ML17313A313

LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached

ML17313A313
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	03/21/1998
From:	Marks D ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML17313A312	List: ML17313A311 ML17313A313
References
LER-98-001-01, LER-98-1-1, NUDOCS 9803310150
Download: ML17313A313 (8)

Text

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 1oFO TLE (a)

Surveillance test deficiency found during quality assurance audit leads to TS 3.0.3/4;0.3 entry EVENT DATE 5 LERNUMBER d REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACIUTIES INVOLVED d YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION T NUMBERS NVMBER NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 9 8 9 8 - 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 3 2 1 9 8 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING HIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANl'O THE REQUIREMEN s oF 10 cFR L: (check one or moro cf Irrefodorrng) (11)

MODE (0) 20.a02(b) 20.45(c) 50.73(aX2Xiv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.45(s)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(s)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL(to) 1 P P 20.405(sXty) 50.36(cX2) 50.73(s)(2)(vs~ OTHER (Specify h Abstract 20 405(aXI j(B) 50.73(aX2xi) 50.73(a)(2XviiXA) below arxf h Text. NRC Form 20.45(s)(1)(iv) 50.73(s)(2XT) 50.73(sX2XviiiXB) 20.45(a)(1)(v) 50.73(aX2XE) 50.73(sX2Xx)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

E ELEPHONE NUMBER EA CODE Daniel G. Marks, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs 6 0 2 3 9 3 - 6 4 9 2 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (1 ~ ) EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR SUBMISSION x.o YES (Ifyes, compiete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

TRAcT (Lena to 1 400 spaces, Le.. spproxvnstely fifteen On March 1, 1998, s~ tfpewreen Ines) (16) at approximately 1645 MST, Palo Verde Unit '2 was in Mode 1 DATE (15)

(POWER OPERATION), operating at approximately 100 percent power when Control Room personnel declared both trains of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) inoperable due to exceeding the specified surveillance interval including the maximum allowable extension of 25 percent as specified in Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.2, and entered TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Control Room personnel invoked the provisions of TS SR 4.0.3 to allow up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to permit the completion of the missed surveillance prior to commencing a plant shutdown.

TS SR 4.5.2.d.3 (pH of trisodium phosphate) was satisfactorily completed within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Control Room personnel exited TS LCO 3.0.3 at approximately 0445 MST on March 2, 1998.

The cause of the event was attributed to personnel error during the performance of the SR. As corrective action, personnel responsible for the inadequately performed SR were coached.

There have been no previous similar events reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

9803310150 980321 PDR ADQCK 05000529 S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ACRIiYNAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR RENQQN NUMBER NUMBER Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 9 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 of 0 4 1~ REPORTING REQUIREMENT:

This LER 529/98-001-00 is being written to report a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS) as specified in 10 CFR

50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) .

Specifically, at approximately 1645 MST on March 1, 1998, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) operating at approximately 100 percent power when Control Room personnel declared both trains of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) (BP/BQ) inoperable due to exceeding the specified surveillance interval including the maximum allowable extension of 25 percent, as specified in TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.2, and entered TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Control Room personnel invoked the provisions of TS SR 4.0.3 to allow up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to period.t the completion of the missed surveillance prior to commencing a plant shutdown. TS SR 4.5.2.d.3 fpH of trisodium phosphate (TSP) ] was satisfactorily completed within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Control Room personnel exited TS LCO 3.0.3 at approximately 0445 MST on March 2, 1998.

2. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Prior to the event, during a Nuclear Assurance (NA) Chemistry/Radiological Monitoring Audit, Chemistzy and NA personnel discovered that the September 10, 1997 performance of TS SR 4.5.2.d.3 was incorrectly performed in Unit

2. TS SR 4.5.2.d.3 requires every 18 months the verification that when a representative sample of 3.5 +/- 0.005 grams of anhydrous TSP (corrected for moisture content) from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in boric acid solution, the pH of the solution is raised to 2 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. NA personnel notified Control Room personnel of the discrepancy. Control Room personnel declared both trains of ECCS inoperable due to exceeding the specified surveillance interval including the maximum allowable extension of 25 percent as specified in SR 4.0.2, and entered TS LCO 3.0.3. Control Room personnel invoked the provisions of TS SR 4.0.3 to allow up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to permit the completion of the missed surveillance prior to commencing a plant shutdown. TS SR 4.5.2.d,3 was satisfactorily completed within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Control Room personnel exited TS LCO 3.0.3 at approximately 0445 MST on March 2, 1998.

There were no safety system actuations and none were required.

3. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

The Bases for TS SR 4 '.2.d.3 (sample from the TSP baskets provides adequate pH ad)ustment of borated water) states that the TSP will incr'ease the water pH to h 7. Maintaining the pH 2 7 prevents a significant

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ACIUlYNAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR RENSQN NUMBER Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 9 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 of 0 4 fraction of dissolved iodine from converting to a volatile form and minimizes the potential of stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components in containment (NH) following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The requirement for TSP to raise the pH to 7.0 was met, with less than the amount specified in TS SR 4.5.2.d.3. Therefore, the ECCS was capable of performing its specified design basis function during the period the TS SR was not met.

The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barriers or result in any release of radioactive materials. Therefore, there were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event.

This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public, CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

An independent investigation of this event is being conducted in accordance with the APS Corrective Action Program. A review of the surveillance test procedure indicated that a calculational error had been made during the performance of the test, which caused the tolerance of

+/- 0.005 grams TSP'as required by TS to be missed. The error occurred when the weight of the drying dish was not subtracted from the total weight of the TSP (SALP Cause Codes: A: Personnel Error). The equivalent weight of TSP used for the performance of the ST was 3.377 grams, which was outside the tolerance of 3.5 +/- 0.005 grams. Although a lesser amount of TSP was dissolved than specified in TS SR 4.5.2.d.3, the SR acceptance criteria (i.e., pH to 2 7) was met because there was a conservative amount of TSP present.

The investigation also determined that with the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications in July 1998, this event would not be reportable because the tolerance as specified in the Bases section would be changed from a tolerance of 3.5 +/- 0.005 grams to a maximum of 5 3.5005 grams under the TS Bases Control Program.

No unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., noise, heat, poor lighting) directly contributed to this event. No procedural errors contributed to this event.

5. STRUCTURES ~ SYSTEMS J OR COMPONENTS IN FORMATION Although the ECCS was declared inoperable for a lapsed surveillance requirement, there were no component or system failures involved in this event. No failures of components with multiple functions were involved.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION hCIVTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR BEQUEMAAl RECON NUMBER NUMBER

-Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 4 of 0 4 No failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable were involved.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

An independent investigation of this event is being conducted in accordance with the APS Corrective Action Program. Actions to prevent recurrence included coaching the Chemistry technician tother utility personnel) on attention to detail and procedural adherence. Cognitive personnel errors that are the result of mental lapses aze not normally correctable with revised procedures or additional training. Therefore, no further actions were determined to be necessary.

7 ~ PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

Although previous events have been reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 in the past three years for missing TS surveillance requirements, the causes discussed in the previous events have not been similar to this event, Therefore, the corrective actions of the previous events would not have prevented this event.

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