necessary. ERP, Part 1, $ IV.H. Thus, Mr. -

Eddleman's allegations with respect to protection of food sup-i plies are also objectionable as lacking in basis and specif-icity.

Applicants further oppose proposed Contentions 100 and 100B -- as well as proposed Contention 210 (which broadly al-leges a failure to establish adequate decontamination or recov-ery procedures) -- on the ground that those contentions seek to require a detailed level of planning beyond that envisioned by the Commission's emergency planning regulations.

The standard for re-entry and recovery is unlike the other planning criteria of 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47 and NUREG-0654, which identify the need for specific information about implementing protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency.

In contrast, only " general plans and procedures" need be developed for re-entry and recovery. See 10 C.F.R.

$ 50.47(b)(13); NUREC-0654, Criterion M.1; Duke Power Co. (Ca-tawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Order (Concerning Mis-cellaneous Matters), August 17, 1983, attached transcript at 1086-87 (rejecting proposed contention as seeking level of de-4 tail not required in plans for recovery and re-entry). This is because the focus of NRC's emergency planning requirements is on the immediate hazard posed by a serious nuclear power plant accident. Advance planning for protective actions such as sheltering and evacuation is needed because there may be insuf- .

ficient time, once the accident has occurred, to effectively respond in a manner that best protects the public's health and safety. After the fact, these considerations do not exist.

There is ample time to plan for the recovery. Moreover, as a l

l practical matter, recovery plans "must -- and should -- be ad hoc." Southern California Edison Co. (San dnofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 N.R.C. 1163, 1207 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346 (1983). Thus, even the NUREG-0654 planning standard evaluation criteria for re-entry and recovery focus on the need to ensure conditions are appropriate to relax protective measures and, hence, permit re-entry. See NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion M.1. Recovery is secondary when the issue is emergency preparedness. According-ly, proposed Contentions 100, 100B and 210 must be rejected as a challenge to the Commission's regulations.

MEDICAL CARE The general thrust of deferred proposed Contention 56 and revised proposed Contentions 57-C-7, 57-C-8, and 63 is a chal-lenge to the adequacy of provisions for medical care for "radi-ation victims." Litigation of these contentions is precluded under Commission case law interpreting 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(12).

In Southern California Edison Co., (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528 (1983), the Commission expressly held that 10 C.F.R.

$ 50.47(b)(12) does not require special medical arrangements or extensive advance planning for injuries to members of the gen-eral public in the event of a nuclear plant accident:

l l

I l

l l

l With respect to-individuals who become in-I jured and are also contaminated, the ar-l rangements that are currently required for j on-site personnel and emergency workers i provide emergency capabilities which should j be adequate for treatment of members of the

! general public. Therefore, no additional i' medical facilities or capabilities are re- '

quired for the general public. However, I facilities with which prior arrangements are made or which have the capability to

[ treat contaminated injured individuals should be identified. With respect to

, individuals who may be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, treatment requires a lesser degree of advance planning and can be arranged for on an as-needed basis dur-

ing an emergency. Emergency plans should, l however, identify those local or regional 1 medical facilities which have the capabili-ties to provide appropriate medical treat-ment for radiation exposure. No contractu-i al agreements are necessary and no additional hospitals or other facilities i

need be constructed.

Id. at 536-37 (footnote omitted). In its Memorandum and order implementing the Commission's decision, the San onofre licens-4 l ing board interpreted the Commission's ruling:

i j [A}s to members of the off-site public who i may suffer radiation injuries, a licensing -

board's proper inquiry is quite narrow --

whether existing medical facilities have i been identified. That identification ,

l itself is to be deemed adequate to satisfy

j. the rule as a matter of law, whether the j existing facilities are many or few, sub-J ject only to the possibility of an excep- .

tion under 10 C.F.R. $ 2.758. Boards are not to go behind the list of existing fa- '

cilities to determine whether those facili--

ties are adequate (or inadequate) to cope

, with various accident scenarios in the

} site-specific setting.

r

-. -- _ _w -.

Southern California Edison Co., (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-47, 18 N.R.C. 228, 232 (1983).

As proposed Contention 57-C-8 recognizes, the ERP clearly identifies the facilities that will support the plant and sur-rounding communities in the event of a radiological emergency.

ERP, Part 1, S V.B; Parts 2-5, S V.B. Therefore, proposed Con-tentions 56, 57-C-7, 57-C-8, and 63 -- which contemplate provi-sions beyond those mandated by the Commission's decision in San onofre -- must be rejected as challenges to the Commission's regulations.

TRAINING Proposed Eddleman Contentions 212 and 243 generally raise the issue of the adequacy of the training provided to emergency response planners and workers. Proposed Contention 212 asserts that, due to the " sloppiness" of the ERP and the deficiencies asserted in other proposed Eddleman contentions, the emergency planners have not been properly trained. The broad-brush con-tention, which sets forth no specific deficiencies in the Plan, does not address the details set forth in the Plan, of the training to be provided to emergency planners. See Part 1 at 84-86, and i VII.C and D of Parts 2-5. Absent such specifics, proposed Contention 212 should be rejected as lacking basis with the requisite specificity.

t--__-------- - - - - _ - _ _ _ - _- - - - - -- -

Similarly, proposed Contention 243 does not attack the sufficiency of the training to be provided to emergency re-sponse workers, see id., but merely asserts that such training has not yet been provided. However, at this point in time, there is no req'uirement that such training be complete. See Applicants' Response to proposed CHANGE Contentions 4 and 30 (April 23, 1984 at 14, 52). This contention should therefore be rejected as lacking any basis in law.

EXERCISE Revised proposed Contention 81 and new proposed Contention 208 both mount challenges to the provisions for the exercise of the ERP. In Contention 81, Mr. Eddleman notes that the ERP "has not been tested," and asserts that the North Carolina De-partment of Crime Control and Public Safety "has stated that it learns from each plan test and that a test of the plan should be made to show that it is workable." Indeed, the ERP provides for periodic drills and exercises to maintain emergency pre-paredness, in accordance with NRC and FEMA regulations and guidance. ERP Part 1, Sections VII.B., C and D. Mr. Eddleman has pointed to no deficiencies in these provisions. Thus, there is no dispute that the plan will be exercised; it is the timing of the exercise which Mr. Eddleman apparently contests.

As Mr. Eddleman concedes, 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(a)(2) provides that emergency preparedness exercises are not required for a nuclear power plant operating licen=c decision. Rather, the exercises "are part of the pre-operational inspection and thus (are] required prior to operation above 5% of rated power, but not for a Licensing Board, Appeal Board, or Commission licens-ing decision." 47 Fed. Reg. 30232 (July 13, 1982). See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346, 380 (1983);

Louisiana Power and Licht Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 N.R.C. 1076, 1107-08 (1983). In-deed, even the purported basis for Mr. Eddleman's contention does not specify when the ERP should be exercised. According-ly, proposed Contention 81 must be rejected both as lacking basis and as a challenge to the Commission's emergency planning regulations.

The seeming thrust of proposed Contention 208 is that an exercise testing the public's ability to evacuate "under ad-verse weather e.g., snow, ice, fog, tornados or severe wind conditions or (between 1 a.m. and 6 p.m.]" should be required.

But, to the extent the contention would require such an exer-cise as a precondition to plant operation up to 5% power, the contention must be rejected as a challenge to the Commission's -

regulations. See San Onofre, ALAB-717, supra. Similarly, 6 IV.F.1 of Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 provides that full-scale exercises are to test as much of the emergency plans "as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public i

l

participation" (emphasis supplied). Thus, to the extent that proposed Contention 208 contemplates a " practice evacuation" of the public under the specified conditions, the contention con-stitutes yet another impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations. See Waterford, ALAB-732, supra. Moreover, Mr.

Eddleman has provided no basis to support the asserted need to demonstrate an ability to evacuate under such conditions. In-deed, in the face of such extreme adverse weather conditions, sheltering would be the protective action of choice. See, e.g., ERP Part 1, Fig. 11 (p.41). Proposed Contention 208 must therefore be rejected as lacking in basis, and as an attack on the Commission's emerge.My planning regulations.

PUBLIC INFORMATION/ EDUCATION New proposed Contention 227 asserts that the emergency public information brochure is inadequate because it is "miss-ing" from the ERP, and because it does not contain certain information to be included in a brochure under NUREG-0654 and the Commission's regulations. Its companion contention, new proposed Contention 228 further asserts that Applicants "cannot be deemed to have met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(7)" until it is demonstrated that the information described in proposed Contention 227 "will be or is in fact made available to the public on a periodic basis."

n The emergency public information brochure is under devel-opment,17/ and thus has not yet been included in the ERP. How-ever, while Mr. Eddleman does not refer to it, the ERP does in-clude a description of the scope of the information to be included in the brochure to conform to the Commission's regula-tions and guidance. Moreover, contrary to the implication of the contention, the ERP expressly provides for the annual dissemination of the brochure, in accordance with NUREG-0654, Criterion G.I. ERP Part 1, 9 IV.D.2.

In such circumstances, where a commitment has been made that the requirements of NUREG-0654 will be met, overseeing the implementation of details (such as completion of the brochure) can properly be left to the Staff and need not be litigated in an adjudicatory hearing. See Licensing Board Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Wells Eddleman's Proposed Contentions Concern-ing Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)...) at 6, 11-13 (Oct. 6, 1983). Proposed Contentions 227 and 228 should there-fore be rejected.

Mr. Eddleman's third contention on the emergency public information brochure, new proposed contention 229, asserts that the ERP " violates" 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(1) and (2) because it -

provides no means to verify the brochure "as having been 17/ Applicants anticipate that the brochure will be available by July 1, 1984.

successful in its task of informing the public." Mr. Eddleman specifically recommends "a tearoff mail-in (prepaid postage) card on the brochure with checkoffs for ' received and under-stood' or 'not understood.'"

There is absolutely no regulatory basis for the imposition on State and local governments of the requirement Mr. Eddleman here advocates. Certainly 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(a)(1) and (2) im-pose no such requirement. Indeed, the only regulatory guidance even remotely related to Mr. Eddleman's proposed requirement expressly charges FEMA (in cooperation with the licensee and/or state and local government) with the responsibility to:

. . .take a statistical sample of the resi-dents of all areas within about ten miles to assess the public's ability to hear the alerting signal and their awareness of the meaning of the prompt notification message as well as the availability of information on what to do in an emergency.

NUREG-0654, at 3-3 to 3-4 (emphasis supplied). See also FEMA-43, " Standard Guide For The Evacuation of Alert and Noti-fication Systems For Nucle'ar Power Plants" (September 1983), at N-4 to N-6. Thus, proposed Contention 229 must be rejected.

INGESTION EPZ New proposed Contention 206 argues that the ERP is defi-cient because it does not expressly provide for "the sheltering and placing on stored feed" of dairy cattle within 2 miles of the plant in a site area emergency, and within 10 miles of the plant in a general emergency. Although Mr. Eddleman indicates that NUREG-0654 so provides, the pages cited in the contention do not provide for the " sheltering" of dairy cattle under any circumstances. Thus, Mr. Eddleman has offered no basis whatso-ever to support the " sheltering" of dairy cattle.

Moreover, contrary to the implication of the proposed con-tention, the ERP does provide for the placement of cattle on stored feed. ERP Part 1, 5 IV.F.5.b. Further, with respect to ;

the timing of such action, the ERP places express reliance on the " Recommendations for State and Local Agencies" of the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Adminis-tration regarding radioactive contamination of human food and animal feed (as published in the October 22, 198.7 Federal Reg-inter), which supersede the guidance on which Mr. Eddleman relies. ERP Part 1, 5 IV.E.2.b; Parts 2-5, 5 IV.E.4. These new recommendations provide for the removal of lactating dairy cows from pasturage and the substitution of stored feed at the level of the preventive PAG (Protective Action Guide).

Thus, Mr. Eddleman has failed to even refer to the rele-vant secti*ons of the ERP. Indeed, there is no indication that he has even reviewed those sections. Certainly, he has not

pointed to any deficiencies in the recent federal guidance on which the State and local governments here rely. Accordingly, his proposed contention 206 must be rejected as lacking in basis and specificity.

l A_________________________..___ i

STAGE OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT Revised proposed Contention 57-C-18 reflects the provision in the ERP that a Memorandum of Understanding between CP&L and the State will be included in a future revision of the ERP.

The thrust o5 the proposed contention is largely an attack on the candor and competence "of CP&L and/or the State of NC."

However, Mr. Eddleman provides no basis whatsoever for his al-legations, beyond the mere absence of the Memorandum of Under-standing. And the mere absence of such a memorandum in a draft emergency plan for a non-operating plant does not, by any means, call into question the characters of the State and CP&L.

Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding will simply re-flect information already included in the Harris on-sito and off-site emergency plans, confirming the obligations of the re-spective parties under the applicable state and federal laws.

And Mr. Eddleman has presumably embodied all his concerns with respect to the on-site plan and the ERP in other already sub-mitted contentions. Certainly he has provided no further spe-cificity here. This contention must therefore be rejected both as argumentation, which is not appropriate for litigation, and as lacking the specificity and basis required by the Commis-

sion's regulations.

Finally, the Memorandum of Understanding between Appli-cants and the State is not even required under the NRC's emer-gency planning regulations or NUREG-0654 guidance. See

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14. N.R.C. 1211, 1602-03 (1981) (nei-ther the Commission's regulations nor NUREG-0654 mandates let-ter of agreement between licensee and county). Aqcordingly, to the extent it seeks to compel the preparation of the subject Memorandum of Understanding, proposed Contention 57-C-18 also implicitly attacks the Commission's emergency planning regula-tions, and should be rejected on that basis alone.

New proposed Contention 211 is similar to proposed Conten-tion 57-C-18, in that both criticize the ERP because it does not include identified summary-type materials. Specifically, proposed Contention 211 asserts that the ERP fails to comply with NUREG-0654 Criteria J.10.a and J.10.b, which -- respec-tively -- provide for (a) "[m]aps showing evacuation routes, evacuation areas, preselected radiological sampling and moni-toring points, relocation centers in host areas, and shelter areas," and (b) "[m]aps showing population distribution around the nuclear facility . . . by evacuation areas. . . ". Contrary to Mr. Eddleman's assertion, Criterion J.10.a does not require maps of th*e ingestion pathway emergency planning zone; rather, that criterion is -- on its face -- limited to the plume expo- -

sure pathway. Accordingly, that portion of proposed contention 211 dealing with the ingestion pathway should be rejected, be-cause it is not supported by the cited basis.

k Mr. Eddleman is correct that the operations Map is not presently included in Annex I to the ERP. The map is currently ,

i under development and is expected to be completed by September l 1984. However, all the information which will be included in f the map (shelter locations, monitoring points, population i densities, evacuation routes, etc.) is currently available in !

other documents, such as the Evacuation Time Estimates and the t

ERP itself. The map itself will merely combine and sum 9arize i this information. In such circumstances, where a commitment has been made that the provisions of tiUREG-0654 will be met, overseeing the implementation of details (such as completion of the maps) can properly be left to the Staff and need not be litigated in an adjudicatory hearing. See Licensing Board Mem-orandum and order (Ruling on Wells Eddleman's Proposed Conten-tions Concerning Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)...) at 6, 11-13 (Oct. 6, 1983). Accordingly, proposed Contention 211 should be rejected in its entirety.

The thrust of revised proposed contention _213-A is that the ERP contains " insufficient information about how it will be implemente'd," and that implementing procedures are necessary.

However, Mr. Eddleman has failed to indicate in any way what *'

information about implementation he would include in the ERP; !

nor has he indicated why that information (whatever it is) should be included in the plan. The contention is so general and lacking in clarity and precision that it utterly fails to l

i l

adequately put the parties on notice of the issues to be liti- ,

t I gated. The contention is thus objectionable on the ground that it is wholly lacking in specificity and basis required by the Commission's regulations.

Moreove'r, the Commission's emergency planning regulations do not require that emergency plan implementing procedures be submitted for consideration in licensing hearings in order for 1

the Commission to make its " reasonable assurance" determina-tion. The Appeal Board recently held, in a similar case involving an intervenor's complaint that the procedures had not been made a part of the hearing record

[T]he Commission never intended the imple-menting procedures to be required for the

" reasonable assurance" finding and thus to !

be prepared and subject to scrutiny during the hearing . . . [T]he Commission did not want licensing hearings to become bogged down with litigation about such details.

Instead, the focus should be on whether the '

applicant's emergency plan (including the off-site plans) itself satisfies the 16 mote broadly drafted standards of 10 C.F.R.

I 50.47(b).

Louisiana Power and_Li_qht_Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 H.R.C. 1076, 1107 (1983). Thus, while the NRC Staff and FEMA may concern themselves with the need for detailed implementing procedures to supplement the ERP, litigation of the level of detail sought by Mr. Eddleman is barred, and his proposed Contention 213-A must be rejected 1

I on the further ground that it constitutes a challenge to the Commission's regulations.

-91=

1 l

l The seeming thrust of new proposed Contention 200 is that the ERP cannot be implemented "(wjithout participating organi-zations." This truism is not disputed. However, to support I

his implication that " participating organizations" might not support the plan, Mr. Eddleman notes only the absence of signa-cures to the ERP. But, as Mr. Eddleman concedes, the ERP is presently only a " draft." Thus, the absence of signatures to the plan is no indication of any lack of " assurance it will be implemented." Indeed, the " participating organizations" have affirmatively evidenced their intent to cooperate in emergency preparedness for the Harris Plant by the signatures of the four i County Departments of Emergency Management to letters of agree-I ment in the Harris site emergency plan. See Shearon Harris Nu-clear Power Plant, Unit 1, Plant Operating Manual, Volume 1, Part 2 (Rev. 2, 2/84), Annex A. Accordingly, the proposed con-tention must be rejected for lack of basis.

PpAN_MAINTEUAMCE Proposed Contention 99 asserts that the emergency plans are deficiant in that they do not assure that the plans will be kept up to date with respect to certain categories of informa-tion. This contention, filed in 1982, does not address the emergency response plans and now is untimely with respect to !

the on-site plan and the Evacuation Time Estimates.18/ With 18/ The ETE includes much of the additional information sought.

respect to the ERP, the contention fails to address the stated provisions for annual review, update and certification of the plan as current.19/ See ERP Part 1,Section VII.F (pp. 85-86);

Parts 2-5,Section VII.D. Consequently, the contention lacks basis.

Proposed Contention 209, while filed after the ERP became available, simply restates contention 99 and adds nothing to it. It should be rejected for the same reasons.

EMERGENCY WORKERS Proposed Contention 245 broadly disparages the ERP for al-legedly relying "too heavily" on volunteer personnel to effect an evacuation, suggesting that State and local emergency re-sponse personnel cannot be depended upon to respond to a ra-diological emergency in sufficient numbers.

The proposed Contention should be rejected for lack of basis and specificity. Mr. Eddleman has shown no basis for the allegation nor should it be assumed that emergency response personnel will not perform their assigned tasks. State and local emergency workers receive extensive periodic radiological emergency response training. ERP, Part 1, $ VII.E. See also ERP, Parts 2-5, 5 VII.C., (discussion of radiological emergency response training of local personnel). In addition, all such 19/ The regulation cited, 10 C.F.R. $ SO.54(t), applies to the Licensee's plan.

6

1 l

personnel who may receive significant radiation exposure will receive thermoluminescent dosimeters. Emergency workers who enter or may enter areas where the external radiation exposure could exceed 10 percent of protective action guides will re-ceive self-reading dosimeters so that they will be aware of the risks at all times. See ERP, Part 1, 9 IV.G; Parts 2-5, 5 IV.F. These measures provide reasonable assurance that State and local emergency response personnel will perform in a pro-fessional manner under any radiological emergency situation l that may arise.

Mr. Eddleman's allusion to an unspecified study conducted by Kai Erikson in the Shoreham area -- a different locale, and an unusual political milieu -- has no relevance to the North Carolina situation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that other licensing boards have considered similar contentions and concluded, despite testimony from Erikson upon which interve-nors relied, that there was reasonable assurance that adequate numbers of emergency workers would stay and perform their jobs in the event of a nuclear emergency. Metropolitan Edison Co.

(Three Mil'e Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1486-89 (1981); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. -

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 N.R.C. 756, 767-68, 804-05 (1982); Consolidated Edison Co.

of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C.

811, 955-60 (1983). Indeed, in rejecting intervenors' claims that volunteer emergency workers would suffer " role conflict" between their family responsibilities and emergency duties, as well as claims that radiological emergencies differ from other emergencies because the " threat" of radiation is " invisible and of uncertain duration," the Indian Point licensing board noted:

Our finding does not disparage the opinion held by (intervenor's witnesses] Drs.

Erikson and Lifton. These witnesses are credible experts. However, the theory they advocate is unorthodox, lacks empirical support, and is contradicted by the equally credible opinion of Licensees' witnesses.

(who testified that "[w]ith respect to emergency workers, both lay and profession-al, past experience demonstrates that these workers will fulfill their duties").

18 N.R.C. at 958 (emphasis supplied); see also 18 N.R.C. at 957.

Thus, Mr. Eddleman's references to Erikson's work can pro-vide no basis for the allegations of his proposed contention.

Certainly, Mr. Eddleman has offered no indication that State and local emergency workers in this area are unreliable. In-deed, North Carolina emergency workers -- both paid and volun-teer -- are on record as performing their assigned functions in the face o't imminent life-threatening situations, such as the recent tornado disaster in eastern North Carolina. According- '

ly, proposed Contention 245 must be rejected for lack of basis.

/ l

_ ___--________ - -_~

I EXPERIENCE / COMPETENCE Proposed Contention 124 asserts that Applicants and the counties do not have the experience and technical ability to plan for a radiological emergency and implement protective mea-

sures. No explanation is provided as to why Mr. Eddleman be-11 eves this is so. The contention also fails to address the ERP in any way. See ERP Parts 2-5,Section VII (Plans, Exer-t cines, Drills, and Training). Consequently, the contention is nothing more than a hopelessly broad opinion, with no asserted factual basis -- specific or otherwise.20/

Proposed Contention 242 criticizes the ERP because of a few typographical errors which reflect the fact that the 3 tate of North Carolina utilized its plans for other nuclear facili-ties in the state as a basis for the !!arris plan.21/ The ERP

! is a draft at this point and the opportunity remains to make such corrections before response readiness is required. Fur-ther, it is desirable and important that the State plans be standardized to simplify and enhance its response capability.

The proposed contention raises no litigable issue with respect to emergency preparedness.

{ .

I 20/ In addition, the cited NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion, l

J.9, does not apply to the licensee.

21/ See, in the same view, Eddleman Contention 114 on the Virgil Summer plant, and generally pages 229-239 of Supplement to Petition to Intervene by Wells Eddleman (May 14, 1902), with copied contentions and inserts to change the name of the plant criticized.

1 ON-SITE PLAN Proposed Contention 151 originally asserted that Appli-cants' on-site plan "does not provide the medical personnel available to treat personnel injured onsite, [as) required by NUREG-0737' Rev. 1, p. 17, re 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix E, item 5" i 1

(regarding arrangements for the services of physicians and l other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies onsite). The sole basis advanced for the conten-tion was a reference to Annex A to the plan (entitled " Agree-ments"), which itself indicated that letters of agreement with physicians were being obtained.

In its November 1, 1983 Memorandum and order (Ruling on !

l Wells Eddleman's Proposed on-Site Emergency Planning Conten-tions), the Board deferred ruling on contention 151, and directed Applicants to provide " specific names of physicians who have agreed to treat personnel injured on-site, or by de- l 1

monstrating reasonable assurance that such agreements will be l 1

made." Memorandum and order, at 4. On February 1, 1984, 1 Applicants served on the Board and the parties a letter of agreement Vith North Carolina Emerge'.tcy Medical Services, Inc.,

signed by three physicians. -

l Althcugh Mr. Eddleman failed to amend his deferred conten-1 l tion within 30 days of receipt of the letter of agreement, the i

Board invited the parties to file comments on the letter, dur-ing the March 8, 1984 conference call. Accordingly, on l l

l April 3, 1984, Mr. Eddleman filed an amendment to his proposed Contention 151.

In his amendment, Mr. Eddleman expresses concern as to whether the physicians will have training to treat radiation-l related injuries. Indeed, the letter of agreement itself re-flects CP&L's commitment to sponsor training for the physicians i

in handling radiation accidents, rurther, the Hrris on-site ,

plan indicates l r

Training of medical support personnel at the agreement hospitals will include basic i training on the nature of radiological emergencies, diagnosis and treatment, and !

follow-up medical care.

On-site plan, Section 5.2.3.15. Thus, Mr. Eddleman has failed :

to address the relevant section of the applicable plan, and has ,

I' failed to provide any basis to support this portion of the re-l vised proposed contention. Accordingly, it should be rejected. ,

i Mr. Eddleman also queries whether the signatory physicians e are required "to stay in the area near Harris or to continue to be bound by their agreements in the future." The letter of !

agreement is with North Carolina Emergency Medical Services, Inc., corporate entity, and is signed by the physicians in their capacities as officers of the corporation. Thus, the ;

agreement would nurvive even should one of the physicians leave the area permanently. And, like other letters of agreement, the letter of agreement with the physicians must be certified to be current on an annual basis, see on-site plan, Section

l l

5.1.2; NUREC-0654, criterion P.4. Thus, should the physicians f declino to renew their agreement at some poirkt, CP&L would be obligated to replace the agreement with another. Mr. l Eddleman's concerns about the currency of the letter of agree-ment are therefore also without basis. For these reasons, de- !

l ferred proposed Contentin 151 should be rejected in its entire- (

i ty. [

Also in its November 1 Memorandum and order, the Board de-ferred ruling on Contention _151, which asserted that the Harris on-site plan did not comply with the NUREC-0737 (Rev. 1) provi-sion "which required the T3C (Technical Support center) to be l designed in accord with good human factors engineering." In support of this charge, Mr. Eddleman alleged only that the plan i did not " mention human factors engineering with respect to TSC" and did not in any other way indicate that human factors engi- I nearing principles have been considered in the design of the !

TSC. To the contrary, section 3.3.1 of the plan (" Technical Support Center (TSC) -- Characteristics") expressly provided, t even then, that the T3C was "(dlesigned taking into account good human factors engineering principles." Nevertheless, the Board directed that Applicants " provide their human factors en-

qineering documents to the NRC." On Tsbruary 17, Applicants filed with the Board and the parties a document describing l

-99=

( .

l generally the consideration given to good human factors engi-l neering principles in the design of the SHNPP TSC.22/ That document detailed the applicable standards used in design, and discussed the application of human factors analysis with re-t spect to the physical layout and location of the TSC, noise ,

I control, display systems and computers, the heating, cooling and ventilation system, the electrical system, communcations and protective / emergency systems. In addition, the document i included a furnishings plan for the TSC.

l Pursuant to the Board's March 8 invitation to comment on the TSC human factors document, Mr. Eddleman amended his de-ferred proposed contention 157 on April 3, 1984. Mr.

Eddleman's amendment to his proposed contention is nothing more than a recitation of the virtues of good human factors engi-neering -- he has completely failed to identify any I deficiencies in the information provided by Applicants. In- i deed, he has not even related his comments to the information filed in response to his proposed contention. Certainly he can no longer assert that there is no written evidence that human factors engineering was considered in the design of the TSC.

Thus, because there is no basis whatsoever for proposed Conten- ',

tion 157, that contention must be rejected.

l l 22/ In providing the document, Applicants observed that l NUREC-0737, Supplement 1 does not require the submittal of any documentation of the consideration given to human factora eng1= i neering in the design of a TSC.

-100-l

f l

Mr. Eddleman has resubmitted for ruling two deferred pro-posed contentions which, by their very terms,' are limited to l Applicants' on-site emergoney planning -- deferred Contentions 103_and 137.

Proposed Contention 103 challenges the shielding 1

of "[t]he on-site counting laboratory at SHNPP," and proposed Contention 137 is a string of disparate allegations of asserted inadequacies in Applicants' site emergency plan which allega-l tions were drafted long before Applicants' site emergency plan was even available, and therefore are necessarily lacking in specificity and basis).

Applicants' site emergency plan was served upon the par-ties on March 29, 1983. Based on that document, Mr. Eddleman l

l proposed ten new on-site planning contentions, and affirmed his intent to pursue twelve deferred contentions, assertedly relat-ed to on-site planning. See Wells Eddleman's contentions re CP&L Site Emergency Plan (SHHPP Operating Manual, Volume 3, Book 1), May 2, 1983. Mr. Eddleman failed to reassert at that time either proposed contention 103 or proposed Contention 137.

Certainly, the filing of the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan affords Mr. Eddleman no occasion to reaffirm interest in deferred contentions critical of the site emergency plan. Pro-

l posed Contentions 103 and 137 must therefore be rejected as un-timely.

l l -101-l l

(_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

CONCLUSION Applicants oppose admission of all of the proposed Eddleman contentions. l Respectfully submitted, l .

Thomas A. Baxter, P.'C.

Deborah B. Bauser Delissa A. Ridgway SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE t 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 ,

(202) 822-1000 Richard E. Jones Samantha Francis Flynn Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Post Office Box 1551 ~

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-6517 Counsel for Applicants f'

DATED: April 28, 1984 i t

b e

-102-

_ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ . ___ . ..., . . ~ _ . _ . . . . _ . .. .,

i

. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULhTO#Y COMMISSION ,

BEFOR2 THE ATOMIC SAFETY lsND_ LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) ,

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

) ,

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) ;

i CERTIFICATE OP_GERVICE _

l I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Answer to .

Eddleman Proposed Contentions on SHNPP Emergency Response Plans" ,

were served this 28th day of April, 1984,'by deposit in the U S.

mail, first cless, postage prepaid, upon the parties or, the attached Service List, except that those whose names are marked by an asterisk have been served by hand, this 28th day of April, 1984.

7L 4 Kr Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.

4 0

'J.

s

-;.---n--.-----..z_u..._.;.2______.____ . . . _ . _ _ . . ._ . _ .. . .-

l l

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power ) ,

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

t SERVICE LIST

James L. Kalley, Esquire John D. Runkle, Esquire Atmic Safety arx1 Licensing Board Conservation Council of North Carolina U.S. Nuclear Pagulatory Ccumission 307 Granville Road Washington, D.C. 20555 Chapel kill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Glenn O. Bright M. Travis Payne, Esquire Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Edelstein and Payne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission P.O. Box 12607 Washington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605

Dr. James H. Carpenter Dr. Richard D. Wilson Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board 729 Hunter Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission Apex, North Carolina 27502 Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Wells Eddleman Charles A. Barth, Esquire 718-A Iredell Street l Janice E. bbore, Esquire Durham, North Carolina 27705 Office of Executive Imgal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ctmmission Richard E. Jones, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Vice President and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Ccmpany -

Docketing and Service Section P.O. Box 1551 Office of the Secretary Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Phyllis Ictchin 108 Bridle Run Mr. Daniel F. Road, President Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 cmHGE/EIP 5707 Waycross Street Dr. Linda W. Little Raleigh, North Carolina 27606 Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 b

4

_ x = _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _- - _ . _ . . - __. . _ . _ . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ - _ -

Bradley W. Jones, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccunission Region II 101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven F. Crockett, Esquire Atanic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C-iasion Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P.O. Box 991 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 e

O l

, _- ,. _

ML20084E133

Text

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