Text

Proposed Scenarios
	ML19248C637
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/09/2019
From:	Joseph Demarshall; Detroit Edison, Co
To:	; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
	Demarshall J
Shared Package
ML17215A391	List: ML19248C281; ML19248C288; ML19248C625; ML19248C636; ML19248C637; ML19248C660; ML19248C664;
References
	Download: ML19248C637 (96)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline eForm ES-D-1 Initial Conditions: MODE 1. 100% reactor power. #6 GSW Pump is out of service.

Turnover: #6 GSW Pump is out of service for motor replacement. Installation of a new motor is in progress. Return to service is expected tomorrow late in the day. Plans for the shift are to maintain the current power level.

Division 2 RHR is in Torus Cooling. The shift will place D1 RHR in Torus Cooling IAW 23.205 Section 6.5, Discharge to Div 1 Torus Cooling Path, in preparation for HPCI Testing on the next shift.

ODMI-19-006d for Steam Leak on 3rd MSIV N11F610 is provided. TB-3 floor plugs are not installed. A Camera has been installed to monitor the leak. The leak rate is stable. Outside air temperature is expected to be very high today along with very high power demand on the grid.

Critical Tasks: PC-TWL-ATWS(CT1), PC-TWL-ED(CT2)

Event No.

Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No.:

Op-Test No: ILO-2019-1 SCN #1 Examiners: See Attached Exam Matrix Operators: See Attached Exam Matrix Place RHR in service to support Torus Cooling.

1 N (BOP)

N (SRO)

E11MF0029 E11MF0034 A control rod drift alarm will actuate, and rod 26-31 will drift into the core. The crew will perform the Control Rod Drift AOP and disarm the control rod at position 00 and evaluate Technical Specifications 3.1.3.

2 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

TS C11MF0469 RHR Pump A or C Shaft Shear (whichever is running).

SRO evaluates LCO 3.5.1.

3 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

TS E11MF0029 E11MF0034 Electric Fire Pump (EFP) spurious start due to a bumped instrument drain valve. BOP shuts down EFP. SRO evaluates LCO TR 3.12.2.

4 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

TS P80MF0015 Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Area Temperature greater than 190°F due to steam leak on N1100F610. ODMI required power reduction.

5 R (ATC)

R (SRO)

B21MF0104 SRV M Opens / Closes when fuses are pulled.

6 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

B21MF0034 BABBF1MCC B21MF0034 Torus Leak at 1/min., caused by SRV opening, will drive to scram. Manual Scram Action will be unsuccessful.

7 M (All)

E11MF0047 RPS Fails to Cause a Scram / Rods insert with manual ARI actions by RO. (CT) 8 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

CT1 C71MF0006 E and W Bypass Valves Fails Closed.

Emergency Depressurize (ED).(CT) 9 M (All)

CT2 N30MF0069 N30MF0071 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #1 A. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The shift will place D1 RHR in Torus Cooling IAW 23.205 Section 6.5, Discharge to Div 1 Torus Cooling Path, in preparation for HPCI Testing on the next shift.

Event: 1 A control rod drift alarm will actuate, and rod 26-31 will drift into the core. The crew will perform the Control Rod Drift AOP and disarm the control rod at position 00 and evaluate Technical Specifications 3.1.3.

Event: 2 The D1 RHR pump inservice (A or C) will shaft shear. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs for this condition.

Event: 3 A spurious start of the Electric Fire Pump (EFP) will occur, which is caused by a plant cleaner bumping into an instrument drain valve. The crew will shut down the EFP which will require the SRO to evaluate the TRM.

Event: 4 During a startup walkdown coming out of RF-19, a steam leak on valve N1100F610 was observed. Valve N1100F610 is the third main steam isolation valve (MSIV) located on Main Steam Line (MSL) B on the Turbine Building 2nd Floor mezzanine, upstream of the 52-inch Steam Manifold. The valve is leaking by the pressure seal gasket, which is causing a steam leak at the bonnet knock-out hole. Due to rising outside air temperatures Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Area Temperature will go greater than 190°F; leak size remains stable. This will require a reduction in Reactor Power using flow.

Event: 5 SRV M will open, requiring the crew to enter the Stuck Open SRV AOP and take actions. The SRV will close when fuses are pulled.

Event: 6 An unisolable leak from the Torus will occur. The leak will cause a high Torus Room Sump level condition, and both sump pumps to run, which is an EOP entry condition.

The operators will implement a leak isolation strategy; however, the torus leak is unisolable, requiring a reactor scram before Torus Water Level lowering below -38. Control Rods will not insert on the scram, due to a failure of RPS, but manual Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) actions by the operators will insert the control rods and shut down the reactor.

As Torus Water Level continues to lower, the crew will anticipate Emergency Depressurization (ED) and try to fully open the failed Main Turbine Bypass Valves; however, Main Turbine Bypass Valves will not open. The crew will ED by opening 5 SRVs when TWL cannot be kept greater than -38.

Event: 7 to 9 MODE 1. 100% reactor power. #6 GSW Pump is out of service.

6 GSW Pump is out of service for motor replacement. Installation of a new motor is in progress. Return to service is expected tomorrow late in the day. Plans for the shift are to maintain the current power level.

Division 2 RHR is in Torus Cooling. The shift will place D1 RHR in Torus Cooling IAW 23.205 Section 6.5, Discharge to Div 1 Torus Cooling Path, in preparation for HPCI Testing on the next shift.

ODMI-19-006d for Steam Leak on 3rd MSIV N11F610 is provided. TB-3 floor plugs are not installed. A Camera has been installed to monitor the leak. The leak rate is stable. Outside air temperature is expected to be very high today along with very high power demand on the grid.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #1 B. SCENARIO OBJECTIVE Given conditions in the simulator that includes a control rod drift, act to control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift.

1.

Given conditions in the simulator that include INOP control rod, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

2.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

3.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 3, Emergency Depressurization, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 3, Emergency Depressurization and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

4.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

5.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

6.

Given conditions in the simulator that include plant conditions the required the declaration of an Emergency Action Level (EAL), declare the EAL per EP-101 Classification Of Emergencies.

7.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes a SRV failure, act to control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 20.000.25, Failed SRV.

8.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes direction to change reactor power, make adjustments to reactor power per 23.138.01 Reactor Recirculation System.

9.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure of the Fire Water Suppression System, operate the Fire Water Suppression System per 23.501.01 Fire Water Suppression System.

10.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure on equipment required by Technical Specifications, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

11.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure of the Residual Heat Removal System, operate the Residual Heat Removal System per 23.205 Residual Heat Removal System.

12.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure on equipment required by Technical Specifications, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

13.

Given conditions in the simulator that requires the operation of the Residual Heat Removal System, operate the Residual Heat Removal System per 23.205 Residual Heat Removal System.

14.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #1 CRITICAL TASKS PC-TWL-ATWS-1 With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, TAKE ACTION to control the reactor as prescribed by the EOPs such that the HCL and PSP curves are not violated.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - The -38 limit bounds the HCL and PSP Curves. If action to control suppression pool water level is ineffective, then initiation of a reactor scram, if one has not yet been initiated, assures the reactor is scrammed and shutdown before RPV depressurization is initiated or if the reactor is NOT shutdown the depressurization is done after a terminate and prevent under the requirements of 29.100.01 SH 3A RPV Flooding and Emerg Derpress - ATWS.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if Torus Water Temperature, Torus Water Level, Torus Pressure and RPV Pressure fall into the DO NO OPERATE IN THIS AREA of the HCL or PSP. The simulator model will already be tracking parameters as required by NUREG 1021. A separate data track will be used to show completion of this critical task.

Initiating Cue -Suppression pool level is approaching the HCL and PSP bounding limit of -38.

Measurable Performance Standard -Initiate a reactor manual scram and then control the reactor per 29.100.01 SH 1A.

Performance Feedback -.

HCL and PSP parameters tracking in band.

Expected action:

Reactor scram is inserted, FSQ-1 through 8 is performed PC-TWL-ED When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38 inches, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization by depressurize the RPV, ignoring cooldown rate by either opening the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Decay Heat Removal (MNSDHR) of 2 SRVs -OR-fully opening both Main Turbine Bypass valves.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance -The -38 limit is used in conjunction with the HCL and PSP curves to preclude failure of the containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant, and to preclude loss of the suppression function of containment.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if Torus water level is -38 inches and 2 SRVs are not open -OR-Torus water level is -38 inches and both Main Turbine Bypass valves are not fully open.

Initiating Cue -Suppression pool level cannot be maintained greater than -38.

Measurable Performance Standard -Initiate emergency depressurization using SRVs -OR-anticipate emergency depressurization, depressurizing using the Bypass valves and ignoring cooldown rates such that the reactor vessel is depressurized.

Performance Feedback -Reactor pressure is decreasing.

Expected action Crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization before -38 inches TWL, This will fail. 5 SRVs will then be opened

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Place RHR in service to support Torus Cooling.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+0 min.

Conducts brief for Div 1 RHR start in torus cooling per ODE-3 SRO Direct RO to place Div I RHR in torus cooling.

May assist with plant announcements and communications.

ATC Acknowledge direction to place Div I RHR in torus cooling.

BOP Start the RHR Service Water System per 23.208 5.3:

Contacts operator for pump start and makes Hi-Com announcement.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed report RHRSW pumps are ready for a start. When pump is started wait 30 seconds and then report a good start for the running pump.

Depress and hold, the OPEN pushbutton for E1150-F068A, Div 1 RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

Five seconds after observing dual indication, start an RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Release open pushbutton for E1150-F068A, Div 1 RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV when 5400 gpm to 6300 gpm is seen on E11-R602A, Div 1 RHR Hx Serv Wtr Flow Ind.

Start a second RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Fully open E1150-F068A, Div 1 RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

Monitor RHRSW:

Direct an operator to place D11-K801A, Div 1 RHR Service Water Radiation Monitor in operation per 23.626, Process Liquid Radiation Monitoring. Direct additional operator to perform IV.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed to place RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump in service, acknowledge order. Wait 2 minutes trigger step to start RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump and report actions are complete.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed to IV RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump acknowledge order.

ROLE PLAY NO: If directed, report good flow out of Div 1 RHR Cooling Tower continuous drain lines.

-OR-Notify Chemistry to sample RHRSW IAW, CHS-AUX-12.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Place RHR in service to support Torus Cooling.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+0 min.

May assist with plant announcements and communications.

ATC Place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling per 23.205 6.5:

BOP Unlock and open E1150-F028A, Div 1 RHR Torus Iso Vlv.

Start one RHR Pump(A/C).

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed report RHR pump is ready for a start. When pump is started wait 30 seconds and then report a good start for the running pump.

Throttle E1150-F024A, Div 1 RHR Torus Clg Iso, to desired flow.

When flow is > 6900 gpm, verify E1150-F007A, Div 1 RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A control rod drift alarm will actuate, and rod 26-31 will drift into the core. The crew will perform the Control Rod Drift AOP and disarm the control rod at position 00 and evaluate Technical Specifications 3.1.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+25 min.

ACTION Trigger Rod 26-31 Drift in.

BOOTH Enters Control Rod Drift AOP 20.106.07.(Crew Update).

SRO Conducts AOP Brief.

Directs actions of 20.106.07, Condition C.

CRS reviews TS for INOP control rod.

LCO 3.13 C One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

REQUIRED ACTION C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod.

COMPLETION TIME 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months AND REQUIRED ACTION C.2 Disarm the associated. COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Responds to alarm Control Rod Drift 3D80 and reports alarm to CRS.

ATC Turn on rod select power and select the drifting rod.

Fully inserts rod 26-31 by holding Rod Out Notch Override Switch in EMER ROD IN. - IMMEDIATE ACTION Reviews ARP (3D80).

Dispatches operator to HCU 26-31.

ROLE PLAY as NO (Reactor Building Rounds):

Respond to orders for HCU 26-31. Wait 3 minutes and report on station.

Disarm Control Rod as follows:

Directs field operator to close C11-F103 (HCU 26-31).

Respond to orders for HCU 26-31 to close C11-F103,F105. Execute Step to clear C11MF0469 to simulate rod settling at 00 when isolated (F103 closed). When directed report that C11-F103,F105 are closed Directs field operator to close C11-F105 (HCU 26-31).

Release ROD Out Notch Override Switch (H11-P603) and verify rod stays at desired position.

Place ROD DRIFT ALARM switch in RESET and verify alarm clears CONDITION.

Notifies SNE.

ROLE PLAY Reactor Engineer(SNE):

When called, inform crew that it should use the current rod pattern and he will be doing some research to determine the long range plan.

If asked All thermal limits satisfactory. (3D Monicore OK)

Dispatches operator to HCU 26-31.

BOP May Peer check control rod disarm at P603.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

RHR Pump A or C Shaft Shear (whichever is running).

SRO evaluates LCO 3.5.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+35 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to cause shaft shear of running DIV 1 RHR pump.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of 1D46 and shaft shear on running RHR pump.

SRO May direct the start of the non-running pump in Division 1 RHR.

May directs shutdown of Division 1 RHR.

Review T.S. for INOP RHR pump LCO 3.5.1 A. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME 7 days.

Respond to 1D46, Div I RHR System Low Flow Bypass Initiated:

BOP Evaluate Div 1 RHR and review ARP.

Verify E1150-F007A, Div 1 RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, is open.

Identify shaft shear on running RHR pump and reports status to CRS.

Direct operator to walk down RHR pump with shaft shear.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed wait 3 minutes (unless already on station because of earlier role play) and report that pump is running with no flow noise, if the pump is running. No obvious damage. If second RHR pump is started report good start on second RHR pump.

If directed acknowledge direction to start of the non-running pump in Division 1 RHR and then starts the non-running pump in Division 1 RHR.

If directed acknowledge direction to shutdown DIV 1 RHR per 23.205.

If directed shutdown Div 1 RHR per 23.205:

Throttle closed E1150-F024A, Div 1 RHR Torus Clg Iso.

Shutdown operating RHR Pumps used for Torus Cooling by placing CMC in OFF/RESET.

Open or verify full open E1150-F007A, Div 1 RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv.

Place Keylock switch for E1150-F028A, Div 1 RHR Torus Iso Vlv, in OPER.

Close E1150-F028A, Div 1 RHR Torus Iso Vlv.

Place Keylock switch for E1150-F028A, Div 1 RHR Torus Iso Vlv, in LOCK.

Open or verify full open E1150-F003A, Div 1 RHR Hx Outlet Vlv.

Open or verify full open E1150-F048A, Div 1 RHR Hx Bypass Vlv.

May start shutdown RHRSW System in accordance with 23.208 RHR Complex Service Water System, however next event will be in progress.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Electric Fire Pump (EFP) spurious start due to a bumped instrument drain valve. BOP shuts down EFP.

SRO evaluates LCO TR 3.12.2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

ACTION trigger step for Spurious Electric Fire Pump Start.

BOOTH ROLE PLAY as Plant Cleaner: Using HiCom report that you are in GSW pump house and a valve was accidentally bumped with a broom handle.

Acknowledges report of EFP start from BOP.

SRO Following field report, directs BOP to restore the EFP to normal standby status IAW 23.501.01.

Conducts brief with crew to discuss TS impact, summarize actions to restore EFP to standby.

Reviews TRM:

TRLCO 3.12.2 Fire Suppression Water System one fire suppression pump inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore the EFP to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME 14 days.

Exits TRLCO 3.12.2 Condition A when the EFP is restored to Standby.

Responds to 7D10, Electric Fire Pump Auto Start:

BOP Verifies and reports start of EFP.

Verifies P41-R809, GSW/Fire Protection Header Pressure Indicator, is > than 130 psig for Fire Header Pressure.

Verifies no indications of fire.

Directs NO to investigate.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed, wait 3 minutes and report that a plant cleaner in the area bumped the drain valve for the X80-N460 (Fire Header Press Switch for the EFP). Report that the valve (P8000-F162) is now closed and nothing is damaged. The EFP is running and everything looks good. You have sent the individual to get their supervisor and report to the Tagging Center.

May recommend restoring EFP to standby per ARP.

May inform SRO of TR 3.12.2 per ARP.

When directed restores EFP to standby IAW 23.501.01, Section 5.5:

Informs SRO that the next step will INOP the EFP.

Places P8000-C002 CMC in OFF/RESET.

Directs NO to push STOP button on EFP Local Panel.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed, wait 30 seconds and trigger step and report that you have depressed the STOP push button and the EFP has stopped locally.

Verifies alarms are clear.

Verifies Fire Header pressure is >135 psig.

Places P8000-C002 CMC in AUTO.

Informs CRS the EFP is back in standby.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Area Temperature greater than 190°F due to steam leak on N1100F610.

ODMI required power reduction.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

ROLE PLAY as SYSTEM ENGINEER: Contact main control room and report that TB steam tunnel temperatures are slowly increasing. There is no increase in the steam leak size. Current 190°F meets ODMI-19-006d action level to lower power.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of TB steam tunnel temperatures are slowly increasing.

SRO Review Requirement of ODMI-19-006d and brief crew on lowering power using flow as required per the ODMI action level and the GOP per ODE-3.

Direct lowering power 3% CTP using flow.

Acknowledge direction to lower power 3% CTP using flow.

ATC Adjusts speeds of RRMG Sets to lower power by 3%, per 23.138.01:

Adjust North (South) RR MG Set speed using B31-R621A (B), N RR MG Set Speed Controllers, as follows:

Verifies B31-R621A (B), N RR MG Set Speed Controllers, in AUTO, or places N RRMG Set Speed Controllers in MANUAL.

Adjust setpoint (SP), or output if in MANUAL, of B31-R621A (B),

N RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed.

Adjusts RR MG Set speeds, to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows on B21-R611A and B.

Verifies indicated RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%, as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW &

RR Flat Panel Display.

Informs CRS when reactor power is 97% CTP.

Verifies position on the P/F map.

Acknowledge report of TB steam tunnel temperatures are slowly increasing and report status to CRS.

BOP Peer checks power/flow reduction.

May contact the following for the power reduction:

TB rounds to monitor CFD Flows and D/Ps.

ROLE PLAY as TB ROUNDS: Acknowledge power change for ODMI, and monitoring CFDs flows and D/Ps.

CSS of power/load reduction.

ROLE PLAY as CSS: Acknowledge power change for Fermi 2.

SNE of power/load reduction.

ROLE PLAY as SNE: Acknowledge power change for ODMI.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Area Temperature greater than 190°F due to steam leak on N1100F610.

ODMI required power reduction.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Acknowledge report of reactor power is 97% CTP.

SRO Direct notification of power change to system engineer and request report of new trend on TB steam tunnel temperatures.

Acknowledge report of lowering trend on TB steam tunnel temperatures.

May review ODMI and note no further action is required.

May brief crew on current status based on power reduction and ODMI.

Acknowledge direction to contact system engineer and request report of new trend on TB steam tunnel temperature.

ATC Contact system engineer in field and report power change, acknowledge lowering trend on TB steam tunnel temperatures.

ROLE PLAY:

SYSTEM ENGINEER: When contacted after power reduction report that TB steam tunnel temperatures are slowly decreasing and you will report final temperature when the temperature has stabilized.

Report lowering trend on TB steam tunnel temperatures CRS.

May assist with communications.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

SRV M Opens / Closes when fuses are pulled.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+55 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to initiate SRV M Stuck Open BOOTH Acknowledges report of SRV open.

SRO Verifies Immediate Actions are carried out.

Enters AOP 20.000.25, Failed SRV.

Makes plant announcement.

Conducts short transient brief for Stuck Open SRV AOP.

Directs the following from AOP 20.000.25 Failed SRV:

Pulling SRV fuses.

Monitor Torus Water Temperature.

Place RHR in Torus Cooling.

Uses alternate indications (Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch, RPV level change, Generator MW) to verify SRV open.

ATC Responds to alarm 1D61, SRV Open.

BOP Recognizes and reports SRV M indicates open.

Depresses OPEN and CLOSE pushbuttons (Immediate).

Reports to CRS that SRV is still open.

Acknowledge direction to pull SRV fuses, monitor Torus Water Temperature, and place RHR in Torus Cooling.

Coordinate monitoring SRV Tailpipe Temperature.

May direct NO to come to Main Control Room to pull SRV fuses.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed, wait 3 minutes and report to MCR for brief on pulling SRV fuses.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

SRV M Opens / Closes when fuses are pulled.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+55 min.

Note: Due to the earlier events the status of each division of RHR may be different. The CRS should direct action that results in both divisions of RHR being in torus cooling.

BOP Place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling as directed per 23.205 Encl A:

Unlock and open E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso Vlv.

Start one RHR Pump(A/B/C/D).

Throttle E1150-F024A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Clg Iso, to desired flow.

When flow is > 6900 gpm, verify E1150-F007A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.

Start RHR Service Water System per 23.208 Encl B:

Place keylock switch for RHRSW Pumps to MANUAL OVERRD Depress and hold, OPEN pushbutton for E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

5 seconds after observing dual indication, start an RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Release open pushbutton for E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (21) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV when 5400 gpm to 6300 gpm is seen on E11-R602A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Flow Ind.

Start a second RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Fully open E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

Monitor RHRSW:

Direct an operator to place D11-K801A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Service Water Radiation Monitor in operation in accordance with 23.626, "Process Liquid Radiation Monitoring."

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed to place RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump in service, acknowledge order. Wait 2 minutes trigger step to start RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump and report actions are complete.

-OR-Notify Chemistry to sample RHRSW IAW, CHS-AUX-12.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

SRV M Opens / Closes when fuses are pulled.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+55 min.

Acknowledge report of SRV closed.

SRO Conducts brief for Stuck Open SRV AOP actions.

Enters and Directs AOP 20.000.25, Condition E.

Directs Reset Low-Low Set.

Review GOP for plant shutdown.

Directs Performance of 24.402.01 surveillance within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Recognize indications of SRV M closed and report to CRS.

ATC Monitors Torus Water Temperature as directed by CRS.

BOP Briefs NO/LNO to pull SRV fuses.

Directs NO/LNO to pull SRV fuses.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed, wait 3 minutes and call the MCR and report you are standing by to pull fuses (if directed to do so before pulling fuses). When directed trigger lesson step and report to MCR that fuses are pulled. Note: This will CLOSE SRV M.

Directs NO/LNO to monitor SRV Tailpipe Temperature.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed, via HiCOM provide SRV M Tailpipe Temperature from Orchid ME drawing b21_i209501.

Recognize indications of SRV M closed and report to CRS.

Acknowledge direction reset Low-Low Set Logic.

Resets Low-Low Set Logic by depressing Div I and Div II Low-Low Set Logic reset pushbuttons.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 1 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Torus Leak at 1/min., caused by SRV opening, will drive to scram. Manual Scram Action will be unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+60 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to initiate an unisolable Torus Leak malfunction.

BOOTH Enters 29.100.01, Sheet 5 Secondary Containment Control.

SRO Enters 29.100.01, Sheet 2 Primary Containment Control.

Announces event over the Hi-Com.

Directs lowering Torus Water Level actions of ODE10, to include:

Align TWMS to add water.

Turn off Torus Room Sump Pumps.

Verify watertight doors closed.

Isolate of systems from the Torus and monitor leakage.

Responds to alarms 2D82, Reac Bldg Torus Sumps Level Hi-Hi/Lo-Lo and 2D83, Reac Bldg Leakage to Torus Sump High.

BOP Recognizes both Torus Room Sump Pumps running and reports to CRS as an EOP entry condition.

Identifies and reports indications of a Torus leak Responds to alarm 7D71, Torus Water Level Trouble and reports EOP entry condition when TWL is <-2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 2 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Torus Leak at 1/min., caused by SRV opening, will drive to scram. Manual Scram Action will be unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+60 min.

Directs performance of 29.ESP.21 to field operator.

BOP ROLE PLAY as NO: If directed to perform of 29.ESP.21, acknowledge direction. No action required.

Aligns TWMS for raising TWL IAW 23.144.

Stops Torus room sump pumps.

Coordinates verification/closing watertight doors.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If directed to verify watertight doors in the RB corner rooms are closed, wait 10 minutes, and report doors are closed.

Performs leak isolation of systems taking a suction on the Torus (RHR & CS) as directed.

Note: If RHR is in Torus Cooling, ensure RO properly backs out of Torus Cooling prior to shutting down the RHR pump by Throttle closed E1150-F024A/B, Div 1/2 RHR Torus Clg Iso and then Shutdown operating RHR Pumps used for Torus Cooling by placing CMC in OFF/RESET.

Reports leak isolation actions to the CRS.

Monitors and reports that TWL continues to lower.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 3 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

RPS Fails to Cause a Scram / Rods insert with manual ARI actions by RO. (CT)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+60 min.

Briefs reactor scram, prior to reaching -38, to allow RPV pressure control, anticipate ED and ED if necessary.

SRO When conditions are met directs RO to place Mode Switch in Shutdown (before torus water level reaches -38).

Enters 29.100.01 SH 1 RPV Control from 29.100.01 SH 2 Primary Containment Control for Reactor Scram.

Announces event over Hi-Com.

Directs Scram Reports.

Acknowledge report of Failure to Scram.

Announces event of Failure to Scram over Hi-Com.

Enters EOPs on Failure to Scram.

Directs the following from 29.100.01 SH 1A:

FSQ 1-8.

Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.

Inhibit ADS.

Bypass & Restore Drywell Pneumatics and order 29.ESP.11.

Pressure Band of 900-1050 psig.

Places Mode Switch in Shutdown.

ATC Recognizes failure of RPS to actuate and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.

Reports Failure to Scram to CRS.

Inserts IRMs/SRM. (Immediate Action)

Provides scram reports based on current plant conditions.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 4 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

RPS Fails to Cause a Scram / Rods insert with manual ARI actions by RO. (CT)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+60 min.

ROLE PLAY: IF dispatched to install EOP defeats, use the following process:

BOOTH Wait 10 minutes for each ESP.

THEN call the control room and report, Defeats for 29ESPxx are installed Note: Reports will be from rounds or extra operators not currently assigned to other tasks (default position)

Transitions back to Sheet 1, RPV Control.

SRO Directs isolations and actuations for level and 173-214 level band.

Directs Scram AOP.

Perform FSQ 1-8 per 29.ESP.01 Encl B by:

ATC Confirm Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Confirm both RR flow runback to minimum 23.138.01 Encl. H by:

Place Recirc A & B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch in DEFEAT.

Adjust setpoint (SP) of B31-R621A (B), North (South) RR MG Set Gen Speed Controllers to 30%.

Verify Rx power is > 3%.

Shutdown RR pumps by placing CMC for both RR pumps on OFF/RESET Confirm ARI 29.ESP.03 Section 9 by :

Place B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D) SW, in ARMED.

Depress B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D)

SW, TRIP pushbuttons.

Reports FSQ-1 thru 8 is complete and Reactor Power is 0% and that all rods have inserted to CRS.

Acknowledge direction to Inhibit ADS.

BOP Inhibits ADS and reports status to CRS.

Acknowledge direction to Bypass and Restore Drywell Pneumatics and direct 29.ESP.11.

Bypass and Restore Drywell Pneumatics and directs an operator to perform 29.ESP.11 and reports status to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #1 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 5 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

E and W Bypass Valves Fails Closed.

Emergency Depressurize (ED).(CT)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+60 min.

Anticipates ED per P-OR1 of 29.100.01, Sheet 1, RPV Control By:

SRO Direct Manually opening Main Turbine Bypass valves to depressurize the RPV ignoring cooldown rate.

When TWL cannot be kept >-38 direct ED by:

Direct opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.

Acknowledge direction to open Main Turbine Bypass valves to depressurize the RPV ignoring cooldown rates.

ATC Attempts to manually open Main Turbine Bypass valves.

Recognizes failure of Main Turbine Bypass valves to open and reports status to CRS.

Acknowledge direction to opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.

BOP Opens 5 ADS SRVs and reports status to CRS.

Appendix D Scenario Outline eForm ES-D-1 Initial Conditions: MODE 1. 90% reactor power.

Turnover: The plant is operating at 90% following a rod pattern adjustment. Power is being held at 90% pending an evaluation of thermal limits by Reactor Engineering that should take about an hour. GOP 22.000.03 4.2.20, 4.2.21 complete. Next GOP step 4.2.22.

Maintenance is requesting Center RBCCW pump for a post-maintenance run per 23.127 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Section 6.1 Alternating RBCCW Pumps. The Shift Manager has assigned a licensed operator who will handle the PMT and required paperwork.

Critical Tasks: RPV-LL-ED(CT1), RPV-LL-FLOOD(CT2)

Event No.

Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No.:

Op-Test No: ILO-2019-1 SCN #2 Examiners: See Attached Exam Matrix Operators: See Attached Exam Matrix Start Center RBCCW Pump.

1 N (BOP)

N (SRO)

APRM Flow Unit #2 fails upscale. ATC bypasses APRM #2 and SRO evaluates LCO 3.3.1.1.

2 I (ATC)

I (SRO)

C51MF0006 The Center RBCCW pump will trip. EECW will auto start. Standby RBCCW pump will be started by crew. Crew will take actions to shutdown EECW and restore standby EECW to standby. CRS will evaluate T.S.

3 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

TS P42MF0005 Control power fuses in 72C-3C will fail. 72CF will swap to 72F bus. SRO evaluates 72CF throw-over scheme INOPERABLE with entry into T.S 3.5.1 and T.S. 3.0.3.

4 I (BOP)

I (SRO)

TS R11RF0044 North Heater Drain Pump (HDP) Trip Recirc. Manual Runback Pushbutton fails to lower power. Manually lower flow.

5 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

N22MF0017 B31MF0070 Reviews Power to Flow and inserts CRAM array.

6 R (ATC)

R (SRO)

Jet Pump Failure. Entry into 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure AOP. T.S. Entry 7

C (ATC)

C (SRO)

TS B31MF0049 Small LOCA caused by damage from Jet Pump Failure. Slow Rise in Drywell Pressure.

Crew Places Mode S/W to Shutdown. Scram Increases LOCA size.

8 M (All)

B31MF0067 DIV 1 EECW fails to start. Operator Manual Start 9

C (BOP)

C (SRO)

EOPRF0037 A Loss of Level indication will occur that will require ED and Flooding 10 M (All)

CT1 CT2 B21MF0073 B21MF0059 B21MF0060 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #2 A. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

This shift is to start the Center RBCCW pump for a post-maintenance run per 23.127 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Section 6.1 Alternating RBCCW Pumps.

Event: 1 APRM #2 will fail upscale. The crew should investigate and subsequently enter Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1 as a tracking LCO.

Event: 2 The Center RBCCW pump will trip. This will require entry into 20.127.01, Loss of RBCCW AOP. The crew will start the standby RBCCW pump and take actions to verify proper EECW system initiation and restore cooling to the CRD Pumps. Crew will then shut down EECW. CRS will evaluate TS for the EECW shutdown.

Only 1 division of EECW must be shut down prior to proceeding to next event.

Event: 3 An electrical short occurs causing the fuses in 2PA2-14 Circuit 2 to fail. This fault will cause a loss of control power to bus 72C. The crew will be alerted by 1D7 & 2D29, which will both come in and clear. The fault will cause an automatic throw-over of 72C-F to 72F. The event makes the 72CF throw-over scheme INOPERABLE and T.S 3.5.1 Condition K applies, which puts them in T.S.3.0.3. The crew will take action to restore fuses and be able to return 72CF to normal, and then exit T.S. 3.0.3.

Event: 4 The North HDP will trip requiring the crew to enter the Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control AOP and perform a Rapid Power Reduction. Failure of the Recirc Manual Runback Pushbutton will require the ATC to manually lower flow. The ATC will evaluate P/F map conditions and insert the CRAM Array as necessary.

Event: 5 to 6 The jet pump failure leads to a degrading condition and a small reactor coolant leak. A division of EECW will fail to start and will not require manual action to start. The crew will enter 29.100.01 Sheet 2. And a loss of all RPV Level indication will require Emergency Depressurization(ED) and RPV Flooding.

Div 1 EECW will fail to start and be started by the crew Event: 7 to 10 MODE 1. 90% reactor power.

The plant is operating at 90% following a rod pattern adjustment. Power is being held at 90% pending an evaluation of thermal limits by Reactor Engineering that should take about an hour. GOP 22.000.03 4.2.20, 4.2.21 complete. Next GOP step 4.2.22.

Maintenance is requesting Center RBCCW pump for a post-maintenance run per 23.127 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Section 6.1 Alternating RBCCW Pumps. The Shift Manager has assigned a licensed operator who will handle the PMT and required paperwork.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #2 B. SCENARIO OBJECTIVE Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure on equipment required by Technical Specifications, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

1.

Given conditions in the simulator that include plant conditions the required the declaration of an Emergency Action Level (EAL), declare the EAL per EP-101 Classification Of Emergencies.

2.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

3.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 3, Emergency Depressurization, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 3, Emergency Depressurization and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

4.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

5.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes a component failure that results in an entry condition for 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater/Feedwater Control, act to control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater/Feedwater Control.

6.

Given conditions in the simulator that include entry conditions for 20.127.01, Loss of RBCCW, control the plant per 20.127.01, Loss of RBCCW.

7.

Given conditions in the simulator that include an APRM failure, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

8.

Given conditions in the simulator that requires bypassing an ARPM, bypass that APRM per 23.605, Section 6.4.

9.

Given conditions in the simulator that requires the operation of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, operate the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System per 23.127, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System.

10.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #2 CRITICAL TASKS RPV - Loss of Level - FLOOD WHEN RPV water level cannot be determined, inject into the RPV to FLOOD the RPV to the Main Steam Lines by maintaining injection with ECCS system, such that flooded conditions are established within 40 minutes from the time the loss of level indication is initiated.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - When RPV water level cannot be determined and pressure is below the MSCP, SRV steam flow may no longer be sufficient to cool the uncovered portion of the core. Injection into the RPV must be established to maintain adequate core cooling by raising RPV pressure above the MSCP or by establishing indications of core flooding to re-establish core submergence. The RPV is therefore flooded to assure that adequate core cooling is established and maintained. The consequences of not establishing flooded RPV conditions, or restoring RPV pressure above the MSCP, under these conditions could include a loss of adequate core cooling or failure of the primary containment.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criterion reasoning: Candidate will fail if injection is not maintained (indication of flow to the reactor by ECCS system) and flooded conditions are not established within 40 minutes from the time the loss of level indication is initiated.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by Fermi 2 PRA analysis for a complete loss of level indication, event HE1FRXPCREF2, Crew fails to depressurize given both reference legs leakdown and no high pressure injection. (See EF2-PRA-004, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook, rev 5, page A.2-1259).

This analysis has determined that an irreversible damage state (RPV level reaches TAF) will occur at T+40 min (Tsw) if adequate core cooling is not established by RPV flooded conditions prior to that time. (T0 is defined to be the time that a total loss of level indication occurs.)

The failure criterion is, therefore, chosen to be 40 minutes for operators to establish and maintain injection flow and achieve a flooded RPV condition to avoid reaching the irreversible damage condition identified by the PRA analysis.

Initiating Cue -RPV water level is unknown and RPV pressure is below the MSCP.

Measurable Performance - Injection into the RPV occurs to establish flooded conditions or raise RPV pressure above the MSCP for the number of open SRVs.

Performance Feedback - Flooded conditions are established or RPV pressure indicates greater than the MSCP for the number of open SRVs.

Expected action - Inject to the RPV using ECCS system, without diverting flow for containment cooling/sprays until flooded conditions are established.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #2 CRITICAL TASKS RPV - Loss of Level - ED WHEN RPV water level cannot be determined, depressurize the RPV, ignoring cooldown rate by opening the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Decay Heat Removal (MNSDHR) of 2 SRVs within 12.5 minutes of recognizing loss of all RPV Level Indication.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance -If RPV water level cannot be determined, adequate core cooling by submergence cannot be verified. The RPV is therefore depressurized to allow for removing heat energy from the RPV and to allow for lower pressure to permit higher injection flowrates, possibly reducing the time to flood the RPV. The consequences of not depressurizing the RPV under these conditions could include a loss of adequate core cooling or failure of the primary containment.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if 12.5 minutes passes from the time the loss of all RPV Level Indication condition exists, and 2 SRVs are not open.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by Fermi 2 PRA analysis for a complete loss of level indication, event HE1FRXPCREF2, Crew fails to depressurize given both reference legs leakdown and no high pressure injection. (See EF2-PRA-004, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook, rev 5, page A.2-1259).

This analysis has determined that an irreversible damage state (RPV level reaches TAF) will occur at T+40 min (Tsw) if no operator actions are performed. It is further assumed that 7 minutes will elapse (Tdelay) before operators will recognize the loss, and that operator actions (Tcog + Texe) to initiate ED will take 5.500017 minutes to complete. (T0 is defined to be the time that a total loss of level indication occurs.)

The failure criterion is, therefore, conservatively chosen to be 12.5 minutes for operators to recognize the condition and complete required actions to avoid reaching the irreversible damage condition identified by the PRA analysis.

Initiating Cue -RPV water level is unknown.

Measurable Performance -Initiate emergency depressurization when RPV water level cannot be determined.

Performance Feedback -RPV pressure is decreasing.

Expected action - Opens 5 SRVs

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Start Center RBCCW Pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+0 min.

Conduct brief for alternating RBCCW per ODE-3.

SRO Directs placing Center RBCCW Pump in service.

Acknowledge direction to placing Center RBCCW Pump in service.

BOP ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed report TB rounds is on station at RBCCW pumps and RB is on station in the DC MCC area.

Prior to alternating RBCCW pumps perform the following:

Direct operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in OFF (AB3 G11, Div 1 Battery Charging Room).

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in OFF, trigger step to place the in T4100-B033 in OFF and report status.

NOTE: Expected alarm for placing T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in OFF is 8D22 Aux Bldg Battery Rm A/C Unit Trouble.

Verify T4100 C007/C008 (C009/C010), Div 1 (2) Batt Rm East/West Exhaust Fans, AUTO start.

Close P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv (H11 P808).

May Direct operator to open MG-Set room doors to control temperature within the MG-Set room.

Makes plant announcement for shifting RBCCW pumps via HI-COM.

Informs field operator of shifting RBCCW pumps.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed report Center RBCCW pump is ready for a start. Electrical maintenance, and system engineering are also on station and will be monitoring the RBCCW pump motor for the PMT. When the Center RBCCW pump is started report a good start of the pump.

Places Center RBCCW pump in service:

NOTE: When standby RBCCW Pump is started P42-F403, RBCCW DP Control Vlv, will OPEN to compensate for the increased flow.

NOTE: Expected alarm for shifting RBCCW pumps is 2D119 RBCCW Pumps Diff Press High/Low.

Start Center RBCCW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Stop RBCCW Pump to be removed from service by placing CMC in OFF-RESET.

Acknowledge report of good start for Center RBCCW pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Start Center RBCCW Pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+0 min.

Acknowledge status of RBCCW.

SRO Verify P42-F403, RBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining a proper differential pressure by verifying annunciators clear:

BOP 2D100, RBCCW PUMPS RECIRC VLV OPEN.

2D104, RBCCW PUMPS RECIRC VLV CLOSED.

Open P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso Vlv (H11 P808).

Direct operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in AUTO (AB3 G11, Div 1 Battery Charging Room).

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in AUTO, trigger step to place the in T4100-B033 in AUTO and report status.

If MG-Set room doors were opened to control temperature within the MG-Set room, direct closing the doors.

Periodically monitor temperatures and pressures in the system to ensure continued proper system operation using the following instruments:

P42-R802, RBCCW Press Ind P42-R800, RBCCW Hx Outlet Temp Recorder Report RBCCW status to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

APRM Flow Unit #2 fails upscale. ATC bypasses APRM #2 and SRO evaluates LCO 3.3.1.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

ACTION: Trigger loss of APRM 2 BOOTH Responds to ARPs 3D111, RBM Trouble, 3D113, Control Rod Withdrawal Blocked and 3D115, APRM Flow Upscale.

ATC Determines that APRM #2 flow is upscale.

Reports indications to the CRS.

Recommends bypassing the affected APRM per ARP.

May report Tech Spec/TRM information from ARP to SRO.

May dispatch operator to the Relay Room.

ROLE PLAY:

Operator: If dispatched to the Relay Room to investigate, wait 3 minutes and report that ARPM #2 flow is reading 130.0%.

NOTE: Before reporting ARPM indication review ARPM indication on provided APRM iChart. Indication in the relay room will match current conditions on the P603.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

APRM Flow Unit #2 fails upscale. ATC bypasses APRM #2 and SRO evaluates LCO 3.3.1.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

Acknowledges report of APRM Flow Unit failure.

SRO Directs bypassing APRM #2 IAW 23.605.

Reviews Technical Specifications/TRM These actions are tracking only since the required number of channels (3) is met in the current MODE.

May contact RTC/WWM to write a CARD, commence troubleshooting, protect unaffected APRMs.

Reviews 23.601 for failed instrument.

May back up diagnosis of APRM #2 flow unit failure.

BOP May handle communications for APRM failure.

May take over monitoring of Power, Pressure and Level.

Peer checks bypassing APRM #2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

APRM Flow Unit #2 fails upscale. ATC bypasses APRM #2 and SRO evaluates LCO 3.3.1.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

Conducts follow-up brief to discuss APRM failure, impact, Tech Specs and actions going forward.

SRO Bypasses APRM #2 IAW 23.605, Section 6.4:

ATC Verifies no other APRMs are in bypass.

Places APRM Bypass Joystick to Position 2.

Verifies the APRM indicates bypassed.

Directs operator to verify APRM #2 indicates bypassed in Relay Room.

ROLE PLAY:

Operator: When directed to the RR, wait 3 minutes (30 seconds if already there) and report that the blue bypassed LED is ON for APRM #2 on each 2/4 Logic Module.

May handle communications for bypassing APRM.

BOP May take over monitoring of Power, Pressure and Level.

Peer checks 23.605, Section 6.4:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

The Center RBCCW pump will trip. EECW will auto start. Standby RBCCW pump will be started by crew. Crew will take actions to shutdown EECW and restore standby EECW to standby. CRS will evaluate T.S.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

ACTION: Trigger Step to initiate trip of C. RBCCW Pump.

BOOTH Enters 20.127.01, "Loss of RBCCW" SRO Announces event over the Hi-Com.

Note: The CRS may direct start of the standby RBCCW Pump, as a prompt operator action, prior to conducting an AOP brief.

Conducts AOP brief.

Directs start of Standby RBCCW Pump per Condition A of AOP.

Directs monitoring for overrides from AOP.

Directs Conditions I and K of AOP.

Note: Progress event after division 1 of EECW is restored. (Ensures TS call)

May direct NO to tripped RBCCW Pump and may inform NO of impending RBCCW Pump start.

ATC May direct NO to breaker for tripped RBCCW Pump.

Recognizes and reports trip of C. RBCCW Pump and start of EECW based on panel indications and the following alarms:

BOP 2D119, 2D104, 3D122,3D146, 1D95, 1D87, 1D88 Monitors for proper initiation of EECW/SW and may direct NO to walkdown of EECW/SW.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If dispatched to EECW, wait about 2 minutes and report both divisions of EECW are running normally.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If dispatched to EESW, wait about 2 minutes and report EESW running normally and flow coming from D1 (D2) RHR Cooling Tower continuous drain lines.

May direct NO to tripped RBCCW Pump and may inform NO of impending RBCCW Pump start.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If dispatched to check pump, wait 2 minutes and report motor is HOT to the touch. South/North Pump ready for start OR looks good on start (depending on pump status).

May direct NO to breaker for tripped RBCCW Pump.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If dispatched to check breaker, wait 3 minutes and report over current trip on breaker. (72F2D)

Starts standby RBCCW Pump IAW hard card.

Monitors for conditions in override of AOP.

Performs Attachment 1 of AOP per Condition I.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

The Center RBCCW pump will trip. EECW will auto start. Standby RBCCW pump will be started by crew. Crew will take actions to shutdown EECW and restore standby EECW to standby. CRS will evaluate T.S.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Announce via HiCOM shutting down EECW. Notifies field operator of EECW shutdown.

BOP ROLEPLAY AS NO: When directed monitor EECW/EESW as directed.

May perform 23.127 Section 5.12/5.13 EECW Automatic Initiation Div 1/2 Shutdown Div 1 EECW per 23.127 Section 7.2:

Depress Isolation Valves RESET pushbutton for Div 1 EECW.

Verify white EMERGENCY MODE light goes OFF.

Close P4400-F602A, Div 1 EECW Makeup Tnk Iso Vlv.

Open P4400-F603A, Div 1 EECW Supply Iso Vlv.

Open P4400-F601A, Div 1 EECW Return Iso Vlv.

Stop P4400-C001A, Div 1 EECW Pump.

Place P4400-C001A, Div 1 EECW Pump, CMC Switch in AUTO.

Shutdown Div 1 EESW as follows:

Place P44-K800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, in MANUAL.

Adjust P44-K800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, or P4500-F147A, Div 1 EECW Heat Exch EESW Return TCV Bypass Vlv, until flow is less than or equal to 50% on P45-R803A, Div 1 EESW Flow Ind (H11 P602).

Place P4500-C002A, Div 1 EESW Pump, in OFF/RESET.

Place P44-K800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, in AUTO, the nominal setting for P44-K800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, is 71°F.

Place P4500-C002A, Div 1 EESW Pump, CMC Switch in AUTO.

If P4500-F147A was throttled, fully open P4500-F147A.

Verify all pressures and temperatures stabilize.

Verify Annunciator 1D87, DIV I EECW NORTH PUMP DIFF PRESS HIGH/LOW, is clear.

Open the following valves as necessary to restore cooling to the desired equipment:

P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rms A/C Iso (COP H11-P808).

P4400-F605A, Div 1 EECW To NW Sump Hx Iso Vlv.

P4400-F614, Div 1 EECW To Penet Clrs Iso.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

The Center RBCCW pump will trip. EECW will auto start. Standby RBCCW pump will be started by crew. Crew will take actions to shutdown EECW and restore standby EECW to standby. CRS will evaluate T.S.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Evaluate Tech Specs.

SRO During Modes 1, 2 or 3, or during movement of recently irradiated fuel in Secondary Containment, if EECW TCV is not in automatic the associated division of CCHVAC is inoperable if running. This is independent of the status of the EECW system.

T.S 3.7.4 Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System.

Condition A.1 Restore to Operable status - 30 days.

May assist with field communications.

ATC Open or verify open the following:

BOP P4400-F606A, Div 1 EECW DW Otbd Supply Vlv.

P4400-F607A, Div 1 EECW DW Otbd Return Vlv.

Locally reset T4100 B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit (AB3-G11).

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed to reset T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, trigger step to reset T4100-B033 and report status.

Verify proper temperature and pressure.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

The Center RBCCW pump will trip. EECW will auto start. Standby RBCCW pump will be started by crew. Crew will take actions to shutdown EECW and restore standby EECW to standby. CRS will evaluate T.S.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Shutdown Div 2 EECW per 23.127 Section 7.3:

BOP Depress Isolation Valves RESET pushbutton for Div 2 EECW.

Verify white EMERGENCY MODE light goes OFF.

Close P4400-F602B, Div 2 EECW Makeup Tnk Iso Vlv.

Open P4400-F603B, Div 2 EECW Supply Iso Vlv.

Open P4400-F601B, Div 2 EECW Return Iso Vlv.

Stop P4400-C001B, Div 2 EECW Pump.

Place P4400-C001B, Div 2 EECW Pump, CMC Switch in AUTO.

Shutdown Div 2 EESW as follows:

Place P44-K800B, Div 2 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, in MANUAL.

Adjust P44-K800B, Div 2 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, or P4500-F147B, Div 2 EECW Heat Exch EESW Return TCV Bypass Vlv, until flow is less than or equal to 50% on P45-R803B, Div 2 EESW Flow Ind (H11 P602).

Place P4500-C002B, Div 2 EESW Pump, in OFF/RESET.

Place P44-K800B, Div 2 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, in AUTO. The nominal setting for P44-K800B, Div 2 EECW Hx Temp Ctrlr, is 71°F.

Place P4500-C002B, Div 2 EESW Pump, CMC Switch in AUTO.

If P4500-F147B was throttled, fully open P4500-F147B.

Verify all pressures and temperatures stabilize.

Verify Annunciator 2D17, DIV II EECW SOUTH PUMP DIFF PRESS HIGH/LOW is clear.

Open the following valves as necessary to restore cooling to the desired equipment:

P4400-F604, Div 2 EECW To CRD Sply Iso Vlv.

P4400-F605B, Div 2 EECW To SE Sump Hx Iso Vlv.

P4400-F608, Div 2 EECW To DW Sump Hx Iso Vlv.

P4400-F606B, Div 2 EECW DW Otbd Supply Vlv.

P4400-F607B, Div 2 EECW DW Otbd Return Vlv

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Control power fuses in 72C-3C will fail. 72CF will swap to 72F bus. SRO evaluates 72CF throw-over scheme INOPERABLE with entry into T.S 3.5.1 and T.S. 3.0.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+30 min.

Trigger Step to simulate a blown fuse in 72C-3C Control Power.

BOOTH NOTE:

If time compression is desired, inform the crew that the Tagging center has performed the following:

Determine control power fuse for 72C-3C is blown (I-2573-09)

Reference 3071-128-EJ and determine replacement fuse to be type FRN-R-30.

Reference MOP01 for fuse replacement guidelines.

Direct an NO to 72C-3C to inspect for damage, NO reports no damage.

NO is in field to replace fuses IAW MOP01.

Determines 72C-F throw-over scheme INOPERABLE..

SRO Reviews T.S. and determines T.S 3.5.1 Condition K applies Enters T.S. 3.0.3 LCO 3.5.1-ECCS Operating.

Per SR 3.5.1.1 and TS Bases, the LPCI Swing Bus is required to be aligned to the Normal source, otherwise BOTH LPCI Sub-systems are INOPERABLE.

LCO 3.5.1 is NOT Met.

Enter Condition K, for Two or more Low Pressure ECCS injection/spray sub-systems inoperable.

Perform Action K.1, which requires entry into LCO 3.0.3 Immediately.

Directs restoring 72CF to Normal IAW 23.321.

Respond to 1D7 (2D29), DIV I(II) RHR VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD.

BOP Refer to 1D7(2D29) and determine the alarms are in and clear and that no RHR valves have lost indication.

Verify status of 72CF bus.

Determine that 72CF has swapped to alternate.

Recognize and report that 72C-3C has lost control power.

Coordinate with NO to replace fuses IAW MOP01.

ROLE PLAY:

NO: When directed to replace the fuses, Trigger Step to control power 72C-3C, and report the fuses replaced and power supply is back ON.

Reports control power restored to 72C-3C.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Control power fuses in 72C-3C will fail. 72CF will swap to 72F bus. SRO evaluates 72CF throw-over scheme INOPERABLE with entry into T.S 3.5.1 and T.S. 3.0.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+30 min.

Acknowledges report of 72CF has been returned to Normal.

SRO Evaluates LCO 3.5.1 and determines that the LCO is MET and Condition K (LCO 3.0.3) can be exited.

Transfers 72CF from Alternate to Normal IAW 23.321:

BOP Verify blue monitor light for Relay 80 is ON at 480V Bus 72C Position 3C.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: If asked, the blue monitor light for Relay 80 at 72C-3C is ON.

Confirm CMC for 72C Position 3C in OPEN.

Verify 72C Position 3C is open.

Confirm 480V ESF Bus 72F Position 5C CMC switch in CLOSE.

Place 480V MCC 72CF Throwover Mode Select switch in MANUAL on H11-P810.

Place the Standby Supply Breaker 480V ESF Bus 72F Position 5C CMC Switch to OPEN.

Place the Normal Supply Breaker 480V ESF Bus 72C Position 3C, CMC Switch to CLOSED.

Place 480V 72CF Throwover Mode Select switch in AUTO.

Verify blue monitor light for Relay 80 is ON at 480V Bus 72C Position 3C.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: If asked, the blue monitor light for Relay 80 at 72C-3C is ON.

Verify blue monitor light for Relay 52XX is ON at 480V Bus 72F Position 5C.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: If asked, the blue monitor light for Relay 52XX at 72F-5C is ON.

Informs CRS that 72CF has been returned to Normal.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 5 to 6 Page 1 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

North Heater Drain Pump (HDP) Trip Recirc. Manual Runback Pushbutton fails to lower power.

Manually lower flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Acknowledge report of trip of N. HDP.

SRO Acknowledge report of failure of RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK.

Acknowledge report of failure of lowering flow using SOP.

Enters AOP 20.107.01 Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control.

Verify immediate action IE.1 Perform Rapid power Reduction by depressing and releasing the RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK pushbutton completed or directs this action.

Perform Rapid Power Reduction by depressing and releasing the RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK pushbutton.

ATC Observes failure of RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK and reports status to CRS.

Notifies CRS of lowering flow using SOP.

Respond to 5D144 Motor Tripped, 5D73 Feedwater Heater 5N level High/Low and 5D85 Loss Of Heater Drains.

BOP Identify trip of N HDP, provided crew update on loss of N. HDP and report status to CRS.

Directs operator to walkdown N.HDP breaker (64A-10A) and pump in N HDP room.

ROLEPLAY:

NO: When directs wait 3 minutes and report 64A POS A10 is tripped with 64 device flag showing (Ground Fault). No other damage.

NO: When directs wait 3 minutes and walkdown of N. HDP complete, Pump is not running and the pumps motor is hot to the touch. No other damage.

Evaluate for a loss of Feedwater Heating using 20.107.02 as direct by 5D86 Loss Of Heater Drains.

Determines Feedwater Temperature is in acceptable region based on 20.107.02 Encl A and reports status to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 5 to 6 Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

North Heater Drain Pump (HDP) Trip Recirc. Manual Runback Pushbutton fails to lower power.

Manually lower flow.

Reviews Power to Flow and inserts CRAM array.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Acknowledge report of P/F and recommendation to insert CRAM array.

SRO Directs inserting CRAM Array.

Brief crew on trip of N HDP per ODE-3.

Lowers power using flow per 23.138.01:

ATC Verifies B31-R621A (B), N RR MG Set Speed Controllers, in AUTO, or places N RRMG Set Speed Controllers in MANUAL.

Adjust setpoint (SP), or output if in MANUAL, of B31-R621A (B),

N RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed.

Adjusts RR MG Set speeds, to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows on B21-R611A and B.

Verifies indicated RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%, as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW &

RR Flat Panel Display.

Monitors P/F map and notes the parameters place the reactor at edge of the Stability Awareness Region/Exit Region and recommends inserting the CRAM Array to CRS.

When directed Inserts CRAM Array as directed Per 23.623 Section 9.7 Place or verify Rod Select Power switch in ON.

Select Rods as needed on the rod selection matrix.

Using the Rod Movement Control Switch insert the rods by selecting IN.

NOTE:Cram Array is identified in the Cram Array book with the first 1 or 2 groups of Cram rods designated as Red Cram rods. The designated Red Cram rods can be inserted prior to consulting the Cram Array book.

Using the Cram Array book, check that all Red Cram rods are fully inserted and continue fully inserting Cram Array control rods using the Cram Array book until the desired power level is achieved.

When Rod movements are completed, place Rod Select Power switch in OFF.

Notifies the Station Nuclear Engineer (SNE)

ROLE PLAY:

SNE: Acknowledge report of lowering power and inserting CRAM array as necessary.

Monitor for Neutron Flux Instability using 24.000.01 Attachment 34b:

Place or verify Rod Select Power switch in ON.

Monitor for Neutron Flux Instability using APRMs and LPRM outputs on RBM ODAs by sequentially selecting the following rods: 30-27, 30-43, 42-43, 42-27, 42-15, 30-15, 14-15, 14-27, and 14-43.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 5 to 6 Page 3 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

North Heater Drain Pump (HDP) Trip Recirc. Manual Runback Pushbutton fails to lower power.

Manually lower flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Direct 20.107.01 Condition L:

SRO Acknowledge direction to perform 20.107.01 Condition L:

BOP Directs Chemistry to perform required sampling for power change.

ROLE PLAY as CHEMISTRY: Acknowledge direction to perform required sampling for power change.

ROLE PLAY as RP: Acknowledge power change.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 1 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Jet Pump Failure. Entry into 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure AOP. T.S. Entry Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

Booth operator initiate step to cause Jet Pump Riser Failure.

BOOTH Enters 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure.(Crew Update)

SRO Directs 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure Condition A Evaluate compliance with TS:

Technical Specifications:

3.4.2, Jet Pumps 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to hot shutdown with a jet pump failure.

3.3.1.1 Instrumentation, 2b and 2f REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Place channel in TRIP COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR REQUIRED ACTION A.2 Place associated trip system in TRIP COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months REQUIRED ACTION C.1 Restore RPS trip capability TRIP COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Brief crew on TS evaluation and Plant Shutdown 22.000.03/22.000.04 Diagnoses change in recirculation flows and reactor power as Jet Pump Failure as reports this to CRS.

ATC Evaluates power to flow map based on indications.

Direct an operator to RR to review jet pump flows.

ROLE PLAY:

NO: Three minutes after directed to Relay Room, report that Jet Pumps:

1-10 read 17-19 11-14 read 17-19 15 & 16 read 4 17-20 read 17-19 Continue to monitor core for thermal-hydraulic instability per 24.00.01 Att. 34B:

Assist P603 with communications.

BOP Notify SNE of Jet Pump Failure ROLE PLAY:

SNE: Acknowledge Jet Pump Failed or conditions as reported.

State the SNE will need to gather some additional information and then will come to the control room to evaluate conditions. If asked concur with the actions of the shift.

Direct operator to perform 24.138.06, Jet Pump Operability Test.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 2 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Small LOCA caused by damage from Jet Pump Failure. Slow Rise in Drywell Pressure. Crew Places Mode S/W to Shutdown. Scram Increases LOCA size.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

Directs Mode Switch to S/D.

SRO Makes reactor scram plant announcement.

Requests Scram Reports.

Acknowledges scram reports.

Enters EOP 29.100.01, Sheet 1, RPV Control and directs:(Crew Update)

Direct the confirmations of isolations and actuations.

Establishes Level band of 173 to 214 inches and pressure band of 900 to 1050 psig.

May direct 603 to perform Scram Procedure AOP 20.000.21.

Enters EOP SH 2 PC Control and directs:(Crew Update).

Confirm EECW initiation and isolation.

Restore Cooling to CRD.

S/D (verify) RR Pumps.

Initiate Torus Cooling/ Torus Sprays (selected RHR Loop).

Directs 29.ESP.08 Drywell Cooling Water Restoration.

Recognize and report to CRS increasing High Drywell Pressure or diagnoses alarms for indication of increasing High Drywell Pressure.

ATC When directed provide scram reports based on current plant conditions.

Places MODE Switch in Shutdown.

Inserts IRMs/SRMs - Immediate Action Recognize and report to CRS increasing High Drywell Pressure or diagnoses alarms for indication of increasing High Drywell Pressure.

BOP When directed provide scram reports based on current plant conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 3 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

DIV 1 EECW fails to start. Operator Manual Start Small LOCA caused by damage from Jet Pump Failure. Slow Rise in Drywell Pressure. Crew Places Mode S/W to Shutdown. Scram Increases LOCA size.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

Acknowledges reports of directed EOP steps completed.

SRO Direct override to secure Torus Sprays before 0 psig is reached.

Verifies RR Pumps tripped.

ATC Place RHR in Torus Cooling Mode per :

Places E1150-F028A(B) Keylock in OPERATE.

Opens E1150-F028A(B).

Starts E1102-C002A(B) Div 1 RHR Pump A (B).

Opens E1150-F024A(B).

NOTE:

RHRSW Flow may be delayed until after Torus Spray is established.

Starts RHRSW:

Depresses E1150-F068A(B) OPEN for 5 seconds.

Starts an RHRSW Pump.

Throttles open E1150-F068A(B) to 5600-6500 gpm.

Starts second RHRSW Pump.

Fully opens E1150-F068A(B).

ROLE PLAY:

NO: If dispatched, after 5 min report, trigger step and then report D1(D2) Radiation Monitor Sample Pump in service.

Places RHR in Torus Spray Mode:

Acknowledges override to secure Torus Sprays, monitors Torus Pressure.

Recognize and report Div 1 EECW Start Failure.

BOP Depress P4400-M003 Div 1 EECW Emergency Mode PB.

Confirms EECW initiation and isolation to the Drywell.

Restores Cooling to CRD Confirms isolations and actuations.

Restores drywell cooling per 29.ESP.08 Drywell Cooling Water Restoration:

Orders out 29.ESP.23 ROLE PLAY:

NO: Acknowledge direction to perform 29.ESP.23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 4 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A Loss of Level indication will occur that will require ED and Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

Booth Operator trigger Step to initiate a Loss of RPV Level Indication.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of Loss of RPV level indication.

SRO Transitions from EOP SH 1 RPV Control L and P legs, enters EOP SH 3 RPV Flooding(Crew Update)

NOTE: RHR realignment may be done during the ED.

For any division of RHR being used for torus cooling and sprays directs aligning that Division of RHR for injection.

Brief crew on ED/Flooding.

Identifies Loss of RPV level indication and reports to CRS ATC Acknowledge direction to Align Div of RHR for injection.

Close E1150-F027A(B) RHR Torus Spray Isolation Valve.

Close E1150-F024A(B) RHR Torus Clg Isolation Valve.

May close E1150F028A(B) RHR Torus Isolation Valve.

If E1150F048A(B) was closed, Open E1150F048A(B) and then start the second RHR pump in that loop.

Report to CRS that Division 1(2) RHR is aligned for injection.

Identifies Loss of RPV level indication and reports to CRS BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 5 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A Loss of Level indication will occur that will require ED and Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

Directs open 5 SRVs ADS preferred.

SRO Directs bypass & restore DW pneumatics.

Bypasses DW pneumatics per hard card:

ATC Place Div 1 Drywell Pneumatic Supply Isolation Bypass Keylock switch in ON.

Verify open or open T4901-F466, Div 1 DW Pneumatics N2 Supply Valve.

Open T4901-F465, Div 1 DW Pneumatics Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.

Open T4901-F601, Div 1 DW Pneumatics Sply Inbd Iso Vlv.

Place Div 2 Drywell Pneumatic Supply Isolation Bypass Keylock switch in ON.

Verify open or open T4901-F469, Div 2 DW Pneumatics N2 Supply Valve.

Open T4901-F468, Div 2 DW Pneumatics Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.

Open T4901-F602, Div 2 DW Pneumatics Sply Inbd Iso Vlv Opens 5 ADS SRVs and reports 5 ADS SRVs open.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #2 Event No.: 7 to 10 Page 6 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A Loss of Level indication will occur that will require ED and Flooding Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+50 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOOTH IF dispatched to install EOP defeats, use the following process:

Wait 10 minutes for each ESP.

Initiate the Remote Function for the ESP defeat, if necessary.

THEN call the control room and report, Defeats for 29ESPxx are installed Directs Flooding the RPV with Table 1 or 2 systems to the MSLs.

SRO Directs closing MSIVs, Drains, and HPCI/RCIC Steam Supplies based on >2 SRVs open.

Directs evaluate, align and inject with available injection sources, to establish flooded conditions, using hard cards as applicable.

Acknowledge flooded condition is established and then direct one of the follwing configurations to Control injection into the RPV, as low as practical, to keep MSL flooded as required by ODE 10:

Two Core Spray Pumps injecting with 1 SRV open (results in a flow of approximately 6000 gpm)

-OR-One RHR pump injecting, with 2 SRVs open (results in a flow of approximately 7000 gpm)

May direct 29.ESP.13, 29.ESP.16 and 29.ESP.19.

Directs RO to closes SRVs and secures injection sources.

Evaluate control room indications for a combination of the following indications to indication that the RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines and reports to CRS:

BOP Increasing RPV pressure (after initially lowering due to depressurization) as non-condensables are compressed.

Tailpipe temperatures of open SRVs decreasing to subcooled values.

ROLE PLAY:

If dispatched to Relay Room to monitor SRV Tailpipe Temperatures, wait 5 minutes are report actual temperatures from Orchid ME drawing b21_i209501 for any of the open SRVs.

If injection sources are aligned with suction from the Torus, Torus water level decreases as the RPV and Steam Lines are flooded, then stabilizes when the steam lines are full.

Actuation of Main Steam Line, HPCI or RCIC high steam flow logic, if they are not isolated.

Water leakage from HPCI or RCIC turbine shaft seals, if they are not isolated.

HPCI or RCIC steam line drain pot high level alarm, if they are not isolated.

Appendix D Scenario Outline eForm ES-D-1 Initial Conditions: MODE 1. 100% reactor power.

Turnover: The Center RBCCW is OOS for motor replacement, and is due to be returned to service next week. Plans for the shift are to maintain 100% power.

North TBCCW is being returned to service after maintenance. The shift is to start the North TBCCW for the PMT using the SOP to shift TBCCW pumps.

Critical Tasks: ATWS-ADS(CT1), ATWS-PWR(CT2)

Event No.

Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No.:

Op-Test No: ILO-2019-1 SCN #3 Examiners: See Attached Exam Matrix Operators: See Attached Exam Matrix Shift TBCCW Pumps.

1 N (BOP)

N (SRO)

FW Flow A Transmitter Failure.

2 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

C32MF0025 Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.

3 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

TS T41MF0002 A leak will occur on the North TBCCW pump. The crew will shift to the standby TBCCW pump and isolating the North TBCCW pump.

4 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

P43MF0023 Main Steam Line Flow Transmitter fails upscale. CRS Evaluate TS.

5 TS B21MF0039 4D53 - AVR General Alarm. The crew will diagnose that there is a failure of one thyristor bank. The ARP requires reducing reactor power so generator output<2400 Field amps.

6 R (ATC)

R (SRO)

NHAIALARM_UNI T554497REV AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Crew will T&P for Level.

7 M (All)

CT1 CT2 N30MF0020 C71MF0006 C11MF0001 SRO directs SLC injection. ATC Injects SLC. Delayed Pump trip. Start Second pump Crew Injects SLC.

8 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

C41MF0004 C41MF0003 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #3 A. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

North TBCCW is being returned to service after maintenance.

Event: 1 FW Flow A Transmitter Failure due to a blown fuse.

3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble" will alarm.

The ARP will direct placing Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM.

Event: 2 Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1.

The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.

Event: 3 A leak will occur on the North TBCCW pump. The crew will receive alarms and field indications that will result in shifting to the standby TBCCW pump and isolating the North TBCCW pump.

Event: 4 B21-N087B will fail. Investigation at Testability will identify the failed circuit. The CRS will identify the applicable Tech Specs.

Event: 5 4D53 - AVR General Alarm will alarm because one thyristor bank blocked.

Based on the ARP the crew will reduce Reactor Power so Generator output <2400 Field amps.

Event: 6 The AVR will fail causing a turbine trip. This will result in an ATWS with Total Scram Failure and All Rods Stuck. The crew will inhibit ADS and perform FSQ1-8. When SLC is the first SLC pump will fail after running for 30 seconds. The crew will start the second SLC pump. The crew will insert control rods using 29.ESP.03 The crew will control PRV level <114 inches per the EOPs and will need to terminate and prevent to establish level in band of 50 to 100 inches.

Event: 7 to 8 MODE 1. 100% reactor power.

The Center RBCCW is OOS for motor replacement, and is due to be returned to service next week. Plans for the shift are to maintain 100% power.

North TBCCW is being returned to service after maintenance. The shift is to start the North TBCCW for the PMT using the SOP to shift TBCCW pumps.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #3 B. SCENARIO OBJECTIVE Given conditions in the simulator that include an Main Steam Line Flow Transmitter Failure, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

1.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure that causes 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble", control the plant 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble".

2.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

3.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure causing one thyristor bank blocked, control the plant per 4D53 - AVR General Alarm.

4.

Given conditions in the simulator that requires the operation of the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, operate the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System per 23.128, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System.

5.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a minor leak in TBCCW, control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 23.128 TBCCW SOP.

6.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

7.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure in CCHVAC, control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 20.413.01, Control Center HVAC System Failure.

8.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #3 CRITICAL TASKS ATWS-PWR When directed by the EOPs, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW 3% by injecting SLC or Boron using the alternate means; -OR-lowering RPV water level; -OR-inserting control rods prior to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit curve (HCL).

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - The challenge to containment becomes the limiting factor that defines the requirement for reactor power reduction in an ATWS condition. Thus, reducing reactor power below 3% can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if reactor power is NOT reduced sufficiently to prevent operation in the DO NOT OPERATE IN THIS AREA region of the HCL curve of 29.100.01 sheet 6.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 3. This document identifies limiting primary containment heatup as the basis for reducing reactor power using boron, control rods, or lowering RPV water level. The scenario validation process provided assurance that the HCL curve will be violated if power is not sufficiently reduced prior to the MSIV isolation.

Initiating Cue -- Reactor scram required and reactor not shutdown.

Measurable Performance -- Reduce reactor power using boron, control rods, or RPV level.

Performance Feedback - Reactor Power is decreasing until below 3%.

Expected action - Inject SLC; and/or insert control rods; and/or lower RPV water level while monitoring reactor power to ensure power is reduced <3%.

ATWS-ADS With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - In order to affect a reduction in reactor power, actions may be taken to lower RPV water level to a level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. Actuation of ADS under ATWS conditions could result in core damage, therefore automatic ADS actuation should be prevented.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if there is a valid SCRAM signal (automatic or manual) AND the reactor will NOT remain shut down under all conditions without boron AND ADS automatically actuates and causes an RPV depressurization.

Safety significant boundary conditions Actuation of ADS imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and complicates the efforts to maintain RPV water level within the ranges specified in the ATWS RPV Control EOP. Further, rapid and uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems may occur as RPV pressure decreases to and below the shutoff heads of these pumps. Such an occurrence would quickly dilute in-core boron concentration and reduce reactor coolant temperature. When the reactor is not shutdown, or when the shutdown margin is small, sufficient positive reactivity might be added in this way to cause a reactor power excursion large enough to severely damage the core.

Initiating Cue - ATWS conditions.

Measurable Performance - Inhibit ADS.

Performance Feedback - ADS inhibited white lights and alarm window.

Expected action - Place both ADS inhibit switches to inhibit.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Shift TBCCW Pumps.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+1 min.

Conduct brief for alternating TBCCW per ODE-3.

SRO Directs placing North TBCCW Pump in service.

Acknowledge direction to placing North TBCCW Pump in service.

BOP Prior to alternating TBCCW pumps perform the following:

Makes plant announcements for shifting TBCCW pumps via HI-COM.

Informs field operator of shifting TBCCW pumps.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed report TB rounds is on station at TBCCW pumps.

ROLE PLAY AS NO: When directed report North TBCCW pump is ready for a start. When the North TBCCW pump is started report a good start of the pump.

Shift TBCCW pumps per 23.128 Section 6.0:

Start Standby P4300-C001 North TBCCW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Stop pump to be removed from service, P4300-C002(3)

Center(South) TBCCW Pump by placing CMC in OFF-RESET.

Acknowledge report of good start.

Verify Supply Header Pressure is approximately 36 to 43 psig.

Verify P43-F405, TBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining a differential pressure across the TBCCW Pumps of 20 to 30 psid (COP H11-P805).

Periodically monitor system using the following instruments:

P43-R805, TBCCW Headers Pressure Indicator.

P43-R803, TBCCW Heat Exchangers Temperature recorder.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

FW Flow A Transmitter Failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+5 min.

Action: Trigger step to cause failure of FW Flow A Transmitter.

BOOTH ROLE PLAY as SUPPORT: if contacted as OPERATOR/SYSTEM ENGINEER/FSS/WWM acknowledge direction.

Acknowledge report of 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble."

SRO Acknowledge report of Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM.

Brief Crew on DCS failure and Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM per ODE-3.

May direct operator to Evaluate DCS in RR.

May contact SYSTEM ENGINEER/FSS/WWM and direct actions for Feedwater DCS.

Respond to 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble."

ATC Evaluate DCS, review status of feedwater and report status to CRS.

Places Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM based on Level Control Alarm, 1-ELE-FORCED / 1 ELEMENT CONTROL FORCED on C32 K816, FW & RR Flat Panel Display (COP H11-P603).

Reports Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM to CRS.

Refers to 23.107, Reactor Feedwater And Condensate Systems, Enclosure H, to determine the failure. Determines failure is C32-N002A / FW FLOW A and reports to CRS.

May assist with communications / HiCOM announcements.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to initiate Malfunction for D1 CCHVAC Return Fan Trip.

BOOTH Acknowledges alarm and Division 1 Return Fan Trip report.

SRO Enters AOP 20.413.01, Control Center HVAC System Failure.(Crew Update)

Note: The CRS may direct swapping CCHVAC divisions as a prompt operator action prior to conducting an AOP brief.

Conducts AOP brief per ODE-3.

Directs swapping CCHVAC divisions per AOP 20.413.01 Condition A.

Identifies alarm 8D5, DIV I CONTROL ROOM A/C TROUBLE, and alarm 8D72, MOTOR TRIPPED and Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan tripped and reports to CRS.

BOP Dispatches operator to investigate Trip of Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan.

ROLE PLAY:

Investigate trip of Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan.

After about 3 min., operator reports hot bearing on D1 CCHVAC Return Fan.

Dispatches operator to check Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan breaker for a cause of trip.

ROLE PLAY:

After about 3 min., Operator reports thermal trip of 72C-2A Pos 1B.

Informs RB of starting Division 2 CCHVAC.

Communicates Crew Update: Starting Division 2 CCHVAC Starts Division 2 CCHVAC using AOP 20.413.01 Condition A:

Shutdown the malfunctioning division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL STOP.

Start the standby Division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL AUTO.

Reports Division 2 CCHVAC is running.

Monitors for correct operation of CCHVAC.

NO: If contacted to check out Div 2 CCHVAC Rad Monitor, wait 5 minutes and report Rad Monitor checkout is complete.

May check damper lineup per 23.413

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

Acknowledges Division 2 CCHVAC started.

SRO Evaluates Technical Specifications.

TS 3.7.3, The CREF System shall be OPERABLE REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore CREF subsystem to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME 7 days.

TS 3.7.4, Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore control center AC subsystem to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME 30 days.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A leak will occur on the North TBCCW pump. The crew will shift to the standby TBCCW pump and isolating the North TBCCW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

ACTION Trigger Lesson for a leak on the North TBCCW Pump.

Note this event takes time to build in and will need to be triggered during the pervious event.

BOOTH Acknowledges report of 5D10, TBCCW CNDS MAKEUP FLOW HIGH and auto start of lead Demin Storage Transfer Pump.

SRO May enters 20.000.03 Turbine Building Flooding and 20.128.01 Loss Of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System.

Acknowledges recommendation to shifting to South TBCCW pump and then shutting down and isolation the N. TBCCW pump.

Makes plant announcement.

Reports auto start of lead Demin Storage Transfer Pump to CRS.

BOP Responds to ARPs 5D10, TBCCW CNDS MAKEUP FLOW HIGH Direct an operator to verify P43-F400, TBCCW Head Tank Demin Water Makeup LCV, is> 80% open (TB3-R6)

ROLE PLAY:

NO: When directed to investigate TBCCW, wait 2 minutes and report LARGE leak from the casing of the North TBCCW pump.

NO: If asked about leak isolations, state that the pump will need isolated.

NO: When asked Head tank level or Makeup valve position refer to P4300_M200081_a in Orchid ME or Provided Ichart.

Acknowledges leak on the N. TBCCW Pump based on indications and communications and reports to CRS or crew.

Recommend to CRS Shifting to standby TBCCW pump and then shutting down and isolation the N. TBCCW pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A leak will occur on the North TBCCW pump. The crew will shift to the standby TBCCW pump and isolating the North TBCCW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Directs Starting standby TBCCW pump and then shutdown and isolation of N. TBCCW pump.

SRO Conducts brief to assign priorities and closeout of ARP actions.

Directs shutdown of lead Demin Storage Transfer Pump.

Contacts or directs another operator to contact WWM.

ROLE PLAY as WWM/FSS: If contacted, acknowledge report of TBCCW pump and need to write CARD, Tagging, etc.

Acknowledges direction to starting standby TBCCW pump and then shutdown and isolation of N. TBCCW pump.

BOP Per 23.128, "Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System:"

Makes plant announcement, informs NO.

Start Standby TBCCW Pump.

ROLE PLAY as NO: Report good start of S. TBCCW Pump.

Stop pump to be removed from service, P4300-C001 North TBCCW Pump.

Verify Supply Header Pressure is approximately 36 to 43 psig.

Verify P43-F405, TBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining a differential pressure across the TBCCW Pumps of 20 to 30 psid.

Verifies system parameters return to normal and reports system status to the CRS.

Shutdown lead Demin Storage Transfer Pump and reports status of Demin Storage to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A leak will occur on the North TBCCW pump. The crew will shift to the standby TBCCW pump and isolating the North TBCCW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOP NO: If asked for isolation recommendations, recommend closing P4300-F024A and P4300-F017A.

NO: When directed to close P4300-F024A and P4300-F017A TRIGGER TBCCW Leak Isolation. After 1 minute report, back the valves are closed and leak has stopped NO: When asked Head tank level or Makeup valve position refer to P4300_M200081_a in Orchid ME or Provided Ichart.

NO: When direct to close P4300-F005, report that the valve needs a ladder to access and it will take time to get setup.

Note: No further action is required for evaluation. Advise the lead examiner to step the scenario.

Based on field report identifies isolations for leak using SOP/M-5728-1.

Once P4300-C001 North TBCCW Pump is removed from service, directs field operator to close P4300-F024A and P4300-F017A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Flow Transmitter fails upscale. CRS Evaluate TS.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+25 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to fail B21-N087B upscale.

BOOTH Reviews 23.601, Instrument Trip Sheets.

SRO Enter Tech Spec 3.3.6.1 actions.

TS 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 specifies that trip channel B must be placed in tripped condition COMPLETION TIME 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Responds to alarm 2D36, NSSSS Isolation Ch B/D Trip and reports to CRS.

BOP Direct an operator to investigate the failure at Testability.

ROLE PLAY:

NO: When directed, wait about 3 minutes, and report that B21-N687B indicates upscale.

Reviews 23.601, Instrument Trip Sheets.

Acknowledges report from operator to investigate the failure at Testability and communicates results to CRS.

Notify Radiation Protection of a possible leak.

Direct an operator to pull fuse A71B-F3B at RR H11-P611 TB DD pos F3.

NO: When directed to create STR for A71B-F3B at RR H11-P611 TB DD pos F3. Report the Tagging center will prepare STR and bring to control room. Note: STR should take about 45 minutes to prepare.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

4D53 - AVR General Alarm. The crew will diagnose that there is a failure of one thyristor bank. The ARP requires reducing reactor power so generator output<2400 Field amps.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+35 min.

ACTION: Trigger step to cause a thyristor bank failure.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of channel 49 Failure of Thyristor Bridge 2GA for the AVR SRO Contact Shift Manager / Operations director for direction on lower Reactor Power Acknowledge direction to lower Reactor Power to establish 2400 Field amps.

Direct lowering power using flow to establish 2400 Field amps.

May assist with communication, briefing field operators and HiCom announcements.

ATC Respond to 4D53 AVR General Alarm.

BOP Report Alarm to CRS and review ARP.

Direct an operator to H21-P272, Rectifier Cubicle, to record any abnormal lights/alarms and direct an operator to obtain Key #111 and perform the ARP actions at the Excitation Control Cubicle (RR H11 P630):

ROLE PLAY as Operator: Acknowledge direction for AVR General Alarm. State that you will obtain a copy of ARP on your way and will report status based on direction given. Two operators will be needed. The locations are the H11P603-Relay Room and H21P272-TB2 L3.

Acknowledge report from Operation Panel and report of alarm for Channel 49. and acknowledge report from an operator at H21-P272 that Cubicle EG1 BLOCK light is ON and N-1 op key light is illuminated at H11 P630.

ROLE PLAY as Operator:

Wait 3 minutes and report from Operation Panel that Channel 49 is in alarm and N-1 op key light is illuminated at H11 P630 (Relay Room - Use HiCOM) and from H21-P272 that Cubicle EG1 BLOCK light is ON (TB2 L3-Radio).

May request assistance from system engineer.

ROLEPLAY as System Engineer: If questioned about Channel 49 and the N-1 op, direct the operator to re-read the Corrective Action for Channel 49. Explain that the N-1 op key light will be illuminated after the Corrective Actions taken and the N-1 op key light should currently be illuminated.

Report status to CRS based on ARP and field reports.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

4D53 - AVR General Alarm. The crew will diagnose that there is a failure of one thyristor bank. The ARP requires reducing reactor power so generator output<2400 Field amps.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+35 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOOTH Operator: If direct to monitor and report field amps as power is lowered use soft panel values from S12-R815 MTG Field Current (H_P804_C027_1 can be used for a graph).

Operations Management: Concur with requirements of ARP to lower power. Direct CRS to lower power to point required for 2400 field amps.

Obtains direction from operations management to lower power.

SRO Directs lowering power to 2400 field amps.

Acknowledge report of P/F and at 2400 field amps.

Lowers power using flow per 23.138.01 until 2400 field amps is achieved:

ATC Adjusts speeds of RRMG Sets, per 23.138.01:

Verifies B31-R621A (B), N RR MG Set Speed Controllers, in AUTO, or places N RRMG Set Speed Controllers in MANUAL.

Adjust setpoint (SP), or output if in MANUAL, of B31-R621A (B),

N RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed.

Adjusts RR MG Set speeds, to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows on B21-R611A and B.

Verifies indicated RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%, as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW &

RR Flat Panel Display.

Verifies P/F map and reports P/F to CRS.

Provide peer check for lower power using flow per 23.138.01.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 1 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Action: Trigger step to trip Main Turbine.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of Failure to Scram.

SRO Announces event of Failure to Scram over Hi-Com.

Enters EOPs on Failure to Scram.

Directs the following from 29.100.01 SH 1A:

FSQ 1-8.

Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.

Inhibit ADS.

Bypass & Restore Drywell Pneumatics and 29.ESP.11.

Pressure Band of 900-1050 psig.

Identifies Reactor Scam condition due to Turbine trip and Places Mode Switch in Shutdown.

ATC Recognizes failure of RPS to actuate and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.

Reports Failure to Scram to CRS.

RO inserts IRMs/SRM. (Immediate Action)

ROs provides scram reports based on current plant conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 2 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Acknowledge direction to perform FSQ 1-8.

ATC Performs FSQ 1-8 using 29.ESP.01 Ecl B and 29.ESP.03 by:

Confirm Rx mode switch in S/D.

Confirm RR flow runback to minimum 23.138.01 Encl H:

Place or verify Recirc A & B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch to DEFEAT.

Adjust setpoint (SP) of B31-R621A (B), North (South) RR MG Set Gen Speed Controllers to 30%.

Confirm ARI 29.ESP.03 Section 9 by :

Place B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D) SW, in ARMED.

Depress B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D)

SW, TRIP pushbuttons.

Verify all control rods did not insert.

Report FSQ 1-8 complete and current Rx power to CRS.

Acknowledge direction to Confirm Isolations and Actuations for Level and Inhibit ADS.

BOP Verifies Isolations and Actuations for Level and reports completion to CRS.

Places ADS Inhibit SW LOGIC A and ADS Inhibit SW LOGIC B in Inhibit.

Reports to CRS that ADS has been inhibited.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 3 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

SRO directs SLC injection. ATC Injects SLC. Delayed Pump trip. Start Second pump Crew Injects SLC.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Acknowledge report of FSQ 1-8 complete and Reactor power level.

SRO Directs SLC Injection.

Acknowledge report of SLC injecting, SLC tank level and RWCU isolation status (successful).

Acknowledge report of SLC pump trip and start alternate pump.

Starts SLC Pump.

ATC Verify SLC system parameters and determines SLC is injecting.

Verifies RWCU isolation by verifying follow valves are closed:

G3352-F004 G3352-F220 Informs CRS of SLC injecting, SLC tank level and RWCU isolation status (successful).

Identifies SLC pump trip and start alternate pump.

Informs CRS of SLC pump trip and start alternate pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 4 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Determines if Terminate and Prevent (T&P) is required and if necessary directs:

SRO Directs RO to Terminate and Prevent all injection into the RPV except Boron, CRD and RCIC.

Provides termination criteria of RPV level <114.

Directs RO to maintain RPV level 50 to 100 inches when termination criterion is met.

If directed acknowledge direction to Terminate and Prevent all injection into the RPV except Boron, CRD and RCIC.

BOP If directed Terminates and Prevents all injection into the RPV except Boron, CRD and RCIC per 29.ESP.01 Encl A:

Place Div 1 CS pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 1 RHR pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place/Verify SBFW pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 2 CS pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 2 RHR pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

If HPCI is running set output to minimum.

If HPCI is not running place Aux oil pump CMC in OFF.

Crew Update lowering level.

Using RFP controllers lower RWL.

Acknowledge termination criteria of RPV level <114.

Recommences injection when RPV level <114.

Acknowledge RPV band level 50 to 100 inches.

Maintains RWL in band at 50 to 100 inches using high-pressure feed sources.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 5 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOOTH IF dispatched to install EOP defeats, use the following process:

Wait 10 minutes for each ESP (step may have a ten-minute delay built in to assist RP timing).

Initiate the Remote Function for the ESP defeat, if necessary.

THEN call the control room and report, Defeats for 29ESPxx are installed Note: Reports will be from rounds or extra operators not currently assigned to other tasks (default position)

Direct defeating logic trips (29.ESP.10) and insert rods per 29.ESP.03 SRO Give out the order to defeat logic trips 29.ESP.10.

ATC Insert rods per 29.ESP.03 Section 3:

Place C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.

Start both CRD pumps by placing CMC in RUN as needed As necessary, throttle C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.

As necessary, adjust C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.

Place the Rod Worth Minimizer keylock switch in BYPASS.

Insert the Cram Array using EMERGENCY IN.

When the Cram Array has been inserted, attempt to achieve a checkerboard control rod pattern using EMERGENCY IN as follows:

Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern, other concurrent actions may preclude obtaining an actual checkerboard pattern.

Continue to fully insert all remaining control rods using EMERGENCY IN as follows:

Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #3 Event No.: 7 to 8 Page 6 of 6 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

AVR Trip of Turbine, the crew will place Mode Switch to Shut down.

Manual RPS Fails to Cause a Scram (Total Scram Failure) and All Rods Stuck, inhibit ADS. Manually insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+45 min.

Acknowledge report of all rods in.

SRO Acknowledge defeat ARI logic trips in accordance with 29.ESP.10 and RPS logic trips in accordance with 29.ESP.09.

ATC Depress ATWS ARI/RPT Div I(II) RESET pushbuttons.

Verify ARI is reset.

Place C7100-M604, Scram Disch Vol Hi H2O Lvl Byp switch, in BYPASS.

Cycle C7100-M605, Scram Reset Switch, to both positions (GP 1/4, GP 2/3) and release.

Verify Trip System A and B blue Pilot Scram Valve Solenoid lights are ON.

Verify the SDV vent and drain valves are open.

Allow the scram discharge volume to drain. (3D94 Clears)

Depress the four manual scram pushbuttons.

Arm and depress the four ATWS ARI/RPT manual initiation pushbuttons.

Observe rod motion and report to CRS when all rods are in.

Appendix D Scenario Outline eForm ES-D-1 Initial Conditions: MODE 1. ~97% Power Turnover: North TWMS Pump Tagged out for motor replacement. Div 1 RHRSW Reservoir Chemical Treatment is in progress.

After taking the shift you are to start the Div 1 EESW pump per 23.208 Section 5.9 EESW Manual Initiation for Reservoir Chemical Treatment per PST event AG75, AH75, AI75.

During testing last shift that caused a half scram; damaged fuse clips resulted in a single rod scram. Work is progressing to replace the damaged fuse clips. Rod recovery is expected later this shift, and the SNE is evaluating the need to reduce power to 90% CTP before rod recovery.

Critical Tasks: SC-ED(CT2), SC-SCRAM(CT1)

Event No.

Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No.:

Op-Test No: ILO-2019-1 SCN #5 Examiners: See Attached Exam Matrix Operators: See Attached Exam Matrix Start the Div 1 EESW pump IAW the SOP for Reservoir Chemical Treatment per PST.

1 N (BOP)

N (SRO)

Oil Leak on #6 GSW Pump. The crew will start standby GSW pump and then shut down #6 GSW pump.

2 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

P41MF0009 A field report will prompt to the crew to swap CRD stabilizing valves, due to the failure of the in-service stabilizing valves.

3 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

C101F171_STVFAI LSP C101F170_STVFAI LSP C1BOK45TVSP Reduce Power per SNE Direction to recover Rod.

4 R (ATC)

R (SRO)

Failure of North Steam tunnel cooler. The crew will start the South Steam tunnel cooler.

5 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

TACLFU_TR1CC A rigging event results in damage to the power supply to E4150-F600 HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve.

6 TS E4AHFU_01CC RCIC Steam Leak. AOP 20.000.02 Abnormal Release Of Radioactive Material 7

C (BOP)

C (SRO)

E51MF0014 E51MF0010 E41MF0007 EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment - >MSO Temperature - RCIC exceeds Max Safe -> Mode Switch to Shutdown 8

M (All)

CT1 E501E5150F008_

MTFASIS E501E5150F007_

MTFASIS 10 Rods Out ATWS EOP entry required.

EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 1A RPV Control Two Areas > MSO Temperature due to RCIC line leak in steam tunnel - EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 3A - ED ATWS 9

C (ATC)

C (SRO)

CT2 C11MF0001 TA20TEN207TFASI S

TA20TEN207ZSOU T

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #5 A. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The crew will brief and then start the Div 1 EESW pump IAW the SOP for Reservoir Chemical Treatment.

Event: 1 Field report of large oil leak on #6 GSW Pump. Crew will start standby GSW pump and shutdown #6 GSW pump.

Event: 2 A field report will prompt to swap Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System(CRD) stablizing valves, due to local report of no flow indicated on C11-R004, Stabilizing Valve Flow indicator, located on H21-P164B, CRD System Rack (RB1-G11).

Event: 3 The SNE will direct power lower to 90% so that the scrammed rod can be recovered later in the shift. The crew will lower power using flow.

Event: 4 Trip of 72B-4A Pos 1E will cause power loss to North Steam tunnel cooler. Crew will start the South Steam tunnel cooler.

Event: 5 A rigging event trips and blocks access to 2PB-1-11B. The field report will indicate no injured personnel.

However, the power to E4150-F600 HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve is off and cannot be restored. The valve is open locally. This event will require a TS entry for primary containment isolation for the E4150-F600.

Event: 6 A RCIC steam supply line leak will occur requiring entry into AOP 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material. The leak is in the penetration located between the RCIC area and the Reactor Build steam tunnel. Steam is discharging into both areas. Attempts to isolate the leak will fail so EOP entry and a reactor scram will be required before exceeding the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) Value in the HPCI Area.

On the scram, 10 rods fail to scram requiring EOP 29.000.01 SH1A. The steam leak will progress to more than one area requiring Emergency Depressurization (ED) EOP 29.000.01 SH3A.

Event: 7 to 9 MODE 1. ~97% Power North TWMS Pump Tagged out for motor replacement. Div 1 RHRSW Reservoir Chemical Treatment is in progress.

After taking the shift you are to start the Div 1 EESW pump per 23.208 Section 5.9 EESW Manual Initiation for Reservoir Chemical Treatment per PST event AG75, AH75, AI75.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #5 B. SCENARIO OBJECTIVE Given conditions in the simulator that includes a component failure in the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System act to control the plant per 23.106, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System" 1.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 3A, RPV FLOODING & EMERG DEPRESS - ATWS, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 3A, RPV FLOODING & EMERG DEPRESS - ATWS and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

2.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

3.

Given conditions in the simulator that include plant conditions the required the declaration of an Emergency Action Level (EAL), declare the EAL per EP-101 Classification Of Emergencies.

4.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 2, PC Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

5.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure that results in an entry condition for AOP 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material, take action to control the plant per AOP 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material.

6.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure, implement Technical Specifications per the Fermi 2 Operating License and ODE-12 LCOs.

7.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes direction to change reactor power, make adjustments to reactor power per 23.138.01 Reactor Recirculation System.

8.

Given conditions in the simulator that the operations of the RHR Complex Service Water Systems, operate the RHR Complex Service Water Systems per 23.208 RHR Complex Service Water Systems.

9.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #5 CRITICAL TASKS SC-SCRAM - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before any area exceeds the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) levels.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - If temperatures in any one of the areas listed in in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EPG actions can no longer be assured. A reactor scram is initiated through entry of the RPV Control guideline to reduce the primary system discharge into secondary containment and in anticipation of possible RPV depressurization.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if the reactor is not scrammed and any secondary containment radiation/temperature/water level reaches its max safe value.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 3. This analysis requires that a reactor scram be initiated prior to any area radiation, water level, or temperature reaches its max safe value. If indicated parameters in any one of the areas listed in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EOP related actions can no longer be assured. Therefore, a manual scram is required prior to reaching any of these indicated values.

Initiating Cue - Primary system discharging into secondary containment and any area parameter is approaching maximum safe operating levels.

Measurable Performance - Initiate a reactor manual scram prior to reaching any max safe value Performance Feedback - All control rods indicate full in and reactor power decreasing.

Expected action - Reactor mode switch placed in SHUTDOWN.

SC-ED - With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - Should secondary containment temperatures exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further temperature increases.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if 2 SRV valves or the Bypass valves are not open and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 3. This analysis requires that an emergency depressurization be performed if secondary containment temperatures continue to increase and exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are unisolated and discharging into the secondary containment.

Initiating Cue - Primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area temperatures exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.

Measurable Performance - Initiate emergency depressurization using SRVs - OR - anticipate emergency depressurization and depressurize using Bypass valves ignoring cooldown rates such that the reactor vessel is depressurized.

Performance Feedback - SRVs or BPVs indicate open and reactor pressure decreasing.

Expected action - Open 5 SRVs - OR - fully open main turbine bypass valves

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Start the Div 1 EESW pump IAW the SOP for Reservoir Chemical Treatment per PST.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+1 min.

Conduct brief to start Div 1 EESW per 23.208 per ODE-3.

SRO Direct operator to Start Div 1 EESW per 23.208.

Acknowledge report of the status of Div 1 EESW.

Acknowledge direction to Start Div 1 EESW per 23.208.

BOP Make plant announcement and inform the operator about the start of the Div 1 EESW pump.

ROLE PLAY:

NO: acknowledge starting Div 1 EESW pump. Report that the pump is ready for a start. When the pump is started wait ~ 30 seconds and report a good start of Div 1 EESW pump.

Start Div 1 EESW per 23.208 as follows:

NOTE:Div 1 EECW temperature control valve will remain full open for approximately one minute after the EESW pump starts, then the TCV will be under the normal temperature control.

Start P4500-C002A, Div 1 EESW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Verify or place P44-K800A, Div 1 EESW Hx Temp Ctrlr, in AUTO.

If EECW is running then verify P44-R800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Outlet Temp Recorder, is being maintained between 71 and 85°F by P44 F400A, Div 1 EECW Heat Exch EESW Return TCV.

To control EECW temperature, adjust as necessary P44-K800A, Div 1 EECW Hx Temp, Ctrlr, pulser knob.

If Div 1 RHR Cooling Towers are in service, verify flow out of Div 1 RHR Cooling Tower continuous drain lines.

NO: If asked report good flow out of Div 1 RHR Cooling Tower continuous drain lines.

Report status of Div 1 EESW to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Oil Leak on #6 GSW Pump. The crew will start standby GSW pump and then shut down #6 GSW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+8 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOOTH As Rounds Operator report that #6 GSW pump has a sizable oil leak, and motor oil level is visibly lowering in sight glass and just above the red line.

State that no oil has entered the GSP pump pit yet, and you are attempting to contain the oil, however, you need some help.

Acknowledge report of the status of GSW.

SRO Direct swapping GSW pumps and shutting down #6 GSW pump.

May assist with communications.

ATC Acknowledge report that #6 GSW pump has a sizable oil leak, and motor oil level slowly lowering in the sight glass in level.

BOP Recommend shutting down #6 GSW pump to CRS.

Direct plant support personnel to assist the operator at #6 GSW pump with containing the oil leak.

Acknowledge direction to swap GSW pumps.

Make Hi Com announcement and alert the field operator of swapping GSW pumps.

ROLE PLAY:

When directed acknowledge swapping GSW pumps. Report the oncoming pump is ready for a start. When the GSW pump is started, report a good start.

When directed report GSW discharge strainers in the directed position. (no action required in the model)

Swap GSW pump per 23.131, "General Service Water System:"

Place GSW Pump #2(#3, #4, #5) Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller for GSW Pump to be the placed in service in CONTINUOUS.

Place Oncoming CMC switch for P4100-C002 (C003, C004, C005, C006) GSW Pump #2 (#3, #4, #5, or #6) to be placed in service in RUN.

Place CMC switch for P4100-C006 GSW Pump #6 in OFF/RESET.

Place GSW Pump #2(#3, #4, #5) Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller for the oncoming pump in INTERMITTENT.

Place GSW Pump #6 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in OFF.

Report status of GSW to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A field report will prompt to the crew to swap CRD stabilizing valves, due to the failure of the in-service stabilizing valves.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Action: Trigger step to cause stabilizing valve failure.

BOOTH ROLE PLAY:

Contact MCR as Rounds Operator and report that 0 gpm flow indicated on C11-R004, Stabilizing Valve Flow indicator, located on H21-P164B, CRD System Rack (RB1-G11). The flow was ~ 6 gpm last shift. There is no indication as to why flow is now 0 gpm.

Acknowledge report on CRD system status.

SRO Directs swapping CRD stabilizing valves.

Acknowledge report on CRD system status.

Acknowledge field report of 0 gpm on C11-R004, Stabilizing Valve Flow indicator, located on H21-P164B, CRD System Rack.

ATC Evaluated Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRD) system indications and notes stabilizer valves selected to A, with the indicating light not lit.

Reports CRD status to CRS and may recommend swapping stabilizing valves.

Acknowledge direction to swap stabilizing valves.

Swaps stabilizing valves per 23.106, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System."

Align the stabilizing valve by directing an operator to open the following valves:

Note report the following valves; no action required in the model.

C1100-F067B, Stabilizing Valve C11-F172, F173 Inlet Valve.

ROLEPLAY as NO when directed wait one minute and report C1100-F067B, Stabilizing Valve C11-F172, F173 Inlet Valve is open.

C1100-F068B, Stabilizing Valve C11-F172, F173 Outlet Valve.

ROLEPLAY as NO when directed wait one minute and report C1100-F068B, Stabilizing Valve C11-F172, F173 Outlet Valve is open.

Place Stabilizing Valve Selector switch in Position B (COP H11 P603).

Direct an operator to verify stabilizing flow is between 5.4 and 6.6 gpm on C11-R004, Stabilizing Valve Flow indicator, located on H21-P164B, CRD System Rack (RB1-G11).

ROLEPLAY as NO when directed to report stabilizing C11-R004, report flow 6 gpm. This can be verified by using graph (C101FEN014ZNFLOW*7.19)

Direct an operator to close the following valves to remove the Stabilizing Valve not selected for service:

C1100-F067A, Stabilizing Valve C11-F170, F171 Inlet Valve.

ROLEPLAY as NO when directed wait one minute and report C1100-F067A, Stabilizing Valve C11-F170, F171 Inlet Valve is closed.

C1100-F068A, Stabilizing Valve C11-F170, F171 Outlet Valve.

ROLEPLAY as NO when directed wait one minute and report C1100-F068A, Stabilizing Valve C11-F170, F171 Outlet Valve is closed.

Evaluated Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRD) system indications and report status to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Reduce Power per SNE Direction to recover Rod.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+25 min.

Acknowledge direction to lower reactor power to 90%.

SRO Direct operator to lower power to 90% using flow.

Acknowledge report of P/F Brief crew per ODE-3 Lowers power using flow per 23.138.01:

ATC Adjusts speeds of RRMG Sets, per 23.138.01:

Verifies B31-R621A (B), N RR MG Set Speed Controllers, in AUTO, or places N RRMG Set Speed Controllers in MANUAL.

Adjust setpoint (SP), or output if in MANUAL, of B31-R621A (B),

N RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed.

Adjusts RR MG Set speeds, to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows on B21-R611A and B.

Verifies indicated RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%, as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW &

RR Flat Panel Display.

Verifies P/F map and reports P/F to CRS Notifies the Station Nuclear Engineer (SNE)

ROLE PLAY:

SNE: Acknowledge report of lowering power or that power has been lowered.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Failure of North Steam tunnel cooler. The crew will start the South Steam tunnel cooler.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+35 min.

ACTION: trigger step to fail N. steam tunnel cooler.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of North Steam tunnel cooler.

SRO Direct operator to start South Steam tunnel cooler.

Acknowledge reports on the status of steam tunnel temperature and tunnel coolers.

Conduct brief on the status of steam tunnel coolers/temperature per ODE-3.

May review and report status of steam tunnel temperature to CRS.

ATC Responds to 8D3, North Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit No Air Flow.

BOP Reviews P808 status and ARP.

Verify Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit A (North) white NO FLOW light ON.

Inform CRS that ARP directs Stopping Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit A (North) and start Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit B (South) in accordance with 23.414, "Steam Tunnel Cooling."

Acknowledge direction to start South Steam tunnel cooler.

Per 23.414, "Steam Tunnel Cooling" performs the following:

Open P4200-F603, S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Outlet Iso.

Verify open P4200-F602, S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Inlet Iso.

Start T4100-B023B, Steam Tunnel Cooler B, by placing its CMC switch in RUN.

Reports status of steam tunnel coolers to CRS.

May review and report status of steam tunnel temperature to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A rigging event results in damage to the power supply to E4150-F600 HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+37 min.

Action: Trigger step to Trip E1150-F600.

BOOTH Action: Contact to control room via HiCOM, report rigging event that has resulted in a metal pipe striking the 2PB1 Pos 11B. The bucket door appears to have a small dent and the switch is mid/off position.

Acknowledge report of status on E4150-F600.

SRO Review TS.

TS 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Brief crew on loss of E4150-F600 and TS impact per ODE-3.

Responds to 2D73 HPCI MOVS MTR Overload / Loss of Power Supply.

BOP Review status of HPCI, reviews ARP and reports loss of indication for the E4150-F600 HPCI STM SPLY OTBD ILO BYP VLV.

Acknowledge report from field of damage to 2PB-1-11B.

Directs operator to investigate 2PB-1-11B.

ROLE PLAY as NO: When directed wait three minutes and provide verification of the status of the 2PB1 Pos 11B.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 1 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

RCIC Steam Leak. AOP 20.000.02 Abnormal Release Of Radioactive Material Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

ACTION trigger step to initiate a RCIC Steam Leak, this will cause steam leaks in both the RB steam tunnel and at RCIC.

BOOTH Enters 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and performs the following:

SRO Sounds plant area alarm and announces steam leak over the Hi-Com.

Enters 29.100.01 Sh 5 Directs isolating the RCIC System.

Respond to alarm 16D27, Fire Alarm, monitor for start of fire pumps and report to CRS.

BOP Recognize and report fire alarm is from RCIC Quad.

Monitor for and report rising temperatures and radiation levels in the RCIC Quad and RB steam tunnel.

May recommend entering AOP for Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material.

May recommend isolating the RCIC System.

Respond to 1D66, Steam Leak Detection Ambient Temperature High and 1D70, Steam Leak Detection Diff Temp High alarms.

Respond to 3D34, Sec Contm Temp High-High EOP Entry.

Direct an operator to the Steam Leak Detection Panel.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If directed to the Steam Leak Detection panel, wait 5 minutes and refer to IPCS in the simulator booth, ARM screen, and report steam tunnel temperature (from IPCS) as the indication from RR.

Respond to 3D34, Sec Contm Temp High-High EOP Entry..

Recognize and report EOP entry condition on high RCIC Room Temp.

Attempts to isolate the RCIC system as directed.

Recognizes and reports inability to isolate RCIC.

May direct operator to 2PA1-POS 3A, bucket for E5150-F008.

ROLE PLAY as NO: If directed to 2PA1-POS 3A, bucket for E5150-F008, wait 3 minutes and report strong acrid odor and the bucket tripped.

Recognizes and reports RCIC Room Temperature still rising and approaching Max Safe.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 2 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment - >MSO Temperature - RCIC exceeds Max Safe ->

Mode Switch to Shutdown Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Enters EOP SH 1 for scram (from SH 5)

SRO Directs Mode Switch to S/D prior to 210°F.

Announces events over the Hi-Com Requests scram reports.

Enters EOP SH 1A for failure to SCRAM.

Places Mode Switch in S/D when directed.

ATC Recognizes Failure to Scram and pushes manual scram push buttons.

Recognizes all rods are not inserted..

Inserts IRMs and SRMs as Immediate Action.

Provide scram reports, based on actual plant conditions, when directed.

BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 3 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

10 Rods Out ATWS EOP entry required.

EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 1A RPV Control Two Areas > MSO Temperature due to RCIC line leak in steam tunnel - EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 3A - ED ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

ROLE PLAY:

BOOTH IF dispatched to install EOP defeats, use the following process:

Wait 10 minutes for each ESP.

Initiate the Remote Function for the ESP defeat, if necessary.

THEN call the control room and report, Defeats for 29ESPxx are installed Note: Reports will be from rounds or extra operators not currently assigned to other tasks (default position)

Direct RO to Inhibit ADS.

SRO Direct RO to confirm Isolations and Actuations (29.ESP.01).

Direct RO maintain RPV pressure and level band.

Direct action of SCRAM AOP and may allow use of 29.ESP.03.

May direct lowering pressure using pressure regulator.

Acknowledge direction to perform action of SCRAM AOP and use of 29.ESP.03.

ATC Confirm Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

May direct operator to Physically verify integrity of Scram Discharge Volume.

NO: If directed, after 10 minutes report that the integrity of Scram Discharge Volume has been verified.

Verify SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.

May Order out 29.ESP.10 and 29.ESP.09.

Per 29.ESP.03 or 23.623 attempts to fully insert control rods.

If directed acknowledge direction to lower pressure using pressure regulator.

BOP Adjusts pressure regulator as directed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 4 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment - >MSO Temperature - RCIC exceeds Max Safe ->

Mode Switch to Shutdown Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Directs ED when temperature exceeds MSO in two areas:

SRO Directs T&P.

Directs opening 5 ADS SRVs.

Directs level band of 173 to 214 following ED Recognize rising temperature in the Steam tunnel.

ATC Recognizes second area is approaching MSO for high room temperature.

Recognize rising temperature in the Steam tunnel.

BOP Recognizes second area is approaching MSO for high room temperature.

Acknowledge direction to T&P.

When directed to Terminate and Prevent all injection into the RPV except Boron, CRD and RCIC per 29.ESP.01 Encl A:

Place Div 1 CS pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 1 RHR pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place/Verify SBFW pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 2 CS pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

Place Div 2 RHR pumps CMC in OFF/RESET.

If HPCI is running set output to minimum.

If HPCI is not running place Aux oil pump CMC in OFF.

Maintains RWL in band at 173-214 inches using feed sources.

Acknowledge direction to opening 5 ADS SRVs.

Opens 5 ADS SRVs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #5 Event No.: 7 to 9 Page 5 of 5 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment - >MSO Temperature - RCIC exceeds Max Safe ->

Mode Switch to Shutdown Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+40 min.

Enters 29.100.01, Sheet 2 on high TWT and TWL.

SRO Directs placing RHR in Torus Cooling Mode.

Recognize and report high TWT and TWL EOP entry condition.

ATC Places RHR in Torus Cooling Mode:

Contacts RB Rounds for pump start and makes Hi-Com announcement.

Places E1150-F028A(B) Keylock in OPERATE and opens E1150-F028A(B).

Starts E1102-C002A (B,C,D) Div 1(2) RHR Pump A(B,C,D).

Opens E1150-F024A(B).

Starts RHRSW:

Depresses E1150-F068A(B) OPEN for 5 seconds.

Starts an RHRSW Pump.

Throttles open E1150-F068A(B) to 5600-6500 gpm.

Starts second RHRSW Pump.

Fully opens E1150-F068A(B).

May contract field operator to place D1(D2) Radiation Monitor Sample Pump in service.

ROLE PLAY:

NO: If dispatched, after 5 min trigger step and report D1(D2)

Radiation Monitor Sample Pump in service.

Recognize and report high TWT and TWL EOP entry condition.

BOP

Appendix D Scenario Outline eForm ES-D-1 Initial Conditions: MODE 2 at ~3-4% CTP. RPV pressure is 350 psig.

Turnover: The plant is in MODE 2 at ~3-4% CTP during a startup. RPV pressure is 350 psig. Plans for the shift are to re-commence power ascension by increasing pressure. The GOP directs startup of a Reactor Feedwater Pump. Another group of operators are preparing to start the North Reactor feedpump.

The STA is plotting HUR. The ATC will make all power adjustments with rods and the pressure regulator.

The STA has reviewed the steam tables, and the crew can raise reactor pressure to 855# and not violate the 90°F limit. The crew is to FIRST raise Reactor Pressure by closing the bypass valves using the pressure regulator and then recommence control rod withdrawal.

Critical Tasks: ATWS-SD(CT1), RPV-LOCA(CT2)

Event No.

Malf No.

Event Type*

Event Description Facility: Fermi 2 Scenario No.:

Op-Test No: ILO-2019-1 SCN #7 Examiners: See Attached Exam Matrix Operators: See Attached Exam Matrix Raise Rx Pressure per GOP 1

R (ATC)

R (SRO)

The West Station Air Compressor is cycling under load and Station Air Header pressure is lowering. This will prompt the MRC to shift to standby Station Air Compressor and Shutdown West.

2 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

P502PSE_N415CL SP P50MF0014 A spurious trip of 65E-E6 will result in a loss of Bus 65E. The crew will perform actions for 20.300.65E Loss of Bus 65E.

SRO will evaluate TS.

3 C (All)

TS R11RF0978 A RR pump speed will increase requiring the crew to trip A RR pump. Actions for single loop will be taken.

4 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

TS B31RF0015 Trip of East CRD pump. Place Mode S/W in SHUTDOWN per IA 20.106.01 CRD Hydraulic System Failure.

Manual RPS Fails All Rods Stuck - LOW POWER ATWS. ATC will be able to insert rods with ARI.

5 C (ATC)

C (SRO)

CT1 C11MF0001 C71MF0006 NB02F403_ATVFA ILSP Small LOCA.

6 M (All)

B31MF0066 Trip of all condenser pumps, RCIC/HPCI autostart failure, BOP will start an alternate source of feed to maintain level (HPCI/RCIC/SBFW) 7 C (BOP)

C (SRO)

CT2 E51MF0006 N20MF0018 N20MF0019 N20MF0020 E41MF0009 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #7 A. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

Per GOP 22.000.02, Plant Startup To 25% Power, the crew will use the pressure regulator to increase reactor pressure.

Event: 1 A Field report and control room indications will show that the West Station Air Compressor is cycling under load. This will prompt the MRC to shift to standby Station Air Compressor and Shutdown West.

Event: 2 A spurious trip of 65E-E6 will result in a loss of Bus 65E. The crew will perform actions for 20.300.65E Loss of Bus 65E SRO will evaluate T.S 3.5.1,3.7.1,3.8.1,3.8.4,3.8.7 Event: 3 Reactor Recirc Pump A will increase speed due to a failure requiring the crew to trip the pump. Actions for single loop will be taken.

Event: 4 Trip of East CRD pump due to an electrical fault. The crew enters AOP 20.106.01. However, the crew will be forced to take override from 20.106.01 and place the MODE S/W in SHUTDOWN.

When the Mode S/W is placed in SHUTDOWN, RPS will fail to cause a scram and all rods will be stuck. All rods insert when ARI is initiated by manual action by the ATC.

Event: 5 After the SCRAM a small LOCA will occur, this will be complicated by the trip of all condenser pumps. HPCI and RCIC will not automatically inject and the crew will start HPCI/RCIC/SBFW manually to stabilize reactor water level.(CT)

Event: 6 to 7 MODE 2 at ~3-4% CTP. RPV pressure is 350 psig.

The plant is in MODE 2 at ~3-4% CTP during a startup. RPV pressure is 350 psig. Plans for the shift are to re-commence power ascension by increasing pressure. The GOP directs startup of a Reactor Feedwater Pump.

Another group of operators are preparing to start the North Reactor feedpump.

The STA is plotting HUR. The ATC will make all power adjustments with rods and the pressure regulator. The STA has reviewed the steam tables, and the crew can raise reactor pressure to 855# and not violate the 90°F limit. The crew is to FIRST raise Reactor Pressure by closing the bypass valves using the pressure regulator and then recommence control rod withdrawal.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #7 B. SCENARIO OBJECTIVE Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 20.138.01, Recirculation Pump Trip, control the plant per 20.138.01, Recirculation Pump Trip.

1.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure resulting in an uncontrolled recirc flow change, control the plant per applicable alarm response procedures and 20.138.03 Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change.

2.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1, RPV Control and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

3.

Given conditions in the simulator that include entry conditions for 20.106.01 CRD Hydraulic System Failure, control the plant per 20.106.01 CRD Hydraulic System Failure.

4.

Given conditions in the simulator that require entry into 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS, control the plant per 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control ATWS and ODE-10 EOP Expectations.

5.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes a component failure that results in a loss of bus 72E, take action to control the plant per 20.300.72E, Loss of Bus 72E.

6.

Given conditions in the simulator that include a component failure that results in a loss of bus 65E, take action to control the plant per 20.300.65E, Loss of Bus 65E.

7.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes a component failure that results in a Loss of Station And/or Control Air, take action to control the plant per 20.129.01 Loss of Station And/or Control Air.

8.

Given conditions in the simulator that includes direction to change reactor power during a startup, make adjustments to reactor power per 22.000.02, Plant Startup To 25% Power.

9.

FERMI 2 D1 Supplement SCN #7 CRITICAL TASKS RPV-LOCA With RPV level lowering and RPV pressure lowering and approaching injection pressure for CS and LPCI pumps, MAINTAIN RPV WATER LEVEL ABOVE TAF, by INJECTING with all available system(s) AND prevent injection from CS and LPCI pumps not required for ACC such that RPV LEVEL DOES NOT REACH 279 INCHES (Main Steam Lines) at any time during the scenario.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - Controlling RPV level above TAF assures adequate core cooling exists, precluding fuel damage.

Controlling level below the main steam lines ensures main steam line piping remains intact, precluding additional coolant inventory loss, and potential release outside primary containment.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if RPV water level drops below TAF or rises above than the main steam lines.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by BWROG EPG rev 3. Top of active fuel and the main steam lines are bounding levels with significant impact to reactor safety. RPV level dropping below TAF can result in core damage. RPV water level above the main steam lines can result in damage to system piping and subsequent additional loss of coolant, and potential release of radioactive material outside primary containment.

Initiating Cue - RPV is lowering and a high drywell pressure ECCS initiation signal exist.

Measurable Performance - RPV level is controlled within the prescribed control band.

Performance Feedback - RPV level indication is within band.

Expected action - Operate available injection systems in accordance with station procedures to control RPV water level within the prescribed band ATWS-SD With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shut down due to RPS failure, TAKE ACTION TO SHUTDOWN THE REACTOR using ARI, to ensure the reactor will remain shutdown under ALL conditions without boron within 12.5 minutes.

NUREG 1021 App D BASIS:

Safety Significance - When there is not a challenge to containment, and a reactor scram is required, action must be taken to place the reactor in a shutdown condition and to ensure that it remains shutdown under all conditions.

NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if all rods are not inserted within 12.5 minutes.

Safety significant boundary conditions are defined by Fermi 2 HRA Notebook, SF2-PRA-004, analysis of event HE1D-D-ATWS5, Operators fail to diagnose ATWS in 12.5 Minutes. This analysis determined that core damage will occur at approximately 12.5 minutes following the initiation a of failure to scram condition if operators fail to take required actions to shutdown the reactor.

Initiating Cue - Reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown Measurable Performance - All control rods inserted.

Performance Feedback - Available control rod position indication shows all rods inserted, and reactor power is lowering.

Expected action Perform step FSQ-8, confirm ARI, by arming and depressing ARI manual actuation pushbuttons

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Raise Rx Pressure per GOP Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+1 min.

Conducts brief for power increase using Control Rods.

SRO Directs ATC to re-commence power increase by pulling Control Rods IAW 23.623 and adjusting the Reactor Pressure regulator as required to maintain bypass valve position between 15-30%

open as required by the GOP.

Directs BOP to monitor secondary plant parameters.

ROLE PLAY:

STA If directed stated that the STA will plot the heatup and has reviewed the steam tables for our current pressure and the crew can raise pressure to 855# and not violate the 90°F limit.

Directs STA to perform Temperature/Pressure Monitoring IAW 22.000.05.

Acknowledge direction to re-commence power increase by pulling Control Rods IAW 23.623 and adjusting the Reactor Pressure regulator as required to maintain bypass valve position between 15-30% open.

ATC Adjusts the Reactor Pressure regulator as required to maintain bypass valve position between 15-30% open as required by the GOP.

Coordinates with Rod Movement Verifier and Reactivity Management SRO to pull Control Rods IAW 23.623:

Places Rod Select Power switch in ON.

From Rod Pull Sheet, selects rod to be withdrawn.

Verifies correct rod is selected with Rod Movement Verifier concurrence.

While monitoring Nuclear Instrumentation, moves selected rod to target position specified on the Rod Pull Sheet.

Completes required information on Rod Pull Sheet.

Repeats steps above for each rod movement.

When rod movements are complete, places Rod Select Power in OFF.

Acknowledge direction to monitor secondary plant parameters and peer check the ATC.

BOP Monitors secondary plant parameters during power ascension.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

The West Station Air Compressor is cycling under load and Station Air Header pressure is lowering. This will prompt the MRC to shift to standby Station Air Compressor and Shutdown West.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+10 min.

ACTION: trigger step to initiate failure of the West Station Air Compressor.

BOOTH Acknowledge report of West Station Air Compressor failure.

SRO Directs shifting Station Air Compressors using SOP while 7D53 is not in alarm.

Acknowledge report of 7D53, Station Air Header Pressure Low.

Enters 20.129.01 Loss Of Station And/Or Control Air.

Directs Condition A.1 Start any available Station Air Compressor.

Evaluate Station Air Pressure and report diagnose of West Station Air Compressor failure to CRS.

BOP ROLE PLAY NO: Report West Station Air Compressor is cycling, no apparent cause.

If 7D53 Alarms Respond to 7D53, Station Air Header Pressure Low:

Evaluate Station air and review ARP.

Verify P50-R802; Station Air Header Pressure Indicator is less than 90 psig.

Notify CRS to ENTER 20.129.01, Loss Of Station And/Or Control Air.

Acknowledge direction to start any available Station Air Compressor per 20.129.01 Loss Of Station And/Or Control Air Condition A.1 Start desired Station Air Compressor, P5001-D001 (D002), East (Center) Station Air Comp by placing CMC in RUN.

Reports status of Station Air to CRS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A spurious trip of 65E-E6 will result in a loss of Bus 65E. The crew will perform actions for 20.300.65E Loss of Bus 65E.

SRO will evaluate TS.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

ACTION: Trigger Step to initiate a trip 65E-E6.

BOOTH Directs performing an electrical evaluation.

SRO Enters AOP 20.300.65E Loss of Buss 65E with Crew Update.

Announces 65E loss over Hi-Com.

Conduct AOP brief per ODE-3.

Directs action of 20.300.65E Conditions A,D,E,H,L,M,N and O.

Identify multiple alarms occurring, on multiple panels, as an electrical transient.

ATC Identify multiple alarms occurring, on multiple panels, as an electrical transient.

BOP Performs electrical evaluation and diagnoses and reports Loss of 65E.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed to investigate 65E, wait about 5 min and report 65E-E6 indicates tripped. Acrid smell in vicinity, black marks around vent openings on breaker, no smoke, no fire.

Directs operator to walkdown on monitor running EDG 13.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed EDG 13 wait 5 minutes and report EDG 13 operating normally. Report that you are starting a set of operating rounds on the EDG.

Directs NO to investigate 65E bus.

Completes back panel walkdown and provides results to CRS.

Acknowledge direction to perform 20.300.65E Condition A.

Performs 20.300.65E Condition A:

Verify EDG 13 output breaker closes.

Verify the following closed:

Bus 72E Pos 5B.

Bus 72EC Pos 2C.

Acknowledge direction to perform 20.300.65E Condition E.

Performs 20.300.65E Condition E:

Verify Div 2 RPS Pwr Source Sel switch red TRANS AVAIL light on (H11-P810).

Place Div 2 RPS Pwr Source Sel switch in ALTERNATE.

Cycle Scram Reset Switch.

Depress Inboard MSIV Isolation RESET pushbutton (H11-P601).

Depress Outboard MSIV Isolation RESET pushbutton (H11-P602).

Verify proper isolations and actuations (23.316, Enc B, RPS Bus B - Affected Equipment).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A spurious trip of 65E-E6 will result in a loss of Bus 65E. The crew will perform actions for 20.300.65E Loss of Bus 65E.

SRO will evaluate TS.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Note: Actions for Conditions O and P are not expected to be started before moving on to the next event.

BOOTH Acknowledge direction to perform 20.300.65E Condition H.

ATC Performs 20.300.65E Condition H:

Direct operator to close B3100-F008A.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed wait 3 minutes TRIGGER step to close B3100-F008A/B and report B3100-F008A and B3100-F008B are closed.

Direct operator to close B3100-F008B.

Verify MSIV Isolation logic reset.

Open B3100-F016A.

Open B3100-F016B.

Direct operator to slowly open, over a one to two minute period, B3100-F008A.

Direct operator to slowly open, over a one to two minute period, B3100-F008B.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed TRIGGER step to open B3100-F008A/B and when (~3 minutes) step is complete report B3100-F008A and B3100-F008B are open.

Acknowledge direction to perform 20.300.65E Condition L,M,N,O and P.

BOP Performs 20.300.65E Condition D,L,M,N,O and P:

Place Div 2 130VDC Batt Charger 2B-1 in OFF/RESET, then in ON.

Place Div 2 24VDC Batt Charger 2IB-1 in OFF/RESET, then in ON.

Perform Attachment 1 of 20.300.65E.

Reviews Attachment 2 of 20.300.65E and restore loads as applicable.

Verify RR MG Set Center Cooling Fan starts and dampers re-align.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 3 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A spurious trip of 65E-E6 will result in a loss of Bus 65E. The crew will perform actions for 20.300.65E Loss of Bus 65E.

SRO will evaluate TS.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+15 min.

Reviews TS.

SRO T.S. 3.8.1, AC Sources--Operating. Condition A. One EDG Inoperable REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE offsite circuit COMPLETION TIME (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

T.S. 3.8.4, DC SourcesOperating. Condition A. One battery charger inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore battery charger to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Brief Crew per ODE-3 on TS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A RR pump speed will increase requiring the crew to trip A RR pump. Actions for single loop will be taken.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+27 min.

ACTION: trigger step to cause RR pump increase.

BOOTH Enters AOP 20.138.01, Recirculation Pump Trip.

SRO Enters AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change.

Ensures IAs are carried out by RO.

Makes Hi-Com announcement.

Conducts AOP brief IAW ODE-3.

Directs Actions of Conditions A & B of 20.138.01.

Evaluates alarms and Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change of N.

RRMG Set.

ATC Attempts Lock scoop tube of N. RRMG Set.(Immediate Action)

When >10% flow change Trips N. RRMG Set.(Immediate Action)

STA independently assesses P/F map and monitors CR insertion (M, C).

Closes B3105-F031A.

Opens B3105-F031A after 5 min..

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

A RR pump speed will increase requiring the crew to trip A RR pump. Actions for single loop will be taken.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+27 min.

Informs SNE of power change.

SRO ROLE PLAY as SNE: If contacted, acknowledge report of RR pump trip and unplanned power change, and acknowledge directions from CRS for TS.

Reviews LCO 3.4.1.

TS LCO 3.4.1:

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to meet SLO requirements:

APLHGR and MCPR limits adjusted for SLO.

APRM STP reset for SLO.

<66.1% RTP.

Directs SNE/STA to adjust APLHGR and MCPR for SLO.

Directs SNE/STA to reset APRM STP for SLO.

Reviews GOP for power reduction..

Conducts brief for TS impact of RR Pump trip and GOP actions.

Directs NO to monitor/adjust RRMG oil temps.

ATC ROLE PLAY as NO: If contacted to adjust RRMG oil temps, acknowledge report. No simulator actions are necessary.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Trip of East CRD pump. Place Mode S/W in SHUTDOWN per IA 20.106.01 CRD Hydraulic System Failure.

Manual RPS Fails All Rods Stuck - LOW POWER ATWS. ATC will be able to insert rods with ARI.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+32 min.

ACTION trigger step to initiate a trip of the East CRD Pump.

BOOTH Enters 20.106.01, CRD Hydraulics System Failure.

SRO Announces pump trip on Hi-Com..

Conducts brief for start of W. CRD Pump per ODE-3.

Directs RO to perform immediate actions of 20.106.01 if necessary.

Responds to alarms 3D5, CRD Charging Header Pressure Low and 3D96 Motor Tripped.

ATC Diagnoses alarms and CRD indications and determines the E.

CRD Pump has tripped reports to CRS.

Directs NO to investigate E. CRD pumps and check W. CRD pump ready for start.

ROLE PLAY NO: When dispatched to E CRD Pump to investigate, after about 5 min, pump not running, motor appears warmer than normal.

Directs NO to pump breaker at 64B-B11.

ROLE PLAY NO: When dispatched to E. CRD Pump Breaker, wait about 5 min, and report Ground Fault (64 device) flag at 64B-B11.

Monitors for accumulator trouble alarm(3D5) and informs CRS when received, and take immediate action 20.106.01 IA.1 Place Reactor Mode switch in SHUTDOWN..

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Trip of East CRD pump. Place Mode S/W in SHUTDOWN per IA 20.106.01 CRD Hydraulic System Failure.

Manual RPS Fails All Rods Stuck - LOW POWER ATWS. ATC will be able to insert rods with ARI.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+32 min.

ROLE PLAY: IF dispatched to install EOP defeats, use the following process:

BOOTH Wait 10 minutes for each ESP.

Initiate the Remote Function for the ESP defeat, if necessary.

THEN call the control room and report, Defeats for 29ESPxx are installed Note: Reports will be from rounds or extra operators not currently assigned to other tasks (default position)

Acknowledges report from RO.

SRO Announces plant event over Hi-Com.

Requests scram reports.

Directs the following from the 29.100.01 SH1A RPV Control -

ATWS FSQ 1-8.

Confirm Isolations and Actuations for Level.

Inhibit ADS.

Acknowledges report from RO of All ROD IN and exits ATWS 29.100.01 SH1A and Enters 29.100.01 SH1 RPV Control. (Crew Update)

Recognizes failure to scram and attempts manual scram push buttons.

ATC Reports failure to scram to CRS.

Provide scram reports to CRS, when requested, based on plant conditions.

Acknowledge direction to perform FSQ 1-8.

Performs FSQ 1-8 using 29.ESP.01 Ecl B and 29.ESP.03 by:

Confirm Rx mode switch in S/D.

Shutdown Reactor Recirc pumps by placing CMCs in OFF/RESET.

Place B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D) SW, in ARMED.

Depress B3100-M031A (B, C, D), Manual Initiate A (B, C, D)

SW, TRIP pushbuttons.

Verify all control rods insert.

Report all control rods in to CRS.

Provide scram reports to CRS, when requested, based on plant conditions.

BOP Acknowledge direction to Confirm Isolations and Actuations for Level and Inhibit ADS.

Verifies Isolations and Actuations for Level and reports completion to CRS.

Places ADS Inhibit SW LOGIC A and ADS Inhibit SW LOGIC B in Inhibit.

Reports to CRS that ADS has been inhibited.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 6 to 7 Page 1 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Small LOCA.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+37 min.

Enters EOP SH 2 PC Control. (Crew Update)

SRO Directs the following from EOPs :

Confirm EECW initiation and isolation.

Restore Cooling to CRD.

Prevent injection from CS and LPCI pumps not required for ACC.

RPV Level band of 173-214 inches.

Responds to 3D81 Primary Containment Pressure High/Low.

ATC Recognizes and reports to CRS rising Drywell Pressure and EOP entry.

Identify HPCI start failure, and manually start and control as follows:

Place E4101-C003, HPCI Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump, in RUN.

Open E4150-F003, HPCI Stm Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.

Open E4150-F059, HPCI Lube Oil Clg Wtr Sply Vlv.

Initiate a start of HPCI System by performing the next two steps in rapid succession:

Place E4101-C005, HPCI Turbine Aux Oil Pump, in RUN, and verify pump starts.

Open E4150-F001, HPCI Turb Stm Supply Iso Valve.

If started following Level 8 isolation depress REACT HIGH H2O LEVEL SIGNAL reset pushbutton.

Open E4150-F006, HPCI Pmp Inbd Disch Iso Valve.

Adjust flow as necessary on E41-K615, HPCI Pump Flow Controller.

Perform or verify complete steps of Section 5.0, Manual Initiation.

Acknowledge direction to Confirm EECW initiation and isolation and restore cooling to CRD.

BOP Confirms EECW initiation and isolation and reports status to CRS.

Places P4400-M004 Div 2 EECW ISO Override SW in Override.

Opens P4400-F604 Div 2 EECW to CRD SPLY ILO VLV.

Reports Cooling restored to CRD to CRS.

Acknowledge RPV Level band of 173-214 inches.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 6 to 7 Page 2 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Small LOCA.

Trip of all condenser pumps, RCIC/HPCI autostart failure, BOP will start an alternate source of feed to maintain level (HPCI/RCIC/SBFW)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+37 min.

Directs the following from EOPs:

SRO Place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling/sprays.

Acknowledge direction to prevent injection from CS and LPCI pumps not required for ACC.

BOP Places CS and/or LPCI pumps in OFF/RESET as directed by CRS.

Identify RCIC start failure, and manually start and control as follows:

Start E5101-C004, RCIC Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump.

Open E5150-F046, RCIC Oil Clr Clg Water Iso Vlv.

Start RCIC System as follows:

Open E5150-F095, RCIC Turb Stm Inlet Byp Vlv.

After approximately 15 seconds, open E5150-F045, RCIC Turb Steam Inlet Vlv.

Open E5150-F013, RCIC Disch To FW Inbd Iso Valve.

Adjust flow as necessary with auto E51-K615, RCIC Discharge Flow Controller.

Perform or verify complete steps of Section 5.4, Manual Initiation.

Inject with SBFW as follows to maintain RPV water level band as necessary:

Start N2103-C003A, West Pump A Aux Lube Oil Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Start N2103-C003B, East Pump B Aux Lube Oil Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Start N2103-C001, West Standby Feedwater Pump A by placing CMC in RUN.

Start N2103-C002, East Standby Feedwater Pump B by placing CMC in RUN.

Verify N2103-F001, SBFW Disch To RPV Iso Valve, automatically opens.

Throttle open N2103-F002, SBFW 6 Disch Flow Ctrl Vlv, until desired flow is achieved.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 6 to 7 Page 3 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Small LOCA.

Trip of all condenser pumps, RCIC/HPCI autostart failure, BOP will start an alternate source of feed to maintain level (HPCI/RCIC/SBFW)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+37 min.

Acknowledge direction to place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling/sprays.

BOP Place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling/sprays per 23.205 Encl A:

Place the Containment Spray Mode Select switch in MANUAL.

Unlock and open E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso Vlv.

Start one RHR Pump(A/B/C/D).

Throttle E1150-F024A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Clg Iso, to desired flow.

When flow is > 6900 gpm, verify E1150-F007A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.

Open E1150-F027A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Spray Iso.

Verify RHR flow increases by approximately 500 gpm.

Start RHR Service Water System per 23.208 Encl B:

Place keylock switch for RHRSW Pumps to MANUAL OVERRD Depress and hold, OPEN pushbutton for E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

5 seconds after observing dual indication, start an RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Release open pushbutton for E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (21) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV when 5400 gpm to 6300 gpm is seen on E11-R602A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Flow Ind.

Start a second RHRSW Pump by placing CMC in RUN.

Fully open E1150-F068A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Serv Wtr Outlet FCV.

Monitor RHRSW:

Direct an operator to place D11-K801A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Service Water Radiation Monitor in operation in accordance with 23.626, Process Liquid Radiation Monitoring.

ROLE PLAY NO: When directed to place RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump in service, acknowledge order. Wait 2 minutes trigger step to start RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump and report actions are complete.

-OR-Notify Chemistry to sample RHRSW IAW, CHS-AUX-12.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions eForm ES-D-2 Scenario No.:SCN #7 Event No.: 6 to 7 Page 4 of 4 Op-Test No.:Fermi 2 ILO 2019-1 Event

Description:

Small LOCA.

Trip of all condenser pumps, RCIC/HPCI autostart failure, BOP will start an alternate source of feed to maintain level (HPCI/RCIC/SBFW)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior T0+37 min.

Start MDCT Fans per 23.208:

BOP Open E1150-F604A/B, Div 1/2 MDCT A Inlet Iso Vlv.

Open E1150-F605A/B, Div 1/2 MDCT C Inlet Iso Vlv.

Close E1150-F603/BA, Div 1/2 RHR MDCTs Byp Vlv.

Direct operator to verify flow out of the continuous drain lines.

Depress and hold E1156-M001(2)(3)(4) MDCT FAN A(B)(D) VIB TRIP BYP PB.

Within 5 seconds, place E1156-C001A(B)(D), Div 1 RHRSW MDCT Fan A(B)(D), in LOW-SPEED.

After MDCT Fan current has stabilized at running current, release E1156-M001(2)(3)(4) MDCT FAN A(B)(D) VIB TRIP BYP PB.

ML19248C637

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