ML20031C991
| ML20031C991 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1981 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031C981 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-10026, TAC-11026, TAC-11262, TAC-12831, TAC-47044, TAC-47045, TAC-47876, TAC-47877, NUDOCS 8110090188 | |
| Download: ML20031C991 (16) | |
Text
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NUMBER 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT'1 l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
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t The proposed changes to the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications would be incorporated as follows:
Insert Page Delete Page 3.2-1 3.2-1 3.2-23a "J.2-49a 3.2-68 3.2-68 3.2-68a 3.2-69 3.2-69 3.9-4 3.9-4 3.9-4a 3.9-4a 3.9-12 3.9-12 l
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LIMlif'oG C0!1DIT10NS FOR 0FERAT10ff SURVEILLAf4CE REQUIREMEriTE 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION
!pplicability Applicability The Liniting Conditions for Operation The Surveillance Requirements apply to the plant instrumentation apply to the instrumentation which which performs a protective function.
performs a protective functicn.
Objective Objective _
The objective of the Limiting Condi-The objective of the Surveillance tions for Operation is to assure the Requirements is to specify the type operability of protective instrumen-and frequency of surveillance to tation.
be applied to protective instru-mentation, f
Specifications Specifications i
The Limiting Conditions for Operation The check, functional test, and
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l of the protective instrumentation af-calibration minimum frequency for fecting each of the following protec-protective instrumentation affect-I tive actions shall be as indicated in ing each of the following protec-j
- the corresponding LCO table.
.tive actions shall be as indicated in the corresponding SR table.
Protective Action LCO Table SR Table A.
Initiates Reactor Vessel and Primary 3.2-1 4.2-1 Containment Isolation B.
Initiates or Controls HPCI 3.2-2 4.2-2 C.
Initiates or Controls RCIC 3.2-3 4.2-3 f
D.
Initiates or Controls ADS 3.2-4 4.2-4 E.
Initiates or Controls the LPCI 3.2-5 4.2-5 Mode of RHR i
F.
Initiates or Controls Core Spray 3.2-6 4.2-6 f
G.
Initiates Control Rod Blocks 3.2-7 42.-7 H.
Limits Radioactivity Release 3.2-8 4.2-8 1.
Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2-9 4.2-9 J.
Monitors Leakage Into the Drywell 3.2-10 4.2-10 K.
Provides Surveillance Information 3.2-11 4.2-11 L.
Initiates Disconnection of Offsite 3.2-12 4.2-12 l
Power Source l
3.2-1 4
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I TABLE 3.2-12 l
INSTRUMENTATION WHICH INITIATES THE DISC 0!JNECTION 1
3 0F OFFSITE POWER SOURCES Action to be Taken Required Channels if the Number of f Ref. No.
Instrument Operable Required Trip Setting
. Required Operable' (a)
(b)
Channels To Trip Channels Is Not httt 1
4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/Ous 2/Dus greater than or equal to 2800 (c) j tbdervoltage Relay volts. At 2800 volts time delay (Loss of Voltage will be less tnan or equal to Condition) 6.5 sec.
2 4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/ Bus 2/ bus greater than or equal to 3280 (c)
Undervoltage Relay volts. At 3280 volts time delay (Uegraded Voltage will be less than or equal to
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concition) 21.5 sec.
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l NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-12 i
The colum entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established,
a.
between items in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.
This instrumentation is required to be operable during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.
O.
c.
With the number of operable channels one less than the required operable channels, operation may proceed,
I until r;erformance of the r. ext required instrument functional test provided a trip signal is placed in the l
LU T lock-out relay logic for the applicable inoperable c"annel.
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il TABLE 4.2-12 INSTRUMENTATION WHICH INITIATES THE DISCONNECTION 0F OFFSITE POWER SOURCES 4
e Instrument Functional Instrument Ref. No.
Instrument Instrument Check Test Minimum Calibration (a)
(b)
Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Frequency 1
4.16 Ky Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ operating Undervoltage Relay cycle (Loss of Voltage Condition) 2 4/16 kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/mrnth Once/ operating lin+1ervol tage Relay cycle (Ijegraded Voltage Condition)
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b NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-12 I
a.
The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.
b.
Surveillance of tt.is instrumentation is required during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.
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B W_5 FOR LIMITING CONDIIION FOR OPERATIGN 3.2.J.4. Scintillation Detector For Monitoring Radiolodine (Continued)
Level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment.
A sample that is continuously drawn from-the primary containment is collected on an iodine filter and monitored by' a gamma sensitive scintillation detector.
Radiation levels are read out by a log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room.
A high radiation level alarm and a failure alarm are
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also provided and are annunciated in the control room.
Also, a high-low ficw alarm is annunicated in the control room.
- 5. GM Tubes for Monitorino Noble Gases A set of GM tubes contained in an instrument rack are used to monitor the release of noble gases in the drywell and torus.
A high radiation level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment.
A sample that's continuously drawn from the primary containment is passed through a shielded sample chamber which contains the beta sensitive GM tubes.
Radiation levels are read out by a s
log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room.
A high radiation level alarm and failure alarm are provided and are annunciated in the control room.
Also, a high-flow alarm is annunciated in the control room.
K. Instrumentation Which Provides Surveillance Information (Table 3.2-11) 4 For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2-11, there are two
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channels of instrumentation except for the control rod oositions indicating l
system.
By comparing readings between the two channels, a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available.
Any significant deviation in readings will initiate an early recalibration, thereby maintaining the quality of the instrument readings.
l The hydrogen and oxygen analyzing systems consist of two redundant, separate systems and are each capable of analyzing the hydrogen and oxygen content of 1
the drywell-torus simultaneously.
They are designed to be completely i
testable at both the analyzer rack and in the control room. With an oxygen concentration of less than 4% by volume, a flammable mixture with hydrogen is not possible.
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L. Instrumentation Which Initiates Disconnection of Offsite Fower Sources (Table 3.2-12)
The undervoltage relays shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits have been exceeded.
This action shall provide voltage protection for the emergency power systems by preventing sustained degraded voltage conditions i
due to the offsite power source and interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems.
The undervoltage relays have a time delay characteristic that provides protection against both a loss of voltage and l
degraded voltage condition and thus minimizes the effect of short duration l
disturbances without exceeding the maximum time delay, including margin, that is assumed in the FSAR accident analyses.
3 3.2-68 a
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BASES F0i< LittlTIt4G C0:4DIT10N5 FOR OPERATIOil i-3.2.1.
References 1.
FSAR Appendix G, Plant fluclear Safety Operational Analysis 2.
FSAR Section 7.3, Primary. Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System 3.
FSAR Section 14, Plant Safety Analysis 4.
FSAR Section 6, Core St:ndby Cooling Systems 5.
FSAR Section 14.4.4, Refueling Accident 6.
FSAR Section 6.5.3, Integrated Operation of the Core Standby Cooling Systems 7.
FSAR Section 6.5.3.1., Liquid Line Breaks 8.
'O CFR 100 3.2-6Sa
BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION l
The instrumentation listed in Table 4.2-1 thru 4.2-12 will be functionally tested and l
calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals.
The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Pretection_ System of 0.99999 is generally applied for all applications of l
one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic.
Therefore, on-of f sensors are tested once every thre l
months, and bi-stable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once per week.
Those instruments which, when tripped, result in a rod block have their todoci.s arranged in a one-out-of-n logic, and all are capable of being bypassed.
For such l
a tripping arrangement with bypass capability provided, there is an optimum test in-terval that should be maintained in order to maximize the reliability of a given channel (Reference 1).
This takes account of the fact that testing degrades re-liability and the optimum interval between tests is approximately given by:
Where i = the optimum interval between tests.
t = the time the trip contacts are disabled from performing their function while the test is in progress.
r = the expected failure rate of the relays.
To test the trip relays requires that the channel be bypassed, the test nede, and the system returned to its initial state.
It is assumed this task requires an estimated 30 minutes to completg in a thorough and workmanlike manner and that the relays have a failure rate of 10' o failures per hour.
Using this data and the above operation, the optimum test intervals is:
i=
2(0.5) = 103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br /> i
10-6 42 days A test interval of once-per-month will be used initially.
The sensors and electronic apparatus have not been included here as these are analog devices with readouts in the control room and the sensors and electronic apparatus can be checked by comparison with other like instruments.
The checks which are made i
on a daily basi.e are adequate to assure operability of the sensors and electronic j
apparatus, and the test interval given above provides for optimum testing of the re-lay circuits.
l The above calculated test interval optimizes each individual channel, considering l
it to be independent of all others.
As an example, assume that there are +wo channels with an individual technical assigned to each.
Each technician test his ( annel at the optimum frequency, but the two technicians are not allowed to communicate so that one can advise the other that his channel is under test.
Under these con-ditions, it is possible for both channels to be under test siHtaneously.
- Now, assume that the technicians are required to communicate and tha. two l
3.2-69
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE ifEQUIREtENTS 3.9,A.6
-Logic Systems (Continued 4.9.A.6 Logic Systems (Continued) a.
The common accident signal a.
Each division of the coTnon logic system is operable.
accident signal logic system 'shall be tested every scheduled l
refueling outage to demonstrate i
that'it will function on actuation of the core spray system to l
provide an automatic start signal l
to all 3 diesel generators.
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b.
The undervoltage relays and b.
Once every scheduled refueling supporting system are operable, outage, the conditions. under which the undervoltage logic system is readired shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each start Dus to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start.
The testing of the undervoltage logic shall demonstrate the operability
'of the 4160 volt load shedding and auto bus transfer circuits.
The simulations shall test both the degraded voltage and the loss of off-site power relays.
c.
The common accident signal logic c.
Once per operating cycle each system, and undervoltage relays diesel generator shall be de-and supporting system are operable.
monstrated operable by simulating both a Icss of off-site power and a degraded voltage condition in conjunction with an accident test signal and verifying:
de-energization of the emergency l
buses and load shedding from the l
emergency buses; the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency buses and sequentially closes all safety load breakers (load breakers in test position):
and that on diesel generator trip i
that safety load breakers on the emergency bus open, and that with an auto-start signal the diesel l
restarts and energizes the i
emergency buses and sequentially l
closes all safety load breakers (load breakers in test postion.
d.
The 600-volt load shedding logic d.
The undervoltage relays for the system is operaole.
start buses shall be calibrated annually for trip and reset voltages and the measurements i
recorded.
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l L1MJTING CONWT'IUli$TUTi DVEWIDN SUR9E1LLANCE REGUIREMENTS 3.9.A.6 Logic Systems (Continued) 4.9.A.6 Logic Systems (Continued',
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600 volt swing bus transfer e.
Once every scheduled refueling circuitry for MCC S01SA and outaga, the condition under which
.50188.
the 600-volt load shedding logic system is required shall be simulated to demonstrate that the load shedding logic system will initiate load shedding on the diesel auxiliary boards, reac MOV boards, and the 600-volt I
shutdown boards.
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f.
Every two months the swing buses i
supplying power to the Low Pres-sure Coolant Injectior. System j
valves shall be tested to assure that the transfer circuits operat as designed.
I B.
Requirements for Continued Operation B.
Requirements for Con (i_rged Operatic With Inoperable Components With Inoperable Comperants j
Whenever the reactor is the Start Continued reactor operations is
& Hot Standby or Run Mode and the permissible with inoperable com-reactor water temperature is greater ponents in accordance with Speci-than 212 F, the availability of aux-fication 3.9.B provided that the iliary electrical power shall be as following increased Surveillance specified in 3.9.A except as speci-Requirements are satisfied.
fied herein.
If the requirements 1
of this Specification cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be ini-l tiated and the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condi-tion within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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3.9.4a
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BASES FOR SURVEILLA'CE REQUIREtENTS 4.9.A.2.e.
Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Following the monthly test of the diesels, the fuel oil transfer pumps shall be operated to refill the day tank and to check the operation of these pumps.
3.
125/250 Volt DC Emergency Power System (Plant Batteries lA and 18)
The plant batteries may deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure is unlikely.
The type of surveillance described in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or inoperable long before it fails.
4.
Emergency 4160 Volt' Buses (lE, 1F, and 1G)
The emergency 4160 volt buses (lE, 1F, and 1G) are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting power to the emergency load.
These buses distribute AC power to the required engineered safety feature equipment.
The normal feeds and backup to the emergency buses (lE, IF, and 1G) are taken from the startup auxiliary transformers.
If neither startup auxiliary transformer is available, buses lE, 1F, and 1G will be energized from the standby diesel generators.
5.
Emergency 600 Volt Buses (IC and ID)
The emergency 600 volt buses (lC and 1D) are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting the emergency load.
6.
Logic Systems The periodic testing of the logic systems will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical systems to running standay readiness with the presence of an accident signal and/or a degraded voltage or LOSP signal.
The periodic simulation of accident signals will confirm the ability of the 600 volt load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 600 volt loads if an accident signal were present and diesel generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.
D.
References 1.
" Proposed IEEE Criteria for Class lE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE Standard No. 308), June, 1969.
2.
American Society for Testing and Materials,1970 Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Part 17.
3.9-12
Georgia Power Company Docket No. 50-366 Operating License tFF-5 Edwin I. Hatch PAJclear Plant Unit 2 Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications The -proposed changes to the Plant Hatch Ur.it 2 Technical Specifications would ce incorporated as follows:
Delete Page Insert Page 3/4 3-63 3/4 3-64 3/4 3-65 3/4 8-4 3/4 8-4 i
B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 3-5 i
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4 INSTRlNENTATION t
3/4.3.8 DEGRADED STATION VOLTAGE PROTECTION INSTRLNENTATION LIMITING C0rOITION FOR OPERATION-3.3.8 The degraded station voltage relay channels shown in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: Conditions 1, 2, and 3.
I ACTIONJ 1
With the number of operable channels one less than the required operable j
channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next scheduled t
i instrument functional test provided a trip signal is placed in the LOSP j
lock-out relay logic for the applicable inoperable channel.
f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Each ' of. the above required degraded station voltage relay channels
- 4. 3. cs shall bc demonstrated operable by performance of the channel calibration and channel functional test operation at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.8-1.
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TABLE 3.3.8-1 l.
DEGRADED STATION VOLTAGE PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION Required Channels Ref. No.
Instrument Operable Required (a)
Channels To Trip, Trip Setting 1
4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus greater than or equal to 2800 volts Undervoltage Relay At 2800 volts time delay will be (Loss of Voltage less than or equal to 6.5 sec.
l Condition) 2 4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus greater than or equal to 3280 volts Undervoltage Relay at 3280 volts time delay will be (Degraded voltage less than or equal to 21.5 sec.
}
Condition) i NOTES FOR TABLE 3.3.6-1 e
6 a.
The column entitled "Ref.
No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be T
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established between items in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.
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i TABLE 4.3.8-1 DEGRADED STATION VOLTAGE PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Instrument Functional Instrument Ref. No.
Instrument Instrument Check Test Minimum Calibration (a)
(b)
Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Frequency 1
4.16 kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ operating l
Unde. voltage Relay cycle (Loss of Voltage Condition) t 2
4/16 kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ operating Undervoltage Relay cycle (Degraded Voltage Condition)
A E
NOTES FOR TABLE 4.3.8-1 a.
The column entitled "Ref.
No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationsnip can be established between items in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.
b.
Surveillance of this instrumentation is required during reactor startup, power operation, and hot
. shutdown.
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.
Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 2764 kW for diesel generator 2A, 2360 kW for diesel generator 18 and 2742 kW for diesel generator 2C without exceeding 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above nominal, whichever is lower.
5.
Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:
a)
Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses; b)
Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads, energizing the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for p 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads.
6.
Verify that on an ECCS actuation test signal, without loss of offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for 2 5 minutes.
7.
Verifying that on a simulated loss of the diesel generator, with offsite power not available, the loads are shed from the i emergency busses and that subsequent loading of the diesel generator is in accordance with design requirements.
8.
Simulating with separate tests a 1) degraded voltage condition and 2) loss of offsite power-in conjunction with an ECCS actuation test signal, and a)
Ver.' rjing de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding for the emergency busses.
1 b)
Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the load sequencer and operatas for y 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.
i c)
Verifying that all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, low lube oil pressure and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with an ECCS actuation signal.
J 3/4 8-4 i
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c INSTRlNENTATION BASES MONITORING INSTRLNENTATION (Continued)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRLNENTATION (Continued)
In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, increasing the frequency of fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation
'is restored to OPERABILITY.
3/4.3.7 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed.
Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage. safety-related components, equipment or structures.
I 3/4 3.8 DEGRADED STATION VOLTAGE PROTECTION INSTRlNENTATION The undervoltate relays shall automatically initite the disconnection of i
offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits have been. exceeded.
This action shall provide voltage protection for the emergency power systems by preventing sustained degraded voltage conditions due to the offsite power source and interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems.
The undervoltage relays have a time delay characteristic that i
provides protection against both a loss of voltage and degraded voltage condition and thus minimizes the effect.of short duration disturbances without exceeding the maximum time delay, including margin, that is assumed in the FSAR accident analyses.
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