ML20031A339
| ML20031A339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Millstone, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Oconee, Mcguire, Indian Point, Catawba, Harris, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Grand Gulf, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Prairie Island, Columbia, Brunswick, Surry, North Anna, Turkey Point, Duane Arnold, Robinson, San Onofre, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Quad Cities, Zion, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000200, 05000496, 05000497, 05000502, 05000471, 05000484, Washington Public Power Supply System, Satsop, Perkins, Cherokee, Green County  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1981 |
| From: | Pollard R, Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CLI-80-21, TAC-42493, NUDOCS 8109230228 | |
| Download: ML20031A339 (23) | |
Text
f e
- C.
.. m..o
- : TACN RUL. F R M M t., h E b b s
ss
{ f.2 3
iL.-
l-4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
PETITION FOR EMERGENCY
)
q[iffrL
.ai',
and REMEDIAL ACTION
)
Og In the Matter of
)
~
)
{
o,4 g
A 8
(/
f COMMISSION MEMORANDUM
)
y
!887 g2' and ORDER
)
i N-UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' C.
^
D RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR EXTENSION g\\
OF DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH
- 99. /
CLI-80-21 AND NRC STAFF RESPONSE THERETO Introduction On June 22, 1981, 18 Licensees moved to extend the CLI-80-21 deadline for completion of the environmental qualification review from June 30, 1982 to July 29, 1983 On July 31, 1981, the NRC Staff responded by recommending a similar one year general extension and the granting of authority to the Staff to permit further extension beyond that date with no limitation on the final compliance deadline.
Both requests should be rejected.
Background
In order to fulfill its responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2011 et seq., and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
5801 et seq., the T)So 3 Cornmis s io n must have " reasonable assurance" that public health 5
and safety are not endangered by its licensing actions.
The' f
8109230228 810918 PDR ORO ECIUC
\\/
Commission's responsibility does not cease with' the issuance of a licence to operate a nuclear power plant.
Indeed, the Commission has affirmed on many occasions that "...public safety is the first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a 5
nuclear facility."
Power Reactor Development Corp.
v.
International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
396, 402 (1961).
Fundamental to the Commission's regulation of nuclear power plants is the principle that safety systems which are required to function in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident
)
must be capable of performing their intended functions in spite of exposure to the environment caused by the accident.
Confirmation of the ability of the safety system equipment to perform its intended functions under the environmental conditions j
to which it is exposed during the accident constitutes environmental qualification.
The Commission's regulations which set forth the requirements for environmental qualification are General Design Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, 4
Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR i
50.55a(h).
These regulations must be met as a condition for issuing a license.
In CLI-80-21, after two and a half years of consideration, the Commission specified actions which it believed would i
"... ensure that the Commission's regulations concerning... environmental qualification are met." (11 NRC 707, 721.)
I l
l UCS disputed the assertions made by the NRC Staff during the proceeding culminating in CLI-80-21 that the Commission's regulations concerning environmental qualification were met, but did not prevail, although the language of the Commission's decision on this question is less than entirely clear.
In its l
April 13, 1978, decision (CLI-78-6,7 NRC 400, 1978) the Commission held that its regulations were met.
However, as noted l
supra, the Commission subsequently ordered further actions to
" ensure" that the regulations were met.
Furthermore, the Commission directed the Staff to make a " technical judgment" about continued operation of a plant when faced with situations where qualification document is pocr, where existing I
documentation raises questions about the ability of the equipment to perform its intended function in accident condit' ions, or where the Staff finds that the Commission's regulations concerning f
environmental qualification are not met.
(11 NRC 707, 715, 721)
The Staff was also " requested" to provide bimonthly reports of progress on its review of responses to Bulletin 79-01B.
(11 NRC 707, 714).
The Commission stated that the Staff must not tolerate the type of incomplete and inadequate licensee responses received in response to earlier IE bulletins and circulars and l
should exercise its power to order licensees to comply with bulletins and circulars.
(11 NRC 707, 713) l l
I
i Ana*;ysis of Safety Issues UCS believes that the Cesmission, after reviewing its two previous decisions in this proceeding 1# and the bases theretare, must decide whether new information provided by the Staff in itsJuly 31, 1981 response reveals risks not previously perceived by the Commiesion and, therefore, not considered in formulating CLI-80-21.
Specifically, the Staff has informed the Commission that environmental qualification has not been demonstrated for approximately 80% of the safety-related electrical equipment in operating plants which must operate in the harsh accident environment.
In addition, the Staff estimates that between 15%
and 40% of the safety-related electrical equipment now installed in operating plants, and which must function in the harsh ace'ident environment, will have to be replaced.
These are truly remarkable statistics.
Although the Staff does not elaborate, presumably the equipment must be replaced because it cannot be demonstrated that it is capable of performing the required safety functions during an accident.
UCS submits that unde' these circumstances, the question properly before the Commission is not whether the June 30, 1982 deadline for demonstrating environmental qualification should be extended, but whether any action other than an immediate shutdown of the operating plants can provide the requisite reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public are not endangered.
1/
7 NRC 400 (April 13, 1978) and 11 NRC 707 (May 23, 1980)
I the Staff's filing of July 31, 1981, implies that there
~
remains the passibility that the licensees will be able to justify continued operation of the '.lants.
The Staff for its part, assumes only a ministerial posture and ignores the Commission's explicit directions 1) that the Staff should i
exercise its powers to order licensees to respond to bulletins promptly and completely and 2) that the Staff should make a technical judgment about continued operation.
Apparently the Staff declines to do either.
It has given licensees at least three bites at the apple.
First, information was ordered to be submitted by November 1,
1980.
Second, when that information was found inadequate (both with respect to enviro k :r:a1 qualification information and justification for continued operation) the Staff issued l
" preliminary" evaluations and again asked licensees for the i
missing environmental qualification information or justification l
for continued operation.
Third, when the licensees did not identify all deficiencies and provide adequate justification for
. continued operation, the Staff issued "rinal" safety evaluation reports and gave licensees an additional 90 days to supply the information originally " ordered" to be supplied by November 1980.
l We are aware of no enforcement action taken by the Staff against licensees that failed to comply with the orders.
Furthermore, I
the' Staff apparently awaits an admission by a licensee that continued operation cannot be justified before it will exercise its " technical judgment" and order the plant shut down.
The wait I
will certainly be a long one.
. We reject the Staff's totally unsupported implication that continued operation of'any plant in which 15% to 40% of the safety-related electrical equipment needs to be replaced can be justified.
In fact, if such justification could be supplied, the equipment would not need to be replaced and the question of extending the compliance deadline would not arise.
The Staff, in its filing of July 31, 1981, has given the Commission no specific information which would illustrate the magnitude of the environmental qualification deficiencies and their safe' significance.
For example, the Commission should find it significant to learn that among the safety-related electrical equipment for which environmental quelification has
~not been demonstrated are electrical connectors, terminal blocks, and conta'inment electrical penetrations.
In the course of the proceeding that led to CLI-78-6 and CLI-80-21, the Commission received repeated assurances from the Staff that all. operating plants having such components had been identified, and that the components were environmentally qualified or adequate justification for continued operation pending qualification had been found.
Even a cursory review of the recent " final" safety evaluation reports (SERs) on environmental qualification will reveal that those Staff assurances were not well-founded.
If the Commission performs a more detailed review of the
" final" SERs, the extent of the-safety problem will begin to be apparent.
The list of equipment with environmental qualification deficiencies encompasses far more equipment than connectors, terminal blocks and penetrations.
For example, at Three Mile
_7_
Island, Unit 1,
qualification deficiencies exist in the redundant following safety systems:2/
equipment in at least the Emergency Core Cooling Core Flood Containment Spray Auxiliary Feed..ater Nuclear Service Water Containment Isolation Delay Heat Removal Containment Cooling The equipment involved includes pump motors, valve motor operators, pressure switches, electrical distribution centers, solenoid valves, limit switches, instruments to measure various temperatures, pressures and levels, cables for instrumentation, control and power circuits, electrical connectors, terminal blocks, containment penetrations, and heat shrink tubing.
The deficiencies range from some equipment which lacks qualification j
l l
"only" with respect to aging to other equipment which has 1
deficiencies involving qualification time, temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical spray, radiation and aging.
When one considers that all of these deficiencies apply to the same piece l
2/ Safety Evaluation Report for the Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Three hile Island Unit 1,
March 24, 1981.
1
of equipment, the Staff's statement that " full" environmental qualification has not betn demonstrated is put into proper perspective.
Whatever " partial" qualification has been demonstrated is obviously insignificant in the case of such equipment.
We have observed other deficiencies in the information supplied by licensees which have not been addressed in the Staff's safety evaluations.or its July 31, 1981 filing in this proceeding.
For example, the licensees have not identified all the equipment which must be qualified, the accident profiles understate the severity of the environment, and the effects of environment-induced failures in a given safety system on a different safety system have not been assessed.
If the Commission decides to accept the petition for deadline extension, UCS requests an opportunity to present its testimony setting forth detailed explanations of such deficiencies in the Staff's evaluations.
The Staff and Licensee Requests Should be Denied We have given the examples above solely to illustrate the extent of the safety issues ignored by the petitioners for a deadline extension and obscured by the Staff.
the licensees' petition has been presented to'the Commission as if it had no significant safety implications and is merely a matter of meeting some more or less arbitrary deadline.
In fact, as the licensee
-e
,+
e,,,
r a and Staff filings reveal to one familiar with the history of this proceeding and as a review of the SER's will confirm beyond any question, it is now much clearer than during the earlier phases of this proceeding that a large majority of vital safety equipment in operating plants cannot be shown to ae qualified to survive an accident environment and that, by the Staff's own reckoning, up to 40% of it will have to be replaced.
This represents a massive failure of operating plants to meet the minimum safety standards mandated by tt.e Commissfon's regulations.
As the Commission is well aware as a result of its review of this issue in connection with the UCS petition, the DOR guidelines and NUREG-0588 (in addition to Reg. Guide 1.89) are the first real attempt to adopt standards which ensure compliance with General Design Criteria 1 and 4.~
Previous " standards" were little more than broad platitudes and this proceeding confirms their grass inadequacy.
The plain fact is that many, perhaps all plants are operating today with no assurance that the consequences of an accident could be mitigated.
Under these circumstances, how can the Commission justify a blanket extension i
of time?
l The Staff asks you not only to generally extend the deadline f
for a year, but also to allow the Director of the Division of I
Licensing to grant further extensions beyond that date with no final limit whatever on compliance.
The extensions from the l
Director could proceed ad infinitum thereafter for " good cause."
Thus, what is being requested in reality is the removal of any effective Commission-mandated deadline.
This request makes a l
l
~
e s
- sham of this proceeding and of the Commission's ability to enforce its own orders.
CLI-80-21 set up a mechanism by which the Commission itself would closely oversee compliance with environmental qualification standards.
This was necessitated by the discovery, during 2 1/2 years of review of the UCS petition, that "some" licensees had
" ignored the responsibility"E emphasized in the Commission's original order and the many I&E circulars and bulletins.
The 4
Staff was told that it "must not tolerate" such responses and powers.E The Commission gave should exercise its enforcement unusually detailed direction to the Staff concerning hos it should review licensees' material, when it should issue LER'S, that it should do case-by-case evaluations when documentation is lacking, etc.
In addition, it specifically directed the Staff to
" keep the Commission and the public apprised" of its findings and provide bimonthly reports.
Now that the facts demonstrate a far greater problem than the l
Staff or industry were previously willing to acknowledge, the i
Staff's response is to ask the Commission to retreat from its c3cse oversight and turn the responsibility bruk to the Staff.
That is precisely what the Commission should not do.
There can be little dispute that the only effective forward movement on this matter has come as a direct result of the 3/ CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 712.
4/ Id. at 713
r l
^
Commission's order in CLI-80-21.
Up to that time, licensees had shown little.or no commitment to meeting the Staff's circulara and bulletins and the Staff had shown itself unwilling to take the enforcement sction necessary to cause compliance.
Abrogation of CLI-80-21, which in reality is what the Staff has recommended, would simply invite a repeat of that performance and would represent an admission of the Commission's failure, after almost four years of trying, to enforce its regulations.
The Staff's justification for requesting this action is that it " believes that those immediate actions necessary to assure safe operation have been taken..."E We can find no support whatever for this remarkable conclusion in the Staff's filing.
Indeed, it is directly contradicted by the Staff's previous statement that "licencee submittals to date'do not satisfactorily identify all deficiencies or provide complete justification for interim operation."6/
Such " beliefs" that apparent safety problems are not genuine have appeared, w-ithout support, previously in the history of this proceeding.
These " beliefs" have repeatedly been proven l
wrong.
The Commission will remember, for example, the following:
l 5/ Staff Recommendations Concerning Extension of June 30, 1982 Deadline for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, at 9 (Hereinafter, " Staff Recommendations")
6/ Id. at 2.
i l
The surveys conducted by the Staff constitute a preliminary audit of the adequacy and qualification of certain safety-related electrical equipment in operating plants, and it is the Staff's belief that the findings would be similar for other electrical components in safety systems located inside containment in those plants.
(NRC Staff Report on Union of Concerned Scientists' Petition f'r Emergency and Remedial Action" Dec. 15, 1977, at 60.)
In fact, there is no basis to conalude that the actions necessary to assure safe operation have been taken.
At the most, with respect to some but not all unqualified or undocumented equipment, the licensees have stated that they believe operation can be continued.
Thu e is no evidence that the Staff, having recognized the inadequacy of these self-serving assertions, has done anything to itself assess whether continued operation is justified on safety grounds.
Indeed, 90 a'dditional days subsequent to issuance of the final SERs in May and June have been granted to the licensees to try again to demonstrate a basis for continued plant operation.
The Staff's " belief" that this will be successfully accomplished can be given little weight considering the history and current status of this issue.
One further comment should be made concerning the Staff's filing.
It 13 stated that replacement of the required amount of electrical equipment "will typically require at least a two-month period of time, or the equivalent of c5out two refueling outages."1 According to the data in NUREG-0020, the average time attributed to refueling was two months in both 1979 and 1980 7/ Staff Recommendations at 2, emphasis added.
and the average outage time attributed 0 a l'1 scheduled shutdowns (including refueling) vas twelve weeks in 1979 and thirteen weeks in 1980.
Thus, the Staff is incorrect.
The licensees' petition is even more vague and unsupported than the Staff's recommendations.
It asks the Commission to grant " generic relief"E to 18 licensees without providing one scrap of factual information describing the status of environmental qualification in the particular plants, the amount and type of currently unqualified equipment, the amount and type of equipment that purportedly cannot be qualified by June 30, 1982 and the technical basis for assurance that the particular plants can be safely operated now and until environmental qualification is achieved.
In the absence of such information, the Commission is asked to blindly authorize an extension.
Even if one were to accept the incorrect premise implicit in the licansees' Petition that the only relevant consideration now is the ability of licensees to meet the deadline, the Petition does not even provide factual support for a conclusion that licensees are not "able" (or should not, with the exercise of due diligence, have been able) to meet the deadline.
The affidavit of Wade Larson said to support ;he assertions contained in the Petition is an essentially valueless document 1/ Petition for Extension of Deadline for Compliance with CLI-80-21 June 22, 1981 at 2.
(Hereinart4r " Licensee Petition").
Presumably this " generic relief" would extend to all licensees.
insofar as providing any useful information to the Commission.
First, Mr. Larson states no qualifications whatsoever.
There is absolutely no basis provided in the affidavit upon which one could conclude that he possesses the qualifications to make any independent evaluation of the steps needed to environmentally qualify equipment, the adequacy of the regulatory guidance provided to the licensees, the amount or type of equipment for which avai1 ability is a problem or any other pertinent issue.
He s
- mply cites 'd e title.
On the basis of his " personal knowledge and professional judgment" (the qualifications for which are not disclosed), and inquiries to "several vendors" left unnamed, he concluded that the June 30, 1982 deadline could not be met, a conclusion which he confirmed by surveying the 18 licensees to obtain their
" independent judgments." The judgments of the licensees, gathered for the specific purpose of writing an affidavit to support their own motion for an extension of the deadline can hardly be classified as independent or probative in any way.
Hr. Larson gives two reasons why the deadline cannot be met:
- 1) lack of " appropriate regulatory guidance" and 2) unavailability of components.
He stops here, providing no I
examples, no details and no factual information at all.
As the Commission is aware, the regulatory guidance contained in the DOR guidelines and NUREG-0588 is vastly more detailed than that which l
existed previously.
It gives the licensees far greater guidance l
l l
t
- than any previous document.E Horeover, the Staff'has had many meetings around the country to answer licensees' questions and has responded to them authoritatively in writing.
An unprecedented effort to ensure the full understanding of the industry has been *
'ertaken on this issue.
If the licensees have a quarrel, it is not really with the level or amount of regulatory guidance they have been provided, but with t,he substance of the criteria.
It is not that the guidance was not " app.*opriate" but that it was not met.
The second ground asserted -- unavailability 7f components --
is impossible to assess absent any specifics.
Precisely what I
components are unavailable?
What percentage of the total does this represent?
What efforts have been made to obtain them?
If some limited number of necessary components is genuinely unavailable, that is no reason to extend the compliance deadline generally.
At the very most, it might argue for selactive extensior.s for those components only, provided that it can be shown that the particular plant in question can be operated 9/ The Commission contrasted the previous standard with the new
...[T]he standard does not specify the accident ones as follcws: "
conditions which the electrical equipment must meet.
There are no specific requirements to maintain document files and no specific requirements concernfug margin, aging and other needed equipment specifications.
It is in fact, a document which briefly and broadly aescribes how to qualify any equipment, electrical or otherwise.
The DOR guidelines and NUREG-0588 substantia 11y improve upon the 1971 standard and should provide greate assurance that equipment is adequately qualified." 11 NRC 700,711.
without undue risk to public safety in the interim.1E The licensees sssert further that the extension should be granted because when it issued CLI-80-21, the Commission I
"obviously" " foresaw a much simpler Staff review than has been necessary."11 They seek to assign the delays to the Staff, which they say " simply has not been afforded the time necessary to complete its tasks on the schedule contemplated."1 This is an ingenious variation on the Emperor-has-no-clothes theme.
It is the licensees' inability to demonstrate environmental qualification of safety equiptasnt that makes the task not a
" simple" one.
In any case, it is not accurate that the Commission foresaw a simple task at the time it issued CLI-80-21.
On the contrary, the Commission was well aware of and specifically discussed in the decision the broadly unsatisfactory state of the environmental qualification review to date, including the i
observations that the' issue " remains a serious problem" and that "almost none" of the equipment reviewed meets the guidelines, "which include the areas which any qualification judgment must I
10/ This finding is necessary in light of the requirement of CLI-80-21 that~in cases of poor documentation or where questions exist about the ability of equip.;ent to perform its function,'the l
staff must make "a technical judgment regarding continued l
operation." 11 NRC 707. 715.
11/ Licenseo Petition at 6.
12/ Id.
'l L.
/
address."11 The Commission proceeded to give much greater detail concerning the extent to which qualification had not been shown.11#
The Commission acted with knowledge of the scope of the action yet needed to assure safety.
The deadline -- over two years from issuance of CLI-80-21 and four and a half (4 1/2) years from issuance of the first IE circulars and bulletina --
provides more than sufficient time to meet the requirements, particular1y considering the aisks associated with allowing operation of these plants with unqualified safety equipment and the fact that compliance with GDC 4 is a necessary condition of licensing.
In this connection, it should be noted that the 18 petitioners include three which do not have operating licenses.11 Although the licensees do not so state, the apparent effect of the extension with respect to these utilities would be to permit them to receive operating licenses without fully demonstrating environmental qualification -- otherwise, an extension would be meaningless.
In our view, this would be manifestly contrary to law and to the Commission's precedents.
There can be no principle more clearly established than that a facility cannot be licensed if it does not comply with all applicabl's regulations or if there has been no positive showing that it does comply.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 6 AEC 520, 528-529 (1973).
This principle cannot be waived on grounds of inconvenience.
12/ CLI-80-21. 11 NRC 707.713 14/ Id. At 713-715.
15/ Affidavit of W.
Wade Larson, at fn.
p.2.
More'over, to our knowledge at least one (and quite possibly others) of the nar4ed construction permit holders -- Texas Utilities Generating Company, for Comanche Peak -- explicitly committed to meet Regulatory Guide 1.89 as a condition to receiving the construction permit.,That Regulatory Guide, which adopts 1EEE Std. 323-1974, contains in essence the same criteria as the DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588.18' Thus, it is now requesting to be permitted to renege on a commitment which was part of the basis for granting its permit.
Conclusion The Commission should not accept the licensees' petition or the Staff's recommendations.
Rather than providing reasons for allowing plante to operate for extended periods without assur'ance that safety equipment can survive an accident, these documents disclose a situation calling for immediate remedial action.
The Commission is now faced with evidence that 80% of the electrical equipment in these plants has not been shown to be qualified and that 15-40% will have to be replaced.
There is no longer any room for argument that the lack of qualification was simply a paperwork or documentation problem.
i Prior to the issuance of CLI-80-21, UCS did not (nor do we now) request the Commission itself to undertake the detailed technical evaluations necessary to determine whether each piece l
of safety-related equipment is environmentally qualified and, if 16/ See CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 710-712.
l l
i
- 1
_19 l
l not, whether continued plant operation could be justified.
Rather, we believed that the evidence showed that immedia'te shutdown of the operating plants was required to protect public health and safety and that, after the Commission specified the criteria or standards by which compliance with the environmental qualification regulations would be judged, individual licensing boards could make the determination of whether the plants were safe to operate.
We believe that the evidence now before you shows beyond reasonable dispute that most if not all operating plants pose an undue risk to public health et;d safety.
The Staff has had ample opportunity to take responsible action.
The following relief is now more than ever appropriate.
The Commission should direct the Staff to issue orders restricting blant operation to those modes of operation (i.e.,
cold shutdown, hot shutdown, power level limitation) where, in the event of an accident, public health and safety are not dependent on any safety system which contains equipment i
identified in the Staff's final SERs on environmental l
qualification as having qualification deficiencies for which the licensee has not provided acceptable justification for continued,
(
unrestricted plant operation.
1 j
These restrictions should remain in effect until such time as compliance with those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion 4 which relate to environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment is demonstrated.
Demonstration of such compliance should consist of Staff findings that the equipment has been qualified in accordance with the DOR
l Guidelines or NUREG-0588.
(NUREG-0588 shall be used for replacement equipment unless there are sound reasons to the contrary.)
Upon the making of these findings by the Staff, the operating restrictions imposed could be removed provided, however, that an opportunity for a hearing should be provided.
The time period for requesting a hearing should end not less than 30-days after the licensee's complete documentation and the Staff's determination that the equipment is qualified are made available in the Public Document Room and the local Public Document Room and notice of opportunity for hearina is published in the Federal Register and local newspapers.
If a hearing is requested and held, the sole question to be decided by the Board is whether the electrical equ 9 ment has been qualified in accordance with the DOR guidelines or NUREG-0588.
If the Board decides in the negative, the original restriction shall be immediately reimposed and shall remain in effect until the Board decides in the affirmative.
We are aware that shutdown of the affected plants will be viewed by the Commission as a drastic measure and that in the past such action has been taken exceedingly rarely.
In the event that it does not occur here, the Commission must at a minimum require the Staff to come forward within a very short period of time with a sc'rutable, technically-supported evaluation which
(
provides a basis for concluding that each plant is safe to operate despite the fact that equipment important to safety is not qualified.
This is no more than what is already required by l
1 l
N<
__________7__________________________-_-______________-
- the terms of CLI-80-21, which calls for a "tect.aical judgment regarding continued operation"17/ when documentation is poor or raises questions about the ability of equipment to perform in accideret conditions.
As the Commission stressed:
These deadlines, however, do not excuse a licensee from the obliga-tion to modify or replace inad-equate equipment promptly. 11 NRC 707, 715 This injunction has been essentially ignored.
As noted above, we believe that the detailed judgments concerning the merits of these evaluations are best left to licensing Boards.
In no case should a licensee's inability to demonstrate that equipment is qualified be accepted in itself as a justification for extending the Commission's deadline, as the licensees have here requested.
Respectfully Submitted,
'filyn R. (eiss Harmon and Weiss 1725 I St.,
NW, Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 V.
H h
Robert D.
Pollard Nuclear Engineer Union of Concerned Scientists 1
1725 I St.,
NW, Suite 601 Washington, D.C.
20006 dated:
Sept. 18, 1981 17/ CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 715.
______________________-____T-~-------~
-~----~~--~--)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d
ks j
~
In the Matter of
)
y'y PETITION FOR EMERGENCY
)
- enna
,1 97--
(
and REMEDIA" ACTION
)
l; t.,
J31 k-:
)
In the Matter of
)
(~'
. sO L' "
)
(T.ndOsC W COMMISSION MEMORANDUM
)
- C i # N' h /
and ORDER
)
\\
8' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify chat a copy of
" Union of Concerned Scientists' Response to Petition for Extension of Deadline for Compliance With CLI-80-21 and NRC Staf f Response Thereto" was mailed first-class postage pre-paid this 21st day of September 1981, to the following:
- Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman William L. Porter, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate General Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 Duke Power Company
- John F. Ahearne, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W.P. Johnson Washington, D.C.
20555 Vice President Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.
- Peter A. Bradford, Commissioner 1671 Worcester Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Framingham, Mass.
01701 Washington, D.C.
20555 W.G. Counsil
" Thomas Roberts, Commissioner Senior Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Northeast Utilities Washington, D.C.
20555 Post Office Box 270
- Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner O.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
20555 nopes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Chase Stephens Boston, Mass.
02110 Docketing & Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
30555 Debevoise & Liberman 1200 Seventeenth St., N.W.
Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Washington, D.C.
20036 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Hand delivered
f 1
- Richard E. Jones, Esq.
James N. Christman, Esq.
Associate General Counsel Hunton & Williams Carolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 1535 Legal Department 707 East Main Street Post Office Box 1551 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Philip R. Steptoe, Ssq.
Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
Isham, Lincoln and Beale General Counsel
~
One First National Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio:
Chicago, Illinois 60603 Washington, D.C.
20555 Jay E. Silberg, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 James Lieberman Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
^
f
_ U., F _ -
}
=
U sllyn R'. Weiss f
. ~,, - - -,.
,-