ML20052F775
| ML20052F775 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1982 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Georgia Power Co, Oglethorpe Power Corp, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, GA |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052F776 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC 10026, TAC 11262, TAC 12831, TAC 47044, DPR-57-A-088, NPF-05-A-027 NUDOCS 8205130615 | |
| Download: ML20052F775 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES f
0, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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GEORGIA POWER COWANY 3
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, llHTT NO 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 88
.' License No. DPR-57 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
1.
The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al.,
A.
(the licensee) dated July 22, 1977, as supplemented October 9,1980, October 2,1981, December 2,1981, and January 26, 1082, May 21,1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regula-tions set forth in 10 CFR Chapter,I; The facility will operate in confomity with the application, B.
the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized C.
by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common
(
D.
defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part E.
51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements.j have been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-2.
ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:
8205130615 820506 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P
. l (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 88, are hereby incorporated The licensee shall operate the facility in in the license.
accordance with the Technical Specifications.
This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
3.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10fl r
> LA.L Joh *F. Stolz, Chief 4
I Operating Reactors Branc sion of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 6,1982
?
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 88 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendnent number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Insert Remove vii vii viii viii 3.2-1 3.2-l*
3.2-23a 3.2-23b 3.2-49a 3.2-49b 3.2-68 3.2-68 3.2-68a 3.2-69 3.2-69*
3.9-4 3.9-4 s.
3.9-4a 3.9-4a 3.9-12 3.9-12
- The overleaf pages are provided to reintain document conple aness.
LIST OF TABLES Tablo Title P,33 3.1-1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation Requirements 3.1-3.
4.1-1 Reactor Protection System (PRS) Instrumentation Functional 3.1-7
. Test, Functional Test Minimum Frequency, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-1 Instrumentation Which Initiates Reactor Vessel and Primary 3.2-2 Containment Isolation 3.2-2 Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls HPCI 3.2-5 3.2-3 Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls RCIC 3.2-8 3.2-4 Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls ADS 3.2-10 3.2-5 Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls the LPCI Mode of 3.2-11 RHR 3.2-6 Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls Core Spray 3.2-14 3.2-7 Neutron Monitoring-Instrumentation Which Initiates Control
- 3,2-15 Rod Blocks 3.2-8 Radiation Monitoring Systems,Which Limit Radioactivity Release 3.2-18 3.2-20 3.2-9 Instrumentation Which Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2-10 Instrumentation Which Monitors Leakage into the Drywell 3.2-21 3,2-11 Instrumentation Which Provides Surveillance Information
'3.2-22 3.2-12 Instrumentation Which Initiates the Disconnection of
- 3. 2-23a of Offsite Power Sources 3.2-13 Instrunentation Which Initiates Energization by Onsite 3.2-23b Power Sources l
4.2-1 Check, Functional Test, and Calibratton Minimum Frequency 3.2 24 l
for Instrumentation Which Initiates' Reactor Vessel and Primary Containment Isolation
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and Calibtation Minimum Frequency 3.2-27 l
4.2-2 Check, Functional Test, for Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls HPCI I
l 4.2-3 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2 30 for Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls RCIC 4.2-4 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-33 for Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls ADS 4.2-5 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-35 for Instrumentation Which Initiates'or Controls the LPCI Mode of RHR 4.2-6 Check, Functional Test; and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-38
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for Instrumentation Which Initiates or Controls Core Spray i
Amendment No.,ar; 88 yit
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LIST OF TABLES (Concluded) s
-Table Title P_a ge_
4.2-7 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-40' For Neutron Monitoring Instrumentation Which Initiates Con-trol Rod Blocks 4.2-8 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-42 for Radiation Monitoring 4 Systems Which Limit Radioactivity Release 4.2-9 Check and Calibration Minimum Frequency for Instrumentation 3.2-45, Which Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip-4.2-10 Check, Functional Test, and Calibration Minimum Frequency 3.2-46 for Instrumentation Which Monitors Leakage into the Drywell-4.2-11 Check and Calibration Minimum Frequency for Instrumentation 3.2-48 Whi'ch Provides Surveillance Information 4.2-12 Instrumentation Which Initiates the Disconnection of Offsite 3.2-49a Power Sources 4.2-13 Instrumentation Which Initiates Energization by Onsite Power 3.2-49b Sources 3.6.1 Safety Related Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 3.6-10c
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4.5-1 In-Service Inspection Program 3.6-11 3.7-1 Primary Containmerit' Isolation Valves 3.7-16 3.7-2 Testable Penetrations with' Double 0-Ring: Seals
,3.7-21 3.7-3 Testable Penetrations w}th Testable Bellows 3.7-22 s
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3.7-4 Primary Containfuent' Testable I:olatio'n Valves 1
3.7-23 3.13-1 Fire Detectors 3.13-2 y
v 3.13-2 Fire Hose Stations 3.13-9 6.2.?-1 Minimum Shift Crew Composition 6-4 6.o.2-1 Special Reporting Requirements 6-19 w
s Amendment No.g.)ff,M 88 Viii k
1 LIMITING CONDITIO;ts FOR OPERATION SURVEILLAfCE REQUIRE >ENTS 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUhENTATION Applicability
, Applicability The Limiting Conditions for Operation The Surveillance Requirements apply to the plant instrumentation apply to the instrumentation which performs a protective function.
which performs a protective function.
Objective Objective The objective of the Limiting Condi-The objective of the Surveillance tions for Operation is to assure the Requirements is to specify the type operability of protective instrumen-and frequency ~of surveillance to tation.
be applied to protective instru-mentation.
Soecifications Scecifications The Limiting Conditions for Operation The check, functional test, and of the protective instrumentation af-calibration minimum frequency for fecting each of the following protec-protective instrunentation affect-tive actions shall be as indicated in ing each of the following protec-the correspcnding LCO table.
tive actions shall be as indicated in the corresponding SR table.
Protective Action LCO Table SR Table A.
Initiates Reactor Vessel and 3.2-1 4.2-1 Containment Isolation 8.
Initiates or Controls HPCI 3.2-2 4.2-2 C.
Initiates or Controls RCIC 3.2-3 4.2-3 D.
Initiates or Controls ADS 3.2-4 4.2-4 E.
Initiates or Controls the LPCI 3.2-5 4.2-5 Mode of RHR F.
Initiates or Controls Core Spray 3.2-6 4.2-6 G.
Initiates Control Rod Blocks 3.2-7 4.2-7 H.
Limits Radioactivity Release 3.2-8 4.2-8 I.
Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2-9 4.2-9 J.
Monitors Leakage Into the Drywell 3.2-10 4.2-10 K.
Provides Surveillance Information 3.2-11 4.2-11 L.
Initiates Disconne: tion of Offsite 3.2-12 4.2-12 Power Sources M.
Initiates Energization ey Onsite 3.2-13 4.2-13 Power Sources Amendment No. 88
L n
s
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N TABLE 3.2-12 i
INSTRtDENTATION WHICH INITIATES TIE DISCIMECTION OF OFFSITE POWER SOLFCES r+
E Action to be Taken Re@ 1 red Chamels if the NLater of cn Ref. No.
Instrument Operable Required Trip Setting Required Operabis (a)
(b)
Channels To Trip Channels Is Not Met e
1 4.16 kv Emergency Bus 2/Ekis 2/ Bus greater than or equal to 2000 (c) thdervoltage Helay volts. At 2000 volts time delay (Loss of Voltage will be less than or e@el to Condition) 6.5 sec.
2 4.16 kv Emergency Dus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus greater than or egal to 3280 (c)
Undervoltage Relay volts. At 3280 volts time delay (Degraced voltage will be less than or equal to Condition) 21.5 sec.
-m T
L U
i NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-12 The colum entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established a.
between items.in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table 4.2-12.
b.
This in:;trumentation is required to be operable during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown, With the number of operable channels one less than the required operable diennels, operation may proceed c.
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until performance of the next required Instrument functional test provided a trip signal is placed in the LOSP lock-out relay logic for the applicable inoperable channel.
l ee e
l
TABLE 3.2-13 p
k INSTRUMENTATION WHICH INITIATES ENERGIZATION BY g
ONSITE POWER SOURCES E
E Action to be Taken Required Required Chamels if the itsmber of Re f. No.
Instrument Operable Required Trip Setting Required Operable (a)
(b)
Chamels To Trip Channels Is Not Met 1
Start up auxiliary 2
i Trip setting (c) transformer 1C greater than or loss of voltage equal to 3280 condition volts. At 3280 volts trip of relay will be instantaneous (no time delay).
I id FJ is v
NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-13 a.
The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items in Table.3.2-13 on items in Table 4.2-13.
b.
This instrumentation l's required to be operable during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.
c.
With the number of operable channels one less than the required operable chamels, operation may proceed provided the relay is removed from its case.
Removing the relay accomplishes the same action as an operable relay operating to open its trip circuit.
k E
TABLE 4.2-12 INSTRUMENTATION WHICH INITIATES THE DISCONNECTION
==
P OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCES Instrument Functional Instrument Ref. No.
Instrument Instrument Check Test Minimum Calibration (aL (b)
Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Fis;;y 1
4.16 KY Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ operating cycle Undervoltage Relay (Loss of Voltage Condition) 2 4/16'kv Emergency Bus N/A Once/ month Once/ operating Undervoltage Relay cycle (Degraded Voltage Condition)
'?e NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-12 The columm entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be a.
established between items in Table 3.2-12 and items in Table-4.2-12.
b.
Surveillance of this instrumentation is required during reactor startup, power operation, and het shutdown.
9
N g-TABLE 4.2-13 8r+
INSTRUPENTATION MIICH INITIATES ENERGIZATION BY ji ONSITE POWER SOURCES Instrument Functional Instrument Ref. No.
Instrument Instrument Check Test Minimum Calibration (a)
(b)
Minimum Frequency Frequency Minimum Frequency 1
Startup N/A Once/ Month Once/ Operating auxiliary cycle transformer 1C loss of voltage condition t'
NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-13 a.
The column entitled "Ref. No." is only for convenience so that a one-to-one relationship can be established between items in Table 3.2-13 and items in Table 4.2-13.
i b.
Surveillance of this instrumentation is required during reactor startup, power operation, and hot shutdown.
0
BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPFRATTnN 3.2.J.4. Scintillation Detector For Monitoring Radiciodine (Continued)
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level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment.
A sample that is continuously drawn from the primary containment is collected on an iodine filter and monitored by a gamma sensitive scintillation detector.
Radiation levels are read out by a log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room.
A high radiation level alarm and a failure alam are also provided and are annunciated in the control room.
Also, a high-low flow alam is annunicated in the control room.
- 5. GM Tubes for Monitoring Noble Gases A set of GM tubes contained in an instrument rack are used to monitor the release of noble gases in the drywell and torus.
A high radiation level reading is indicative of a leak in the nuclear system process barrier in the primary containment.
A sample that's continuously drawn from the primary containment is passed through a shielded sample chamber which contains the beta sensitive GM tubes.
Radiation levels are read out by a log rate meter and recorded on a strip chart located in the control room.
A high radiation level alarm and failure alarm are provided and are annunciated in the control room.
Also, a high-flow alarm is annunciat.ed in the control room.
K. Instrumentation Which Provides Surveillance Infomation (Table 3.2-11)
For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2-11, there are two channels of instrumentation except for the control rod positions indicating system.
By comparing readings between the two channels, a near continuous surveillance of instrument perfomance is available.
Any significant deviation in readings will initiate an early recalibration, thereby maintaining the quality of the instrument readings.
The hydrogen and oxygen analyzing systems consist of two redundant, separate systems and are each capaole of analyzing the hydrogen and oxygen content of the drywell-torus simultaneously.
They are designed to be completely testable at both the analyzer rack and in the control room. With an oxygen concentration of less than 4% by volume, a flammable mixture with hydrogen is not possible.
L. Instrumentation Which Initiates Disconnection of Offsite Power Sources (Table 3.2-12)
The undervoltay relays shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits have been exceeded.
This action shall provide voltage protection for the emergency power systems by preventing sustained degraded voltage conditions due to the offsite power source and interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems.
The undervoltage relays have a time delay characteristic that provides protection against both a loss of voltage ano degraded voltage conoition and thus minimizes the effect of short duration disturoances without exceeding the maximum time delay, including margin, that is assumed in the FSAR accident analyses.
Amendment No. E, 88 3.2-68
BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION M.
Instrumentation which Initiates Energization by Onsite Power Sources (Table 3.2-13)
The undervoltage relays shall automatically trip the loss of offsite power (LOSP) lockout relays if voltage is lost on the emergency buses and low voltage is sensed on start-up transformer 1C (SUT 1C).
This lockout will, if a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) has previously occurred, cause energization of the emergency 4160 volt buses by the Diesel Generators (D/Gs).
If the LOSP and LOCA occur simultaneously, the lockout relay will provide a permissive allowing D/G output breaker closure when the D/G voltage is up to normal.
The undervoltage relays will have no time delay.
The absence of time delay provides a faster response time if the diesel generator has been previously initiated and prevents an additional time delay if it has not.
This scheme prevents the connection of the D/G to the offsite power source.
3.2.1 References 1.
FSAR Appendix G, Plant MJClear Safety Operational Analysis 2.
FSAR Section 7.3, Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System 3.
FSAR Section 14, Plant Safety Analysis 4.
FSAR Section 6, Core Standby Cooling Systems 5.
FSAR Section 14.4.4, Refueling-Accident 6.
FSAR Section 6.5.3, Integrated ' Operation of the Core Standby Cooling Systems 7.
FSAR Section 6.5.3.1, Liquid Line Breaks 8.
10 CFF. 100 l
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Amendment No. 88
u BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE 'REQUIRDIENTS 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRU$ENTATION The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2-1 thru 4.2'-13 will be f'unctionally l
tested and calibrated at regularly " scheduled intervals.
The same design re-
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liability goal as the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 is generally applied for all application 3 of o..e-out-of-two-taken-twice logic. Therefore, on-off sensors are tested cace every three months, and bi-stable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once,per week.
Those instruments which, when tripped, result in a rod block have their contacts arranged in a one-out-of-n logic, and all are capable of being bypassed. For such a tripping arrangement with bypass capability provided, there is an optimum test interval that should be maintained in order to maximize the reliability of a given channel (Reference 1).
This takes account of the fact that testing degrades re-liability and the optimum interval between tests is approximately given by:
1 = ' 2 t.
r-Where:
i = the optimum interval between tests.
t= the time the trip contacts are disabled from performing their function while the test is in progress.
r = the expected failure rate of the relays.
To test the trip relays requires that the channel be bypassed, the test made, and the system returned to its initial state.
It is assumed this task requires an es-timated 30 minutes to complete in a thorough and workmanlike manner and that the relays have a failure rate of 10-6 failures per hcur. Using this. data and the above operation, the optimum test interval is:
3 i= h(0.5) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
=
\\/10-6
% 42 days A test interval of once-per-month will be used initially.
The sensors and electronic apparatus have not been included here as these are ana-log devices with readouts in the control room and the sensors and electronic ap-paratus can be checked by compari, son with other like instruments.
The check's which are made'on a daily basis are adequate to assure operability of the sensors and i
electronic apparatus, and the test interval given above provides for cot'imum test-ing of the relay circuits.
The above calculated test interval optimizes each individual channel, considering it to be independent of all others.
As an example, assume that there are two chan-nels with an individual technician assigned to cach.
Each technician tests his channel at the optimum frequency, but the two technicians are not allowed to com-municate so that one can advise the other that his channel is under test.
Under these conditions, it is possible for both channels to b6 under test simultaneous-ly.
Now, assume that the technicians are required to communicate and that two Amendment No. 88 3.2-69
cx i
- BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTA1 ION (Continued) channels are never tested at the same time.
Ferbidding simultaneous testing improves the availability of the system over that which would be achieved by testing each channel independently. These one out of n trip systems ill be tested one at a time in order' to take advantage of this in-herent improvement in availability.
Optimizing each channel independently may not truly optimize the system consider-ing the overall rules of system operation. However, true system optimization is a complex problem. The optimums are broad, not sharp, and optimizing the individ-ual channels is generally adequate for the system.
The formula given above minimizes the unavailability of a single channel which must be bypassed during testing. The minimization of the unavailability is illustrated by Curve No.1 of Figure 4.2-1 which assumes that a channel has a failure rate-of 0.1 x 10-6/ hour and that 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is required to test "it.
The unavailability is a minimum at a test interval 1, of 3.16 x 103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br />.
If two similar channels are used in a one-out-of-two configuration, test interval for minimum unavailability changes as a function of the rules for testing.' The simplest case is to test each one independent'of the other.
In'this case, there is assumed to be a finite probability that both may be bypassed at one time. This case is shown by Curve No.2.
Note that the unavailability is lower as expe'eted for" a redundant system and the minimum occurs at the same test interval. Thus, if the two channels are tested independently, the equation on the preceding page yields the test interval for minimum unavailabi,lity.
A more usual case is that the testing is not done independently.
If both channels are bypassed and tested at the same time, the result is shown in Curve No. 3.
Note that the minimum occurs at about 40,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, much longer than for Cases 1 and 2.
Also, the minimum is not nearly as low as Case 2 which indicates that,this method of testing does not take full advantage of the redundant channel. Bypassing both channels for simultaneous testing should be avoided.
The most likely case would be to stipulate that one channel be bypassed, tested. and restored, and then immediately following, the second channel be bypassed, tested, and restored. This is shown by Curve No. 4.
Note that there is no true minimum, i
The curve does have a definite knee and very little reduction in system unavailabil-ity is achieved by testing at a shorter interval than computed by the equation for a single channel.
The best test procedure of all those examined is to perfectly stagger the tests.
That is if the test interval is four months, test one or the other channel every l
two months. This is shown in Curve No. 5.
The difference between Cases 4'and 5' is negiligible. There may be other arguments, however, that more strongly support j
the perfectly staggered tests, including reductions in human error.
l The conclusions to be drawn are these:
- 1. A,one-out-of-n system may be treated the same as a single channel in terms of choosing a test interval; and l
ii. More than one channel should not be bypassed for testing at any cr.e time, i
3170 n
LIMITING CONDIIIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.9.A.6. Emergency 250 Volt DC to 600 Volt AC Inverters (Continued) b.
Once every scheduled refueling
- outage, the emergency 250 volt DC/600 volt AC inverters shall be subjected to a
load test to demonstrate operational readiness.
3.9.A.7 Logic Systems 4.9.A.7 Logic Systems The following logic systems shall The logic systems shall be tested in be operable:
the manner and frequency as follows:
a.
The common accident signal a.
Each division of the common logic system is operable, accident signal logic system shall be tested every scheduled refueling outage to demonstrate that it will function on actuation of the core spray system to provide an automatic start signal to all 3 diesel generators.
b.
The undervoltage relays and b.l. Once every scheduled refueling supporting system are operable.
outage, the conditions under which the undervoltage logic system is required shall be simulated with an undervoltage on each start bus to demonstrate that the diesel generators will start.
The testing of the undervoltage logic shall demonstrate the operability of the 4160 volt load ' shedding and auto bus transfer circuits.
The simulations shall test both the f
degraded voltage and the loss of off-site power relays.
- 2. Once per month, the relays which initiate energization of the l
emergency buses by the Diesel Generators when voltage is lost on the. emergency buses and start-up transformer IC, will be l
functionally tested.
c.
The common accident signal logic c.1. Once per operating cycle each system, and undervoltage relays diesel generator shall be de-and supportin;; system are operable, monstrated operaole by simulating both a loss of off-site power and a degraded voltage condition in conjunction with an accident test Amendment No.X X 83 DN * #N 3,g,4 i
t
LIMITIflG C0flDITI0f4S FOR OPERATI0fl SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 3.9.A.7 Logic Systems (Continued) 4.9.A.7 Logic Systems (Continued) de-energization of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses; the diesel starts from arrbient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency buses and sequentially closes all safety load breakers (load breakers in test position);
and that on diesel generator trip that safety load breakers on the emergency bus open, and that with an auto-start signal the diesel restarts and energizes the emergency buses and sequentially closes all safety load breakers
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(load breakers in test position).
2.
The undervoltage relays for the start buses shall be calibrated annually. for trip and reset voltages and the measurements recorded.
d.
The 600-volt load shedding d,
Once every scheduled refueling logic system is operable.
outage, the condition under which the 600-volt load shedding logic system is required shall be-simulated to demonstrate that the load shedding logic system will initiate. load shedding on the diesel auxiliary boards, react MOV boards, and the 600-volt shutdown boards.
Every two months the swing buses e.
600 volt swing bus transfer f*
circuitry for MCC S018A and supplying power to the Low Pres-S018B.
sure Coolant Injection System valves shall be tested to assure that the transfer circuits operate as designed.
B. Recuirements for Continued Operation 8.
Recuirements for Continued Operation witn Inoceraole Comconents With Inoceraole Components Whenever the reactor is in the Start Continued I1 actor operation is
& Hst Standby or Run Moce and the peImissible with inoperable com-reactor water temperature is greater ponents in accordance with Speci-than 2120F, the availability of aux-fication 3.9.B provided that the iliary electrical power snall be as following increased Surveillance specified in 3.9. A, except as speci-Requirements are satisfied.
flea herein.
If the requirements of this Specification cannot be met, an orderly snutdown shall be ini-tlated and the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condi-tion within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Amendment tio. #, 88 3.9-Aa
BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS o.9.A.2.0.
Fuel Oil Transfer Punos Following the monthly test of the diesels, the fuel oil transfer pumps shall be operated to refill the day tank and to cfeck the operation of these pumps.
3.
125/250 volt DC Emergency Power System (Plant Batteries lA and 153)
The 5
- stteries may deteriorate with time, but precipitous failur
.likely.
The type of surveillance described in this speci
, that which has been demonstrated through experience to p.-
'7dication of a cell becoming irregular or inoperable long
/ alls.
4.
Emera.
260 Volt Buses (IE, IF, and 1G)
The et rgency 4160 volt buses (lE, 1F, and 1G) are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting power to the emergency load.
These buses distribute AC power to the required engineered safety feature equipment.
The normal feeds and backup to the emergency buses (lE, IF, and 1G) are taken from the startup auxiliary transformers.
If neither startup auxiliary transformer is available, buses lE,1F, and 1G will be energized from the standby diesel generators.
5.
Emercency 600 Volt Buses (lC and ID)
The emergency 600 volt buses (lC and 1D) are monitored to assure readiness and capability of transmitting the emergency load.
6.
Emercenev 250 Volt DC to 600 volt AC Inverters The emergency 250 volt DC to 600 volt A0 inverters are monitored' to assure readiness and capability of transmitting power to the ema.rgency Joads.
7.
Logic Systems The periodic testing of the logic systems will verify tne ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical systems to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal and/or a degraded voltage or LOSP signal.
The periodic testing of the relays whien initiate energi2ation of the emergency buses by the olesel generators when voltage is lost on startup transformer IC will verify operaollity of these relays.
The periodic simulation of accident signals will confirm the ability of the 600 volt loaa shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 600 volt loads if an accident sigial were present and diesel generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.
D.
RPS MC Sets The surveillance requirements for the RPS power supply equipment will ensure the timely detection of potential component failures that might be caused by a I
sustained over-voltage or under-voltage conditions.
l E.
References l
l 1.
" Proposed IEEE Criteria for Class lE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE Standard No. 308), June, 1969.
2.
American Society for Testing and Materials,1970 Annual Sock of ASTM Standards, Part 17.
Ord? dtd "/'/ m, bu 3.9-12
- -