ML19332E861

LER 89-034-00:on 891031,control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Rendered Inoperable Due to Removing Independent Circuits from Svc.Caused by Inadequate Guidance.Procedures Revised & Circuits flagged.W/891130 Ltr

ML19332E861
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/30/1989
From:	Ewing E, Taylor L ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
1CAN118908, LER-89-034, LER-89-34, NUDOCS 8912130079
Download: ML19332E861 (4)

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.ICAN118988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document-Control-Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555

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SUBJECT:

Arkansas Nucicar One - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 ,.,.

License No. DPR-51 Licensee Event Report No. 50-313/89-034-00 l

i Gentlemen: .

In-accordance.with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B), attached is the subject report concerning the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System being

. rendered inoperable by removing ANO-2 equipment from service due to inadequate guidance with respect to equipment common to both~ units.

Very truly yours, E. C. Ewing General Manager, Technical Support and Assessment J ECE/RHS/sgw I attachment cc: Regional Administrator Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan D]agg Dpjyg, $gjte 10Q0 Arlington, TX 76011 INPO Records Center 1500 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 h

8912130079 891130 i PDR

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p E41 lw }a .' i Form 1062.01A NRC Form 366' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3 (9-83) Approved DMB No. 3150-0104 Expires: 8/31/85 i L1CEN$EE EVENT REP 0RT (L E R)

FACILITY NAME (1) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One IDOCKET NUMBER (2) lPAGE (3)-

10151010101 31 11 31110Fl013 i TITLE (4) Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Rendered Inoperable by Removing ANO-2 Equipment From Service Due to inadequase Guidance with Respect to Equipment Common to Both Units

~5 VENT DATE (5) l LER NUMBER (6) i REPORT DATE (7) I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) l l. l l lSequentiell IRevisionl l l l l Monthi Day lYear lYear l l Number l i Number IMonthI Day lYear l' Facility Names 1 Docket Number (s) l l l l l l l l l l l 10161010101 I i 11 01 31 11 81 91 Bl 91--I 01 31 41--! 01 Of 11 Il 31 01 81 91 10151010101 l l OPERATING l . lTHl$ REPORT l$ $UBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR $2 MODE (9) l NI (Check one or more of the followina) (11)

-POWERI l__l 20.402(b) l__l 20.405(c) l__l 50.73(a)(2)(iv) l__l 73.71(b)

LEVELI l__l 20.405(a)(1)(1) l__l 50.36(c)(1) l__l 50.73(a)(2)(v) l__l 73.71(c)

(10) 101714I l 20.405(a)(1)(ii) l__f 50.36(c)(2) l__f 50.73(a)(2)(v11) l__I Other (Specify in l__l 20.405(a)(1)(111) l_XI 50.73(a)(2)(1) l__l 50.73(a)(2)(v111)(A)I Abstract below and ,

l__l 20.405(a)il)(iv) l__l 50.73(a)(2)(ii) l__l 50.73(a)(2)(v111)(B)l in Text, NRC Form I I 20.405(al(1)(v) l l 50.73(a)(2)(111) l l 50.73(a)(2)(x) I ,366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name i Telephone Number lArea l  ;

Larry A. Taylor Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist (Code I 1510111916141-13111010 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH CDMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l l l lReportabiel l l l l lReportabiel Causelsysteal component IManufacturerl to NPRDS l ICauselsysteel Component IManufacturert to NPRDS l i l i i l 1 I i l i I I I I I I I I I I i i l I l ! I I I I i 1 1 1 I I I l l l l l l 1 I l l 1 l I i i l i I i 1 i i l l l 1 I l i 1 l 1 i l l SUPPLEMENT REPORT EXPECTED (14) l EXPECTED l Monthi Day lYear

_ l SUBMIS$10N I l l 7 l_l Yes (if yes. complete Expected Submission Date) IX) No I 0 ATE (15) l l l l 1 1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., epproximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 31, 1989, it was determined by plant personnel that the provisions of ANO 1 Technical i

Specification (TS) 3.9.1 had likely been violated during previous ANO-2 outages. The TS requires two b independent circuits of the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) be operable whenever l reactor building integrity is required. Control Room unit coolers 2VUC ?7A and B and their associated

. condenser / compressors supply air conditioning to the combined ANO-1 and ANO 2 Control Rooms during emergency conditions. These units are powered from the ANO-2 Engineered Safeguards busses._ During previous ANO 2 outages, when an EDG was removed from service for maintenance, the applicable cooler was l= rendered technically inoperable since its emergency power source was inoperable. This condition is E believed to have resulted in operation of ANO-1 in violation of the Technical Specifications. The cause of this event was inadequate guidance regarding removal from service of equipment common to both f .- units. Corrective actions which will be taken include revising appropriate procedures for both units

to provide additional guidance related to equipment common to both units. Additionally, the Systems Infermation Management System will be modified to fisg equipment common to both units to ensure that job orders affecting common equipment will be approved by the Operations Supervisors of both units.

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-e- Form 1062.018 NRC Form 366A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9-83) Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 I Expires: B/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY KAME (1) IDOCKEl MUMBER (2) I tER NUMBER (6) l PAGE (3) l l l lSequentiall IRevision!

Arkansas Nu: lear One, Unit One l I,1 tert i Number l l Number l 10151010101 31 11 31 Bi Si--i 01 31 al--I of Ol01210F1013 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. Plant Status At the time of discovery of this condition Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One (ANO-1) was operating at approximately 74 percent of rated power.

B. Event Description On Oct)ber 31, 1989, it was determined by plant personnel that the provisions of ANO-1 Technical r Specification (TS) 3.9.1, had Itkely been violated during past ANO-2 refueling outages when the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) (EK) were removed from service for maintenance. The TS requires two independent circuits of the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) (VI) be operable whenever reactor building integrity is required.

The CREACS consist of two independent, redundant trains of air conditioning equipment powered from the ANO-2 vital Engineered Safeguards (ES) electrical busses which provide emergency air conditioning for the combined ANO-1 and ANO-2 Control Rooms. Each train consists of a cooling unit (cooling coil and fan) and a contenser/ compressor unit. The units are manually started, when required.

On October 3,1989, while ANO-2 was in a refueling outage (Mode 6), it was identified by Operations personnel that Control Room cooling unit 2VUC-278 and its associated condenser / compressor unit (2VE-18) were technically inoperable because the ANO-2 EDG whict is their emergency power source had been removed from service for an 18 month surveillance activity on September 27, 1989. The ANO-2 Technical Specifications do not require the CREACS to be operable in Mode 6.

-ANO-1 Technical Specifications allows Continued operation with one circuit of the CREACS inoperable for a period of 7 days. If the inoperable circuit cannot be restored within that time, the reactor must be placed in cold shutdown within an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, j Upon discovery of the condition, actions were initiated to provide power to the CREACS 'B' train components from the ANO-1 electrical distribution system. A work plan was initiated and completed l: within the time frame allowed by the Technical Specifications providing normal and emergency power l

to 2VUC-278 and 2VE-1B from an ANO-1 vital ES bus, l

l An investigation was initiated to determine if similar conditions had existed during previous ANO-2 refueling outages. On October 31, 1989, it was concluded that the provisions of the ANO-1 Technical Specifications regarding CREACS operability requirements had Itkely been violated when i .the EDGs were removed from service for maintenance during outages, j.

l C. Safety Significance L

• The safety significance of this condition is minimized by the fact that only the emergency power eupply to one of the CREACS trains was removed during EDG surveillance activities and because the i

redundant CREACS train remained operable.

l-( D. Root Cause L

i The cause of this event was determined to be inadequate controls defining requirements related to plant activities such as maintenance which could affect operability of equipment common to both ANO-1 and ANO-2. Job orders used to perform Technical Specifications surveillances do not identify that equipment applicable to both units might be affected, or require obtaining authorization from both unit's Shift Supervisor prior to performance. In addition, the procedure used to perform the EDG surveillance did not indicate that removing an EDG from service would affect equipment required to be operable by ANO-1 Technical Specifications.

E. Basis for Reportability This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(D) as operation in a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications oecause it was determir.ed that during previous ANO-2 outages, ANO-1 had likely operated with one train of the CREACS inoperable for a time period longer than allowed by the plant's Technical Specifications.

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, Form 1062.01B

,-NRC Form 366A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- (9-83) Approved DMB No. 3150-0104 Expirest' 8/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) l DOCKET NUMBER (2) l LER NUMBER (6) 1 PAGE (3) l l l 15equentiall l Revision l Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One l l_Yearl I Number .1 1 Number l 10151010101 31 Il 31 81 91--l 01 31 41--I 01 Ol01310Fl013 TEKT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17)

F. Corrective Actions immediate corrective actions taken with respect to this event were to provide normal and emergency power to 2VUC-278 and 2VE-18 f rom an ANO-1 E5 bus.

As an interim corrective action, a discussion of this event and the lessons learned from it are being conducted with the operating crews of ANO-1 and AN0-2. These discussions will be completed by December 30, 1989.

Future corrective actions which should aid in preventing the occurrence of similar events include:

• The operating procedures for ANO-1 and ANO-2 will be evaluated and the appropriate changes will be made to a*.ert Operations personnel to the applicability of equipment inoperability on the opposite unit.

• . A review will be conducted to identify equipment and components required to be operable by both units Technical specifications. The Systems Information Management System (SIN 5) database will then be modified to " flag" the identified equipment as being applicable to both units. This action will ensure that job orders issued to work or perform surveillances on equipment common to both units will require approval by both ANO-1 and AND-2 Operations prior to being worked.

This report will be supplemeh?sd by January 31, 1990 to include the schedule for completion of the above mentioned future corre-tive actions.

G. Additional Information.

There have been no previous events reported in which removing equipment from service in one unit resulted in viointion of the opposite units Technical Specifications.

Energy Industry Identification System (E!!S) codes are indicated in the text as [WX).

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