ML19211C651
| ML19211C651 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1979 |
| From: | Lewis M AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140106 | |
| Download: ML19211C651 (11) | |
Text
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- Marvin I. Lewis D N,A 6504 3radford Terrace A 4 s A Ivan W. Smith, Chairman '
Phila. PA 19149 hQ, g',,.
\
Dr. Walter H. Jordan In the matter of Three ', tile Island'T \>'
, Ia\
n Dr. Linda W. Little !
D eket :To 50-289.
Dear Sir and Drs.,
" Motions for correction of the Order shall be filed within 10 days after its service." In light of this Statement on Page 67 of the Board's Order of 12-)S-79, I as filing the following motions,tasis and comments.
Most importantly to me, I appreciate that the Board has used its discretion to allow me to participate albeit in a limited manner. I am flattered by the 3oard's comments on my participation to date.2.58.
Considering that the nuclear fuel cycle will eventually cause the premature deaths of millions of peopic by the :iRC's own admission (Reginald L.
Gotchy in this Docket ,31I#2 on July 5, 1977),and(Letter by Dr Walter H. Jordan stating that the Radon value in Table S-3 was off by an error of 100,000 too low.), and considering1 hat the latest calculations show that the accident at TMI #2 will cause orders of magnitude more deaths than the HEW estimate of .1 death,( Karl %.
- organ at a news Conference in Washington, D.C. organized by Bob Alvarez of the Invironmental Policy Center shortly after the Hew report was published) ,I feel that my efforts will never be enough .
Further , the kind comments by the 3oard concerning my participation do not change my observation that the :iRC does not fulfil its Atomic f Energy Avt mandate to protect the health and safety of the public.
Ilfs observation is shared by the Zemeney Commission .P.20.
"NRC's primary focus in on licensing and insufficient attention has been paid to the ongoing process of assuring nuclear safety."
- Inlightofthe12-$8-79Orderandtheabovefacts,Ipresentthe
, Io11owing motiora to the Board:
Motion 1 I request that the 3oard correct the record by admitting i
my revised contention on fuel rods.
Revised Contention on ?uel Rods:
i ?uel rods failed in BII#2 during the accident on 3/28 Fuel rods will fail at 31I#1 during a similar accident.
Fuel rods have been shown to have deficiencies in a recent court case .
To mitigate a similar accident at DtI#1, fuel rods must meet at least present reguirements.
Although there may be other deficiencies in the fuel rods , I am limiting t my contention to the above specifics.
A 1743 203 soo m etcg a
r 3 My fuel rod contention meets all the very same tests as applied to allow ,
my contention 3 "Bewis Contention." I am restating my fuel rod k contention in similar form to " Lewis Contention" to show more easily I i,
that it meets the same tests. This reworded fuel rod contention clearly meets the testa used by the Board for aceppting the " Lewis Contention."
A. It "is not advanced by any other party."
Although other parties have proposed " reactor coolant pressure boundary " contentions (Steve Sholley Contention #2) and "non-safety ,
related components" (UCS Contention #14), no other party has brought to the fore specific deficiencies related to the fuel rods and fuel i pellets. Further these other parties would have to expand their f contentions in an unforeseen and artificial manner to attack the fuel rod deficiencies in a parallel manner to my approach. Further, the Board and I do not have any authority or financial ability (according to the Staff's statements on intervenor funding by the Board) to help )
these other intervenors investigate fuel problems.
Also Sholley's Contention #2 which refers to GEC 14 is written specifically to include those components from the surface of the fuel rod outward toward the environment.
Aij ,
rumps gap Fuel Water Cladding ;
and .- ---
3oron --
coolant
% s Instruments
- \
n r nment and water.
(Not to scale for reasons of illustration) _
Mr. Sholley's Contention 92 speaks specifically of components and phenomena associated with the arrow going to the right.( Observed pressures, pumps, valves etc.)
My fuel rod contention speaks of components and =aterials associated with the arrow going to the left. (Cladding defects, wrapping etc.) -
UCS Contention #14 might have been expanded to include fuel rod defects, but several obstacles stand in the way of expanding the UCS Contention
- 14 to include fuel rod defects.
(1) UCS may not have the financial capability to expand their area of inquiry.
'1" UCS (2)
Mr. Lewis does not have the financial capability to "l A 3 20 4
~ i. ( ,- , ~z, on expanding their Contention # 14 . Inotherwords, I can't afford to use up hours of expensive phone time in hopes of talking UCS into accBpting this fuel rod contention.
(3) UC3 Contention #14 was originally written also to include similar considerations as Mr Sho11ey's. Inotherwords, UCS dontention #14 and Mr Sho11ey's Contention #2 are both looking at t
components outside the fuel rods as shown by the arrow going 3he right in the illustration above,.
- 44) Most importantly, UCS Contention #14 has been rastricted 'cy the Board to the " core cooling system" only. (Page 23 ,12-13-79 Order.)
Finally, I come to the 3oard's (Chairman Smith's) suggestion of giving my fuel rod contention to the Staff. "ihen Chairman Smith asked me about this in the Prehearing , I feared a' lawyer's trick. " By this, I mean that Chairman doith had ruled 3 times in tha preceedings that I could not bring up a certain point of NRC conduct describing :iRC attitude and epidomizing NRC attitude toward intervenors. I really beleived that if I pointe dout this verbotten NRC attitude , I would be in contempt of the Board's previous rulings. To get around thb dilemma, I answered in as abbreviated a manner as possible. I now expand on some of the many reasons that the Staff - with no reflection on their conpetency- would be severely hampered in the investigation of fuel rod defects.
Also ,
the Board has demonstrated its openness by accepting me as a limited intervenor so that I no longer fear a ' lawyer's trick '
from Chairman Smith.
The reasons that the Staff would be hampered in its investigation of fuel rod defects include (1) NRC attitude- I shall not belabor this point with pages of examples. The Kemeney Commission Report qoute from Fage 1 of this submittal will suffice.
(2) The Staff will have to meet with people who have found out or suspect that (a) the Government supplied confidants, lovers, etc. for the purpose of thwarting legitimate union activity.
(b) the Government was directly or $ndirectly involved 1 c.'ve.":{
up the facts of a death.
(c) The 3RC has a habit'of warning people of conseluences r: n'r
( rhone ;;"verca:Icc than c ting information when it is e"fered.
bet: een :.1, Lewis and Vince S telle :cacerning 3ayca 3riar 'et; r to M. Lewis. Also see entire 'iarble .iill Jacket and I_alA:ivr.e..
t743 205
I do not wish this to sound like I ab impugning the Staff's competence.
Ms Mulkey, Singer, Tipton have all been helpful even before I was accepted as an intervenor. J. Tourtelotte was probably acting under the orders of his superiors in his actions toward me. I also follow orders of my superiors so I hold no grudge against 7. Tourtelotte.
Nonetheless, considering the cirewnstances and background of any fuel rod investigation, government investigation would be at a distinct disadvantage to citizen in,tervenor inquiry.
(3) The Board stated that the Lewis 'ontention was'important.'
"Importance" thereby becomes a testfor acceptance of a contention.
The discussion of the ','importance" of fuel rods to an accident at TMI#2 demonstrates that the fuel rod contention fulfils the test of importance as follows:
Demonstrating that the integrity and design of fus1 rods were important to and accident sequence at IMI#2 is difficult from actual evidence because we still have not opened up TMI#2 and cannot say how the fuel rods were involved. Nonetheless, it is obvious and easy to show the importance of fuel rods in a TMI#2 accident scenario in a general way.
Fuel rods are prime movers in ?EA's and PCMA's( power excursion accidents and power cooling mismatch accidents.)
The next point (or lack of it ) that a minor or major ?EA or ?$MA occurred at TMI#2.
Rep James Weaver (D Or) stated on the floor of Congress that his gommittee's investigation showed to him that nobody could tell what was happening during the accident. ( This.was during the Committee of the Whole discussing amendments to the NRC Authorization 3111.) Now ,
not disregarding the fine work that James SIsaver is doing, I believe that the utility could have observed a significant ?EA of PCMA. ( I am defining a significant PIA or ?CMA as an order of magnitude increase in thermal output.) This still leaves the question or possibility of undBtected - but destructive - FCAA's or ?BA's during the accident where the prime cause of the addition destructiveness is relate.d to the fuel rod defects.
1743 206 .
~ .
5.
The re~Lationship of fuel rods to PEA's and PC.t A's 1.s clearly and graphically sta ei in AEC's National Rep.ctor Testing Station internal report ,PTR 733.
.. , pointed out by James Weaver (D Or), the Board cannot tell so far whether t r.~ r e m a any min o r - bu t destructive - PCMA or PEA which could originate tac.a fuel rod defectaduring the EtIf2 accident.
I requested the ehenical analyses of certain waters at TMIp2 from vatious offices in the SRC on several occasions. Very truthfully, these NRC Occole told me that they did not have said analyses. Although said analyses wculd not have been definitive as to whether a PCMA or P2A did occur , they may have provided a clue.
I, however, have found evidence that the fuel rods were deficient. I wish to present this to the Board, have said evidence answered by the Staff and Licensee , and argue the possibility of fuel rod effects during the adcident. The Board can then decide whether the fuel rod problem is sufficient to continue suspension or require further a,e tion.
In light of this correction above ,
I shall also have to present' evidence that at least a minor PCMA or PEI could have occurred - detected or undetected - during the accident at TMI#2 .
This is not to say that a major PEA or PCMA did not occur nor could not occur during the accident. I am merely pointing out that the thrust of my evidence will be in the area of minor PEA's or PCMA's since could have gone undetected according to the statements of James Weaver recently in Congress.
I have been repeatedly told thatcontentions are analogous to allegations and I should not include evidence in contentions. Unhappily, I must provide some scenario as basis for my fuel rod contention. Since my scenario is similar to scme design basis accidents ( although Class 9 accidents can also be caused by faulty fuel rods (PTR 738)), I do not believe that I am providing new evidence in presenting scenario's closely alignedte (plagirized from ?) Design Basis Accidents in PSAR and PSAR.
I present only 2 possible accident scenario's out of a myriad.
(1) If the fuel rods are slightly warped for any reason, further heating during an accident enough to stop the reinsertion of control rods during a SSEAM related to a IMI accident. Although this could happento well qualified fuel rods, previously damaged or out of specification fuel rods would be even more likely to be damaged. If the worth of the control rod was adequate or if enough control rods were stopped from reinserting, a significant PEA ccu co 7
~
o.
Turther , even a minor 22A or 20.1A would be enough toendanger the health and safety of the public much more greatly in a TMI#2 accident than if no ?IA or ?CMA occurred.
Even more significantly , only the opening of the TMI#2 containment will definitely answer what fuel rod effects payed a part in the accident.
(2) Oue to the heating and other accident regimes , the fuel rods have great damage. Proper fuel rods should have more dimensional stability cver time during an accident. Considering the value of every split second during a TMIY2 accident, every effort must be expended to maximize the integrity of the fuel rods during the accident. We
~
cannot throw away time which is preciously needed to reinsert control rods, start ECCS pumps, and have operators react correctly. Adequate fuel rods should help p ovide a precious split second more time to react in an accident. I= proper, fuel rods ( bent, damaged , improperly manufactured) can be a major contributor to worsening the effects of an accident thru premature failure.
So ends my argument to accept my corrected fuel rod contentinn.
Motion 2. I request the Board to correct the record by admitting my revised contention on Control Room Design.
Revised Cantention on Centri Room Design.
Control room design was a major problem during the TMI#2 accident.
Control Room Design will continue to be a major problem during a similar accident at IMI#1.
To mitigate a similar accident at TMI#1 , control room design must be improved to the point of well known nuclear technology. Existing nuclear technology refers to the article by Carol Wilson in the 3ulletin of Atomic Scientists.
3 asis:
I am restating my control room contention in similar form to the
" Lewis Contettion " to show that it meets somn of the same tests.
My control renacentention meets some - but not all as in the case of my fuel rod contention - of the very same tests whi.ch were ap?hed to accept the " Lewis Contention."
d 1743 208
t.
Now , my control room contention meets the test of "importance" without belaboring why since sinilar contentions have been accepted.
It however does not fully meet the test of exclusiveness, "not advanced by any other party" 2. 59 Of order,12-18-79. As far as exclusiveness, I do wish to point out that I am the snly intervenor so far whoins attempting to show that the Control Room Design does not even meet the criteria used in Atomic suhmarines for decades. In nuclear submarines, one man controls the reactor with all gauges within easy viewing by merely turning his head. Guages are not placed behind instru= ant panels as in the case of CMIy2 (Zemeney Commission Report
?. 11)
"There are some key indicators placed in locations where openators canno t s e e them. "
Che major differences between my fu,el rod contention and the contril room design contention is that A. Other parties do have control room design enntentions. These intervenors might still be willing to accept my particular worry.
- 3. Vihereas in my fuel rod contention the NRC would have to investigate areas where people would be very antagonistic to them, the NRC should be interacting with very pronuclear types who should be very friendly to the NRC when investigating this particular worry about the control room being a poorer design than even decades old nuclear subs.
Therefore, I suggest these several possible reliefs to the Board.
Alternate Motion 2. I request that the Board choode one or more of the following reliefs if the Board refuses Motion 2.
2.a. The Board accepts the original Control Room Design "ontention accepts me to argue it.
2.b. The 3oard directs that the other intervenors investigate my concern about the Control Room Design. This is , of course , a very unfair approach since neither I not the Board have money to provide financial assistance to the other intervenors. .
2.c. The 3 card directs that the Staff calls Carol 7/ilson- or equivalent specialist such as Hyman Rickover - to give expert testimony on the Navy vs the utility approach o Control Roc = Design, and that I be allowed to cross exanine that Staff witness in this additional matter .
1743 209
c.
A "i i' Issue demonstrating NRC's continuinz Policy of keepinc info rmati_on _
from the public until the time is past for Effective ?ublic Participation.-
I have been lucky and resourceful enough to be placed upon the NRC's Cffice of public Affairs "for immediate release" distribution lidt that includes the D.C. and Region 1 offices. These NRC releases have bden helpful and informative; however, they are lacking in timeliness and getting t6 the right people.
- 1. I have attempted to get othersof the anti-nuclear persausion on this distribution list with limited success. '
- 2. She releases of ten arrive post facto or so close to the event that the public cannot possibly schedule participation. I enclose a "i =ediate release" dated 12-19-79 which I received 12-22-79 for a meeting 12-21-79.
Obviously this scheduling eliminated effective public participation and limited the press briefing to the NRC's and the suspended licensee's viewpoints. Ohis is only one example to show this kind of restrictive timing. I shan't burden the record with a litany of such exanples.
Instead I an asking relief in the form of a motion.
".otion3. I request that the 3 card direct that the Office of public Affairs include the intervenors in this Docket 50-289 in the for Immediate release distribution list for all such releases having anf relationship to this docket. I also request that the Board direct that such releases be mailed early enough so that that infor=ation doesn't arrive post facto.
3 asis : Ohe 3 card is not required by rule or law to agree to my motion.
Rowever, fairness dictates that intervenors be as informed as possible concerning NRC actions in this docket.
Please note: I do not specifically accuse the NRC of purposely attempting to limit participation by the public. I only point out that the result of HRC present pclicy is to limit effective public part'.cipation.
6 1743 210
- 9. -
A Final Comment on "inadecuate and dicressive statements of interest. "
2he 3 card may believe that due to the restrictions of the Scope, the 3 card must allow the operation of an nnsafe nuke because the safety violations are autside the Scope. Chis is where my " inadequate and digressive statements " are directed. I am merely trying to show that this proceeding does not exist in a vacuum bounded by the scope of the August 9 order. I have attempted to show in a most inadequate manner that laws and consideratons beyond 32?A and AIA do impact upon these proceedings. I have attempted to show that a decision of the Board may not contradict the body of U.S. ahd International law. My reference to slaves in the Civil War days was to demonstrate how the very same laws today are used to protect blacks as were ignored in Civil War days to allow cruel . , and unusual treatment to be used to enslave blacks. Siciliarly , laws were changed in Nazi Germany for the purpose of enslaving and eliminating minorities. German magistrates found themselves required to enforce unfair and cruel Nazi-inspired laws.
Nonetheless, the Nuremberg Tribunal found that enforcinginhumanf and inhumane law and obeying illegal and inhumane orders was itself a crime. This principle of international law was upheld recently in the conviction of Lt Calley.
Again, I point out these examples to demonstrate to the 3oard my belief that the 3oard has no authority to lift the suspension of an obviously dangerous nuclear power plant no matter what the August 9 Crder states. No order of the Commission can legitimize the breaking of any US or International law or Principle.
Ihe plea,"I did as I was ordered ," is not a defense.
1743 21I
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f""%, UNITED STATES 4
.!. %~6,1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !,!,
I!
'N#0 OFFICE OF PUBLIC' AFFAIRS, REGION I t
s, v 631 Park Avenue, King of Prussia. Pa.19406 i No.: I-79-162 FOR DO!EDIATE RELEASE Karl Abraham 7 December 19, 1979 I,
Contact:
215-337-5330 Tel.:
5000
)gk ,
NOTE FOR EDITORS AND NEWS DIRECTO : /L 2) 77, A review of General Pubi Utilities' and Metropolitan Edison Company's from exposuresprogram to protec7,'
to radiatien. Jillworkers at Three be discussed atMile Island Unit 2 a Nuclear Regulatory Commission R iff4 p hess briefing in Middletown, Pennsyl-vania, on Friday, ecember 21.' It will begin at 11 a.m. in the Liberty Fire Compa r.ingdocm at Adelia and E=aus Streets. }
The results of the review by a special panel, appointed by Harold Denton, Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, will be presented by the panel's chai. an C. B.-
Meinhold of Brookhaven (New York) National Laboratory. He will be accompanied by John Collins, Deputy Director of the NRC's Recovery Operations Office at Three Mile Island. ,
)
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1
t e
I do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy cf the foregoing r f
document on the below listed parties by first-class mailing: }
Ivan W. Smith, Esquire '
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, CC 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jcrdan }
881 West Guter Drive Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Dr. Linda W. Little 5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, NC 27612 George F . Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006 Docketing and Service Section -
U .S . Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Washington, CC 20555
[
Executive Legal Director 'Q,f' ,,, O U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission jW \
Washington, DC 20555 k
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