ML20044G288

Forwards SSAR Markups for 930517 Conference Call Re Clarification of Chapter 1 & 9,consisting of Table 3.4-1, Structures,Penetrations & Access Openings Designed for Flood Protection

ML20044G288
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	05/21/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslunsy C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9306020278
Download: ML20044G288 (11)

Text

V f, GE Nuclear Energy Genere no: cmaw U5 Cstres A.enue San.ta:;e CA 95125 May 21,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate

. Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - Clarifications for Chapters 1 and 9

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are SSAR markups for our May 17,1993 conference call pertaining to clarifications'of Chapters 1 and 9. Specifically enclosed are responses to: Section 3.4.1, Items 3 and 4; Section 9.1.3, Items 1 and 2; Section 9.2.4, Item 1; and, Section 9.2.8, Item 1. Section 9.4.1, pertaining to control building HVAC, is currently being reviewed and a response will be provided by May 26, 1993.

~ Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Butch Burton.

Sincerely,

• A Jack Fox -

Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Gary Ehlert (GE)

Norman Fletcher (DOE)

Ed Nazareno (GE)

Gail Miller (GE) dl0 m>w W

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g grR 34-'- F * * ~ S' m-Standard Plant nrv n Table 3.4-1 STRUCTURES, PENETRATIONS, AND ACCESS OPENINGS DESIGNED FOR FLOOD PROTECTION Reactor Service Control Radwaste Turbine Strveture Buildine Buildine Buildine Building Buildine Design Flood Level (mm) 11,700 11,700 11,700 11,700 11,700 Reference Plant Grade (mm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 Base Slab (mm)

-8,200

-2150 &

-8,200

-1,500 5,300 3500 Actual Plant Grade (mm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 l Building Height (mm) 49,700 22,200 22,200 28,000 54,300 Penetrations Below Design Refer to None Refer to None None Flood level Table 6.2-9 Table 6.2-9 for RCW lines Access Openings Below Accesursy from Mam Entrance Area Access Pipe Tunnel Area Access Design Flood Level S/P @ 4J100mm

@ grade level from S/B from R/B&T/B from S/D @

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@ -2150mm. HX,

@l500mm 7VJ0mm Area Access Note 3 Tunnel from imm S/B @

PEB @8.800mm

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3,%>.. m Notes:

1.

Water tight doors (bulkhead type) are provided at all reactor and control building access ways that are below grade.

l 2.

Water tight penetrations will be provided for all reactor, radwaste building and control building penetrations that are below grade.

3.

The lines that run through the radwaste building tunnel are not exposed to outside ground flooding.

4 Penetrations below design flood level will be scaled against any hydrostatic head resulting from a moderate energy pipe failure in the tunnel or connecting building.

i 34-8 Amendment 26 m

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sAssoare Standard Plant nev n 3.11, all safety-related equipment is qualified to high relative humidity.

For those structures outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant (e.g., the ultimate heat sink pump house), the COL applicant wil demonstrate /

the structures outside the scope il meet the requirements of GDC 2 and the guidance of RG 1.102. See Subsection 3.4.3.

or license information requirements.

3 CO' 3.4.1.1.2.1 Evaluation of Reactor Building Flood Events Analysis of potential flooding within the reactor building is considered on a floor-by--

floor basis. The potential consequences of the high energy breaks in the reactor building are evaluated in Subsection 6.2.3.3.1.

3.4.1.1.2.1.1 Evaluation ofiloor 100 (B3F)

Worst case flooding on this floor level would result from leakage of the RHR 18" suction line between the containment wall and the system iso-lation valve (this applies also to the HPCF, RCIC, and SPCU suction lines, although in smaller line sizes). Leakage from this source may cause flooding of the affected RHR heat exchanger (HX) room at a rate of 1.04 cubic meter / minute (275 gpm) and may continue until the line is repeated or equalization of water level occurs between this room with the suppression l pool level. Flooding in the room may cause loss of functions for that particular divisional system loop. This will not impair the safe shutdown capability of the reactor system.

Flooding of other areas is prevented by water tight doors. Suction lines to other services always remain submerged. Other flooding inci-dents mat result from failures of other piping systems penetrating the RHR HX rooms for each division; these events, however, upon detection by sump pump alarms, are controllable by terminating flow with closure of valves and shutdown of pressure sources.

34-23 Amendment 24

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I nAnowl av a Standard Plant i

9.1.3 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup fuel bundles.

System The FPC system cools the fuel storage pool by 9.1.3.1 Design Bases transferring tge spent fuel decay heat through two 6.55 x 10 Blu/hr heat exchangers to the reactor building closed cooling water system (RCW). Each of the two heat exchangers is de-The fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FPC) system signed to transfer one half the system design shall be designed to remove the decay heat from heat load. The system utilizes two parallel 250 the fuel pool, maintain pool water level and m /hr gumps to provide a system design flow of quality and remove radioactive materials from the 500 m /hr. Each pump is suitable for pool to minimize the release of radioactivity to continuous duty operation. The equipment is the environs.

located in the reactor building.

The FPC system shall:

The system pool water temperature is main-a tained at or below 52 C.

The decay heat l (1) minimize corrosion product buildup and shall released from the stored fuel is transferred to control water clarity, so that the fuel the RCW. During refueling prior to 21 days assemblies can be efficiently handled under-following shutdown, the reactor (shutdown cooling) and fuel pool cooling are provided water; jointly by the residual heat removal (RHR) and (2) minimize fission product concentration in FPC systems in parallel. The reactor cavity the water which could be released from the communicates with the fuci pool since the pool to the reactor building environment; reactor well is flooded and the fuel gates are open. RHR suction is taken from the vessel (3) monitor fuel pool water level and maintain a shutdown suction lines, pumped through RHR heat water level above the fuel sufficient to exchangers and discharged into the upper pools provide shielding for normal building occu-to improve water clarity for refueling. For the g, h fMig FPC system, fuel pool water is circulated by pancy; gg f

means of overflow through skimmers around the (4) ma'ptain the pool water temperature below periphery of the pool and a scupper at the end 52 C un er normal operating egndi-of the transfer pool drain tanks, pumped through tions. The temperature limit of 52 C is the FPC heat exchangers and filter-deminer-set to estab b an acceptable environment alizers and back to the pool through the pool for personnel orking in the vicinity of the diffusers.

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fuel pool. Th design basis for the FPC system is to pro ide cooling after closure After 21 days, the fuel gates are closed.1 of the fuel gates (21 days) at the normal At this point, the FPC system, solely provides, heat load from spent fuel stored in the pool the fuel pool cooling function. However, when is the sum of decay heat of the most recent the reactor is defueled more than the 35% batch plus the heat from the previous 4 design basis 35% batch (maximum heat load fuel batches after closure of the fuel condition), RHR can provide supplemental gates. The RHR system will be used to cooling. RHR supplemental cooling suction is supplement the FPC system under the maximum taken from the skimmer surge tank, passed load condition as defined in Subsection through RHR heat exchanger and back to the fuely 9.1.3.2.

g 9.1.3.2 System Description Clarity and purity of the pool water are maintained by a combination of filtering and ion The FPC system (Figures 9.1-1 a and b, and exchange. The filter-demineralizers maintain 9.1-2 and Table 9.1-11) maintains the spent fuel total corrosion product metals at 30 ppb or less storage pool below the desired temperature at an with pH range of 5.6 to 8.6 at 258C for comp-l acceptable radiation level and at a degree of atibility with fuel storage racks and other clarity necessary to transfer and service the equipments. Conductisjty is maintained at less than 1.2 #S/cm at 25 C and chlorides less 91-3 Amendment 27

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After 21 days the fuel pool heat exchangers are capable of maintaining the spent fuel pool temperature below 125'F at the normal heat load from the decay heat

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of the most recent 35% batch of discharged fuel plus the 4 previous batches j

stored in the fuel pool.- if the fuel pool gates are installed prior to 21 days, or if

-l more than 35% of the most recent beich of fuel is stored in the pool (maximum j

heat load condition)it may be necessary to utilize one of the RHR systems to

,j supplement the cooling of the spent fuel pool. Supplemental cooling from RHR l

can be achieved by aligning RHR B or C must in the fuel pool cooling mode. In -

the fuel pool cooling mode of RHR a suction is taken from the skimmer surge I

tanks, passed through an RHR heat exchanger, and returned to the fuel pool. In

f the event one of the RHR systems is aligned in the fuel pool cooling mode it is permissible for that system to be counted as one of the minimum required Emergency Core Cooling systems during shutdown (Modes 4 or 5) as long as the system can be manually realigned and the system is otherwise operable.

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i water supply (yard main, one diesel engine driven shielded cells. For these reasons, the exposure i

pump and water source) are seismically designed. of plant personnel to radiation from the FPC A second fire pump, driven by a motor powered system is minimal. Further details' of g

from the combustion turbine generator is also radiological considerations for this and other-i provided. Engineering analysis indicates that systems are described in Chapters 11,12, and l

under the maximum abnormal heat load with the 15.

l pool gates closed and no pool cooling taking i

place, the pool temperature will reach about 212 F in about 16' hours. This.provides l hoses for pool makeup. The COL applicant will sufficient time for the operator to hook up fire develop detailed procedures and operator training for providing firewater makeup to the spent fuel i

I pool. See Subsection 9.1.6.9 for COL license information, j

The FPC components, housed in the Seismic i

Category I reactor building, are Seismic Category I, Quality Group C including all components The FPC 5 sb*w' t$ non-Sc b h i

except the filter demineralizer. These QQad % % 4 u cn %., oJf components are protected from the effects of ' 4 g,,, g, p g,,, 34 % e, ww.ch t o w p..

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Q natural phenomena, such as: earthquake, external h t d coo %. h W [ T.g.

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flooding, wind, tornado and external missile [s r

!=Id: S ::::::: 5:!!!!r-de FPC "E TAPP r '"-d cc-r---" m protecEed from the effects t o ww e ch o

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of pipe whip, internal flooding, internally generated missiles, and the effects of a moderate en ern l

h c.e tu[ture within the vicdnit. S ea S 4 5 *-ch on 9 1 C 10

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From the foregoing analysis, it is concluded that the FPC system meets its design bases.

i 9.13.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements i

No special tests are required because, normally, one pump, one heat exchanger and one

- filter-demineralizer are operating while fuel is i

stored in the pool. The spare unit is operated periodically to handle abnormal heat loads or to

'l replaec a unit for servicing. Routine visual inspection of the system components, instrumen-

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tation and trouble alarms is adequate to verify

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system operability.

9.13.5 Radiological Considerations -

t The water level in the spent fuel storage j

pool is maintained at a height which is suffi-cient to provide shielding.for normal building occupancy. Radioactive particulates removed

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from the fuel pool are collected in filter-demineralizer units which are located in a

I 9.1-5.1 Amendment 27 l

9. i. 3 TWi

'2.eF2 MN 23A6100AH Standard Plant m.a 9.1.6 COL License Information operator qualifications, training and control program.

9.14.1 New Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis 9.1.6.7 Spent Fuel Racks Structural Evaluation The COL applicant referencing the ABWR The COL applicant will provide the NRC design shall provide-the NRC confirmatory critically confirmatory structural evaluation of the spent fuel analysis as required by Subsection 9.1.1.1.1.

racks as outlined in Subsection 9.1.2.13.

9.1.6.2 Dynamic and Impact Analyses of New Fuel 9.1.6.8 Spent Fuel Racks Thermal.Hydrauht. nalysis Storage Racks The COL applicant will provide the NRC The COL applicant shall provide the NRC confirmatory thermal-hydraulic analysis that evaluates confirmatory dynamic and impact analyses of the the rate of naturally circulated flow and the maxirnum new fuel storage racks. See Subsection 9.1.1.1.6.

rack water exit temperature as required by Subsection 9.1.2.1.4.

9.1.63 Spent Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis 9.1.6.9 Spent Fuel Firewater Makeup Provedures and Training The COL applicant shall provide the NRC confirmatory criticality analysis as required by The COL applicant will develop detailed Subsection 9.1.23.1.

procedures and operator training for providing firewater makeup to the spent fuel pool. (See 9.1.6.4 Spent Fuel Racks Load Drop Analysis Subsection 9.133).

The COL applicant shall provide the NRC 9.1.7 References confirmatoryload drop analysis as required by Subsection 9.1.43.

1.

General Electric Standard Application for Reactor fuel, (NEDE-24011-P-A, latest 9.1.6.5 New Fuel Inspection Stand Seismic approved revision).

Capability bb The COL applicant will install the new fuel 3,g,g,ga p,_A. d ovsok 2 HR. b 3 54 6 inspection stand firmly to the wall so that it does not c,,acho vsr 4 o FPCS 3 fallinto or dump personnel into the spent fuel pool during an SSE. (See Subsection 9.1.4.23.2.)

T he COk, cx p[ s c ch d e lI a s 5 u 9.1.6.6 Overhead I. mad llandling System khed 4ba PJfl.- C h C.owac Information QMM r ei h 4 C)t'* d Ev >

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The COL applicant shall provide a list of all h y* ^C

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cranes, hoists, and elevators and their lifting capacities including any limit and safety devices m r.r M,ew d & c& br.kI ef AW required for automatic and manual operation. In

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• #^ J ), ( w) ) S A s a c h a e addition, for all such equipment, the COL applicant shall provide: (1) heavy load handling system l operating and equipment maintenance procedures, 9.\\ 3 N (2) heavy load handling system and equipment maintenance procedures and/or manuals,(3) heavy load handling system and equipment inspection and test plans; NDE, visual, etc., (4) heavy load handling safe load paths and routing plans,(5) OA program to monitor and assure implementation and compliance of heavy load handling operations and controls,(6) 9 l-13 Amendment 26 i

9.2 4 T+ ~ s i oFv ABWR 2-u Standard Plant x,m n a froth spray pump, a hypochlorite pump and to being discharged via the cooling tower blowdown related equipment. The system can be operated in line. The settled sludge is sent to the aerobic two modes: extended aeration and contact digesters and disposed of off-site.

stabilization.

i 914.4.2 Abnormal Operation 9.2.4.4 System Operation (Conceptual Design)

The components of the PSW system are designed 9.2.4.4.1 Normal Operation to meet the increased needs during refueling operations when additional people are on-site.

The potable water pumps take water from the potable water storage tank and discharges it into The sewage tre.atment system may be operated in the potable water hydropneumatic pressure tank.

the contact stabilization mode to process the Under automatic control, a low pressure switch substantially higher waste water flow rates during starts one of the two potable water pumps when outages. In this mode, a portion of the settled sludge the hydropneumatic pressure tank water pressure from the final clarifiers is aerated, sent to the aera-falls below a specificd limit. A pressure switch tion tanks and mixed with incoming sewage.

automatically starts the second potable water pump when a single pump is unable to maintain the tank 9.2.4.5 Evaluation of Potable and Sanitary Water pressure above a specified limit When water level System Performance Guterface Requirements) reaches a specified high level in the hydro-pneumatic pressure tank, a level switch auto-The COL applicant shall analyze the PSW system matically stops the potable water pumps. If high to assure that the system meets all applicable regula-water level in the pressure tank is reached and the tory requirements and is compatible with site condi-tank pressure is low, the air compressor is auto-tions.

matically started and is stopped at a specified pressure by a high pressure switch.

9.2.4.6 Safety Evaluation Unterface Requirements)

WMTA The air compressor controls are interlocired h ::: :: &j mi~-

4 with the potable water pump controls so that the air compressor may operate only when the pumps 9.2.4.7 Instrumentation and Alarms Guterface are stopped and the hydropneumatic pressure tank Requirements water level is at the speciSed high limit.

The subsystems of the PSW system are provided Downstream of the hydropneumatic pressure with control panels located in the control building tank, a branch sends potable water to a heater and which are designed for remote manual and a hot water distribution system.

automatic control of the processes.

Potable water is used to flush the service water A flow proportioning controller is used to operate sides of the RSW and TSW heat exchangers the hypochlorinator pump as water enters the PSW whenever they are put into a wet standby condition.

system. Pressure andlevel switches are provided to start and stop the potable water pumps and the air Normally, the sewage treatment system is compressor. Low bydropneumatic tank pressure is operated in the extended aeration mode. The alarmed. Low levelin the hypochlorite feed tank is sanitary wastes enter the sewage treatment system alarmed.

via the comminutor, in which any solids are shred-ded, and flows into the aeration tanks. In the aera-The minimum instrumentation requirements for tion tanks, the waste liquids are continuously the sewage treatment system are a treated effluent aerated. Occasionally, foaming occurs in the sewage flow meter and a common air blower aeration tanks. A froth spray system is provided discharge pressure gage.

which uses processed sewage to control any froth which is present. The aeration tank contents are 9.2.4.8 Tests and Inspections Onterface then transferred to the clarifiers where the sludge Requirements) is allowed to settle. The clarified sewage passes into the chlorine contact tank for chlorination prior Drainage piping is hydrostatically tested to the

'2-I I Amendment 21

9.2.eT b i;t ch ABWR mamin Standard Plant n, s the pH to improve dissolved solids rejection in the 9.2.8.7 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface second pass.

Requirements)

The demineralizer feed pumps are controlled One division of MWP components is normally in by a water level controller in the demineralized operation. The components of the standby division water storage tanks. Each demineralizer contains are automatically placed into operation upon 40 cubic feet of ion exchange resin in a receiving a low level signal from their downstream cation / anion ratio of 1 to 2. When the effluent water storage tank.

quality of a demineralizer becomes unsatisfactory, it is automatically removed from operation and the The following shall be displayed and alarmed standby demineralizer is automatically put into locally and in the control building-operation. The exhausted resins are regenerated Water levelin all water storage tanks offsite.

The demineralized water forwarding pumps are

- Rnnwg status of all pumps controlled by a pressure switch in their discharge piping. Normally, one pump is operated to

- System pressures and differential pressures as-maintain a specified system pressure. When the sociated with the filters and RO modules pressure drops below a specified pressure, the second pump is automatically put into operation

- Water quality monitors, including conductivity, until system pressure returns to the normal range.

pH, turbidity and silica analyzers If this does not occur, the third pump is automatically put into operation.

All water storage tanks are provided with low. low water level switches which stop the forwarding 9.2.8.4.2 Abnormal Operation pumps for that tank.

During the early construction period and at 9.2.8.8 Tests and Inspedons (Interface certain times later, the makeup water preparation Requirements) system may either not be installed or may not be in operation. Also, there may be times when The COL applicant shall prepare and perform a demineralized water requirements exceed the pro-preoperational test program and tests in accordance i

duction capacity. During these periods, mobile with the requirements of Chapter 14.

water treating systems will be used. They will be transported to the site by truck and will enter the 9.2.9 Makeup Water System (Condensate) makeup water preparation building through large doors. When no longer required they will be re-9.2.9.1 Design Bases moved.

(1) The makeup water-condensate system 9.2.8.5 Evaluation of Makeup Water System (MUWC) shall provide condensate quality Preparation Performance (Interface water for both normal and emergency Requirements) operations when required.

The COL applicant shall analyze the raw water (2) The MUWC system shall provide a recuired quality and availability and the required makeup water quality as follows:

water quality and amounts to assure that these re.

quirements can be met. Any deficiencies in either Conductivity (gS/cm) 10.5 at 25 C quality or product a capability shall be met with Chlorides, as C1(ppm) 40.02 mobile water treating systems.

pH 5.9 to 83 at 25 C Conductivity and pH limits shall be applied after 9.2.8.6 Safety Enluation (Interface correction for dissolved CO,. (The above limits Requirements) shall be met at least 90% of the time.)

> h: : ::e dt epern (3) The MUWC system shall supply water for the 6

uses shown in Table 9.2-L 9.2-L7 Amendment 21 m

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