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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML18152B3371999-09-24024 September 1999 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Plan Request for Relief SR-026 for Surry Power Station Unit 2 ML18152B3631999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Eddy Current Techniques Used by VEPCO to Determine Depth of Degradation Evident in Units SG Tubing & VEPCO Approach for Dispositioning Tubes with Avb Wear Indications ML18152B3831999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section XI Requirements for Containment Insp ML18152B3841999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section Xa Requirements for Containment Insp ML20196J4781999-07-0101 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 221 & 221 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20195D3571999-06-0707 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 220 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18152B6481999-04-14014 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief Requests IWE-2,4.5.6 & IWL-2 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 Respectively ML18152B6451999-04-13013 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Methodology for Surry Power Stations,Units 1 & 2 & North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2 Subject to Listed Limitations ML20207L8081999-03-12012 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 219 & 219 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML18152B5381999-02-16016 February 1999 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief for Surry Power Station,Unit 1.Staff Concludes That Licensee Proposed Alternative Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Technical Ltr Rept Also Encl ML18152B5861998-12-18018 December 1998 SER Approving Request Relief Related to Inservice Testing Program at Surry Power Station Unit 1 ML18152B5901998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request to Use Code Case N-577 as Alternative to Requirements of ASME Code Section XI for Surry Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198F9221998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 217 & 217 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20151U7261998-09-0303 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Certain 10CFR20 Requirements Re Use of self-contained Breathing Apparatus with Enriched Oxygen in Subatmospheric Containments at SPS ML20237E9721998-08-26026 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 216 & 216 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20236R2111998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Request for Revised Exemption from 10CFR70.24(a) for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20249B8191998-06-19019 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 215 & 215 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20249B8261998-06-19019 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 214 & 214 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20248M0911998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 213 & 213 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18152B8011998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Plan Request for Relief SR-19 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 ML18152B7881998-04-28028 April 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Code Requirements - Deferral of Repair to RHR Sys Piping ML18153A3011998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Assessment of Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity ML20217P9941998-04-0707 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Third 10-yr Inservice Insp Program Relief Requests SR-018 - Sr-024 ML18153A3841997-12-0303 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Structural Integrity & Operability Assessments ML20202B8751997-11-24024 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for Exemption from Section III.G.2.f of App R to 10CFR50.Staff Concluded That Use of Combustible Radiant Energy Heat Shields Inside Containment at Surry & North Anna Unacceptable ML18153A4011997-11-24024 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Perform Visual Exam of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts in Lieu of Surface Exam ML18153A4471997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Relief from Implementation of 10CFR50.55a Requirements for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2 & North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217P0951997-08-21021 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee ,As Suppl by 970324 Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR70.24(a) Re Criticality Monitors as Pertaining to Unirradiated Fuel & Other Forms of Special Nuclear Matls ML20149D8361997-07-15015 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 211 & 211 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A1271997-04-11011 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Third 10-yr ISI Interval Requests for Relief Sr-14 - SR-17 for Plant,Unit 2 ML18153A0511996-08-30030 August 1996 SE Granting Third 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan Requests for Relief SR-009 Through SR-017,subj to Requirement for Relief Request SR-014 ML20117M4281996-06-0707 June 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 210 & 210 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML20108B3661996-04-29029 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 209 & 209 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20107K0081996-04-18018 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 208 & 208 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A6091996-04-16016 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Third 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan Requests for Relief to Use Code Cases N-522 & N-535 at Plant,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20099M0071995-12-28028 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 207 & 207 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A5631995-12-19019 December 1995 SER Recommending That Relief Requests SR-22 Through SR-26, Be Granted,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML18153A5541995-12-13013 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Accepting Change to Emergency Plan Augmentation Goals of Selected Responders from 30 Minutes to 45 Minutes for Plant ML20092G7381995-09-14014 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 205 & 205 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML20092A3131995-09-0101 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML18153A7511995-08-30030 August 1995 Safety Evaluation Granting Third 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan,Rev 0 & Associated Requests for Relief ML20087B5731995-08-0303 August 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 203 & 203 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20087A1791995-07-27027 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 202 & 202 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A7261995-07-19019 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Re Third 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Update & Associated Requests for Relief ML18153A7101995-07-19019 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Granting Requests for Relief RR-2,RR-6, RR-7,RR-8,RR-11,SR-002,SR-003,SR-004 & SR-006 ML20086J7611995-07-11011 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 201 & 201 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A6951995-07-0606 July 1995 SER Denying Proposed Revisions to Decrease Effectiveness of Currently Approved Emergency Plan for Each Site ML20086E3221995-06-29029 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 200 & 200 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A8511995-06-0808 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Granting Third Interval Inservice Insp Program Relief Requests from ASME Code Section XI for Plant, Unit 1 & 2 ML20091R3121995-05-31031 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 199 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively 1999-09-24
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18152A2811999-10-12012 October 1999 Technical Basis for Elimination of Nozzle Inner Radius Insps (for Nozzles Other than Reactor Vessel),Technical Basis for ASME Section XI Code Case N-619 05000281/LER-1999-004-02, :on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed1999-10-0101 October 1999
- on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed
ML18152B3531999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B3371999-09-24024 September 1999 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Plan Request for Relief SR-026 for Surry Power Station Unit 2 ML18152B6651999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 05000280/LER-1999-006, :on 990802,determined That Plant Was Outside of App R Design Basis Due to Fire Barrier Deficiencies. Caused by Original Plant Design Deficiencies.Fire Watches Were Established & Mods Have Been Completed.With1999-08-27027 August 1999
- on 990802,determined That Plant Was Outside of App R Design Basis Due to Fire Barrier Deficiencies. Caused by Original Plant Design Deficiencies.Fire Watches Were Established & Mods Have Been Completed.With
05000280/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990731,effluent Radiation Monitors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Degraded Heat Trace Circuits for Monitors Sample Suction Line.Degraded Heat Trace Circuit Was Replaced & Addl Heat Trace Is Being Installed1999-08-27027 August 1999
- on 990731,effluent Radiation Monitors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Degraded Heat Trace Circuits for Monitors Sample Suction Line.Degraded Heat Trace Circuit Was Replaced & Addl Heat Trace Is Being Installed
ML18152B3841999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section Xa Requirements for Containment Insp ML18152B3631999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Eddy Current Techniques Used by VEPCO to Determine Depth of Degradation Evident in Units SG Tubing & VEPCO Approach for Dispositioning Tubes with Avb Wear Indications ML18152B3831999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request from ASME Section XI Requirements for Containment Insp 05000280/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990714,TS Violation Due to non-safety Related Fans Effect on CR Boundary Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Cable Spreading Room Doors Were Operned to Reduce Pressure in Rooms1999-08-13013 August 1999
- on 990714,TS Violation Due to non-safety Related Fans Effect on CR Boundary Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Cable Spreading Room Doors Were Operned to Reduce Pressure in Rooms
ML18151A3981999-08-13013 August 1999 SPS Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept for 1999 Refueling Outage ML18152B3791999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000281/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990705,auto Reactor Trip on Low Coolant Flow,Occurred.Caused by Loop Stop Valve Failure.Approved RCE Recommendations,Designed to Prevent Recurrence of Similar Event Will Be Implemented Through CAP1999-07-30030 July 1999
- on 990705,auto Reactor Trip on Low Coolant Flow,Occurred.Caused by Loop Stop Valve Failure.Approved RCE Recommendations,Designed to Prevent Recurrence of Similar Event Will Be Implemented Through CAP
ML20196J4781999-07-0101 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 221 & 221 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18152B3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195D3571999-06-0707 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 220 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML20195E2401999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 2 to COLR for SPS Unit 2 Cycle 16 Pattern Ag ML18152B4341999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000281/LER-1999-002-02, :on 990425,MSSVs Tested Out of Tolerance for as Found Setpoint.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.No Immediate Action Required.Deviation Rept Submitted for Each Valve.With1999-05-18018 May 1999
- on 990425,MSSVs Tested Out of Tolerance for as Found Setpoint.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.No Immediate Action Required.Deviation Rept Submitted for Each Valve.With
ML18152B4161999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 05000280/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990331,potential Loss of Charging Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Main CR Fire.Station Deviation Was Issued on 990331.With1999-04-28028 April 1999
- on 990331,potential Loss of Charging Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Main CR Fire.Station Deviation Was Issued on 990331.With
ML18152B6481999-04-14014 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief Requests IWE-2,4.5.6 & IWL-2 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 Respectively ML18152B6451999-04-13013 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Methodology for Surry Power Stations,Units 1 & 2 & North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2 Subject to Listed Limitations 05000281/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990301,RPS Relay Not Placed in Trip Resulted in Violation of TS 3.7.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance.Developed New Procedure to Provide More Explicit Instructions for Placing Stop Valve in Relay Trip1999-03-31031 March 1999
- on 990301,RPS Relay Not Placed in Trip Resulted in Violation of TS 3.7.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance.Developed New Procedure to Provide More Explicit Instructions for Placing Stop Valve in Relay Trip
ML18152B6511999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2 05000280/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990301,prematurely Released Fire Watches Resulted in Violation of TS 3.21.B.7.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedure for Opening & Sealing Fire Stops Was Revised on 9902121999-03-29029 March 1999
- on 990301,prematurely Released Fire Watches Resulted in Violation of TS 3.21.B.7.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedure for Opening & Sealing Fire Stops Was Revised on 990212
05000280/LER-1998-013, :on 981122,turbine/reactor Tripped on High Due to Short Circuit in Summator for MSL C Loop Channel III Flow Transmitter.Replaced 1-MS-FT1494 Summator & Module Repair Procedure Revised.With 9903190 Ltr1999-03-19019 March 1999
- on 981122,turbine/reactor Tripped on High Due to Short Circuit in Summator for MSL C Loop Channel III Flow Transmitter.Replaced 1-MS-FT1494 Summator & Module Repair Procedure Revised.With 9903190 Ltr
ML20207L8081999-03-12012 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 219 & 219 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37 ML18152B7331999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B5381999-02-16016 February 1999 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief for Surry Power Station,Unit 1.Staff Concludes That Licensee Proposed Alternative Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Technical Ltr Rept Also Encl ML18152B5421999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18151A3031999-01-29029 January 1999 ISI Summary Rept for 1998 Refueling Outage,Including Form NIS-1, Owners Rept for ISIs & Form NIS-2, Owners Rept for Repairs & Replacements 05000280/LER-1999-001, :on 981222,auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Support Missed Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Deviation Rept Was Submitted.Two Supports in Question Received Required Code Insp & Were Found Acceptable1999-01-21021 January 1999
- on 981222,auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Support Missed Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Deviation Rept Was Submitted.Two Supports in Question Received Required Code Insp & Were Found Acceptable
ML18152B6011998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B5861998-12-18018 December 1998 SER Approving Request Relief Related to Inservice Testing Program at Surry Power Station Unit 1 ML20198F9221998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 217 & 217 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively 05000280/LER-1998-014, :on 981126,manual Reactor Trip in Response to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure Occurred.Caused by Dislocation of Retaining Clip in Positioner.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition1998-12-16016 December 1998
- on 981126,manual Reactor Trip in Response to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure Occurred.Caused by Dislocation of Retaining Clip in Positioner.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition
ML18152B5901998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request to Use Code Case N-577 as Alternative to Requirements of ASME Code Section XI for Surry Power Station,Unit 1 ML18152B7121998-12-0404 December 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 981105,noted Failure to Deactivate Station Access Badge.Caused by Human Error.Licensee Will Now Deactivate Station Badges Before Clearance Is Revoked & Process for Badge Deactivations Have Been Strengthened 05000280/LER-1998-012, :on 981102,noted That EDGs Were Concurrently Inoperable.Caused by Required Testing Per TS 3.16.B.1.a.2. Redundant EDG Was Returned to Svc within Two Hour Period, Following Satisfactory Testing.With1998-12-0101 December 1998
- on 981102,noted That EDGs Were Concurrently Inoperable.Caused by Required Testing Per TS 3.16.B.1.a.2. Redundant EDG Was Returned to Svc within Two Hour Period, Following Satisfactory Testing.With
ML18152B7081998-11-30030 November 1998 Rev 0 to COLR for Surry 1 Cycle 16,Pattern Un ML18152B5721998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B6241998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B6881998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With ML20151U7261998-09-0303 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Certain 10CFR20 Requirements Re Use of self-contained Breathing Apparatus with Enriched Oxygen in Subatmospheric Containments at SPS ML18153A3271998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20237E9721998-08-26026 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 216 & 216 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively ML18153A3161998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2 05000280/LER-1998-010, :on 980715,low Intake Canal Level Instrument Channel I Was Declared Inoperable to Allow Testing of Intake Canal Level Probe 1-CW-LE-102.Subject Probe Was Cleaned by Diver,Tested & Channel I Was Returned to Operable Status1998-07-31031 July 1998
- on 980715,low Intake Canal Level Instrument Channel I Was Declared Inoperable to Allow Testing of Intake Canal Level Probe 1-CW-LE-102.Subject Probe Was Cleaned by Diver,Tested & Channel I Was Returned to Operable Status
1999-09-30
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e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555--0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-280
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (1 O CFR) Section 50.55a, requires that inservice testing (1ST) of certain American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves be performed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code),Section XI and applicable addenda, except where alternatives have been authorized or relief has been requested by the licensee and granted by the Commission pursuant to Section (a)(3)(i), Section (a)(3)(ii), or Section (f)(6)(i) of 1 O CFR 50.55a. In proposing alternatives or requesting relief, the licensee must demonstrate that: (1) the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable level of quality and safety; (2) compliance would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety; or (3) conformance is impractical for its facility. Guidance related to the development and implementation of 1ST programs is given in Generic Letter (GL) 89-04, "Guidance on Developing Acceptable lnservice Testing Programs," issued April 3, 1989, and its Supplement 1 issued April 4, 1995. Additional guidance can be found in NUREG-1482, "Guidelines for lnservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-6396, "Examples, Clarifications, and Guidance on Preparing Requests for Relief from Pump and Valve lnservice Testing Requirements," and "Summary of Public Workshops Held in NRC Regions on Inspection Procedure 73756, 'lnservice Testing of Pumps and Valves,' and Answers to Panel Questions on lnservice Testing Issues."
The 1989 Edition of the ASME Code is the latest edition incorporated by reference in Paragraph (b) of Section 50.55a. Subsection IWP of ttw 1989 Edition, which gives the requirements for 1ST of pumps, refere*nces Part 6 of the American National Standards lnstitute/ASME Operations and Maintenance Standards (OM-6) as the rules for 1ST of pumps.
OM-6 replaces specific requirements in previous editions of Section XI, Subsection IWP of the ASME Code.
9812280258 981218 PDR ADOCK 05000280 p
PDR Enclosure
2.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated October 19, 1993, Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee),
submitted the third 10-year interval 1ST program for Surry Power Station. Relief Request P-11, as contained in the licensee's October 19, 1993, 1ST program submittal, proposed to test the emergency service water (ESW) pumps within the tide level limits of a pump reference curve.
The staff evaluated the relief requests contained in the licensee's revised 1ST Program and issued a safety evaluation (SE) on October 20, 1994. For Relief Request P-11, the staff granted interim relief pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.55a(f)(6)(i) for one year or until the next refueling outage, whichever is later [see Technical Evaluation Report Section 2.3.1 and 1ST Program anomaly 5]. Prior to making its third interval 1ST program submittal (i.e., on June 29, 1993), the licensee had submitted Relief Request P-11. This version of P-11 was similar to the version contained in the 1ST program submittal except the earlier version was written against ASME Section XI, Subarticle IWP-3110. The NRC staff reviewed and approved the earlier version of P-11 in an. SE dated October 22, 1993. By letter dated October 12, 1995, the licensee responded to the 1ST program anomalies identified in the staff's October 20, 1994, SE, including anomaly number 5 related to P-11. By letter dated February 12, 1996, the NRC staff informed the licensee that continued use of P-11 was acceptable and that the staff's approval of P-11 was no longer considered "interim."
The Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, 1ST program for the third 10-year interval began on May 10, 1994. The Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, 1ST program was developed to the 1989 Edition of ASME Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The 1989 edition of the Code specifies that the rules for the inservice testing of pumps and valves are stated in the ASME/ANSI Operations and Maintenance (OM) Standards, Part 6, "lnservice Testing of Pumps in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants," and Part 10, "lnservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants."
3.0 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM REVISED RELIEF REQUEST P-11 Relief Request P-11 pertains to the three ESW pumps for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 (17SW-P-1A, 1-SW-P-1B, and 1-SW-P-1C). These standby pumps are deep draft vertical line shaft pumps. The licensee has revised Relief Request P-11 to obtain relief from the hydraulic acceptance criteria for flow rate specified in Table 3b of OM-6. Table 3b establishes the acceptable range (0.95 to 1.1 O times the reference flow rate Qr), the alert range (0.93 to
< 0.95 Qr), and the required action range ( < 0.93. Qr and > 1.10 Qr). The ESW pumps provide the source of water to the intake canal during the design basis accident. In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a total loss of station power, with the requirement that the unit that did not undergo the LOCA must be cooled down, the maximum flow rate required would be 21,000 gpm. This would require two of the three ESW pumps to be operated.
As discussed in Section 2.0 above, the licensee previously obtained, for this current 10-year interval, relief from the requirements of Paragraph 4.3 of OM-6, which requires reference values to be at points of operation readily duplicated during subsequent tests where subsequent test results are compared to these reference values. For this reason, this particular aspect of Relief Request P-11 is not reevaluated in this SE.
e 3.1 Licensee's Basis for Request The licensee provided the following basis for the relief request:
)
Basis for Relief from Paragraph 4.3 [provided in this SE for background only]
The emergency service water pumps take suction from the James River and discharge into the intake canal. The James River near the plant is subject to a tide level variation of approximately five feet. Therefore, the total static head for the system can vary from test to test. There are no valves in the lines to throttle flow and to compensate for the change in system static head. The only way to duplicate flow and differential pressure from test to test is to perform the test at the same tide level each time. Trying to perform this test within a small enough tide level range to produce repeatable results has proven impractical. To compensate for the change in total system head, a pump reference curve will be prepared based on test results taken at different tide levels. Tests will be conducted within the tide level limits of the curve, and results will be compared to acceptance criteria based on the reference curve and the ranges given in OM Part 6, Table 3b. Inlet pressure will be calculated from tide level.
Basis for Relief from Table 3b [discussed in this SE]
The emergency service water pumps are standby pumps that are only operated during periodic tests. The pumps operate at adjusted speeds from 880 to 900 RPM and are driven by diesel engines. The suction bells containing the impellers for these pumps are submerged in the James River to a depth of approximately 9.8 feet. The brackish water of the James River provides a favorable environment for the growth of biological organisms. Between tests, organisms such as hydroids and barnacles attach to the inside of the suction bell and the pump impeller. As these organisms grow the hydraulic performance of the pumps degrades. The period of greatest growth occurs from mid-summer through early fall. During other portions of the year, biological growth does not cause significant degradation.
Surry Power Station has aggressively addressed this problem by coating the inside of the suction bells with antifouling material, by testing the pumps each month and by cleaning the suction bells and impellers when performance is projected to degrade to unacceptable levels before the next monthly test. Divers using specialized equipment clean the inside of the suction bells, the impellers and portions of the diffuser. This cleaning process restores the pumps to almost peak hydraulic performance levels.
In the past, the pumps have been completely removed for cleaning. However, frequent removal of the pumps is not practical because installation and realignment is a difficult and complex evolution. The suction bay has also been drained to allow cleaning of the pumps. This process involved construction of scaffolding, and removal of the suction bell and impeller. Also, any work that is being performed on the pump suction makes the circulating water pump sharing
l...
e the suction bay with the emergency service water pump unavailable. Draining the suction bay and removal of the pump takes several days. During certain summer periods, all eight circulating water pumps are needed to maintain both units at 100% electric power.
Currently, if the flow rate falls into the alert range of (0.93 to < 0.95 Qr) a trend of
- the degradation rate is performed to determine if the performance will decrease to ( < 0.93 Qr) before the next monthly test. If so, the divers are called in to clean the suction bell and impeller at a cost of approximately $4,000 per pump.
Experience has shown that when fouling occurs and the pumps degrade to the minimum acceptable limit there is still substantial margin between the minimum acceptable flow rate of 0.93 Qr and the design basis flow rate of.14,020.
Changing the acceptable range to (0.93 to 1.1 O Qr), the alert range to (0.90 to
<0.93 Qr), and the required action range to (< 0.90 Qr and> 1.10 Qr) for the monthly test would eliminate the need for at least one cleaning per pump during the high growth period, while maintaining adequate margin between pump performance and the design basis flow rate.
Given that 1) the mechanism of degradation is understood and can be trended,
- 2) the pumps are t~sted monthly as opposed to the Code required frequency of every three months, and 3) adequate performance margin exists, Surry Power Station believes that changing the acceptance criteria as described above will provide a sufficient level of safety while reducing the burden of maintaining the emergency service water pumps.
3.2 Proposed Alternate Testing The licensee proposed the following:
Tests will be conducted every month within the tide level limits of the pump reference curve, and flow will be compared to acceptance criteria based on the
- reference curve and the ranges given below. For flow rates that fall into the alert range, the test data will be trended and corrective action taken if the trend evaluation determines that the flow will fall below the required action range before the next monthly test.
OM-6, Table 3b (vertical line shaft pumps)
Proposed in P-11 for the three Emergency Service Water Pum s 3.3 Evaluation Flow Rate (Q)
Acceptable Range
- 0. 95 to 1.1 0 Q r 0.93 to 1.10 Qr Alert Range 0.93 to <0.95 Qr 0.90 to <0.93 Qr Required Action Range
<0.93 Qr
>1.10 Qr
<0.90 Qr
>1.10 Qr The licensee stated that the primary hydraulic degradation mechanism for the ESW.pumps is the growth of biological organisms such as hydroids and barnacles which occurs at a significant rate from mid-summer through early fall. The expanded acceptance criteria will reduce the burden of maintaining the pumps by reducing the frequency of cleaning the pump suction bells and impellers during the period of high biological growth. To justify the expanded acceptance criteria, Surry Power Station has proposed an alternative which involves: 1) testing the pumps monthly, and 2) taking corrective action if the measured flow rate falls into the alert range and if the trend evaluation determines that the flow will fall below the required action range before the next monthly test.
Surry Power Station has attempted to address this problem by coating the inside of the suction bells with antifouling material, by testing the pumps each month, and by cleaning the suction-bells and impellers when performance is projected to degrade to unacceptable levels before the next monthly test. The licensee stated that divers use specialized equipment to clean the inside of the suction bells, the impellers and portions of the diffuser. The licensee stated that this cleaning process restores the pumps to almost peak hydraulic performance levels.
The licensee's experience has shown that when fouling occurs and the pumps degrade to the minimum acceptable limit, the.re is still substantial margin between the minimum acceptable flow rate of 0.93 Qr and the design basis *flow rate. The reference flow rate for one ESW pump is approximately 17,000 gpm (0.93 X 17,000 gpm = 15,810 gpm). According to the licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), in the event of a LOCA and a total loss of station power, with the requirement that the unit that did not undergo the LOCA must be cooled down, the maximum flow rate required would be 21,000 gpm. This would require two of the three ESW pumps to be operated. Even with each of two ESW pumps degraded to 0.90 Qr (15,300 gpm) there would be more than sufficient flow to meet this criteria.
From a risk perspective, testing the ESW pumps monthly as opposed to quarterly will reduce the fault exposure time and common mode failure probability associated with the ESW pumps and thus will tend to reduce overall plant risk. This reduced plant risk is potentially offset by the reduced hydraulic margin associated with lowering the flow rate required action acceptance criteria from 0.93 Qr to 0.90 Qr*
I e The flow rate acceptance criteria in the ASME Code of record for the licensee's second 10-year 1ST interval (Table IWP-3100-2) specified an acceptable range (0.94 to 1.02 times the reference flow rate Qr), an alert range (0.90 to < 0.94 Qr and 1.02 to 1.03 Qr), and a required action range (< 0.90 Qr and> 1.03 Q J When the revised OM Code was published, the "low
alert range for flow rate measurements of vertical line shaft pumps was made more stringent (0.93 to 0.95 Q J The licensee's third (current) 10-year interval 1ST program uses the more stringent flow rate acceptance criteria. As stated in NUREG/CP-0111 (page 43-44), more stringent hydraulic acceptance criteria are necessary for these pumps because there am inherent deficiencies in vibration testing vertical line shaft pumps and degradation will be identified sooner through changes in hydraulic parameters. The pump performance information obtained by testing the ESW pumps monthly (as proposed by the licensee) will be much more beneficial than using more stringent flow rate acceptance criteria to evaluate a quarterly test in terms of assuring that the ESW pumps will be capable of performing their design basis function when required. Therefore, the alternative proposed by the licensee will provide reasonable assurance of operational readiness.
Because the licensee did not request relief from the requirements of Section 6.1 of OM-6, the licensee is required to comply with these Code requirements (i.e., using the revised test frequency and hydraulic acceptance criteria approved by this SE).
The proposal will reduce the burden of maintaining the pumps by reducing the frequency of cleaning the pump suction bells and impellers during the period of high biological growth. This involves securing the ESW pump and circulating water pump in the shared suction bay, tagging both pumps out, and sending a diver into the bay to scrape off the hydroids and barnacles. The licensee estimates that the proposal would eliminate the need for at least one cleaning per pump during the high growth period. During certain summer periods, when all eight circulating water pumps are needed to maintain both units at 100 percent electric power, it would be a hardship to clean the ESW pumps.
The staff finds that the licensee's proposed test strategy for the ESW pumps will provide reasonable assurance of the operational readiness of the ESW pumps to perform their intended.
safety function when required because: 1) the licensee has taken reasonable steps to correct the root cause of the flow degradation such as coating the inside of _the suction bells with antifouling material; 2) the flow degradation mechanism is understood and can be trended;
- 3) the pumps will be tested monthly as opposed to quarterly as required by the Code; 4) when ESW pump flow is found to be in the alert range, the test data will be trended and corrective action taken if the trend evaluation determines that the.flow will fall below the required action range before the next monthly test; and 5) adequate system performance margins will be maintained.
3.4 Conclusion In light of the reasonable assurance provided by the alternative testing and expanded acceptance criteria, the proposed alternative is authorized pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii) based on the determination that compliance with the specified requirements results in a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Principal Contributor: D. Fischer Date:
December 18, 1998