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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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ACCELERATED DISHUBUTION DEMONSHRATION SYSIKM
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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9004040165 DOC.DATE:,90/03/26 NOTARIZED: NO 'DOCKET,.C FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BRADISH,T.R. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 90-001-00:on 900223,manual reactor shutdown.
trip during planned W/9 'ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
J ENCL g SIZE:
NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA .1'1 1- PD5 PD 1 1 PETERSON,S. 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB'EDRO 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P 2 2 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 .1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB1'1 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 .1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB. 7E 1 1 SZ LB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG F 02 1 "1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 F1LE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EGGG STUART g V A 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHYgG ~ A 1' NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENIS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE, WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES -REQUIRED: LTTR 35 ENCL 35
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Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 JAMES M. LEVINE 19 2-"006'4 0- JML/TRB/RKR VICE PRESIDENT March 26, 1990 NUCLEAR PRODUCTIDN U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51'),
Licensee Event Report 90-001-00 File'0-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-001-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.
If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting) Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/tlg Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
E. E. Van Brunt J. B. Martin D..H. Coe
. T. L. Chan A. C. Gehr J. R. Newman INFO Records Center 90o-'2 90LI 'og.
AD O~~0LI052'r'DFl
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0 NRC Forrrr 355 V <L NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)3 I APPROVED OMS NO. $ 1500104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) EXPIRES: 5/31/SS FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (1) PA Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 1 OFO TITLE 141
'Mannual Reactor Tri Durin Planned Shutdown EVENT DATE(5I 7'ONTH LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)
DAY YEAR YEAR SSOVSNTI*L NUMSEII 4 NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS) 0 5 0 0 0 02 23 9 090 0 0 1 p p 0 3 2 6 9 0 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 cF R ()I ICnrck onr or mort ol tnr Iollowlntl (I'I MODE (Sl 20.402(4) 1 20.405(cl 50.7$ (el(1)(lr) 7$ .7((SI tOWER 20.405( ~ ) (I 1(il SOM(cl(II 50.734) (2l(el 7$ .71(cl LEVEL p 20.405 (e) II I (4) 50.35(c) (1) 50.7$ (e) (2)(rS I OTHER ISprcily in At<et<oct S~
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CAVSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TVRER TO NPRDS '4 .~~<4' REPORTABLE .8;.<PS<o
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' CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAG TURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS
ÃL%%I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Ill MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 YES IIIyrL comPlrtr EXPECTED SVSMISSIOII DATE/ NO ABSTRACT ILlmlt to tr00 u>>crt, ir., rpproeimrtely Iiltrrn tintfr tl>>cr typewrinrn linN/ (15)
At approximately 2301 MST on February 23, 1990, Palo Verde 'Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at. approximately 24 percent power during a planned shutdown for a refueling outage when the reactor was manually, tripped by a reactor operator because the Axial Shape Index was,approaching its trip setpoint on the Core Protection Calculator. The reactor trip was di'agnosed as an uncomplicated reactor trip. No other safety system responses occurred and none were required. At approximately 2311 MST on February 23, 1990 the plant was stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal temperature and pressure.
The cause of the manual reactor trip was that the Axial Shape Index was approaching its trip setpoint during an end of core life shutdown. The corrective action was to trip the reactor and ensure the Axial Shape Index remained within limits.
A previous similar event was reported in LER 528I/'87-018-01.
NRC eorm 3el
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NRC FORM 355A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 31604)04 (SJIQ)
EXPIRES: 1/30/Q2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 60A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31604)(M), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITYkAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEOVENTIAL 4EV0 ION NVMSER NVM 54 Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 52 990 0 0 1 0 002 oF 0 7 TEXT llfmO>> NNce /T nocked, u>> afdidoAAIHRC Form 35543/ ()7)
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:
A. Initial Conditions:
At approximately 2301 MST on February 23, 1990, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 24 percent power during a planned shutdown for refueling.
B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification: Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)(JE),
including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)(JC).
At approximately 2301 MST on February 23, 1990, while shutting down for a planned refueling outage, the Unit 2 reactor (RCT)(AC) was manually tripped by a reactor operator (utility, licensed) due to the Axial Shape Index approaching its trip setpoint on the Core Protection Calculator (CPU)(JC). The reactor trip was diagnosed as an uncomplicated reactor trip. No safety system responses occurred and none were required. At approximately 2311 MST on February 23, 1990, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal temperature and pressure.
The Axial Shape Index is defined as "the power generated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core divided by the sum of these powers" (Technical Specification Definition 1.2). Axial Shape Index is calculated in each of the four Core Protection Calculator Channels. When a Core Protection Calculator Channel calculates an Axial Shape Index greater than .50 or less than minus .50, it generates a trip signal to the Plant Protection System (JC). The Plant Protection System has a two-out-of-four logic thus requiring Axial Shape Index trip signals from two Core Protection Calculator Channels to initiate a reactor trip.
Prior to the event, at approximately 1700 MST on February 23, 1990, Unit 2 was at approximately 97 percent power when boration was started to shutdown the reactor for the scheduled refueling outage. During the reactor shutdown, Axial Shape Index increased in the negative direction. The Group 4, Group 5, and Part Length Control Element Assemblies (CEAs)(ROD)(AA) were inserted in NRC Form 355A (58Q)
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NRC FORM 366A UA. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3)504)104 (64)9) EXP I R ES.'/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50Al HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR Q~ EEQVENTIAI NVM E4 Pk 4EVISK)N
>6> NVMEE4 Palo Verde Unit 2, 0 s o 0 0 529 9 0 001 00 03 QF 0 7 TEXT /// more 4/rece /4 tJJr/rerL cree er/r/iaorre/HRC Form 36649/ (I2) accordance with an approved procedure to dampen the negative shift in Axial Shape Index. During the CEA insertion, Axial Shape Index initially became less negative, but then the trend continued in the negative direction. At approximately 2023 MST, insertion of Group 4 CEAs was stopped in accordance with an approved procedure due to indication of a potential ground. Manipulation of the Group 5 and Part Length CEAs continued to optimize Axial Shape Index control.
At approximately 2130 MST with the reactor at approximately 40 percent power and decreasing due to increasing Xenon concentration, a maximum dilution (120 gpm) was started to slow the power decrease and stabilize Axial Shape Index. At approximately 2149 MST,, with Axial Shape Index approaching the limit (minus .28) of Technical Specification 3.2.7.a, the Group 4 CEAs insertion was continued in accordance with an approved procedure. No grounds were detected .during this insertion.
At approximately 2218 MST on February 23, 1990, the Axial Shape Index decreased below the limit (minus .28) of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.7.a and the associated ACTION statement was entered. The Group 4, Group 5, and Part Length CEAs were again manipulated in accordance with an approved procedure in an attempt to control Axial Shape Index without success.= The Reactor Engineer (utility, non-licensed) and Control Room Shift Supervisor (utility, licensed) discussed the situation and determined that any further power reduction would increase the negative shift in Axial Shape Index. At approximately 2256 MST, the Shift Supervisor and Operations Supervisor (utility, licensed) were discussing the potential for Axial Shape Index approaching the trip setpoint on the Core Protection Calculator. At this time the Channel D Core Protection Calculator generated a trip signal to the Plant Protection System based on Axial Shape Index exceeding its trip setpoint (minus 0.50). The Shift Supervisor and Operations Supervisor decided to manually trip the reactor if any of the untripped Core Protection Calculator channels Axial Shape Index reached minus 0.49.
Axial Shape Index continued to approach the trip setpoint for the Core Protection Calculators non-tripped channels and at approximately 2301 MST on February 23, 1990, the reactor was manually tripped when Channels A and B Core Protection Calculators Axial Shape Index reached minus 0.49. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and at approximately 2311 MST on February 23, 1990, the plant was stabilized in Mode 3 at normal temperature and NRC Ferro 366A (669)
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NRC FORM 366A ILS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION APPROVEO 0MB NO. 31500104 (64)9)
E XP IR ES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWAAO COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUNIBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMSER NUMSER Palo Verde Unit 2 0 s 0 0 o,529 9 0 '001 00 04 OF 0 7 TEXT /I/msve SFSCs /4 NqukwL s44 SI/I/e'an4/H/IC Foml 36643/ (17) pressure. There were no Engineered Safety Features responses or actuations and none were necessary.
C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:
Not applicable - no structures, systems or components were inoperable which contributed to this event. The Group 4 CEAs were not inoperable. Their use was restricted based on past experience and justification for continued operation.
D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:
Not applicable - no component or system failures were involved.
E. Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:
Not applicable - no component failures were involved.
F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were, also affected:
Not applicable - no component failures were involved For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:
Not applicable - there were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable.
H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:
Not applicable - there were no component or system failures or procedural errors.
Cause of Event:
The cause of the manual reactor trip was that the Axial Shape Index was approaching its limits during an end of core life shutdown (SALP cause code'). Past industry experience shows it is difficult to maintain operating limits, especially Axial Shape Index, during an end of cor'e life shutdown, particularly with NRC Foml 366A (689)
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NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO 0MB NO. 31500(04 (609)
E XPIR ES; 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR I: L1 SEQUENTIAL 4~% NVMoerl jg rrU>>
~
AEVISrON ell Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 0 001 00 05 oF 0 7 TEXT llfmore 4r>>ce Jrr nrRrked, rree Arr Ike>>l NRC Arrrr 3664 BJ (Ill large (height) cores. The shutdown plan, based on an evaluation of core parameters during a normal shutdown, predicted Axial Shape Index would approach its limit at the end of the shutdown. As described in Section I.B, the shutdown plan did not maintain Axial Shape Index within its limits. There were no personnel errors or procedural errors that contributed to this event. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that contributed to the event.
The restriction to movement of Group 4 CEAs from approximately 2023 MST to approximately 2149 MST due to the indicated ground as described in Section I.B, may have contributed to the event.
However, due to operator actions to control Axial Shape Index as a result of the restriction on movement of Group 4 CEAs, the exact effect cannot be accurately determined. The CEA grounding problem had been identified prior to this event. Justification for continued operation had previously been prepared. A procedure had been approved for CEA operation when there are indicated grounds on CEAs,.
Safety System Response.:
A manual reactor trip occurred due to the Axial Shape Index approaching its trip setpoints on the Core Protection Calculators as described in Section I.B. No other safety systems responses occurred and none were required during this event.
Failed Component Information:
Not applicable - no failed components were involved.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:
The reactor trip was manually initiated prior to the reactor exceeding a Core Protection Calculator trip setpoint and was diagnosed as an uncomplicated reactor trip. No safety systems response was required.
The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers or result in any releases of radioactive materials. Therefore, there were no safety consequences or implications as a result of this event.
This event did not adversely affect the health and'afety of the public.
NRC Forrrr 366A (64)9l
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NRC FORMSSSA US. NUCLEAR AEGULATORY COI4MISSION APPROVEO DMS NO. 3(504))04 (5SQ) ~
EXPHI ES: 4/30t02 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION AEQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING SUROEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND SUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMSER LS) PAGE (3)
REVISION YEAR NUMSER NUM ER Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2, 9 9 0 P P=l 0 0 0 OF p TEXT tlt moro Spore ts orN)rorL Irro eArko'arel ttRC Form SSSAS) (IT)
III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
A. Immediate:
1 The reactor was manually tripped to ensure the Axial Shape Index Core Protection Channel trip setpoint was not exceeded.
B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:
Because of the reactor core physical characteristics there is a potential for a reactor trip during an end of core life shutdown. However, APS is enhancing the procedures listed below to reduce the chance of a reactor trip during a planned shutdown.
Procedure 4XOP-XZZ05 "Power Operation", is being enhanced to include a requirement to obtain Reactor Engineering's prediction of important parameters prior to starting a shutdown (when time permits). This requirement is expected to be implemented by October 31, 1990.
B. Procedure 72PR-9ZZ01 "Reactor Engineering Program", is being enhanced to provide more formal control of the information provided to Operations by Reactor Engineering. This is expected to be implemented by October 31, 1990.
The Unit 2 Control Element Drive Mechanism coils are being inspected and re-worked during the current refueling outage to correct CEA grounding indications.
IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
LER 528/87-018-01 described an event where the reactor tripped during an end of core life shutdown. The reactor was shutting down to evaluate a possible Reactor Coolant System leak. The reactor trip was automatically initiated when the Core Protection Calculator generated a trip signal to the Plant Protection System due to Axial Shape Index deficient exceeding limits. The root cause of the event was a procedure. The procedure did not contain sufficient strategies for controlling Axial Shape Index at the end of core life. The procedure was updated to include strategies for controlling Axial Shape Index during an end of core life shutdown. Although these were similar events, the corrective action could not have prevented the event NRC Form 36SA (54)9)
NRC FORM 355A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CON)MISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 (589)
EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED'URDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60J) HRS.
REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS FORWARD'OMMENTS TEXT CONTINUATION, AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(50410(). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER IS) PAGE (3)
YEAR NUM Srl '4 N'll. SEQUENTIAL .WA rrEVrSIOrr rrvMFErr Palo Verde Unit 2 o s o o o 5 2 9 90 0 01 0 0 70F 0 7 TEXT /llrrroro Jlro>> /o rooted,'v>> afdio'orro/HRC Frnrr 35/AB) (17) described in this report, even though strategies for controlling Axial Shape Index were used in accordance with the approved procedure.
NRC Form 355A (589)
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