Text

Proposed Tech Specs Allowing Removal of Existing Resistance Temp Detector Bypass Manifold Sys
	ML17348A563
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/13/1990
From:	; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
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ML17348A562	List: ML17348A561; ML17348A563; ML17348A564; ML20059K918;
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	L-90-68A, NUDOCS 9009250085
	Download: ML17348A563 (40)
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L-90-68 ATTACHMENT3 Proposed Technical Specification Revisions RTD Bypass Replacement 9009250085 9005'13 PDR AGOCK 05000250 P

PDC

TABLE 1

'ECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION UNIT PAG NUMBER Overtemperature bT Table 4.3.-1, Pages 3/4 3-8 and 3/4 3-12 Reactor Coolant Flow Low Page 2-4

-'etpoint Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-3 and Bases 2-2.1, 3/4-3.1, 3/4-3.2 Pages 2-3, 2-4, B2-3 3/4 3-13, 3/4 3-23, 3/4 3-25, 3/43-27, B3/4 3-1, and B3/4 3-2, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9 and 2-10 Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 pages 3/4 3-8, 3/4 3-29, 3/4 3-32, 3/4 3-34.

Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-2, pages 3/4 3-2,. 3/4 3-7, 3/4 3-15, 3/4 3-18, 3/4 3-22 Pressurizer Water Level High, page 2-4 Overtemperature hT page 2-7 Overtemperature bT page 2-8 Overpower hT page 2-10 Overpower bT page B 2-5 Tavg-LOW pages 3/4 3-23, 25 and 27.

MODIFICATION Remove Note 12 Added an allowable value of 88.7%

Added bases for using the 5 column setpoint format and provided values for functions implemented in the digital process system.

Changed analog channel operational test surveillance test interval to quarterly.

Changed Surveillance testing.

Addition of Allowable

Value, 92.2%

RTD Response time constants.

'educed Delta I to 1.5, added allowable value of 1.5%.

Removed Delta I

Gain, added allowable value of 1.4%.

Removed Delta I

Gain from bases.

Revised trip setpoint to 543 F and added an allowable value of 542.5 F.

JUSTIFICATION Elimination of RTD

'ypass Lines.

Application of W

Setpoint Methodology.

Application of W

Setpoint Methodology.

WCAP 10271 and subsequent W

evaluation for digital process control equipment..

WCAP 10271 and subsequent W

evaluation for digital process control equipments Appl icat i on of W

Setpoint Methodology.

Elimination of RTD bypass lines.

W Safety Evaluation SECL 89-1164, and W Setpoint Methodology.

W Safety Evaluation SECL 89-1164.

Application of W

Setpoint Methodology.

PG 10F SL DEFINITIONS THERMAL POWER 1.31 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to reactor coolant.

TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST 1.32 A TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of operating the Trip Actuating Device and verifying OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions.

The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the Trig. Actuating Device such that it actuates at the required setpoint within the required accuracy.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.33 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIEO LEAKAGE or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.

UNRESTRICTED AREA 1.34 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY access to which is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.35 A VENT'ILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal adsorbers

'and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulates from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment.

Such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents.

Engineered Safety Features Atmospheric Cleanup Systems are not considered to be VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.

VENTING 1.36 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature,

pressure, humidity, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not pro-vided or required during VENTING.

Vent, used in system

names, does not imply a

VENTING process.

G TA ANN 1.37 A OIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock, and/or trip functions.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8

4 1-6 AMENDMENT NOS. l37AND 132

SAFETY LIMITS ANP LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUtlENTATION SETPOINTS 2.2. 1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2->.

APPLICABILITY:

As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value

.I ~B I

setpoint valu within permissible calibration tolerance.

With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than own in the All wabl Va col n of Table 2.2-1, 8ii.her:

1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Tab1e 2.2.1 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel or t

2. Oeclare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION state-ment requireeent of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERASLE status with its setpoint a+usted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

EgUATIN 2.2-1 I+R+S<TA where:

I The value for colum Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channe1.

R The "as aeasured'alue (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, S

Either the 'as seasured'alue (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value of Coluan S (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and TA The value froa Column TA (Total Allowance in % of span) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 f. 4 2-3 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND l32

TABLE 2.2-1 REACTOR lRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SFTPOINTS UNCT IONAL UNIT I.

Manual Reactor Trip 2.

Power Range, Neutron Flux a.

High Setpoint b.

Low Setpoint 3.

Intermediate

Range, Neutron flux IILt.oHANCECTA) u.A:

km.

41.

TRIP SI TPOINT N. A.

<l09~~ of RTP""

<25K of RTP""

<25X of RlP""

ALLOWABLE YALUE II N. A.

<f

. ]X of RTP""

<I.

]X of RTP""

]X of RTP*"

Source

Range, Neutron Flux 5.

Over'temperature hT 6.

Overpower hT 7.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low Pressuri zer Pressure-High 10.

Reactor Coolant Flow-Low ll. Steam Generator Mater Level Low-Low 9.

Pressurizer Mater level-High

.V.2

~ 5'5

<IOs cps See Note 1

See Note 3

>1&35 ps ig

<2385 psig

<92K of instrument

>90K of loop des ign flow"

>15K of narrow range instrument span

] x 10s cps

~

SEE Note. '2 SEE Note 4

>[

] psig psig p n ~92>2$, of instrument span

>88.7 lo of loop Resign flow"

>[

]X of narrow range instrument span oop design f ow = 89,500 gpm

"RTP =

RATEO THERMAL POWER

m fhBLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACIOR iRIP SYSIEH INSTRUMENTAIION TRlP SEIPOINTS c)

FUNCTIONAL UNII 12.

Steam/Feedwater Flow I

Hisaatch Coincident With Steam Generator Mater Leve l-Low ALLMMCELTll cj c3 C3 TRIP SETPOINT Feed Flow

<O.64 x IOe ib/hr below steam flow

>15% of narrow range instrument span ALLOMASLE VALUE f Feed Flow g[

] x 10"'b/hr below steam flow p[

]X of narrow range instrument span 13.

Undervoltage - 4.16 kV Busses A and 8 14.

Underfrequency - Trip of Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker(s)

Open 15.

Turbine Trip cz I3 c>

E3 I 1 c1

>2496 volts-each bus

>56.1 Hz

>[

] volts-each bus

>[

] Hz m

a.

Auto Stop Oil Pressure b.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure-16.

Safety Injection Input froa ESF 17.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks a.

Interaediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 C. 3 MA.

H.A.

cj cl MA.

M-A.

M A.

Q.h.

Cl E3

>45 psig Fully Closed

>1 x 10-'o amp

] psig Fully Closed """

N.A.

>[

] amp LIo>t sw>tch Is set when Turbine Stop Valves are fully closed.

fhBLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REAClOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP Sl IPOINTS m

I UNCT IONAL UNIT b.

Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 1)

P-10 input 2)

Turbine First Stage Pressure c.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 d.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10

~WMtYE(TA) j S

E 3 C

1 E'3 E]

C3 t3 t3 IRIP SEIPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE N.

<45K of RFP*"

c[

]X of RIP*"

>10K of RTP""

>[

]X of RTP""

< IQQ o f RIP++

c[

]g o f Rl p*<

<10% Turbine Power c[

]X turbine Power 18.

19.

Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip V

Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.

N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

20.

Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic N. A.

m C7 C)

C/l CsJ ID

""RlP = RATED.THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS NO E I:

OVERTNPERATURE ~r

~{+'YS

/+ v>s

(

) ( 6T

{K K -~ '[T (

) - (']

K (P - P') - (~(EI)}

1iyS o

~

~ (1 ~lgS) 1+7 S

3 Where:

hT It7i S l ~ AS

{

{~Yzg K)

Kp I+~~G I+ YsS

I 7j.)Y5 2

3 Measured h,I by RID Instrumentation LEAD/ Lag compensator on measured hf;

>i =8/> +2. = 3 S

{ e, coH{e)({s((ToRo.){jPIEA5{){'EP hT) G=Dpg.

Indicated hf at RATED TNERMAL I'OWE.R

l. 095; 0 0107/

F The function generated by the lead-Iag compensator for I dynamic compensation; avg Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T

, ry = 25s, 3 s) avg'erage temperature, F;

Lag compensator on measured T

W('

Og avg'i e const nt uti ized the m asure Ta lag comp nsa or,

+

RTO espon tim

= 2.'5s; a g 574.2'F (Nominal I at RATED THERHAL POWER);

0.000453/psig; Pressurizer

pressure, psig;

Dl NOTE 1:

(Continued)

CD pl lAOLE 2.2-1 (Cont.inued)

IAOLE NOTATIONS (Continued) 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure);

Laplace transform operator, s->;

m CD m

NOTE 2:

and f<(hl) is a function of the indicated tlifference between top and bot,tom detectors of t.he power-ange neutron ion chambers; wit,h gains to be select.ed based on measured inst,rument response during plant startup tests s<<ch t.hat:

(1)

For q

- qb between - 14K and

+ 10K, 0> hl) = 0, where qt and q

are percent.

RATEO THERHAL t

b POWER in the top and bottom halves o

he core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERHAL POWER in percent of RATEO THERHAL POWER; (2)

For each percent that the magnitude of q

- q exceeds 14X, the dT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by~ of its value at RATEO THERHAL POWER; and

).6 o (3)

For each percent that the magna ude of q

- qb exceeds

< lOX, the 4T Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced b

of its value at RATED THERHAL POWER.

1-5 Io PE EHANI/ELS AIAX(Mush 'TRiP EETFbiN7 5HAlLWTEXCPE~/y~

&4~~ 5ETFbIN7 BJj NloRE THAN /5% gP ggga~~~~~~

CD E/l 4)

CD

pcm TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) fABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

CD

,AT N 1E 3:

OVERPOWER hT l+ TT.S Where:

bT As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, T -

K

[T T ] - f (AT))

7G As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, CD m

CD C/T, CD 7~ S Ks 1+~S 1'4p

l. 09, 0.02/'F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T dynamic compensation, Time constants utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T

, ~ = 10 s, avg's defined in Note 1, l 7 As defined in Note 1,

TABLE 2. 2-1 Continued I

TABLE NOTATIONS Continued '

~A Lab NOTE 3:

(Continued)

Ke T

f,(al) 0.00068/

F for T > T" and Ke = 0 for T < T",

As defined in Note l, Indicated T

at RATEO.THERMAL PNKR (Calibration teaperature for AT avg instruaentation,

< 574.24F),

As defined in Note NOTE I:

~PE <h, one.l's dNfI87NN

+ri 0 GETPZIS?

mgp07 Ea 7ZiP SE 7/8/iU 7 Bv NDZ 7ÃAAJ

" ~<><<~m ~T ~r~nr

!nser7 m

CD m

CD Col gus a<~ ZucurWCZ<rc>, >,q< 1 N If no alienable valuetis specified as indicated by f ], the trip alliable value.

C g+Po>H shall also be the CD

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES PG, Jb

2. 2. 1. REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal va lues at which the Reactor trips are set for each functional unit.

The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the. consequences of accidents.

~J The setpoint for a reactor trip system or interlock function is considere to adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" setpoin 5p's within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

SLWP04l tsp To accommodate the instrument drift that y occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which setpoints be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip S

oints have been specif' in

=Table 2.2-1.

Operatio with> 'ess conservative than the p.l.

b table since an

~E al 1 owance has been made in the safety analysi s to accommodate this error no va1Ue i~r,;

i 1

~

I I >>ll For some functions, an optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable

)Value.

The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from

(

th ifi d calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation.

In Equation 2.2-1, 1 + R + S < TA, the interactive effects of i

the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered.

Z, as specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent

span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.

TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent

span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for reactor trip.

R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint.

S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent

span, from the analysis assumptions.

Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshol value for R ORTABL VENT~S The methodoloay to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an allowance for instrument uncertaVnties.

Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.

Sensors and other instru-mentation utilized in these channels are expected to b of operating within a11 m

Qu~

~

F

,Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance.

Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected.

Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8c 4

B 2-3 AMENDMENT NQ5,137ANp 132

2 2 LIMITING SAFETY SY TEM SETTINGS P& ll BASES

2. 2. 1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS C (tA$luR~4 0~~

pl'~&0<~

p<)~

% 2-0 The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a

preset or calculated level.

In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variables, therefore providing Trip System functional diversity.

The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for ~hich no direct credit was assumed in the safety analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System.

The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated.

This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

Manual Reactor Tri The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 8 2-3(Conk'~)

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Power Ran e, Neutron Flux In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting.

The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during subcritical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power excursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power operations for all power levels to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion which may be too rapid for the temperature and pressure protective trips.

The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10~ of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.

Intermediate and Source Ran e

Neutron Flux The Intermediate and Source

Range, Neutron Flux trips provide core protection during reactor startup to mitigate the consequences of an uncon-trolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical condition.

These trips provide redundant protection to the Low Setpoint trip of the Power

Range, Neutron Flux channels.

The Source Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at about 10s counts per second unless manually blocked when P-6 becomes active.

The Intermediate Range channels wi 11 initiate a

Reactor trip at a current level equivalent to approximately 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless manually blocked when P-10 becomes active.

No credit is taken for operation of the trips associated with either the Intermediate or Source Range Channels in the accident analyses; however, their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required by this specification to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

Qvertem erature dT The Overtemperature dT trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure.

power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with res ect to ipin transit delays from the core to the temperature detectors and pressure is within the range between the Pressurizer Hig and Low Pressure trips.

The setpoint is automatically varied with:

(1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water and includes dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, (2) pressurizer

pressure, and (3).axial power distribu-tion.

With normal axial power distribution, this Reactor trip limit is always below the core Safety Limit as shown in Figure 2. 1-1. If axial peaks are greater than design, as indicated by the difference between top and bottom power range nuclear detectors, the Reactor tri is automati 1

reduced ac r

e t's in Table

.2-1 pfL&G

~ExT' TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3

8 4

B 2-4 AMENDMENT NOS 137 AND 132

I LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM ETTINGS PGc l3 BASES Over ower DT The Overpower DT trip prevents power density anywhere in the core from exceeding 11BX of the design power density.

This provides assur ance of fuel integrity (e.g.,

no fuel pellet melting and less than IX cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for Over-temperature bT trip, and provides a,backup to the High Neutron Flux trip.

The setpoint is automatically varied with; (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water, (2) rate of change of temperature for dynamic com n a in e

rom the core to the loop temperature detector to ensure that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) 1s not excee e

Pressurizer Pressure In each of the pressurizer pressure

channels, there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting to provide for a High and Low Pressure trip thus limiting the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted.

The Low Setpoint trip protects against low pressure which could lead to DNB by tripping the reactor in the event of a loss of reactor coolant pressure.

On decreasing power the Low Setpoint trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER with turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K of full power equivalent);

and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7,.

The High Setpoint trip functions in conjunction with the pressurizer safety valves to protect the Reactor Coolant System against system overpressure.

Pressurizer Water Level The Pressurizer Water Level-High trip is provided to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves.

On decreasing power the Pressurizer High Water Level trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K of full power equivalent);

and on increasing power, auto-matically reinstated by P-7.

Reactor Coolant Flow The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low trip provides core protection to prevent DNB by mitigating the consequences of a loss of flow resulting from the loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.

On increasing power above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10K of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine first stage pressure at approximately 10K TURKEY PQINT - UNITS 3 8

4 B 2-5 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132

a7 m,

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRINENTATION C/l FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.

Hanual Reactor Trip TOTAL NO.

OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP HINIHUH CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE NODES 1,

2 3*

4A 5A ACTION 2.

3.

4.

Power

Range, Neutron Flux a.

High Setpoint b.

Low Setpoint Interaediate

Range, Neutron Flux Source

Range, Neutron Flux a.

Startup b.

Shutdown""

c.

Shutdown 1, 2 1¹¹,

2 1¹¹,

2 2¹3,4,5 3k 4*

5*

5.

Overteaperature hT 6.

Overpower 4T 1, 2 1, 2 7.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7) 8.

Pressurizer Pressure High 1, 2 9.

10.

Pressurizer Mater LevelHigh (Above P-7)

Reactor Coolant Flow--Low a.

Single Loop (Above P-8) b.

Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8) 3/loop 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 2/loop 1

2/loop.

1 W )3

TABLE 3. 3-1 Continued ACTION STATEMENTS Continued ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provided the inoperable channe1 is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 13 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour.

For subsequent required DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass status for up to 4

hours.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 EE 4

~

3/4 3-7 AMENPHENT NOS 137AND 132

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TABLE 4.3"1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING CHANNEL DEVICE CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST HODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS RE UIRED 1.

Hanual Reactor Trip N.A.

N.A.

N.A.'(11)

N.A.

3A 4*

5*

2.

Power'ange, Neutron Flux a.

High Setpoint S

D(2, 4),

N N(3,'),'(4, 6),

R(4)

N.A.

1, 2

b.

Low Setpoint 3.

Interaediate Range,'eutron Flux R(4)

R(4)

S/U(l),H N.A.

N.A.

1*RA PA*

R(4) 5.

Overteiperature 4T 6.

Overpower hT S

~RPRf 7.

Pressurizer Pressure Low S

8.

Pressurizer Pressure High S

9.

Pressurizer Water Level"-High S 10.

Reactor Coolant FlowLow S

ll.

Steam Generator Water Level--

S Low-Low 4.

Source

Range, Neutron Flux S

S/U(1),H(9)

~Q N.A.

N.A.

PA 3

4 5

1, 2

PC, l7 (12 Nuit USED.

TABLE 4. 3-1 Continued TABLE NOTATIONS (13)

Remote manual undervoltage trip when breaker placed in service.

(14) Interlock Logic Test shall consist of verifying that the interlock is in its required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(15) Automatic undervoltage trip.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-12 AMEHPHENT NOS 137AND 132

INSTRUHENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION PC IS LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3. 3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3.

APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-2.

ACTION:

a.

b.

Mith an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Tab e 3.3-3 ad ust the Set oint consistent with the Trip Setpoint wi~~in permissible calibration tolerance.

Nth an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown the All le Value column

%3 Ei 7HBR':

. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-3 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION state-ment requirements of Table 3.3-2 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its setpoint a<Ousted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

EgUAT10N 2.2-1 Z + R + S < TA where:

Z The value for colum Z of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel.

R The 'as measured'alue (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, S

Either the 'as measured'alue (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value of Colum S (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel, and TA The value froa Colum TA (Total Allowance in % of span) of Ta le 3.3-3 for the affected channel c.

Nth an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-2.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS

4. 3.2. 1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8L 4 3/4 3-13 AHENDHENT NOS 137AND 132

TABLE 3.3-2 Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUNENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO.

OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP NININN CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE NODES ACTION f.

Steaa Line FlowHigh 2/steaa line Coincident with:

1/steaa line in any two steaa lines I/steaa line 1, 2, 3~

in any two steaa lines 15 Steaa Generator Pressure"-Low 1/steaa generator 1/steaa line in any two steaa lines I/steaa generator in any two steaa lines 1, 2, 3~

15 2.

or T

Low avg Containaent Spray a.

Autoaatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 1/loop 1/loop in any 1/loop in any 1, 2, 3*

two loops two loops 1,2,3,4 14 25 b.

Containaent Pressure--

High-High Coincident with:

Containaent Pressure--

High 1, 2, 3

1, 2, 3

15 15 3.

Containaent Isolation a.

Phase "A" Isolation 1)

Hanual Initiation 2

2)

Autoaatic Actuation 2 Logic and Actuation Relays 1, 2, 3, 4 17 1, 2, 3, 4 14

C:

ycm TABLE 3.3-2 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS OF CHANNELS TO TRIP

'INIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE HODES ACTION I

Cil 4.

Steam Line Isolation-(Continued) 1/steam generator 1/steatI generator in any two steam lines 1/steal generator in any two steam lines 1,2,3 d.

Steam Line FlowHigh 2/steam line 1/steam li'ne '/steam line 1, 2, 3

Coincident with:

Steam Generator Pressure Low 15 15 or T

Low 5.

Feedwater isolation a.

Automatic Actua-tion Logic and Actuation Relays 1/loop 1/loop in any two loops 1/loop in any two loops 1, 2, 3

1, 2 22 m

C7 b.

Safety-Injection 6.

Auxiliary Feedwater¹¹¹ a.

Automatic Actua-tion Logic and Actuation Relays See Item 1.

above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.

20

TABLE 3. 3-2 Continued TABLE NOTATION (Continued)

ACTION 18-ACTION 19-ACTION 20-ACTION 21-ACTION 22-ACTION 23-ACTION 24-With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specifica-tion 3.0.3.

With the number of OPERABLE channels

'one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within. the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2. 1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated valve inoper,-

able and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7. 1.5.

With thenumber of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2. 1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with Specification 3.0.3.

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolate the control room Emergency Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode.

ACTION 25-With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour.

For subsequent required DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass status for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

\\'URKEY POINT - UNITS 3 EE 4 3/4 3-22 AMENOMENT NOS. 137ANO 132

~

TABLE 3.3-3

'NGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM

~

ALLOWANCE TA)

FUNCTIONAL UNIT l.

Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Turoine Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Contro1 Rooa Isolation, Start Oiesel Generators, Containaent Cooling Fans, Containaent Filter

Fans, Start Sequencer, Corrrponent Cooling Water, Start Auxiliary Feedwater and Intake Cooling Water)

Z S'RIP 3ETPOINT ALLOWABLE VaLUEg d.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low High Oifferential Pressure 8etwien the Steaa Line Header and any Steaa Line.

a.

Manual Initiation Autorsatic Actuation Logic c.

Containlent Pressure-High N.A hl.A.

N.A N.A.

Q.A.

HA.

H.A.

C3 f 3

<<psig

r. j f g

>XnS psig f Q 'BO psi H.A.

H.A.

] psig

>[

] psig

<[

] psi f.

Steaa Line Flow-High f

3

<A function defined f

as follows:

A bp

~

corresponding to 0.64 g Soe lbs/hr at CK load increa-ing linearly to a bp corresponding to 3.84 x 10 lbs/hr at full load.

Coincident with:

Steaa Generator Pressure-Lov or T -LoBB 2.

Contai~nt Spray a.

Autoiatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.

Containaent Pressure-High.

High Coincident with:

Containaent Pressure-High 4-.0 f.3 f 3

>600 psig

>~4@'F 2.O 10 et&.

BJ4-N. A

<30.0 psig

<6.0 psig

] psig

>s42. 5 "F M.A.

<( ] psig

<[ ] psig TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4

'/4 3-23 NENOHENT NOS. 13>AND 132

%ABLE 3.3-3 (Cantfdued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTBl U

N FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP AL Okl N

TA) 3 SETPOINT ALLt3'ABLE VALUEA 3.

Containlent Isolation a..

Phase "A" Isolation 1)

Hanual Initiation 2)

Autolatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays H.A.

H.A bl.A NA-0.A.

H.A.

N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

3)

Safety In)ection b.

Phase "O'solati.on SE.E ZTEMI See Itea 1 above for all Safety Infection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

1)

Nanual Initiation 2)

Autoaatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 3)

Contai~nt Pressure-High-High Coincident with:

Contaireont Pressure-High N.A.

P.A N.A N. A

<.A.

H.A N.A.

C 3 C. Q e30.0 psig c6.0 psig H.A.

N.A.

c[

] psig

<[

] psi9 c.

Contaimont Vent)lation Isolation 1)

Contaireent Isolation Nanual Phase A or Phase b

2)

Autoaatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 3)

Safety Iniection 4)

Contaitaent Radio-activity High (1)

NA.

QA.

NA.

SEE ET' N.A.

N.A.

See Itee l. above for all Safet'I Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Particulate (R-D)

[

]

c6.1 x 10s CPN Gaseous (R-12)

See (2)

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-24 ANENPNENT NOS. 137AND132

AELE 3.3-3 (Continued)

~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT A

h/A E TA

'TRIP SET>>OINT Atto"AE"E "At"E>>

4.

Steaa Line Isolation a.

Hanual Initiation b.

Autoeatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays H.A.

Q.A N.A d.k gA K.A.

K.A.

K.A K.A.

c.

Containeent Pressure-High-High Coincident with:

Containment Pressure-High f.

Staae Line Flow-High Coincident with:

Steaa Line Pressur e-Low or T v -Low 5.

Feedwater Isolation H.o Z.o i.o c30.0 psig c[

] psig c6.0 psig c[

] psig cA function defined f

3 as follows:

A hp corresponding to 0.64 x 10e lbslhr at CX load increa-ing linearly to a hp corresponding to 3.84 x 10e lbs/hr at full loa4.

3600 psig

} psig a.

Autoeatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.

Safety In5ection 6.

Auxiliary F~ter (3) a.

Autoaat)C Actuet)on Logic and Actuation Relays b.

Steaa Generator '%ter Level Low Low ci Safety In5ect ion AA.

hl.A H.A.

HA.

ca t3 5EE ITEM 2 N.A.

K.A.

See Itee l. above for all Safety Ingection Trip Setpoints and Allowabl ~ Values.

N.A.

@gal of narrow

>t',

]X of narrow range instant range instrument span+

spano See Item l. above for all Safety Infection Trip Setpoints and Altowable Values.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-25 ANENDNENT NOS,137 AND 132

FUNCTIONAL UNIT BLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM UMN N

ALLDLIAQCE(TA' j

gETppygT TRIP ALLOWABLE VALUES 6.

Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued) d.

Bus Stripping See Item 7.

below for all Bus Stripping Setpoints and Allowable Values.

e.

Trip of All Main Feedwater Pump Breakers.

7.

Loss of Power a.

4.16 kV Busses A and B

(Loss of Voltage) b.

480V Load Centers (Instantaneous Relays)

Degraded Voltage LMdClll'tsI'.

A.

H. A.

k. A.

3A 3B 3C 3D 4A 4B 4C 4D Coincident with:

Safety Injection and C3 U t:3tH t'HEl E3C3 436VRSV (10 sec i 1 sec delay) f 416VRSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay)

[

]

417VRSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay)

[

]

42BVjSV (10 sec a 1 sec delay)

[

]

415Vi5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay)

[

]

414Vg5y (10 sec t 1 sec delay)

[

4pgVg5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay)

[

]

403Vg5V (10 sec t 1 sec delay)

[

]

C See Item 1.

above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Diesel Generator Breaker Open N.A,

k. A.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8L 4 3/4 3-26 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132

FUNCTIONAL UNIT 7.

Loss of Power (Continued)

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMEN ATION TRIP S

POIN 5 ALlOhJAAJCE (7W Z

TRIP SETPOINT

.ALLOWABLE VALUE/

c.

480V Load Centers (Inverse Time Relays)

Degraded Voltage C

Load Center 3A 3B 3C 30 4B 4C 4D Coincident with:

Oiesel Generator Breaker Open 8.

Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks a.

Pressuriter Pressure b.

T v --Low

'I 9.

Control Room Ventilation Isolation C3 E. '3

+.0 t:3 t: j C 3 L-2 L

C 3 i

3 M. A M.R C.

3 t: 3 2.0

'1.0 419 ViSV(60 sec delay) 426Vt5V(60 sec delay) 427e5V(60 sec delay) 436Vi5V(60 sec delay) 427Vi5V(60 sec delay) 424Va5V(60 sec delay) 4l3VR5V(60 sec delay) 412V>5V(60 sec delay)

N.A.

<2000 ps ig

) 543 F

sec 130

[

7 sec a30

[ ]

sec f30

[

3 sec i30

[

3 sec i30

[

3 sec x30

[

3 sec X30

[ ]

sec 130

[

3 N.A.

<[

1 psig

) &25'F a.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.

Safety Injection

, N.A.

M,h hl.g so~ r~cM<

N. A.

N.A, See Item l. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Al 1 owab1 e Values.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 3-27 AMENGHENT NOS.137 ANO 132

LE 3.3-3 (Contfnued)

~

ENGINEEREQ SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT 9.

Contr ol Rooa Isolation (Continued)

'TRIP SETPOINT ALLIABLE VALUES c.

Containment Radioactivity-Mfgh (1)

Particulate (R-11)

[

<6.1 x 10s CPM gaseous (R-12)

See (2)

'd.

Containment Isolation Manual Phase A or Phase B

e.

Air Intake Radiation Level)

N.A.

< 2 aR/hr N.A.

2.83 mR/hr TABLE NOTATIONS (1) Either the particulate or gaseous channel in the OPERABLE status will satisfy this LCO.

3.2 x 10'2)

Containment Gaseous Monitor Setpoint ~

CPM,

(

F

)

Actual Pur e Flow Oesign Purge Flow (35,000 CFM)

Setpoint may vary according to current plant conditions provided that the release rate does not exceed allowable lfafts provided in Specification 3.11.2.1.

Vhere F -"

(3) Auxiliary feedwater aanual fnftfatfon fs included fn Specification 3.7.1.2.

usa'.r

> ALLOgAnlCECTA) f gR g SIf no allowable value fs specfffed so indicated by [

3, the trip setpoint shall also be the allowable value.

AL<oeAHCE C TA)

M.A.

E 3

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4

'/4 3-28 C3.

M.A C. '3 NsEk/

A@DUE M.A.

C '3 AMENQMENT NOS 137 ANO 132

TABLE 4.3"2 ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.

Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, Feed-water Isolation, Control Rooa Ventilation Isolation, Start Oiesel Generators, Containment Phase A Isola-tion (except Hanual SI),

Containment Cooling Fans, Containment Filter Fans, Start Sequencer, Ceaponent Cooling Mater, Start Auxiliary Feedwater and Intake Cooling Mater) a.

Hanual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.,

1, 2, 3

~ 1, 2, 3(3) b.

Automatic <Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays c.

Containment Pressure N.A.

High d.

Pressurizer Pressure S Low N.A.

N.A.

H(1)

R N.A.

N.A.

H(1) 1, 2, 3

H(5)

N.A.

. N.A.

1, 2, 3(3)

TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING HODES CHANNEL OEV ICE FOR MHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE

'HECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST 1E t ~RE e.

High Oifferential Pressure Between the Steam Line Header and.

any Steam Line Steam Line FlowHigh Coincident with:

Steam Generator Pressure Low or T

--Low avg R"

H(5)

Q(5)

N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3(3) 1, 2, 3(3) 1, 2, 3(3) 1, 2, 3(3)

CÃI 7C CTl TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS C

CA CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHECK TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL OEVICE FOR WHICH CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE CALIBRATION TEST TEST 4.

Steaa Line Isolation (Continued) c.

Containoent Pressure N.A.

High-High Coincident with:

Containaent Pressure N.A.

High N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3

C7 m

5.

d.

Steaa Line FlowHigh Coincident with:

Steaa Generator Pressure Low or T

Low Feedwater Isolation a.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays S(3)

S(3)

N.A.

M(5)

H(5)

Q(5)

N.A.

N'.

N.A.

1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,

2 Cl Vl Erd ED b.

Safety Injection 6.

Auxiliary Feedwater (2) a.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays N.A.

N.A.

N. A.

1, 2, 3

See Itea l. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

b.

Steam Generator Water LevelLow-Low N.A.

N. A.

1,2,3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS C:

Vi 4k Qe m

m CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT 8.

Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks a.

Pressurizer Pressure b.

T Low 9.

Control Room Ventilation Isolation a.

Autoaatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.

Safety Injection c.

Containment RadioactivityHigh d.

Containment Isolation Hanual Phase A or Hanual Phase B

e.

Control Roo Air Intake Radiation Level N.A.

N.A.

H(5)

Qa)

N.A.

1, 2, 3(3) 1, 2, 3(3)

N.A.

NcA.

See Item 1.

above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

S R

H N.A.

N.A.

(4)

N.A.

1, 2, 3, 4 N.A.

N.A.

Al 1 TABLE NOTATIONS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING HOOES CHANNEL DEVICE FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST 7

REIE 1

Cl CA O~

Col C7 (1)

Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(2)

Auxiliary feedwater manual initiation is included in Specification 3.7.1.2.

(3)

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entering Hode 3, provided that the applicable surveillances are coILpleted within 96 hours0.00111 days 0.0267 hours 1.587302e-4 weeks 3.6528e-5 months froa entering Hode 3:

(4)

Applicable in HODES 1, 2, 3, 4 or during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

(5)

Test of alarm function not required when alarm locked in.

NAt least once per 18 months each Actuation Logic Test shall include energization of each relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay.

3/S.3 IRSTRULsEHTATIG BASES PL 31 3/4.3. 1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that:

(1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip wi 11 be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is main-tained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance (due to plant specific design, pulling fuses and using jumpers may be used to place channels in trip), and (4) fufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Surveillance Requirements speci-fied for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periodic surveil-lance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Under some pressure and temperature conditions, certain surveillances for Safety Injection cannot be performed because of the system design.

Allowance to change modes is provided under these conditions as long as the surveillances are completed within specified time requirements.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Tri Setpoints specified in Table 3. 3-3 ar 'nomin 1

al a

which the ~w-are set for each functionyl unit.

The setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

o accommodate the instrument drift that may occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3.

Opera-tion with Setpoints less conservative tgy~ Trip Setpoint but

. ith'n~

i ILtahlMsince an allowance has been ma e in e safety:

analysis to accosssodate this error no vefuue s TTsae

'~>n he owahle column, lie e

q. n va ua is t imitinq settl.ngi TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 CL 4 8 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132

3/4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION fG 32 BASES 3/4.3. 1 and 3/4.3 2

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES For some functions, an optional provision has been included for determining the'PERABILITY of a channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value.

The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation.

In Equation 2.2-1, Z +

R + S < TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the."as measured" values of the errors are considered.

Z, as specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent

span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.

TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent

span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for actuation.

R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint.

S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent

span, from the analysis assumptions.

Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a

sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a

threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an al1owance for instrument uncertainties.

Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel, uncertainties.

Sensor and rack instrumenta-tion utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncerta'fnty magnitudes.

Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance.

Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected.

Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected p1ant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.

If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combina-tions indicative of various accidents

events, and transients.

Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 B 3/4 3-1 P5 2.))

CO)VTIMUR'O

ML17348A563

Text

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