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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405 ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999 LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999 LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999 LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999 LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998 LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998 LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122 ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998 LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998 LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998 LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998 LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405 ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999 LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999 LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999 LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999 LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998 LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998 LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122 ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998 LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998 LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998 LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998 LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999 Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3). ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999 Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios. ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999 Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2. ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates. ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999 Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218. ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
REGULATOR" INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S'TEM (BIOS)
ACCESSION NBR:7906150334 DOC,DATE; 79/06/Og NOT>RIZEO! NO DOCKET FACIL:50 315 Donald 50 316 Donald BYNAME C ~ Cook Nuclear Power Plantt Unit ii Cook Nuclear Power Planti Unit 2r Indiana Indiana 8 8
0 5000 0315 CD AUTH AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHALLER>D,V, Indiana 8 Michigan Power Co, RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFF II.IATION Region 3i Chicagoi Office of the Director
SUBJECT:
LER 79 019/01L 0 on 790519:cracks found in 16 inch feedwater elbows adjacent to nozzle welds caused buildup of non-radioactive water in containment sump.16-inch elbows in generators being replaced, Causes being determined, DISTRIBUTION CODE; A001S TITLE:
COPIES RECEIVED:LTR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR I, ENCL AFTER f SIZE: ~+LQ ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC 5-+ 4 &s bi( RA-ra NOTES'ECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAi4IE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION: 05, BC 0~ 7 7 INTERNAL: 01 EG L 1 1 .02 NRC PDR 12 LE 2 2 14 TA/EOO 15 CORE PERF BR 1 1 16 AD SYS/PROJ 17 ENGR BR 1 1 18 REAC SFTY BR 19 PLANT SYS BR 1 1 20 EEB 21 EFLT TRT SYS 1 1 22 BR INKMAN EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 1 1 00 NSIC 23 ACRS 16 16 SUN )8 1978 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL 38
0 NRC FOAM 386 P 77)
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LICENSEE CODE
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AMOUNT oF ACT!V!TY Q 44 N/A
-:-. <<~8 80 7 8 9 10 11 44 eo PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
~i7 0 ~LLQJQ27 I'I LJCS 7 9 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES E ~00 0QINA eo I OSS OF OR DAM>>OE TO FAC!LITY Q43 8
LLJO2~MAIJ~l.. DWATER PIPING TO STEAM GENERATORS 7 9 10 80 O
ISSUED
~OI4 PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION Q NRC USE ONLY 8 9 IO NAME PF PREPARER D . 'HALLER . (616) 465-5901-Ext.'.311;
iver. James G. Keppler June 7, 1979 Regional Director AEP:NRC:00216 Examination of the elbows has indicated the cracks initiated at the top of the inner surface of the elbow at a machined discontinuity required for the weld-end preparation.
Radiographic examinations of the nozzle/feedwater line weld regions for Unit 2 steam generators Nos. 2 and 3 showed indication of cracks in the same area of the elbows. The same areas in Unit 1 were subsequently radiographed and indications were 'found in the 16-inch elbows of the feedwater lines to steam generators No. 2, 3 and 4.
This discovery of crack indications was promptly reported to Region III.
l<e were not able to detect the presence of indications in the 16-inch elbow to steam generator No. 1 in Unit 1 using radiographic techniques because of the unique conditions of the backing ring. Subsequent-liquid penetrant examination indicated cracking in this elbow.
The wall thickness of the 16-inch elbow is approximately 50 percent greater than that of the steam generator nozzle. To compensate for this difference in wall thickness, the weld preparation included machining and beveling a step on the inside of the elbow to match the thickness of the steam generator nozzle at the point of the weld.
Stresses concentrated in this thinner section adjacent to the weld and were magnified at the point of discontinuity.
The highest design stress point in the feedwater line inside the containment is at the 90'4-inch elbows at the bottom of the vertical riser. The 14-inch elbows are in the same vertical plane as the affected 16-inch elbows. Five of the 14-inch elbows were radiographed. No indications were found.
Samples of the cracked areas of the 16-inch elbows were sent to two laboratories for metallurgical examination. Reports from the metal-lurgical examinations showed that the crack propagation was caused by high cycle fatigue assisted by corrosion. Further details of the metallurgical examination are described in Attachment 2.
After removal of the 16-inch elbows, the inside of the Unit 2 steam generator nozzles were examined by the liquid penetrant method. Light pitting and intermittent linear indications were noted on the nozzle counter-bores. Subsequent visual inspection of the Unit 1 nozzles showed similar pitting in the nozzle counterbore region.
Me are replacing the 16-inch elbows to all steam generators in Units 1 and 2. These new elbows do not have the sharp discontinuities on the pipe inner surface, and the strength of the elbow in the weld area has been increased. The pits and indications on the steam generator nozzles
Nr. James G. Keppler June 7, 1979 Regional Director AEP:NRC'00216 are being blended out. The stress concentration at the nozzle counter-bore is being reduced with the addition of a 1/2-inch radius fillet.
We are implementing a program to determine the characteristics of the high cycle fatigue. This program includes the. installation of strain,=-temperature, pressure and vibration instrumentation at significant points on the piping system of two feedwater lines in Unit 2. Details of the new 16-inch elbow, the nozzle repairs and instrumentation are in .
The safety implications of this event at Cook Nuclear Plant have been carefully analyzed by our safety review committees. It was concluded that the condition identified did-.notadversely affect the health and safety of the general public. It was-concluded that the return of the units to power with the newly designed elbows will have no adverse effect on the general public. Operation of Unit 2 with the instrumentation program will indicate whether there is any need for further corrective action. A safety evaluation is given in Attachment 6.
We expect to begin startup of Unit 2 by June 13, 1979 and Unit 1 by June 20, 1979.
Very truly yours, ohn E. Dolan Vice President JED kb Attachments cc: R. C. Callen G. Charnoff R. S. Hunter R. W. Jurgensen N. C. Hoseley, NRC D. V. Shaller, Bridgman
AEP:NRC:00216 bc: S. J. Milioti/J. I. Castresana/K. J. Vehstedt R. F. Hering/S. H. Steinhart/J. A. Kobyra A'..S. Grimes/ J. J. Markowsky H. N. Scherer, Jr.
T. W. Baker R. F. Dodd R. F. Kroeger J. F. Stietzel - Bridgman B. A. Svensson/E. A. Smarrella - Bridgman J. G. Del Percio/J. f. Etzweiler - For CCL Update W. W. Lowe DC-N-6015.4 AEP:NRC:00216 Packet D. Wigginton NRC
,NRC Site Inspector -"Bridgman
ATTACHMENTS'TO AEP!NRC!00216
ATTACHMENT NO. TOPIC/DESCRIPTION 1.0 General Information 2.0. Hetallurgical Evaluation of Hain Feedwater Line Cracks 3.0 Stress Analyses of tlain Feedwater Lines Inside Containment 4.0 Feedwater Chemi stry 5.0 Corrective Actions 6.0 Safety Evaluation
noifq'raag~~G 8-;NoigoO~AE l.O GENERAL INFORMATION The cracks in the 16-inch feedwater elbows initiated from the inner wall outside of the heat affected zone of the weld at the discontinuity of the weld end preparation counterbore. Through-wall cracks existed in the 16-inch elbows-to Steam Generators Nos. I and 4 of Unit 2. The most severe through-wall crack occurred in S.G. No. 1 and was 3> inches in length on the outer surface. Cracks in the other elbows were smaller.
After the feedwater elbows were removed, liquid penetrant examination of the steam generator..nozzles was performed. Results of this examination have shown light pitting and intermittent linear indications along the circumference of the counterbore discontinuity on all eight steam generator nozzles. Figure 1 depicts the steam generator nozzle and feedwater elbow in elevation.
Figure 2 is a full scale section of the nozzle to the elbow weld.
The feedwater piping between each Steam Generator and its containment penetration, the two anchor points of this line, was visually inspected in detail for interferences. The seismic hydraulic snubbers were checked for piston disp'lacement and found functional. The constant force hanger was also inspected. No interferences were noted.
Minor interferences noted by crushed insulation were found at the Crane llall sleeve and at one of the pipe whip restraints. Pipe stress analyses were performed with simulated restraints at these locations.
The resulting stresses did not increase significantly and were well within the allowable limits.
The highest design stress point in six of the feedwater piping systems was identified at the 90'lbows at the bottom of its vertical riser .
The elbows in the same plane as the affected elbow in five of these six lines were radiographed and found acceptable.'he other two lines have twin 45'lbows at this location and have lower stress levels.
Three specimens, one taken at the elbow crack to Steam Generators Nos.
1 and 3 of Unit 2 and Steam Generator No. 3 of Unit as well as 1 a complete ring from the elbow to Steam Generator No'. 3 of Unit 2, were shipped to Westinghouse for detailed metallurgical examination.
Splits of the specimens from elbows from Unit 2 Steam Generator No. 1 and Unit 1 Steam Generator No. 3 were sent to Chicago Service Laboratories for preliminary metallurgical examination. These results are addressed in Attachment 2.
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2.0 METALLURGICAL EVALUATION OF MAIN FEEDWATER LINE CRACKS Specimens were removed from the 16-inch elbows for metallurgical examination from Unit 2 steam generators (SG) 1 and 3, and Unit 1 SG,. 3. Specimens were from the 12.o'lock position where radio-graphic examination indicated cracking originated. Half of the specimens from Unit 2 SG 1 and Unit 1 SG 3 were examined by Chicago Service Laboratory. The other halves and the entire sample from Unit 2 SG. 3 were examined by Westinghouse.
Chicago Service and Westinghouse laboratories reported that the primary crack was at the change in section where the counterbore had been machined on the inside surface as part of the weld end preparation. Both laboratories reported several additional cracks on the inside surface near the primary crack. Both reported oxide in the cracks and pitting corrosion. The primary crack, and adjacent smaller cracks, were not in the weld or heat affected zone, but were about 1/2 inch away at the inside surface.
Westinghouse reported the main crack had multiple origins, was wide due to corrosion and blunted at the tip. Two cracks, one which was 1/2 inch deep, and one which was less than .040 inches deep, were opened for examination by Westinghouse. Electron microscope examination at the crack tips revealed fatigue striations. Visual examination of the fracture surface markings of the longer crack showed typical fatigue beach marks.
Presence of fatigue striations, beach marks and corrosion product in the crack indicated crack progression was by high cycle corrosion assisted fatigue. Fracture surface markings close to the inside surface, where the crack originated, were obscured by corrosion and positive identification of the crack initiation mechanism was not possible.
Westinghouse received, in addition to the specimens for metallurgical examination, a four inch ring section from the 16-inch elbow from Unit 2 SG 3. Ultrasonic examination from the end showed four cracks, one from ll o'lock to 1'o'clock and almost through the wall, a second crack a quarter through the wall from 2 o'lock to 4 o'lock, a third a quarter through the wall from 8 o'lock to 10 o'lock and a barely discernable crack around 6 o'lock. Subsequent inspection after sectioning showed that the second and third cracks were much smaller than the ultrasonic examination indicated.
The 16-inch feedwater elbow is schedule 80 SA234, WPB steel. Chemical and metallurgical examination by Chicago Service Laboratory showed the material to be acceptable. The steam generator nozzle, to which the elbow is welded, is schedule 60 SA508, C12 steel.
Il 2.0 Metallurgical Evaluation of Main Feedwater Line Cracks
-,-(Cont".d)'adiography "detected cracks in all 16-inch elbows on Units 1 and 2 with the exception of Unit 1 SG 1. Cracks were more extensive and deeper on Unit 2 than Unit 1.
detected by radiography, was in the upper half, and granged from cracks that progressed more than half way around to those Cracking, as
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that were 3 or 4 inches in length. In each case cracks were evident at the 12 o'lock position.
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3.0 STRESS ANALYSES OF MAIN FEEDWATER LINES INSIDE CONTAINMENT Stress analysis was performed on the feedwater line configuration in an effort to determine the mechanism causing the observed cracking. This analysis was broken into three parts:
(1) Structural analysis of the feedwater line including the effects of thermal, deadweight and pressure.
(2) 2D finite element s'tress> analysis of the original feedwater nozzle/elbow configuration and the'as modified" elbow.
(3) Dynamic analyses of the feedwater line and steam generator.
The structural analysis was performed by Westinghouse using a 3D finite element model of the feedwater line with anchors included -..
at the steam generator (SG) and containment penetration and the vertical and horizontal thermal growth of the steam:.generator. -",;,-;
a'ppllied..at'..the'ifeedi~ater nozzle. The geometry consisted of the feedwater nozzle, which is connected to a 16" schedule 80 90 elbow followed by a reducer to a 14" schedule 80 pipe, and a 24 ft.
':,.;",: vertical run. This pipe run was followed by four pipe segments running to the containment penetration. The supports for the line include a constant force hanger on the first horizontal segment, two locations of hydraulic snubbers attached to the pipe and several pipe whip restraints which do not touch the pipe.
Two thermal conditions were run. The first with the steam generator at 547 F and the feedwater line at 450oF.representing normal operatioq. The second with the steam generator at 547oF and the feedwater line cold representing the hot shutdown condition. The analyses results show a ~maximum'. thermal stress of approximately 10 ksi at the first and second elbows from the steam generator.
The maximum deadweight and pressure stresses, were 1. ksi; and 4-ksi, respectively. These stresses are well below code allowable values.
The second analysis performed was a detailed 2D finite element
- stress analysis of the most severe thermal transient, which occurred during hot shutdown, in the region of the feedwater nozzle to elbow junction. The analysis used the Franklin Institute Computer 'Codes FEETEMP arid FEEAAS. The model used
- quadralaterial and triangular elements with a minimum of 8 nodes through the wall in the area of the failure and ran from the steam generator shell to 12" beyond the nozzle to elbow weld. The transient analyzed consisted of a ramp change in temperature from 540oF to 40 F in 9 seconds followed by a period of constant 40oF operation-with'a
,flo>i velocity of .0.38,ft/sec. 'his represents, the injection of auxiliary feedwater into the feedwater nozzle/elbow junction, which has been heated by the steam generator during the hot standby condition.
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~)'.0 Stress Anal sis Cont'd.'he maximum stress obtained from this transient was 27. 1 ksi which is then multiplied by a factor of 1.7 to account for the detailed effect of the discontinuity at the elbow counterbore. This peak stress of 46. 1 ksi yiel.ds an approximate 7000 allowable cycles using the ASME Section III Fi'gute,.'I~9.1 S%N. curves'The.maximum
<number of.',cycl es,, of, .the. trans i'ent vihichcoul d been.ii s,. approximately 000 assiimi.ng".the,"auxiliary;,feedwqter is.',turned. on',every.'4,'ours for
< amenti.re .year'. - Annal d; C.: Cook: Uni t 1.~'i s presently'~i'n 'hutdown!f89 j
and Unit 2 in shutdown 42. We have estimate'd 400 auxiliary feedwater~
injection cycles on Unit 2 for the operating year.
A similar detailed 2D finite element est'ress~ analysis was performed for the new elbow geometry during a..similar severe thermal transient, i.e., the one which occurs during hot shutdown, in the region of the feedwater nozzle to elbow junction. The 20 model was similar except it provided for the thicker pipe wall adjacent to the weld and the modification to the counterbore. The maximum stress obtained from this transient for the modified elbow was 24.3 ksi which then mul,tiplied by a factor of 1.2 to account'or the detailed'effect~of the 4 inch radius fillet at the elbow counterbore. This peak stress of 29.2 ksi yields an allowable 28,000 cycles using the ASME Section III S/N.curves. The 'stresses within the nozzle will likewise be r educed due to the inclusion of a 4 inch fillet to the nozzle counterbore. This reduction in stresses of approximately 295 at the nozzle counterbore will also significantly increase the cycle life of the nozzle.
The final analysis performed was a dynamic analysis of the feedwater line to determine frequencies and mode shapes. The lowest frequencies found were between 5.7 and 10.3 Hz. These frequencies are close to those found for the steam generator in the reactor coolant. loop analysis. Westinghouse testing of other plants has shown that the steam generator vibrates in its fundamental modes due to flow in the reactor coolant:loop. The possibility therefore exists that the feedwater line could be in resonance with the steam generator. This affect increases the possibility of additional vibratory cycles at the nozzle to elbow junction and might explain the propagation of the observed cracks. Final resolution of this possibility must await results of feedwater line instrumentation to determine if resonant vibration exists.
This is necessary due to the degree of uncertainty in determining the feedwater line and steam generator frequencies and the closeness of these frequencies that must be demonstrated to show resonance.
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4.0 FEEDMATER CHEMISTRY It is suspected that dissolved oxygen may have been a contributing factor in the failures and cracking of the feedwater lines on Cook Units 1 and 2.
A thorough review of dissolved oxygen data for both the Cook Units has shown no extremely high dissolved oxygen levels at the feedwater inlets to the steam generators for any extensive period. Most of the time the dissolved oxygen values have been below 10 ppb. Rarely have they exceeded 30 ppb except during unit startups and similar cycle operations.
During unit startups, and hot stand-by, the auxiliary feedwater pump(s) which take suction directly from the condensate storage tank are used to supply makeup water to the steam generators. The condensate storage tank dissolved oxygen levels have generally ranged from 1 to 3 ppm.
While there is no concensus on the minimum concentration of dissolved oxygen that may contribute to this type of failure, AEP intends to reduce and/or maintain dissolved oxygen to a minimum.
- 5. 0 CORRECT'IVE'CTIONS Schedule 80, 16"., A234WPB, carbon steel feedwater line
.'ight new elbows were purchased for installation as replacements. Specific requirements were set forth to machine the elbow's weld end preparation to eliminate the previously existing discontinuity caused by the counterbore and to have a 125 RMS finish on transition. The transition from schedule 60 ID to schedule 80 ID is being made in a long ramp-like fashion with a 1/2" radius fillet as shown in Fig-ures 3, 4 and 5. In addition, weld material has been added to the elbow's outside diameter in the vicinity of the counterbore to return the elbow to the original schedule 80 thickness. These design modifications will reduce the stresses in the area adjacent to the nozzle to elbow weld. The modified weld connection is designed to be made without backing rings.
The Steam Generator nozzles were inspected by radiography and magneti,c particle techniques with negative results. After the elbows were removed on Unit 2, the inside surface of the nozzles were inspected using liquid penetrant. Light pitting with intermittant linear indications were found on the corresponding discontinuity of the nozzle counterbore. Further visual inspection at the second nozzle transition, where the thermal sleeve begins, also showed minor pitting. Westinghouse recommended grinding out the pits and the linear indications at the counterbore discontinuity. Minor pits at the thermal sleeve discontinuity are acceptable. The following criteria has .been set forth by Westinghouse for the grinding of the feedwater nozzles without weld repair:
(1) 0.025" for the entire circumference.
(2) 0.050" for local areas.
(3) Depths within the limits of (1) and (2) above will be blended to approximately 1/2" radius at bottom of repair and tapered to a 4:1 slope.
Each steam generator nozzle counterbore transition from the weld is being pr e-pared similar to the elbow transition, that is, a 1/2" radius fillet.
Test instrumentation will be installed on auxiliary and main feedwater piping and the associated steam generator feedwater nozzles for loops number one and three of Unit 2. The purpose of installing the test instrumentation is to collect information on steady state and transient conditions during normal plant operation from cold shutdown to 100/ power for two steam generators and their associated feedwater piping. Information to be collected consists of motions, strains, pressures and temperatures.
Following is a brief summary of the number and location of the various types of test instrumentation located on each of the two instrumented steam generator-feedwater loops. Loops one and three will be instrumented,'identically with
5 )
5..0 Corrective Actions Cont'd.
respect to type, quantity and location of test instrumentation.
Strain Ga es: Approximately twelve (12) strain gages will be utilized to o tain bending, torsional and axial stresses on the elbow and bending stresses on the nozzle.
Accelerometers: Approximately thirteen (13) accelerometers will be utilized to monitor possible oscillations of the steam generator and associated main
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feedwater piping within the containment.
App measure~circumferential 1y temperature elbow, axial temperature distribution y-f (34) h distribution on p1 11 b d the nozzle and associated along the elbow, and main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater temperatures.
Pressure Transducers: Approximately four (4) pressure transducers will be uti ize to monitor possible water pressure oscillations within the elbow, and main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater piping.
Dis lacement Transducers: Approximately ten (10) displacement transducers wi e use to measure main feedwater pipe displacement within the contain-ment.
The test instrumentation described above will be located on two loops in order to have confirmation of monitored information. The information obtained from all test instrumentation will be recorded outside the contain-ment on either magnetic tape or strip chart recorders.
A detailed program for data collection and evaluation is being developed.
This will include checking the hot and cold positions of the feedwater piping inside containment as Unit 2 is taken from cold shutdown through hot standby.
An evaluation of our findings will be submitted to the NRC before the end of the Unit 2 refueling outage.
The piping lines to Steam Generators 2-1 and 2-3 were chosen to be instrumented.
Since all eight elbows developed cracks in the same location and the piping lines themselves are virtually identical, one line is sufficient to obtain meaningful data. Two lines are instrumented for redundancy and verification.
Unit 2 was chosen because i.t.wi.l.l restart-first .
6.0 SAFETY EVALUATION l~
The cracks in the main feedwater elbows were,'detected by a normal leak detection procedure. The prompt shutdown of Unit 2 and the corrective actions being taken in both units eliminate the possibility of the subject event becoming a source of concern for the health and safety of the general public.
AEP initiated a thorough review of our safety analysis, specifically those sections relating to feedwater line ruptures, includfng the sudden circumferential severance of the feedwater elbow and the status of the Unit at the time of the incident.
The emergency backup systems were fully capable of mitigating the consequences of a feedwater line break wi thout adversely affecting the health and safety of the general public. Emergency operating procedures were available at the pl,ant to cope with a feedwater line rupture. During the time of the feedwater line leakage and throughout the, Unit 2 shutdown,".all requi'red'auxiliary feedwater,- pumps and ECCS equipment were operable to mitigate the consequences of a feedwater line rupture.
Our offsite (AEPSC NSDRC) and onsite (PNSRC) committees have reviewed the feedwater elbow cracking event and have concluded that the "as found" feedwater system did not constitute an unreviewed question within the bounds of the safety analysis, and that it is safe to operate the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant with the installed modifica-tions.
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