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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
ACCELERATED O'STRIBUTION DEMONS~RATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8911020281 DOC.DATE: 89/10/25 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530
.AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHRIVER,T.D. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE/J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 89-013-00:on 890926,inadvertent control room essential filtration actuation signal ESF actuation.
W/8 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident"Rpt, etc.
NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1. 1 DAVIS,M. 1 = 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1" 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR DREP RPB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 LE 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLZAMSi S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 '
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR'9 ENCL 39
'i+i Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P,O, BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00540-JML/TDS/DAJ October 25, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)
Licensee Event Report 89-013-00 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-013-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with IOCFR 50.73(d); we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.
If you have any questions, .please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours,
. H. evine ice President Nuclear Production JGH/TDS/DAJ/kj Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all w/a)
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
J. B. Hartin T. J. Polich H. J. Davis A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center
-89 1 1 02028 1 89 1 02'=i /
l'j
~
pg J?i PDR ADGCK 05000530 PDC
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NAC FORM 396 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64) 9) APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)104 EXPIRES: 4(30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PS30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO-THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. OC20503.
FACILITY NAME (1I DOCKFT NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 TITLE (4)
Palo Verde Unit 3 050005301OFP6 Inadvertent Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation Si nal ESF Actuation EVENT DATE ISI LFA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI
- SEQUENTIAL ?rr'+ REVISrON MONTH OAY YEAR DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)
P???: NUMBER S???: NUMBER N/A 0 5 0 0 0 0 9 26 8 9 8 9 0 1 3 0 01p 25 89 I(I/A 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT.T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I: (Check one or more of the follorvinPI (11 OPERATING MODE (9) 5 20.402(B) 20.405(c) 60.7 3(e) (2) (iv) 73.71(B)
POWER 20A05 ( ~ )11) (I) 50.38(c)(1) 50.73(e)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
LEVEL p p p 20A05(e) l1) Ill) 50.38(cl(2) 50.73(e) (2)(vill Q'THER ISpeclty In Aottrect
""'8? Tr tpelorvend ln Test HIIC Form SFR?'k 20.405 ( ~ I (1)(ill) 50.73( ~ ) (1)(ll . 60.73(el(2) (vill)(A) 3BBAI 20A05(s) (1)(iv) 60.73(el(1)(B) 50.73(sl(2)(viBHB)
.FA 20.405 (e)11)NI 50,73(el(2)(ill) 50.73(el(2l(sl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Timothy D. Shriver, Compliance Manager 6 02 39 3 .25 21 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
'c?JN CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- EPORTABLE MANUFAC EPORTABLE TURER. TO NPROS CAUSE ' SYSTEM COMPONENT W TURER TO NPADS NF','.?m
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXI'ECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE I16)
YES Ilf yN, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DAFBI NO.
ft approx'im'atety f439 MMS1 on September 26, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 5 during a refueling outage when a control room operator inadvertently turned the wrong handswitch during post mai'ntenance testing which resulted in a Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation Signal (CREFAS)'alance of Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (BOP ESFAS) actuation. The ESF actuation was verified not to be the result of a valid signal, all actuated components were returned to their normal configuration, and testing was continued. Subsequently during test restoration, an inadvertent Control Room Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (CRVIAS) BOP ESFAS actuation occurred during removal of instrumentation test leads; All CREFAS and CRVIAS components responded properly.
The cause of the CREFAS wa a cognitive personnel error. The cause of the CRVIAS was the inadvertent, grounding of a handswitch contact via the test leads as they were being removed.
As corrective action for the CREFAS, appropriate disciplinary measures have been taken. As corrective action for the CRVIAS the work authorization documents being used for BOP ESFAS handswitch testing were revised.
There have been no previous similar events reported pursuant to IOCFR50.73.
NRC Form 388 (64)91
i+[ IQt NRC FORM 355A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (549) APPROV ED OMB NO. 31504106 EXPIRES! 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME ((I DOCKET NUMBER (2) LE R NUMBE R (6) PAGE IS) r!rN 660vsNTrAL NVM5%rr iN/ REVISION vg% rr vM 6 R Palo Verde Unit 3 o s,o o o 5 30 8 9 0 1 3 . 0 0 0 2 0 6 TEXT /// moro o/rooo /r roqowod, rroo odd/dowel I/RC Form 366AB/ I 17)
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:
A. Initial Conditions:
At approximately 1439 MST on September 26, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)(AB) at approximately 105 degrees Fahrenheit and 350 pounds per square inch-absolute.
B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification: Engineered Safety Feature Actuation At approximately 1439 MST on September 26, 1989, a Unit 3 control room operator (utility, licensed) inadvertently turned the wrong
.handswitch (HS) during post-maintenance testing resulting in an inadvertent Train RA" Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation Signal (CREFAS)(VI)(JE). CREFAS is part of the Balance of Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (JE). Control room personnel (utility, licensed) verified that the actuation was manually initiated and not the result of a valid signal. All components responded properly to the actuation signal. CREFAS "AH was reset, all components were. returned to their normal position, and testing was resumed in accordance with an approved. work document.
Following completion of the testing, APS maintenance personnel (utility, non-licensed) were removing test equipment from the Train "A" Control Room Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (CRVIAS)(VI)(JE) manual initiation handswitch when a Train "A" CRVIAS occurred. CRVIAS is a manually initiated ESF and therefore is not the result of an automatic actuation. All components responded properly to the actuation. signal. CRVIAS "A" was reset and all components were returned to their normal position.
Prior to the events described above, the CRVIAS and CREFAS manual actuation handswitches had been replaced during the refueling outage in accordance with approved work authorization documents.
Prior to returning the switches to service, testing was required to be performed to verify that the switches would perform their intended function. The testing was being performed in accordance with an approved work authorization document.
On September 26, 1989, Unit 3 maintenance personnel were verifying the proper operation of the Train "AH CRVIAS hand'switches. As part of the verification, it was required that control room personnel NRC Form 366A (649)
.i+i,
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NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION (589) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150d104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150d104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME O) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAL REVISION P NUMSER NUM SEA Palo Verde Unit 3 o s o o o 53 08 9 01 3 00 0 3 oF0 6 TEXT ////Roro 4/roco k rrr/Ir/rod, oro odd/dono/ HRC Forrrr 35//4'4/ (12)
(utility, licensed) first cycle the Train RAR CRVIAS manual initiation handswitch three times verifying that jumpers have been installed properly. Next, test instrumentation is installed and the handswitch is cycled three times while maintenance technicians monitor the operation of the switch contacts. Following verification that the jumpers had been installed properly on the Train RA," CRVIAS handswitch, at approximately 1439 HST on September 26, 1989, the responsible control room operator (utility, 1'icensed) inadvertently turned the Train RAR CREFAS manual initiation handswitch (Note: these handswitches are located adjacent to each other and are approximately four inches apart). This resulted in an inadvertent actuation of Train RAH Control 'Room Essential Filtration.
Control room personnel verified that the actuation was not the result of a valid signal. All components were verified to respond properly and Train RAR CREFAS was reset. All actuated components were returned to their normal alignment for the existing plant conditions and handswitch testing was resumed.
Following completion of the testing on the Train RAR CRVIAS manual initiation handswitches, maintenance technicians (utility, non-licensed) were removing test instrumentation leads when an inadvertent Train "A" CRVIAS occurred. Control room personnel verified that all components responded properly to the actuation signal. This event did not occur as a result of an automatic actuation as CRVIAS is manually initiated by control room personnel in accordance with approved procedural controls (i.e., there are no automatic actuation signals associated with CRVIAS). Following verification that al-1 components actuated as designed, control room personnel reset Train RAR CRVIAS and returned actuated components to their normal alignment for the existing plant conditions.
C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:
Other-than described in Section I.B, no structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the start of the event which contributed,to the event.
D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:
Not applicable - no component or system failures were involved.
E. Failure known:
mode, mechanism, and effect of each fai,led component, if Not,applicable - no component failures were involved.
NRC Form 366A (669)
4i (Qi NRC FORM 368A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (889) APPR0 V ED OM 8 NO. 3)500108 EXPIRES: O/30)92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S."NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)500)04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR ~'EQUENTIAL 'rO>k (MI'EVISION
'SFSO NUMSER NUMSER Palo Verde Unit 3 o s o o o 5 3 0 8' 01 .3 00 0 4o" 0 6 TEXT lllIIRVO S>>co l) EOqIdwd; IIEO OddIO'onol HRC FomI 38843l ()7)
F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:
Not applicable - no component failures were involved.
G. For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:
Not applicable - no failures were involved.
H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:
There were no component or system failures.
Based upon the results of an investigation of the inadvertent CRVIAS conducted in accordance with the APS Incident Investigation Program, -it was determined that the work authorization document being utilized to perform the testing should have contained more prescriptive instructions and precautions.
CRVIAS is initiated when the normally energized system is grounded causing a voltage drop. To initiate a manual CRVIAS, the appropriate handswitch is repositioned on the main control board (HCBD) in the Control Room (NA) which causes line voltage to be grounded through the appropriate contacts. The voltage drop results in relays (RLY) repositioning which results in component actuations.
In order to perform testing of the CRVIAS handswitches, the lead connecting the appropriate handswitch contact to ground was determinated in accordance with an approved work authorization document so the switch could be manipulated for testing without causing unnecessary actuations. On September 26, 1989, maintenance technicians were verifying the proper operation of CRVIAS Train "A" handswitch contacts adjacent to the determinated "grounding contact." Following completion of the testing, the test leads were being removed when it is believed that one of the leads came into contact with the "grounding contact".on the handswitch resulting in a complete circuit to ground which caused the CRVIAS Train RA" actuations.
Based upon this cause, it has been determined that the work authorization documents being utilized should have contained more prescriptive instructions for ensuring that the appropriate handswitch "grounding contact" was sufficiently isolated from the system. Additional-ly, the work authorization document should have NRC FOIRI 368A (689)
i+i i NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION (649) APPROVED 0MB NO. 3)500)04 E XP I R E5 I 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH 'THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'01) HRS. FORWARD
.COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500)0(). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME O) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR>>6 Rk SEQUENTIAL NIIM ER $ 1~>: REVISION "M NVMSER Palo Verde Unit 3 o s ~
o o,o 53 0 8 9 0 1 3 00 05 OF -0 6 TEXT ///morP EJ>>TF /1 E)IIPEIL IrJP //)/'Pr>>/HRC Ferrrr 35549/ (11) contained precautionary notes for alerting maintenance personnel that inadvertent actuations could occur circuit to if test leads provided a complete ground under some situations.
I. Cause. of Event:
The cause of the inadvertent CREFAS was a cognitive personnel error by the responsible control room operator (utility, licensed) who turned. the wrong handswitch during the testing. The error was a result of not adequately following an approved work authorization document. There were no procedural errors or omissions which contributed to this event. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the event.
The cause of the inadvertent CRVIAS is. discussed above in Section I.H.
J. Safety System Response:
The following safety system responses occurred:
Control Room Essential Filtration Train "AH (VI)
Control room Ventilation Isolation Train RAR (VI)
Essential Chilled Water Train RAR (KH)
Essential Cooling Water Train "AH (BI)
Essential Spray Pond Train NAR (BS)
K.. Failed Component Information:
Not applicable - no component failures were involved.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:
There were no safety consequences or implications resulting from the events described in this LER. The component actuations were not the result of conditions requiring either system operation. All components operated properly and would have performed to maintain Control Room habitability.
III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
A. Immediate:
As immediate corrective action, both actuations were verified not to be the result of conditions, requiring system actuation, actuated NRC Form 366A (569)
i+i <Qi NRC FORM 365A (LS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIAMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 31504106 (SJ)9),
E XP I RE 5 I 6/30/92 BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER),
'STIMATED INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET;WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LFR NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMSER NUMSER Palo Verde Unit 3 o s o .o o. 5 3 0 8 9 01 3-00 06 OF 0 6 TEXT /I/IINup e>>so /S ssqussd. uss sddR/oI>>/HRC FomI 366A's/ (ll) components were verified to operate properly, and components were returned to their, normal configuration for the existing plant conditions.
B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:
As corrective action to prevent recurrence for the inadvertent CREFAS, appropriate disciplinary measures have been taken.
Additionally, a Human. Performance Evaluation System analysis is being performed for the personnel error and further corrective measures will be developed and implemented ifif'ubstantial necessary. A supplement to this report will be submitted additional corrective measures are developed.
An independent investigation of the CRVIAS was conducted in accordance with the APS Incident Investigation Program. Based upon the results of this investigation, the following corrective actions were developed.
The work authorization documents for testing BOP ESF manual initiation handswitches have been revised to ensure that the switches are properly isolated from the ESF actuation circuitry and to include appropriate precautionary notes. Additionally, maintenance personnel responsible for testing the handswitches and personnel responsible for preparing the work authorization documents will be provided training regarding appropriate work practices for performing testing on the ESF actuation system handswitches.
IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
There have been no previous similar events reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
NRC Foun 366A (609)
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