ML20011D894

Application for Amend to License SNM-1227,authorizing Storage of U Oxide in temporary,weather-tight Storage Facilities Such as Trailers or Freight Containers.Fee Paid

ML20011D894
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	11/20/1989
From:	Malody C SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER
To:	Rouse L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
26139, CWM:89:124, NUDOCS 9001020257
Download: ML20011D894 (13)

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i c3 License No. SNM-1227 1

Docket No. 70-1257

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Dear Mr. Rouse:

x-A Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation (ANF) hereby request amendment to Liconse '

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No. SNM-1227 to authorize storage of uranium' oxide'in temporary, weather-tight -

storage facilities such as-trailers or freight : containers.

A similar authorization existed in a previous appl.ication (June' 1980) but was deleted during license renewal (July 1987).

It would now appearethat we need such an authorization reinstituted.

ANF produces uranium oxide for shipment to plants in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

For example, sintered-pellets are loaded into pellet boxes which are sealed and, in turn, loaded'into certificated packages for shipment.

Prior to shipment, the loaded. pellet boxes can be stored (sealed and externally free of contamination) in the Packaged Radioactive Materials Storage Building, or they may be loaded into certificated packages for shipnent and subsequently stored in the yard.

The available warehouse space and certificated package inventory are exceeded on rare occasion.

One option on those occasions is to bring in a temporary l

" warehouse" for storage.

These are structurally sound, weather-tight i

facilities such as trailers as are used as temporary offices at construction l.

sites, or enclosed freight containers used for containment and protection during transport.

l The temporary " warehouse (s)" would be near or adjacent to the U0p Facility such that they would be fully monitored by the existing' criticality alarm 1

system.

They will not have a filtered exhaust so that all containers must be determined to be sealed and externally free of significant contamination prior to storage.

They will be weather-tight such that neither rain nor snow will be a problem.

Standard ANF radiological safety procedures will also prevail including a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) covering the temporary storage facilities.

Storage will be subject to the same criticality safety analysis and criticality safety specification requirements as all other ANF facilities,

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o Mr.' L. C. Rouse CWM:89:124 November 20, 1989 Page 2 Initially, it is planned to store pellet boxes on pallets in a planar array on the floor of the warehouse.

An example of a criticality safety analysis for the storage of pellet boxes in a temporary warehouse is presented in.

These storage facilities will stand within the restricted area (fenced area) which is already commit.ted to industrial activity with little or no ground preparation necessary.

There will be no liquid or gaseous effluent stream.

The environmental impact is judged to be nil.

Revised pages to Parts I and 11 of the license application are enclosed.

A check for $150 for the initial licensing fee is enclosed.

Very truly yours, C. W. Malody, Manag Regulatory Compliance jrs Enclosures

$LDVANCED M) CLEAR FtAELS CORPORATION gup.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM 1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 701257 PART I - LICENSE CONDITIONS REV.

21 TABLE 1-1.1 Specific locations of Authorized Activities Location 33 Authorized Activity SF Building Pu and Pu0 002 Storage and repackaging, 2

contaminated waste U02 (up to 19.99 wt%

Storage, blending, pressing, U 235) sintering, fuel rod loading and downloading, fuel-rod welding, fuel element assembly; process tests; associated quality control activities.

Uranium Compounds (up Waste storage, sorting, to 5 wt% U-235) incineration, packaging, and associated quality control activities.

00. Building Uranium Compounds (up All operational steps of 2

(including to 5 wt% U-235) fuel manufacturing from UF -

6 PowderStorage)

UO2 conversion to packaging finished fuel elements, scrap recycling and reprocessing; process tests; associated quality control activities.

U02 (5 to 19.99 wt%

All operational steps of U-235) fuel manufacturing involving 00 ; including associated-2 quality control activities.

ELO Building Uranium Compound (up All operational steps of to 19.99 wt% U-235) fuel manufacturing involving uranium compounds; including process tests.

FCTF Building U02 (up to 5 wt% U-Hydraulic flow tests 235) involving single fuel elements.

Auswousuta m cato~o*ie-November 20, 1989

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1-8 ANF 3830.051 (G/89)

,ADMANCED NUCLEAR PUELS CORPORATION y p.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE No. SNM.1227, NRC DOCKET No. 701257 PART I - LICENSE CONDITIONS REV.

21 TABLE 1 1.1 Specific Locations of Authorized Activities (Cont.d) location SM Authorized Activity Packaged Radio-Uranium Compounds (up Storage of closed and active Materials to 5 wt% U-235) externally free-of-Storage Building significant-contamination containers of product, scrap, and waste materials.

Temporary Uranium 0xide (up to Storage of a planar array of Storage 5 wt% U 235) closed containers of oxide Facilities pellets which are externally free of significant contamination.

Materials UOp (up to 5 wt% U-Storage of closed and Warehouse 235) externally free of significant contamination containers of product, scrap and waste materials.

Laundry Facility UraniumCompounds(up Cleaning of contaminated to 5 wt% U 235) protective clothing and equipment.

UF6 Cylinder UF6 (up to 5 wt% U-Outside storage of UF6 Storage Areas 235) cylinders (full and empty).

Packaged Fuel UO2 (up to 19.99 wt%

Outside storage of fuel Storage Areas U-235) packed for shipment; the transport containers are closed, sealed and properly labeled for shipment.

Packaged Waste Uranium Compounds (up Outside storage of Storage Areas to 19.99 wt% U 235) contaminated materials which are packaged, sealed, labeled and externally free of contamination.

Process Chemical UraniumCompounds(up Transfer, mixing, sampling, Waste Storage to 5 wt% U-235) storage and solar Lagoon System evaporation of contaminated liquid wastes.

AME@ MENT APPUCATION DATE.

November 20, 1989

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1-9 ANF-3B30.oS1 (&B9)

d ADWWC8DNUCLEARMMLE CORPORATICW gup.y SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM 1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 701257 PART I - LICENSE CONDITIONS FtEv.

21 TABLE 1-1.1 Specific Locations of Authorized Activities location S.NM Authorized Activity Retention Tanks Uranium Compounds (up Interim storage of to 5 wt% U 235) potentially contaminated liquid wastes.

High Uranium Uranium Compounds (up Transfer of uranium bearing Solids Pond to 5 wt% U 235) solids, leaching for uranium recovery.

Solids Trench Uranium Compounds (up Transfer and storage of to 5 wt% U-235) contaminated solids-awaiting leaching or burial.

Lagoon Uranium UraniumCompounds(up Recovery of uranium from Recovery to 5 wt% U 235) waste solutions.

Ammonia Recovery Uranium Compounds (up Removal and recovery of Facility to 5 wt% U 235) ammonia from uranium contaminated liquid wastes, i

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AMENDMENT APPUCATION DATE~

November 20, 1989

'act wo ANF-3830.051 (G/89)

ADMANCED NUCLEAR FLAELS CORPORATION my.g SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM 1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 701257 PART II - SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

21 differentials and airflows in the metal structure.

All interior surfaces are taped and sealed, and suitably painted.

The floor was made of 3000 psi concrete and designed for 250 psf.

Contaminated clothing is dry-cleaned in a freon solvent system, surveyed for contamination, and returned to use.

Where clothing is essentially free of contamination but remains badly soiled, it may then be water-washed and the effluent directed to retention tanks which are sampled prior to being emptied to the site lagoon system.

After cleaning, the clothing is again surveyed and returned to use.

10.1.5 Fuels Storaae Warehouse The location of the Fuels Storage Warehouse is shown on Figure 11-10.1.

The building is a pre engineered metal building 60'x40'x16' eave height. The exterior walls are 26-gauge sheet metal, and the roof is 24-gauge sheet metal.

The interior of the walls and roof are fully sealed with closure strips and insulated.

The floor slab was made of 3000 psi concrete and designed for 250 psf.

The warehouse is used for the storage of packaged special nuclear material in various compounds and forms.

10.1.6 Radioactive Material Warehouse The location of the Radioactive Material Warehouse is shown on Figure 11-10.1.

The building is a pre-engineered metal building 50'x140'x16' eave height.

The exterior walls are 26 gauge sheet metal, and the roof is 24 gauge sheet metal. The interior of the walls and roof are fully sealed with closure strips and insulated.

The floor slab was made of 3000 psi concrete and designed for 250 psf.

The warehouse is used for the storage of packaged special nuclear material in various compounds and forms.

10.1.6a &ncillary Radioactive Material Storace On occasion, additional storage for uranium oxide product material is required.

During those occasions, pre engineered enclosures such as enclosed sea containers or trailers are positioned near the south end of the 002 plant in grid 6D (see Figure 11-10.1).

These temporary warehouses are weather-tight, and are positioned such that criticality alarm coverage is obtained by existing units.

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November 20, 1989 10-7 ANF 3830.oS1 (6/89)

ADVANCED NUCLEAR Ft2LS CORPO*4ATION m p.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM.1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 701257 PART II - SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

21 purifying it through use of a solvent extraction system.

The clean UNH from this operation is then reacted with aqueous ammonia to form ammonium diuranate.

The precipitate is then centrifuged, dried, and calcined to U0, all within the Scrap Recovery facility.

2 As in the case of the UNH Facility discussed above, criticality safety is assured in the scrap recovery area through control of equipment and tank locations and geometry.

Batching of the dissolver is strictly controlled, and product UO2 is handled only in safe batches.

Both the hooding and process equipment are exhausted through HEPA filters, and protective clothing and eye protection are required for operating personnel safety.

15.8.4 Gadolinia Scran Recovery A separate facility is provided in the ELO Building for recovery of gadolinia scrap from the NAF operation.

This facility, equipped with a dissolver, filtration equipment, and solvent extraction system, produces gadolinia-free uranyl nitrate.

The uranyl nitrate may be converted to UO2 in the scrap recovery area or in either conversion line.

Criticality safety in the Gadolinia Recovery Facility is provided by control of the geometry of the solvent extraction equipment and the dissolver, as well as throu of feed and product solution uranium concentration (mass).gh control A HEPA-filtered exhaust hood is provided around the dissolver, and protective clothing and eye protection are required for personnel operating in the area.

Survey equipment is provided at the exit of this area to monitor hands, clothing, and feet on egress.

15.9 Temocrary Storaae Advanced Nuclear Fuels produces, among other products, sintered uranium oxide pellets for shipment off-site.

There are occasions when pellet production exceeds normal storage capacity and temporary storage facilities are required.

In those cases, the pellets are stored in a planar array of closed containers which are free of significant external contamination.

A Criticality Safety Analysis has been performed on such a temporary storage facility.

It was determined that criticality safety is assured by controls on the geometry of the containers, the net weight of the contained uranium

oxide, the H/V within the container, and the restriction that the containers be arranged only in a single-tier planar array. Storage requirements are posted at the storage site.

1 AMENDM(NI APPUCAllON DATE.

November 20, 1989

G5 " 2 15-15 ANF 3830.051 (C89) l

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I CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS y

STORAGE OF PELLET SUITCASES;IN SINGLE-TIER PLANAR ARRAYS INTRODUCTION This Criticality Safety Analysis (CSA) addresses storage of suitcases" in generic single-tier planar arrays.

^ Pellets are loaded -into suitcases at ANF-Richland for shipment to ANFGmbH-Lingen in a certified-package such as the CE-250-2.

ANF has many years of experience in.the safe use of this suitcase.

The plan is to store suitcases ' in a single-tier array on the floor.of a' facility with adequate protection.from the weather.

FISSILE MATERIAL DESCRIPTION l

4 LWR fuel pellets of pure UO2 with a density up to 95-96% TD-are typically i

shipped in the suitcase.

Most pellets have = a diameter in the ' range 0.'3-0.4 i

inch.

Unless stated otherwise, the calculation models were based on _a 0.35-inch diameter and a 10.96 gm UO /cc density (100% TC).

All models assumed a 2

l 5.0% enrichment.

Up to 60 kg uranium with an H/V up to 2.26 may be in each suitcase.

Pellets are placed end-to-end in the corrugations of plastic trays and - then. the trays are stacked ~and placed into the suitcase - as described y

l below.

SUITCASE DESCRIPT10tf-The subject suitcaso is shown on Drawing ANF-304306, Rev.- 2..A photocopy of part of.this_ drawing is. attached for reference.--The maximum dimensions of the tray stack are about 7.75" wide by. 4.87" ' tall by 24.88" long ' for. a : maximum.

volume of 15.39 ' liters.

The tray stack.is centered on a steel base that is about 9.37". wide by 26.5" long.

A lid of 0.06" thick stainless steel is then placed over the stack and secured to the steel base which is composed of a 0.12" thick steel plate on a frame. of square tubing.

The 0.06" thick lid and the 0.12" thick base plate were modeled but other steel parts such as handles and tubing were concervatively neglected.

Since the base is longer and wider that the tray stack, a ' gap exists between tray stacks when the bases are.

placed edge-to-edge.

This-gap will be referred to as "the volume between suitcases."

2 CALCULATION METHODOLOGY All codes and cross section libraries used are part of the SCALE system:

Sixteen-group cross sections preparcd by BONAMI/NITAWL were used.

The pellet tray stack was modeled as a homogeneous mixture' using cell-weighted cross sections from XSDRNPM.

l KENO-Va was used to calculate k-eff.

t Biased water and concrete reflector regions were used for most models.

LIMITS AND CONTROLS The limits and controls used to. assure criticality safety are listed'below.

Enrichment:

5.0% maximum i

i Uranium Mass:

60 kgU (68.1 kg 00 ) maximum per suitcase 2

Moderation:

2.26 maximum H/U in suitcase Geometry:

The suitcase shall. conform to Drawing ANF-304306, Rev. 2.

Suitcases may be stored in a single tier array of any size. and in any arrangement (i.e., no minimum-horizontal spacing between units i

is specified).

l Arrays of shipping containers and other. fixed fissile units shall be-at least 10 feet edge-to-edge from the suitcase array unless covered 1

by a specific analysis.

Temporary storage areas l shall be approved l

and posted by the criticality safety component of Safety Security, and Licensing before storing fissile materials, j

SAFETY EVfLUATION I

l Calculations were performed to verify that criticality safety ~ is assured at

. normal and credible abnormal conditions.

NORMAL CONDITIONS

" Normal" conditibns were modeled as follows:

Each suitcase' contained 60 kgu with an H/V atom ratio of 2.26.

1 The pellet density was 100% TD, and the pellet diameter was either 0.35" or 0.50".

Therefore, the U02 volume is 6.21 liter, and the water volume e

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is 9.18 liter (15.39 liter total).

To yield a 2.26 H/U, the volume between pellets is 55.96 vo1% water and 44.04 vo_1% void (0.559 gm water /cc).

An infinite planar array of edge-to-edge suitcases wa's modeled with 30 cm of water above the array, and 30 _cm of concrete below.

The. volume between suitcases was void.

The k-eff with 0.35" and 0.50" pellets is 0.7896 2 0.0050 and ' 0.7883 1 0.0046, respectively.

The full reflection. conditions modeled, the large size of the array modeled..

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and the low reactivity of the system provide adequate. margin for potential interactions with in-transit materials and for accident conditions where i

fissile materials are stored closer _ than specified.

L ABNORMAL MODE, RATION CONDITIONS Sensitivity study calculations were made to-determine the e'ffect ' of accidentally exceeding the.specified H/U limit.

The. space between pellets (flooded with water) was adjusted to produce-water-to-fuel volume _ ratios (Vw/VF) in the range 1.0 to 4.0.

The volume between suitcases was either flooded or void but the volume between pellets within -the suitcase was always flooded.

These cases represent full flooding and then drainage'of the' water between suitcases while retaining full reflection; a very conservative model.

The calculation results are in Table-1, The data in Table 1 indicate a considerably enhanced reactivity with concrete reflection but the array remains adequately subcritical with - any amount of-water within and between suitcases.

The reactivity with 0.35" pellets -is greater than or equal to that with 0.50" pellets.

r Suitcases are typically elevated above a floor such as concrete by wooden or steel pallets.

This would tend to reduce the concrete effect at flooded conditions.-

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CONDITIONS WITH STACKED SUITCASES An - 11x11 subarray of suitcases (single layer was modeled with a suitcase stacked on the central unit and with specular ) reflection at the. edges of the-4 sub-array.

The result is an infinite array'of the 11x11 subarray.' ' Conditions other than ~ stacking were normal.

The k-eff is 0.7988 1 0.0039 with water / concrete-reflection.

For an infinite array of suitcases-stacked two high, the k-eff -is 0.9721 1 0.004S but this represents many simultaneous.

accidents.

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KENO-Va RESULTS FOR INFINITE PLANAR ARRAY OF EDGE-TO-EDGE SUITCASES FULLY FLOODED CONDITIONS WITHIN SUITCASES CLOSE-FITTED FULL WATER REFLECTION ABOVE ARRAY Vw/Vf kg_UQ2 lioL k-eff

.t 0.35" pellet, water below array,. water between suitcases.

'2.0 56.2 5.46 0.8979 1 0.00494 2.5 48.2 6.83 0.9037.1 0.0049 l

0' 35" pellet, concrete below array, ~ water between suitcases l

1.5 67.5 4.10 0.9417 1 0.0041 L

2.0 56.2 5.46 0.9521 1 0~0042-2.5 48.2' 6.82-0.9507 1 0.0043-3.0 42.2 8.20 0.9308 1 0.0042 0.35" pellet, concrete below array, void' between suitcases-

~ 2. 0 56.2 5.46 0.9562.t:0.0051 2.5 48.2 6.83-

-0.9566't'O.0041 0.50" pellet, concrete below array, water between suitcases 2.0 56.2 5.46 0.9417't 0.0046 i.

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