ML17305A353

LER 89-019-00:on 890929,Train B of Fuel Bldg Essential Ventilation Actuation Sys Spuriously Actuated.Caused by Loose Connection Between Radiation Monitor Remote Indication & Control Unit Instrument Drawer & cabinet.W/891025 Ltr

ML17305A353
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/25/1989
From:	James M. Levine, Shriver T ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00543-JML-T, 192-543-JML-T, LER-89-019, LER-89-19, NUDOCS 8911060427
Download: ML17305A353 (14)

Text

ACCELERATED +STRJBUTION DEMOIRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8911060427 DOC ~ DATE: 89/10/25 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528g FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, AUTH. NAME .- AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHRIVER,T.D. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-019-00:on 890929,ESF actuation caused by loose connection.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES 05000528 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 CHAN,T 1 1 DAVIS,M. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PS B 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR REP RPB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 G F 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 019'ILE 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSi S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1, LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 40 ENCL 40

tl l

It Q

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P 0 BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00543-JML/TDS/SBJ October 25, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)

Licensee Event Report 89-019-00 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-019-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T..D. Shriver, Compliance Hanager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours,

. M. evine ice President Nuclear Production JML/TDS/SBJ/kj Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Hartin T. J. Polich H. J. Davis A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center r 9$ 106O4'~'~ 9$ o25 QQII3CK 0 r=I)oo~i28 Fi'DI PDR S

l C

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)9) APPROVED QMB NO. 3(504)(04 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HAS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TQ THE RECORDS AND AEPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530). V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TQ THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 52 8 1 OF 0 5 TITLE (4)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Caused by Loose Connection EVENT DATE(5) LER NUMBER (6) AEPOR'7 DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVrEIQN MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI NUMBER NUMEER N/A 0 5 0 0 0 0 9 29 898 9 0 1 9 0 0 10 25 8 9 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 TH15 REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFA (): /Cher/r one or more Ol the lollowinp/ (11)

OPERATING MODE ISI 20A02(E) 20.405(cl 73.71(II) 50.73(e) (2)(iv)

POWER 20.405(e) l1) (II 50.36 (e) (1) 50,73(el(2)(v) 73.71(cl LEVEL (10) 20.405( ~ l(1l(N) 50.36(c)(2) 60.73(el(2)(rill OTHER ISpecily in Ahtirect helovr end ln Teer. /IIIC Form 20A05( ~ ) (I) (ill) 50.73( ~ l(2)(ll 50,73(el(2) Irllll(A) 20.405( ~ l(1)(lvl 50,73( ~ l(2)(ill 50.73( ~ )(2)(vill)IBI

':,':::i4!)LPgk4@g 20.405 (~ ) Il) Iv) 50.73(e) (2) (ill) 50.73( ~ )(2)(e)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Timothy D. Shriver, Compliance Manager 6 02 39 3- 25 21 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC. EPORTABLE MANUFAC. EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TO NPADS SYSTEM COMPONENT TVRER TVRER TO NPRD5 FAI%('(

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED l(4) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES Ill yH, Cpmplete EXPECTED SVSM/SS/ON DATE/ NQ ABSTRACT IL/mlt to /400 tpecer, /e., epproe/mere/y lilteen rinple rover typewritten linn/ (16)

On September 29, 1989 at approximately 0720 HST, Unit 1 was in a refueling outage with the core off-loaded when the RBR train of Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation System (FBEVAS) spuriously actuated. The HBR train FBEVAS logic cross tripped the AAR train FBEVAS and Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation System (CREFAS), trains RAR and HBH as designed.

At approximately 0744 HST on September 29, 1989 the fuel building vent low and high range gas channels were declared inoperable and the RBH FBEVAS was reset and placed in bypass. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.8 ACTION 37, and ACTION 41 requirements were initiated as required.

The cause of this event was a loose connection between the radiation monitor's remote indication and control unit instrument drawer and instrument cabinet.

As immediate corrective action, the connection was fully engaged by firmly installing the instrument drawer. An engineering evaluation will be performed to determine the corrective action to prevent recurrence.

On October 2, 1989 at approximately 0744 HST, the high range radiation monitor gas channel had been inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Therefore, this report is also being submitted in accordance with TS 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b) and 6.9.2.

NRC Form 36B (64)9)

NRC FORM368A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (689) APPROVEO DMS NO. 31600104 EXPIRES: 4130)92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD

'OMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F430>, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROSECT (315001041< OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND SVDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER l2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

>~9 SEQUENTIAL II4 VrS IO N NVMSSII NVMSSII Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 8 9 0.1 9 0 0 0 2 0 5 TEXT Ilfrrroro Spooo Q ruuur>od, uro oddi rSrrol PIRC Forrrr 366ASI l IT)

I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:

A. Initial Conditions:

On September 29, 1989 at approximately 0720 HST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in a refueling outage with the core (AC) off-loaded. There was no fuel movement in progress. The reactor coolant system was at atmospheric pressure with a temperature of approximately 80 degrees Fahrenheit.

B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Hajor Occurrences):

Event Classification: Engineered Safety Feature Actuation On September 29, 1989 at approximately 0720 NST, the HBH train of Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation System (FBEVAS)(JE) spuriously actuated. The RBR train FBEVAS logic cross tripped the RAR train FBEVAS and Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation System (CREFAS)(JE) as designed.

The reactor operator (utility, licensed) verified all equipment actuated as designed. The fuel building low range effluent radiation monitor (ND)(IL}(RI},which, actuates "BH FBEVAS was indicating normal radiation levels. A review of the radiation monitor recorders did not reveal a spike or condition that would have initiated FBEVAS. At approximately 0744 NST the fuel building ventilation low range and high range radiation monitor gas channels were declared inoperable and the RBR FBEVAS was reset and placed in bypass.

The fuel building low range monitor (RU-145) works in conjunction with a high range monitor (RU-146). The low range monitor is normally operating with the high range monitor in standby. When the low range monitor reaches a predetermined setpoint, the high range monitor starts and the low range monitor goes to standby.

Therefore, the high range monitor must be declared inoperable when the low range monitor is inoperable.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.8 ACTION 37,- requirements were initiated at approximately 0845 MST on September 29, 1989. There was no fuel movement in progress during the event so TS 3.3.3.8 ACTION 41 requirements were met.

The control room essential filtration system (VI) and the fuel building essential ventilation system (VG) were secured and normal fuel building and control building ventilation returned to service at approximately 0752 HST on September 29, 1989.

NRC Form 368A (&89)

'I NAC FOAM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO(r(MISSION (649) APPROVED OMS NO. 31500104 EXPIRES; 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFOAMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD TEXT CONTINUATION COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430). U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKEl'UMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUIIOER NUIIIEER Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 8 9 -01 9 0 0 0 3 OF 0 5 TEXT /i/moro Spooo /4 rorlrr/rod, oro odditiorro/HRC Farm 3MA'4/ (Il)

C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:

Not applicable - No components were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to this event other than described in Section I.B.

D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:

Not applicable - No component or system failures were involved.

E. Failure known:

mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if Not applicable - No component failures were involved.

F. For failures of components with multiple functions, or secondary functions that were also affected:

list of systems Not applicable - No component failures were involved.

G. For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:

Not applicable - No component failures were involved. However, the fuel building ventilation radiation monitor gas channels were declared inoperable on September 29, 1989 at approximately 0744 HST. The radiation monitors were declared operable on October 3, 1989 at approximately 1101 MST.

H. Hethod of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:

Not applicable - No component or system failures or procedural errors were involved.

I. Cause of Event:

The cause of this event was a loose connection between the radiation monitor instrument drawer and the instrument cabinet.

There were no personnel errors, procedural errors, or unusual work characteristics associated with this event.

On September .26, 1989 maintenance technicians (utility, non-licensed) completed work on the fuel building vent low range radiation monitor. The remote indication and control (RIC) unit (CPU) instrument drawer was pushed into place and secured in the NAC Form 366A (64)9)

NRC FOAM 388A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COI4MISSION (64)9) APPROVED 0M B NO. 31504)104 6 XP I R 6'S: 4130(9 2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 503) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IPJ)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504)104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET,WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

VERA Rjj~ SEQUENTIAL k.l NUM 14

+i'EVISION NUM ER Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 52 889 01 9 0 0 0 4 QF 0 5 TEXT lllrrrdrP JP444 4 rPI)rdrdd, IIJP 4dddr5441 NRC Fdrrn 3884'Jl (Il) instrument cabinet. The required surveillance tests were performed and the radiation monitor was declared operable at approximately 2246 HST on September 26, 1989. The troubleshooting of the circuit discovered that the instrument drawer could be slid into place, feel properly seated, and operate properly while not actually being fully seated.

J. Safety System Response:

FBEVAS and CREFAS responded to the spurious signal as designed.

The fuel building normal ventilation (VG) was isolated and the normal air handling units (AHU) were stopped. Train "AH and "BH fuel building essential air ventilation units started to control any release from the building. The control room normal ventilation (VI) isolated and normal air handling units stopped. Train "A" and ABH control room essential filtration units started.

Several spurious signals were received on HBA FBEVAS before the condition was corrected. HBH FBEVAS was in bypass so no equipment actuations occurred because of these spurious signals.

K. Failed Component Information:

Not applicable - there were no- failed components.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

There were no safety consequences or implications resulting from the CREFAS and FBEVAS actuations. The Fuel Building Ventilation Monitor detects any activity released into the fuel building ventilation due to activities in the fuel building. The radiation monitor performs the safety function of initiating an isolation of normal ventilation systems and activating essential ventilation system on a HIGH-HIGH alarm. As discussed in Section I.B, there was no indication of abnormal radiation levels at the time of the event. Additionally, the fuel building was surveyed and no abnormal radiation levels existed.

III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A. Immediate:

The reactor operator verified all equipment operated as designed.

The fuel building area was surveyed to verify that there were no unusual radiation levels. The fuel building ventilation radiation monitors were declared inoperable and a work request initiated.

The multi-pin co'nnector was fully engaged by firmly installing the instrument drawer into the instrument cabinet.

NAC Form 368A (6$ 9)

NRC FQRh)355A US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (5 J)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 3)500)OO EXPIRES: O/30/02 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTJ 50J) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARD)NO BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAOEMENT BRANCH (F430). V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINOTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500)04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDOET,WASHINOTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3)

YEAR,IO SEaveNTraL NUM Err o>gI rlhyr310 N rrvM 511 Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 8.9 0 1 9 00 05 OF 0 5 TEXT (I/moro Jlroco /1 roqulrod. uoo oddtriorrol l/RC Form 35SA3 / (It)

B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:

Notification of this event and its cause has been given to Unit 2 and Unit 3 I&C supervision and Unit 1 instrument technicians to make them aware of the condition in order to minimize the probability of recurrence of the condition.

An engineering evaluation (EER 89-Sg-136) will be performed to determine the corrective action to prevent recurrence. This will be completed by April 24, 1990.

IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

There have been no previous actuations of FBEVAS and CREFAS that have been attributed to the same root cause.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION On October 2, 1989 at approximately 0744 MST, the high range radiation monitor had been inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Therefore, this report is also being submitted in accordance with TS 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b) and 6.9.2 for an event in which the fuel building vent high range effluent monitor was inoperable greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

If additional information is identified during the engineering evaluation that significantly alters the reader's perception of this event, a supplemental report will be submitted.

NRC Form 355A (SBS)

C

>)l l