ML17040A220
| ML17040A220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/2017 |
| From: | Fred Bower Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Browne K, Mccartney E NextEra Energy Seabrook |
| References | |
| IR 2016004 | |
| Download: ML17040A220 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000443/2016004
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713
February 8, 2017
Mr. Eric McCartney
Site Vice President
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
c/o Mr. Kenneth Browne
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
Dear Mr. McCartney:
On December 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook). On January 19, 2017, the NRC
inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-443
License No. NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000443/2016004
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
E. McCartney -2-
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000443/2016004 dated February 8, 2017
DISTIRBUTION w/encl: (via e-mail)
DDorman, RA (R1ORAMAIL Res)
DLew, DRA (R1ORAMAIL Res)
MScott, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Res)
DPelton, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Res)
RLorson, DRS (R1DRSMAIL Res
FBower, DRP
RBarkley, DRP
MDraxton, DRP
RVadella, DRP
PMeier, DRP, RI
JBowen, RI, OEDO
RidsNrrPMSeabrook Resource
RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Resource
ROPreports Resource
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection Reports\Seabrook\2016\16Q4\SB IR16004 FINAL.docx
ADAMS Accession Number: ML17040A220
SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP
NAME PCataldo/email RB RBarkley FBower
DATE 2/8/2017 2/8/2017 2/8/2017
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No.: 50-443
License No.: NPF-86
Report No.: 05000443/2016004
Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1
Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
Dates: October 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016
Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Meier, Resident Inspector
R. Vadella, Project Engineer
B. Dionne, Health Physicist
W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst
J. DeBoer, EP Inspector
P. Ott, Operations Engineer
Approved by: Fred L. Bower, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3
1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ..................................................................................... 4
1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 4
1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 5
1R06 Flood Protection Measures ....................................................................................... 6
1R07 Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................ 6
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance ... 7
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 8
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 9
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ...................................... 9
1R18 Plant Modifications ..................................................................................................10
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing .......................................................................................10
1R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................................11
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes .........................................11
2. RADIATION SAFETY.........................................................................................................12
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls .......................................12
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation ......................................................................13
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................................................13
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ...........................................................................13
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................14
4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................18
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit...........................................................................................20
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION....................................................................................... A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED .................................... A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED....................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-9
3
SUMMARY
IR 05000443/2016004; 10/01/2016-12/31/2016; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine
Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 6.
4
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Seabrook operated at full power for the entire assessment period, with the exception of a minor
down-power on December 9, 2016, to perform scheduled main turbine control valve testing.
Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample)
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed NextEras readiness for the onset of seasonal cold
temperatures. The review focused on the emergency feedwater pump building, the
service water (SW) pumphouse and the cooling tower (CT) pump area. The inspectors
reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications
(TSs), control room logs, and the corrective action program (CAP) to determine what
temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure
NextEra personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors
reviewed station procedures, including NextEras seasonal weather preparation
procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns
of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could
challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
- 480V AC Bus 52 secondary breaker maintenance on October 18
- Startup feed pump following maintenance run on October 20
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders
(WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
trains of equipment to identify conditions that could have impacted the systems
performance of its intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field
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walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and
support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined
the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of
equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed
whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into
the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Full System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On November 17, 2016, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of
accessible portions of the A train voltage direct current (VDC) system alignment
following battery replacement, to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The
inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, system diagrams,
equipment line-up check-off lists, WOs, work requests, CRs, TSs, and the UFSAR to
verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors
also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling,
hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors
performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system
components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The
inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating
parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also
reviewed whether NextEra staff had appropriately evaluated and resolved any
equipment issues and other performance deficiencies and entered them into their CAP
for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material
condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with
administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression
equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire
barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that
station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or
inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
- Cable spreading room (CB-F-2A-A) on October 18
- Containment enclosure ventilation area (CE-F-1-A) on October 19
- Turbine building 50 (TB-F-2-0, TB-F-2-Z) on December 29
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- Turbine building 75 (TB-F-3-0) on December 29
- Service & circulating water pump house (SW-F-1A-Z) on December 29
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample)
Internal Flooding Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to
identify internal flooding susceptibilities for the site. The inspectors review focused on
the cooling water tower pump room to verify the adequacy of drains, electrical
connections and boxes, and control circuits. It verified the adequacy of equipment seals
located below the flood line, floor and water penetration seals, watertight door seals,
common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and
temporary or removable flood barriers. It assessed the adequacy of operator actions
that NextEra had identified as necessary to cope with flooding in this area and also
reviewed the CAP to determine if NextEra was identifying and correcting problems
associated with both flood mitigation features and site procedures for responding to
flooding.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (711111.07A - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the B emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchanger leak
repair to ensure readiness and availability from November 16 through 18. They
observed maintenance activities, which included tube leak investigation and
plugging. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent inspection with
applicable NextEra staff and observed the as-found and as-left conditions. The
inspectors verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified
deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged within the
heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
7
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
(71111.11Q - 2 samples, 71111.11A - 1 sample)
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 19, 2016,
which included an anticipated transient without scram scenario. The inspectors
evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of
risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating
procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
and the technical specification action statements entered by the shift manager.
Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify
and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed infrequently performed test or evolution briefings, pre-shift
briefings, and reactivity control briefings to verify that the briefings met the criteria
specified in NextEras Administrative Procedure OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct of
Operations, Revisions 18 and 19. In addition, on October 6, 2016, the inspectors
observed: control room operators utilize alarm response procedures (ARP) following an
unexpected ground on unit substation (US)-52; reactivity (dilution) activity and setup for
reactor coolant system hotleg calibration, which included: (1) the placement of
condenser steam dump valve control system into steam pressure mode, (2) initiation of
forced pressurizer sprays, (3) placement of the rod control system into manual control,
and (4) placement of the pressurizer level control system into manual control. The
inspectors also observed a deviation log entry for configuration control of power
operated relief valve (PORV) RC-456B Block Valve, RC-V-124, which was left open
during instrumentation and controls (I&C) performance of surveillance testing.
Additionally, on December 19, 2016, the inspectors observed a pre-job brief and
performance of a pressurizer pressure operational test and a quarterly PORV block
valve timing test, conducted with both Operations and I&C technicians; several
annunciator alarm response activities resulting from field activities; recovery from venting
the pressurizer relief tank (PRT); and verified senior reactor operator (SRO) TS entries
for testing and technical requirements manual (TRM) review for emergent work.
On December 21, 2016, inspectors observed a pre-job brief and high risk discussion,
including the reactivity effects of steam usage during performance of the turbine-driven
emergency feedwater (EFW) pump surveillance testing and associated valve timing
testing, as well as coordination with the emergency news manager for the steam release
and chemistry pre-requisites for the testing; and unexpected annunciator response
involving SW travelling screen high d/p. The inspectors, as applicable, observed
8
operator performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations
and standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Operator Testing
a. Inspection Scope
On December 15, 2016, one NRC region-based inspector conducted an in-office review
of results of the licensee-administered annual operating tests for 2016 for Seabrook
Station Unit No.1 operators. The inspection assessed whether Pass/Fail rates were
consistent with the guidance of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I,
Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.
The review verified that the failure rate (individual or crew) did not exceed 20 percent.
- None of the 47 operators failed any section of the Annual Exam. The overall
individual failure rate was 0.0 percent.
- None of the 10 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0.0
percent.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and
reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents,
maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that NextEra
was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the
MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly
scoped into the MR in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR) 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by NextEra
staff were reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors
assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2).
Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra staff was identifying and addressing
common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries.
- SW system leak downstream of 1-SW-V5 on October 4
- A VDC battery cell replacement activities during October - November 2016
- Instrument air system repair history and improvement activities in November 2016
- Breaker maintenance and several associated component failures PC during
November - December 2016
9
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed
the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors
selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety
cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra
personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the
assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work,
the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant
risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results
of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions
were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical
specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when
applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements
were met.
- A vital DC battery inoperable and solar magnetic disturbance off
normal condition procedure entry on October 25
- A primary component cooling water (PCCW) pump motor change out on
November 15 & 16
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or
non-conforming conditions based on the risk significance of the associated components
and systems:
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to
assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject
component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk
occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate
sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEras evaluations to determine whether the
components or systems were operable. The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate,
compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Where
compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors
determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were
properly controlled by NextEra.
10
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether
the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety.
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing
results, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that the temporary
modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance
capability of the affected systems.
- A VDC battery cell replacement during October - November 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the SW pumphouse ventilation system,
implemented by engineering change (EC) 287688, Service Water Pumphouse
Thermostat Setpoint Change, Revision 0. The inspectors verified that the design bases,
licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded
by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents
associated with the design change, including WO 40497981, which implemented the
applicable thermostat setpoint changes. The inspectors verified that affected interface
documents, such as the calibration procedures utilized to adjust the setpoints, had been
revised to the settings consistent with the modification requirements.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed
below to verify that procedures and test activities adequately tested the safety functions
that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in
the procedure were consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis
and/or design basis documents, and that the test results were properly reviewed and
accepted and problems were appropriately documented. The inspectors also walked
down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where
possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, and witnessed the test or
11
reviewed test data to verify quality control hold point were performed and checked, and
that results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
- 480V AC Bus 52 transformer PM/secondary breaker maintenance on October 18
- A residual heat removal (RHR) pump seal cooler flow instrument leak repair on
November 4
- A PCCW pump motor change out on November 15 and 16
- B EDG heat exchanger leak repair on November 16 through 18
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of
selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,
and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance
criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with
design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and
accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test
prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether
the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety
functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
- TS surveillance frequency change project and evaluation for the analog channel
operational test frequency extension
- B train RHR quarterly flow and valve stroke testing on November 29 (in-service test)
- 2B charging pump flow testing on December 5
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
NextEra implemented various changes to the Seabrook Emergency Action Levels
(EALs), Emergency Plan, and Implementing Procedures. NextEra had determined that,
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3), any change made to the EALs, Emergency
Plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any reduction in
effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the standards in
50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E.
The inspectors performed an in-office review of all EAL and Emergency Plan changes
submitted by NextEra as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), including the changes to
lower-tier emergency plan implementing procedures, to evaluate for any potential
12
reductions in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. This review by the inspectors was
not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal
NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC
inspection in their entirety. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as
reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Next Eras performance in assessing and controlling
radiological hazards in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements contained
in 10 CFR Part 20, TSs, applicable Regulatory Guides (RGs), and the procedures
required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed the performance indicators (PIs) for the occupational exposure
cornerstone, radiation protection (RP) program audits, and reports of operational
occurrences in occupational radiation safety since the last inspection.
Radiological Hazard Assessment (1 sample)
The inspectors conducted independent radiation measurements during walkdowns of the
facility and reviewed, air sampling and analysis, continuous air monitor use, and any
changes to plant operations since the last inspection to verify sampling/monitoring
adequacy of any new radiological hazards for onsite workers or members of the public.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 sample)
The inspectors observed the monitoring of potentially contaminated material leaving the
radiological controlled area and inspected the methods and radiation monitoring
instrumentation used for control, survey, and release of that material.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 sample)
The inspectors assessed the use of continuous air monitoring, air sampling and
engineering controls; and dosimetry monitoring were consistent with the present
conditions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
13
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed performance in assuring the accuracy and operability of
radiation monitoring instruments used to protect occupational workers during plant
operations and from postulated accidents. The inspectors used the requirements in
10 CFR Part 20, RGs, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 323A, N323D, and
N42.14, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed Next Eras UFSAR, RP audits, records of in-service survey
instrumentation, and procedures for instrument source checks and calibrations.
Calibration and Testing Program
The inspectors reviewed radioactive effluent discharge system surveillance test results
based on TS acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that high-range effluent
monitors used in emergency operating procedures are calibrated and operable and have
post-accident effluent sampling capability.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed NextEras submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2015, through September 30,
2016:
- Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)
- RHR System (MS09)
- Cooling Water System (MS10)
To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors
used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also
reviewed NextEras operator narrative logs, mitigating systems performance index
derivation reports and basis documents, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection
reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
14
.2 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the occupational radiological
occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2015 through the third quarter 2016. The
inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02,
Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment of Performance Indicator Guidance, to determine
the accuracy of the PI data reported. The inspectors reviewed electronic personal
dosimetry accumulated dose alarms, dose reports, and dose assignments for any
intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were
potentially unrecognized PI occurrences. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of
various Locked High and Very High Radiation Area entrances to determine the
adequacy of the controls in place for these areas.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the radiological effluent TS/Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual (ODCM) radiological effluent occurrences PI for the fourth quarter
2015 through third quarter 2016. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance
contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment of
Performance Indicator Guidance, to determine if the PI data was reported properly. The
inspectors reviewed the public dose assessments for the PI for public radiation safety to
determine if related data was accurately calculated and reported.
The inspectors reviewed the CAP database to identify any potential occurrences such as
unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have
impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent summary
data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations to determine if indicator
results were accurately reported.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 3 samples)
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
status reviews to verify NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold,
gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed
adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures
15
and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily
screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR screening
meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as applicable, for
identified defects and non-conformances, NextEra performed an evaluation in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends that
might indicate the existence of more significant safety concerns. As part of this review,
the inspectors included repetitive or closely-related issues documented by Seabrook
personnel in trend reports, site PIs, major equipment problem lists, system health
reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The
inspectors also reviewed Seabrooks CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of
2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human
performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily
CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed Seabrooks quarterly trend report
for the third quarter of 2016, conducted under PI-AA-207-1000, Station Self-Evaluation
and Trending Analysis, Revision 6, to verify that Seabrook personnel were appropriately
evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors evaluated a sample of CRs generated over the course of the past two
quarters by departments that provide input to the quarterly trend reports. The inspectors
determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by Seabrook
staff for potential trends and resolved within the scope of the CAP. Moreover, the
inspectors identified instances where potential adverse trends were identified by
department staff during the course of the assessment period, which were consistent with
similar station-level trends, and confirmed that station personnel were utilizing statistical
and trending tools to identify potential emerging trends. Additionally, the inspectors
verified that discussions between department and performance improvement staff were
occurring to ensure emerging trends were appropriately captured either in the CAP or
the quarterly trend report, as applicable. One such example was the declining rate of
CR initiation recognized by Maintenance personnel under CR 2168318, and the
MRC-identified trend of CR initiation rate under CR 2167899.
The inspectors also confirmed one area of concern of very low safety-significance in
the area of housekeeping. NextEra closed out housekeeping as an adverse trend in
Seabrooks 3rd quarter trend report due to an improved trend noted by station
performance improvement personnel in the previous two quarters. However, the
inspectors observed that the 4th quarter statistical analyses demonstrated that
housekeeping issues were still an area that warranted attention based on the increase
of this metric exceeding the Upper Control Limit and flagged as a potential trend that
warranted further discussions among Seabrook staff. Moreover, this trend was entirely
16
consistent with inspector observations of housekeeping issues during implementation
of baseline inspection throughout the assessment period.
.3 Follow-up of Seal Penetration Degradation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Seabrooks corrective actions
following the identification of a degraded containment enclosure ventilation area
(CEVA) penetration seal, in February 2016, as detailed in CR 2107678, Gap
Identified in CEVA Seal 1-PB-021-EV101-7602. The inspectors reviewed the initial
seal inspections conducted in accordance with MX0599.02, 18 Month Inspection of
Technical Requirement Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Seals, Revision 5, and any
associated expansion of inspections required under the inspection program for
identified seal failures.
The inspectors assessed Seabrooks problem identification threshold, applicable cause
analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and
timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether Seabrook was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Seabrooks CAP and 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and
interviewed applicable Seabrook personnel to assess the effectiveness of the
implemented corrective actions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors verified that Seabrook had effectively evaluated the failed CEVA seal
penetration, and had previously assessed operability of the seal as documented in the
First Quarter 2016 NRC Inspection Report, 2016-001. The inspectors further observed
and evaluated seal restoration activities, which included a configuration that required
laboratory testing and certification. The repair and installation activities were conducted
under WO 40446460, and the inspectors verified the installed seal design was
consistent with applicable design and licensing basis attributes, and tested in
accordance with the original requirements, based on review of the final vendor test
report.
The inspectors questioned Seabrook staff regarding the condition of other seals within
the similar Category 12 (special seals, fire stops, seismic gaps, etc.) seal population,
based on the standard 10 percent population of seals that are inspected every 18-
months under MX0599.02. Moreover, the inspectors were concerned that seal No. 7602
could have been degraded for years without being appropriately identified, and the
condition of other seals in the same 10 percent population could be potentially degraded
without adequate assessment. As a result, Seabrook personnel initiated CR 2108874,
and evaluated the extent of condition of the other seals that had been previously
inspected during the same timeframe as seal No. 7602. The inspectors evaluated the
resultant response as documented in the CAP and determined that Seabrook staff had
addressed the applicable performance aspects that could have resulted in additional
seals being identified as potentially degraded and not be appropriately addressed within
the CAP.
17
The inspectors evaluated several additional seal inspection results during the
assessment period, i.e., through the fourth quarter of 2016, to verify that continued seal
inspections were being conducted in accordance with applicable program requirements.
In addition, the inspectors verified that as applicable, degraded conditions were being
addressed under the CAP.
.4 Alkali-Silica Reaction Monitoring
a. Inspection Scope
An objective of periodic site visits to Seabrook Station over the past few years has been
to review the adequacy of NextEras monitoring of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) on
affected reinforced concrete structures, per their Maintenance Rule Structures
Monitoring Program (SMP), and to determine whether the results were appropriately
considered for impact to the Seabrook prompt operability determinations for
ASR-affected structures. A region-based inspector was onsite between October 11-13,
2016, to conduct an inspection of ongoing ASR-related activities relevant to this
objective and to review NextEras corrective actions in response to Notice of Violation
[NOV 05000443/2016008-01]. This NOV was issued by the NRC for failure of the
Seabrook Station staff to complete, in two instances, immediate and prompt operability
assessments for nonconforming conditions when pertinent new information was
developed (see Section 4OA5 below for additional details). The inspector also
conducted in-office reviews of ASR-related documentation.
The inspector assessed the problem identification threshold, operability and functionality
assessments, extent of condition reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of
corrective actions to determine whether NextEra personnel were appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with the ASR-affected
structures. The inspector evaluated NextEras actions to verify compliance with
Engineering Department Standard 36180, SMP, Revision 09, the CAP and in the quality
assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspector toured Seabrook Station with the NRC resident inspectors and NextEra
staff to observe several ASR-affected structures and systems and to status NextEras
activities associated with the installation of new crack monitoring instrumentation and
through-wall expansion monitors (extensometers). The inspector also:
- observed field activities involving the removal of cover concrete from the containment
enclosure building missile shield impinging on the containment outer wall
(EC No. 287308 and Foreign Print 101071)
- examined crack gauges and extensometers in the RHR/CS Equipment Vault and B
Electrical Tunnel, including a review of preliminary data collected from the first three
months of extensometer installation
- reviewed and discussed use of onsite concrete core testing equipment
- reviewed EC No. 285349, Revision 003, Design Change Package for
(RHR/containment spray (CS)) Equipment Vault Monitoring using InVar Rod
Assemblies and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, No. 2015-306
- reviewed preliminary results from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME)Section XI, 2004 Edition, IWL inservice inspection of containment
18
The inspector concluded that NextEra appropriately implemented the station SMP per
procedure and that information from ASR-related activities was appropriately entered
into the Seabrook CAP for proper resolution. However, the inspector noted that the
current revision (Rev. 09) of the Seabrook Station SMP provides a more detailed phased
approach to monitoring and assessing ASR-affected reinforced concrete structures. The
inspector did not review for adequacy the recently implemented structures monitoring
methods. Interim monitoring results and NextEras consideration for impact to current
ASR-affected structures operability determinations were considered reasonable and
appropriate. The SMP, Revision 9, is currently under NRC staff review consistent with
the processing of NextEras license amendment request (LAR) 16-03, dated August 1,
2016 (ML16216A250).
4OA5 Other Activities (3 samples)
.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515-192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim
Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design
Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance-based TI is to verify implementation of interim
compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition (OPC) design
vulnerability in electric power systems for operating reactors. The inspectors verified
NextEra has implemented the following measures to mitigate the potential impact of an
OPC:
- NextEra had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned from the
OPC events at the US operating plants including the Byron station OPC event and its
consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing,
recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC event;
- NextEra had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly
diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe
shutdown of the plant;
- NextEra had established and continues to implement periodic walkdown activities to
inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and
transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power
circuits to detect a visible OPC; and,
- NextEra had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard
components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance
and testing activities, NextEra assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified; therefore, this one-time TI is considered
closed for Seabrook.
19
.2 Licensee Strike Contingency Plans (92709)
a. Inspection Scope
NextEra Energy Seabrook developed a Staffing Contingency Plan to ensure a sufficient
number of qualified personnel were available to continue operations in the event that:
(1) the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA) Local 555, personnel engaged in a job
action upon the expiration of their contract at midnight, on December 2, 2016; and,
(2) Seabrook Nuclear Security LLC personnel (Formerly known as United Federation of
Special Police and Security Officers (UFSPSO) Union Local 501) engaged in a job
action upon expiration of their contract on December 31, 2016.
Using the guidance contained in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 92709, Licensee Strike
Contingency Plans, the inspectors reviewed NextEra Energy Seabrooks Staffing
Contingency Plan content, and verified that adequate qualified personnel were identified
to perform key functions necessary for safe operation of the facility. Additionally, the
inspectors selected several key positions that required updated qualifications to ensure
applicable training requirements were met prior to any proposed job action. The
inspector reviewed and/or observed training for key positions including: (1) training of
fire brigade personnel through hands on fire-fighting at the Brentwood Fire Facility, (2)
re-activation of Senior Reactor Operators through requisite amount of hours in the
control room to meet watchstanding requirements, (3) equivalence qualification for key
maintenance activities such as Seismic Monitor calibrations, as well as signed
agreements for switchyard services through New Hampshire Transmission, and (4)
qualification of contingency security officers consistent with NRC rules through live-fire
weapons qualifications at the indoor range.
The inspectors verified the control room staffing plan complied with TS and other NRC
requirements.
On November 28, 2016, NextEra Energy Seabrook and UWUA, Local 555, tentatively
agreed to a new contract and union members approved the contract on December 1,
2016. Additionally, on December 2, 2016, G4S and Seabrook Nuclear Security, LLC,
approved a rolling no job action bridge agreement until contract negotiations could be
finalized.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 (Closed) NOV 05000443/201600801: Failure to Complete Operability Determinations
for ASR-affected Structures
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of IP 92702 is to verify that the root cause(s) for licensee performance
deficiencies resulting in enforcement action have been appropriately identified and to
determine that adequate corrective actions have been implemented to prevent
recurrence. The purpose of this inspection was to review the adequacy of corrective
actions implemented to address an NOV (see EA-16-101 at ML16127A155) involving
NextEras inadequate implementation of NextEra Nuclear Fleet Administrative
Procedure, EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments.
Specifically, NextEra did not prepare and approve Immediate Operability Determinations
20
(IOD) and Prompt Operability Determinations (POD) following the identification of
nonconforming conditions impacting the RHR and CS Equipment Vaults and the
Containment Enclosure Building (CEB). By letter dated June 6, 2016, (ML16161A534)
NextEra provided their response to the NOV.
The inspector used the NOV response to focus the in-office review of associated
documentation and on-site follow-ups, verifications and interviews with responsible
Seabrook staff. The inspector reviewed NextEras causal analysis and actions to
prevent recurrence that included: establishment of a cross-discipline team that provides
routine oversight and review of all ASR-related issues and developments; development
and promulgation of lessons learned from the untimely implementation of
EN-AA-203-1001 and the associated IODs and PODs to all responsible Engineering and
Operations staff members; a comprehensive revision to the Engineering Department
Standard 36180, Structures Monitoring Program, that more closely focuses on ASR
progression monitoring and assessment; and, a revised integrated ASR corrective action
plan that includes the submission of a LAR to reconcile the current licensing basis. This
action was completed with NextEras submittal of a LAR 16-03, dated August 1, 2016
(L16216A240). NextEra has proposed a first-of-its-kind methodology for monitoring the
progression of material property changes caused by ASR and for monitoring structural
deformation (bulk expansion) impacts on overall structural performance. These
monitoring methods are currently being reviewed by NRC staff in the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulations consistent with the NRC staffs processing of NextEras LAR.
b. Findings and Observations
This violation is closed. Additional observations were documented above in
Section 4OA2.4.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 19, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and
other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The inspectors verified that no
proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
E. McCartney, Site Vice President
C. Domingos, Plant General Manager
C. Adams, General Supervisor, Operations Training
K. Boehl, Senior Rad Protection Analyst
V. Brown, Licensing Engineer
K. Browne, Licensing Manager
A. Chesno, PI Manager
J. Crowley, CIP Manager
D. Currier, Emergency Planning Manager
T. Fouts, Operations Training Requalification Supervisor
A. Giotos, Sr Analyst
R. Guthrie, System Engineer
M. Hansen, Engineering Site Manager, Systems
D. Hickey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
D. Ritter, Operations Director
D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager
D. Strand, RP Manager
T. Smith, Radiation Protection Supervisor
C. Thomas, Licensing Engineer
J. Tucker, Security Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Closed
05000443/2016008-01 NOV Failure to Complete Operability Determinations
for ASR-affected Structures (Section 4OA5.3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
OP-AA-102-1002, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 15
Condition Reports
2153879 2155622 2157259 2168322 2169984 2175241
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40426602 40457257 40474933 40507473 40507511 94151166
94151422
Attachment
A-2
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
OS1016.01, Service Water System Fill and Vent, Revision 19
OS1035.02, Startup Feed Pump Operation, Revision 16
OS1046.07, Vital 480V Operation, Revision 24
OS1048.13, Vital Bus 11A Operation, Revision 15
OX1446.03, Electrical Bus Weekly Operability (Operating), Revision 12
Drawings
1-CO-B20426, Condensate System Detail, Revision 31
1-FW-B20684, Feedwater System Overview, Revision 10
1-FW-B20687, Feedwater System Detail, Revision 30
1-NHY-310013, 480V Unit Substation Buses E-51 & E-52 One Line Diagram, Revision 22
1-NHY-310041, 125VDC & 120VAC Instrument Buses Key One Line Diagram, Revision 18
1-NHY-310042, 125VDC Vital Distribution System One Line Diagram, Revision 4
1-SW-B20794, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 37
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Condition Reports
2163607 2163620
Miscellaneous
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, Containment Enclosure
Ventilation Area, CE-F-1-A
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, Control Building Cable
Spreading Rooms and Mechanical Rooms, CB-F-2A-A
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume II, Service & Circ. Water Pump
House, SW-F-1A-Z
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume II, Turbine Building 50, TB-F-2-0
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume II, Turbine Building 50, TB-F-2-Z
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume II, Turbine Building 75, TB-F-3-0
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Miscellaneous
Report TP-7, Seabrook Station Moderate Line Break Study, Revision 5
UFSAR Section 3.6B Revision 8; Section 9.2, Revision 14
Drawings
9763-F-604139, Cooling Tower Ventilation and Drainage System, Revision 12
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Procedures
MS50515.60, Heat Exchanger Tube Cleaning and Inspection, Revision 1
ES1807.025, Inservice Inspection Visual Examination Procedure, Revision 06
Condition Reports
2169614
A-3
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40502704 4050460
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
CS0910.01, Primary Systems Sampling at SS-CP-166A, Revision 25
TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Revision 4
OP 9.2, Transient Response Procedure Users Guide, Revision 17
OX1401.03, RCS Vent Path Block Valve Quarterly, Cold Shutdown, and 18 Month Surveillance
Test, Revision 14
OX1436.02, Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Quarterly and Monthly Valve
Alignment, Revision 27
OX1456.81, Operability Testing of IST Valves, Revision 25
Condition Reports
2176172
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40450687 40451046 40451048
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
EC-287539, Temporary Clamping Device for Through Wall Leak Repairs, Revision 0
EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Revision 19
ES1850.003, Motor Operated Valve Performance Monitoring, Revision 12
PEG-5, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 11
Condition Reports
0188033 0202006 1681551 1790872 1803668 1850566
1853148 1890951 1907568 1968335 2004541 2060360
2081769 2089810 2135419 2136567 2137168 2158711
2159845 2160307 2164045 2166011 2168141
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
01968335 40312977 40438519 40493072 94056612
Drawings
PID-1-SW-B20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 45
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
WM-AA-100, Risk Management Program, Revision 0
WM-AA-100-1000, Work Activity Risk Management, Revision 8
ON1246.03, GSU Trouble, Revision 11
Condition Reports
0000300 0209321 2162696 2164045
A-4
Miscellaneous
EC 287668, 286883
UFSAR Section 8.3, Revision 14
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments, Revision 22
Condition Reports
2162696
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Procedures
EN-AA-202-1001, Engineering and Change Scope Screening, Revision 7
EN-AA-203-1201, 10 CFR Applicability and 10CFR50.59 Screening, Revision 8
EN-AA-203-1201-F02, 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Form, Revision 1, Screen # 2016-246
EN-AA-203-1202, 10CFR50.50 Evaluation, Revision 1
EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Revision 19
EN-AA-205-1102, Temporary Configuration Changes, Revision 8
IS1674.414, SWA-T-5610 SW Pump House Fan-38A Control Calibration, Revision 9
IS1674.415, SWA-T-5611 SW Pump House Fan-38B Control Calibration, Revision 7
LX0556.95, 1-EDE-B-1-A Battery Performance Test, Revision 6
LX0556.10, 18 Month Technical Specification Battery Surveillance, Revision 2
LX0556.101, 1-EDE-B-1-A Quarterly Technical Specification Battery Surveillance, Revision 11
MA 3.5, Post Maintenance Testing Guide, Revision 3.5
Condition Reports
2159845 2164045 2166011
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40438519
Miscellaneous
Procedure Change Request (PCR) 02170573, Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation System
Operation, Revision 11
Drawings
1-NHY-300219, Service Environment Chart, Revision 30
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
AD-AA-100-1006, Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence, Revision 9
ES1807.025, Inservice Inspection Visual Examination Procedure, Revision 6
FP71537, Metal Tube Rotameter Instruction Manual, Revision 0
LS0563.11, Testing of Agastat 125 VDC (7000 Series) TDPU Timing Relays, Revision 11
LS0564.38, 4160 Volt Dynamic Motor Monitoring, Revision 7
LX0557.02, 60 Month PM of 480V US Breakers, Revision 21
MA3.5, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 19
MA-AA-203-1000, Maintenance Testing, Revision 15
MA3.5, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 19
A-5
MA-AA-203-1000, Maintenance Testing, Revision 15
OX1412.01, PCCW Train A Operability, 18 Month Position Indication, and Comprehensive
Pump Testing, Revision 21
OX1426.05, DG 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance, Revision 44
Condition Reports
2161853 2162103 2162696 2169614
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
00209321 00628988 40397416 40397420 40437463 40437593
40494053 40502704 40504060
Miscellaneous
MM-AA-201, Minor Maintenance Process, Revision 11
Drawings
PID-1-CC-B20207, Primary Component Cooling Loop A, Revision 12
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
OP-AA-200, Surveillance Frequency Change Process, Revision 1
OP-AA-200-1001, Evaluation of Proposed Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals, Revision 4
Condition Reports
2072481 2072484 2076687 2171703
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40446945 40451097
Miscellaneous
NEI 04-10, Revision 1
SBK-PRAE-16-004
UFSAR, Revision 17
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures
ER 3.5, Joint Information Center Operations, Revision 40
ER 3.6, Assembly Area Operations, Revision 31
ER 5.4 Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 35
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
HD095817, Performance of Routine Radiological Surveys, Revision 13
HD0955.50, Far West REM-500 Operation, Revision 6
HN0960.10, Radiological Requirements for Entry Beneath Reactor Vessel, Revision 31
HN0960.17, Radiological Controls for Transfer of Spent Fuel between the Containment and the
Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 4
OA 13-007 Pre-Planned Posting and Survey Instructions, Revision 0
RP-AA-102-1001, Area Radiological Surveys, Revision 1
A-6
RP-AA-103-1001, Posting Requirements for Radiological Hazards, Revision 2
RP-AA-103-1002, High Radiation Area Controls, Revision 3
RP-AA-107-1001, Radioactive Material Receipt, Revision 2
RP-AA-107-1003, Unconditional and Conditional Release of Material, Revision 1
Condition Reports
02142895 02150257 02150260 02151850 02152748 02153269
02154926 02155077 02156307 02170204
Miscellaneous
Air Sample Results AS 16-93 for WPC -8 El, March 2, 2016
Air Sample Results AS 16-95 for CTMT D SG Platform, March 2, 2016
Air Sample Results AS16-280 for FSB 11 El, June 24, 2016
Air Sample Results AS 16-93 for FSB Transfer Canal, June 28, 2016
HD0958.03 Form A Personnel Contamination Report, Badge No 6540, November 13, 2015
HRA\LHRA\VHRA Briefing Acknowledgment Form for Containment Entry, December 7, 2016
LHRA Stay Time Tracking Form for RWP 16-0010, December 7, 2016
LHRA/VHRA Entry Verification for Containment, December 7, 2016
Next Era WBC Analysis Results, SID N130658, July 1, 2016
Next Era WBC Analysis Results, SID N130674, July 1, 2016
Quick Hit/ Department Assessment Report # 02114213 - 2015 Radiation Protection Program
Assessment, July 20, 2016
RP-AA-104-1000-F06 TEDE ALARA Assessment, RWP 16-0091 Transfer Canal Decon and
Liner Repair, May 31. 2016
Seabrook Air Sample Log 2016
Seabrook Station Radiation Protection Program, Revision 67
SB RWP-16-0010, Containment Entry at Power, December 7, 2016
Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Procedures
HX0958.12, Radiation Protection Response to RDMS Tech Spec and Cat 2 or 3 Monitor
Failures, Revision 15
Condition Reports
02144082 02148262 02148271 02167707 02172340
Miscellaneous
SB System Health Report RM Rad Monitoring 3rd Quarter 2016
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 14
CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20
HD0958.33, Performance of Radiation Protection Supervisory Plant Walkdowns, Revision 6
JD0999.910, Reporting Key Performance Indicators per NEI 99-02, Revision 8
Condition Reports
2159224 2159236
A-7
Miscellaneous
CP 4.1C Release Index Log 2016, November 30, 2016
CS0908.01 Form F - Radioactive Effluent Dose Assessment Report 2016 (Sheets 1 and 2),
December 5, 2016
JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, October, November and
December 2015, dated January 20, 2016
JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, January, February and March 2016,
dated April 6, 2016
JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, April, May and June 2016,
dated September 7, 2016
JD0999.910 Figure 1 Occupational Exposure Occurrence, July, August and September 2016,
dated October 21, 2016
LIC-16014, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station 3rd Quarter 2016 Performance
Indicator Submittal, dated October 21, 2016
LIC-16011, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station 2nd Quarter 2016 Performance
Indicator Submittal, dated July 27, 2016
LIC-16006, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station 1st Quarter 2016 Performance
Indicator Submittal, dated April 20, 2016
LIC-16002, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station 4th Quarter 2015 Performance
Indicator Submittal, dated January 27, 2016
LIC-16014, Seabrook Station NRC 3rd Quarter 2016 Performance Indicator Submittal
MSPI Derivation Report for Seabrook Unit 1, September 2016, MSPI Cooling Water System UAI
MSPI Derivation Report for Seabrook Unit 1, September 2016, MSPI Cooling Water System URI
MSPI Derivation Report for Seabrook Unit 1, September 2016, RHR System UAI
MSPI Derivation Report for Seabrook Unit 1, September 2016, RHR System URI
NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7
SBK-PRAE-15-001, Seabrook MSPI Basis Document Update 2014, Revision 0
NextEra - Seabrook Station 2015 Annual Radioactive Release Report, April 24, 2015
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
C-S-1-61035, Allowable CEVA Penetration Seal Opening Size, Revision 3
EC-285777, 1-PB-021-EV101-7602, CEVA Penetration Seal Design Detail, S-33, Revision 1
FP4497R-02, Penetration Seal Design, Seal No. PB-021-EV101-7602, Revision 1
PI-AA-207, Trend Coding and Analysis, Revision 11
PI-AA-207-1000-10000, Performance Improvement Trending Analysis Tools, Revision 1
Condition Reports
2004748 2100572 2145108 2146039 2146805 2167947
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40292272 40408502 40436442 40436446
Miscellaneous
Final Report, dated May 3, 2016, Hydrostatic and Pneumatic Pressure Integrity Testing of PCI
Promatec Low Density Foam SE-Foam
Engineering Change (EC) 0287308, dated 9/21/16
Engineering Department Standard 36180, Structure Monitoring Program, Revision 09
Foreign Print No. 101071, CEB Assess Seismic Gaps and Effect of Cutting Missile Shield,
dated 8/30/16
NextEra License Amendment Request 16-03, SBK-l-16071, dated August 1, 2016,
Prompt Operability Determination (POD) AR 02134569, Fuel Storage Building, dated 6/30/16
A-8
POD AR-1977456, RHR/CS Vault, Revision 2
POD AR-2094762, CEB, Revision 1
POD AR-1804477, Containment, Revision 0
Seabrook Station Engineering Procedure, ES1807.031, Inservice Inspection Procedure Primary
Containment Section XI IWL Program, Revision 4
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Procedures
ES1807.16, Thermography Program, Revision 5
OP-AA-100-1001-F01, License Watch-Standing Record, Revision 0
OP-AA-100-1001-F02, License Activation/Reactivation Approval, Revision 0
OP-AA-100-1001-F05, Seabrook Comprehensive Plant Tour, Revision 0
OAI.22A, Returning to Shift Checklist, Revision 46
TR-AA-230-1004-F06, Alternate Qualification Form, Revision 2
QM 3.1, Maintenance Group Job Incumbent Qualification Worksheet, Revision 6
Condition Reports
02120109 02134569 02140522 1732579 1731646
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40464635 40460820
Miscellaneous
Apparent Cause Evaluation Report CR2130728, dated 5/26/16
Day & Zimmerman Agreement dated 10/21/16, Article XXVI: Work Stoppages
Engineering Evaluation EE-13-016, Seabrook Station Response to NEI Open Phase Condition
Initiative, Revision 0
ERO Staffing Succession Plan - 10/14/16
G4S RSS Seabrook Nuclear Station Staffing Contingency Plan, dated September 19, 2016
Miscellaneous Badge Access Transaction Reports
NextEra Energy Seabrook letter SBK-L-16076, dated June 6, 2016 (ML16161A534)
NextEra Energy Seabrook Staffing Contingency Plan
SBK LOP L3554C122, Seabrook Licensed Operator Requalification Training, Phase 12-02
SBK LOP L5076C123, Seabrook Licensed Operator Requalification Training, Phase 12-03
Strike Contingency Primary Watch Station Qualification Guide, #SBK NLO N0050Q, Revision 0
A-9
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ARP alarm response procedure
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASR alkali-silica reaction
CAP corrective action program
CEB containment enclosure building
CEVA containment enclosure ventilation area
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR condition report
EAL emergency action level
EC engineering change
EDG emergency diesel generator
I&C instrumentation and controls
IOD immediate operability determination
IP inspection procedure
LAR license amendment request
MR Maintenance Rule
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NOV notice of violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
PCCW primary component cooling water
PI performance indicator
POD prompt operability determination
PORV power operated relief valve
PRT pressurizer relief tank
RG Regulatory Guide
RP radiation protection
RWP radiation work permit
SMP structures monitoring program
SRO senior reactor operator
SSC structure, system, or component
TI temporary instruction
TRM technical requirements manual
TS technical specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UFSPSO United Federation of Special Police and Security Officers
US unit substation
UWUA Utility Workers Union of America
VDC voltage direct current
WO work order