ML17348A563

Proposed Tech Specs Allowing Removal of Existing Resistance Temp Detector Bypass Manifold Sys

ML17348A563
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/13/1990
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17348A562	List: ML17348A561 ML17348A563 ML17348A564 ML20059K918
References
L-90-68A, NUDOCS 9009250085
Download: ML17348A563 (40)

Text

L-90-68 ATTACHMENT3 Proposed Technical Specification Revisions RTD Bypass Replacement 9009250085 9005'13 PDR AGOCK 05000250 P PDC

TABLE 1

'ECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION UNIT PAG NUMBER MODIFICATION JUSTIFICATION Overtemperature bT Remove Note 12 Elimination of RTD Table 4.3.-1, Pages 3/4 'ypass Lines.

3-8 and 3/4 3-12 Reactor Coolant Flow Added an allowable Application of W Low Page 2-4 value of 88.7% Setpoint Methodology.

-'etpoint Tables 2.2-1 Added bases for using Application of W and 3.3-3 and Bases the 5 column setpoint Setpoint Methodology.

2-2.1, 3/4-3.1, 3/4-3.2 format and provided Pages 2-3, 2-4, B2-3 values for functions 3/4 3-13, 3/4 3-23, 3/4 implemented in the 3-25, 3/43-27, B3/4 3-1, digital process system.

and B3/4 3-2, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9 and 2-10 Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 Changed analog channel WCAP 10271 and pages 3/4 3-8, 3/4 3-29, operational test subsequent W 3/4 3-32, 3/4 3-34. surveillance test evaluation for interval to quarterly. digital process control equipment..

Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-2, Changed Surveillance WCAP 10271 and pages 3/4 3-2,. 3/4 3-7, testing. subsequent W 3/4 3-15, 3/4 3-18, evaluation for 3/4 3-22 digital process control equipments Pressurizer Water Addition of Allowable Appl i cat i on o f W Level High, page 2-4 Value, 92.2% Setpoint Methodology.

Overtemperature hT RTD Response time Elimination of RTD page 2-7 constants. bypass lines.

Overtemperature bT 'educed Delta I W Safety Evaluation page 2-8 to 1.5, added allowable SECL 89-1164, and value of 1.5%. W Setpoint Methodology.

Overpower hT Removed Delta I W Safety Evaluation page 2-10 Gain, added allowable SECL 89-1164, and value of 1.4%. W Setpoint Methodology.

Overpower bT Removed Delta I W Safety Evaluation page B 2-5 Gain from bases. SECL 89-1164.

Tavg-LOW Revised trip setpoint Application of W pages 3/4 3-23, 25 to 543 F and added Setpoint Methodology.

and 27. an allowable value of 542.5 F.

PG 10F SL DEFINITIONS THERMAL POWER 1.31 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to reactor coolant.

TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST 1.32 A TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of operating the Trip Actuating Device and verifying OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the Trig. Actuating Device such that it actuates at the required setpoint within the required accuracy.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.33 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIEO LEAKAGE or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.

UNRESTRICTED AREA 1.34 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY access to which is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.35 A VENT'ILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal adsorbers 'and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulates from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment. Such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents. Engineered Safety Features Atmospheric Cleanup Systems are not considered to be VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.

VENTING 1.36 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not pro-vided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.

G TA ANN 1.37 A OIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock, and/or trip functions.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 4 1-6 AMENDMENT NOS. l37AND 132

SAFETY LIMITS ANP LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUtlENTATION SETPOINTS 2.2. 1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2->.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

setpoint valu

.I ~B With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column within permissible calibration tolerance.

but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint I

less conservative than own in the All wabl Va col n of Table 2.2-1, 8ii.her:

1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Tab1e 2.2.1 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel or t

2. Oeclare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION state-ment requireeent of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERASLE status with its setpoint a+usted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

EgUATIN 2.2-1 I+R+S<TA where:

I The value for colum Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channe1.

R The "as aeasured'alue (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, S Either the 'as seasured'alue (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value of Coluan S (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and TA The value froa Column TA (Total Allowance in  % of span) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.

- 2-3 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND l32 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 f. 4

TABLE 2.2-1 REACTOR lRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SFTPOINTS UNCT IONAL UNIT IILt.oHANCECTA) TRIP SI TPOINT ALLOWABLE YALUE II I. Manual Reactor Trip u.A: km. 41. N. A. N. A.

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux

a. High Setpoint <l09~~ of RTP"" <f ]X of RTP""

b. Low Setpoint <25K of RTP"" <I. ]X of RTP""

3. Intermediate Range, <25X of RlP"" ]X of RTP*"

Neutron flux Source Range, Neutron Flux <IOs cps x 10s cps

]

5. Over'temperature hT .V.2 See Note 1 ~ SEE Note. '2

6. Overpower hT ~ 5'5 See Note 3 SEE Note 4

7. Pressurizer Pressure-Low >1&35 ps i g >[ ] psig

&. Pressuri zer Pressure-High <2385 psig psig

9. Pressurizer Mater level-High <92K of instrument p n ~92>2$, of instrument span

10. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low >90K of loop >88.7 lo of loop des ign f low" Resign flow" ll. Steam Generator Mater >15K of narrow range >[ ]X of narrow range instrument Level Low-Low instrument span span oop design f ow = 89,500 gpm

• "RTP = RATEO THERMAL POWER

fhBLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACIOR iRIP SYSIEH INSTRUMENTAIION TRlP SEIPOINTS m

c) FUNCTIONAL UNI I ALLMMCELTll TRIP SETPOINT ALLOMASLE VALUE f I

12. Steam/Feedwater Hisaatch Coincident With Flow cj c3 C3 Feed Flow

<O.64 x IOe below steam ib/hr flow Feed Flow g[ ] x 10"'b/hr below steam flow Steam Generator Mater Leve l-Low

>15% of narrow p[ ]X of narrow range instrument range instrument span span

13. Undervoltage - 4.16 Busses A and 8 kV cz I3 c> >2496 volts-each bus

>[ ] volts-each bus

14. Underfrequency - Trip of Reactor E3 I 1 c1 >56.1 Hz >[ ] Hz Coolant Pump Breaker(s) Open

15. Turbine Trip

a. Auto Stop Oil Pressure C. 3 cj cl >45 psig ] psig MA. MA. M-A.

b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure-Fully Closed Fully Closed """

16. Safety Injection Input H.A. M A. Q.h.

N.A.

froa ESF

17. Reactor Trip System m Interlocks

a. Interaediate Range Cl E3 10-'o Neutron Flux, P-6

>1 x amp >[ ] amp LIo>t sw>tch Is set when Turbine Stop Valves are fully closed.

fhBLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REAClOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP Sl IPOINTS m

I UNCT IONAL b.

UNIT Low Power Reactor Trips

~WMtYE(TA) j S IRIP SEIPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE N.

Block, P-7

1) P-10 input E 3 < IQQ o f RIP++ c[ ]g o f Rl p*<

Turbine First Stage C 1 E'3 <10% Turbine Power c[ ]X turbine Power 2)

Pressure

c. Power Range Neutron E] C3 <45K of RFP*" c[ ]X of RIP*"

Flux, P-8

d. Power Range Neutron t3 t3 >10K of RTP"" >[ ]X of RTP""

Flux, P-10

18. Reactor Coolant Pump N.A. N. A.

Breaker Position Trip V

19. Reactor Trip Breakers N.A. N.A.

20. Automatic Trip and Interlock N. A.

Logic m

C7 C)

C/l CsJ ID

""RlP = RATED .THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS NO E I:

~{+'Y S

/+ v>s OVERTNPERATURE

(

1iyS3

) (

~r 6T o

{K -

~

K

~

-~

(1 ~lgS)

'[T (

1+7 S

)

- ('] > K (P - P') - (~(EI)}

Where: hT Measured h,I by RID Instrumentation I t7i S LEAD/ Lag compensator on measured hf; >i =8/> +2. = 3 S l ~ AS

{  :- { e, coH{e)({s((ToRo.){jPIEA5{){'EP hT) G=Dpg.

{~ Yzg Indicated hf at RATED TNERMAL I'OWE.R K) l. 095; Kp 0 0107/ F I+~~G The function generated by the lead-Iag compensator for I avg I+ YsS :I dynamic compensation; 7j.) Y5 2 3 Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T , ry = 25s, 3 s) avg'erage temperature, F; Lag compensator on measured T  ; W(' Og avg'i e const nt uti ized the m asure Taa lag comp nsa or,

+ RTO espon tim = 2.'5s; g 574.2'F (Nominal I at RATED THERHAL POWER);

0.000453/psig; Pressurizer pressure, psig;

lAOLE 2.2-1 (Cont.inued)

IAOLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

Dl NOTE 1: (Continued)

CD pl 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure);

Laplace transform operator, s->;

and f<(hl) is a function of the indicated tlifference between top and bot,tom detectors of t.he power- ange neutron ion chambers; wit,h gains to be select.ed based on measured inst,rument response during plant startup tests s<<ch t.hat:

(1) For - - 14K and + 10K, hl) = 0, where qt and are percent.

q t qbb between 0> q RATEO THERHAL POWER in the top and bottom halves o he core respectively, and qt +

qb is total THERHAL POWER in percent of RATEO THERHAL POWER;

( 2) be automatically reduced by ~

For each percent that the magnitude of q

).6 o of its

- q value at exceeds - 14X, the dT Trip Setpoint shall RATEO THERHAL POWER; and (3) For each percent that the magna ude of q - qb exceeds < lOX, the 4T Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced b . of its value at RATED THERHAL POWER.

1-5 Io NOTE 2:

PE EHANI/ELS AIAX(Mush 'TRiP EETFbiN7 5HAlL WTEXCPE~/y~

m CD m

&4~~ 5ETFbIN7 BJj NloRE THAN /5% gP ggga~~~~~~

CD E/l 4)

CD

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) fABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) pc m

CD N 1E 3: OVERPOWER hT l+ TT.S -

,AT T - K [T T ] - f (AT))

7G Where: bT As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1,

l. 09, Ks 0.02/'F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, 7~ S The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T dynamic compensation, Time constants utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T avg's

, ~l = 10 s, defined in Note 1, 7 CD 1+~S m

As defined in Note 1, CD C/T, 1'4p CD

TABLE 2. 2-1 Continued I

TABLE NOTATIONS Continued '

NOTE 3: (Continued)

Ke 0.00068/ F for T > T" and Ke = 0 for T < T",

T As defined in Note l,

~ A Indicated Tavg at RATEO.THERMAL PNKR (Calibration teaperature for AT Lab instruaentation, < 574.24F),

As defined in Note f,(al)

NOTE I:

~PE <h, one.l's dNfI87NN +ri 0 GETPZIS?

m g p07 Ea 7ZiP SE 7/8/iU 7 Bv NDZ 7ÃAAJ " ~<><<~m ~T ~r~nr

!nser7 m

CD m gus a<~ ZucurWCZ<rc>, >,q< 1 CD N If no alienable valuetis specified as indicated by f ], the trip shall also be the alliable value. C g+Po>H Col CD

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS PG, Jb BASES

2. 2. 1. REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal va lues at which the Reactor trips are set for each functional unit. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the. consequences of ~J accidents.

The setpoint for a reactor trip system or interlock function is considere to "as measured" setpoin adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the 5p's within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

SLWP04l tsp the instrument drift that y occur between operational

>>ll To accommodate tests and the accuracy to which setpoints be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip S

=Table 2.2-1. Operatio with>

b

'ess oints have been specif' conservative than the table since in an p.l.

i~r,; .

this error

~E al 1 owance has been made in the safety analysi s to accommodate no va1Ue i 1 ~ I I included for determining the For some functions, an optional provision has been is to exceed the Allowable OPERABILITY of a channel when its trip utilizes the "as measured" deviation from setpoint found

)Value. The methodology of this option in conjunction th ifi d calibration point for rack and sensor components in calibrating the

( with a statistical combination of the other uncertaintiesinteractive effects of

+ R + S < TA, the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, 1and the "as measured" values of the errors .

the errors in the rack and the sensor, in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, is the i

are considered. Z, as specified the analysis excluding those statistical summation of errors assumed in drift and the accuracyspan, of their measurement.

associated with the sensor and rack difference, in percent between the trip Total Allowance is the Rack Error TA or setpoint and the value used in the analysis for reactor trip. R orchannel from span, for the affected "as measured" is the "as measured" deviation, S inorpercent Sensor Drift is either the the specified trip setpoint. its calibration point or the value specified in deviation of the sensor from from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation Table 2.2-1, in percent span, an increased rack drift factor, and 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, provides a threshol value for R ORTABL VENT~S The methodoloay to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an allowance for instrument uncertaVnties. Inherent to the determination of the Trip other Setpoints instru-and are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. to b Sensors of operating mentation utilized in these channels are ' expected within a11 m Qu~ ~

,Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that F

this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack indicative or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

132

- UNITS 4 B 2-3 AMENDMENT NQ5,137ANp TURKEY POINT 3 8c

2 2 LIMITING SAFETY SY TEM SETTINGS P& ll BASES

2. 2. 1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS C (tA$ luR~4 0~~ pl'~&0<~ p<)~

% 2-0 The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a preset or calculated level. In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variables, therefore providing Trip System functional diversity. The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for ~hich no direct credit was assumed in the safety analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated. This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

Manual Reactor Tri The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 8 2-3(Conk'~)

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Power Ran e, Neutron Flux In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting. The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during subcritical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power excursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power operations for all power levels to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion which may be too rapid for the temperature and pressure protective trips.

The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10~ of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.

Intermediate and Source Ran e Neutron Flux The Intermediate and Source Range, Neutron Flux trips provide core protection during reactor startup to mitigate the consequences of an uncon-trolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical condition. These trips provide redundant protection to the Low Setpoint trip of the Power Range, Neutron Flux channels. The Source Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at about 10s counts per second unless manually blocked when P-6 becomes active. The Intermediate Range channels wi 11 initiate a Reactor trip at a current level equivalent to approximately 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless manually blocked when P-10 becomes active. No credit is taken for operation of the trips associated with either the Intermediate or Source Range Channels in the accident analyses; however, their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required by this specification to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

Qvertem erature dT The Overtemperature dT trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure. power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with res ect to ipin transit delays from the core to the temperature detectors and pressure is within the range between the Pressurizer Hig and Low Pressure trips. The setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water and includes dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, (2) pressurizer pressure, and (3) .axial power distribu-tion. With normal axial power distribution, this Reactor trip limit is always below the core Safety Limit as shown in Figure 2. 1-1. If axial peaks are greater than design, as indicated by the difference between top and bottom nuclear detectors, the Reactor tri is automati power range ac r e t's in Table .2-1 1 reduced pfL&G

~ExT' TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 4 B 2-4 AMENDMENT NOS 137 AND 132

PGc l3 I

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM ETTINGS BASES Over ower DT The Overpower DT trip prevents power density anywhere in the core from exceeding 11BX of the design power density. This provides assur ance of fuel integrity (e.g., no fuel pellet melting and less than IX cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for Over-temperature bT trip, and provides a,backup to the High Neutron Flux trip. The setpoint is automatically varied with; (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat ' capacity of water, (2) rate of change of temperature for dynamic com n a in e rom the core to the loop temperature detector to ensure that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) 1s not excee e .

Pressurizer Pressure In each of the pressurizer pressure channels, there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting to provide for a High and Low Pressure trip thus limiting the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted.

The Low Setpoint trip protects against low pressure which could lead to DNB by tripping the reactor in the event of a loss of reactor coolant pressure.

On decreasing power the Low Setpoint trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER with turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7,.

The High Setpoint trip functions in conjunction with the pressurizer safety valves to protect the Reactor Coolant System against system overpressure.

Pressurizer Water Level The Pressurizer Water Level-High trip is provided to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves. On decreasing power the Pressurizer High Water Level trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, auto-matically reinstated by P-7.

Reactor Coolant Flow The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low trip provides core protection to prevent DNB by mitigating the consequences of a loss of flow resulting from the loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.

On increasing power above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K TURKEY PQINT - UNITS 3 8 4 B 2-5 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132

TABLE 3.3-1 a7 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRINENTATION m,

HINIHUH TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE NODES ACTION

1. Hanual Reactor Trip 1, 2 3* 4A 5A C/l

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux

a. High Setpoint 1, 2

b. Low Setpoint 1¹¹, 2

3. Interaediate Range, Neutron Flux 1¹¹, 2

4. Source Range, Neutron Flux

a. Startup 2¹

b. Shutdown"" 3,4,5 3k 4* 5*

c. Shutdown

5. Overteaperature hT 1, 2

6. Overpower 4T 1, 2

7. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7)

8. Pressurizer Pressure High 1, 2

9. Pressurizer Mater Level High W )3 (Above P-7)

10. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low

a. Single Loop (Above P-8) 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 1

b. Two Loops (Above P-7 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop. 1 and below P-8)

TABLE 3. 3-1 Continued ACTION STATEMENTS Continued ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY within 6 hours.

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provided the inoperable channe1 is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour. For subsequent required DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass status for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 EE 4 ~

3/4 3-7 AMENPHENT NOS 137AND 132

TABLE 4.3"1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING HODES FOR CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS RE UIRED

1. Hanual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. N.A.'(11) N.A. 3A 4* 5*

2. Power'ange, Neutron Flux

a. High Setpoint S D(2, 4), N N.A. N.A. 1, 2 N(3,'),'(4, 6),

R(4)

b. Low Setpoint R(4) N.A. N.A. 1*RA

3. Interaediate R(4) S/U(l),H N.A. N.A. PA*

Flux Range,'eutron

4. Source Range, Neutron Flux S R(4) S/U(1),H(9) N.A. N.A. PA 3 4 5

5. Overteiperature 4T S ~RPRf ~Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2

6. Overpower hT N.A. N.A. 1, 2

7. Pressurizer Pressure Low S N.A. N.A.

8. Pressurizer Pressure High S N.A. N.A. 1, 2

9. Pressurizer Water Level"-High S N.A. N.A.

10. Reactor Coolant Flow Low S N.A. N.A.

ll. Steam Generator Water Level-- S N.A. N.A. 1, 2 Low-Low

PC, l7 TABLE 4. 3-1 Continued TABLE NOTATIONS Nuit USED.

(12 (13) Remote manual undervoltage trip when breaker placed in service.

(14) Interlock Logic Test shall consist of verifying that the interlock is in its required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(15) Automatic undervoltage trip.

132 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-12 AMEHPHENT NOS 137AND

PC IS INSTRUHENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3. 3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.

ACTION:

a. Mith an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Tab e 3.3-3 ad ust the Set oint consistent with the Trip Setpoint wi~~in permissible calibration tolerance.

b. Nth an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown the All le Value column

%3 Ei 7HBR':

. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-3 and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply thechannel applicable ACTION state-ment requirements of Table 3.3-2 until the is restored to OPERABLE status with its setpoint a<Ousted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

EgUAT10N 2.2-1 Z + R + S < TA where:

Z The value for colum Z of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel.

R The 'as measured'alue (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, S Either the 'as measured'alue (in percent span)ofofTable the sensor 3.3-3 error, or the value of Colum S (Sensor Error) for the affected channel, and

% of span) of TA The value froa Colum TA (Total Allowance in Ta le 3.3-3 for the affected channel

c. Nth an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-2.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS

4. 3.2. 1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

- 137AND 132 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 8L 4 3/4 3-13 AHENDHENT NOS

TABLE 3.3-2 Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUNENTATION NININN TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE NODES ACTION

f. Steaa Line Flow High 2/steaa line 1/steaa line I/steaa line 1, 2, 3~ 15 Coincident with: in any two in any two steaa lines steaa lines Steaa Generator Pressure"-Low 1/steaa 1/steaa line I/steaa 1, 2, 3~ 15 generator in any two generator steaa lines in any two steaa lines T or Low 1/loop 1/loop in any 1/loop in any 1, 2, 3* 25 avg two loops two loops

2. Containaent Spray

a. Autoaatic Actuation 1,2,3,4 14 Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Containaent Pressure-- 1, 2, 3 15 High-High Coincident with:

Containaent Pressure--

High 1, 2, 3 15

3. Containaent Isolation

a. Phase "A" Isolation

1) Hanual Initiation 2 1, 2, 3, 4 17

2) Autoaatic Actuation 2 1, 2, 3, 4 14 Logic and Actuation Relays

TABLE 3.3-2 Continued C:

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION yc m

TOTAL NO. CHANNELS

'INIMUMCHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE HODES ACTION

4. Steam Line Isolation-(Continued)

I Cil d. Steam Line Flow High 2/steam line 1/steam li'ne '/steam line 1, 2, 3 15 Coincident with:

Steam Generator Pressure Low 1/steam 1/steal 1/steatI 1,2,3 15 generator generator generator in any two in any two steam lines steam lines or T Low 1/loop 1/loop in any two 1/loop in any two 1, 2, 3 loops loops

5. Feedwater isolation

a. Automatic Actua- 1, 2 22 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Safety-Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.

m C7

6. Auxiliary Feedwater¹¹¹

a. Automatic Actua- 20 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

TABLE 3. 3-2 Continued TABLE NOTATION (Continued)

ACTION 18- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 19- With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specifica-tion 3.0.3.

ACTION 20- With the number of OPERABLE channels 'one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within. the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2. 1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 21- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the associated valve inoper,-

able and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7. 1.5.

ACTION 22- With thenumber of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2. 1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 23- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 24- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> isolate the control room Emergency Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode.

ACTION 25- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour. For subsequent required DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass status for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

POINT

\'URKEY

- UNITS 3 EE 4 3/4 3-22 AMENOMENT NOS. 137ANO 132

~ TABLE 3.3-3

'NGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM

~ ALLOWANCE TA) Z S'RIP 3ETPOINT ALLOWABLE VaLUEg .

FUNCTIONAL UNIT

l. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Turoine Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Contro1 Rooa Isolation, Start Oiesel Generators, Containaent Cooling Fans, Containaent Filter Fans, Start Sequencer, Corrrponent Cooling Water, Start Auxiliary Feedwater and Intake Cooling Water)

Initiation hl.A. N.A N.A. H.A.

a. Manual Autorsatic Actuation Logic N.A Q.A. HA. H.A. H.A.

c. Containlent Pressure-High C3 f3 <<psig ] psig

d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low r. j fg >XnS psig >[ ] psig High Oifferential Pressure 8etwien the Steaa Line fQ 'BO psi <[ ] psi Header and any Steaa Line.

f. Steaa Line Flow-High f 3 <A as function defined follows: A bp ~

f corresponding to 0.64 g Soe lbs/hr at CK load increa-ing linearly to a bp corresponding to 3.84 x 10 lbs/hr at full load.

Coincident with: >600 psig ] psig Steaa Generator Pressure-Lov >s42. 5 "F or >~4@'F T -LoBB 4-.0 2.O 10

2. Contai~nt Spray et&. BJ4- N. A M.A.

a. Autoiatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Containaent Pressure-High. f.3 <30.0 psig <( ] psig .

High Coincident with:

] psig Containaent Pressure-High f3 <6.0 psig <[

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 '/4 3-23 NENOHENT NOS. 13>AND 132

%ABLE 3.3-3 (Cantfdued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTBl U N TRIP AL Okl N TA) 3 SETPOINT ALLt3'ABLE VALUEA FUNCTIONAL UNIT

3. Containlent Isolation a.. Phase "A" Isolation

1) Hanual Initiation H.A. bl.A NA- H.A. N. A.

2) Autolatic Actuation Logic H.A 0.A. N.A. N.A.

and Actuation Relays

3) Safety In)ection SE.E ZTEM I See Itea 1 above for all Safety Infection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

b. Phase "O'solati.on

1) Nanual Initiation N.A. P.A N.A N. A H.A.

2) Autoaatic Actuation Logic <.A. H.A N.A. N.A.

and Actuation Relays

3) Contai~nt Pressure- C 3 C. Q e30.0 psig c[ ] psig High-High Coincident with:

Contaireont Pressure-High c6.0 psig <[ ] psi9

c. Contaimont Vent)lation Isolation

1) Contaireent Isolation QA. N.A. N.A.

Nanual Phase A or Phase b

2) Autoaatic Actuation Logic NA. QA. NA. N.A. N.A.

and Actuation Relays

3) Safety Iniection SEE ET' See Itee l. above for all Safet'I Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

4) Contaitaent Radio- Particulate (R-D) [ ]

activity High (1) c6.1 x 10s CPN Gaseous (R-12)

See (2)

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-24 ANENPNENT NOS. 137AND132

AELE 3.3-3 (Continued)

~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM

'TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT A h/A E TA SET>>OINT Atto"AE"E "At"E>>

4. Steaa Line Isolation

a. Hanual Initiation H.A. N.A d.k K.A. K.A

b. Autoeatic Actuation Logic Q.A gA K.A. K.A.

and Actuation Relays

c. Containeent Pressure-High- c30.0 psig c[ ] psig High Coincident with:

Containment Pressure-High c6.0 psig c[ ] psig

f. Staae Line Flow-High cA function defined f 3 as follows: A hp corresponding to 0.64 x 10e lbslhr at CX load increa-ing linearly to a hp corresponding to 3.84 x 10e lbs/hr at full loa4.

Coincident with: 3600 psig } psig Steaa Line Pressur e-Low or T -Low H.o Z.o i.o v

5. Feedwater Isolation

a. Autoeatic Actuation Logic AA. hl.A H.A. N.A. K.A.

and Actuation Relays Itee l. above for all Safety

b. Safety In5ection 5EE ITEM 2 See Ingection Trip Setpoints and Allowabl ~ Values.

6. Auxiliary F~ter (3) instrument

a. Autoaat)C Actuet)on Logic HA. N.A. N.A.

and Actuation Relays

b. Steaa Generator Level Low Low

'%ter ca t3 @gal range of narrow instant

>t',

range

]X of narrow span+ spano ci Safety In5ect ion See Item l. above for all Safety Infection Trip Setpoints and Al towable Values.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-25 ANENDNENT NOS,137 AND 132

BLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM UMN N FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLDLIAQCE (TA' j TRIP gETppygT ALLOWABLE VALUES

6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)

d. Bus Stripping See Item 7. below for all Bus Stripping Setpoints and Allowable Values.

A. k. A.

e. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pump Breakers.

7. Loss of Power

k. A.

Clll'tsI'.

H. A.

a. 4.16 kV Busses A and B (Loss of Voltage)

b. 480V Load Centers (Instantaneous Relays)

Degraded Voltage LMd 3A C3 U 436VRSV (10 sec i 1 sec delay) f 3B t:3tH 416VRSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay) [ ]

3C t'HEl 417VRSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay) [ ]

3D E3C3 42BVjSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay) [ ]

4A 415Vi5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay) [ ]

4B 414Vg5y (10 sec t1 sec delay) [

4C 4pgVg5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay) [ ]

4D 403Vg5V (10 sec t1 sec delay) [ ]

C Coincident with: See Item 1. above for all Safety Safety Injection and Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

N.A, k. A.

Diesel Generator Breaker Open 132 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8L 4 3/4 3-26 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMEN ATION TRIP S POIN 5 TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALlOhJAAJCE (7W Z SETPOINT .ALLOWABLE VALUE/

7. Loss of Power (Continued)

c. 480V Load Centers (Inverse Time Relays)

Degraded Voltage C

Load Center 3A t:3 419 ViSV(60 sec 130 sec delay)

[ 7 3B t: j 426Vt5V(60 sec a30 sec delay)

[ ]

3C 427e5V(60 sec f30 [ 3 sec delay) 30 C 3 436Vi5V(60 sec i30 [ 3 sec delay)

L-2 L 427Vi5V(60 sec i30 [ 3 sec delay) 4B C3 C 3 i 3 424Va5V(60 sec x30 [ 3 sec delay) 4C 4l3VR5V(60 sec X30 [ ]

sec delay) 4D 412V>5V(60 sec 130 [ 3 sec delay)

Coincident with:

Oiesel Generator Breaker Open M. A M.R N.A. N.A.

8. Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks

a. Pressuriter Pressure E.

'3 C. 3 t: 3 <2000 ps i g <[ 1 psig

b. T --Low +.0 2.0 '1.0

9. Control v 'I Room Ventilation

) 543 F ) &25'F Isolation

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays , N.A. M,h hl.g N. A. N.A,

b. Safety Injection so~ r~cM< See Item l. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Al 1 owab1 e Values.

- AMENGHENT NOS.137 ANO 132 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 3-27

LE 3.3-3 (Contfnued)

~

~

ENGINEEREQ SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM

'TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT SETPOINT ALLIABLE VALUES

9. Contr ol Rooa Isolation (Continued)

c. Containment Radioactivity- Particulate (R-11) [

Mfgh (1) <6.1 x 10s CPM gaseous (R-12)

See (2)

'd. Containment Isolation N.A. N.A.

Manual Phase A or Phase B

e. Air Intake Radiation Level) < 2 aR/hr 2.83 mR/hr TABLE NOTATIONS (1) Either the particulate or gaseous channel in the OPERABLE status will satisfy this LCO.

Containment Gaseous Monitor Setpoint ~

' x 3.2 10'2)

CPM,

( F )

Vhere F -"

Actual Pur e Flow Oesign Purge Flow (35,000 CFM)

Setpoint may vary according to current plant conditions provided that the release rate does not exceed allowable lfafts provided in Specification 3.11.2.1.

(3) Auxiliary feedwater aanual fnftfatfon fs included fn Specification 3.7.1.2.

usa'.r >

ALLOgAnlCE CTA) f gR g SIf no allowable value fs specfffed so indicated by [ 3, the trip setpoint shall also be the allowable value.

AL<oeAHCE C TA)

C3. NsEk/

A@DUE M.A. M.A M.A.

E 3 C.

'3 C '3 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 '/4 3-28 AMENQMENT NOS 137 ANO 132

TABLE 4.3"2 ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING HODES CHANNEL OEV ICE FOR MHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CALIBRATION TEST TEST 1E t ~RE 'HECK

1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, Feed-water Isolation, Control Rooa Ventilation Isolation, Start Oiesel Generators, Containment Phase A Isola-tion (except Hanual SI),

Containment Cooling Fans, Containment Filter Fans, Start Sequencer, Ceaponent Cooling Mater, Start Auxiliary Feedwater and Intake Cooling Mater)

a. Hanual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A., 1, 2, 3

b. Automatic <Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. H(1) ~

1, 2, 3(3)

Logic and Actuation Relays

c. Containment Pressure N.A. R N.A. N.A. H(1) 1, 2, 3 High

d. Pressurizer Pressure S H(5) N.A. . N.A. 1, 2, 3(3)

Low

e. High Oifferential R" H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3)

Pressure Between the Steam Line Header and.

any Steam Line Steam Line Flow High H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3)

Coincident with:

Steam Generator Pressure Low H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3) or T --Low N. A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3) avg Q(5)

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

C

ÃI 7C ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CTl SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL OEVICE FOR WHICH C CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST CA

4. Steaa Line Isolation (Continued)

c. Containoent Pressure N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 High-High Coincident with:

Containaent Pressure N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 High

d. Steaa Line Flow High S(3) M(5) N.A. N'. 1,2,3 Coincident with:

Steaa Generator Pressure Low S(3) H(5) N.A. N.A. 1,2,3 or T Low S(3) N.A. N.A. 1,2,3 Q(5)

5. Feedwater Isolation

a. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2 Logic and Actuation C7 Relays m

b. Safety Injection See Itea l. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

Cl Vl 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (2)

Erd

a. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N. A. 1, 2, 3 Logic and Actuation ED Relays

b. Steam Generator N.A. N. A. 1,2,3 Water Level Low-Low

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING HOOES CHANNEL DEVICE FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE C: FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST 7 REIE 1 Vi 8. - Engineering Safety 4k Features Actuation Qe System Interlocks

a. Pressurizer Pressure N.A. H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3)

b. T Low N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3(3)

9. Control Room Ventilation Qa)

Isolation

a. Autoaatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. NcA.

Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

c. Containment S R H N.A. N.A. (4)

Radioactivity High

d. Containment Isolation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4 Hanual Phase A or Hanual Phase B m e. Control Roo Air N.A. N.A. Al 1 Intake Radiation Level m

TABLE NOTATIONS Cl (1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

CA O~ (2) Auxiliary feedwater manual initiation is included in Specification 3.7.1.2.

Col (3) The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entering Hode 3, provided that the applicable surveillances are coILpleted within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> froa entering Hode 3:

C7 (4) Applicable in HODES 1, 2, 3, 4 or during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

(5) Test of alarm function not required when alarm locked in.

NAt least once per 18 months each Actuation Logic Test shall include energization of each relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay.

3/S.3 IRSTRULsEHTATIG PL 31 BASES 3/4.3. 1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip wi 11 be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is main-tained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance (due to plant specific design, pulling fuses and using jumpers may be used to place channels in trip), and (4) fufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements speci-fied for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveil-lance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Under some pressure and temperature conditions, certain surveillances for Safety Injection cannot be performed because of the system design. Allowance to change modes is provided under these conditions as long as the surveillances are completed within specified time requirements.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Tri Setpoints specified in Table 3. 3-3 ar 'nomin 1 al a which the ~w-are set for each functionyl unit.

The setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

o accommodate the instrument drift that may occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3. Opera-tion with Setpoints less conservative tgy~ Trip Setpoint but ith'n~

i ILtahlMsince an allowance has been ma e in e safety:

analysis to accosssodate this error no vefuue s TTsae '~>n he owahle column, lie e q. n va ua is t imitinq settl.ngi TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 CL 4 8 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132

fG 32 3/4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3. 1 and 3/4.3 2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES For some functions, an optional provision has been included for determining of a channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable the'PERABILITY Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, Z + R + S < TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the."as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.

TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint. S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an al1owance for instrument uncertainties. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel, uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumenta-tion utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncerta'fnty magnitudes.

Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected p1ant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.

If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combina-tions indicative of various accidents events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 B 3/4 3-1 P5 2.))

CO)V TIMUR'O