ML17303A708

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LER 87-005-00:on 871030,while Unit in Mode 3,main Steam Isolation Sys Automatically Actuated.Caused by Faulty Logic Card for MSIV-170.Faulty Logic Card replaced.W/871124 Ltr
ML17303A708
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 11/24/1987
From: Bradish T, Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00317-JGH-T, 192-317-JGH-T, LER-87-005-02, LER-87-5-2, NUDOCS 8711300256
Download: ML17303A708 (10)


Text

REGULA. Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8711300256 DOC. DATE: 87/11/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL; STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Stationi Unit 3 Arizona Publi 05000530

,AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BRADISHI T. R. Arizona Nuclear Poujer ProJect (formerlg Arizona Public Serv HAYNES> J. G. Arizona Nuclear Power ProJect (PormeY lg Arizona Public Serv REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-005-00: on 872030I chile unit in mode 3 main steam iso'lation sos automaticallg actuated. Caused bg faulty logic card MSIV-170. Faul tg logic card replaced. W/871124 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR I ENCL ~ SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) I:Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 LICITRAIE 1 1 DAVIS' 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEQD/DSP/NAS 1 AEQD/DSP/RQAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB "'1'..i.

1 1 NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 1

'NRR/DEST/SGB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DQEA/E*B 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 N~

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1 RES TELFORDI J 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 RGN5 F I LE 01 EXTERNAL: EG5G GRQHI M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS. J 1 1 NSIC MAYSI G NOTES:

1'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 47 ENCL 46

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NRC Form 344 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9413)

APPROVED OMS NO. 3)500104 LICENSEE EVENT'REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 5/31/SE FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMSER (2) PA 3 Palo Verde Unit 3 o 5 o o o 53 01OF TITLE (4)

Main Steam Isolation System Actuation due to Faulty Logic Board EVENT DATE ISI LER NUMSER ISI REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQVEIITIAL RE VIErQN DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMSERISI NVMEER ><<3 lrvMEER MONTH N/A 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 30 87 8 7 0.05 0 0 1 1 2 4 8 7 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTF D PURSUANT T0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (It /Chrtc Onr or mrrr O/ thr /ollowlnf/ ill)

MODE (4) 3 20.402(4) , 20.405(c) 50.73(cl(1)(iv) 73.71(4)

~ OWER 20.405 I~ ) Ill(i) SOM(c)(I) 50.7$ (r ) (2) Ir) 73.7)(c)

LEvEL Ill(vl 0 0 0 20.405( ~ l(1l(EI 50.35(cl(2) 50.73(c) (21(rE) OTHER /Sprr/+ ln AprCrrCt

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMSER AREA CODE Thomas R. Bradish, Compliance Lead 60 23 93 3 53 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRISED IN THIS REPOAT (13)

EP>RT*BLr CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER Q~(g$ CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER J E ECBDA 640 N

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SUFI'LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEA/I, EX)IECTED-SU 5 MISS ION YES /I/ yrr, complrtr fXPECTED SUSM/$ $ /OH DATf/

DATE 05)

NO AssTRACT /Lr'mlt to f400 rprcrr, /r.. rpprorlmrtr/Y Hltrrn Nnolr rprtr trrprwrrttrn /rnrt/ (14)

At approximately 1618 HST on October 30, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) when the Hain Steam Isolation System (MSIS) was automatically The t<SIS is part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. 'ctuated.

During troubleshooting to locate a ground on a Class 1E 125 VDC distribution cabinet, a Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation Valve (MSFIV). logic cabinet was deenergized at 1617 HST and reenergized at 1618.HST. When reenergized, Hain Steam Isolation Valve (HSIV) SGE-UV-170 opened and a steam generator 1 MSIS automatic actuation occurred due to high level in the steam generator.

The root cause of the-event was a faulty logic card for t<SIV-170. A second logic card was tested and also found to be faulty. A third logic card tested satisfactorily and was installed in the logic cabinet. as corrective action.

.The first and second cards will be sent to the vendor for analysis and rework.

There have been no previous similar events reported.

8711300256 87ii24 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S

NRC corm 344

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NRC Form SSIA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

/PENT)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. SISO&10I EXPIRES: S/SI/SS FACILITY NAME Ill OOCXET NUMSER ITI LER NUMSER ISI

$ EOVENT/AL yet /IEV/SION NVMFTA t. F NVMFTA Palo Verde Unit 3 0 s o 0 o 5 3 o 8 7 005 00 02 oF0 3 TEXT /// mPtP tPtce it /PFM/9/L t/tt aAW+W NIIC fomt SINA't/ I Ill At approximately 1618 MST on October 30, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) when the Hain Steam Isolation System (HSIS) was automatically actuated. The MSIS is part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)(JE) and is actuated by a receipt of a 2.-out-of-4 high containment pressure, low steam generator pressure, or high steam generator water level signal.

At the time of the event the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)(AB) was at normal operating temperature and pressure. The Secondary Plant was at ambient temperature and depressurized with all Hain Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) (ISV) and HSIV bypass valves (V) closed. Instrument and Control (IBC) Technicians were troubleshooting, in accordance with an approved work control document, a ground which'was on Class 1E 125 VDC (EJ) distribution cabinet (CAB) PKA-M41.

Each module in the Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation Va'1'ves (HSFIV) logic cabinet, which receives power from PKA-.f51, was deenergized and reenergized individually in an attempt to locate the ground. .At 1617 MST the entire HSFIV logic cabinet was deenergized in an attempt to locate the ground and was reenergized at 1618 MST. Steam Generator (SG) 1 MSIV SGE-UV-170.opened and a Steam Generator 1 hi'gh level HSIS automatic actuation occurred. The high level was caused by steam generator swell caused by the increased steam flow when MSIV-170 opened. The HSIS then terminated the steam blowdown by isolating steam .generator 1. ~ '"-

The control room operators (utility licensed) identified the event by Hain Control Board (HCBD) Annunciators (ANN). The control room operators. then verified the MSIS actuation per appendix M of 43EP-3ZZ01 (emergency

,..Operations). This verifies that all the valves were in their actuated positions. After verification of the HSIS, the MSIS was reset in accordance with appendix R of 43EP-'3ZZOl at 1644 HST and the plant was stabilized. The event duration was 26 minutes.

The root cause of the event was an internal fault in the logic card for MSIV-170. A second card was installed to replace the original card. The second card was tested and produced the same results as the first card. The first and, second cards were both tested in the logic cabinet and on a test bench where the initial event symptoms were duplicated. A third card was installed in the MSFIV logic cabinet and tested approximately 50 times without duplicating the event symptoms. The first and second faulty logic cards will be sent to the vendor for analysis and rework. The manufacturer of the ca) ds is Automation Industry Vitro Laboratories and the model number is 3205-1021.

Corrective action to prevent recurrence was to replace the faulty logic card with a new functional logic card. A root cause analysis will be completed upon receipt of the vendors findings.

NAC I I/AM tttA I9 ST>

1 NFC Porm 34SA U8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IP83 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO3(50~184 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 PACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMSER (31 LER NUMEER (81 PACE SEOI/SNTIAL r/IP IIEVISION YEAR gg NI/M 1 A 'CPA; NUMSSA (31'al o Verde Unit 3 o s o o o 5 3 0 8 70 0 500,03 OF 0 3 TEXT //f /tu/>> SPP>> N /Pound. u>> IRPPSAn4//Y/IC A/m 3(((A El I IT(

Subsequent troubleshooting identified the ground in solenoid operated hot leg sample containment isolation valve (3JSSAUV0203). The ground was in the electrical connector (CON) on the solenoid valve. The connector was replaced and the ground cleared.

There were no structures, systems, or components inoperable prior to the event which contributed to the event. All valves actuated as per the approved system design. Therefore there was no threat to the health and safety of the public.

Should other information pertinent to this event be discovered, a supplement to this report will be issued. There have been no previous similar events reported.

'IAC I 0AM 3444 IS SSI

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00317- JGH/TRB/ JEH November 24, 1987 NRC Document Control Desk Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 Licensee Event Report 87-005-00 Fi le: 87-020-404

/

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-005-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Lead at (602) 393-3531.

Very truly yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TRB/JEH/kj Attachment cc: 0. H. DeHichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Hartin J. R. Ball R. C. Sorenson E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

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