ML17261A521

LER 87-005-00:on 870514,containment Ventilation Isolation Occurred.Caused by Spurious Signal from Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor.Operations Restored All Components Affected to pre-event status.W/870612 Ltr

ML17261A521
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/12/1987
From:	Backus W, Kober R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-005, LER-87-5, NUDOCS 8706190141
Download: ML17261A521 (10)

Text

REGULATORY 'FORMATION DISTR IBUTION SY =I'1 (R IDS)

I ACCESSION NHR: 87061 901 41 DOC. DATE: 87/06/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET N FACIL: 50-f44 Rober t Emmet Ginna Nuclear Pianti Uni t iI Rochester G 0500024<

AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUSI W. H. Rochester Gas 0 Electric Corp.

KOHERI R. ll. Rochester Gas Fr. Electr ic Corp.

REC IP. NAt IE PEC IP IENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-005-00: on 870514I containment ventilation isolation occurred. Caused bg spurious signal from containment par ticulate radiation monitor. Operations restored all components affected to their pre-event status. W/870612 ltr.

DISTRIRUTIDN CODE: IE22D CDPIEE RECEIVED: LTR i ENCL i SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)I Incident Rpt> etc.

NOTES: License Exp date in accordance eith 10CFR2I 2. 109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES REC IP IENT COP IES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/MANE LTTR ENCL PDi-3 LA 1 PD1-3 PD STAHLE, e INTERNAL: ACRS NI CHELSON 1 ACRS NOELLER AEQD/DQA 1 *EOD/DSP/RQAB 2 AEQD/DSP/TPAB 1 DFDRQ 1 NRR/DEST/*DE 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 NRR/DEBT/NEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/NTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DQEA/EAB NRR/DREP/R*B NRR/DREP/RPB I 2 /ILRB 1 NRR/Pl')AS/PTSB REG FILE 02 1 RES DEPY GI 1 RG E 01 1 EXTERNAL; EG".G GRQH N H ST LOBBY NARD 1 1 LPDR NRC PDP. 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' NSIC MAYSI G TOTAL NUYiBER QF CQP I ES REQUIRED: LTTP, 42 ENCL 40

Uk. IhICLEAh hthULATONY ONOI~

AtthOVEO INN NO. SI~OO EXtINEL EIS I M UCENSEE EVENT REPORT LER) tAa LITT NMot III DOCXtT ~h IEI R.E. 'Ginna Nuclear Pawer Plant 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF Inadvertent Contairment Ventilation Isolation During Performance of K>nthly Periodic Vest of Containment Particulate Radiation Wnitor Due A Fr nducto

~ VENT DATE N Lth Nlh&th 10I httONT DATE lll Olllth tACILITIEEINVOLVED 101 DAY YEAh YtAN 04@0 NT Q NUM00h l ..,0 ygpWah gY. DAY YEAh toaLITY NAM00 DOCXET NUMOEh(N 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 14 8787 I 0 0 5 0 0 0 6 1 287Ot Cth f. IOHOO Of sear Of IOO fiOOOONI IIII 0 5 0 0 0 THN httONT EUEMITTED tUhtUAIITTO THE htIXIIEEENNTE 10 OOO OtthATIIN 10ODE OI N <<ANIoI N.TENIIEHNI

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<<A<<loHIINI ~ LTENIIEINl N.TENIIEHal LICtJQE ~ CONTACT tOh THXI Lth IIEI TELttHONE NUMOEN Ah COOt N.H. Backus Technical Assistant to the ations Mana 315 524 44 4 6 COEPLETE ONt llht oOh EACH ~ENT tMLUht Dt<<hIEEO IN THXI httONT 11tl EYETEM COMtONENT MANUtAC TUhth KlOIITJSLE 0I MANU0AC TUN Eh

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DATE Yt0 IIfyw, cooWtN EXtECTED EIISNIEEIOH DATtl X NO ANTNACT ILIoOI N IOOI NoON. I.a, ftfNOo oMNooNoo Ooool 1101 On May 14, 1987 at 0055 EDST with the unit at 100% reactor power, a containment ventilation isolation occurred due to a spurious signal from containment particulate radiation monitor (R-ll).

All containment. ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

Immediate corrective action taken was: after the immediate cause of the containment ventilation isolation was determined, operations restored all components affected to their pre-event status.

The intermediate cause of the event was identified to be an input signal BNC connector with a frayed middle conductor. This frayed conductor was determined to be caused by a manufacturing discre-pancy during construction of the R-ll drawer. This R-ll drawer had been recently installed in March of 1987.

Corrective action taken to prevent recurrence was, to resolder the conductor to connector frayed area and notify the vendor of the manufacturing discrepancy.

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0 IIAC 4MM 444A V.4. IIVCLCAII IISCULA'TOAT COMMI44IOH ISWI UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APi+OVSO OM4 IIO ) I SOMIOl 4XPiA45 SISIi4$

4ACILITT HkM4 III OOCKST NUM44A ITI LIA HUM44A ISI ~ A44 ISI 54OUSNTIAL +'Iv>5IQA VUM ~ 8 4QM TA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Pawer Plant TINT IP~MM4e~ ~ ~A44C Pew ~SI lltl .

0500024487 0 0 5 0 0 020FO PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The unit was at 100% reactor power and the Control Room Control Operator was performing Periodic Test PT-17.2 (Process Radiation Monitors R-ll to R-22, Iodine Monitors R-10A and R-10B) .

DESCRIPTION OP EVENT A. EVENT On May 14, 1987 at 0055 EDST, while commencing the steps of PT-17.2 for R-11 (Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor), the Control Operator slid the R-ll drawer out per procedure and observed that all the drawer displays disappeared. At this same time Control Board Annunciator A-25 (Containment Ventilation Isolation) alarmed and all containment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

B. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

C. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o May 14, 1987, 0055 EDST: Event date and time 0 May 14, 1987, 0055 EDST: Discovery time and date 0 May 14, 1987, 0100 EDST: R-11 drawer returned to service, containment ventilation isolation reset and all containment ventilation isolation valves returned to normal status MAC AOAM 444A 045 I

NRC Form 288A Ug. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIS5ION (8421 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 2(50-0105 EXPIRES: 8121/85 FACILITYNAME (11 DOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER (5) PACE (SI 55QVENTIAL rI5 v r5 lo N YEA(I NvM 5II NVM 5A R.E. Ginna Nuclear Po(A(er P3ant 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 005 000 3 oF 06 TEXt (IImoro <<oco <<ooRrriorE Moo o55<<OrrH HIIC %%drrrr JSLiSI IITI D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

With the containment ventilation isolation, the following major components were isolated:

o R-lOA, Containment Iodine Monitor o R-ll, Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor o R-12, Containment Gas Radiation Monitor E~ METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was immediately apparent 'due to a Control Board annunciator alarm, R-ll display loss of indica-tion, and containment ventilation isolation valve position indication in the Control Room.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

Control Room operations personnel immediately removed the fuse from the R-ll drawer for a fuse check. Even though the fuse checked out okay, a new fuse was installed and the R-11 drawer was turned on with all normal displays returning.

Control Room operations personnel restored all components affected by the containment ventilation isolation to their pre-event status.

Control Room operations personnel completed performance of PT-17.2 on R-ll with satisfactory results.

NIIC FOIIM 555A RISSI

NRC Form 388A 0 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (8$ 31 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO, 3(50 OIOA EXPIRES: 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME (11 COCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUMSER (8) PACE LSI YEAR ~C SEQUENTIAL  :.~i IISVISION NVMOSII NUMOSII R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 0 5 0 0 0 40F 0 6 TEXT /I/more <<Mr<< if oFF/krorE ooo ar<<R/ono/HIIC irorm 383A'I/(IT(

CAUSE OF EVENT A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

Containment ventilation isolation actuated from R-ll when R-11 drawer was slid out and all drawer displays disappeared.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The Intermediate cause was identified to be an input signal BNC connector with a frayed center conduc or.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause was determined to be a manufacturing discrepancy because the frayed conductor and the connector were internal to the R-11 drawer.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which required reporting of "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)EE in that containment ventilation isolation is an ESF sub-system.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inadvertent containment.

ventilation isolation because:

The containment ventilation isolation system operated as designed.

0 The components affected were restored to normal status very quickly (within approximately 5 minutes).

0 The components affected were capable of withstanding the isolation.

NIIC FORM SOOA (8831

NRC Pore 888A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (040 I.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO, 1150&104 EXPIRES! 8/11/85 I'ACILITYNAME lll OOCXET NU~ER (1( L'ER NUM4ER ISI ~ AOE (11 YEAR ,'(Py, 55QVENT/AL (Ly. AEVOION HVV (R VVV TA 0 OF R.E. Ginna Nucl Plant 0 5 0 0 m(T IP/RP/5 ~ Pawer 4/////5/E VAPO(585(XM//YRC %%d//R 885AE/(ITl V CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

o Operations, after R-ll returned to normalP restored all components affected by the event, to their pre-event status.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

o The Instrument and Control (I&C) DepartmentP during troubleshooting, were able to reproduce the R-ll event several times and traced the cause to a frayed conductor wire where entered a connector in the R-11 drawer. The I&C it department resoldered the conductor wire to the connector and were unable to reproduce the R-ll event again.

o The Z&C Department visually checked all recently installed Victoreen Radiation Monitoring drawers with the same type of connectors and found them all in satisfactory condition.

o Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Corporation Engineering Department notified the vendor of the workmanship failure.

o RG&E Engineering Department will perform a 10 CFR 21 evaluation for the R-ll drawer. This evaluation is expected to be complete by June 30, 1987.

ADDITIONAL INFORMAT ON A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

The frayed input signal conductor was an RG-58 Coaxial Cable with multi strand center conductor.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the 'following results: No documentation of similar LER events could be identified.

HRC POEM 554*

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NIIC Pptm 888A V.S. NVCLSAR RCOULATORY COMMISSION I885 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVSO OM8 NO. 3150WIOI 8XP/REST 8/SI/85 PACILITY NAMS I I I OOCKST NU~SR ITI LSII NVM88II ISI ~ AOK ISI ySAR .'P~" SSOVSNTtAL ASVOIO/t N:~ ttuMPSR NVM IA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power P3ant 0 S 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 7 005 00 06 OF 0 6 TSXT /8'om Mptp /t ttsrJr4 ttm akNpno/N/IC fam ~ 5/ II TI C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

The R-11 drawer is a Victoreen Model 942A and had gust been replaced during the 1987 Annual Refueling and Maintenance Shutdown.

tvtIC POIIM 888A I84$ l

p;,',vga,w e& E48T AVENUE ROCHES7s:R t) 14649 O~~.l June 12, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 87-005, Inadvertent Containment Ventilation Isolation, During Performance of Monthly Periodic Test of the Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor, Due to a Frayed Conductor R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv) which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 87-005 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

V truly yours,

)p4. 4v.

Roger W. Kober XC ~ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Resident Inspector