ML20045H094

Special Rept Spr 930006:on 930609,discovered Mechanical Penetration in fire-rated Barrier Unsealed.Caused by Unique Configuration of Fire Barrier Penetration Located Near Ceiling.Penetrations Visually Inspected

ML20045H094
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	07/08/1993
From:	Skolds J SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
RC-93-0184, RC-93-184, SPR-930006, NUDOCS 9307190051
Download: ML20045H094 (2)

Text

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South Caronna Electne & Gas Company John L Skolds

, P O. Bcx 68 Wee Presioent anionsMe SC 2906S Nciear Operations 203) 3454040 SCE&G

.can- July 8, 1993 Refer to: RC-93-0184 Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Region II, Suite 2900 1 101 Marietta Street, NW l Atlanta, GA 30323 J

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 SPECIAL REPORT (SPR 930006) l South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is submitting this report pursuant to the requirements of Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 131A, " Fire {

1 Service Ecuipment/ Systems Operability Requirements."

l On June 9, 1993, during a walkdown associated with engineering activities, a mechanical penetration in a fire rated barrier was found unsealed. Compensatory action as required by SAP-131A was initiated and a Nonconformance Notice (NCN) was written documenting the as-found condition, for evaluation and recommended repair. Following an evaluation by engineering, disposition of the NCN was to fill the penetration with silicone foam based sealant. This action was taken June 14 and following a twenty-four hour cure time the penetration was inspected and declared operable June 15, 1993.

The cause of this event was due to the unique configuration of the fire barrier penatration which was located near the ceiling and involved a spray shield which precluded an adequate visual inspection. Also contributing to this event was a transposition error in the penetration number which identified the penetration as being located in a non-fire rated barrier. This error resulted in a failure to properly seal the penetration as required by the specification for fire rated barriers.

The following action was taken as a result of this event. Design Engineering reviewed all fire barrier penetrations with similar design requirements installed under the same specification to identify any additional rupture restraints or spray shields which could preclude a visual inspection. From this review, five additional penetrations were identified with rupture restraints or spray shields that could potentially preclude an adequate inspection. These penetrations were visually inspected, and none were found to be obscured by the installed rupture restraints or spray shields.

Should you have any questions, please call at'your convenience.

Very truly yours, 140CGZ MdSA John L. Skolds 8'r RJB:1cd I c: See Page 2 9307190051 930708 PDR ADDCK 05000395 E

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O Mr. S. D. Ebneter 0NO 930043 Page 2 c: 0. W. Dixon R. R. Mahan R. J. White G. F. Wunder L. D. Shealy NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Knotts Jr.

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