ML16340B998
| ML16340B998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1981 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340B997 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109150332 | |
| Download: ML16340B998 (98) | |
Text
EVALUATION FINDINGS DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OFFSITE ENERGENCY
RESPONSE
PLANS EXERCISE AUGUST 19, 1981
EXECUTI V E
SUMMARY
~.
Pursuant to tasking identified in FEMA directives and related
- letters, FENA Region IX and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) began preparation in May 1981 to evaluate the exerci se, scheduled for August 19, 1981.
at the Di ablo Canyon nuclear Generating
- Station, San Luis Obispo, California.
The exercise included of fsite juri sdi ct ional -play by the County and the Ci';y of Norro Bay.
Res ident State agenci es including, State Parks and
- Beaches, California Highway Patl ol, and CALTRAHS played fully boih in the field and in the EOC.
The State of California Office of Emergency Services and Radiological Health Section, Department of Health Services, also participated in the exercise.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion (NRC),
Region V, evaluated onsite utility actions of the Pacific Gas and Electric Companv (PGEE),
the principal owner.
FENA Region IX and support staff from other aoenci es evaluated State and local jurisdict ional pl ay.
Following the exercise, an assessment of the exercise events was made by the 28 person evaluation team and a general finding determined wi thin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
( in accordance wi th FENA Guidance Memorandum 8 17) through a pyramidal cri tique process.
'An informal debriefing was scheduled for Friday, August 21,
- 1981, to provide cursory critique input to the jurisdictions that played.
Subse'quent preparation of final f indi ngs for the record have been prepared and are the content of this document.
Team member activities and requirements were ideniii ied in an evaluator's packet.
Adv'ance brief ings and revi ews of pl ans 'w re conducte'd, as" wel 1
as an evaluation team brief ino the afternoon
'efore the exerci.se (August
- 18).
An evaluation team coordinator (Team Chief )
served as an advance party to receive team members
. and provide coordination in advance of formal initiation activi-
'ies on the day prior to the exercise.
The scenario was specifical ly site-oriented and was limited to an initiating event and 'cue cards for f ield radi ation readings by field team members.
All of fsite jurisdict ional play was as a
result of message tra fic from the util i ty.
The ol lowing oeneral ly summarizes the FENA Evaluation Team findi ngs.
I t was developed through a consolidation process following the exerci se and represents general comments relating io key findings.
The observations and resultant findinos were based upon these primary factors:
adherence to execution of present planning; demonstration of the ability to meet the basic critera identified i n t~UREG 0654/
FENA REP-1.
C
,'We felt that the rci se participants wereo be hiohly com-
)m~~nded for their ef forts to prepare for this evaluation and for ihe f ul 1 part ici pat ion o'bserved by al 1 the evaluators.
These findings are presented with suqgested recommendations which are to be incorporated into subsequent planning, training, dril], or exercise activities.
- Overall, each jurisdiction and agency demonstrated a very
- active, dynamic, and highly enthusiastic level of play during the exercise.
The participants demonstrated a qood capability to handle the exerci se events and chal lenoes.
The fo1 lowino i tems represent a bri ef sample of the findi nqs:
1.
Prot ect ive act ion recomme nda t ions fr om t he ut i 1 i ty appeared to bypass the UDAC and go directly to the EOC.
This caused some problems as the EOC had to backtrack to consult wi th the UDAC on these matters.
2.
There is a
need for a Health Physici st at the Medi a Center to assist in technical explanations.
3.
The lead public information officer should be located c loser to the Medi a Center.
4:
An improved system i s needed to coordi nate information.
from the EOC with al 1 the cj ties in the plume exposure zone.
5.
Improved meteorological forecastinq and di spl ay are needed in the UDAC and the EOC.
6.
Regular status briefings in the UDAC, similar to those provided in the
- EOC, are needed to ensure consistent information sharing.
7.
The UDAC Chic coul d not 'adequately control or commun i-
~ cate with his'ield monitors under the exi sting communications arrangement.
8.
Field monitors should have additional training in respiratory protect'ion.
9.
blot al 1
emerge ncy r es po ns e with basic self-protection items li All of the concerns identi, ied in t are correct ab le thr ouoh tr a i ning, d
ourch ase of equi pment.
l4e bel i eve tive aciions will be taken as part planning process in the County.
fiel d personnel were f ami1 i ar ke KI and dos imeters.
his exerci se evaluation
- rills, Dian revi sions, or that the necessary correc-of the ongo i ng erne roe ncy The evaluation conclusion is that due to the plannino e fort to date and the.ful 1 participation by al 1 participants, the exercise
'succeeded in its three basic goals.
First, it demon-strated a
capabi lity to respond to a devel opino emerqency situation, second, it served as an excellent trainina
- device, and third, it highlighted potential problem areas to be corrected.
l
TABLE OF CONTENTS PART PAGE EXERCISE EVALUATION OVERVIEW A
Exercise Development and Operation B
Team Makeup C
Objectives
'and Guidelines D
Events Log I-3 I-4 I-6 EXERCISE EVALUATION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A
Introduction General Findings and Recommendations II-1 II-1 1.
San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
II-2 2
Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC)
II-9 a.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
I I-13 3
4.
- b. Field Monitoring Teams
- c. Mobile Laboratory
- d. Ingestion Pathway Sampling Team Public Information Center/Media Center State Parks and Beaches I.j-14 II-17 II-21 II-22 II-27 5.
6.
7.
Reception and Care Medical/Hospital Elements Not Observed City of Morro Bay Emergency Operating Center II-29 II-31 II-33 II-35
$ (
PART I EXERCISE EVALUATION OVERVIEW
J
~
4 lib A.
EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION FEMA Region IX initiated development of an evaluation team with the assistance of the Reqional Assistance Committee (RAC)
Federal agenci es, particularly DOE who provided 6 evaluators at their expense.
A total of 27 evaluators, under the direction of a
FEMA Reqion IX Team Chief, completed approximately ten hours of preparatory training, including revi ew of appropriate plans relative to their areas of evaluation.
Scenario development was accompli shed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company based on their own knowledge of plant mechanics and coordination with FEMA Region IX regarding exercise requirements.
The scenario essentially was composed of an initiating event and cue cards for field monitoring teams.
Local jurisdictions and the utility determined the depth of participation or level of exercise play each would demonstrate based on general exercise guidance provided by the FEMA Regional office. Subsequent review of the.product by Regional staff resulted in concurrence and acceptance of the scenario, objectives, and guidelines (extent of local jurisdiction play).
The util i ty, EDS Nuclear, Inc., acting as a consultant to the utility, and local jurisdictions identified personnel to serve as "controllers," while FEMA staff were to serve solely as evaluators."
Prior to the exerci se, meet inqs
.were held to revi ew evaluat ion procedures,'cenario
- events, objectives, and rel ated procedural concerns.
(A controller's meeting was called by the utility to review last-minute concerns and to hand out cue cards to controllers.
Coordination between NRC Regi on V
and FEMA Reqi on'X was ef fected on July 21 to identify areas of evaluation, scenario development, and guidelines of play.
It was aareed that the Offsite Interim EOF was to be jointly evaluated by FEMA and NRC evaluators due to the combined nature of its operation.
The evaluation team consisted of FEMA Region IX personnel as well as Regional Assistance Committee organizational support from DOE
- NRC, NWS,
A total of 27 evaluators were assigned to cover 2
EOC locations and 10 field activi ties.
This depth of coverage was considered appropri ate due to the level of organizational development,
- training, and observed dril ls at the time of the exercise.
Evaluators were given approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> training to cover evaluation techniques as well as plan review and a general overview of jurisdictional capability.
An evaluator's packet was devel oped to pr ovide further guidance regarding exercise objectives, agenda of events, and depictions of suggested critique format.
Teams were generally site-oriented and Team Leaders served to coordinate team operations and conso 1 i date fi ndi ngs.
'1
Thi s exerci se was conducted on August 19,
- 1981, between the hours of 7:00 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m.
Fo1 lowing the exerci se, an evaluator's debri ef ing session was held to di scuss the flow of
. events at the various locations.
This was to bring a perspec-tive to the.site-specific evaluation process and to corroborate various communications actions during the exerci.se.
Subsequent to this session, team members and leaders worked to consolidate their findings and provide those findings to the Evaluation Team Chief and Deputy Team Chief.
They in turn formulated a prelim-inary finding for issuance to the exercise participants in an informal debrief ing on F'riday, August 21, 1981.
The findings resulting from the review of all team members'valuations and resultant qroup di scussions were developed,
.within 14 days of the exercise.
They were reviewed by the RAC Chairman, FEMA Reqion IX Plans and Prepared-ness Division Director, and the FEMA Regional
- Director, and are reflected in the followinq pages.
Those findings reflecting recommendations for corrective action are expected to be reviewed and integrated into planning,
- training, and drill activities at the earliest opportunity:
The County should establish a corrective action plan(s) and provide
. a summary to FEMA Region IX within 60 days of receipt of this finding.
FEMA Region IX and the State of California Office of Emergency Servi ces shoul d be advi sed of al 1 dri1 ls and exerci se efforts so that records of events and evaluations of performance, where appropriate, can be established.
Plan changes or revisions shoul d be forwarded through the State of Cali forni a Office of Emergency Services to FEMA Region IX for review and comment.
Clarifications or further information regarding these findings should be addressed to Mr. John W. Eldridge, Jr., Project Representative for FEMA Regi on IX.
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE AUGUST 19, 1981
~w "fA/RAC REGION IX LIST OF EVALUATORS AND ASSIGNMENTS EOC Team Leader:
Members:
R.
J.
B.
Carlton Guido Patterson J. Eldridge R.
S andwina T. Knight FEMA RAC (FEMA)
FEMA FEMA AZ.Div Rad Hlth FEMA
~
UDAC/EOF Team Leader:
Members:
MEDIA CENTER Team Leader:
Members:
F.
K.
M.
D.
D.
V.
H.
V.
Fong Nauman Mogil Stevenson Kunihiro Paule Bowden Guzman RAC (DOE)
FDA NRC FEMA DOE FEMA EVACUATION/RECEPTION AND CARE Team Leader.:
Member:
R.
M.
Manuel Wordsman RedCross (FEMA)
FEMA FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Team Leader:
Monitoring Team 81:
Monitoring T'earn 82:
Mobile Unit:
Ingestion Pathway Sampling Team:
CHP/CALTRANS/SHERIFF:
HOSPITAL (HEALTH PHYSICS)
Team Leader:
Member:
D.
J.
M.
R.
M.
F.
M.
J.
F.
Stevenson Orcutt Chilton Morris Seal Bold Sullivan Reilly Bold FDA DOE (REECO)
DOE (REECO)
DOE (LLNL)
RAC (FDA)
DOE (GACO)
RAC (DOT)
RAC (HHS)
DOE (GAG0)
OTHER JURISDICTIONS Team Leader:
D. Schroder FEMA State Parks and Beach'es D. Schroder Montana de Oro State Park Hq.
Morro Bay S.
S.
Phelps Elkins AZ Div Rad Hlth Pismo Beach Parks Hq,/
Sheriffs Office E.
Raymond
0IABLO CANYON OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ANO GUIOELINES As a result of coordination between Pacific Gas and Electric Company 'and local jurisdictions surrounding the plant,, the offsite emergency response exercise scheduled for August 19,
- 1981, has been developed to reflect a
capability to meet the objectives listed below.
The objectives are as follows:
o To demonstrate that task orqanizations can alert, notify, and mobilize emergency response personnel to respond to the energency in a timely fashion.
o To demonstrate that decisions can be made with regard to protective measures for both plume and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones.
o To demonstrate that State and local radiation control staffs can assess the accident and make appropriate reccmmendations to the decision makers at the County and State Emergency Operating Centers (EOC's).
o To demonstrate that the State and local radiation control staffs can respond to and provide analysis of a simulated airborne release.
o To demonstrate that local jurisdictions can provide control of access to restricted areas and effectively perform a coordinated evacuation.
o To demonstrate that all jurisdictions and the utility can coordinate all information releases to the media and the public.
o To demonstrate that the oarties can coordinate protective measures and actions with the public (e.g.,
warning notices and reccmmendations for protective measures per plume EP7) o To demonstrate that the parties can carry out free-play decision
'aking with regard to protectiv'e measures for the plume and ingestion emergency planning zones.
o To demonstrate support from responsible elected or appointed public officials regardinq plan faniliarity, operations
- process, and decision making.
o To demonstrate adequate communications between all desiqnated facili-ties and field activities.
o To demonstrate pability of al 1 jurisdiction o execute energency resoonse plans to protect the public.
o To demonstrate the existence of adequate energency facilities and equi pme nt to s uppo rt the ene rge ncy r es po ns e.
o To demonstrate that the parties effectively utilize support agencies and authorities where local capability is exceeded.
Exercise guidelines identifyinq the extent of play by participants if re-flected in the following summary of events:
The exercise will begin with an Unusual Event situation and escalate through the types of emergencies to a General Emergency.
Simulated radio-active.release will reflect realistic accident conditions and could require an anticipatory evacuation to five miles and shelter to ten miles.
Wind direction. will vary throughout the exercise.
A sanple evacuation, monitor-ing, dose projection and ingestion pathway sanpling will be conducted
'within the County with supportinq assistance frcm the State and the utility.
The County will provide monitoring and initial evacuation activities.
Three field teams will be dispatched for purposes of testinq response
- time, communicatiolns, and demonstration of monitorinq procedures and training.
Teams will gather sample media and simulate routing such sanples to appro-priate laboratory facilities for analysis.
Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) and Department of Enereqy (00E) response may be requested, but response will be simulated.
State and County EOC's will be staffed and will perform their functions as identified in their respective plans.
The Media Center should be staffed and members of the press invited to partici pate in that aspect of the exercise.
No exercise press releases will be made to the public.
Field sanpling in the ingestion pathway will be demonstrated by the Radioloqical Health Section, Department of Health Services (RHS) and the County Agricultural Commissioner's staff.
Decision making and resultant followup actions (simulated) will be necessary by EOC staff regarding shelter and related protective actions.
Emerqency Broadcast Station (EBS) announcements should be prepared and passed to appropriate
. statiolns but not released.
Medical facilities and capability will be tested through evacuation of a
simulated injured worker. for treatment and decontanination.
An onsite injury and potential contanination accident will occur outside the boundary gate.
Highway barricade material will be deployed to positions, in accordance with plan directives.
Monitoring and decontanination procedures will be demonstrated at the hospital and monitoring actiolns displayed at reception and care facilities.
Highways will not be closed.
A sanple evacuation will be conducted moving a group of people fromm a special facility and fran Montana de Oro Beach to reception and care facilities developed during the exercise.
In-processing of evacuees will be conducted by the Red Cross at which time the evacuees will be released to return to the'school.
No other live or simulated events are to be included in the exercise extent of the pl ay.
I-5
Oi DIABLO CAiVZON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE AUGUST 19, 1981 EVENTS LOG DIABLO CANYON CONTROL ROOM MESSAGE ORIGINATION TIME NUMBER 7:00 a.m.
Initial condition established.
7:02 a.m.
Fire detected in Unit 2, 12KV startup switch-gear, E1.85'f the north end of Unit 1 tur'vine building.
Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 12KV startup, switchgear trip out and a loss of 230KV offsite power results.
7:04 a.m.
UNUSUAL EVENT declared by shift foreman.
7:10 a.m.
3a 3b ALERT, fire protection system appears inoperable.
Offsite fire protection assistance requested.
7:40 a.m.
Fire in north end of turbine building E1.85's under control.
7:50 a.m.
Fire is reported to be totally extinguished.
7:55 a.m.
Unit 1, 12KV startup switchgear restored to operability.
8:00 a.m.
Bank D rod 'cluster control assembly (RCCA) is ejected from reactor core.
Reactor trips, followed by turbine.
8:01 a.m.
The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps start normally and provide the steam generators with feedwater.
Containment high radiation and high humidity alarms received.
8:10 a.m.
The shift foreman is notified that the Radia-tion Protection Monitoring Technician, Auxiliary Operator and Electrician, who were working on containment fan cooler Unit 1-2, have been contaminated.
(Ambulance requested.
Hospital notified that a contaminated injured individual will be arriving by ambulance.)
8:12 a.m.
SITE AREA E?URGENCY declared by Site Emergency Coordinator.
(Initial monitoring teams dispatched.)
8:40 a.m.
10 Reactor in a stable, hot shutdown condition.
1-6
DIABLO CANYON CONTROL RO.
MESSAGE ORIGINATION TIME Nt&EER-9:00 a.m.
- lla, lib Ambulance carrying injured and contaminated technician leaves Diablo Canyon access road (outside Avila Beach) and collides with a station wagon.
People in ambulance are knocked unconscious.
9:10 a.m.
12 To remain within Technical Specifications reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure-temperature cooldown limits, it is estimated that depressurization of the RCS will take approximately 3 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
At that time, residual heat removal system operation will be initiated.to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition.
9:20 a.m.
13 The Control Room receives continuous indica-tion of high radioactivity inside the Containment.
9:30 a.m.
Winds have shifted direction and are now from the WSW.
10:15 a.m.
15 Depressurization of the RCS is proceeding slowly in an orderly and stable manner.
10:30 a.m.
16 Due to an electric power system grid dis-turbance,,there is a loss of all 230KV and 500KV offsite power.
10:35 a.m.
17 Diesel generators l-l, 1-2, and 1-3 have picked up all vital loads.
- However, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps fail to start.
10:45 a.m.
18 The electric system dispatcher shift super-visor informs the shift foreman that offsite power will be unavailable for 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
10:48 a.m.
11:0.0 a.m.
19 GENERAL EMERGENCY declared by the Recovery Manager.
All steam generators boil dry resulting in the loss of the RCS.
11:05 a.m.
20 RCS temperature and pressure are rapidly increasing.
ll:10 a.m.
21 All power-operated relief valves fail closed as actuation pressure is reached.-
DIPLO CANYON CONTROL RO ORIGINATION TIME MESSAGE NRQ3ER EVENT ll:12 a.m.
22 The Control Room receives indication of fuel damage in the reactor core and a rapidly in-creasing hydrogen concentration in the Contain-ment.
The hydrogen recombiners are inoperable.
ll:15 a.m.
ll:45 a.m.
'23 LUNCH BREAK.
The Field Exercise is in recess for 30 minutes.
Resume current positions and locations at ll:45 a.m. for resumption of exercise play.
Wind direction has again shifted and is now from the WNW.
ll:45 a.m.
25 A hydrogen explosicn occurs inside the Contain-ment as explosive concentration.limits are reached.
Containment purge exhaust valves RCV-11 and RCV-12 are damaged and appear to be partially open as the unit vent particulate, radiogas and iodine monitors all indicate very high radioactivity levels.
12 Noon to 2:00 p.m.
Field Monitoring, decision making, Emergency Broadcast System station announcements, pro-tective action recommendations, etc.,
taking place during this time.
2:15 'p.m.
26 The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are restored to service and feedwater is now being delivered to the steam generators.
2:37 p.m.
27 The maintenance team repairs and,closes con-tainment purge exhaust valve RCV-ll.
The release from the plant is terminated.
2:50 p.m.
28 It is now 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> later.
The radioactive plume has completely dispersed and there is no trace of it over land.
3:00 p.m.
to 4:00 p.m.
Ingestion pathway sampling teams procure samples and field data in this time frame.
3:50 p.m.
29 Long-term recovery actions discussed by the exercise participants.
4:18 p.m.
30 The Field Exercise is terminated pending completion of ingestion pathway monitoring activities.
PART II I
EXERCISE EVALUATION F INDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
0 EXERCISE EVALUATION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A.
INTRODUCTION The findings resulting from this evaluation were based upon the objectives of the exercise and the general criteria of NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1 Any findi ngs not ed as "not obs erved" resulted from scenario development or lack of equipment, as indicated.
Resolution of proficiency of jurisdictions regarding these areas will require subsequent dril ls observed by FEMA/RAC in accordance with NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-I guidelines.
B.
GENERAL FINDINGS AND: RECOMME NDATIONS The fo 1 lowing f indi ngs were developed through revi ew and cross examination of all FEMA evaluators during the debriefing process.
Included with each findinq is a section titled "Recom-,
mendation."
The'ecommendation is generally a
statement.
of a
suggested action to correct a problem pointed out in the findi ng.
- However, a recommendation should not be interpr eted as the only way to solve the problem raised by the finding.
The corrective action taken should be coordinated with the State Office of Emergency Services and FEMA Region IX.
1.
SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER (EOC)
GENERAL:
Full'participation was observed by all County personnel, including the Chairman of the Board of Supervi sors, the County Administrative Offic'er, and all tasked State and local agencies.
Al,l personnel responded in a timely manner and played the exerci se real i stical ly. Regul ar summary brief ings were given to the entire EOC staff to keep them simultaneously updated on chanqing events.
This action provided a cohesiveness and unification of purpose to the entire EOC staff.
Cooperation among all agencies was excel lent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
I.
FI ND I NG The County demonstrated a very good capability to alert, notify and mobilize the emergency personnel.
The Sheriff' dispatch office did an excellent job on notification and recall of personnel at each emergency action level based on their SOP.
They were not confused by the very fast change from "Unusual Event" to "Alert." County OES and other agency repr esentatives took action wi th, the alert li sts in their SOP' immedi ately upon arrival at the'OC.
Verification of the emergency action level should be done vi a radi o from the Sheriff's di spatch of fice to the pl ant.,
Thi s radi o link did not work due to operator error at the plant. Verification had to be made by telephone.
Also, the first operator at the util i ty end of the hot line sometimes gave confusing or incomplete information to the Sheriff's dispatch officer.
RECOMMENDATION Training should be given in radio operation to the appropriate people at the plant.
The most apparent oroblem was knowing how to encode the radio signal.
As a backup for this problem,.the Sheriff should be able to override that condition and have the ability to decode his radio receiver.
2.
FI ND ING The mobilization of the EOC staff and set up of the facility was done in a timely fashion.
The time of day the initiating event occurred caught most people in transit between home and work thus building in a 30 minute delay factor in many cases.
Many key personnel began arriving within an hour of the time that the f'irst alert fanout was compl eted.
The set up of the EOC began immedi ately in accordance with SOP instructions for-the Alert level:
Although the EOC set up time is scheduled to
'take two hours inde SOP, it was set up an~unctioning in one hour.
The Sherif fzitiated an effective sedlP'i ty system for the E5C area immedi ately and maintained it throughout the day.
The Chairman of the Board of Supervi sors gave a short briefing to the first group of EOC s taf f arrivals to help them become oriented as the EOC was being set up and repeated this from time-to-time as the set up proceeded.
Between these briefings newcomers arriving could not quickly catch up on events.
R E COMME NDATI ON The development of a priority list of the first few things to set up in the EOC would be helpful The priority li st might include a minimum number of phones, the status board showing the current emergency action level, and a li st of public announce-ments made to that point.
This would allow early arrivals to see what the situation i s as they arrive.
The idea of color or number coding each telephone and each wal 1 jack woul d expedi te the telephone set up time and permi t preprintinq of telephone numbers for the
That list could be taped.to each table as it is set up.
All the EOC set up material should be permanently stored within a short walking distance of the EOC.
At least one completed set of the County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan and SOP 's should be stored within the EOC set up equi pment so they wi 1 1
be there when the people arrive.
3.
FI NDING The Direction and Control Group in the EOC demonstrated a
clear ability to control and di stribute information and deal with the deci sio'n making process.
Working i nformation was shared by all agencies in the EOC and there was a noticeable spirit of cooperation present.
The regular EOC status briefings provided a qeneral information update to al 1 present and a
sense of cohesiveness among the group.
The use of prewritten legal declarations
'as part of the SOP was a notable time-saving device in declaring a local emergency.
The current status of protect ive actions and percent of evacuations complete was included in only one general EOC briefing and was not widely shared in the
- EOC, the UDAC, or wi th many of the fi el d teams even though the evacuation control group did maintain an updated status board.
In a similar vein, only once during the day was each agency in the EOC po 1 led for a verbal s tatus report to al 1 present.
'hi s resulted in some information not being shared, on a timely basis.
R ECOMME NDATION a,
The EOC verbal brief inq summaries should include the status of protective actions ordered such as, percent of evacua-tions completed on a regular basis until the actions.are completed.
A speci al effort should be made to include a
UDAC repr esentative to hear these briefings.
Also, field units such as, law enforce-ment, fire, and f iel d monitoring teams; who may not be able to 1 i sten to the EBS station should be kept informed over their working radio net as to the progress of the protective actions.
l k
I b.
The EOC Director should, during the verbal EOC brief ing, vol 1 each agency in the EOC so the information can be ful.ly and simultaneously shared.
The frequency of this poll depends on the pace of events but once every four hours is a reasonable mi nimum.
FI ND I NG The decision process used by the Direction and Control Group in regard to protective action measures was effective.
In their discussions with the utility representative on plant conditions and protective
- actions, the Direction and Control Group showed a
good knowledge of their plan and a
sound grasp of the basic factors involved in protective actions.
- However, a checklist of key'oints would expedite the di scussions.
The utility repre-sentative was informat ive and helpful but tended to present a
~ great deal of technical plant status information before getting to the facts that the Direction and Control Group can take action on.
The decision making process on, protective actions appeared to frequently bypass the UDAC because the utility recommendations seemed to be funneled directly to the EOC for consideration.
The County Health Officer consistently referred back to the UDAC staff for conf irmat ion only to f ind they were just receiving or had not yet received the new information from the EOF.
R ECOMME NDATI ONS a.
To evaluate each change in plant status a checkli st should include:
(1)
Wh at i s the earl i est pos s ib le rel ease time?
(2)
Direct ion and speed of wind predicted at that
'time?
(3)
In tens i ty of re 1 e ase?
(4)
Puff of what duration or a continual release of, wi th wh at appr oxima t e t ime parame ters?
(5)
Time it would take to evacuate the zones that would be affected?
(6)
Ut il i ty protect ive act ions recommendation?
(7)
UDAC protect ive act ion recommendation?
b.
The utility representative should first 'provide the pi rection and Control Group wi th the clos e~sposs ib le release time and intensity along with any change in protective action recommendation.
After that di scussion has been held and necessary action is taken, the information on technical pl ant problems
~bk d
0 I
c.
The u t i 1 i must rou t e al 1 protect ivact i on recomme nda-tions through the AC.
It may also be appar i ate that when there is a.conflict of opinion, protective action recommendations to the EOC from a util i ty representati've be made wi th a senior UDAC representative present.
The UDAC represents the combined technical expertise of the County, the Util i ty, the State, and the Federal agencies involved and should be utilized as a
'rimary link in the decision making chain for protective actions.
5.
F I ND I NG j
'he agenci es represented in the EOC showed that they coul d provide access control on traffic routes and perform a coordi-nated evacuation procedure in accordance wi th the exerci se.
Personnel from the Sheriff's office, California Highway Patrol, CALTRANS, 'and State Parks and Beaches followed their plans, used common
- sense, were on time,. communicated wi thin the
- EOC, and coordinated very well among themselves.
The State Parks and Beaches people ful ly staffed a complete closure and evacuation of two State parks in accordance wi th their pl ans.
The other agencies simulated the manning of various traffic control points as the exerci se progressed as we 1
1 as the staging of evacuation control points when that protective action was ordered.
They each physically manned one evacuation control point for evalua-,
tion purposes.
R E COMME NDATI ON These agencies should continue to train and drill together with their plans to maintain a high level of proficiency.
6.
FINDING The EOC staf f, which represented only one aspect of the public information effort, did show a very good capability to develop public information releases and to utilize the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) on a coordinated basis with the decision
- .makers.
The emergency warning system sirens were sounded (simulated)
~ at 'the General Emergency classification level and the EBS emergency instruction provided in proper coordination.
The option of sounding the sirens at the Site Area Emergency level was discussed in accordance with the SOP but decided against at that time.
R E COMME NDATI ON The evaluators general ly recommend that the emergency warning system s irens be sounded at the" Si te Area Emergency level unless plant conditions strongly indi cate that the problem wil 1 quickly be reduced to the Alert level.
An emergency public instruction over the EBS station may announce the plant condition, any anticipated
- release, the fact. it is being monitored by the
- County, and ask that people stay tuned to the EBS station in case protective actions are recommended.
7.
FI ND ING The ability of the EOC staff to coordinate protective action measures was generally quite good.
Two potential. problems were brought out in the process though.
The UDAC recommended that all cattle in a certain area be put on stored feed.
This turned out to be too general a statement to have the desired effect.
When the UDAC made the recommendation that emergency workers in certain areas should take their KI pills and properly coordinated that through County Health, our field evaluators determined that not al 1 field units were fami li ar. with dos ime ters and KI pr ocedures R ECOMME NDATI ONS..
a.
General ly, the cattl e food.advi sory is directed solely at dairy cattle to protect milk.
In San Luis Obispo County
'this considerably reduces the magnitude of the problem.
b.
All potential field resoonse personnel should receive annually an orientation on exposure control procedures and an appropri ate number of exposure control kits should be prepared and made available for distribution.
8.
FINDING San Luis Obispo
- County, State local agencies,'and private agencies provided ful 1 support for the exerci se.
Elected officials and senior staff showed their support by responding in a timely man'her and part ici pat ing reali stical ly in accordance with their plan and SOP's.
R E COMME NDATI ON None.
9.
F I ND I NG The communications equipment and procedures used for the exerci se in the "Sheri ff' di spatch center and the EOC worked well with a
few exceptions.
It was apparent that the ful 1 contingent of clerical help available to the EOC was put to good use in maintaining the necessary information flow.
There was wide agreement that the ten phone lines available in the EOC would not be enough to handle the needs there.
There was a
20 minute delay between the time that the Site Area Emergency declaration was received by the EOF and the time that the messaqe was received at the Sheriff's di spatch center in wri ting, to document the act ion for the EOC.
The one man and single telephone line used in the exercise was barely adequate to keep the two cities that participated informed of the exercise developments.
R E COMME NDATI 0 Additional telephone lines are needed in the EOC.
The exact number of addi tional lines should be determined jointly by the County, State OES and FEMA, based on the results of the exer ci se.
b.
The utility must improve its message handling system to ensure that critical.information documenting the declaration of an emergency action level i s received almost simultaneously at the
- EOF, UDAC, and Sheriff's dispatch office.
c.
Protect ive action recommendations from the utility Recovery Manager shoul d be'ut in hard copy and provi ded to the UDAC first.
A copy of that utility recommendatio'n should be, attached to.the UDAC recommendation for the Direction and Control Group.
d.
Develop and install a
system that wil 1 allow all the cities involved in the plume exposure zone to be kept informed from the EOC
~
10.
FI NDING The agencies represented in the EOC demonstrated the ability to follow their emergency plans and SOP's in accordance with the exercise activities.
They also showed the ability to improve on the plans, where
- needed, as a result of the exerci se experience.
R E COMME NDATI ONS a.
The plans and SOP's should be modified based on the results of this. exerci se and previous pl an revi ew comments from FEMA.
b.
Continuing participation in the emergency pl arming
,process wi1 1
ma intain the capabi 1 i ty to r'espond in accordance
'with the plans.
1 l.
FINDING The facilities and.equipment available in the EOC were general ly adquate, considering the temporary nature of the arrangement.
Wi th the exception of'he communications previously mentioned, f ew addi tional comments were made by the evaluators.
The importance of the evacuation zone boundary maps was hig'hl ighted as protect ive action recommendations were announced and the two wall maps in the EOC featuring these boundaries were not enouqh for the entire staff to function with.
The detailed questions on boundaries from Morro Bay, where a wal 1
map had been provided,.
showed a
need for the ci ties to add local details to their maps.
A weather map showing wind s peed and direction was ma'intainedd but it did not have suffici ent detail to coordinate wi th the protective act ion guidance being developed.
Some addi tional identif ication of personnel in the EOC woul d be useful Some of the County personnel suggested that a
common geographical cross-reference of the County would be useful to aqencies coordinating on evacuation problems.
R E COMME NDAT I ON S a.
A copy of the evacuation zone map should be placed at each table in the EOC arid probably the UDAC as a
common reference to all personnel.
b.
Each participating city should have a wall size map of the evacuation zone boundaries and fil 1 in suffici ent local details to al low it to be used for operational purposes.
c.
A weather map developed in a similar fashion to the one in the UDAC should be maintained in the EOC by an Air Pollution Control representative.
This map should highlight forecast wind direction and speed at the time of the nearest expected release and attempt
- to show weather projection for the expected duration of that release.
d.
A list on the wall next to each table in the EOC showing what agencies are represented at that table would be very useful.
In addi tion, some conspicuous method of identifying
- State, Federal, and utility response personnel would assist all concerned in an emergency situation.
e.
County personnel recommended use of the County mutual aid address book as a cross-reference for agencies involved in evacuation procedures.
Copies of that book shoul d be made avai 1 able to appropriate tasked people in these agencies.
12.
FI ND ING The County EOC s taff demonstrated that it would effectively work with support aoencies and authorities where local capability was exceeded..
The State OES staff arrived in a timely manner and provided excellent counsel and assistance to the County in requesting t Ye declaration of an emergency by the Governor and in obtaining both Sta'te and Federal assistance.
The County also worked we 1
1 wi th the Fire Servi ces.
The Office of Emergency Services Fire Coordinator provided good preplanning in calling for a strike team at 9:33 a.m.
The County Fire Department, followed i ts SOP and appeared well organized and the coordination between fire and law enforcement was very good.
RECOMME NDAT IONS a.
A State OES representative should continue to be used in an advisory capacity to the Direction and Control Group.
b.
There is a
need to seat the OES Fire Rescue Coordinator directly across from or next to the County Fire Coordinator to enhance fire activi ty communication.
2.
UNIFIED DOSE ASSESSMENT CENTER GENERAL:
The Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC) consisted of representatives of California Office of Emergency Services and Department of Health Services; San Lui s Obi spo County Environ-mental
- Health, Department of Air Pollution, and Department of Agriculture, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
The tech-nical capability of the UDAC staff is very high and was contin-uously demonstrated in conf irming the utility's postulated population exposures.
The problem inherent to any UDAC during the plume exposure phase of an exercise is one of great time pressure to perform complicated but'ccurate calculations that will result in protective action recommendation that fit the current situation.
Their ability to perform i s 'greatly enhanced by current informa-tion on the plant from the EOF and current information on the status of protective actions by the public from the EOC.
This information from the EOF and EOC was limited during the exercise.
In spite of that
- handicap, the UDAC did provide a
number of cogent pr otective actions and the overal 1 result may be expressed as satisfactory.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMEND'ATI ONS:
1.
FINDING The UDAC lacked the input of total information available from the EOC and EOF.
From the EOF several of the consecutively numbered status forms used to send information to the UDAC were not received by the UDAC.
The ful 1 picture of events in progress and status of protective actions was not fed back into the UDAC from the EOC.. The UDAC staff was not kept current on public announcementst and press releases throughout the exercise.
R E COMME N OATI ON The
- UDAC, EOF,
- EOC, and the County Health Officer should evaluate the process of information management to the UDAC ~
If the County i s to have a County technical group support the
, County deci sions and act ions, the County must ensure that the UDAC i s kept ful ly informed. of al 1 pertinent information on a timely basis.
The UDAC may choose to have a representative in the EOC briefings to insure that information plus the latest p'ress release are shared with the UDAC staff.
2.
FI ND ING The UDAC was not able to stay in close contact with or direct the movement of the field monitor teams due to lack of communications equipment.
The monitor teams were controlled only by the TSC and the EOF.
Thi s lack of direct communication'etween the UDAC and the field teams reduced their efficiency and ef feet'ivenes's.
RECOMMENDATION The County and the utility are. in the process of obtaining
. radio equipment on a County system for the UDAC and the County members of the monitor teams.
This will give the teams dual radio coverage and resolve the basic problem.
When obtained, these radios will be tested in the next monitoring drill.
3.
FINDING Information management within the UDAC should be improved.
There were times wh'en actions were taken or problems were di scussed and key resource people located in the UDAC were not involved.
The UDAC tends to function like a small EOC and break
.. up into smal 1
wo'rk groups that require more than updated s tatus boards to insure timely coordination and cohesiveness.
RECOMME NDAT ION The'DAC director or his designee should provide regular status brief ings to the UDAC staff.
The briefings should include situation and current problems as well as protective act ions being recommended.
These general bri ef ikngs woul d also provide an excel lent opportunity to summarize information from the,EOC and EOF.
I
4.
F I ND ING The message traffic system in the UDAC became. overloaded during the exerci se causing some delays
.in processing protect ive action recommendations.
Additional assistance was obtained to correct the problem durina the exercise.
R E COMME NDATI ON The UDAC director should evaluate the funct ions of the UDAC clerical staff and consider assigning more staff to these duties.
5.
F I ND I NG No log record was maintained of the UDAC transactions.
No record was available to show when and what messages were received and dispatched.
These records in an exercise would be helpful as an instrument for learning.
In an actual accident these records may be invaluable for tracking the actual course of events.
RECOMMENDATION Maintain chronological loq covering minutes of significant discussions,
'and pertinent actions taken by the UDAC.
Also it was suggested that a date and time stamp machine be provided for al 1
incoming and outgoing wri tten messages,so the exact time that information arrives at or departs the UDAC can be recorded.
6.
FI NDI NG At one point there was some di scussion among the technical people in the UDAC regarding the advi sability of a precautionary evacuation of the area near the plant boundary based on'a
,very low dose rate projection.
R E COMME NDATI ON The parties involved should utilize the protective action level quidedlines agreed on by the County and the State as a
basis "for taking act ion.
That wi 1.1 reduce the amount of di scus-sion involved in determining a protective act ion.
I
7.
FIND ING UDAC depended on the utility report of meteorological data for plume projection and did not develop a projection based on independently obtained weather data.
RECOMMENDATION Conduct dose and plume projections based on U.S.
Weather Service forecasts to anticipate possible protective actions.
This data should be developed and maintained in the UDAC by a
member of the Air Pollution Control staff in consultation with the Natioal Weather Service, utility meteorologi sts and other suitable weather sources.
This same person should provide assistance in maintaining a similar meteorology map in the EOC.
4
(
0
Za.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS. FACILITY GENERAL:
The evaluation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was primarily restricted to the movement of field teams informa-tion to the PGKE Monitoring Director.
and the transmi ssion of that field data to the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC).
The communication between the survey'eams and the EOF was found to be adequate.
(Telephones were used whenever radio cont act was not pos s ib 1 e. )
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
FI ND ING The communication between the EOF monitoring director and the UDAC was inadequate to permi t proper control of the field monitor teams by the UDAC.
R E COMME NDATI ON The Monitoring Director should be under the control of UDAC.
2.
FI NDING Iodine c'oncentrations were not determined as fast as possible because of field conditions.
RECOMME NDATI ON Vehicle runners to transport samples from the survey teams to the mobile laboratory would produce accurate and timely iodine concentration data.
0 j
2b.
FIELD MONITORING TEAMS GENERAL:
Two fiel d plume exposure pathway teams were di spatched for this exerci se.
Each team was composed of two PGEE personnel and two San Luis Obispo County sanitarians.
The teams have a hard cover notebook containinq indexed procedures, data
- sheets, and equipment checkl i sts.
The check-lists were quite complete and extensive.
The procedure consti-tuted good operational procedures and the monitorinq teams knew the procedures quite well.
The kit contained adequate samplinci material for an exten-sive samplina. program.. The teams were also equipped with
. maintenance supplies such as, batteries and tools.
The selected radiation detection instruments were appropriate for the job.
The instruments had been calibrated on August 7,
- 1981, according to the stickers on the housing.
A Cs-137 check source was also avail able in the ki t.
The teams were very well organized.
They had a good sense
'f purpose and a sincere attitude throughout the exercise.
The team members were very knowl edgeable and responded in a very professional manner.
The teams 'veral 1 response was excel lent and should not be overshadowed by the minor nature of the findi ngs.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
FI ND I NG The teams, were no overall emergency nor location and'movement known by the teams so
'ontaminated areas or unknown exposures.
R E COMME NDATI ON t provided information on the status of the cont inui ng i nforma t ion on the plume These radiological conditions must be that they wi1 1 not unnecessarily traverse subject themselves to unnecessary and The EOF should pr to the field teams as 2.
FI NDING ovide radiologi cal s ituation information soon as available vi a radio communication.
'I
.The teams rel i ed on 'the EOF to inform them of the necessity for respiratory protection.
The monitors did not have a clear concept, of the'ondi tions warranting respiratory protection.
I 4
~
R E COMME NDATI ON A policy should be estab li shed for respiratory protection and the monitors be oriented in that policy.
The worker should be capable of deciding what protective actions are necessary for his job, even if the EOF initiates the requirement.
to wear respiratory 'protective equi pment.
3.
FI ND ING The County personnel were not ful ly fami 1 i ar wi th al 1
phases of the survey and samplinq operations.
RECOMMENDATION The County personnel need to take a more active part in all phases of surveys, especi al ly air sampl'ing, to f ami liarize themselves with sampling and survey techniques and procedures.
Additional training and dril ls on plume exposure monitoring for County personnel i s recommended..
4.
FINDING The County monitor only wore a
low range (0-200 MR).pocket dosimeter.
RE COMME NDATI ON The County monitor should have an integrated dosimeter like.
a TLD or film dos imeter.
Wi th,the low ranqe pocket dos imeter, a
high range (0-5R) pocket dos imeter i s also recommended.
5.
FINDING No vi sible calibration sitcker was found on the air, sampler,
'ECOMMENDATION Calibration and maintenance of air sampl ers shoul d be per fo rmed per i odi c al ly.
FINDING A team was 'noted to have taken the external dose rate measurement by placing the radi ation detection instrument on the roof of the vehicle.
This is not in accordance with PGEE procedures.
R E COMME NDATI ON Team members should be instructed about the importance of following the written procedures.
h
I
7.
FINDING Equipment used for sample collection and sample handling was not surveyed for contamination, even though the hands of the monitors were surveyed.
RE COMME NDATI ON Conduct contamination survey of sample collection and handling equipment after use.
All potential sources of sample cross-contamination should be identif ied,
- marked, and separated or el iminated.
4 2c.
MOBILE LABORAT Y
GENERAL:
Appropriate written procedures were available for the mobile laboratory team.
The procedures appeared to be 'clear and conci se.
The members of the mobile laboratory team acted professionally and with remarkable competence.
While the mobile laboratory is not a basic radi ologi cal emergency preparedness
'requirement, it is an excellent additional piece of equipment that enhances the abili ty of the County and the utility to respond to a
radi ation incident.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
I.
FI ND ING The mobile laboratory equipment was not used as effectively as possible by the EOF.
The primary function of a mobile 1 aboratory should be to analyze
- samples, not col lect them.
No samples were submitted during the exercise by the field monitoring team.
The field teams should have submitted their carbon filters for analysis, and early-on definitive radioiodine concentrations could be 'made available for protective action guidance.
RECOMME NDATION Establish a radio-equipped vehicle as a method of transporting s amp 1 e s to t.be mob i 1 e 1 a bor ato ry.
2.
FI NDING The location or the relocation of the mobile laboratory should be made in light of where the plume wil 1 not deposit radi oact ive c'ontami nation, on or in the van.
Contaminating the vehicle wil 1 negate the use of these expensive but excel lent analytical equi pme nt s.
RECOMMENDATION Assure that the vehicle location is in an area where the plume passage has a
low probabili ty.
Also, apprise the team on current radiological condi tions.
3 F I ND I NG The securi ty for the parked mobile laboratory was not ful ly adequate.
Visitors to the Information Center opened the back door and entered the van.
On another occassion, a vi sitor entered the unoccupi ed vehic le whil e the team was col lect ing s amp 1 es.
R ECOMME NDATI ON
~
A better locking arrangement should be instal led on the back door.
The vehicle should. never be left unattended during use.
.In an actual response a
team member shoul d always be in the mobile laboratory for security and radio monitoring.
I
4.
FI ND ING Prior to the exercise, a
member of the mobile laboratory team was instructed to report to the van at 8:00 a.m.
The reason for the prenotification was because he carries no emergency not ific ation. equipment.
RECOMMENDATION Emergency notification equipment should be made available to all field team members or have adequate backup so that the team i s not dependent on one person.
5.
F I ND ING The air sampler took 45 minutes to collect a
sample at its calibrated flow rate.
RECOMME NDATION A high volume air sampler should be avail able in the mobile laborato.ry.
6.
FI ND I NG Ending air sampling flow rates were not always noted.
RECOMMENDATION The importance of checking both beginning and ending sample flow rates shoul d be emphas ized.dur ing training.
7.
FINDING The tota'I sample flow for iodine samples and the detection probe used to measure the sample were needlessly al lowed to vary.
These continual ly ch angi ng condi tions cause more ari thmetic problems and produces more opportuni ty for errors under cri s i s situations.
RECOMME NDATI ON A standardized procedure for air sampling should be adopted and varied only for good reasons.
8.
FI ND ING Samples that were counted wi th the intrins ic germanium detector were counted as they were received from the field.
Undetectable contamination on the outside of the container from the field could contaminate the analytical system.
I
RECOMME NDATI0 Samples should be secondarily contained in a clean container before being placed in the detector.
9.
F I ND I NG Dose rate survey instruments were not source checked prior to users RECOMME NDATION The importance of source checking rad'i ation detection instruments should be emphasized during training.
10.
FINDING The scale of the dose rate meter selected varied from 1X to 1000X for no apparent reason.
RECOMME NDAT ION An appropriate scale selection for the instrument should be made and not changed unl ess indicated by the radi ation environment.
11
~
FINDING The count rate meter on the unshi el ded gamma detector requires continuous visualization to observe a
change in the rate.
RECOMMENDATION The count rate meter should be equipped with a vari able alarm set.
12.
FI NDING Generators were not adequate to power the air conditioner and air sampler simultaneously.
RECOMME NDATI ON Install a larger generator in the vehicle.
13.
FI ND I NG Controls need to be maintained over what equipment may he plugged into which electrical power outlets due to different power requirements.
R E COMME N OAT I ON Clearly mark on the power outlets what equipment may be plugged into that outlet.
This can take the form of color coded outlets.
I
14.
FI ND ING The compressed
- air, u'sed for the noble gas
- purge, coul d not be effectively delivered to the charcoal filter cartridge due to the poor connect ion.
Thi s problem wasted compr es'sed air and caused the depletion of the compressed air.
RE COMME NDATI ON The cartridge should be properly fitted with a hose barb.
There should be more than one lecture bottle of air in the mobile laboratory.
l5.
FI ND ING No portable radio transceiver was available in the mobile labor ato ry-.
R ECOMME NDATI ON
'A portable radio transceiver should be provided. for people sent out from the van to collect samples and as a backujp communication capabi 1 i ty.
16.
FINDING An arithmetic problem occupi ed al 1 three team members for several mi nutes.
Timely sample analysis and f i el d measurements were impaired.
RECOMME NDATI ON Personnel at the EOF or UDAC could compute the reported raw data.
Th'is wi1 1
reduce the probabili ty of arithmetic errors and free the field teams to take more samples.
It is possible to significantly increase the amount of data collected in this manner and lower the potenti al for computation errors.
I I-20
d.
INGESTION PATHWAY SAMPLING TEAM GENERAL'he ingestion pathway sampling team consisted of a represen-tative from the California Radiological Health Section and representatives from the San Luis Obispo County Department of Agriculture.
Samples collected were to include water, milk, and fodder.
The operation was noted as successful.
f FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION:
FI ND I NG The ingestion pathway
- team, including the California repre-
- tative, was not trained in current radiological f ield sampling technique.
Soil sampling depth could not be defined.
The stainless steel container, after'ne sampling
- use, was reported to require separation for chlorine bleach decontamination.
R E COMME N DATI ON Training be provided to all team members on ingestion pathway sampling requirements.
I
3.
PUBLIC INFORM'A N CENTER/MEDIA CENTER i
GENERAL:
In both the Public Informa'Cion Center and unamimous agreement among Public Information was that the efficiency and capability of the good. All the County PIO's did an outstanding in a most professional manner.
They showed q
understood the operation and their respective They coordinated the information well.
The u
efficient and provided competent support wi th The securi ty was out standi ng.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
the Media Center Officers (P IO')
operation was very job and f unct ioned ood leadership and respons ibi1 i ties.
t il i ty was most good s pokespersons.
1.
FINDING The period between reaching a deci sion at the EOC to the time the deci sion was put into hard copy for news r elease coul d be shortened.
RECOMMENDATION The Senior PIO should spend more time at the Media Center as this would lessen this time gap.
Better communication should be establi shed between the EOC and the Information Center.
The Information Center could be located backstage at the Media Center for greater efficiency.
2.
FI ND I NG The facilities at the Media Center and the Media barracks could be improved by:
a.
Better acoustics.
b.
Space needs for many TV stations covering the event.
c.
More equipment for medi a at the barracks, i.e., tele-
- phones, telephone
- books, typewriters, etc.
RECOMMENDATION Telephones were sufficient for the exercise but many more would be needed for a real emergency.
- Further, no bathroom faci 1 i ti es at the barracks.
For a real emergency, temporary bathroom facilities should be provided.
3.
FI NDI NG News media were not 'allowed inside the Media Center until g:35 a.m.
They were told that the first briefing would occur at 10 a.m.
or sooner..
I I<2
l'
R ECOMME NDATI OH 1
News medi a should be allowed inside the center as early as possible and a spokesperson should be on hand to explain the situation and procedures.
This action can give a good public relation image for the start of the Medi.a Center operation.
4.
FI NDING The Co'unty made excellent use of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station and promptly transmitted EBS messages to the station.
The first few EBS messages were not authenticated.
All later.
messages were authenticated.
The station was ins'truc-ted to utilize each message for 15 minute repeat broadcasts until updated.
R E COMME'ATI ON All EBS messages should be authenticated.
5.
FI ND I HG Some information developed at the Public Information Center, particularly, Highway Patrol information, was not put into hard copy for release at the Medi a Center, i.e.,
News Release Pl.
News Release numbers vary between those issued at the Information Center and the Media Center, and a
Hews Release obtained at the Information Center did not get released at the Media Center.
None of the news releases were identified with the exercise.
RECOMMENDATION
~.
A uniform numbering,.system for News Releases should be developed.
All of the News Releases should be identified with an "exercise 4
"6.
FIND ING The Press Kit, developed jointly by the utility, County,
- State, and FEMA, provided good information to the medi a..
RECOMMENDATION None.
7.
FI NDING The graphics used by the utility to identify the malfunctions at the plant appeared to be too cqmplicated.
J I
A 4
~
RE COMME NDAT I QN Simple schematics c'oui d better identify 'roblems at the plant.
8.
FI ND ING The medi a inquired about weather c'ondi tions on several occasions and it appeared that weather information was inadequate and 1 ack i ng.
I R E COMME N DAT I ON Improved weather information sholul d be obtained.
9.
FI ND ING t.
Six news bri ef inqs were conducted wi th the lead County P IO as the chief spokesperson.
He did an exceptional job of providing factual information in a moderate, non-crisis manner.
At each briefing there were representatives from the utility (except the first briefing) and State agencies providing support state-ments.
- However, introductions and identification of participants was lacking, and an appearance by a senior County o'fficial at the Media Center should have been accomplished sooner.
RECOMMENDATION a.
Table identification cards could be provided.
~ ~
b.
A top elected or appointed official such as, County Administrative Officer, Sheriff, or Chairman of the Board of Supervi sors shoul d make an appea'rance at the Medi a Center as soon as pos s ib le.
10.
F I ND I NG The public address system was excel lent and adequate wi th the exception of mi crophone cords be ing too short to al low proper use of displays.
The use of the media box (a junction box wi th jack input for broadcast mi crophones) was most usef ul and prevented individual station microphones from being posted on the table.
The lighting on stage was excel lent.
RE COMME NDAT I ON Longer microphone cords should be available for people getting up from the table on stage and moving to a display.
11.
FI ND ING There was no introduction of all P IO's in the Information Center to, each other and support staf f in the beginning of the exerci se.
0 I
I
RECOMME NDATI 0 Before exerci se begins the lead PIO should introduce al 1
partici pants to each other and explain their roles.
il C
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12., FINDING The time elapsed from the time a deci sion'as made to the final development of a coordinated News Release took from 30 to 45 minutes.
The County achieved for accuracy at the expense of timeliness.
R ECOMME NDATI ON More effective use of the "NOTEPAD" system for disseminating hard copy shoul d resolve that prob 1'em.
13.
FINDING The lead PIO at the Information Center desiqnated two members on the support staff to establi sh logs and log every incoming message whether written or telephonic.
There was no. status board or log maintained by the County at the Media Center, but News Releases and utility "NOTEPAD" messages were posted in the staff room.
The utility did maintain a message log and tape recorded all news briefings.
RECOMMENDATION A status board shoul d be maintained at the Medi a Center.
14.
FINDING All supporting equipment and supplies were adequate at the Information Center and at the Medi a Center.
RECOMME NDATION Hone.
15.
FI ND ING Most officials at the Information Center and the Medi a Center had personal identification badges.
None of the State PIO's at the Information Center were identified by badges.
RECOMME NDAT ION All officials should be badged to identify name,
- agency, and position.
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16.
FINDING The media appeared satisfied that the tapes they made at the news briefings seemed adequate for their needs.
It did not appear that.the medi a needed one-to-one intervi ews.
The utility had sufficient information and a spokesperson was available who did provide stand-up intervi ews for some TV stations.
RECOMNE NDAT ION In developing brief ings individual medi a deadlines should be considered, specifically for newspapers versus radio and TY.
17.
FINDING Several news people expressed concern that in relationship to the flow of events, they were not obtaining sufficient information.
RECOMME NDATION More frequent and shorter news brief ings be conducted, even just giving bul 1etin information.
18.
FI ND ING In a real emergency the local government woul d receive many calls from outside media requesting information and even recording an, interview on the status of the emergency
~
This was not simulated during the exercise.
RECOMME NDATI ON For the real emergency, the utility woul d provide, an 800 tol 1-free number that woul d be publicized on the wire servi ces informing out of town medi a to cal 1 for updated information.
This 800 number could be manned by a
P IO Reservi st or State Information Officer.
It could be possible to utilize the Automatic Broadcast Feed (ABF) which utilizes several cartridge tape recorders
- that, can give a recorded brief message for radio stations.
This could be updated several times a day and the media informed about it via the wire services.
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4.
STATE PARKS AND BEACHES GENER'AL:
State Parks and Beaches have preo ared detailed plans to close the facilities at Montana de Oro and Pismo Beach at the Alert level.
The call up procedures and'he facility pl,ans have been caref ul ly thought out and appear to be hiqhly ef feet ive.
The State Parks and Beaches Headquarters in San Lui s Obi spo and each of the two park facilities had an evaluator present during the exercise.
State Parks and Beaches was also represented in the EOC at the evacuation control table where they coordinated wel 1 with the other law enforcement and f ire agencies.
All of their personhel were considered to have done an excellent job in mobilizing staff and followinq the closing procedures.
When they were finished with their responsibilities they assisted in later evacuation procedures.
I FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
F I ND ING The State Parks and Beaches Headquarters'OC has adequate
- staff, equipment, display area, and communications to support evacuation procedures.
The two parks were swept by State employees and closure and evacuation were completed before noon.
R E COMME N OAT I ON None.
2.
FIND ING State Parks and Beaches directed that KI dosage be provided to field team members and horses.
R E COMME NDAT I ON Recommend that KI tablets be suppl i ed to County and State agencies that would have emergency workers in the plume exposure zone.
3.
FINDING At Pi smo Beach the operational department has a good capabi 1-i ty to assign and di spatch teams wi th proper materials, suppl i es, barricades, s igns, and equi pment,.
RECOMMENDATION Addi tional s igns need to be made.
The department is aware of this need and types of signs needed have been identified.
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4.
FINDING 4
(g c.
A very common problem of keepinq the field units informed of the qeneral picture arose here also.
The field units at the parks were not kept as up to date on plume direction and release time estimated or protective actions recommended to the public as they might have been.
- However, upon notifica-tion of Alert, the direction and control by management was t ime1y.
R ECOMME NDATI ON More attention should be given to providing f ield units with general information on emerqency action levels and protective action guidance being given to the public.
~5.
FI ND ING The Rangers and 'staff demonstrated good abili ty of timely implementation of alert and evacuation actions for the plume emerqency planning zone.
The Parks and Beaches access and traffic control was acceptable.
RECOMMENDATION Training for Rangers tasked with emergency responsibilities and radiological defense training (self-protection) should be scheduled on an annual basis for all personnel assigned to radi ological defense tasks.
6.
FINDING Adherence to the emergency evacuat ion pl an and SOP '
were good but weather terminology was mi sunderstood.
RECOMME ND'ATI ON The. aqenci es shoul d agree on standard terms for announce-ment of wind direct ion.
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5.
CITY OF MORRO EMERGENCY OPERATING CE R
GENERAL:
The City of Morro Bay recognizes their dependence on the County for evaluative
- data, but is prepared to meet the demands of a nuclear power plant accident.
The City prepared for and deal t, wi th the threat presented by the exerci se in a'ery professional manner.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS'.
FI NDING The City was most interested in receiving notification of any change in emergency action level, specific protective action guidance for the City, and plum'e or projected plume direction.
Information on plant condi tions and f ield monitor readings were not useful to them.
The City also h ad a problem keeping u p wi th what information was being qiven to the public
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R E COMME NDATI ON Work wi th the County to develop an improved system for obtaining appropriate, timely status reports and repeating protective action direct ions from t ime to time as it remains valid.
- Also, any public information di spatches shoul d be read to the cities it may effect before it ooes to the public.
2.
FI ND I NG Minimal logi stic and equipment ref inements were duly noted by the C~ty and plans for implementing corrective action pl armed for. -'
ECOMME NDATI ON Among the ref inements the Ci ty pl ans to address, are the fo 1, 1 owi ng:
a.
Improved di splay (maps, events log, charts, etc.)
equi pment.
b.
More telephone equipment (jacks).
C.
d.
e.'xpanded attention to precise Alternate EOC (City currently pl ans to relocate to Cali forni a 'Divi s ion of Forestry site)
Develop written instructions for staff assiqned as controllers at evacuation staging.areas.
Addi tional r'adi ologi cal defense eauipment (dos ime ters)
Expand communication di spatch. staf f to permi t more expedi tious handling of incoming.oub lie inauiries and radi o communi cat ion.
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g.
Use of "Explorer" group for loqi st>cs support.
Long-range goal to procure communications van.
i.
Emergency servi ces staff individual plans for family protection--perhaps through a "buddy system" use of off duty staf f.
j.
Consider use of CB radi o to improve data gat'hering.
k.
Exerci ses to include evacuation scenario.
3.
F I ND ING This is a continuing need for more precise weather information and map tr ackinq capabi 1 i ty.
R E COMME NOATI ON Investigate method for obtaininq more timely wind current/
climatic condition information and obtain larqer map display for use in charting same.
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a, 6
RECEPTION AND CARE GENERAL:
County Social
- Services, Red
- Cross, CALTRANS, and the National Guard worked extremely wel 1 together to provide timely facilita-t ion in the handling of evacuees.
A group of vo lunteers from the County were picked up by bus near Montana,de Oro State Park and transported to Camo Roberts where they were checked in, monitored, had temporary quarters
- located, and they were fed.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
F I ND ING The evacuees at Camp Roberts were not kept aware of the progress of the exerci se nor was the press kept informed of the status of the evacuees.
RE COMME N DATI ON A Reception and Care public information officer may be necessary to brief evacuees as to what is happening outside and also to let the medi a know about the evacuees.
2.
FINDING The CALTRANS contingent monitoring the evacuees and procedures were so that the or alarmed.
They enhanced t
several evacuees "contaminat A few minor improvements on R ECOMME NDATI ON of monitors did an excellent job explaining what the monitorinq evacuees did not become frigntened, he monitoring process by finding ed" and processed them appropri ately.
traffic flow are suggested.
The radiological monitoring check point should have been farther away from the Reception Center.
The monitor who checked an evacuee should have been the person to give that evacuee the green tag indicating no contamination.
Sending the evacuee to another point to get, the green tag increased the likelihood of error.
The traffic flow of evacuees should have been in the front door and.out the back door of the Reception Center to prevent mingling wi th contaminated new arrivals.
3.
F I ND I NG The evacuation vehicle was radio equipped and followed a
predesignated route
- and, in general, appeared capable of handling alternatives that might emerge during an evacuat ion.
0
R E COMME NDA7I ON In future exercises it might be well to present some obstacles al ong the bus route, i.e.,
c losed roads.,
need for emergency assistance, etc.,
to further test the evacuation capabi 1 i ty.
FI ND I NG The coordination and cooperation between the Red Cross Representative and County Soci al Services was excel lent.
There respective SOP's were used and they initiated contacts with Camp Roberts, Vandenberg Air Force
- Base, and CALTRANS in a timely and ef feet ive manner.
The set up procedures at Camp Roberts to receive the evacuees went extremely well.
RECOMME NDATI ON Continued joint dril ling by these aaencies will allow them to maintain that high level of cooperation.
I I-32
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7.
MEDICAL/HOSPITAL GENERAL:
French Hospital did demonstrate an abi lity to al,ert, notify, and mobilize emergency response personnel in a timely manner to respond to a radiological emergency.
The staff rapidly carried out the pre-patient arrival facility preparations.
Two health physiqi sts were provided to the hospital by PGEE.
The staff:
demonstrated a well trained approach to the treatment of radi ation exposed patients.
They entered into the exercise with enthusiasm.
The hospital and ambulance procedure and personnel were able'o cope wi th the addi tional problems posed by the exerci se when the ambulance carrying the contaminated victim crashed into a
car on the way to the hospital.
They di spatched a
second ambulance and handled the addi tional patient load.
F INOINGS ANO RECOMMENDATIONS '
F I NO I NG Communications between Diablo Canyon, the ambulance, and the hospital were weak.
RECOMME NDATI ON Establi.sh a dedicated telephone line or radio communications in the emergency room area used to handle contaminated
- patients, ambulances, and Diablo Canyon.
(This has been recognized by the hospital and remedi al steps are being taken.)
2.
FI ND ING Information concerning patient identification, possible
- injuries, and contamination/radi ation levels were not adequate.
R ECOMME N OAT I ON Use tri age tags on patients that cle'arly provide the necessary i nformat i on.
3.
F I NO ING Ambulance attendants were not ful ly cognizant of contamination/
radi ation hazards and problems.
R )COMME NOAT I ON Train and provide periodic retraining to ambulance attendants in handling of radi ation accident victims.
I I-33
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FINDING The hospital has a wel 1 written "Procedure for Admi ssion of Radioactively Contaminated Patients at French Hospital," although there was no record of reading nor was a historical record of procedure change maintained.
R E COMME NDATI ON Maintain a "sign off" record of reading and maintain a
historical record of procedure change.
5.
FINDING There were some breaches in radi ation exposure procedure.
R E COMME NDATI ON A health physicist should take more aggressive responsibility to assure strict adherence to the radi ation exposure handling procedure.
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C.
ELEMENTS NOT OBSERVED:
There were certain items that were not observed during the exercise due to the fact that hardware or installation was not complete at that time.'s these items are completed, they wil 1 be tested and observed.
Some examples are li sted below:
a.
Siren System.
The siren system i s not yet compl eted.
h fi ih~d thFEMAt igPg b.
Monitor Receivers.
Certain speci al facil i ties such as, 'hospitals an sc oo s,- are scheduled to have monitor receivers installed as warning devi ces.
When. instal led, these wi 1 1
be tested with the siren system.
c.
Emer ency Broadcast System (EBS).
A commerci al telephone was use to simu ate a
e i cate telephone and backup r adi o between the EOC and the EBS s tation.
d.
Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC) Set Up.
The
'set
.up time for the EOC was teste urging the exerci se but the UDAC was still in the process of being equipped.
When that is completed, a set up drill will have to be conducted to determine how 1 ong i t takes to set that faci lity up from i ts day-to-day position.
I I-35
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