05000280/LER-2010-001
| Surry Power Station, Unit 1 | |
| Event date: | 05-21-2010 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 07-15-2010 |
| Initial Reporting | |
| 2802010001R00 - NRC Website | |
On May 21, 2010, with Surry Power Station (SPS) Units 1 and 2 at 100% reactor power, a Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) Nuclear Security Officer detected a handgun in the bag of a Dominion SPS employee at the SPS security access control building, which is outside the protected area. The handgun was found to contain a magazine loaded with six rounds of ammunition, but did not have a round of ammunition in the chamber.
Security noted that the employee was cooperative when stopped and unaware that the handgun was in the bag. The employee stated that the day before he had taken the handgun out of his vehicle and placed it in the side pocket of his bag. The employee stated that he packed his lunch for the next day and had forgotten to take the handgun out. The employee was in possession of a valid Virginia Concealed Weapons Permit.
The employee fully cooperated with the investigation of this incident. There was no evidence collected in the investigation to suggest that the employee was untruthful when he stated that his acts on May 21, 2010 were unintentional and without malice.
This event meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, item 1(d), as an attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area. A one-hour report Event Notification# EN45941 was made to the NRC. This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4) for a 60 day follow-up written report.
The format of the items below is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Reporting of Safeguards Events. Because this event does not involve a security system failure or a threat related incident, items 1 through 14 in section 3.2 of Regulatory Guide 5.62 are relevant to this issue and are addressed below:
1.DATE AND TIME OF THE EVENT May 21, 2010 at approximately 0555 EDT.
2. LOCATION OF ACTUAL OR THREATENED EVENT IN A PROTECTED AREA,
MATERIAL ACCESS AREA, CONTROLLED ACCESS AREA, VITAL AREA, OR
OTHER (SPECIFY AREA) The event occurred in the search area of SPS security access control building, which is outside the protected area.
3. THE POWER REACTOR OPERATING PHASE, E.G., SHUT-DOWN, OPERATING At the time of this event, both SPS Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% reactor power.
4. SAFETY SYSTEMS AFFECTED OR THREATENED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
The event did not result in an introduction of contraband into the protected area, and no safety systems were threatened.
5. TYPE OF SECURITY FORCE ON SITE (I.E., PROPRIETARY, CONTRACT) SPS maintains a proprietary security force.
6. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, E.G., EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS, SECURITY, VISITORS, NRC PERSONNEL, OTHER (SPECIFY) Three Dominion SPS employees were involved. One employee with the handgun, and two on-duty Nuclear Security Officers performing searches.
7. METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF INCIDENT, E.G., ROUTINE INSPECTION, TEST,
MAINTENANCE, ALARM, CHANCE, INFORMANT, COMMUNICATED THREAT,
UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES (GIVE DETAILS) The contraband was detected during the routine security inspection process when the employee's bag was processed through the x-ray machine in the security access control building, which is outside the protected area.
8. PROCEDURAL ERRORS INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE
There were no procedural errors identified. The contraband action was a violation of SPS Security policy. The employee failed to comply with the posting at the security checkpoint that cautions personnel against bringing contraband onto company property.
9. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO EVENT
The employee was denied access. The handgun and employee were controlled by Nuclear Security Officers. Nuclear Security Officers completed searches of the bag and person; no additional evidence was found. The employee's protected area access was placed on security hold. A one-hour report Event Notification# EN45941 was made to the NRC.
Nuclear Fitness for Duty (FFD) assessment and testing of the employee were negative.
A security investigation was performed. The employee was in possession of a valid Virginia Concealed Weapons Permit. It was verified with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that the handgun was not a stolen weapon. The employee was interviewed regarding the event. A search of his personal vehicle recovered no evidence. He was informed not to return to the property until contacted by Dominion Management, escorted to his personal vehicle, and observed leaving the property of SPS.
A background investigation with local law enforcement indicated no issues of concern related to the employee in the May 21, 2010 event.
Interviews performed with two levels of supervision of the employee, with a Human Resources (HR) representative, and review of HR files for related work place concerns identified no problems.
An interview with a Nuclear FFD and Access Programs representative identified no concerns with the employee's Nuclear FFD or Nuclear Access clearance issues prior to the May 21, 2010 incident.
There was no evidence collected in the investigation to suggest that the employee was involved in any work place concerns regarding violence, threats, or intended harm to himself, any other Dominion employee, or to Dominion as a corporation.
A cause evaluation was performed which determined the cause of this incident was a human error, with a cause category of self-checking less than adequate.
10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED
The personal performance human error incident has been addressed through the Dominion disciplinary process.
Supervision reiterated, with station personnel at SPS, the event that happened and to not repeat the event. The station Human Performance Event-Free Day Clock was reset, station personnel at SPS were notified of the reason for the reset, and other Dominion nuclear sites were notified.
11.LOCAL, STATE, OR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONTACTED Local and federal law enforcement agencies were contacted in the Security Investigation.
12.DESCRIPTION OF MEDIA INTEREST AND PRESS RELEASE No press release was made, and no media interest was identified.
13. INDICATION OF PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
On March 10, 2001, an employee attempted to introduce four .50 caliber casings with primers in his lunch box into the protected area, but was stopped by Nuclear Security Officers during the routine inspection process when the employee's lunch box was processed through the x-ray machine in the security access control building, which is outside the protected area.
14.KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACT Trace J. Niemi, SPS Licensing, telephone 757-365-2848.