ML20004F636

Reply to TMI Alert 810515 Mgt Findings Per ASLB 810609 Memorandum & Order.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20004F636
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/15/1981
From:	Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8106190319
Download: ML20004F636 (36)

Text

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4 LIC 6/15/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S REPLY TO TMIA F.N INGS ON MANAGEMENT ISSUES SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE l

George F. Trowbridge -

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

Deborah B. Bauser Counsel for Licensee

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LIC 6/15/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S REPLY TO TMIA FINDINGS ON MANAGEMENT ISSUES SEAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F. Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

Deborah B. Bauser Counsel for Licensee

LIC 6/15/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S REPLY TO TMIA FINDINGS i

ON MANAGEMENT ISSUL'S I. INTRODUCTION

1. Licensee herein submits, in accordance with the findings schedule established by the Board's Memorandum and Order dated June 9, 1981, its reply to "TMIA's Management Findings," dated May 15, 1981. Licensee has not attempted to respond here to each proposed finding and conclusion with which Licensee disagrees or to note in each instance where there is substantial disagreement among the parties. Nor is the Board required to expressly treat in its Recommended Decision each and every individual finding proposed by every party. See Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook l Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 41 (July 26, 1977)

(and cases cited therein). Where the disagreements are plain, and the positions are accompanied by accurate citations to the record, for example, we have not repeated our position, but

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.} O rely upon Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Management Issues, dated May 15, 1981. In some I cases, where a number of findings are common to one subject, or in Licensee's view , suffer from a common fault, our reply may address a group of findings together.

2. Licensee's reply is set forth in the form of a section.of a proposed initial decision in which the Board addresses the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the parties. Proposed findings of fact are cited as TMIA, Staff or Licensee PF [ paragraph number].

3. TMIA raised in its proposed findings the subject of burden of proof. TMIA PF 1. Licensee has not contended, nor does it now contend, that Licensee does not bear the burden of proof in this proceeding, even though there is no precedent in NRC cases for this restart proceeding. The Commission's August 9, 1979 Order and hotice of Hearing applies to Licensee the burden of meeting the NRC reasonable assurance standard.

That burden of proof, or ultimate burden of persuasion, is met by convincing the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasonable assurance standard has been met on the issues presented in this case. See 42 U.S.C. S 2231; Steadman v. SEC, U.S. , 101 S.Ct. 999, 1009 (1981);

Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C. 141 (1979); commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-616 (Oct. 2, 1980),

slip op., at 3.

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7 II . ' LICENSEE'S REPLY TO TMIA FINDINGS

4. TMIA's proposed findings of fact'and conclusions of law on the subject of Licensee's management capability focus primarily on the issue of Licensee's past maintenance' ,

practices, in'accordance with the allegations-raised by TMIA in its Contention 5. TMIA also discusses in its proposed findings Licensee's safety review program. TMIA PF 69-71.1

5. In connection with its discussion of poor past performance in the area of safety-related maintenance, TMIA raises a number of independent criticisms of Licensee's maintenance practices. First, TMIA contends that Licensee cannot properly identify safety-related maintenance. TMIA PF

7. We believe this viewpoint is contrary to the evidence. See Licensee PF 78-90. In its factual statements in support of a

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this' proposition, see TMIA PF 5-11, TMI' reflects its own

, apparent confusion on the subject of who determines whether a

maintenance is safety-related at TMI-1, and how that determina-tion is reached. TMIA is wrong in its assertion at TMIA PF 5 t

1 In view of TMIA's admitted lack of understanding of the interaction and responsibilities of Licensee's safety review 3 groups, TMIA PF 69, and its unsupported questioning of Licensee's commitment to find qualified people to staff IOSRG and NSAD, TMIA PF 69, contrary to all of the evidence we received on this subject (see, e.g., Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 13,437,

! at 5, Table 1 and Figure 1 for general discussion of staffing levels, and Clark, ff. Tr. 11,759, at 9-10; Tr. 11,791 (Clark) for discussion of_ staffing of safety review groups), we consider TMIA's observations in this area to be of little probative value.

t Contrary to TMIA, we find the evidence quite .

clear with respect to Licensee's deliberate allocation of various safety review functions within the GPU Nuclear organization. See Licensee PF 244-249. ~

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that Licensee's maintenance procedures require the originator of the work request to decide whether the work is nuclear safety related; rather, the senior planner under the present system, and the Supervisor of Maintenance or the Maintenance Engineer under the old work request system, makes this deter-mination. Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 15; Lic. Ex. 29, at 8. Moreover, the decision to prioritize work on a daily basis was made in the past by senior Maintenance and Operations personnel at regular plan-of-the-day and 1600 hour0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> meetings.

See Licensee PF 76; Lic. Ex. 29, at 11-14; Shovlin et al., ff.

Tr. 13,533, at 45-50. Contrary to TMIA's assertion, this method of doing business is consistent, not at odds, with a former TMIA Maintenance foreman's explanation that he did what the shift supervisor told him to do regardless of the individual priority located on the work request. form. Tr.

3,615-16 (Leakway).

6. In its proposed findings on the definition of safety-related maintenance, TMIA does not mention the fact that in order for a piece of maintenance work which has been designated as QC but not nuclear safety related to be worked in accordance with that designation, the O&M Director (in the past, the Unit Superintendent) is required to approve the job.

Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 17; Lic. Ex. 29, at 9.

Thus, jobc which have any potential for being nuclear safety j i

related because the affected component is listed in GP 1008, '

see Tr. 3,851-52 (Dyckman), are scrutinized by the senior plant

I operations personnel to ensure that the job is done right,.in accordance with the appropriate procedures and regardless of whether the job ticket is checked " nuclear safety related-yes".

7. It is TMIA and not Mr. Shovlin who is "quite confused" as to what a " Priority 1" means. It is clear from the record that high priorities are not now, and wer not in the past, limited to nuclear safety related items. See Licensee PF 71-75; Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 42, 51.

Moreover, under the old work request systemy the priority assigned by the initiator of the work requert did not reflect whether a job might be of any safety concern (nuclear or industrial). Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 51; Tr.

3,069, 3,071-72 (Shovlin). Mr. Shovlin's testimony not only reflects these facts, but emphasizes them through his explana-tion ot' how one could determine the nuclear safety significance of a particular maintenance job in the past by looking at the description of the malfunction provided on the work request, not by drawing any inferences from the priority assigned to the job. Tr. 3,101 (Shovlin); TMIA PF 8. Later on in its proposed findings (TMIA PF 66-67), TMIA again refers to the priority system, this time stating that the new system "does little more than add one category to the old system." TMIA PF 66. We cannot agree in view of the entirely different series of categories of priorities under the present system compared to the former system, and the detailed definitions of each category which now exist. See Licensee PF 74; see also Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 47-49. ~

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8. Most importantly, however, TMIA either does not understand or does not accept .Gicensee's view that the concept  ;

of nuclear safety related is not a matter of " objective guidelines," but rather requires the use of judgment in evaluating what is involved in and the impact of each particu-lar maintenance acti'rity. See test utilized by Plant Engineering Director J. J. Colitz, at Licensee PF 80; Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 16. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that'although TMIA characterizes Licensee's definition of nuclear safety related as " entirely unsatisfactory," TMIA PF 13, this method of identifying safety related maintenance was agreed to, at least initially, by TMIA's counsel. See Licensee PF 78-79.

9. In summary, TMIA's assertion that Licensee cannot identify safety related maintenance is simply incorrect, is not supported by the record, and is not a position with which we Concur.

10. In its findings on Licensee's alleged deferral of maintenance and poor record-keeping, TMIA improperly cites the Board in support of a broad sweeping allegation concerning Licensee's " extremely poor maintenance procedures and policies." TMIA PF 14. We strongly disapprove of and regret l this sort of abuse of the record.2 As TMIA ought to be aware, 2 TMIA throughout its proposed findings also misquotes and takes entirely out of context statements made by witnesses on the stand and in prefiled testimony, and statements of counsel.

See alleged statement of Snyder at Tr. 13,615, cited in TMIA

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we took their allegations very seriously and, in one instance, requested that the Staff and Licensee present further testimony on past maintenance practices at TMI-1. See Licensee PF 65,

77. On the basis of this additional testimony, our concerns were alleviated. See Licensee PF 98-103; Tr. 13,659-67 (discussion of parties and Board); Tr. 16,408-09, 16,413 (Smith).

(continued)

PF 15, that Licensee "had no clear way to even identify preven-tive maintenance versus corrective maintenance items"; alleged statement of unidentified witness at Tr. 3,798 regarding.

importance of seal which is the subject of TMIA Ex. 40, cited in TMIA PF 16; alleged statement by Colitz at Tr. 2,965-66 regarding incompletion of work on TMIA Exhibits. 21 and 22, cited in TMIA PF 18; alleged statement of Shovlin at Tr. 13,625, cited in TMIA PF 25, that unavailability of parts "sometimes" caused the Licensee to force a plant shutdown while parts could be found; alleged statement of Eberle, without a citation proved by TMIA, see Tr. 3,999-4,000, in TMIA PF 34, that he once worked seven days a week, twelve hours a day, for four months straight; alleged statement of Blake at Tr. .i,347, that TMIA could use a few exhibits as representative of patterns inherent in the maintenance organization, cited in TMIA PF 53; assertion that Staff Ex. 4, Appendix C, p. 10 shows " specific items of deferred maintenance and record-keeping problems identified in investigationa at Unit-1 after the accident, but before the maintenance department at Units 1 and 2 were separated," cited in TMIA PF 56; alleged statement of Arnold at Tr. 11,499, cited in TMIA PF 57, that "a 1977 management audit conducted by the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Organization [ ] concluded that GPU needed to increase its in-house maintenance organization, and establish a separate Service Corporation to take the lead in controlling the maintenance and operations of its plants; allegation in TMIA PF 57 that statements of Keimig at Tr.

12,106 supports previous allegation by Arnold; allegation in TMIA PF 57 that Crocker stated at Tr. 11,991 that the authors of the NRC's management criteria document, NUREG-0731, had "no management training to say that (the new GPU structure) is the l optimum"; allegation in TMIA PF 64 that Mr. Shovlin indicated at Tr. 13,611 that he is unsure whether the Maintenance and Construction Division workers will be under his direction or not.

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11. In a similar vein, we do not agree with and are aware of no factual basis in the record for TMIA's assertions that Licensee's " answer [s] for everything" in its prefiled testimony on Maintenance at TMI-1 were unsupported. TMIA PF 14-19. To the contrary, Licensee explained in excrutiating detail its understanding of the maintenance tasks at issue in TMIA's work request exhibits. Licensee PF 88; Shovlin et al.,

ff. Tr. 13,533, at 23-24, 52-69, 75-77. Moreover no attempt was made by TMIA to question Licensee's witnesses on the basis for their understanding of the history of these work requests.

Licensee PF 87; Tr. 13,534-85 (Shovlin et al.). This is equally applicable to TMIA's unsupported skepticism at TMIA PF 24 of Licensee's description of the history of TMIA Exhibit 12.

See Shovlin et al., Tr. 13,533, at 23-24.

12. We also cannot abide TMIA's misuse of TMIA Exhibit 40, which was offered and admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of indicating an inadequacy in Licensee's record-keeping practices. Tr. 3,797 (Selkowitz, Smith). In its pre-filed testimony, Licensee acknowledged that this work request represents an inadequate recordkeeping practice, although Licensee attributed no safety significance to this inadequacy. See also Keimig & Haverkamp - TMIA 5, ff. Tr.

16,412, at Table b, 18-19. While TMIA initially discusses TMIA Exhibit 40 in the context of record-keeping, TMIA goes on to discuss the substance of the repair work in question and, I

without any references to the record, offers TMIA's own u'nsupported opinion as to the importance of completing that work in short order. TMIA PF 16-17. In view of the purpose for which TMIA Exhibit 40 was offered into evidence, TMIA's digression into the importance of fixing the reactor coolant pump fl seal leakoff recorder alarm is inappropriate and irrelevant.3

13. In PF 19, TMIA states that the problem of cancelled work requests, reached such proportions that Mr. Dennis Dyckman, who had just become temporary Supervisor of Corrective Maintenance in October, 1979, Shovlin, et al., ff. Tr.

13533, at 9, was forced to order a review of all Priority 1-A work requests from their maintenance log. Priority 1-A's were, at the time, defined as urgent. Shovlin, et al.,

ff. Tr. 13533, at 51. We do not know whether the review was ordered as a result of this hearing discovery process, or because Licensee finally realized they were not in compliance with the record-keeping requirements of Appendix B.

TMIA PF 19. This charac'terization of the record flies in the face of the following exchange between Mr. Dyckman, and TMIA's counsel, Mr. Selkowitz:

Q. And am I also correct sir, that since TMIA undertook that review [of maintenance logs], there has been a subsequent review of those Priority 1A open work requests on the maintenance log?

3 In Any event, we note that TMIA ignores in its findings its own cross-examination of Mr. Dyckman on this subject. The record reflects his view, which is absolutely at odds with the unsupported opinion expressed by TMIA in its findings. See TMIA PF 16-17. Mr. Dyckman stated that the error in the alarm l was "in the conservative direction" and of such infrequency -

that it was of no concern. Tr. 13,604 (Dyckman).

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A.- That is not correct. When I took over as Supervisor of Maintenance i[n]

October of '79, I instituted a review of old job tickets at that time in order.to apprise myself of all outstanding work. At the time the discovery room was instituted, we were already well into a phase of review, and that has continued up to date. -

Q. I didn't mean to imply, sir, that it was triggered necessarily by that review. I am just trying to get a time-frame. Some of this has taken place since the review that was done by TMIA.

A. That is probably correct.4 Tr. 3,862 (Dyckman, Selkowitz).

4 Following this exchange, TMIA's counsel proceeded to confiru his understanding of the import of Mr. Dyckman's testimony:

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is that literally true, Mr. Selkowitz?

MR. SELKOWITZ: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yo do not wish an inference drawn from his testimony that it was your inquiry which brought about the program referred to.

MR. SELKOWITZ: I am trying to locate in time, and my next question was going to be what caused it, and he gave us an explanation of it, and I would have gone on to ask him specifically so we have it on the record.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: You may come to that, but so far you are not asking the Board to draw I any such inference.

I just want to reconcile what you really intend with what your statement is.

MR. SELKOWITZ: I was curious, and I now have an explanation, I think. I perhaps would have wantcd the Board to draw that inference had we not gotten the information we got, yes, sir, but I have no way of challenging Mr. Dyckman's statement as to a continuing process. ,

Tr. 3,862-63 (Selkowitz, Smith).

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14. Later in its discussion of alleged ~ l record-keeping problems in the TMI-1 Maintenance Department, TMIA cites to the testimony of Kelmig and Haverkamp, following Tr. 16,412, at 65, Atttchment A, No. 16, for the proposition that, "Even according to NRC, the priority system was abused."

TMIA PF 22. The statement which we believe TMIA improperly relied upon in support of this proposition is located in Attachment 1 to NRC Staff Testimony of Keimig and Haverkamp in response to the Board question concerning the auditability of maintenance practices in the sample year, 1978, and currently.

(Keimig and Haverkamp - Sample Yaer 1978, ff. Tr. 16,412).

Attachment 1 consists of excerpts (pages 60-68) of IE Appraisal Report No. 50-289/80-21. Paragraph (16) of that attachment, located at page 66, states:

The licensee maintenance program included establishing the priority of maintenance activities in order to expedite and schedule maintenance as necessary.

Interviews revealed that the priorities established by the Supervisor of Corrective Maintenance as recommended by the initiator of the work request (WR) was working well.

The Supervisor of Maintenance indicated that the abuse of the priority system had been corrected through the improved maintenance department staffing, on-shift maintenance, and communications during the POD [ plan of the day] and outage coordi-nation meetings.

Thus, TMIA improperly characterizes a particular statement made by the Staff. In addition, no mention is made of the specific finding reached by witnesses Keimig and Haverkamp that in the sample year, 1978, "[r]ecord keeping associated with the i

maintenance activities was complete and auditable." Keimig and Haverkamp - Sample Year 1978, at 10.

15. Similarly, in TMIA PF 24, TMIA states that with respect to_its Exhibit 12, although the work request " indicated that QC wanted to observe the operation, Tr. 3484, QC did not sign off. Tr. 3485 (McGarry)." What the record in fact makes clear is that a stamp marked, "QC Hold Points Indicated" is placed conspicuously on the work request, and is used to inform the maintenance workers on the job that certain marked portions of the maintenance activity will be witnessed by a QC inspector. This stamp was used on TMIA Exhibit 12. However, there is no signature block on the work request form where the QC inspector signs off after witnessing the work that is on

" hold"; rather, the inspector signs off at the end of the-maintenance activity. Tr. 3,484-85 (McGarry); TMIA Exhibit 12.

Nowhere in the record does it state or from the evidence can one infer, as TMIA does, that GC improperly failed to sign off on TMIA Exhibit 12.

16. With respect to TMIA Exhibit 23, a work request which TMIA cites in its discussion of "the lack of parts on hand and the delay in ordering them," TMIA states that " [ t] his work request was originated on June 15, 1978, but because engineering apparently decided they wanted to change switches themselves and not merely reposition them, a new design was needed. However, it took two months for someone to order the 1

parts and they were not received until five and one-half months l l

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1ater. Tr 13600 (Dyckman)." TMIA PF 25. TMIA fails to mention the fact that during his discussion of TMIA Exhibit 23, Mr. Dyckman explained how the two month time interval included in it Engineering's examination of the new design it proposed in lieu of the repair that was originally recommended. TMIA also ignores the fact that it was evident at the time the parts were ordered that a five and one-half month time delay in receiving the necessary parts would not impact on the repair, since the work was scheduled for the next refueling outage, which was more than five and one-half months away. See Tr.

13,600-01 (Dyckman); Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 26.

17. In its findings on Licensee's calculation and use of estimated manhours needed to complete maintenance work, TMIA PF 26-31, TMIA fails to cite any record support and, in our view, there is none, for the proposition that Licensee's witnesses were reluctant to be straight-forward on the witness stand about this issue. TMIA PF 27. At worst, the witnesses were initially inarticulate or confused by the direction of the questioning, precisely because, as TMIA states, this matter was not part of TMIA Contention 5, as defined by TMIA's presenta-tion of its case-in-chief in October, 1980. See Tr. 13,542-84 (Dyckman, Shovlin). Whether or not TMIA believes that "[11* is inexcusable that Licensee has, through years of operation, made little use of estimated manhours" is not at issue here. TMIA PF 31. What is relevant is the reasonableress of Licensee's maintenance practices, including its use (or nonuse) of estimated manhours. -

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18. FrGm the record it is clear that Licensee's Maintenance supervisory personnel are able to rather easily use estimate aanhours for scheduling and staffing preventive maintenance jobs, th'e manhours for which can be quite accu-rately predicted once the task has been performed a few times.

Tr. 13,575 (Snyder). However, in the absence of a complete statistical base, which Licensee lacks, the estimated manhours for corrective maintenance are frequently incorrect because of the uncertainties involved in predicting the time and men necessary to perform the precise work that needs to be done to repair the identified problem. Tr. 13,553, 13,565, 13,567 (Dyckman); Tr. 13,575-76 (Snyder); Tr. 13,548-49 (Shovlin).

Generally, Licensee's estimates for its corrective maintenance work are more inclined to be low, rather than high, because Licensee hypothesizes the ideal circumstances under which the job will be performed, without a margin for unexpected prob-lems. Tr. 13,565, 13,566, 13577 (Dyckman); Tr. 13,579 (Shovlin). While estimated manhours are not considered by Licensee to be reliable, without a more detailed data base, for 9 scheduling corrective maintenance jobs, estimated manhours are used over th( Aung term for trend analyses of needed manpower.

Tr. 13,581-85 (Shovlin, Dyckm:in, Snyder). At the present time, the Maintenance Department is attempting to build the necessary statistical base to improve the scheduling of CM work. Tr.

13,553-56, 13,574, 13,577 (Dyckman). In any event, it is clear that if a high priority job takes more manhours than estimated,

j'obs'with lower priorities will get delayed, and the backlog of CM work will increase. Tr. 13,581 (Snovlin); Tr. 13,583 (Dyckman). Thus, if Licensee's alleged " trend of consistent underestimation" of manhours in fact created an adverse impact on staffing needs at TMI-1, the backlog of maintenance work, including high priority jobs, would be on the rise, rather than decreasing, as is the case. See Tr. 13, 34-85 (Snyder);

Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 69-70; see also Staff PF 54.

19. In its discussion of Licensee's overtime policies and practices, TMIA PF 32-42, TM1A again misquotes a witness to support a proposition which is not explicitly stated in the record, or implicit from a review thereof. In describing Mr. McCurdy's views on overtime practices, TMIA attributes to the witness the following statement: " [S l ome days, if someone did not feel up to it, others would have to cover for him. Tr. 4144." TMIA PF 35. What McCurdy in fact stated was the following, in response to questions from the Board regarding the availability of colleagues to serve as

" backup":

What I am saying is, there (arel days 1

when you come in there and you can mention to a guy, I really don't feel up to it today. There were not days that you were made to stay 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. You could go home after eight hours. And we have sick leave at Three Mile Island. They could take off.

There were days you came in and maybe just weren't sick, but you just didn't feel up to snuff. You might have had an argument with your wife or something. We could pick up that slack.

When you are working 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> a day, there is teamwork there at Three Mile -

There [were] a lot of times Island. hat one man could just slide along for an cour or so, get himself together. And then we would pick it up for him.

Tr. 4,144-45 (McCurdy). See generally, Licensee PF 109-114;

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Staff PF 64.

20. Similarly, TMIA suggests at TMIA PF 36 that Mr.

Reismiller, another witness who testified on the subject of Licensee's overtime practices, left the company because he was forced to do so, allegedly because of compulsory overtime demands. TMIA does not refer to Mr. Reismiller's overtime record, see Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,333, Attachment 12; Tr.

4,174 (Reismiller), which provides evidence to the contrary, nor to the pressures Mr. Reismiller felt, which were related to his union activities, Tr. 4,191 (Reismiller). Thus, while Mr.

Reismiller felt he "couldn't handle it," and his feelings were motivated in part by Licensee's overtime practices, the evidence does not support the view that Mr. Reismiller was under any Licensee imposed duress to leave, either directly, or indirectly through forced overtime. See Tr. 4,165, 4,190 (Reismiller).

21. TMIA also attributes to Mr. Reismiller the statement that workers could work as long as they wanted to -

over and above twelve hours. TMIA PF 38. However, Mr.

Reismiller was careful to limit that assertion to an incident which occurred before hot functional testing at TMI-1, i.e.,

prior to the initial loading of fuel in the reactor. Tr. 4,168

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("Reismiller). This policy was no longer in effect after TMI-l went on line. Tr. 4,169 (Reismiller).

22. In TMIA PF 37, TMIA cites Mr. Robert Koppe, an independent consultant who testified for Licensee on the subject of infraction, LER and operating experience statistics, see Licensee PF 253-269, for the proposition that "even during normal operations, if equipment became inoperable and tech specs required that it be fixed within a certain number of hours or days before an unscheduled' shutdown was mandated, whatever o*ertime was necessary to get that plant back on line was used. Tr. 13348 (Koppe)." No such statement exists. (Mr.

Koppe did state, at Tr. 13,349, during a general discussion of the significance in the industry of good operating availability, that "the vast majority of the safety equipment in the plant can and normally is repaired on line. It does not require a shutdown. What shuts the plant down is if they do not finish the maintenance of the safety equipment in time and they have to shut down. So, to that extent, you must maintain the plant in a safe condition in order to maintain it on line."

This testimony is hardly supportive of TMIA's position.

23. Throughout TMIA PF 39-42, TMIA persists in its incorrect citations to and mischaracterization of the evidence, and in its totally unsupported assertions. While it is clear that Mr. Reismiller strenuously objected to the hours he was

-asked to work at TMI-1, see Licensee PF 112, TMIA's characteri-zation of his testimony distorts Mr. Reismiller's views.

dontrary to TMIA's assertion, Mr.

Reismiller did not indicate at Tr. 4,170 that " complaints as to too much forced overtime eventually prompted him to request a meeting with the top management of GPU"; rather, he simply answered "yes" to the question posed by TMIA's counsel, "As the union representative, did you complain about the excessive overtime?" TMIA fails to cite to the record at all in support of its allegation that,

" Generally, Mr. Arnold was far from responsive to those complaints." TMIA PF 39.5 Moreover, TMIA then quotes portions of sentences, deleting other relevant material, in support of this mischaracterization. Compare TMIA PF 39-40 with Tr.

4171-72, 4174, 4178-80, 4183.

Moreover, TMIA fails to even indicate that the quotations which appear to be from testimony by Mr. Arnold were in fact Mr. Reismiller's recollections of what Mr. Arnold stated at an unspecified meeting the approxi-mate date of which Mr. Reismiller could not recall since he "had so many meetings." Tr. 4,172 (Reismiller). Even in this 5 There is also no record support for TMIA's allegation that, "Mr. Reismiller was usually able to resist forced overtime hours, we surmise because of his union position. Tr. 4174." TMIA PF 40. The referenced transcript page does not support TMIA's allegation. Instead, it simply includes Mr. Reismiller's admission that he did not believe he was ever involved in doing a strenous job that required precision, which he was required to work 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> straight. There is also no evidence to support TMIA's assumption that "the risk of carelessness due to fatigue is probable" when overtime is permitted, TMIA PF 41. Furthermore, with the exception of Mr. Reismiller's views, the evidence (including the views of individuals randomly selected by the Board) is overwhelmingly contrary to TMIA's assertion that overtime was forced. See Licensee PF 112, 113, and n. 7, infra.

context, the alleged statement of Mr. Arnold as related by Mr.

Reismiller gives a different impression of senior management's concerns that those suggested by TMIA:

We got different responses. Generally, the response was that you were working for a public utility, and you owe a service to the public, and it is our job to get this on line as fast as possible to serve the public.

Tr. 4,171 (Reismiller). Moreover, the evidence presented by Mr. Arnold and all of the other witnesses who testified on this issue in no way support the proposition that " maximization of profits," as stated by TMIA PF 42 .ad 47, was or currently is an instigating force behind any action which could be consid-ered to be inconsistent with the paramount consideration of public and workers' health and safety. See Licensee PF 12, 236, 237; see also views of Mr. Dieckamp, at Licensee PF 232; impressions of Licensee's top management and finan-cial/ technical interface by NRC Staff, at Licerlee PF 20, 22, 229; impressions of Licensee's top management by Mr. William Lee, President of Duke Power Company, and of Mr. William Wegner of BETA, at Licensee PF 20, 22.

24. Even when TMIA fairly accurately cites the record, e.g., Mr. Reismiller did state, essentially, that "the faster we get it on [line], the faster we ere up, the faster we are making money," Tr. 4,183,6 they inaccurately cite the author of the statement. Mr. Reismiller attributed this l

6 TMIA's quotation reads, "the faster the plant is back on I line, the faster we are making money." TMIA PF 39.

statement to an unindentified "they," not to Mr. Arnold, or for that matter, to any particular individual. TMIA states in its findings that Mr. Arnold made this statement. TMIA PF 39.

25. With respect to TMIA's budget cut allegations, TMIA PF 43-47, there is no evidence that " severe" maintenance cuts were planned and would likely be approved, see Licensee PF 92, or that "[t]he 6% reduction goal established by management

. . . was expected to be met." See Tr. 4,043 (Wise: the 6% <

level at Met Ed was a figure used for review purposes; however, it doubled the required proposed budget cut of $2.5 million, or 3% of the annual O&M budget). Rather, as a target, the 6%

offered further assurance .that even potentially undue financial pressures would not curtail technically important work.

26. TMIA castigates the Staff in TMIA PF 48-53, 79 and 81 for what TMIA describes as "conclusory, unsubstantiated and inadequate" testimony on the auditability of maintenance 7 In its extended discussion of Licensee's overtime practices, TMIA also ignores most of the evidence in its determination to prove that " letters in the file" oere used to force workers to work overtime. TMIA PF 40, 41.

Contrary to TMIA's allegation, a letter was not placed in an individual's file simply because he did not or could not work overtime. See Licensee PF 113; Shovlin et al., ff. Tr.

13,333, at 71 and Attachment 10. In order to reach this conclusion, TMIA not only ignored the explanation given by Licensee in its testimony of the use of a letter of criticism when employees f ailed to show up for work without notice, but also totally disregarded the statements of witnesses McCurdy and Eberle, which were not consistent with Mr. Reismiller's views on the use of letters on workers' files. Tr. 4,145 (McCurdy: "if you went to (the supervisors and foremen] far enough in advance, there was no problem with leaving after eight hours for a couple of days a week"); Tr. 4,004 (Eberle:

he was not aware of anyone who h:d a letter put in his file because the individual refused to work overtime) . -

1 practices at TMI in the sample year, 1978 (Keimig and Haverkamp

- Sample Year 1978, ff. Tr. 16,412). TMIA PF 48. This assertion is completely bald, there being a total absence of any substantiation by TMIA for the allegation.8 For example, TMIA " cast (s] doubt on the credibility" of the Staff's conclu-sions in its prefiled testimony on the sample year, 1978,

" basically because we doubt that the sampling (of work requests] used by the Staff was representative." TMIA PF 51.

The only explanation or support given by TMIA in connection with this serious allegation is the statement that, "TMIA seemed to surface many at least questionable work requests and we have seen many which evidence maintenance problems." TMIA PF 51. We do not agree with TMIA's assertion, nor do we believe it deserves consideration in view of the absence of supporting references to the record.9 See also Licensee PF 102, 103; Tr. 16,409 (Smith).

27. In its discussion of Licensee's new corporate structure, TMIA PF 56-59, in addition to continuing the practice of misquoting witnesses and prefiled testimony, see references to TMIA PF 56-69 in n. 2, supra, TMIA grossly 8 It is particularly remarkable here in view of the fact that TMIA had no questions of the Staff's witnesses on TMIA 5 nor on the Board questions on the sample maintenance year and, in fact, did not even attend the session during which this testimony was received into evidence. Tr. 16,408 (Smith).

9 The same principle applies to TMIA's skepticism about the basis used by the Staff to determine that Licensee had properly defined and identified safety-related work requests. TMIA PF 52.

discharacterizes the testimony of Mr. Arnold when it states at TMIA PF 59 that Mr. Arnold was unable, under questioning, to outline any significant improvement the new organization will have over the old. See Licensee PF 8-12. TMIA appears to be confusing the changes in the basic organization and functioning of GPU's nuclear activities which took place with the formation of the GPU Generation Group, followed by the GPU Nuclear Group, with the nonfunctional changes in the organization which are associated with the move from the GPU Nuclear Group to the GPU Nuclear Corporation.10 See Licensee PF 11, 13. Even as to the latter, Mr. Arnold identified a number of advantages which he associated with putting the GPU Nuclear Corporation in place.

Tr. 11,528 (Arnold); Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,434, at 28-30.

28. In TMIA PF 61, TMIA asserts that Licensee's improved average mrintenance job completion rate may be due, at least in part, to the fact that the plant was down in 1980.

TMIA is either confused, or is intentionally distorting the record. The citation upon which TMIA relies for this proposi-tion relates to the performance of preventive maintenance, and the resultant increases in the number of PM jobs that were performed while the plant was down in 1980. Tr. 13,539 (Snyder). With respect to corrective maintenance, it is clear that plant shutdowns do not produce "less identified problems,"

i.e., the identification of fewer corrective maintenance jobs.

10 The record is replete with consistent opinions by virtually I everyone who has considered it, that the reorganization is a substantial, meaningful move. See Licensee PF 5. -

Tr. 13,540 (Dyckman); Tr. 13,561-62 (Shovlin, Dyckman). Thus, there is no evidentiary basis for TMIA's further assertion, which is not supported by any reference to the record, that once the plant is operational, "without the increased person-nel, Licensee might once again have to rely on inappropriate overtime, or else defer <;ertain maintenance." TMIA PF 61.

29. TMIA's description of the role of GPU's Maintenance and Construction Division, at TMIA PF 63-65, reflects an admitted confusion on the part of TMIA which is not well-founded, in light of the record developed on this subject.

See Licensee's PF 50, 57. As Mr. Shovlin explained in response to questions on this subject by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, TMI-l's maintenance activities, including its procedures, will be coordinated with the activities of the Maintenance and Construction Division of GPU. Tr. 13,610-11 (Shovlin). This organizational framework, with an onsite TMI-l maintenance group responsible for day-to-day activities, and a support organization at the division level, is consistent with the organization of all of GPU Nuclear's activities. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,4?.4, at 9-10, 27-28. The TMI-l Plant Maintenance organization will continue to do regular corrective and preventive maintenance, and minor modifications. Tr. 13,611 (Shovlin). However, large maintenance repair and modification work will be supported by the Division organization, either under the direction of Mr. Shovlin, or under the direction of Mr. Manganaro, the Vice President of Maintenance and Construction. Id. By providing a specialized group to plan, -

' schedule, and direct major and special maintenance and construction activities involved in planned and forced outages, the additional burden which otherwise would be placed on the unit operations and maintenance personnel is relieved. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,434, at 27-28; Manganaro, ff. Tr. 13,643, at 2.

30. TMIA's discussion of Licensee's " Safety-Related Improvements," TMIA PF 66-78, begins by inaccurately character-izing Licensee's new priority system for classifying corrective maintenance jobs. See 1 6, supra. We also find no basis in the record for TMIA's " fear that priority designations will be, at origination, more accurate" than the act 1 oriority assigned by the CM Manager. See Licensee PF 73, which describes the tendency of a janitor to classify his housekeeping jobs as priority 1; see also Tr. 13,621-23 (Dyckman). Moreover, TMIA's amazement that Licensee would

" rely on ' hope that someone would catch it,'" citing to Tr.

13,623, not only misquotes Mr. Dyckman, but reflects TMIA's continued confusion on this subject. TMIA is correct that "there should be some added automatic check within the system to ensure high priority items are not missed." TMIA PF 67.

This is in fact what occurs when the work is given a recom-mended priority by the originator, and is required to be re-evaluated by the CM Manages who need not follow the recom-mended priority in his designation of the actual priority.

Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 40-41. Moreover, the prioritization of maintenance work is re-evaluated at the

r I

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plan-of-the-day and other regularly scheduled operations and maintenance meetings. Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 45-47.

31. TMIA is wrong in its assertion at TMIA PF 68 that Licensee fought TMIA on every exhibit TMIA attempted to introduce on the issue of safety-relatedness. See, e.g., Tr.

3,252-55 (TMIA Ex. 19), Tr. 3,155-58 (TMIA Ex. 31) (Colitz).11

32. At TMIA PF 73, in its discussion of Licensee's computerized (GMS) job ticket system, TMIA again mischarac-terizes the facts of record. First, while it is correct that hundreds of work requests were not transferred into the data base,12 this was only true during the GMS " test phase," prior to actual GMS implementation, and was explained by Licensee in its discussion of the absence of a " clean" complete turnover from work requests to job tickets, Shovlin et al., ff. Tr.

13,533, at 29-30; in our view, this is a probable if not inevitable result of a "living" system. Moreover, in its criticisms of the computerized system, TMIA PF 72-77, many of which are not supported by any citations to the record, TMIA 11 In connection with this allegation, TMIA states "we see no reason to trust Mr. Arnold" in his characterization of the

" increased scope in definition of safety-relatedness as a corporate wot k policy. " TMIA PF 68. TMIA provides no basis for this distrust, other than Licensee's objections to its work request exhibits. Not only is TMIA's position without record support in view of the testimony of Mr. Arnold, but it ignores the supporting testimony of Messrs. Herbein, Kazanas and Ballard, and the Staf f. See Licensee PF 30-32; Staff Ex. 1, at C6-7, C6-9, C6-12; Staff Ex. 14, at 13.

12 In support of this assertion, TMIA incorrectly cites to Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533 at 28, rather than at 29-30. -

4 overtly ignores the program developed by Licensee to correct the problems associated with the change from the manual work request to the computerized job ticket system. See Shovlin et al., ff. Tr. 13,533, at 30-34. This distortion of and absence of citation to the record also applies to TMIA's discussion at TMIA PF 80 of the use of "outside maintenance personnel," we presume contractors, and the absence of adequate training for these individuals as well as Licensee's own employees. See Licensee PF 154, 159-161, 184.

33. Finally, in the closing pages of its proposed findingc on management, TMIA continues its consistent pattern of misquoting testimony and mischaracterizing the evidence, however, in these paragraphs, this practice is more egregious because in so doing, TMIA maligns the character and credentials of three individuals whom we personally observed during their appearance at the hearing, along with the appreciation shown for them by the Staff and other witnesses. See Licensee PF 19-23. We cannot let stand the following unsupported asser-tions by TMIA: (1) Mr. Arnold has an incomplete command of details, TMIA PF S4, referencing only Mr. Arnold's inability to recollect the name of an individual who had just been hired to fill the position of Director of the Nuclear Safety Assessment Department of the Nuclear Assurance Division, and who was not reporting to wur.R for two months, see Tr. 11,777 (Clark, Smith); (2) Mr. Arnold spoke in generalities rather than specifics, TMIA PF 84, a statement which indicates utter disregard for the breadth and level of detail of the -

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examination and cross-examination of Mr. Arnold, see Tr.

11,432-611, 12,120-25 (Arnold); (3) Mr. Arnold's prepared testimony " lacked what we believe to be important emphasis on i

safety matters, such as QA/QC matters, concentrating mostly on other organizational matters," TMIA PF 74, when the facts are absolutely to the contrary, see Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,434, at 15-22, 33-34; (4) Mr. Arnold displayed a " lack of knowledge, or

[a] willingness to accept incompetence in areas decisively impacting upon safety," referencing tne company policy that "in emergency situations, management may override the decision of the Emergency Director. Tr. 14,786." However, Licensee explained in detail the specifics of this issue which TMIA has taken out of context. These specifics relate to the division of responsibility between the emergency director and the emergency support director; (5) "Either Mr. Arnold is unaware 13 A. (WITNESS ROGAN) . . . During the initial stages of an incident or accident when the emergency director is the senior representative on site charged with management of the emergency, he is also charged with the authority and responsibility for classifying the accident and for making appropriate protective action recommendations through the BRP to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

To the extent that he has the authority and it is vested in him, it is not corporate policy <

to override that decision or to change it. It just simply will not occur.

To the extent that the accident progresses beyond that which is clearly a temporary short-term I transient and where the decision has been made that '

it is now necessary to expand the corporate emergency response capability to include the of f-site facilities, and in particular the emergency operations facility (footnote continued on next page) ~

. cf th] chain cf c:mmand, of which ho hto becn plcc d ct ths 4

. head, Tr. 16,544 (Rogan), or he is willing to accept an (continued) near site, the emergency support director will, l at his determination of the functional status of 4 the EOF and upon his determination that he is now properly made aware of the details and history and circumstances of the accident, establish himself as the emergency support director.

When he does that, provision is made in the plan that he will assume the responsibility for directing emergency response efforts and establishing policies.

The single exception to his assumption of responsi-bilities is that he will leave with the emergency director on site in the emergency control room, or control menter, which is the control room, the respons_aility for the technical and operational functioning of the plant.

To the extent that other emergency management efforts are not within those two categories, the emergency support director will assume those respon-sibilities, anc that includes making protection action recommendations, and he will then make those recom-mendations rather than the emergency director.

BY DR. JOHNSRUD: (Resuming)

Q. Mr. Rogan, perhaps I misheard you or perhaps your explanation used a term you did not intend to. I understood you to say in the course of that explana-tion that the emergency support director, at the determination of the capability of the EOF to function, will become the emergency support director.

Did I misunderstand what you had .901d?

A. (WITNESS ROGAN) Perhaps. As a point of clarification, the individual senior corporate management representative who is designated to be the emergency support director will, upon his determination that the emergency operating f acility is now adequately functional to support his require-ments and he is now sufficiently knowledgeable to identify himself as the emergency support director and assume from the emergency director all those emergency managHient responsibilities not directly associated with the technical functioning of the plant and its operational issues and requirements.

14 This subject is not discussed by Mr. Rogan at Tr. 16,544, but by Louise Bradford, on behalf of TMIA.

individual (Mr. Clark) who he himself has defined as incompe-tent, taking control of an emergency situation where the public i health and safety is in direct and immediate jeopardy." TMIA PF 85.- Here, TMIA flagrantly abuses the record, in view of Mr.

Arnold's detailed explanation of the basis for his satisfaction with Mr. Clark as the Deputy Chief Operating Executive, Tr.

11,516-21 (Arnold); see also Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,434, at 9-10; (6) "

In light of this and the earlier discussions of Mr. ,

Arnold's willingness to risk the public's health and safety to maximize the corporation's profits, we question why Mr. Arnold has been placed in the very position where he will be super-vising the operations and maintenance of all GPU's nuclear power plants," TMIA PF 85, a serious, broad-sweeping allegation-which TMIA fails to support by any reference whatsoever to the record; (7) Licensee's questionable decision to place Mr. J.

Herbein in the position of Director of the Nuclear Assurance Division, in view of what TMIA describes as his " demonstrated inability to utilize [his] expertise in times of stress, such as occurred on March 28, 1979." TMIA PF 86. Here, TMIA relies upon Mr. Herbein's deliberate decision to remain offsite and i

not insert himself into the chain of command, a decision which the witnesses indicated was an example of good management i decision-making, not, as TMIA alleges, without supporting citations, "the first in a series of misjudgments," see Keaten and Long, ff. Tr. 13,242, at 6; Tr. 16,537, 16,545 (Keaton);  !

cf. Lee, ff. Tr. 13,251, at 3, 4-5. TMIA also places out of

context the Staff's evaluation of Mr. Herbein's decision to leave the TMI area, TMIA PF 88-91,15 avers a number of unsup-ported assertions,16 and then mischaracterizes the evidence as 15 Staff Ex. 5, at 44, states:

The afternoon briefing of the Lt. Governor left a number of the State people with a believe that Met Ed (Herbein was the principal spokesman) was downplaying the accident, and that "everybody was making a big deal out of nothing" (Gerusky, IE, 10/1/80, p. 23). The investigators' review of the Lt. Governor 's briefing from the perspective of the State people wa's limited to their interview with Gerusky. Based on the information received, the investigators accepted the fact that some of the State people believed they had been misled and attempted to assess whether this happened deliberately on the part of Met Ed. On the one hand, there could be motives for Met Ed to describe conditions as being better than they believed them to be. On the other hand, although Met Ed knew the plant was outside known operating parameters, they also believed that conditions were improving. It was concluded that Miller and Herbein were encouraged by indications showing that the hot leg temperatures were decreasing and that the cold leg temperatures were increasing.

The notes of IE Inspector Higgins show that those located on site believed that the situation was improving. Miller and Herbein would not have wanted to unduly alarm the State people. Not knowing exactly how much detail or background information the people present for this briefing wanted or needed, Miller and Herbein could .have expected to be guided by questioning as to how much information was wanted. Nevertheless, based on a belief that information was omitted about their concerns earlier in the day and their lack of assurance that the situation would not deteriorate, the investigators conclude that the Met Ed representatives were not completely forthcoming during the briefing.

16 There 13 no citation provided in support of the  !

propositicn, and we find no basis in the record to conclude, .

that Mr. Herbein "fai1[ed] to adequately inform himself of plant conditions personally, such that the information he passed on to the Lt. Gen, was as accurate as possible," TMIA PF .

89, or.that " Messrs. Herbein, Miller and Kunder left the Lt.

.(footnote continued on next page) -

providing " clear indications of grave mismanagement and irresponsibility on the part of Mr. Herbein," again, without

.any citation to the record.

34. On the basis of the inaccuracies which we have found in TMIA's proposed findings on management, including the frequent failure to provide any citation to the record in support of the allegations stated, the numerous misquotations,

.and the continuous mischaracterization of the record as it exists, and on the basis of our own review of the record, we cannot adopt the Conclusions of Law proferred by TMIA at TMIA PF 92-93.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE wf$. Yok .

George F. Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

Deborah B. Bauser Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: June 15, 1981 (continued)

. Governor's office for the plant after the briefing, but for 45 minutes, they were unaccounted for"; but see Keaton and Long, ,

ff. Tr. 13,242, at 7, which references beeper which Miller  !

carried; see also Tr. 16,540-41 (Keaton).

l

LIC 6/15/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing

" Licensee's Reply to TMIA Findings on Management Issues" were served this 15th day of June, 1981 by hand delivery or by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the individuals identified on the attached Service List.

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

o w A

800EED B  !

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s-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) ..

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three. Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

SERVICE LIST

• Ivan W. Smith, Esquire (4) John A. Levin, Esquire Chairman Assistant Counsel Atcmic Safety and Licensing -

Pennsylvania Public Utility Ca mission Board P.O. Box 3265 U.S. Nuclear Pagulatcry Ccnmission Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C. 20555 Karin W. Carter, Esquire Dr. Walter H. Jordan Pcbert Adler, Esquire Atcmic Safeef and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel 505 Fa cutive House 881 West Outer Drive P.O. Bcx 2357 Cak Ridge, Tennessee 378N Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Dr. Linda W. Little John E. Minnich Atcmic Safety and Licensing Chaizran, Dauphin Cbunty Bcard Board Panel of Camissioners 5000 Hemitage Drive Datphin County Courthouse Paleigh, North Carolina 27612 Front and .t rket Streetc Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 James R. Tourtellotte, Esquim Tffice of the Executive Iegal Director Walter W. Cohen, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Cmmission Consumer Advocate Washington, D.C. 20555 Office of Consumer Advocate 1425 Strawberry Squa.9.e Docketing and Service Secticn (3) Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17127 j Office of the Secretary ,

U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Cmredss.t.on  !

. Washington, D.C. 20555 l

• By hand delivery -

l

Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire Pobert Q. Pollard 2320 North Second Street 609 Montpelier Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Baltirere, Maryland 21218 Ms. Icuise Bradford Chauncey Kepford DE ALERr Judith H. Jobr.srud 315 Peffer Street Environmental Coalitien en Nuclear Pcwr Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Harmen & Weiss Marvin I. Iesis 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 6504 Bradford Terrace Washington, D.C. 20006 Philadelphia, Penn.Tfl'rania 19149 Steven C. Sho11y Marjorie M. Aa.Wt thicn of Concerned Scientists R. D. 5 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 601 Coatesville, Pennsyhania 19320 Washington, D.C. 20006 Thctras J. Germine, Esquire Gail Bradford Deputy At*wrney General ANGRY Division of Iaw - Pcom 316 245 West Pb41adalph4 = Street 1100 Rai m .d Boulevard Ycrk, Pennsylvania 17404 Newark, New Jersey 07102 William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Hacen & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006

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