IR 05000443/2016009
Download: ML16340A195
Text
-1- December 1, 2016 Mr. Eric McCartney Site Vice President Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC c/o Mr. Ken Browne P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION - PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2016009
Dear Mr. McCartney:
On October 21, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at Seabrook Station. On that date, the NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety. The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas also adequately supported nuclear safety. Finally the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
E. McCarthy -2- This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,/RA/ Fred L. Bower III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000443/2016009
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
E. McCarthy -2- This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,/RA/ Fred L. Bower III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000443/2016009
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ DISTIRBUTION w/encl: (via e-mail) DDorman, RA DLew, DRA MScott, DRP DPelton, DRP RLorson, DRS JYerokun, DRS FBower, DRP RBarkley, DRP MDraxton, DRP RVadella, DRP PCataldo, DRP, SRI PMeier, DRP, RI ACass, DRP, Resident AA JBowen, RI, OEDO RidsNrrPMSeabrook Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Resource ROPreports Resource
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection Reports\Seabrook\2016\PIR Biennial\Seabrook 2016 PIR Report FINAL.docx ADAMS ML16340A195 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP 3 RI/TSAB RI/DRP 3 NAME R. Barkley M. Ferdas F. Bower DATE 11/14/2016 12/01/2016 12/01/2016 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000443/2016009 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire Dates: October 3 - 21, 2016 Team Leader: R. Barkley, PE, Senior Project Engineer Inspectors: S. Elkhiamy, Project Engineer P. Meier, Resident Inspector N. Staples, Senior Project Engineer Approved by: Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects 2
SUMMARY
IR 5000443/2016009 - Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution. This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors, one of whom was from Region II, and the resident inspector. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated August 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that NextEra was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. NextEra personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. In most cases, NextEra appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that NextEra typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.
The inspectors concluded that NextEra adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Seabrook operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that NextEra's self-assessments and audits were thorough.
Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program (ECP) issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described NextEra's corrective action program at Seabrook Station. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program (CAP), the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and NextEra procedure PI-AA-104-1000, Condition Reporting. For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) and Management Review Committee (MRC) meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.
(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the service water system and station batteries. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that NextEra entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate. (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in October 2014. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes.
Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues. (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed NextEra's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed NextEra's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected non-cited violations and findings to verify that NextEra personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate NextEra actions related to the feedwater system. b. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that NextEra identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. NextEra staff at Seabrook initiated over 26,000 condition reports between January 2014 and August 2016. The inspectors observed supervisors at the CARB and MRC meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that NextEra trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, NextEra personnel promptly initiated condition reports or removed old deficiency tags for issues that had since been corrected. The team noted the following minor violation of NRC regulations while performing this portion of the inspection: Use of Unqualified Maintenance Workers on a Safety-Related Valve During a review of the root cause evaluation (RCE) on the RHR suction valve (RC-V-22) packing leak, the inspectors noted that NextEra brought in a contractor to repack that valve and others during the prior refueling outage. NextEra then had to bring in a subcontractor to assist due to the need for additional labor. However, the employees for this subcontractor were not qualified to perform work on safety-related equipment, such as repacking valve RC-V-22. While they were supposed to be supervised by a qualified worker and only provide labor assistance, they in fact wound up performing key elements of the valve repacking and did so without supervision by a qualified worker.
The valve packing leaked shortly after pressurization and eventually had to be replaced during the March 2016 forced outage initiated for other reasons. The inspectors considered the failure to follow NextEra's procedure governing the qualification and oversight of contract workers (SSMA, Maintenance Manual, Revision 140, "Job Assignments") to be a performance deficiency. Specifically, Seabrook did not ensure that an outside contractor was properly qualified to perform safety significant activities under NextEra's established quality assurance program (NextEra QATR Section A.5 - Personnel Training and Qualification). However, because the leak was small and did not involve the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the inspectors screened the violation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B and determined that it was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. NextEra documented this issue in condition reports 02163894, 02164076, and 02164143.
(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that, in general, NextEra appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem.
NextEra screened condition reports for operability and reportability, categorized the condition reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.
Based on the sample of condition reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by NextEra's corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in the categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases, the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the team did note some observations in NextEra's prioritization and evaluation of the following issues: Evaluation of the Operability/Functionality of Potentially Degraded Equipment: The inspectors found three occasions where an issue with operability/functionality was not fully addressed by Operations during the process of characterizing potentially degraded equipment. For example: (1) a packing leak on a steam generator (SG) blowdown valve with a containment isolation function was not listed as technical specification (TS) equipment and safety-related, which would have prompted an additional level of technical review; (2) a reactor coolant pump thermal barrier leak was misclassified; and, (3) the team noted an issue in 2014 (AR 01995793) where indicated service water flow values were found to be 500 GPM apart versus the usual 200 GPM. In the last example, Instrumentation and Controls technicians did a calibration and found one flow instrument was out of calibration, but the team noted that the flow rate found before the calibration was used for a prior surveillance test. Fortunately, the proper engineering evaluation was eventually taken in each of the three cases above, but in the case of the service water (SW) flow instrument, not until after a month lapsed. We noted that Seabrook identified similar screening issues in a June 2016 self-assessment (AR 2097987), but such events continue to occur.
The inspectors determined that the inadequate operability evaluation documentation for these components was a performance deficiency. However, because the first two issues were evaluated in a timely manner, and the proper technical actions taken in all three cases, the inspectors determined that these issues were of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. NextEra documented these issues in condition reports 2160716, 2163674, and 2164244. (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, NextEra identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC non-cited violations and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. The inspectors did observe a weakness in NextEra's resolution of a degraded condition as noted below: Proper Scheduling of Inservice Test Surveillances During a review of an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) and a common cause evaluation (CCE) on the untimely completion of inservice testing (IST) surveillances on two service water valves and two safety-related pumps, the team noted that the proposed corrective action for the first instance in May 2015 was not completed. Specifically, the extent of condition review performed for the first overdue surveillance identified other surveillances that could come overdue, but the corrective action did not get a hard schedule date in NextEra's tracking system. When schedule dates were later changed, it allowed the surveillance test on another SW valve to go overdue in February 2016. Two other pump ISTs also went overdue in February 2016. Since this corrective action was not implemented, permitting the problem to recur, the team considered this issue to be a performance deficiency. However, as the components subsequently tested satisfactorily, this violation of NextEra's Condition Reporting Procedure (PI-AA-104-1000, Section 4.9.2.B) was determined to be of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The team also had concerns with two follow-on corrective actions that had either not been reflected in the corresponding fleet procedure, or had yet to be scheduled for completion. This issue was entered into NextEra's CA system as CR 2160543.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether NextEra appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Seabrook and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that NextEra adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that NextEra appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental functional area and quick hit self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if NextEra entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether NextEra initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal NextEra assessments were generally critical and thorough, and in several cases effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that NextEra personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. NextEra completed these audits and some self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Seabrook. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station ECP coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed selected ECP files to ensure that NextEra entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate. b. Assessment During interviews with individual team members, Seabrook staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the ECP. The 2014 safety culture survey (the most recent available) was also reviewed and it also reflected a willingness of employees to raised safety concerns.
While the site affords employees the opportunity to submit condition reports anonymously, few are actually submitted each year; the team reviewed a number of these as well as the resulting actions taken. Also, the team noted that several condition reports on sensitive subjects were freely submitted by employees who provided their contact information. In addition, NRC allegation activity at Seabrook since the last Problem Identification and Resolution PI&R has remained low. Based on these limited interviews as well as the survey data and a review of the ECP case history since 2014, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 21, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric McCartney, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- E. McCartney, Site Vice President
- A. Chesno, Performance Improvement Manager
- V. Brown, Licensing Analyst
- K. Browne, Licensing Manager
- C. Ellis, Radiation Protection
- S. Folsom, Maintenance Director (acting)
- J. Dolan, Maintenance CAPCO
- E. Mathews, System Engineer
- B. McAllister, Systems Engineering Supervisor
- C. Moynihan, Performance Improvement Analyst
- A. Downey, System Engineer
- J. Klempa, System Engineer
- R. Guthrie, System Engineer
- R. Schalck, System Engineer
- K. Harper, System Engineer
- M. Collins, Engineering Director
- M. Peters, Engineering CAPCO
- D. Ritter, Operations Director
- T. Smith, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- D. Strand, Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Tucker, Security Manager
- B. Whyte, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
NRC Personnel
- W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, Region I
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened and Closed None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
- Audits and Self-Assessments Department Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture
- EP self-assessment audit
- Focused Self-Assessment - Fleet Corrective Action Program
- Focused Area Self-Assessment -- Radiation Protection Instrumentation Program
- Focused Area Self-Assessment - Problem Identification & Resolution
- Nuclear Oversight Report - Performance Improvement (SBK# 15-011)
- QHSA 2014 Nuclear Projects Measure of Success
- QHSA 2015 Nuclear Projects Measure of Success QHSA Ops CAP Measure of Success 2014
- QHSA Ops CAP Measure of Success 2015
- QHSA Security Measures of Success
- Seabrook Daily Quality Summary Reports (CA-related observations 1/1/14 - 8/25/16)
- Self-Assessment has not yielded improvement (AR 02112403)
Condition Reports
(* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)1693814
- 1873391
- 2004234
- 2035366
- 2077820
- 2108355
- 2136006
- 1693855
- 1921653
- 2006305
- 2035686
- 2077836
- 2083599
- 2065230
- 1697250
- 1928545
- 2008404
- 2036697
- 2077898
- 2108372
- 2139566
- 1699599
- 1934008
- 2011698
- 2036924
- 2079522
- 2109628
- 2140612
- 1702556
- 1938728
- 2013302
- 2037260
- 2081715
- 2110020
- 2143155
- 1703710
- 1942280
- 2014116
- 2045450
- 2083161
- 2112244
- 2144144
- 1704325
- 1942717
- 2014264
- 2047846
- 2085253
- 2114495
- 2145617
- 1716908
- 1944559
- 2014325
- 2049737
- 2086391
- 2135126
- 2146624
- 1756235
- 1945403
- 2014638
- 2062240
- 2086635
- 2116310
- 2154705
- 1792118
- 1948973
- 2014639
- 2052602
- 2089549
- 2115865
- 2154819
- 1803271
- 1957766
- 2016192
- 2053991
- 2091049
- 2116400
- 2155786
- 1803685
- 1964787
- 2016225
- 2075215
- 2091331
- 2116923
- 2156454
- 1803686
- 1969397
- 2016238
- 2054462
- 2091426
- 2117035
- 2156773
- 1811526
- 1988938
- 2016863
- 2054590
- 2091437
- 2117097
- 2157869
- 1815351
- 1989369
- 2017379
- 2059207
- 2091477
- 2118148
- 2158622
- 1817396
- 1989420
- 2022050
- 2061978
- 2091480
- 2125934
- 2159224
- 1823598
- 1990677
- 2022462
- 2064300
- 2097586
- 2127573
- 2160716*
- 1825599
- 1991284
- 2023931
- 2067326
- 2101826
- 2128093
- 2160295*
- 1832016
- 1992038
- 2023961
- 2070638
- 2103175
- 2128468
- 2160543*
- 1843442
- 1994649
- 2027276
- 2070872
- 2103176
- 2129116
- 2163894*
- 1846995
- 1995588
- 2150303
- 2071051
- 2106893
- 2129315
- 2164301*
- 1847826
- 1990673
- 2028739
- 2072557
- 2091366
- 2130510
- 2164244*
- 1852329
- 1995663
- 2030144
- 2073964
- 2107978
- 2130585
- 2164143*
- 1862823
- 1995793
- 2030192
- 2075349
- 2107980
- 2134335
- 2164076*
- 1862894
- 2000697
- 2030450
- 2075894
- 2107981
- 2071671
- 2163674*
- 1873383
- 2000817
- 2032322
- 2077337
- 2107982
- 2028054
- 2163481*
- 2163388*
- Operating Experience
- PWR Chemistry Fuel Reliability Guidelines (AR 02050157)
- Formal Benchmarking Report - ALARA (AR 01928545)
- Braidwood & Byron block valve design flaw (AR 02069062)
Procedures
- Appendix B Strategic Water Chemistry Plan Primary System, Revision 67 CP 3.1, Primary Chemistry Control Program, Revision 45
- EN-AA-203-1001, Operability and Functionality Assessment, Revision 22
- EN-AA-203-1100, Engineering Evaluations, Revision 9
- ER-AA-113-1000, IST procedure, Revision 1
- FPL-1 Quality Assurance Topical Report, Revision 19 LX0557.02, 60 Month PM of 480V US Breakers, Revision 20
- MA 3.5, Post Maintenance Test, Revision 19
- MA-AA-204-1000-1000, NAMS PM Requirement Processing, Revision 5
- MA-AA-203-1002, Equipment Repair and Refurbishment, Revision 0
- MA-AA-215, Outage Valve Maintenance Process, Revision 0
- NA-AA-200-1000, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 0
- NA-JB-1006, Source Surveillance of Supplier Activities, Revision 0
- OP-AA-101-1000, Nuclear Fleet Administrative, Revision 11 OS1090.03, Backup Instrumentation for Category 2 and 3, Revision 6 OX1416.04, Revision 20, SW Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test, Revision 20 OX1416.05, SW Cooling Tower Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test, Revision 24
- PEG-04, Building/Structures Surveillance Inspections, Revision 09
- PI-AA-01, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 4
- PI-AA-101-100, Quick Hit Self-Assessment, Revision 9
- PI-AA-101-1000, Focused Area Self-Assessment, Revision 15
- PI-AA-101-1006, Common Cause Evaluation, Revision 12
- PI-AA-100-1005, Root Cause Analysis, Revision 15
- PI-AA-101-1007, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 16
- PI-AA-100-1008, Condition Evaluation, Revision 9
- PI-AA-101, Assessment and Improvement Programs, Revision 22
- PI-AA-102, Operating Experience Program, Revision 11
- PI-AA-104-1000, Condition Reporting, Revision 11
- PI-AA-207, Trending, Revision 11
- PR-AA-100-1000, Nuclear Contract Management, Revision 9 QM 4.11, Verifying Qualifications, Revision 10 SSMA, Maintenance Manual, Revision 153
- TR-AA-100, Fleet Supplemental Personnel Training Requirements, Revision 8
- WM-AA-203-1004, Online Scheduling Process Flow and Description, Revision 1
- WM-AA-203, Online Scheduling Process, Revision 15
- Work Orders94114238
- 94128551
- 94129870
- 9419906
- 94132975
- 94132974
- 94127094
- 40181308
- 40235297
- 40212536
- 40185529 PM12956
- 40214004
- 40213823
- 94067836
- 40366150
- 40366152
- 40312722
- 40279910
- 40464191
- 40486421
- 94139510
Miscellaneous
- 36180, Structures Monitoring Program, Revision
- 09 Contracts
- 02340179 &
- 02320469 Engineering Corrective Action Program Recovery Plan Engineering Department CARB Agenda - October 19, 2016 LTAM Strategy for Service Water IST Programs Engineering Task Force Listing of Trend CRs since September 2014 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Improvement Plan MRC Screening Report - August 31, 2016 NEI Efficiency Bulletin 16-10 - Reduce Cumulative Impact from the Corrective Action Program Operator Burdens List (March, June, September and December 2015, March & June 2016) Organizational Survey Analysis Report for Seabrook Station - 12/30/2014 Seabrook NRB Observations #644, #648, #656, #659
- Seabrook Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Report for 2nd Quarter 2016 Selected ECP Files (confidential)