ML20039B128

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 81-033/01T-0:on 811125,reactor Bldg Roof Hatch Opened by Work Crew W/O Notice to Supervisor Until Fire Permit for Welding Requested.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Reinstructed Re Procedural Requirement
ML20039B128
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/1981
From: Murphy W
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20039B126 List:
References
LER-81-033-01T, LER-81-33-1T, NUDOCS 8112220319
Download: ML20039B128 (2)


Text

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER 81-33/1T CONTROL BLOCK: l l i

l l l l lh 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATIONI Io IiI8 i9 V l TLICENSEE 7

l V lCODE Y l Sl 1l@l0 l0 l -10 LICENSE 14 15 l0 l0NUMSERl 0 l 0 l- l 0 l 025 l@l 26 4 {1 Il l1 l1 l@l$ 7 CAl T 58l@

LICENSE TYPE Jo CON'T lolil ,"X "c' It l@l 61OI 5l 0l0 l0 l2 l 7 I l l@l i69l i I 2EVENT l sDATE l s l 1 l@l 112 REPORT l 0l <3l 8 l 1l@

? 8 60 DOCKET NUMBER 66 74 75 DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h 1012l l l 10131 i See Attached Sheet. I lo i41 i i lo isi i l lo is i I I l o 171 1 1 10181I I 7 8 9 80 E CODE SU8C E COMPONENT CODE SU8 CODE S E l0l91 i 6 I zl ZIO 9 10 11

@ Ic l@ l z l Z I z i z l 21 zi@ l z l@ Lz.J 12 13 18 19 20

,. SEOUENTI AL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER RO EVENTVEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE N O.

OREg s l218 22l1 l l-l l 0 l3 l3 l 24 l4 lM 0l llM lTl l-l l0 l

_ 23 26 27 30 34 32 TA N AC ON ON L NT E MOURS S8 1 FOR B. S PPL MANUF C RER LHj@l 33 34 Zl@ lZl@

35 lZl@

36 l 0 l 0l 0l 0l 37 40 lY l@

41 l42 Nl@ y@

43 lZl9h l9l@

44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l i 101 l This event was caused by personnel error. All nnnlienble novennnn1 4m7niuna l

, were made aware of this event and have been reinstructed to notify the Shift i 7.,,,y Supervisor prior to removing any plant equipment from service or performing any [

9,,,,; work activity that has the potential of changing plant conditions. ]

li t a l I l 7 8 9 80 SA S  % POWER OTHER STATUS Cis O RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION lil5] y @ l0l0l0l@l NA l lAl@l Observation by STA l ACTIVITY CO TENT RELEASE LOCATION OF RELEASE I i ! '6*l d @D OF RELEASEI@l lZ AMOUNTOF NA ACTIVITYl

@ NAl "

l PERSO~~d ExPOSi AES NUV8ER TYPE DESCRIPTION li l 71 1010 l 01@l d@l NA I

' ' ' ,ERSONN a'iN J u

  • NUM8ER oESCR,,TiO~@

NA li la 8l 9lo lo lo l@l 7 11 12 80 l

LOSS OF OR CAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION NA li 191 7 8 3 Iz l@l 10 l

80 7 a 3 iSs l 2 ) o f lN f@OESCRiPTm@

l to NA l 68 63 l!!!IllIIl lIl% 80 3 2

8112220319 811209' Warren P. Murphy PHONE:

(802)257-7711 i, PDRADOCK05000g S

VTVYS1 e

05000271 LER 81-33/lT EVENT DESCRIPTION ED PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES During preparations for a routine startup, plant and contractor personnel were assigned to weld a strongback to the reactor building roof hatch. The work crew opened the hatch to the outside from approximately 1930 to 1945 hours0.0225 days <br />0.54 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.400725e-4 months <br />. Contrary to the requirements of the plant equipment control procedure, the work crew did not notify the Shif t Supervisor of their intent to open the reactor building roof hatch. At approximately 2115 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.047575e-4 months <br /> the work crew requested a fire permit from the STA to weld the strongback to the hatch. While investigating the condi-tions for the fire permit, the STA discovered that the hatch had been opened and notified the Shif t Supercisor. At no time while the hatch was open, however, was secondary containment integrity required. Insequence criticals (which require secondary containment) were not initiated until 2041 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.766005e-4 months <br />.

Although there were no direct consequences of this event, it does constitute a situation in which a failure to f ollow plant procedures could have prevented the secondary containment f rom fulfilling its requirements in coping with accidents analyzed in the FSAR. Therefore, it is being reported in accordance with Tech.. Spec.-Section 6.7.B.1.f.

{

l

. .