ML19320A459
| ML19320A459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford, Midland |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1973 |
| From: | Brand W, Leckie D JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006180664 | |
| Download: ML19320A459 (21) | |
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'"'1TED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE Titz His DOCUMEMT COBTMMS P00R QU b U NMIC ENERGY C0324ISSION I-In the Matter of )
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CONSi1MERS FOWER COMP /d1Y ) Docket Nos. 50-329A (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) 50-330A DRIEF OF TF.E DEPART!!EliT OF JUSTICE TO ASSIST BOARD III DETERMINIHC I!! PACT OF COMMISSION'S LIEMORANDDI AND CRCER (COCKET 50-382AT UFOli TliIS PROCEEDING The Atomic Energy C= mission recently issued a Femorandum and Order in its Louisiana Potter and Light Company Fntad 't 3 e.nt3 twet resrien preceeding.3/ The Licensing I Ecard a the Waterford case had recommanded granting petitions to intervene sad hoiding a hearing en dasignated antitrust issues.
. The Commission, in its Memorandum and Order, accepted the Daard's recommendations. In'the cource of its opinion, the Commission commented on the secpe of prelicensing antitrust review under Section 105c of the Atcmic Energy Act. The Scard hac called a preh2aring conference to censider the offect of this Memorandum and Order en the conduct- of this proceeding.
The Department of Justicc belicves the antitrust hearing on Consumers Ecwer Company's Midland Units must go forward as scheduled with its scope unchanged from that
- / Mercorandum and Order in the catter of Lcuisiane Power and I~ight Compan't (Waterford Stean Electric Generating f tation, Unit 3), Docket No. 50-382A, September 26, 1073.
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previously adopted by this Board.*/ Nothing the Commission has said or done requires otherwise.
Section 105c(5) of the Atomic Energy Act requires the Commission (and here by delegation the Board) to make "a finding as to whether the activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." The Commission's Memorandum and Order emphasizes that there must be a meaningful nexus between the activities under the nuclear license and the situation alleged to be inconsis-tent with the antitrust laws in order for those activities to be found tcJcreate or maintain that situation. The Department agrees entirely. We allege and ue will present evidence shew-ing that there exists todcy in Michigan's tcwer raninsula a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and that the activities under the Midic nd licenses, if i sued, would affirma-tively maintain, indeed exacerbate, that situation.
The statutory finding require i here of the Board is concerned with the relationship or nexus between two things:
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(1) "A situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws"; and (2) " Activities under the license." Tt.e requisite nexus is simply that the activities must "creat( or maintain" the situation. We will now examine the si:uation, activities, and nexus as they exist in this proceeding.
- / Prehearing Conference Order of. August 7, 1972, p. 3.
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In the prese'nt centext,,the Board must accept the facts
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.we set Azt asit' rue--the proper. analogy is to a c.ourt's considera-lion o.f a blaintiff's case upon a defendant's demurrer or motion
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'to dismiss'~foi failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of ~
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Civil Proceddr.e(12(bf(61 That sio~me,of the facts map be contro-verted is irrelevant to the.Ecard's appra.isal o'f our claim of nexus at this point 'in the pro'ccedi~ng, wit'h no. evidence'iin the record.
THE SITUATION What is the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws that the Department alleges now e::ista in Michigan's lower peninsula? Briefly sected, we will show a situation wherein Applicant has monopoliced the wholesale-for-resale 1
firm-pover market over a large area of Michigan's lower peninsula and uses its menopoly power to restrict ccmpetition in the retail-distribution firm-power market in that area. We allege this situation to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws and the policies underlying those laws,
) ice., the avoidance of monopolies and restraints upon freedom of competition.*/
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- / E.g.: "The purpose was . . . to make . . . a competitive Fusiness economv." United States v. South-Eastern Underwaters
. Ass'n, 322 U.S.'533, 559 (19441; "The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith-in the value of ccmpetition.
In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress uns dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent."
Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C. , 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951T ; " Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public wealth is that goods must stand the cold test of ccmpetition; that the public, acting thrcugh the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the nation's resources and thus direct the course its ,
economic development will take." Times-Picayune Publishing Co. 1
- v. . United S tates.. 35 3 . ", S. 5 c '; :6S5 (305
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The following fac'tual' allegations underlie she charge of monopolization. To compete in the wholesale-for-resale fire-power market, an electric utility recuires a low-cost bulk power supply. Nuclear power is cheaper now than any other kind of available pcuer to meet new and growing loads.
Nuclear power, however,' may be economically produced only from large units, i.e., units with over-500 mczawatts capacity.
Large units are economic sources of firm power only if tied by high-voltage transmission to on integrated system of generating units and/or to the regional power exchange. Appli-cant has accuired and/or owns a vast prependcrance of central station power scurces in its area of lower Michigan. Through ownarship oF all the extra-high-voltage (345 kv and higher) transmission and nearly all the high-volcage (44-345 kv) transmission in its area, Applicant controls access to the regional power exchange there. Applicant refuses other electric utilities in this area coordinating access to its system and to the regional power exchange. This precludes the other electric utilities from installing large units. Thus Appli-cant is the sole source of power from large units--and hence of nuclear power--in the wholesale-for-resale firm-power market.
Its: exclusion of other potential nuclear power plant licensees from the regional power exchange enables it to monopolize the wholesale-for-resale firm-power market.
Applicant's monopo-lization of the wholesale-for-resale firm-power market has the further effect cf restricting competition in the retail-distribution firm-power market whi*ch Applicant also dominates--
alternative sources of bulk power supply are denied to its competitor distribution systems. This is the anticompeti-tive situation, t
THE LICENSE ACTIVITIES What will be the activities under the Midland licenses? Applicant will be entitled to construct and sub-sequently to operate the Midland units. The purpose of this construction and operation (as well as the basis upon which the financing necessary for construction was obtained) is the r.iarketing of the electric pouer produced by the nuclear units.
The Midland license applications are pursuant to Section 103 of the Act--i.e., the nuclear plants are to be used for cor.mercial purposes . According to Section 50.22 of the Commission's Rules,*/ Section 103 licenses are issued to applicants to use nuclear facilities for commercia1 curposes.
Section 50.33 directs that license applications state the use to uhich the nuclear facility will be put and "[i]nformation sufficient to demonstrate . . . the financial cualifications of the Applicant to carry out . . . the activities for which the permit is sought." That section goes on to recuire addi-tional information "[i]f the proposed activity is the eenern-tion and distribution of electric enernv under a class 103 license" (emphasis added). Applicant's Midland license
- / 10 C.F.R. 550.22 (1973).
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..s application makas this statemant: " Applicant desires to use the reactors to generate electrical energy for its integrated electric system . . ." (p. 4). There can be no doubt what-ever that marketing pouer from the Midland units is an activity under the license.*/_
The Midland units will produce 1300 megawatts of large-unit, base-load, nuclear electric power for marketing over Applicant's system. This power will not and cannot be marketed in isolation; its successful marketing necessarily dapends upon the reliability and economies that result from inte-grstion of the Midland units into Applicant's system and coor-dination of that system with the regional power exchange. The Midland units vill represent approximately 16 peracnt of Applicant's 1978 generating capncity; they will be substantial
--indeed among the largesc--components of Applicant's power
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marketing capability. When they become cperational, they will increase the portion of generating capacity of Applicant represented by nuclear generation to apprcximately 36 percent.
. Any argument that " activities under the 1icense" do not extend so far also flies in the faca of clear Congressional intent that section 105c prelicensing antitrust review reach the marketing of electric power. The legislative history
- / . Applicant admitted as much while arguing lack of nexus in Its Response to Justice Reply and Petitioner's Statement, dated June 27, 1972, pages 21-22.
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leaves no doubt that Congress was very much concerned with the effect of nuclear generation upon competition in electric power markets.*/ ,
9 THE NEXUS: THE ACTIVITIES WILL MAINTAIN THE SITUATION The Departmen't will show that the activities under the Midland licenses would maintain--i.e., continue, carry en, support, sustain, uphold, keep up--and indeed exacerbate the anticompetitive situation described above--and thus that the nexus recuired by Section 105c is present in thic case.
The activities, as we have seen, necessarily include the integratien of 1300 megauatts of nuclear power into Applicant's system for marketing in the area' of lower Michigan where Applicant is located. That 1300 megawatts of nuclear power--supported by the tying of Applicant's system into the regional power exchange--will be the cheapest available power to serve new and growing loads in 1978. Such a 1300 megawatt generation addition is hardly insignificant--16 percent of Applicant's total generation capacity when installed, and an even greater percentage of its base load capacity (generating units projected to operate nearly full time) . Also, as noted above, the Midland units are not Applicant's first;
- / Congressional intent regarding the scope of prelicensing antitrust review was discussed in . detail in the Reply of the Department of Justice on Issues Other Than Disoualification, dated. June 9, 1972, which is hereby incorporated by reference in the present brief.
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l approximately 36 percent of its generating capacity will be nuclear when they become operational. Nor are they the last nuclear units Applicant plans to install: it has already contracted for two 1150 megawatt units expected to be in operation in 1982 and 1983 (the Quanicassee units). Their installation will, of dourse, increase the percentage of Applicant's generating capacity represented by nuclear units.
The. low-cost, large-unit, base-load nuclear power supplied by the Midland Units will strengthen and expand Applicant's system and the regional power exahange of which it is a part. This strengthening and expansion will increase Applicant's future ability to install and obtain low-cost power from large units--witness the already projected installa-tion of the two Quanicassee 1150 megawatt units. Yet, concurrent with Applicant's action of installing and planning to operate the Midland units to strengthen and c::pand its system and the regional exchange and support its future installation of more, even larger generating units, the Applicant continues to refuse reasonable access'to the regional power exchange by its competitors (in the wholesale-for-resale firm-power marke t) . It thus forecloses them from applying for licenses to-install.their own lorge, low-cost, base-load nuclear generation
--and from obtaining the benefits of the nuclear technology ,
developed by the Federal Government--and it denies them the lbw-cost pcwer they need to compete with Applicant's Midland
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i power for new-and growth 1 cads and to support their future t
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competitive installation of large generating units. Construc-tion and operation of the Midland units'and marketing of the power from those units through integration into Applicant's system and the regional power exchange demonstrably furthers Applicant's monopolization of the wholesale-for-resale firm-power market--thus maintaining and exacerbating a situation clearly inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
THE DISPUTE HERE IS OF FACT, NOT LAW We have pleaded here the required meaningful nexus, and we will prove it in the evidentiary hearing. We do not understand Section 105c or the Commission to recuire more.
We note that Applicant, in its Response to Justice Department Reply and Petitioners' Statement (June 27, 1972) rade the nexus argument in much the same way as we have here, albeit reaching a different result (pages 21-22). Applicant
. admitted that the Midland units will provide its system with additional generation capacity; however, it denied the effe-t of this increment of large-unit power on the competitive situa-tion in lower Michigan. Applicant apparently would analogize !
l its installation and marketing of pcwer from the Midland units to the purchase of wholesale firm pouer from another system.
However, this is a false analogy. In fact, Applicant does not now and does not wish in the future to purchase firm power as
'a wholesale customer. It wants to control its own bulk power supply (as do the smaller systems seeking relief here) and
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does so-by installing generating units and tying them into its system and into the regional power exchange. We cite this not to argue with Applicant's factual claims--such argument is not called for under the present postura of this proceeding, as we have explained above--but to point out that the dispute over nexus in this proc ~eeding is one of fact, not law. We have pleaded facts showing that Applicant's marketing of Midland power as part of its system and the regional exchange will strengthen its monopoli:ation of the wholesale market. Appli-cant denies that Midland will have such effect. The issue of nexus is ripe for evidentiary hearing.
THE DEPARTMDIT COES NOT RELY ON MERE COMMIUGLING GF FOWER TO ESTABLISH HEXUS The Commission's Memorandum and Order emphasizes that the mere commingling of pcuer frem the nuclear unit (for which a license is sought) with power from otner generating facilities on an applicant's system should not be construed as supplying the recuired nexus. We agree. While it is true that power from'the Midland units must be (not merely will be) commingled with power from the remainder of Applicant's system (and the regional pct'er exchange) to make installation of.those units"eco'nomically f6asible so that firm power can be marketed from those units, we do not contend that this fact alone establishes the necessary -cxus here. The nexus--
the one reouired by Section'105c--is that the marketing of Midland power will affirmatively maintain the antitrust-inconsistent situation uhereby Applicant monopolizes the
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wholesale-for-rcsale firm-power market by denying others access to the regional power exchange and thus denying them access to large-unit nuclear generation.
t SECTION 105c COMPELS INQUIRY INTO ANY SITUATION INCONSISTENT WITIl THE ANTITRUST LAWS THAT WOULD BE MAINTAINED BY THE LICENSE ACTIVITIES Applicant has suggested that Congress' only concern in amending Section 105c in 1970 vas to prevent the exclusion of small utilitics from joint ventures owning and operating nuclear power reactors and that the statute was not intended to reach situations uhere, as here, proposed units are owned by a single utility.*/ Section 105c cannot be read so narrowly, however; its plain language requires the Commission to inquire into any situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws that would be maintained by activities under the license. The
- situation here is more complicated than that of exclusion from access to nuclear power because of exclusion from a joint venture nuclear plant, but the anticompetitive effect is the s ame . . Denying other systems access to the regional power exchange just as surely results in denying them access to nuclear power--
while Applicant proceeds to install the Midland units. We have pleaded this to be a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws. Applicant may contend that it is not because it disputes the facts or perhaps disputes our application of
- /_ Response to Justice Department Reply and Petitioners' Statement, June 27, 1972, pp. 22-23.
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antitrust law and policy to those facts; hcwever, it should not be permitted to argue that Congress did not intend even to permit inquiry into situations where small systems are allegedly denied meaningful access to the benefits of nuclear power.*/
TIIL PRFEXISTING COMPETITIVE SITUAT .ON MUST BE ANALYZED tie are concerned that there be no confusion between the statutory phrase, " activities under the license"--which relates to construction and operation of the nuclear units and marketing power from thern--on the one hand and the variety of Applicant's past or present activities which must be incuired into as facets or elements of the competitive situatioa into which the licensed activities will be thrust. The language of Section 105c does not conte.T. plate that " activities undar the license" shall be considered in a vacuum. Moreover, the statutory test is not whether the licensed activities are themselves inconsistent with the antitrust laus. The activities must be evaluated in-the context of a preexisting "situction"--
more specifically, the competitive frameuork-in which the
- / Applicant, of course, will contend that small systems in Its' area may obtain the benefits of nuclcar power by whole-sale firm power purchases frem Applicant's system (which integrates nuclear generation.with other forms of generation) .
This misses the point. The smaller systems do not desire to be merely Applicant's customers in'the uholesale-for-resale firm-power market--they want fEstead to compete with Appli-cant as generating and cocrdinating entities--i-e., as sellers in that market.
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license applicant operates: how it relates to its competitors, its customers, neighbors, and regulators. In this proceeding, our analysis of the competitive situation in lower Michigan has necessarily involved consideration of Applicant's activities vis-a-vis smaller privately owned, municipal and cooperative electric systems in its area, including the nature of interconnection witit them, if any, competition for whole-sale and retail custcmers, acq:isition of other systems, etc.
4 Applicant's coordinating relationships with Detroit Edison and other neighboring systems are also important elements of this corapetitive situation.
The effect of federal and state laws and regulation upon electric utility competition likeuise
, had to be taken into account.
Many such facts or activitics must be considered and evaluated by this Board in determining whether there is a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws as alleged by the Department. The statute does not require that each such fact or activity itself be an " activity under the license,"
ner does it require that there be any direct relationship between each such fact or activity considered in isolatica and the licensed activities. The only nexus necessary is thac the situation allegedly inconsistenc with the antitrust laws be maintained by the licensed activities.
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THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE BROAD COMPETITIVE SITUATION IS NOT UNIOUE TO SECTION 105c PROCEEDINGS The need to consider a broad competitive situation, not all elements of which bear directly upon a licnese or other regulatory end, is not unique to prelicensing antitrust review under Section 105c. Competition is the nation's fundamental economic policy. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1953).*/ Regulation and competition are not mutually exclusive but rather are recognized as comnle-mentary means to the same goal of proper resource allocation; regulators must as a general rule consider the impact of their decisions upon competition. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v.
United States, 387 U.S. 465 (1967); "orthern Natural Gas Co.
- v. F. P. C. 399 F.2d 953, 939 (D.C.Cir. 1966). A good example t
is the recent case of Gulf States Utilities Co. v. F. P. C.,
411 U.S. 747 (1973). Gulf States sought Federal Pouer Commission authorization of a bond issue. The FPC could authoriae the the issue on finding it to be for some lawful purpose and compatible with the public incerest. Too municipal electric systems in Gulf States' area opposed the FPC authorization on grounds that proceeds of the bond issue would be used to
- / Even aside from tae prelicensing antitrust review pro-visions of Saction 105c, the Atomic Energy Act explicitly reaffirms the fundamental national policy of competition by charging the Commission to develop the use of atomic energy so as to " strengthen free competition in private enterprise,"
Section 1(b), 42 U.S.C. 20ll(b), and states a purpose of the Act to provide for "a program to encourage videspread participa-tion in the development and utilization of accmic energy for peaceful purposes. " Section 3(d), 42 U.S.C. 2013(d) .
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9 finance or refinance a broad range of anticompetitive activities similar in many respects to those we have inquired into here.*/
The FPC denied their request for hearing on the basis that the allegations were irrelevant to the securities authorization.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for considera-tion of the allegations' raised, and the Supreme Court affirmed The preexisting situation--the history of its decision.
anticompetitive activities--had to be examined to determine if'the securities issue would have an anticompetitive result.
In the instant proceeding, of course, the need to inouire into the preexisting situation to determine the effect of licensing is even more clear, for the mere maintenance of a preexisting anticcmpetitive situation by the license activities could justify an adverse antitrust finding by the Board.
THE CODIISSION APPROVED THE INTERVENTION PETITIONS AND THE ISSUES IN THE WATERFORD CASE In assessing the implications of the Waterford Memorandum and Orderf it should not be forgotten that the Commission accepted its Licensing Ecard's recommendations that the petitions to intervene in the Louisiana Pouer and Light Company Waterford proceeding be granted and an antitrust
- / Many of the very same anticompetitive activities involv-Ing electric utilities in Louisiana were alleged in support of the petitions to intervene in this. Commission's Louisiana Power and Light Waterford proceeding, AEC Doc!:et No. 50-382A.
., ,- . s hearing be ordered. The Licensing Ecard's recommendations were based en findings which included the following:
(1) Petitioners and Intervenors have alleged with sufficient particularity situations that may be inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies. underlying those laws.
(2) There are nexi between activities under the proposed license and (a) said situation and (b) proposed relief.*/
The Commission also ruled that Issues I and II listed by the Board were apprcpriate for purposes of commencing the hearing.
These issues are:
I. A. Whether Applicant alone or together with others has the ability to
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hinder or prevent:
(1) smaller electric entitics frem achieving access to the benefits of coordinated operation 4/ cither among themselves or with Ipplicanc or other electric utilities; (2) smaller electric entities from achieving access to the benefits of economy of size of large electric generating units by coordinated 5/ either among them-development, selves or wit E Applicant or other electric utilities.
B. Whether a situation or situations inconsistent with the antitrust lcus or the policies clearly under-lying these laws has resulted or will result from the exercise of such ability.
- / Memorandum and Order of Board with Respect to Petitions to Intervene in an Antitrust Hearing, Docket No. 50-382A, April 24, 1973, p. 1. The nexus alleged was thct power frcm Waterford (activities under the license) would strengthen the ability of Louisiana Power and Light to maintain or exaccr-bate existing antitrust-inconsistent situations.
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II. Whether Applicant's policy not to sell unit power or ownership shares in Water-ford Station Unit 3 deprives smaller electric utilities tha't are connected or could be connected with Applicant, of the benefit of power from Waterford 3 and thereby results in a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying these laws. -
4/ Coordinated operation refers to such activities as reserve sharing, emergency power exchanges, defi-ciency pouer sales and other coordination of e::isting facilities.
5/ Coordina ted development refers to joint planning ind invescment. It includes staggered investment and joint investment in new plants of such size as to achieve the economies of scale.
(Memorandum and 0,ainion of Ecard, Docket No. 50-382A, April 24, 1973, p. 61 They are similar in content to the issues in the present proceeding.
CONCLUSION: THE BOARD MUST HEAR THE EVIDENCE The Commission has commented upon the difriculty of delineating the secpe of Section 105c antitrust review in the abstract, with evidentiary records not yet developed in the initial proceedings under the statute (Memorandum and Order, p. ST. Consumers Power--Midland is the very first license application to approach the evidentiary hearing stage.
That . hearing is scheduled to begin" imminently; the parties' conned direct -testimor., documentary evidence and trial briefs are in the final stages of preparation. There will soon be
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a full evidentiary. record to consider--and a decision on that record to serve as precedent for subsequent Section 105c cases.
I The Board recognizes the significance of this pro-ceeding. It has permitted broad discovery which has taken
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over a year to complete.(including discovery by the Applicant ranging well beyond what the Department has sought and con-tended to be proper under Section 105c.). It recently denied a motion of the Intervenors for summary judgment and explained its ruling as follows:
MR. CI*,RK: Mr. Brand has commented on the
. fact that this being the first antitrust case, that rulings in this case may well go far beyond the particular facts of this case and the particu-lar parties of this case since ne will be setting a precedent for cuch cases.
For this reason, the Board was initially of the opinion that it would not limit disecvery and that it would let the parties go pretty well as far as they wanced uichin the scope of the matters in controversy, . . . .
[I]t does seem to me that before we can decide as a Board, and this is an agreement among the members of the Board that before ue are going to decide this case we are going to give1the Appli- .
cant broad latitude in attempting to rebut the thrust of the Department. of Justice's case.
Accordingly, we, this Board, are denying the -
moticn-to limit discovery and we are denying the regaest for summary judgment. -We expect all parties;in-this case to present the fullest and best case that they can within their abilities.
.Then we will carefully study the evidence, the arguments, the' presentations, and then we
- will attempt to decide the issues in this case.
But wcTare not going to shortcut it,'we are not: going to. leave loopholes for saying that we have st-ir -d -mr. t ornethinm The nnt-ion.ic
-CCnied Ln CoLU.
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- Summary judgment only is appropriate where we have no issues of fact. We think there are genuine issues of fact he e, and that is an additional reason for denying summary judgment.
(Tr. 546, 548-9)
The Department has shown here that its direct .
evidentiary case falls clearly within the scope of Section 105c, with . factual allegations of a meaningful nexus between the Midland license activities and a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laus. This is most emphatically not a proceeding to be disposed of summarily without first hearing the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
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WALIACE E. BRAND
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DAVID A. LECKIE Attorneys, Antitrust Division Department of Justice October 19, 1973 Washington, D. C.
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
BEFORE THE ATOMIC ENERGY C0FDiISSION In the Matter of )
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CONSU'ERS POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-329A (Midland Plcnt, Units 1 and 2) ) 50-330A, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copics of BRIEF OF THE DEP).RTMENT OF JUSTICE TO ASSIST BOARD IN DETERMINING IMPACT OF COMMISSION'S MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (DOCKET 50-382A) UP0H THIS PROCEEDING, dated October 19, 1973, in the above-capcieted matter have been served on the folicwing by deposit in the United States mail, first class or air mail, this 19th day of October, 1973:
Honorchic Jereme Garfinhel Mr. Frank W. Karas , Chie f Chairaan, Aconic Safety and Public Proceedings Srcnch Licensing Board Office of the Secretary of U. S. A::omic Energy Cc=vission the Ccemission Washington, D. C. 20545 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Henoralsle Huc Ate:aic Energ~4h K . Clark Cotmission Willica W. Ross, Escuire Keith S. Watson, Esquire ~
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Pcst Officc he:: 127A Kennedyville, Maryland 21645 Wald, Harkrader & Ross 1320 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Honorabic J.'Vann Leeds, Jr.
- Washington, D. C. 20036 Atomic Energy Commission Post Office Bo:: 941 Harold P. Graves, Esquire Housten, Te::as 77001 Vice President and General Counsel Consumers Pouer Cecnany Atemic Safety end Licensing 212 West Michigan Avenhe Eo.ird Panel Jackson, Michigan 49201 U. S. Accaic-Energy Cermission Washington, D. C. 20545 Rob ~ert A. Jablon, Esquire James C. Polloch, Esquire Chairman, Accmic Safety and '
Spiegel and McDiarmid Licensing t.ppeals Board 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
U. S. Atomic Energy Cc mission Washington, D. C. 20037 Washingten, D. C. 20545 ,
Joseph Rutberg, Esquire HMr. Abrcham Braitman, Chief Benjamin H. Vocier, Esquire Office of Antitrust and Indemnity Antitrust Counsel for AEC U. S. - Atomic Energy Con.nission Regulato ry Staff Washington, D. C.- 20545 U. S. Atemic Energy Cc=missien
. Washington, D. C. 20545
lionorable Frank Kelly Attorney General State of Michigan Lansing, Michigan 46913
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' I DAVID A. LECKIE .
Attorney, Antitcust Division
' Department of Justice ,
- Wcchington, D. C. 20530 ;
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