05000366/LER-1980-111-03, /03L-0:on 800724,while Operating at Steady State, HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve 2E41-F002 Isolated, Making Hcpi Inoperable.Probably Caused by Personnel Bumping HPCI Steam Leak Detection Relay

/03L-0:on 800724,while Operating at Steady State, HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve 2E41-F002 Isolated, Making Hcpi Inoperable.Probably Caused by Personnel Bumping HPCI Steam Leak Detection Relay

ML19344D957
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/19/1980
From:	Coggin C GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19344D956	List: 05000366/LER-1980-111, Forwards LER 80-111/03L-0 05000366/LER-1980-111-03, /03L-0:on 800724,while Operating at Steady State, HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve 2E41-F002 Isolated, Making Hcpi Inoperable.Probably Caused by Personnel Bumping HPCI Steam Leak Detection Relay
References
LER-80-111-03L, LER-80-111-3L, NUDOCS 8008260436
Download: ML19344D957 (2)

LER-1980-111, /03L-0:on 800724,while Operating at Steady State, HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve 2E41-F002 Isolated, Making Hcpi Inoperable.Probably Caused by Personnel Bumping HPCI Steam Leak Detection Relay

Event date:
Report date:
3661980111R03 - NRC Website

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KN'T 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER Hi 63 tVENT DATE 14 75 REPOHi DAf t 80 8

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h the HPCI 1

pial bn 7 24-80, while operating steady state at 99% thermal power, 1

g eam line inboard isolation valve 2E41-F002 isolated, making HPCI inop-1 n13i 0141 brable (Tech Specs 3.5.1.a).

The isolation was reset, 2E41-F002 was op-1 Misi pned, and HPCI was operable.

ADS, core spray, RCIC, and LPCI were oper-l l

due to this I

There were no effects upon oublic health and safety 1

ko lc i bble.

There__wa_ a o impact on Unit 1.

This is_a non-repetitive event.

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'll 40 di 42 44 47 3J 34 J5 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORnECTIVE ACTIONS h I The probable cause of the spurious HPCI isolation was plant personnel I

i O i i l bumping an HPCI steam leak detection rel ay.

Personnel have been cau-1 ITTTl I tioned to avoid bumping relays when working in panels.

The unit is now 1 l in full compliance with the requirements and no further reporting is l

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i LER #:

50-366/1980-111 Licensce:

Georgia Power Company Facility Name:

Edwin I.

Hatch Docket #:

50-366 f

Narrative

Report for LER 50-366/1980-111 b

On 8-24-80, while Hatch Unit 2 was operating steady state at 99%

thermal

power, the HPCI system steam line inboard isolation valve 2E41-F002 isolated on a spurious isolation signal.

HPCI was inoperabic while the isolation valve was 3

closed (Tech Specs 3.5.1.a).

The isolation was

reset, 2E41-F002 was opened, and HPCI was again operabic.

ADS, core spray, RCIC, and LPCI systems were operable.

There were no effects upon-public health and safety due to this event.

There was no impact on Unit 1.

This is a non-repetitive oCCurrenCc.

The cause of the llPCI isolation was not annunciated.

Plant personnel were working in thc-leak detection instrumentation panel in the control room when the isolation occurred.

The probable-cause of-the isolation was a

HPCI steam Icak detection relay being bumped.

Plant personnel have been cautioned against bumping relays while working in panels.

The unit is now in full compliance with the requirements, and no further reporting is required.

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