ML17328A910

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Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $150,000.Noncompliance Noted:Licensee Identified Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection & Failed to Promptly Correct Deficiencies
ML17328A910
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/1991
From: Davis A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17328A907 List:
References
EA-90-194, NUDOCS 9103130094
Download: ML17328A910 (12)


Text

Enclosure 1

NOTICE OF'IOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C.

Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Dockets No. 50-315 and 50-316 Licenses No. DPR-58 and No.

DPR-74 EA 90-194 During an NRC inspection conducted during the period of September 10 through November 6, 1990, violations of NRC requirements were identified.

In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.

The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:

I.

Violation Assessed a Civil Penalt 10 CFR 50.48(b) requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1,

1979 satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R

to 10 CFR Part 50 including, specifically, the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requires, in part, that, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, means of ensuring that'ne of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section'II.G.2,

requires, in part, that the means to be employed shall be (a) separation of cables and equipment and non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire bar rier having a 3-hour rating, or (b) separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards and fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed, or (c) enclosure of the cables and equipment and non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one-hour rating with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, requires, in part, that independent alternative or dedicated shutdown capability shall be provided where the fire protection features for structures,

systems, or components whose functions are required for hot shutdown do not satisfy Section III.G.2.

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Notice of Violation Contrary to the above, for Unit 1 of the D.C.

Cook facility, licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, the licensee failed to ensure that one of the redundant trains of components and cabling located within the same fire area outside of primary containment whose function was required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions were adequately separated or protected.

Specifically, as of August 24, 1990, the power supply cabling in Fire Areas 48 and 49 for both control room indication and local shutdown indication (redundant trains of indication necessary to achieve and main-tain hot shutdown of Unit 1) were not adequately separated or protected in that the cabling was not separated by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating, a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards or a one-hour fire barrier and no independent alternative/

, dedicated shutdown indication was provided.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

Civil Penalty

$ 150,000.

,II.

Violations Not Assessed a Civil Penalt A.

Sections 2.C(4) and 2.C.3(o) of Amendments No.

31 and No.

12 to Plant Operating Licenses No.

DPR-58 and No.

DPR-74, respectively, require the administrative controls for fire protection, as described in the licensee's submittal dated October 27, 1977, shall be implemented and maintained.

The October 27, 1977 licensee submittal specifies that the Operations guality Assurance Program will meet the criteria as described in Attachment No.. 6 of'he NRC document, "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and guality Assurance."

Paragraph 8.0 of Attachment No.

6 states, in part, that measures shall be established to ensure that conditions adverse to fire protection, sucl as deficiencies and defective components, are identified and corrected promptly.

Contrary to the above, the licensee identified conditions adverse to fire protection, i.e.,

emergency lighting system deficiencies, and failed to promptly correct the deficiencies.

Examples of these failures include:

1.

Battery deficiencies associated with Emergency Lightira Unit 366 v'<ere identified on July 19, 1988, and were not corrected.

The deficiencies were identified again on September 20, 1988.

2.

Battery deficiencies associated with Emergency Lighting Unit 386 were identified on November 8, 1988, and were not corrected.

The deficiencies were identified again on December 23, 1988.

This is a Severity. Level IV violation (Supplement I).

e B.

Sections 2.C(4) and 2.c.3(o)'f Amendments No.

31 and No.

12 to Plant Operating Licenses No.

DPR-58 and No. DPR-74, respectively, require that the administrative controls for fire protection as described in

Notice of Violation 3

w This C.

the licensee's submittal dated October 27, 1977 shall be implemented and maintained.

The October 27, 1977 licensee submittal specifies that the Operations guality Assurance Program will meet the criteria described in Attachment No.

6 of the NRC document, "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and

guality Assurance."

Paragraph 1.0 of Attachment No.

6 states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable guidelines are included in design documents.

These measures shall include design reviews to verify adequacy of wiring isolation and cable separation criteria.

10 CFR Part.50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, used as a criteria by the licensee for design of Fire Area 29 requires, in part, that redundant trains of cables be separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles.

Contrary to the above, licensee design reviews failed to ensure the adequacy of wiring isolation and cable separation for fire protection considerations.

Specifically, as of September 6, 1990, the licensee failed to verify that Cable Nos.

1-1936R and 2-12467 in Fire Area 29, which provide the Unit 2 LSI panels alternative and normal power supply, respectively, had been adequately separated.

The cables were physically separated but the fire area was not free of intervening combustibles.

is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

10 CFR 50.48(b) requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1,

1979 satisfy the applicable requirements, of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 including, specifically, the requi rements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, requires that emergency lighting units with at least an eight hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes to those locations.

Contrary to the above, from April 14, 1988 through August 30,

1990, for Units I and 2 of the D.C.

Cook facility, licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, adequate emergency lighting was not provided in certain plant areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes'to those locations.

For example:

C 1.

The Nuclear Sampling Room, Elevation 587 feet; 2.

The Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Piping Penetration Area, Elevation 591 feet, at Local Shutdown Panel 2-LSI-2; 3.

The Unit 1 Mest Non-Essential Service Mater Valve Gallery, Elevation 612 feet; and

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Notice of Violation 4.

The Unit 2 West Non-Essential Service Water Valve Gallery, Elevation 612 feet.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1;.

D.

10 CFR 50.48(b) requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1,

1979 satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 including, specifically, the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R;Section III.G, requires, in part, that, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and main-tain hot shutdown conditions are located withir. the same fire area outside of primary containment, means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided.

'I 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.7, requires, in part, that the safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall be known to be isolated from ass'ociated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that shorts to ground in the associate0 circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipmert.

Contrary to the above, as of September 14, 199"., for Unit 1 of the D.C.

Cook facility, licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, the safe shutdown equipment for each fire area was not known to be isolated from associated non-safety circuits in the fire area, such that shorts to ground in the associated circuits would not prevent operation of

'he safe shutdown equipment.

Specifically, th:- licensee's circuit coordination study had not included an evaluation of the potentially adverse affect of high impedance=faults, a typ=-.of short to ground.,

on the safe shutdown equipment from all associated non-safety circuits located within any fire area.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I.'.

E.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable regu-latory requirements and the design basis are ccrrectly translated into drawings and procedures.

These design control measures shall include control of design interfaces and coordination among participating design organizations.

The design control meas'res shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of the desicn.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to ensure that adequate design control measures were provided.

Specifically, on or about November 13, 1985, for Unit 1 and on or about June 23, 1984, for Unit 2, the licensee failed to verify that the component cooling water (CCW) and essential service water (ESW) low header pressure isolation

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Notice of Violation relay wiring changes had been correctly translated onto Drawing Nos..l-98405 and 2-98405 (CCW) and Nos.

1-98415 and 2-98415 (ESM) by a design interface organization.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Indiana and Hichigan Power Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement of explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).

This reply should be clearlv marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged viola-tion:

(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results

achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance is achieved.

If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other actions as may be proper should not be taken.

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.

Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coomission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States ir the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposi-tion of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission.

Should the Licensee fai] to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.

Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in

part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:

(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.

In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.

In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section V;B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990), should be addressed.

Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.

The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.

Notice of Viol ation Upon failure to pay any civil pena1ty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty,.unless compromised,

remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

2282c.

The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:

Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 799 Roosevelt

Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant.

FOR THE NUCLEAR RfGULATORY COYYISSION Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois this 6th day of Harch 1991 A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator

Enclosure 2

SYNOPSIS 3-82-024 The D.C.

Cook Nuclear Plant (Cook Plant), which was licensed to operate by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) prior to January 1, 1979, is owned by the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (IMEC).

IMEC is one of a number of operating electric utility companies which together comprise the American Electric Power system.

The American Electric Power Company, Inc.

(AEP) is the parent or holding company for the American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEPSC) and all of the operating electric utility companies within the American Electric Power system.

AEPSC is the AEP subsidiary which provides management, professional and technical services to the companies comprising the American Electric Power System.

On April 8, 1982, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation relating to an alleged false statement made by AEPSC on March 27, 1981.

That alleged false statement was discovered by NRC during preparation for the Special Team Fire Protection Inspection of the D.C.

Cook Nuclear Plant (Cook Plant).

That alleged false statement related to Cook Plant's state of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Plants Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."

The report of that investigation was.completed on February 4, 1983.

That report provided documentation indicating that AEPSC corporate officials were apprised on February 5, 1982, of apparent Cook Plant noncompliance with those requirements.

Subsequent to review of the investigation report, NRC Region III Administrator, James G. Keppler, related that he and other Region III officials had discussed fire protection matters during a meeting on March 16, 1982, with those AEPSC officials.and notification was not made at the time of what NRC believed to be a reportable deficiency.

As a result of that information, OI was requested by Mr. Keppler to conduct a supplemental investigation into the apparent failure to notify NRC of a reportable deficiency.

The additional investigation effort by OI involved not only the new allegation, but also a reanalysis of the false statement allegation.

This report provides information, in the form of statements, testimony, communi-cations and documentation, indicating that the AEPSC Executive Vice President, Construction and New York Engineering; Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Engineering; Assistant Division Manager Nuclear Engineering; Section

Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing; Cognizant Nuclear Engineer; Cognizant Electrical Engineer and Cognizant Fire Protection Engineer participated in the preparation and submittal of the false letter to NRC dated March 27, 1981.

It was testified that those individuals agreed upon an approach to the new fire protection regulation where AEPSC would interpret Appendix R as reouiring Cook Plant to only have the alternate safe shutdown system that was already installed in the plant without any modifications, while each of those individuals knew, as noted through admissions or allusion in testimony, that Cook Plant did not meet the specific requirements of Appendix R.

This report also provides information indicating that the AEPSC Executive Vice President, Construction and New York Engineering, the responsible officer of AEPSC and IMEC, had obtained information on or about February 5, 1982, indicating that Cook Plant was in noncompliance with Appendix R as interpreted by NRC

and, having received that information, failed to notify NRC of Cook Plant's noncompliance.

During a discussion of the upcoming Appendix R inspection at a meeting between AEPSC and NRC on March 16, 1982, the responsible officer was afforded direct opportunity to provide notice of Cook Plant's noncompliance; but instead, queried NRC concerning the ramifications of being in noncompliance.

Between the dates of February 5, 1982, and March 30,

1982, he received numerous cues from his staff and from NRC identifying noncompliance areas at Cook Plant;
however, the AEPSC letter to NRC dated March 30, 1982, signed by the responsible officer merely indicated that an interpretation difference concerning Appendix R

existed between AEPSC and NRC, that AEPSC should be given a second opportunity to review Cook Plant for corn'pliance with Appendix R and that the upcoming inspection should be postponed until the second review was comp1eted.

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