|
---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
.ACCESSION NBR:9009250128 DOC.DATE: 90/09/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BRADISH,T.R. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R
SUBJECT:
LER 90-006-00:on 900814,reactor turbine trip. trip following manual D
H/9 DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR 2 ENCL 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. /
SIZE'ITLE:
NOTES:STANDARDIZED PLANT 05000528 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D PETERSON,S. 1 3. TRAMMELL,C. 1 1.
INTERNAL: ACNH 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll. 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DS~T SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 ~E 1 1 1 1 RGN5 FT5P 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE g J ~ H 3 3 L ST LOBBY HARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 35 ENCL 35
i 1
II 1
f l
II
Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00691-JML/TRB/SBJ JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT September 13, 1990 NUCEEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subj ect: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit: 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)
Licensee Event Report 90-006-00 File 90-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-006-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), we are forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.
If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/SBJ/dmn Attachment CC: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
J. B. Martin D. H. Coe A. C. Gehr C. M. Trammell A. H. Gutterman INPO Records Center 9009250128 960913 PDR ADOCK O 000.28 S PDC
~6 2Q
~f I
il
/I II I
t,
NRC Form 345 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
AppRDYED DMS No, $ 1504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: SISIISS FACILITYNAME II) DOCKET NUMSER (2) PA E 3 TITLE (4)
Palo Verde Unit 1 0 s o 0 0 528 > o(- 8 Reactor Tri Followin Manual Turbine Tri EVENT DATE(5) LER NUMEER (5) REPORT DATE (1) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)
HI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEGVENTrAL Io~~ REYS~ MONTH OAY FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)
NUMIIER tpni NUMBER YEAR N A 0 5 0 0 0 08 9 90 006 00 9 390 N/A THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): IChrcir onr or mori of the foffowlnpi l11) 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (5) 1 20.402(a) 20AOE(cl 50.7$ (e) 12Hivl 7$ .71(a)
POWER 20.405( ~ ) (I Hi) 50.35(c ( 50.7$ 4H2Hv) 73.71(c)
LEVEL 1 p p 20.405(e ) (I I I ii) 50.35 (c) (2( 50.7$ (el(2)(vQI OTHER ISprcIfy In Atrttrrct trriow rnd In Trit, IIRC Form 20.405( ~ ) II I(iii) 50.73(eHEHI) 50.73(e) (2) (riiil(AI 3rtt)AI 20.405(e) (1)(ivl 50.734) (2) (5) 50.73(el(2) (riiil(S) 20.405 (e I III(v) 50.73(eH2) (ii)) 50.7$ ( ~ )(2Hcl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMSER AREA CODE T. R. Bradish, Compliance Manager 6 0239 3-2 521 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRISED IN THIS REPOR'7 (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTASLE rg~)@IRR@ MANUFAC. rroRT rLE TURER TO NPRDS g+~&@)+I%I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER fr~(le)g(4LIr L F MR 121 Y y'."": .1, vm C%%%71.
%4WW SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SU 5 MISS ION YES fifyet, complete EXPECTED SUSMISSIOff OATEI DATE II5)
X NO ASST RACT (Limit to f400 tprtrL I e., epproiimrtriy fifteen tfnpir eprcr typrwrftNn lined I'I~ I On August 14, 1990 Palo Verde Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. At approximately 2159 MST it was discovered that the 'B'hase of the Main Transformer had lost forced cooling. A rapid power reduction was initiated in order to unload the transformer within 30 minutes as required by the alarm response procedure for a loss of transformer cooling and to minimize the transient on the plant. The Main Turbine was manually tripped at approximately 2223 with the reactor at approximately 65 percent power.
Approximately 30 seconds after the Main Turbine trip, the reactor tripped on high pressurizer pressure. All systems functioned as designed and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY).
The loss of cooling to the Main Transformer was caused by the failure of a control power transformer. The reactor trip has been determined to be the expected result of a load reject with the reactor at 65 percent power with steam bypass control configured for normal (100 percent power) operation.
The control power transformer was replaced. The alarm response procedure for the Main Transformer will be revised to enhance directions for the "No Voltage Alarm". Enhancements to the steam bypass control system are currently under evaluation.
NRC form $ 55
t NRC FORM366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)9) APPROVED 0MB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTI 50J) HAS. FORWARD COMMENTS AEGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND RFPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4I30). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SES( SEOUENTIAL j31<'EVISION os> NUMBER SVB NUMBER Palo Verde Unit 1 o so oo528 9 0 06 00 0 2 oF 0 8 TEXT IIImom sosso Is soqIdmd, oso odd+'oesl INC FomI 36M 'sf (17)
I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:
A. Initial Conditions:
On August 14, 1990 Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATIONS) at 100 percent power.
B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification: An event or condition that resulted in automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS)(JC)
On August 14, 1990 at approximately 2223 MST Palo Verde Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip from approximately 65 percent power due to high pressurizer (PZR)(AB) pressure.
Immediately prior to the reactor trip, reactor power had been rapidly reduced to approximately 65 percent power and the Main Turbine (TA) manually tripped due to loss of forced cooling to the
'B'hase of the Main Transformer (EL).
Prior to the event, Palo Verde Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power when the control room (NA) received a Main Transformer Voltage Alarm" at approximately 2123 MST. An operator
'B'No (utility, non-licensed) was dispatched to investigate the alarm in accordance with the alarm response procedure (41AL-1MAOl, Group I). The operator proceeded to the control panel located behind the Main Transformer enclosure wall and discovered a breaker (BKR) in the control panel to the 'B'ain Transformer had tripped. The breaker was reset but tripped open in approximately 4 seconds.
The Assistant Shift Supervisor (utility, licensed) then went to investigate the situation. The Assistant Shift Supervisor unsuccessfully attempted to reset the breaker after isolating loads. All actions for the alarm response procedure were taken with the last action being to contact Maintenance. At approximately 2159 MST maintenance personnel (utility, non-licensed) observed that the cooling fans to Main Transformer not operating. The Main Transformer alarm response procedure
'B'ere for a loss of cooling was then entered (41AL-1MA01, Group A). The alarm response procedure directed that the Main Transformer load be reduced to zero within 30 minutes of a loss of forced cooling to the Main Transformer.
NRC F oRR 366A (6()S)
NRC FORLI 366A V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 31500(04 (669) EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN FSTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR 3(32 SEQUENTIAL ZN REVISION NUMBER i&% NVMEER Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o5 28 0 0 06 00 03oF 08 TEXT lilmoro EP444 /4 rrtur)od, uro oddiciono//VRC Forrrl 36649/ ((7)
At approximately 2202 MST a power reduction was initiated in accordance with plant procedures. Approximately 20 minutes into the power reduction with reactor power at approximately 70 percent, it was decided to manually control trip the Ma'in Turbine. A quick briefing was held by room personnel (utility/licensed) to discuss required actions and the anticipated plant response. At approximately 2223 MST, the Main Turbine was tripped with the Reactor at approximately 65 percent power.
The Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS)(JI) responded to the transient as designed. At the time of the event seven of the eight steam bypass valves (SBCV)(PCV) were in service and one SBCV was in manual in accordance with plant procedures. When the Main Turbine was tripped, the SBCS generated a quick open signal. The seven in service SBCV's automatically opened to 100 percent in response to the quick open signal. The SBCS then transferred the SBCVs to modulating control. The time delay for the modulate control signal to integrate to take control of the valves allows the SBCVs to begin to close prior to modulation. During this time period, the pressurizer pressure increased and approximately 30 seconds after the turbine trip, the reactor tripped on high pressurizer pressure.
The control room personnel entered the Emergency Operations Procedure and diagnosed the event as an uncomplicated reactor trip. The plant was then stabilized within 5 minutes in accordance with plant procedures and remained in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) pending investigation of the trip.
During the recovery from the trip, it was noted that the 'O'og Power (IG) channel was reading approximately 2 decades higher than the other channels. The 'O'og Power channel was declared inoperable and placed in bypass.
NRC Form 366A (669)
il r,
NAC FOAM366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31500104 (669)
EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'0.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITYNANIE (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL <~:m REVISION N U M 6 E II odS NUMSSR Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 528 0 006 0 0 0 4 oF 0 8 TEXT ///mote 4/Mce /4 ret/It/ted. Vee eddt'0'ooeltYRC Fottn 3554'4/ (ll)
Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:
The cooling fans and pumps for the 'B'hase of the Main Transformer were out of service prior to the reactor trip because of the loss of transformer control power is described in Section I. B.
In addition, one of the eight SBCVs was in manual as required by APS procedures (e.g. the valve would not automatically operate) for normal (100 percent) power operation.
D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:
Cooling to Main Transformer 'B'as lost because of the failure of a transformer (XFMR) supplying control power. The loss of control power caused the cooling fans and pumps to stop and the loss of the annunciator system for other transformer alarms. A root cause of failure is being performed on the control power transformer.
The 'C'og power channel reading was caused by noise introduced into the circuit by the proximity of other cables within, the instrument drawer. When the instrument drawer is opened and closed (e.g., during surveillance testing), the cables can be repositioned such that noise will be introduced into the circuit.
When the reactor is at power (greater than 0.0001 percent), the signal to noise ratio is high enough that the noise has no affect on the indication. When at low power levels (less than 0.0001 percent), the signal to noise ratio is such that the noise can contribute to the indication.
E. Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:
The control power transformer failed such that all control power to the 'B'hase of the Main Transformer was lost. This caused the transformer oil cooling fans and pumps to trip resulting in a potential for the transformer to overheat.
F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:
Not applicable - no component failures with multiple functions were involved.
NAC Fotm 366A (569)
f t
l f
I II f
NRC FORM366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3)504)104 (669)
EXP IR ES; 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST! 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(504)104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2I LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR or@4 SEQUENTIAL 6~@ 4EVISION NUMBER NUMSE4 Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 589 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 5OFO 8 TEXT f// msso spsso is /sqoked, IISo Sdditlooo/PVRC FomI 3ÃA'4/117)
G. For a failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:
Not applicable - there were no failures that rendered a safety system inoperable.
H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:
The component failures were identified as discussed in I.B.
The limitations of the alarm response procedure for the "No Voltage" alarm to the Main Transformer was discovered during the event investigation. The alarm response procedure did not properly identify the consequences of the alarm (e.g., the loss of other main transformer annunciations, loss of oil pumps and cooling fans) ~ As discussed in Section I. B, Palo Verde procedures require that the transformer be unloaded within 30 minutes of a loss of cooling event. Approximately 36 minutes passed before the loss of cooling was identified because of the procedure limitations.
I. Cause of event The high pressurizer pressure condition that caused the reactor trip has been determined to be normal plant response to a load rejection at 65 percent power. Combustion Engineering was contacted and verified that a reactor trip is the expected result for a load reject from 65 percent power with one steam bypass valve in manual.
The cause of the control power transformer failure and the erroneous log power channel indication are as discussed in I.D.
A Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) evaluation was performed. Personnel actions during the event were determined to be adequate and prudent. There was no unusual work characteristic that contributed to the event.
NR 0 Fosm 366A (689)
II f
t f
NAC FOAM366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATOAYCOICMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 31504))04 (689)
EXPIRES; 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFOAMATION COLLECTION REGUESTI 500 HRS, FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504))04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YCAA ~~r SEQUENTIAL Pr ~<V ACVIBIIDN NUMBCA 8>S NUMBCA Palo Verde Unit 1 0 6 0 0 0 2 5 8 9 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 oj 0 8 TEXT ///more <<>>ee /4 reerrkef, Iree edditer>>l /ll(C Form 3664'4/ (17)
J. Safety System Response:
The Plant Protection System (PPS)(JL) responded to the transient as designed. The reactor was automatically tripped when the 2 out of 4 logic was satisfied in channels 'A" and 'D'or the high pressurizer pressure. In addition, Core Protection Calculator (CPC)(ID) channel 'D'xperienced an auxiliary trip on high Pressurizer Pressure. Prior to the event the channel 'D'ressure indicator was reading approximately 30 psia higher than the other channels (this was within the instrument tolerance verified by surveillance tests), therefore, channel 'D'ould be expected to reach its auxiliary trip setpoint in the Core Protection Calculator. The PPS actuations were verified to be within technical specification setpoints (less than 2388 pounds per square inch absolute) and response time (less than 1.15 seconds) limits.
K. Failed Component Information:
The control power transformer is model 548G11502M manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:
The reactor trip following the manual Main Turbine trip has been determined to be the expected result based on the current control systems design. A Combustion Engineering evaluation performed on the SBCS shows that a reactor trip will occur on pressurizer pressure after a load reject with the reactor at 65 percent power and one steam bypass control valve in manual.
The plant systems stabilized the plant after the reactor trip as designed. The equipment/system malfunctions identified after the reactor trip did not affect the operation of the plant.
Based on the post trip review of the event, there were no significant safety consequences or any affect on the health and safety of the public because of the event.
NRC Form 366A (689)
I, II h
i
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION APPROVEO 0MB NO, 31500)04 (669) EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR e$+ ~ SEQUENTIAL @C aEVISION MS NUMeea '... 3 NUMeea Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 2 5 8 0 0 4 00 0 7 OF 0 8 TEXT /// /aors sPsso /s )4)/I'rL oss sr/dro'ons/HRC Forrrr 3664 4/ (Il)
III. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
A. Immediate:
Reactor power was rapidly reduced in response to the loss of cooling of the Main Transformer. Subsequently, the Main Turbine was manually tripped.
Following the reactor trip, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3.
The Main Transformer oil was analyzed and found to be within specifications.
B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:
The control power transformer for the 'B'hase Main Transformer was replaced and the associated control circuit functionally checked.
The cable routing for the 'C'og power channel was adjusted to eliminate the noise.
The alarm response procedure for the Main Transformer will be revised to include enhanced direction for the "No Voltage" alarm.
This is expected to be completed by November 16, 1990.
An evaluation of the Main Transformer Control Circuit will be performed to determine if any modifications should be made to change the circuit response to a loss of control power. The evaluation is expected to be completed by November 16, 1990.
Combustion Engineering (CE) had previously evaluated the SBCS.
Based on an engineering review of the CE report, design and procedural changes have been identified that will improve system performance. The procedural changes will be incorporated into the applicable procedures. The design changes will be scheduled and implemented in accordance with the site work schedule.
NRC Form 366A (669)
I)
'(
ll
(
I I
1 I
NRC FORM 368A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION APPROVED OM 8 NO. 31500104 (84)9)
E X PIR ES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50/I HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMBER (2I LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR gS SEQUENTIAL v>HR REvrsroN NVMBER ~+4 NUMBER QF 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 TEXT /Ifmore <<reee /4 rrekaf, oee eddrtNrrre/HRC Fomr 36642/ ((7)
IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS There have been several reactor trips due to High Pressurizer pressure. All of the previous events involved the failure of-SBCVs to perform as designed. As discussed in this report, a Reactor trip is the expected result of a load rejection from 65 percent power, therefore, recurrence measures would not have prevented the event discussed in this report.
NRC Form 366A (669)
'v' jt 1
I h
l t
(