ML17250B016

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LER 89-011-00:on 890920,inadvertent Containment Ventilation Isolation Occurred Due to Spurious Event.Immediate Cause Determined to Be Spurious.Sys Returned to Svc & Instrument & Control Dept Initiated Troubleshooting effort.W/891020 Ltr
ML17250B016
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/20/1989
From: Backus W, Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-011, LER-89-11, NUDOCS 8910250228
Download: ML17250B016 (9)


Text

'r 4 ACCELERATED UTION DEMONFAkTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8910250228 DOC.DATE: 89/10/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUS,W.H. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-011-00:on 890920,spurious actuation of containment ventilation isolation. ltr.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Q ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt; etc.

I SIZE

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NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D. 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLP{}/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NR~RJ3REP/RPB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 1 1

' FILE 01 1 1 RES/DSZR/EZB 1 RGN1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENI'ONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISIRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL 38

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 TCLCRHONC AREA COOC 714 546.2700 October 20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Sub)ect: LER 89-011, Spurious Actuation of Containment Ventila-tion Isolation R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

.Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Pro-tection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 89-011 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Me red General Manager Nuclear Production XCR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475. Allendale Road King:>of;.Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna;USNRC Senior Resident Inspector P//Sl 8910250228 891020 PDR ADOCK 05000244 PDC

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HAllC TCLCtNONC HVIclt(I Wesley H. Backus ANCA COOl Technical Assistant to the Operations Manager 31552 4-44 COMSLCTC ONC LINC t01 lACN COMtONtNT SAILV1t OCSCllllD IH THIS AttOOT (ill IlANUSAC CtOIITASLC MAHVSAC CAVSC STSTCM TUN III TO HSIIOS TUWC1

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SVttLCMCNTALOltOOT CXtlCTtD (14) MONTH CAY YCAII CXtlCTlD LVSMISSIOH OATS Illl I tl /I/ ycc, cccwNN CXSCCTCO SUCH(tt(OH OA TC/ HO ASCTAACT (UAV( 4 (400 ctccAL IA. 4ANcctnccHy H(H44 44ctH4tccc IytcwcHNA tccsl Il~ I On September 20, 1989 at 0519 EDST with the reactor at approxi-mately 994 full power, an inadvertent containment ventilation isolation occurred due to a spurious event.

All containment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

Immediate operator action was to perform the applicable alarm response procedures actions. This included verifying automatic actions, attempting to determine cause of containment ventilation isolation, and making appropriate notifications.

The immediate'ause of the event was determined to be spurious.

Corrective action taken was to return the containment ventilation isolation system to service followed by a troubleshooting effort by the Instrument and Control Department. Further investigation to determine the root cause is continuing.

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~Wwae weee~ vm~~faesma'sllITI P CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 994 steady state full power with no ma)or activities in progress.

N 0 A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o September 20, 1989, 0519 EDST: Event date and time.

o September 20, 1989, 0519 EDST: Discovery date.

and time.

o September 20, 1989, 0520 EDST:. Control Room operators verified all containment ventilation isolation functions took place.

o September 20, 1989, 0522 EDST: Control Room operators reset containment ventilation isolation and restored system to normal.

B. EVENT:

On September 20, 1989 at '0519 EDST with the reactor at approximately 994 full power, the following control board alarms were received, E-24 (RMS Area Monitor High Activity), and A-25 (Containment Ventila-tion Isolation). The Control Room operators, respond-ing, to the above alarms, observed that no Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) monitor indicated an alarm condition. Subsecpxently at 0520 EDST control board alarm E-20 (CNMT or Plant Vent Rad Mon Pump Trip) was received. This alarm was due'o the containment venti.lation isolation which trips the containment radiation monitor pump and isolates the contai.nment valves to and from this pump.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TIE IIT ~~ 1 ~ INC 1VAI~'TI IITI o so o o 24 489 0 l 1 0 03 OF 0 6 The Control Room operators verified that all contain-ment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

Subsequently, the Control Room operators checked the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) computer and observed that no alarms were generated from the RMS, thus verifying this as a spurious event.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTUREST COMPONENTSI OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

With the containment ventilation isolation, the following ma)or components were isolated:

o R-10A, Containment Iodine RMS Monitor o R-ll, Containment Particulate RMS Monitor o R-12, Containment Gas RMS Monitor E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was immediately apparent due to control board annunciator alarms, and containment ventilation isolation valve position indication in the Control Roomo

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant terr IrMMY ~ r IVSvls4 ~ AMMmae IIII o so o o 4 OF 0 6 F~ OPERATOR ACTION:

Control room operators responded to the event by performing the applicable actions of alarm response procedures, E-24, A-25, and E-20. This included the following:

o Verifying that all containment ventilation isolation valves that were open, closed as designed.

o Determining that the containment ventilation isolation actuation and the E-24 alarm was spurious.

o Resetting the containment ventilation isolation signal and restarting R-10A, R-ll, and R-12 sample pump and verifying sample flow was re-established.

o Verifying that R-lOA, R-ll, and R-12 RMS monitor

'eadings returned to normal.

o Notifying the NRC and Higher Supervision of the ESF actuation.

III CA S A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The containment ventilation isolation was apparently caused by a spurious event.

BE ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause has not yet been determined, and investigations for root cause are continuing.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant ASM ~'AII199 o s o o o 2 4 4 8 9 0 1 1 05 oi0 6 S 0 This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires reporting of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)". The containment ventilation isolation due to the spurious event was an automatic actuation of an ESF sub-system.

An assessment was performed "considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with, the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inadvertent containment ventilation isolation because:

o The containment ventilation isolation system operated as designed.

o The components affected were capable of withstanding the isolation.

o The containment ventilation isolation was in the conservative direction.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power P3ant CO NIC Papa~'pl CT lllI ACT 0 o s o o o2 448 9 1 1 0 0 6 OF 0 6 A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

0 The Control Room operators, 'fter. determining that the containment ventilation isolation was spurious, reset the containment ventilation isolation signal and restored the system to pre-event status.

0 The Instrument 'and Control (I&C) Department, after troubleshooting the containment ventilation isolation actuation system, determined that the problem was of a spurious nature as they could find nothing that might have caused the contain-ment ventilation isolation.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECUSANCE:

Several potential sources of spurious signals have been proposed by I&C. . Troubleshooting will be performed, and tracked by CAR 1979, in an effort to determine the root cause.

VI ADD ZON ORMA 0 Ae FAILED COMPONENTS:

None.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was. conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar, LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. However, LER 87-005 and LER 88-007 were similar events 'with different root causes.

C e, SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None.

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