ML19262A989

Response in Opposition to Ucs 791115 Amended Contention 13. Petitioner Failed to Identify Accident or Sequence of Events for Which Intervention Sought.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19262A989
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	11/21/1979
From:	Trowbridge G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 7912110384
Download: ML19262A989 (9)

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1. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N .& BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE' S RESPONSE TO AMENDED CONTENTION NO. 13 OF THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS On November 15, 1979, the Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS") filed a motion for leave to amend its contention no. 13. While Licensee does not object to the request by UCS to amend contention no. 13, Licensee still believes the contention to be inadmissible in this pro-ceeding and requests the Licensing Board to so rule.

1529 130 Amended Contention No. 13. The design of TMI does not provide protection against so-called

" Class 9" accidents. There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not cred-ible. Indeed, the staff has conceded that the accident at Unit 2 falls within that classification. Of the realm of possible accidents, the staff's method of determining which fall within the design basis accidents and those for which no protection is required is faulty in that the design basis accidents for TMI do not bound the credible accidents which can occur. Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance that TMI-l can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public and resumption of opera-tion should not be permitted.

6 7912110 3M

Licensee's Response:

Both Licensee and the NRC Staff objected to this contention as originally framed by UCS because it failed to identify the accident or sequence of events for which UCS contended that TMI-l should be designed against. As Li-censee noted, the lack of such information precluded Li-censee either from responding to the contention or from determining the relevance of the contention to the scope of this restart proceeding. During the course of debate on this contention at the special prehearing conference (see Tr. at 252-83) , it became clear that the primary concern of UCS was the method used by the NRC Staff for determining which sequence of events is classified a design basis acci-dent, and which sequence is beyond the design basis of the plant (Tr. at 266-67, 268-69, 275-78). Therefore, at the Chairman's request (Tr. at 282-83), UCS has now amended its contention by adding the following language:

Of the realm of possible accidents, the staff's met:.od of determining which fall within the design basis accidents and those for which no protection is required is faulty in that the design basis accidents for TMI do not bound the credible accidents which can occur.

UCS' added language provides no greater specificity of the sequence of events which it believes should be con-sidered, but are not, than did the contention as initially framed. Notwithstanding the quoted language that has been 1529 131

added by UCS, Licensee still is in no position either to respond to the contention or to determine the relevance of the contention to the scope of this proceeding.

Moreover, without identifying any sequence of events which UCS believes should be considered, there is not even an attempt by UCS to satisfy the Commission's basis-for-contention requirement. Certainly the accident at TMI-2 does not provide a sufficient basis for the broad range of the amended contention. Accepting arguendo that the TMI-2 accident was a Class 9 accident, that sequence of events and the lessons learned from the accident are the subject matter of this proceeding. Since those matters are already being considered, the amended contention must mean that the Staff's accident analysis is faulty for failure to consider sequences of events other than the TMI-2 accident. However, as to those unspecified sequences UCS provides no basis for alleg-ing that such matters need be considered.

This omission is particularly telling in view of UCS' concession that it "could provide scenarios if we were pressed" (Tr. at 257).1/ If UCS believes the Staff's acci-

-1/

See also Tr. at 272 (ANGRY's claim that "we can come up with scenarios"); 282 (CEA's admission "that some kind of analysis that would need to specify something in the nature of multiple system breakdowns or multiple problems combined with some operator malfunction * * *" may be needed); 733-34 (Sholly's position that he had "come up with six [ scenarios]

that are more severe than Unit 2 [ accident], and they are very close analogs to Unit 2 [ accident]").

1529 132

dent analysis flawed, and if it knows particular ways in whicn that analysis is flawed, then UCS should inform the NRC Staff, the Licensing Board and Licensee by identifying the particular scenarios that have been ignored. Only in that manner can UCS satisfy the specificity and basis re-quirements of the Commission's Rules of Practice.

All of this is not to say that a review of the NRC Staff's approach to accident analysis might not be ap-propriata in the proper forum. Indeed, such a review was recommended in the TNI-2 Lessons Laarned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations (NUREG-0 57 8 ) . As to "he future work to be performed by the Lessons Learned Task Force, it was stated (id. at 16-17) :

A central issue that will be considered is whether to modify or extend the current de-sign basis events or to depart from the con-cept. For example, analysis of design basis accidents could be modified to include multiple equipment failures and more explicit considera-tion of operator actions or inaction, rather than employing the conventional single-failure criterion. Alternatively, analyses of design basis accidents could be extended to include core uncovery or core melting scenarios. Risk assessment and explicit consideration of acci-dent probabilities and consequences might also be used instead of the deterministic use of analysis of casign basis accidents.

This theme has been carried through to the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report (NUREG-0 5 85) .

10 states (pd. at A-14 to A-15):

Recommendatio$

i529 I3 The Task Force recommends that the Commis-n issue within three months a notice of

intent to conduct rulemaking to solicit com-ments on the issues and facts relating to the consideration of design features to mitigate accidents that would result in (a) core-melt and (b) severe core damage, but not substan-tial melting.

There follows a list of nine specific subjects that the Task Force believes should be addressed in such a rulemaking, in-cluding the probabilities and consequences of the various event sequences that might result in significant releases of radioactivity to the environment. See also NUREG-0585 at 3-4 to 3-6.

The very reasons UCS' amended contention no. 13 is inappropriate for litigation in this adjudicatory forum --

lack of specificity and basis -- do not necessarily bar con-sideration of the matter in a legislative-type, rulemaking forum. Indeed, a rulemaking forum drawing on a broad range of expertise and experience is better suited for resolution of the amorphous, broad policy issues raised by amended con-tention no. 13. As the introduction to the Lessons Learned Final Report notes (NUREG-05 85 at 1-1) :

In contrast to the short-term recommendations in NUREG-G578, which were of a more narrow, specific, and urgent nature, this report deals with safety cuestions of a more fundamental golicy nature regarding nuclear plant opera-tions and design and the regulatory process.

The Task Force considers the thrust of the modifications it has outlined to be of funda-mental importance to nuclear safety, and urges that immediate steps be taken to complete the 1529 134

deliberative process and initiate implementation of these specific recommendations. We envision the deliberative process to include review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; formulation of an action plan by the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in consultation with the Offices of Inspection and Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Research, and Standards De-velopment; and approval of the action plan by the Commission. [ Emphasis added.]

For all the foregoing reasons, Licensee requests the Licensing Board to exclude from consideration at the up-coming TMI-l restart hearing UCS' amended contention no. 13.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PIT MAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

, MJ M I j By: ' ' Geofge F. Trowbridge /

Dated: November 21, 1979 1529 135

November 21, 1979 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON CCZPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Re-sponse to Amended Contention No. 13 of the Union of Concerned Scientists", were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 21st day of November, 1979.

M 7 Robert E.

p6hlef' Dated: November 21, 1979 1529 136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

SERVICE LIST Ivan W. Smith, Esquire John A. Ievin, Esquire Om4=n Assistant Counsel Atcmic Safety and Licensing Pennsylvania Public Utility Ccum'n Board Panel Post Office Box 3265 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission Harrisburg, Pernsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C. 20555 Karin W. Carter, Esquire Dr. Walter H. Jordan Assistant Attorney General Atcmic Safety and Licensing 505 Executive Fouse Board Panel Post Office Box 2357 881 West Guter Drive Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37910 Robert L. Knupp, Esquire Dr. Linda W. Little Assistant Solicitor Atcmic Safety and Licensiry County of Dauphin Board Panel Post Office Box P 5000 Hermitage Drive 407 North Front Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 James A. Tourtellotte, Esquire John E. Minnich Office of the Executive Iagal Director Chairman, Dauphin County Board U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Cr-iasion of Ccmnissioners Washington, D.C. 20555 M rhLn County Courthcuse Frcnt and Market Streets Docketing and Service Section Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory cr-iesion Walter W. Cohen, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Ccnsumer Advocate Office of Consumer Advocate 14th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17127 1529 137

Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire Karin P. Sheldon, Escuire Attorney for Newberry Township Attorney for People Against Nuclear T.M.I. Steering Camittee Energy 2320 North Second Street Sheldon, Harnen & Weiss Marrh brg, Pennsylvania 17110 1725 Eye Street, N.W. , Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006

'Iheodore A. Mier, Esquire Wicbff Peager Selkowitz & Mler Robert Q. Pollard Post Office Box 1547 Qwcapake Energy Alliance Harrisb.trg, Pennsylvania 17105 609 Frntpelier Street Baltincre, Maryland 21218 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire At erney for the Union of Ccncerned Gauncey Kepford Scientists Judith H. Johnsrud Sheldal, Haznan & Weiss Environmental Coalition on Nuclear 1725 Eye Street, N.W. , Suite 506 Power Washington, D.C. 20006 433 Orlando Avenue Scate College, Pennsylvania 16801 Steven C. Sholly 304 Scuth Market Street Marvin I. Iewis Mechani m harg, Pennsylvania 17055 6504 Bradford Terrace Philaalphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Frieda Berryhill, Gaiman N1ition for Nuclear Power Plant Marjorie M. Aamodt Postponement R. D. 5 2610 Glendon Drive Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Wilmington, Delaware 19808 Jane Iee Gail Bradford R. D. 3, Box 3521 Holly S. Keck Etters, Penrsylvania 17319 Iagislation Gaiman Anti-Nuclear Group Pepresenting York 245 West Phila alphia Street York, Pennsylvania 17404 1529 138