ML17261B035

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LER 90-002-00:on 900226,fire Watch Patrol Hourly Patrol Performed in Wrong Areas.Caused by Personnel Error.Card Issued to Each Individual Performing Tech Spec Fire Watch commitment.W/900323 Ltr
ML17261B035
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/28/1990
From: Cavanaugh M, Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-002, LER-90-2, NUDOCS 9004130181
Download: ML17261B035 (7)


Text

ACCELERATE UTION DEMONSATION SYSIEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9004130181 DOC DATE: 90/03/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CAVANAUGH,M.E. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 90-002-00:on 900226,fire watch patrol hourly patrol performed in wrong areas due to'personnel error.

W/9 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. /

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 D JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/-DS P 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 D LB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 EG 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G STUART, V.A , 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 R NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS'LEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEl CONTACT ~ DOCUMENT CONSOL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) 'IO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISHUBVIION FULL TEXT, CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 35 ENCL 35

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STATK ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.K 14649-0001 TEI.C>~ONf.

Aec* cooa vie 546 2700 March 23, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 90-002, Fire Watch Patrol Performed Technical Specification Hourly Patrol in the Wrong Areas Due to Personnel Error.

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket: No. 50-244 In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, Item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of Specifications",

<<Any Operation Or Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical the attached Licensee Event Report LER 90-002 is being submitted.

This LER is being submitted because an Hourly Fire Watch Patrol patrolled the wrong area and did not meet the Ginna Technical Specification 3.14 requirements for hourly patrol for two (2)

Technical Specifications systems.

This event in no way affected the public health and safety.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Mec dy Division Manager Nuclear Production xc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector 9004l30i8i 90032

PDR S

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P>><<t<<N CXPSCTSO SVPVISSION OATSI <<0 ASSTAACT IIJ<<>H>> lt00 MW>>, I ~ ., ttt>>i>>V>>it Nt>>t<< el~i~t Itre~<<>>A A~>>I ll~ I On February 26, 1990, at approximately 1544 EST with the Reactor at approximately 98%, Watch that was assigned to perform the hourly tours of the "A" it was determined that the roving Fire and "B" Battery Rooms mistakenly performed the tours of the "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Rooms. The error was identified by the responsible Fire Watch during an afternoon pre-turnover meeting. Immediate action was to ensure an hourly patrol covered the "A" and "B" Battery Rooms. The cause of the event was determined to be personnel error by the assigned Fire Watch. Corrective action has been taken by the Fire Protection section by issuing a card to each individual performing a Technical Specifi-cation Fire Watch commitment, which identifies the area of their responsibility. N <<AC Pv>> S00 I}0SI I NRC Rerm 344A V.E. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIEEION I444I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ARAROVEO OM4 40 5I50&IOI EXlrIRES EflII45 RACILITY NAME III OOCKET NVMEE R ITI LER NUMEER IEI ~ AOE IEI SEOUE4TIAL i rlEYIEIO4 4@M ER 4IIM EA R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o so TEXT Ih'rrrr roect R rRRrrnd. rrer aamonel HlK'rxrrr444A'I I I IT) oo 244 0 0 2 0 0 02o~ 0 5 I. I IA PLA 0 T ON The plant was at approximately 98% steady state full power with no major activities in progress. II. DESCRIPTION 0 EVENT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES: February 26, 1990, 1544 EST: Discovery date and time. February 26, 1990, 1551 EST: Fire Watch correctly performed hourly patrol of "A" and "B" Battery Rooms, in compliance'ith Technical Specif ications. February 26, 1990, 1744 EST: Fire Detection System which was inoperable due to construction activities was restored to service, B. EVENT: On February 26, 1990, at approximately 1544 EST with the Reactor at approximately 98% full power, it was determined .by the Fire Watch Patrol that she was touring the "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Rooms instead of the "A" and "B" Battery Rooms, On February 26, 1990, at approximately 1551 EST, a Fire Watch was sent to the "A" and "B" Battery Rooms to perform the hourly tour. C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES,. COMPONENTS OR SYSTEM THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: Inoperable Fire Detection System - Pyrotronics VRC AORM 544A I443I NRC So<~ 944A V.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I945I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION AFSROVEO OM4 NO 5150&IOC EXPIRES 4/SI/45 FACILITY NAME I11 OOCKET NVM'4ER IEI ~ AOE LER NIJM4ER IEI ISI YEAR SSQV IN>>AL " REVISION ~ 4VM CR - VVV CA R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o 4 4 9 0 0 0 2 0 0 03 OF TEXT 0Smcvc NMCC N CCtvnd. vcc ccRF4+w'HRC Ann PSA'cc lltl D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E. 'ETHOD OF DISCOVERY: This event was discovered by the responsible Fire Watch during an afternoon turn-over meeting. F. OPERATOR ACTION: The control'oom operators were notified by the Safety Coordinator at which time they performed the following: Initiated an A-25.1 ' Notified Duty Engineer Stat' t e o t Notified Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Notified Plant Superintendent Notified Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: None III. CAUSE OF EVENT A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE: Technical Specifications fire detection system was not Fire Watch toured hourly. B. ROOT CAUSE: The root cause was determined to be unintentional human error. IV. ALYSIS OF EVENT Hourly Fire Watch tours of two (2) Technical Specifications areas with inoperable fire detection systems were not conducted so Technical Specifications 3.14.1 and 3.14.1.1 were not met. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, Item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of, "Any Operation Or Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications". NRC FORM 544A l94SI HAC SM~ 444A V 4. HVC44*II IIIOVlATOIIYCOMMI44IOH i44) I LICENSEE E ENT'REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUA N ATMOV40 OM4 HO 4I40&IOl 4XAH44. 4QI44 SACIllTY HAM4 III COCK T 7 HVM44A ITI I,4A HVM44H I4I ~ AOI I4I ~ 44OVIHTtkl, AIVISIO< 1 1 R. E. Ginna TEXT W mOn HMTT H nouns YM ~ Nuclear Power Plant oIs HAC ~ JNA'II I IT I o o o 44 9 0 0 0 20 0 0 40F An assessment was performed considering the safety of this event with the following results and conclusions: There were no operational or, safety consequences or implica-tions attributed to the inoperable fire detection system because: Inoperable Fire Detection System >>A>> Battery Room: The fire area for the TTA>> Battery Room has a maximum permissible fire load of 160,000 BTU's/Sq. Ft. with an actual fire load of 44,021 BTU's/Sq.Ft. The actual fire load of 44,021 BTU's/Sq.Ft. is considered low (<80,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft.). The wall separating the >>A>> Battery Room from the Turbine Building is a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated wall. The wall separating the >>A>> Battery .Room from the >>B>> is wall. Battery Room a 2 hour rated The wall separating the >>A>> Battery Room from the Air . Handling Room is a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated wall. Inoperable Fire Detection System >>B>> Battery Room: The fire area for the >>B>> Battery Room has a maximum permissible fire load of 160,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an actual fire load of 52,656 BTU's/Sq.Ft. The actual fire load of 52,656 BTU's/Sq.Ft. is considered low(<80,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft.). The wall separating the >>B>> Battery Room from the Turbine Building is a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated wall. The wall separating the >>B>> Battery Room from the >>A>> Battery Room is a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated wall. These two fire areas/zones (BR1A-1 and BR1B-1) have fire extinguishing equipment within the area and there are hose stations adjacent to them. The fire detection system for the area adjacent to the >>A>> and "B>> Battery Room in the Turbine Building basement,was operable. The fire>>A>>suppression system for the area adjacent to the Battery Room in the Air Handling Room was operable. V NRC fWm 99EA U.E. NUCLEAR RlOULATORY COMM)El)ON (949 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AttROVEO OM9 NO 5)50&)0e EXtlRES< 9/5) /95 tACI(.I'TY NAME (1) OOCXET NUMEER CI) LER NUMEER (9) ~ AOE (9) eeQI/ENTIAL .N.~ REVISION M R Ie>> R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 s 0 0 o 4 4 9 0 0 0 2 0 0 05oF0 TExT /// mme etece N nqvwaf. tee e)99(eN/ HRC te/m ~'I/ (IT) No work was performed in either of the <<A<< or <<B<< Battery Rooms. Based on the above, it health and safety was assured at all times. can be c'oncluded that the public's i V. , CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN INOPERABLE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS: Fire System reconnect was performed under plant procedure SC-3.16.2.4 're S' S s e Co-o t isco ct'o o e System declared operable on February 26, 1990 at 1744 EST. B. - ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: As the root cause was determined to be a personnel error, the Fire Watch Supervisor has been instructed to follow-up the assignments given to fire watches to ensure they are going to the right area. Index cards have also been issued to the Fire Watch to ensure they have written instructions on where their patrols are to be conducted. VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED COMPONENTS: None B. PREVIOUS LER'S ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results; No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. C. SPECIAL COMMENTS: During the five (5) hours in which the assigned Fire Watch inspected the incorrect area, Security entered the area of concern ten (10) times. NRC tORM 99EA )9451