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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr. ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999 ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines. ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999 SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept. ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209. ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998 Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project). ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr. ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
II Q~ ~'ACCESSION NBR':9802250239 DOC.'DATE "98/02/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power &, Light Co. 05000335 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHAFER,K.W. Florida Power & Light Co.
STALL,J.A. 'lori;da'ower & Light Co;-
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency lighting outside App R design bases occurred;"Caused'by congnitive personnel error during translation of App R section III.Procedures ONOP 1 &
2 ONP-100.01 were issued for use on 980206.W/980219 ltr.
DISTRIBDTION!CODE: IE22T" COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1'SIZE:.
TITLE:-'0.73/50.9 -Licensee Event '-Report (LER), QIncident Rpt, etc.
ENCL
~ l II NOTES:
RECIPIENT . COPIES ' RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL XD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 GLEAVES,W '1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 AEOD/SPJ)g 2. 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 F ER 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1' NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 -
1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL. L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1
( (
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LIST'R REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROI DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR ENCL
0 Florida Power & Light Company,6351 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 February 19, 1998 FPL L-98-051 10 CFR 50.73
-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 98-004 Date of Event: January 21, 1998 Emergency Lighting Outside t'A endixRDesi n Bases The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
Very truly yours, J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Plant JAS/EJW/KWF Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant 9802250239 9802i9 PDR ADQCK 05000335 S PDR llllllrrlrrilr rllllgliellllllI an FPL Group company ~~
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMS No. 316041104 (4-96) EXPBIES 04/30/0 S ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATOR INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTr 60J) HRS. REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND F BACK To BIOUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IT% F33)
US. NUCLEAR REGIAATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 206664001 ANO To THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (316 F104); OFRCE 0 (See reverse for required number of MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20603.
digits/characters for each bIockl FAcIUTY NAME UI DOCKET NIW4BER 121 PAGE 13)
ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 1 OF7 TITLE IBI Emergency Lighting Outside Appendix R Design Bases FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER DAY YEAR SEOUENTIAL, REVISION NUMBER NUMBER DAY ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 21 98 98 004 ,0 19 98 FACILITYNAME DOCKETNUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (6) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2)(v) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL l10) 100 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203 (a) (3) (ii) 50.73(s) l2) liii) 73.71 OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) (2) (v) Specify In Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2) (vii)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER enerude Area Code)
K. W. Frehafer I561) 468%284 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTAGE To NPROS To NPRDS A FH LF N/A N/A F,H LF N/A N/A MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION llf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) l16)
On January 21, 1998, Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power. While utility personnel were performing an extensive plant fire protection compliance analysis, FPL determined that eight-hour battery backed emergency lighting units required for Appendix R alternate shutdown were not provided for selected alternate shutdown manual action areas, and a one hour ENS phone call was made.
The apparent cause of this event was cognitive personnel error during the translation of Appendix R Section III.J requirements into the St. Lucie emergency lighting design and procedures.
Interim corrective actions include the use of existing emergency diesel generator backed lighting fixtures that were evaluated to provide adequate lighting, and the proceduralized use of battery powered lights staged in selected areas of the site. Long term corrective actions include review and update of the safe shutdown analyses for manual actions and emergency lighting enhancements, and providing the deficient areas identified with emergency lighting that meets the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.J.
NRC FORM 366 (4-96)
NRC FORM 3BBA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4.95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 2 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT (Ifmore spaceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC &rm 388AJ I17)
On January 21, 1998; Units 1 and;2 were in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power. Utility personnel were performing an extensive plant Fire Protection compliance analysis. 'While reviewing. the Unit 1 and 2 Off-Normal Operating Procedures (ONOPs) for Control Room .
Inaccessibility,'ONOP 1 and 2-0030135, "Control Room Inaccessibility,".FPL determined that eight-'hour battery backed emergency lighting units [EIIS:FH:LF] required foi Appendix R alternate shutdown were not provided for selected alternate shutdown manual action's. The subject proce'dures provide the operating instructions to safely shut down the affected unit in'h'e event of a control room or cable spreading room fire (i.e., alternate shutdown) ~
As stated in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FSARs, Appendix 9.5A, permanently installed eight-hour emergency lighting is to be provided in areas needed for manual operation of alternate and safe shutdown (hot standby) equipment and the access/egress rout'es thereto. Appendix R Section III.J requirements are less stringent, and do not preclude the use of portable eight-hour emergency lighting. However, contrary to Appendix R Section III.J requirements, FPL identified some manual actions areas and access/egress routes thereto that are not provided with either permanent or portable eight-hour emergency lighting. The NRC ENS notification required by 10 CFR 50.72 was completed on January 21, 1998.
In accordance with Section III.L of Appendix R, procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability. Specific discrepancies identified from the procedure reviews are as follows:
Appendix D, Steps 1 and 2, requires that the normal/isolate switches for Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) V1402 and V1404 be placed in the 'ISOLATE'osition.
These manual actions take place in the A and B electrical penetration rooms. However, there are no installed eight-hour battery powered lighting units in either room, 'or the proceduralized use of portable eight-hour emergency lighting, as required by Section III.J.
- 2) There are several outdoor manual actions identified in the procedure that do not have Appendix R emergency lighting. For example, Appendix B, Step 1, requires manual actions at the turbine front standard. Appendix J requires local manual operation of the atmospheric dump valves which are located on the mezzanine level of the A and B steam trestles.
gl NRC FORM 366A'4-96)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 3 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT ilfmore space is required, use edditionel copies of IVRC Form 3MA/ I17I k
There are several outdoor manual actions identified in the procedure that do n'ot have Appendix R emergency lighting. For example, Steps 7.2.11, 7.2.12 and 7.2.~13 require manual actions in the steam trestle and Appendix B, Step 1, requires manual actions at the turbine front standard.
FPL determined that existing emergency lighting fixtures located within the affected areas are powered from A and B train emergency diesel generators, and provide adequate lighting for the performance of the manual actions. Additional battery powered lights are staged at the entrance to affected areas as compensatory measures, and no operability concern exists for continued plant operation.
The cause of this event was cognitive personnel error during the translation of Appendix R Section III.J requirements into the St. Lucie emergency lighting design and procedures. Areas in which manual operation of alternate and safe shutdown (hot standby) equipment is required, and the access/egress routes thereto, are required to have emergency lighting backed by an eight-hour battery power supply. However, some manual action areas or access/egress routes were not provided with either fixed eight-hour battery backed emergency lights, or the proceduralized use of portable eight-hour battery backed emergency lights. A contributing factor to this event was that the St. Lucie Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA), which analyzed the effect of postulated fires on the ability to safely shutdown the unit, was deficient in that compensatory manual actions were not clearly described in the document.
This condition has been determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), as a condition resulting in the nuclear power plant being operated outside its Appendix R design basis. As stated in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FSARs, Appendix 9.5A, permanently installed eight-hour emergency lighting is to be provided in areas needed for manual operation of alternate and safe shutdown (hot standby) equipment and the access/egress routes thereto. Appendix R requirements are less stringent, and do not preclude the use of portable eight-hour emergency lighting. However, contrary to Appendix R Section iii.J requirements, FPL identified some manual actions areas and access/egress routes thereto that are not provided with either permanent or portable eight-hour emergency lighting.
li E
NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 4 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT iifmore speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366t4J I17I Item III.J of Appendix'R. (Emergency Lighting) requires th'at emer'gency lighting units with at least an eight-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of-safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. For Unit 1, FSAR Appendix 9.5A delineates specific conformance to Appendix R. Table 2'.5 indicates that conformance to Item-III.J has been met with the use of permanently installed emergency lighting fixtures.. The. table also indicates that dedicated portable emergency lighting is available for containment access and for selected cold shutdown operations. Section 3.7 of the Unit 1 FSAR is consistent with Table 2.5. However, Section 3.7 also states that lighting is provided in areas needed for manual operation of alternate and safe shutdown (hot standby) equipment. For Unit 2, FSAR Appendix 9.5A delineates specific conformance to Appendix R. Table 2.5 indicates that conformance to Item III.J has been met with the use of permanently installed emergency lighting fixtures. The table also indicates that dedicated portable emergency lighting is available for containment access and for selected cold shutdown operations. Section 3.7 of the Unit 2 FSAR is consistent with Table 2.5, similar to Unit 1.
The Unit 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms are currently under a pre-existing compensatory 30 minute roving fire watch. In addition, both cable spreading rooms are equipped with automatic fire detection and fire suppression systems. The enhanced roving fire watches and the fire protection features minimize the potential for a fire that would develop beyond the incipient stages before detection and require alternate shutdown. Based on the plant design and compensatory actions currently in place, the potential for a control room or cable spreading room fire are considered significantly small and would not affect alternate shutdown capability.
In the unlikely event a fire did occur in the control room or cable spreading room, a review of the Unit 1 and 2 control room inaccessibility procedures was performed to determine what the effect would be with the lack of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery backed emergency lighting. A comparison of the required manual actions versus available emergency lighting was performed to determine operability. The following summary of each procedure is provided below.
0 NRC FORM SSSA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-99)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 5 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT (ifmoie space is rettuired, trse edditionel copies of NRC Form 368Ai I17I Upon completion of an initial review of the subject procedure, the manual actions which require a review for Appendix R emergency lighting can be grouped into either indoor actions (i.e. Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)) or outdoor actions (i.e. turbine building, steam trestles, RAB roof, etc.).
For the indoor areas, in addition to the dedicated Appendix R emergency lights, 4 Emergency Portable Lantern Storage lockers (EPLS), each containing 4 portable lanterns, are available on each elevation (-0.5, 19.5 and 43') of the RAB. As shown on plant drawings, these lights can be utilized for access/egress and the performance of manual actions within the indoor areas.
Also, as stated in Section 9.5.3 of the FSAR, normal/emergency (N/E) AC lighting is available for indoor and outdoor areas. The N/E lighting consists of 2 redundant and physically separate (A and B train) lighting systems which are backed'by the emergency diesel generators.
The critical indoor manual action lacking 'dedicated emergency lighting is the Appendix D, Steps 1 and 2, action of placing the PORV isolate switches in the 'ISOLATE'osition. Isolating the
'PORV switches is required to prevent spurious. opening of the PORVs for fires in the control room or cable spreading room. The manual actions are taken in the A and B electrical penetration rooms which are located in the RAB 19.5'evel. The required manual action is a simple action of operating a switch. No special access or tools are required. Diesel backed N/E lighting from both the A and B trains is available in each room. Also, there are 4 portable emergency lanterns in locker ¹3 (EPLS-Locker ¹3) located in the AB switchgear room for use in the fire areas associated with the isolate switches (Fire Areas A and C). An additional portable lantern locker
~
is also available at the entrance to containment (EPLS-Locker ¹1) This locker is approximately
~
20'rom the entrance to the electrical penetration rooms. Emergency lighting for access and egress within the RAB to these lockers is provided. Although portable lighting is available, this condition is not considered optimal as there is currently no procedural guidance for the specific action to obtain the portable lights. In addition, having to go to the AB switchgear room to
~
obtain the portable lights does not yield the most direct route to the electrical penetration rooms for the PORV manual action.
The actions to be performed outside the control room in outdoor areas'are either contingency actions (Step 7.1.2 and Appendix B Step 1 - tripping the turbine at the front standard, Step 7.1.6 - closing manual steam generator blowdown isolation valves, Step 7.2.11 - locally closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) or a longer term manual action required for plant cooldown (Appendix J - local Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) operation)). For these outdoor manual actions, emergency power backed N/E lighting is available to general access/egress walkways. Tripping the turbine at the front standard and isolation of blowdown on the RAB MOP cllAkl %RAh td.Orl
NRC FORM 3BBA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 6 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT /iimare speceis required, use eddi tionel copies oi NRC Form 366Ai I 17) roof are relatively-simple contingency actions that likely could be accommodated with the current available'level of N/E lighting. Access/egress is also provided by N/E lights. N/E lights are also available for access/egress to the steam trestle and redundant N/E lights are available in the steam trestles themselves. Portable emergency lanterns could be utilized in the steam trestles to perform local isolation of the MSIVs and the longer term action of locally operating the ADVs to accommodate plant cooldown.
Upon completion of an initial review of the subject procedure, the manual actions which require a review for Appendix R emergency lighting outside the control room are performed in outdoor areas. As stated in Section 9.5.3 of the FSAR;.normal/emergency (N/E) AC lighting is available for indoor and outdoor areas. The N/E lighting consists of 2 redundant and physically separate (A and B train) systems which are backed by the emergency diesel generators.
The actions to be performed outside the control room are contingency actions (Step 7.1.2 and Appendix B Step 1 - tripping the turbine at the front standard, Step 7.1.6 - closing manual steam generator blowdown isolation valves, Step 7.2.11 - locally closing the MSIVs). For these outdoor manual actions, emergency power backed N/E lighting is available to illuminate access/egress walkways. Tripping the turbine at the front standard and isolation of blowdown on the RAB roof are relatively simple contingency actions that likely could be accommodated with the current available level of N/E lighting. Access/egress is also provided by N/E lights. N/E lights are also available for access/egress to the steam trestle and redundant N/E lights are available in the steam trestles themselves. Portable emergency lanterns could be utilized in the steam trestles to perform the action of locally isolating the MSIVs.
As discussed above, the available lighting is considered adequate for the performance of the necessary manual actions, and both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 are considered operable. To further enhance operability, several short term compensatory'actions were implemented as discussed below.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-99)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 7 OF 7 98 004 0 TEXT Pf more space ls required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ I17)
- 1. 's an iriterim measure,.portable. battery backed lights have been positioned at locations to support manual actions in areas:where no fixed lights are located and portable light Iockers are not located nearby. Procedures ONOP 1 and 2-0030135, "Control Room Inaccessibility," and procedures 1 and 2 ONP-100.01, ".Response to Fire," were revised to specify the existence, location, and,use of the portable lights. in areas where no fixed battery backed emergency lighting is provided. Procedures ONOP 1 and 2-0030135 were issued for use on January 30, 1998. Procedures 1 and 2 ONP-100.01 were issued
- -for use on February 6, 1998.
- 2. FPL will complete a detailed line-by-line evaluation of the current plant control room inaccessibility and general response to-fire procedures to identify any SSA manual actions which require enhanced Appendix R emergency lighting. Upon, completion of the SSA reviews for manual action clarifications, the emergency. light requirement evaluation will be finalized.
- 3. The deficient areas identified are to be supplemented by emergency lighting that meets the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.J.
None LER 50-335, 389/97-007, "RCP Oil Collection System Outside Appendix R Design Bases."
Describes event where initial design was inadequate to meet Appendix R requirements.
LER 50-389/97-004, "Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assemblies Outside Appendix R Design Bases." Describes event where initial design was inadequate to meet Appendix R requirements.
NRC FORM 3Il8A (4 951