ML16341B995

Rev 2 to Verification of Pressure,Temp,Humidity & Submergence Environs Used for Safety-Related Equipment Spec Outside Containment for Auxiliary Feedwater Sys & Control Room Ventilation..., Interim Technical Rept 14

ML16341B995
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Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	07/25/1983
From:	Sestak F STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.
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ML16341B996	List: ML16341B995 ML17083B195 ML20024D083
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PACIFIC GAS 8 ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INDEPENDENT DESIGN +RIFICATION PROGRAM INTERIM TECHNICAL REPORT NO.

14 REVISION 2 VERIFICATION OF THE PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND SUBMERGENCE ENVIRONMENTS USED FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATIONAND PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM PERFORMED BY STONE 8 WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50"275 LICENSE NO. DPR-76 PROJECT MANAGER F. Sestak, Jr.

DATE 7

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aSOBOiO147 BSO728 PDR'DOCK 05000275

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PROGRAM MANAGER'S PREFACE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT I INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM INTERIM TECHNICAL REPORT VERIFICATION OF THE PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, AND SUBMERGENCE ENVIRONMENTS USED FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

'OR AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM This is the revision 2 to the fourteenth of a series of Interim Technical Reports prepared by the DCNPP-IDVP for the purpose of providing a conclusion of the program.

This report provides the analytical

results, recommendations and conclusions of the IDVP with respect to the initial sample.

As IDVP Program

Manager, Teledyne Engineering Services has approved this ITR including the conclusions and recommendations.

The methodology followed by TES in performing this review and evaluation is described by Appendix B to this report.

ITR Reviewed and Approved IDVP Program Manager Teledyne En ineering ervices D. C. Stratouly Assistant Project Manager

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title

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INTRODUCTION..

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DEFINITION OF ITEMS REVIEWED.

2-1 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW

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3.1 REVIEW OF LICENSING DOCUMENTS 3"1 3.-2 REVIEW OF DESIGN CHAIN.

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'. 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.6

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3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTOR ACTIVITIES 3"2 Items Reviewed Description of Review

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3-2 3-4 INDEPENDENT CALCULATIONS......

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3 6 Mass and Energy Release Data 3-6 Area GE Environments.

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3-9 INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF SITE GEOMETRY (SITE VISIT).......

3-9 reas Inspected............................................

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Method of Inspection.......................................

3-10 0bservations........................................,....

~ in SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS OF DIFFERENT CALCULATIONALMETHODS..

3-4 Computer Programs Compared

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3-5 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.1.5 Tur'bine Building Environments.

Initial Temperature Conditions Submergence Analysis.

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SUMMARY

OF REVIEW RESULTS.................,................

4-1 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTOR ANALYSES........................................

4-1 Mass and Energy Release Data...............................

4-1 Area GE Environments.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT)

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4.2, 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 RESULTS OF COMPUTER PROGRAM SENSITIVITY STUDY..............

4-5 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT CALCULATION OF PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND HUMIDITY 4-6 Area GE Environments..................,.....................

4-6 Turbine Building Environments..............................

4-7 EOI REPORTS ISSUED.........................................

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'6. 1 EVALUATION OF RESULTS............

MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE DATA.....

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6-1 6.2 6.3 COMPUTER PROGRAM, CONTEMPT..........

AREA GE ENVIRONMENTS...........................

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6.4 TURBINE BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS..............................

6-3 6.5 SUBMERGENCE ANALYSIS.............

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APPENDIXES A

B EOI FILES PROGRAM MANAGER'S 'ASSESSMENT

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LIST OF TABLES Table Title 4-1 Results of Independent Calculations of Environments for Area GE Elevation 115 Feet-0 Inch 4-2 Results of Independent Calculation of Environments for Turbine Building Elevation 140 Feet-0 Inch

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION An Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) review was performed which included samples of pressure, temperature, humidity, and submergence analy-ses performed by the Nuclear Services Corporation (NSC) for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PGSE)

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1

(DCNPP-1).

The review was performed in accordance with the Stone 6 Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)

Scope of Work defined in Appendix D

(DCNPP-IDVP-PP-002) of the IDVP Phase II Program Management Plan issued by Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) as IDVP Program Manager.

The following sections of this Interim Technical Report (ITR) provide a description of the

methods, results, and evaluations associated with this independent design verification.

SECTION 2 DEFINITION OF ITEMS REVIEWED

Pressure, temperature,

humidity, and submergence environment calculations performed for PGSE by service-related contractors were reviewed.

The review included environments calculated for the specification of safety-related equipment in the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

System and the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization (CRVP)

System.

The review was restricted to two selected locations:

one location associated with the AFW System and the other location associated with the CRVP System.

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SECTION 3 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW 3.1 REVIEW OF LICENSING DOCUMENTS Licensing documents applicable to DCNPP-1 were reviewed to determine the E

relevant licensing commitments made by PGSE.

The specific licensing commit-ments relating to the evaluation of environments associated with postulated pipe ruptures outside containment were identified.

The licensing commitments were then compared to the analyses which resulted in calculated temperature,

pressure, humidity, and submergence environments for safety-related equipment specifications for the AFW System and CRVP System to verify conformance with, the commitments.

3.2 REVIEW OF DESIGN CHAIN ITR No.

29, entitled "Design Chain - Initial Sample" for the SWEC sample indicated that NSC was the only service-related contractor responsible for the'evelopment of the temperature,

pressure, humidity, and submergence environments analyses outside containment for the safety-related equipment specification.

NSC activities consisted of performing the calculations and writing the report which was the basis for the licensing submittal.

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3.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTOR ACTIVITIES A review was performed of the NSC

analyses, computer

runs, and reports associated with the development of pressure, temperature, humidity, and sub-mergence environments in areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building and in the turbine building.

The following sections describe the review.

3.3.1 Items Reviewed The following NSC reports and analyses were reviewed:

Compartment Pressurization

Analysis, 1-15-74, File No.

1.37.12, 33.5

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Lines, 4-1-74, File No. 33.423 Diablo Canyon Unit 1

Flooding

Analysis, G

Area and Auxiliary Building Revised, 6-9-76, File No. 33.440

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Thermal Hydraulic Analyses of Postulated Pipe Break Outside Containment at Diablo Canyon Unit 1, 6-26-74, Report PGE-01-27, Revision 1

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Modified EOX

. File 8005 (Flooding)

Response, 12-8-82, File No.

PGE-0012.

The following computer program outputs were reviewed:

CONTEMPT output,

Title:

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - Area GW-Main Steam Break-St.

Valve Failure, 5-2-74

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output,

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Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - Turbine - Main Steam Break - St. Valve Failure, 5-24-76

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Diablo Canyon Unit 1 -

GE at 115'leva-tion - Leakage from M.S. in GW Area, 4-29-74 PRTHRUST output,

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Diablo Canyon Long-Term Blowdown Analysis Steam Check Valve Failure, 2-1-74 Selected piping schematics, structural steel, piping and mechanical, equip-ment location,'nd concrete

drawings, requested by and sent to SWEC by PG&E, were also reviewed in conjunction with the independent calculation of environments.

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3.3.2 Description of Review The items listed in the preceding Section 3.3.1 were reviewed for the following attributes:

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Reasonableness of the output, compared to the inputs Identification of applicable regulatory requirements to be used as a basis of design, as committed to in the approved DCNPP-1 licens-ing documents 3.4 SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS TO DIFFERENT CALCULATIONALMETHODS 3.4.1 Computer Programs Compared

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CONTEMPT - A computer program for predicting the containment pres-sure and temperature response to a

loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA),

used by NSC for calculating

pressure, temperature, and 3-4

humidity environments outside containment.

The computer program was developed by Phillips Petroleum

Company, Idaho Falls, Idaho.

The CONTEMPT computer program models only one control volume and two leakage paths to the atmosphere.

THREED - A SWEC proprietary computer program which was used to calculate the transient response

pressure, temperature, and humid-ity in various subcompartments following a postulated rupture in a moderate or high energy pipeline.

This computer program was derived from RELAP4 with the heat sinks developed from CONTEMPT-LT/026.

THREED has the capability to model multiple nodes and vent paths.

SWEC computer programs are documented in accordance with the requirements of the Stone 6

Webster Standard Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.

3.4.2 Sensitivity Calculation Method A sensitivity study was performed to determine the difference in magnitude of pressure and temperature transient calculations which could be attributed solely to the use of-different computer programs.

The SWEC analysis, which used the computer program THREED, utilized, to the maximum extent possible, identical input data used by NSC in the computer program CONTEMPT.

Input data for junction loss coefficients and inertia terms had to be developed from CONTEMPT nozzle approximations and design information, respectively.

The comparison between the two computer programs was made using the NSC analysis (shown in Section 3.3.1) that considered a main steam line rupture 3-5

in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch, assuming failure of the steam check valve to close.

3.5 INDEPENDENT CALCULATIONS Independent calculations of the mass and energy release data as well as the

pressure, temperature, and humidity transients were performed with THREED.

The pressure, temperature, and humidity environments were calculated at two locations:

one associated with the AFW System and the other with the CRVP System.

The purpose of the independent calculations, was to verify the environments calculated by NSC and also to allow verification of assumptions and methods used by NSC in computation of the environments.

3.5.1 Mass and Energy Release Data Independent calculations of the mass and energy release data resulting from main steam line ruptures in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch and the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch were performed.

The location of the pipe rupture in each area was taken from Appendix 3.6 of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Main steam line ruptures were selected based on the following:

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A main steam line rupture in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch was selected because it is a high energy line and will produce the most severe environments to which safety-related equipment in the 3-6

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AFW System located in area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch is exposed.

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A main steam line rupture in the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch was selected because it is a high energy line and will produce the most severe environments to which safety-related equipment in the CRVP System in the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch is exposed.

Two break sizes were considered for calculation of the mass and energy release

data, a main steam line double-ended rupture (DER) and a 0.908 foot split rupture.

The DER was selected because this break size results in the highest compartment pressure and temperature transients in the short term.

An additional

break, namely a split rupture,.was selected because liquid entrainment will not occur and this break will result in a higher calculated equilibrium temperature environment.

The split rupture was selected based on the SWEC evaluation of the statement in NUREG-0588, "The objective of this review is to provide reasonable assurance that the equipment can perform its intended function in the most limiting environment in which it is expected to function."

The mass and energy release data for these two specific breaks were calcu-lated using two different methods:

1) The mass and energy release data for

'the DER were developed assuming a constant blowdown until steam generator dry-out occurred.

The flow rate and enthalpy of this constant flow were established based on the initial plant operating conditions.

2) Westing-house mass and energy release data provided by the DCP for a 0.908 foots

main steam line split rupture inside containment were conservatively modified for use outside containment.

This modification consisted of utilizing the provided Westinghouse data for release rates from 0

to 94.5 seconds.

The release rate was held constant from 94.5 seconds until 600 seconds when operator action was assumed to have isolated flow.

3.5.2 Area GE Environments An independent calculation of the pressure and temperature transients in area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch of the auxiliary building was performed.

This location was selected based on the following:

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Calculation of environments in area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch required the modeling of a blowout panel and the modeling of flow through

louvers, flow through

screens, and flow from adjacent compartments.

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Comparison can be made between the environments calculated by NSC and SWEC which resulted from a high energy line rupture.

A model was developed to-calculate the environments in area GE due to a main steam line rupture in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch.

The piping and mechanical, equipment

location, and concrete drawings were utilized to develop the model.

The SWEC computer program THREED was used to calculate the pressure and temperature transients.

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3.5.3 Turbine Building Environments An independent calculation of the pressure and temperature transients in the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch was performed.

This location was selected based on the following:

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The independent model of the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch was developed using the piping and mechanical, equipment location, and con-crete drawings.

The temperature and pressure transients resulting from a

main steam line rupture were calculated using the SWEC computer program THREED.

3.6 INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF SITE GEOMETRY (SITE VISIT)

Verification that NSC and SWEC developed geometric models that adequately reflected the "as-built" conditions of the plant was accomplished by a site inspection of the areas of interest.

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3.6.1 Areas Inspected The areas inspected were the turbine building and areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building at all elevations.

3.6.2 Method of Inspection The inspection consisted of a walkdown of the following systems:

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Main Steam System.

3.6.3 Observations The walkdown verified the relative locations of the systems listed above and the locations of vent areas in compartment walls and floors in the areas through which these systems passed.

The calculation by SWEC of the vent area to the atmosphere from the turbine building was confirmed by observation of this vent area during the site inspection.

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Differences were observed between the "as-built" geometries of areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building and the calculational inputs which were utiliz-ed by NSC.

It was concluded that the differences would not significantly affect the

pressure, temperature,

humidity, and submergence environment results calculated in these areas.

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SECTION 4

SUMMARY

OF REVIEW RESULTS 4.1 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SERVICE"RELATED CONTRACTOR ANALYSES The results of the SWEC reviews of the analyses, computer program outputs, and reports described in Section 3.3.1, utilizing the methods described in Section 3.3.2, are summarized in the following sections.

4.1.1 Mass and Energy Release Data The review of the mass and energy release data resulting from a main steam line rupture consisted of the following:

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A review of the mass and energy release data which was utilized as input into the CONTEMPT computer program for the calculation of pressure and temperature environments A review of the model developed by NSC to calculate the main steam line mass and energy release data.

The mass and energy release

data, utilized to calculate the pressure and temperature transients in area GW and the turbine building, considered the effects of liquid entrainment in the break effluent.

Liquid entrainment will lower the enthalpy values and the corresponding energy rates from the break.

The effects of the lower effluent energy rates and the increased amounts of liquid in the atmosphere will lower the calculated temperature.

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If entrainment effects in the break effluent are included, additional break sizes must be investigated to assure that the worst temperature environment has been calculated.

A review was also performed of the analysis which resulted in the long-term mass and energy release data due to a main steam line DER.

Results of the review revealed that the methods utilized for modeling the steam generators will have the effect of overpredicting the level swell and the amount of liquid entrainment in the break effluent.

F 1.2 Area GE Environments The review of the analysis and computer program outputs that developed the pressure and temperature transients in area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch due to a

main steam line break in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch resulted in the following:

The enthaLpy values were underpredicted for the energy flow from area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch into area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch following a main steam line break.

The inflow and accumulation of air, that was calculated by CONTEMPT in area GW, lowers the value of the enthalpy that was developed and utilized as input into the area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch.

Refer to Section 4.2 for additional discussion of the air inflow.

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The mass discharge data into area GE considered only flow from area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch and assumed all vents out of the GE area were exhausted to the outside atmosphere.

4.1.3 Turbine Building Environments The ventilation fans for the CRVP System are located in the turbine building

at elevation 140 feet-0 inch.

This location, therefore, was selected for review of the pressure and temperature environments resulting from a main steam line rupture, to which the CRVP System is exposed.

Reviews were performed of the CONTEMPT computer program output that calcu-lated the environments and the NSC report that summarized the results of the analysis.

The review of the input data utilized in CONTEMPT revealed that enthalpy values that were too low were used in the long term.

Enthalpy values of 1130 Btu/ibm at 60 seconds increasing linearly to 1150 Btu/ibm at 2000 sec were used as input instead of the constant enthalpy value of 1200 Btu/ibm which was the value used in the auxiliary building.

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4.1.4 Initial Temperature Conditions The values of the initial temperatures used in areas GE, GW, the turbine

building, and the atmosphere were 70 F.

The 70 F initial temperature which is contained in Section 4.2 of Reference 3 to Appendix 3.6 of the FSAR is lower than the maximum temperatures specified in Chapter 9 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR for these areas.

The effect on the equilibrium temperature of initial temperatures is not significant in the area of the break.

However, in areas away from the

break, lower initial temperatures have an impact which results in calculation of lower equilibrium temperatures.

4.1.5 Submergence Analysis A review of the submergence analysis in the areas GE and GW, due to a design basis break in the feedwater line, was conducted.

The feedwater line break was selected because it is representative of other high energy lines and a

rupture in this line could affect components in the AFW System.

A review of the submergence analyses in other areas was

not, performed because the methods and assumptions utilized would be similar to those used in areas GE and GW, and components of the CRVP System are not affected by flooding due to pipe breaks.

The initial results of the submergence analysis review identified that the flood heights calculated in areas GE and GW may be too low because the maximum available water inventory was not considered.

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available for release from the steam generator considered only the liquid mass above the feedwater sparger ring (inlet pipe);

therefore, only approximately 25,000 ibm from the steam generator were considered for calculation of the maximum flood height.

Also, the auxiliary feedwater flow out the ruptured pipe that occurs until isolation (approximately 10 minutes) was not considered.

A subsequent analysis was performed by NSC to detail the several conservative assumptions and methodology used in the original submergence analysis.

This analysis was reviewed by SWEC with the conclusion that the initial NSC submergence analysis results in water release volumes and flooding heights that are conservative, even though the maximum available steam generator water inventory and AFW system flow rates were not considered.

4.2 RESULTS OF COMPUTER PROGRAM SENSITIVITY STUDY The comparison between the temperature transients calculated in area GW, using the computer programs CONTEMPT and

THREED, shows good agreement for the first 50 seconds.

Both computer programs calculated an initial increase in temperatures to approximately 300~F followed by a decrease to approxi-mately 215~F.

After 50 seconds, the temperature transients vary signifi-cantly.

The long-term temperature calculated by THREED increases and reaches an equilibrium value of 313~F, while the equilibrium temperature calculated by CONTEMPT decreases to 200 F.

The difference between the long-term temperatures can be explained by the different vent models that were utilized to calculate flow to the atmosphere.

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CONTEMPT utilizes a nozzle approximation without inertia effects, while the computer program THREED solves the momentum equation and considers fluid inertia effects.

As the compartment pressure approaches

ambient, CONTEMPT calculates pressure oscillations that vary between atmospheric and subatmospheric.

As a result, the direction of the vent flow also oscillates as the compartment. pressure oscillates.

In CONTEMPT, the direction of the vent flow is only a function of the presure gradient and changes directions instantaneously and unrealis-tically as the direction of the pressure gradient changes.

The compartment flow direction oscillations that CONTEMPT calculates allow the unrealistic accumulation of air to occur inside the compartment.

The inflow of 70 F air and the accumulation of the air reduces the compartment temperature calculated by CONTEMPT to a value which is too low.

4.3 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT CALCULATION OF

PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND HUMIDITY The results of the independent calculations of the pressure and temperature transients utilizing the methods described in Section 3.5 are as follows:

4.3.1 Area GE Environments The pressure, temperature, and humidity transients in area GE at elevation 115 feet-0 inch due to a

main steam line rupture in area GW at elevation 115 feet-0 inch were calculated.

The following three cases were analyzed:

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A DER using the SWEC calculated mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values used in the NSC analysis (Section 4.2 of Reference 3 to Appendix 3.6 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR).

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A DER using the SWEC calculated mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values specified in Chapter 9 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR.

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A 0.908 foots split rupture using SWEC modified Westing-house mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values specified in Chapter 9 of DCNPP-1 FSAR.

The equilibrium temperature and peak pressure calculated for each case by SWEC along with the temperature and pressure calculated by NSC are presented in Table 4-1.

This table indicates that the NSC results are lower.

The relative humidity specified for equipment qualification by NSC was 100 percent which would bound the resulting relative humidity of all high energy line breaks.

4.3.2 Turbine Building Environments The pressure, temperature, and humidity transients due to a main steam line rupture were calculated in the turbine building at elevation 140 feet-0 inch.

The following three cases were analyzed:

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A DER using the SWEC calculated mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values used in the NSC analysis (Section 4.2 of Reference 3 to Appendix 3.6 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR).

Case 2:

A DER using the SWEC calculated mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values specified in Chapter 9 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR.

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A 0.908 foot~ split rupture using SWEC modified Westing-house mass and energy release data with the initial temperature values equal to the values specified in Chapter 9 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR.

The equilibrium temperature and the peak pressure calculated for each case by SWEC along with the temperature and pressure calculated by NSC are pre-sented in Table 4-2.

This table indicates that the NSC temperature results are lower.

The relative humidity specified for equipment qualification by NSC was 100 percent which would bound the resulting relative humidity of all high energy line breaks (HELBs).

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TABLE 4-1 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT CALCULATION OF ENVIRONMENTS FOR AREA GE ELEVATION 115 FEET-0 INCH SWEC Case 1 - Initial conditions sensitivity case SWEC Case 2 - Initial conditions sensitivity case SWEC Case 3 - Equilibrium temperature case Peak Pressure

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15. 3 Equilibrium Tem erature

( F) 295 297 321 NSC Documented Results 212

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TABLE 4"2 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT CALCULATION OF ENVIRONMENTS FOR TURBINE BUILDING ELEVATION 140 FEET-0 INCH SWEC Case 1 - Initial conditions sensitivity case SWEC Case 2 - Initial conditions sensitivity case SWEC Case 3 - Equilibrium temperature case Peak Pressure

( sia) 15.3 15.2 Equilibrium Tem erature

(~F) 181 204 278 NSC Documented Results 14.8 165

SECTION 5 EOI REPORTS ISSUED Nine EOI files were issued as a result of the verification of the pressure, temperature,

humidity, and submergence environments used for safety-related equipment specification outside containment for the AFW System and the CRVP S

System.

The status of these files is summarized in Appendix A.

The resolu-tion of these files is discussed in this section.

EOI File 8001 was issued because of the inappropriate application by NSC of the computer program CONTEMPT for calculation of environmental conditions outside the containment for equipment specification.

PG&E has performed a

reanalysis of the pressure and temperature transients for HELBs outside containment using a multi-node computer program which is appropriate for this type of analysis.

EOI File 8001 was revised to combine the concerns identified in EOI Files 7004,

7005, 8003,

8006, 8033, and 8034.

The PGRE reanalysis has properly addressed the IDVP concerns which are identified below:

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The mass and energy release data developed by Westinghouse addressed the concern identified in EOI File Nos.

8003 and 8033.

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The reanalyses were based on as-built geometrical parameters (EOI File No. 7005).

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The reanalyses used multiple node models (EOI File No.

8034).

~

The reanalyses provided documentation for the turbine building input data (EOI File No. 8006).

The reanalyses provided documentation for the validity of assumptions; e.g.,

door positions, open or

closed, (EOI File No. 7004).

This file has been closed.

'OI File 8002 was issued because the method used by NSC (effect of liquid entrainment included without additional breaks considered) in calculating mass and energy release data for determination of environments outside the containment results in temperatures which are lower than those which would be calculated if split ruptures without liquid entrainment were considered.

This method was not considered adequate based on the IDVP interpretation of the NUREG-0588 statement concerning "most limiting environment."

However, the following clarification of the DCNPP-1 licensing commitment was provided by PGBZ.

"At the time of the original analysis, all NRC required break sizes were considered.

Subsequently, in NUREG 0588 the NRC recommended, but did not

require, consideration of additional break sizes.

PGSE's response to this recommendation is found on page IV-16 of a letter 5-2

dated 9-2-81 from Crane (PG&E) to Miraglia (NRC).

The

response, in

essence, states that break sizes were chosen in conformance with the acceptance criteria at the time of the analysis."

Based on the above response, this file has been closed.

EOI File 8003 was issued because the value of the enthalpy used by NSC for calculating the temperature environment in the turbine building was too low.

The response by PG&E stated that appropriately chosen values of enthalpy would be used in the reanalysis in response to EOI File 8001.

The concern described in this EOI file was properly addressed in the PG&E reanalysis.

This file has been closed.

EOI File 8004 was issued because the maximum initial temperatures identified in Section 4.2 of Reference 3 to Appendix 3.6 of the FSAR and used by NSC for calculating temperature environments in the areas GE, GW, and turbine building were lower than the ones specified in Chapter 9 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR.

However, the DCNPP-1 licensing commitment was clarified by PG&E to indicate the initial conditions assumed in the analysis are the ones specified in Section 4.2 of Reference 3 to Appendix 3.6 of the DCNPP-1 FSAR.

This file has been closed.

5-3

EOI File 8005 was issued because flooding heights for safety-related equipment may have been too low due to neglected water volumes in the NSC calculation.

Based on the response provided by

PGSE, this file has been closed.

EOI File 8006 was issued because documentation necessary to verify analysis methods and inputs, such as the vent area in the turbine building, could not be provided.

The response by PGRE stated that a complete reanalysis of the turbine building was being performed in response to EOI File 8001.

The concern of this EOI file was properly addressed in the PGSE reanalysis.

This file has been closed.

EOI File 8033 was issued because it was determined that NSC used an inappro-priate method to model the steam generator for calculation of the mass and energy release data.

The responses by PGSE stated that the entire analyses was being redone in response to EOI 8001 and that Westinghouse blowdown data would be used in the reanalyses.

The concern described in this EOI file was properly addressed in the PG&E reanalysis.

This file has been closed.

EOI File 8034 was issued because the methods used by. NSC to calculate the pressure and temperature transients in the area GE did not consider the effects of adjacent compartments.

This resulted in the calculation of low values for equilibrium temperature and peak pressure.

The concern of this EOI was properly addressed by the PGSE reanalysis committed to as a result of EOI, File 8001.

This file has been closed.

5-4

EOI File 8040 was issued because the water inventory, calculated by NSC as available for flooding, neglected some sources of water volume available.

Based on the response provided by PG&E, it was,concluded that the assump-tions used in the original analysis result in flooding heights that are conservative.

This file has been closed.

5"5

P

SECTION 6 EVALUATION OF RESULTS 6.1 MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE DATA The mass and energy release

data, calculated by NSC and utilized for deve-loping the environments in the turbine building and areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building, included liquid entrainment.

The resulting temperature transients calculated were not the worst environments which can be postu-lated.

6.2 COMPUTER PROGRAM, CONTEMPT The use of the computer program CONTEMPT for calculation of the pressure and temperature transients in areas outside containment is not appropriate and will yield results which are too low.

This is due to the vent model util-

.ized and the inability to model adjacent compartments and their venting effect on the equilibrium temperature.

Additional investigation by SWEC concluded that a later version of CONTEMPT (i.e.,

CONTEMPT-LT/026) will also exhibit the behavior described in Section 4.2 when used in a manner similar to the NSC analyses.

6.3 AREA GE ENVIRONMENTS The temperature and pressure transient results calculated by NSC were too low due to the following:

6-1

~

The use of liquid entrainment by NSC in the mass and energy release data.

~

The use of the computer program CONTEMPT by NSC to calculate the environments in area GE.

~

The effects of adjacent compartments on the environments calcu-lated in area GE were neglected by'SC.

The review of the pressure and temperature environments in area GE at eleva-tion 115 feet-0 inch calculated by NSC indicated that both these results were too low.

The use of these environments for equipment qualification for the AFW System resulted in the specification of temperature and pressure environments that were not the worst case which can be postulated to occur.

A higher peak pressure in area GE due to a main steam line DER in area GW affects the environments in the fuel handling building.

The door between the two areas, which was assumed closed, will experience a pressure which exceeds its design value of approximately 2 psid.

The failure of this door would allow venting into the fuel handling building.

Additional doors which were assumed closed are located in area GE at elevations 115 feet-0 inch, 100 feet-0 inch, and 85 feet-0 inch.

A higher peak pressure in these

areas, due to a

main steam line DER in area GW, which exceeds the design value for these doors allows venting into, areas which were assumed isolated from the main steam line rupture environments.

6-2

6.4 TURBINE BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS Reviews of the analyses performed by NSC, as well as the independent calcu-lation of the temperature environments in the turbine building, at elevation 140 foot-0 inch, performed by SWEC, indicated that the temperature transient calculated by NSC was too low.

The temperature results calculated by NSC were too low due to the following:

The use of liquid entrainment by NSC in the mass of the energy release data The use of the computer program CONTEMPT by NSC to calculate the environments

~

The incorrect values of enthalpy were utilized by NSC as input into the computer program CONTEMPT.

The results of the detailed review of the environments calculated by NSC have identified that the temperature environment was not the worst temperature transient which can be postulated to occur.

6.5 SUBMERGENCE ANALYSIS The review of both the initial submergence calculations and summary con-tained in the DCNPP-1

FSAR, as well as the flooding analysis verification calculation, provided by PG&E in response to EOl Files 8005 and 8040,indi-6-3

cated that the assumptions used in the original analysis will result in overprediction of the water release volumes and flooding heights.

6-4

SECTION 7 CONCLUSIONS The review of the pressure, temperature, humidity, and submergence analyses has been completed.

The corresponding EOI files described in Section 5 were issued.

A discussion of errors and an evaluation of their significance are summarized in Sections 4 and 6, respectively.

The analyses which addressed the consequences of the postulated ruptures in high energy lines outside containment at DCNPP-1 were performed by NSC in 1974 in accordance with existing NRC guidelines.

However, additional guide-lines and clarification were issued later by the NRC as IE Bulletins (e.g.,

'79-01B) and as NUREG-0588.

PGGE was required by the NRC (letter from J. F.

Stolz to J.

C. Morrissey, dated March 3, 1980) to perform a review of the environmental qualification program and to respond to the NRC with an identification of the degree of compliance with NUREG-0588.

The PGSE response is contained in the Environmental Qualification Report, dated September

1981, which identifies the degree of compliance with NUREG-0588 on a point-by-point basis.

The IDVP has concluded that PGSE has met the DCNPP-1 licensing commitment as specified in the FSAR and the Equipment Qualification Report.

However, the results in Section 4

and the evaluation in Section 6

demon-strate that the pressures and temperatures used for equipment qualification specifications are too low and do not "...provide reasonable assurance that 7-1

the equipment can perform its intended function in the most limiting en-vironment in 'which it is expected to function" as stated in NUREG-0588.

The fundamental error associated with the inapplicability of the CONTEMPT computer program used by NSC and other identified NSC analytical errors form the basis for this conclusion;

however, the NSC analyses which address the pressure and temperature consequences of pipe ruptures outside containment were recalculated by PGSE.

This reanalysis was necessary to provide environ-mental conditions for specification of safety-related equipment.

This reanalysis required additional verification by the IDVP which is described in ITR No. 34, and the results are reported in ITR No. 47.

'llthe files opened as a result of this IDVP verification have been closed.

The results in Section 4 and the evaluation in Section 6 demonstrate that the submergence analysis performed by NSC resulted in flooding heights which are considered adequate for the specification of safety-related equipment.

The relative humidity specified for equipment qualification by NSC in the

'nvironmental Qualification Report was 100 percent.

When this value is used, it would bound the resulting relative humidity of all postulated pipe ruptures; therefore, no additional verification by the IDVP is required for humidity and submergence parameters used in equipment qualification.

7"2

I

APPENDIX A EOI FILES

APPENDIX A REUo 0 DCHPP IDUP STATUS REPORT LATEST REVo FILE NO.

8001 8001 8001 8001 8001 8001 8001 8001 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8002 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8003 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8005

. 800S 8005 8005 DATE 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 8205'09'20909 820909 820909 8205'09 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 8205'09 820909 820909 8205'09 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909'20909 820909'20909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820905'20909 820909'20909 8205'09 820909 820909 820909 REVo 0

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 0

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 10 11 12 13 0

1 2

3 820909'20909 821004 830225 830527 830531 830602 830602 820909 821001 821018 821029 821116 821119 830124 830131 830210 830210 830225 830225 830225 830225 820909 821001 821018 821029 821116 821118 830210 830217 830222 830222 820909 821001 821018 821029 821116 821119 830124 830131 830210 835210 830225 830225 830225 830225 8205'09 821001 821022 821028 BY STATUS SMEC OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PPRR/CI TES PRR/CI TES CR SMEC OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PPRR/CI TES PRR/CI TES CR TES OIR TES PRR/OIP TES PRR/CI TES CR SMEC OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PER/C TES ER/C TES CR SMEC OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES OIR SMEC PER/AB TES ER/AB TES GIR SMEC PPRR/CI TES PRR/CI TES CR TES OIR TES PRR/OIP TES PRR/CI TES CR SMEC OIR SMEC PPRR/OIP SMEC PPRR/OIP TES PRR/OIP SUBJECT EVALUATION OF ENVIROHHEHT IN COMPARTHEHT GM EVALUATIOH OF EtNIROHHEHT XH COHPARTMEHT GM EVALUATION OF ENVIRGHHEHT IH COHPARTtfEHT Gfl REEVALUATIOtl OF BNXRGHMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT REEVALUATION OF EHVIROHHEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT REEVALUATION OF EHVIROHHEHT OUTSXDE COHTAIHMEHT REEVALUATIOH OF EHVXRONHEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT REEVALUATION OF EHVIROHHEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHHBtT NOHCOHSERVATIVE CALCULATION OF PRESS fl 7EMP HOHCOHSERVATIVE CALCULATIOH GF PRESS 5 TFMR HOHCOHSERVATIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS i TEHP NOHCOHSERNTIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS X TEHP HOHCOHSERVATXVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS X TEMP HOHCOHSERNTIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS K TEMP HGHCOHSERVATIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TEHP HOHCOHSERVATIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TEMP HOHCOHSERNTIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TEMP HONCOtlSERVATIUE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1

TEMP HONCOHSERNTIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TBfP HOHCOHSERNTIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TEMP HOHCGHSERVATIVE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS 1 TB{P HGHCOHSERVATIUE CALCULATIOH OF PRESS X TBfP EVALUATIOH OF EHUIROHMEHT IH TURBIHE BUILDING ENLUATXOH OF ENVIRONHEHT IH TURBIHE BUILDIHG ENLUATIOH OF EHUIRIIEHT IH TURBINE BUILDIHG EVALUATIOH OF BNIROHHEHT IH TURBIHE BUILDIHG EVALUATION OF ENVIRGHMEHT IH TURBINE BUILDING EVALUATION OF EHUIROHHEHT IH TURBIHE BUILDING EVALUATIOH OF EHVIRGHHEHT XH TURBINE BUILDIHG EVALUATION OF BNIROHHEHT IH TURBIHE BUILDXHG EVALUATION OF EtlVIROHHEHT IN TURBINE BUILDIHG EVALUATIOH GF BNIROHMBlT IH TURBINE BUXLDIHG EVALUATION OF ASSUMED IHITIALTEMPo IH GE/GM ENLUATIOH OF ASSUHED IHITIALTBfPo IH GE/GM EVALUATIOH OF ASSUMED IHITIAL'EHPo IH GE/GM EVALUATIOH OF ASSUMED IHITIALTEHPo IH GE/GM EVALUATIOH OF ASSUMED INITIALTEHPo IH GE/GM ENLUA7IGH OF ASSUHED ItlITXAL TEMPo IH GE/GM ENLUA7IGH OF ASSUMED IHITXAL TEMPo IH GE/GM EVALUATION OF ASSUMED INITIALTEMPo IH GE/GM ENLUATIOH OF ASSUtfED IHITIAL TEHPo IH GE/GM EVALUATIOH OF ASSUHED INITIAL TEMPo IH GE/GM EVALUATXON OF ASSUtfED INITIAL TEMPo IH GE/GM ENLUATIOH OF ASSUHED IHITIALTEMPo IH GE/GM EVALUATION OF ASSUMED IHITIAL TEHPo 1H GE/GM EVALUATIOH OF ASSUMED IHXTIAL TEHPo IH GE/GM EVALUATION GF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY Ik GM ENLUATIOH OF EFFECT OF MA7ER IHVEHTORY IH GM EUALUATIGH OF EFFECT OF MATER IKVEHTORY IH GM ENLUATION OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IH GM

APPENDIX A (CONT)

REVo 0 DCHPP IDVP STATUS LATEST REVo REPORT FXLE HOo DATE BY STATUS SUBJECT 8005 8005 8005 8005 8005 8005 8005 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006 8006

'8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8034 8034 8034 8034 8034 8034 8034 8034 8034 8040 8040 8040 8040 SO4O 8040 8040 8040 8040 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 820909 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 821014 8"1014 821014 821014 821022 821022 821022 821022 821022 821022 821022 821022 821022 10 830210 820'909 821001 821018 821029 821116 821118 830111 830118 830124 830124 821014 821028 821104 830210

-830217 830225 830225 821014 1

821028 2

821104 830131 830210 830216 830218 830225 830225 821022 821028 821030 830131 830210 830217 830218 830222 830222 821029 5

821116 6

821118 7

830131 8

830210 830210 TES SMEC TES TES SMEC TES TES SMEC SMEC TES TES SMEC TES TES SMEC TES TES SMEC SMEC TES TES SMEC TES TES SQEC SMEC TES TES SMEC TES SMEC TES TES SMEC SMEC TES TES OIR PPRR/OIP PRR/OIP OIR PPRR/CI PRR/CI CR OIR PPRR/OIP PRR/OIP OIR PPRR/OIP PRR/OIP OIR PPRR/CI PRR/CI CR OIR PER/B ER/B OIR PER/C ER/C CR OIR PER/AB ER/B OIR PPRR/CI OIR PER/C ER/C CR OIR PER/B ER/B OIR SMEC PPRR/CI TES OIR SMEC PER/C TES ER/C TES CR EVALUATIOH OF EFFECT OF MATER-INVEHTORY IH GM EVALUATION OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IH GM EVALUATION OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IH GM EVALUATXOH OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IN GQ EVALUATIOH OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IH GM EVALUATION OF EFFECT OF MATER IHVEHTORY IH GQ EVALUATIOH OF EFFECT OF MATER INEHTORY IH GM LACK OF REFERENCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE EHVIRONMEHT LACK OF REFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENVIRONMENT LACK OF PEFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENIRONMEHT LACK OF REFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENIRONMEHT LACK OF REFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE EHVIROHMEHT LACK OF REFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENIRONMEHT LACK OF REFEREHCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE EWIROHMENT LACK OF REFERENCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENIROHMENT LACK OF REFERENCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE EHVIROHMEHT LACK OF REFERENCE MATERIAL TO EVALUATE ENIRONMENT AFM 4 CRVP EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAItIEHT AFM 1 CRVP EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE CONTAIHMEHT AFM i CRVP EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT AFQ 4 CRVP,EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT AFQ X CRVP EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAINMEHT AFM 4 CRVP EQUXPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT AFQ i CRVP EQUIPMEHT OUTSIDE COHTAI?IEHT AFM SYSTEM EGUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EQUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EQUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EGUIPMEHT.

AFM SYSTEM EQUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EGUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EQUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EGUIPMEHT AFM SYSTEM EQUIPMEHT S-R EQUIP+/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHTo S-R EQUIP+/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAINMEHTo S-R EQUIP,/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHT, S-R EQUIPS/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHTo S-R EQUIPS/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT+

S R EQUIP t/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE CONTAIHMEHT~

S-R EQUIP+/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSXDE CONTAIHMEHTo S-R EQUIP /FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAIHMEHTo S-R EQUIPS/FLOOD LEVELS OUTSIDE COHTAINMEHTo A-2

APPENDIX B PROGRAM MANAGER'S ASSESSMENT

e

APPENDIX B

PROGRAM MANAGER'S ASSESSMENT Independent review by TES of the tasks performed by SWEC to verify the envirormental parameters outside contairment was done in accordance with IDVP Phase II Program Management

Plan, dated June 18,

1982, and the Engineering Procedure EP-1-014.

The review included several visits to the site and to the SWEC offices for detailed discussion and review, with SWEC personnel, of the work performed by SWEC including the methodology used in the evaluati on of the enviroanental parameters outside containment, and criteria used with

-specific reference to the SWEC analysis, calculations, comparisons, etc.

The files issued by SWEC were thoroughly reviewed and specific recommendations were made to the IDVP Manager delineating appropriate r esoluti on.

As a result of the verification of the initial sampling selected by SWEC and the assessment of the impact of SWEC findings,

TES, as Program Manager, was of the opinion that the temperature and pressure environments outside containment for safety-related equipment required additional verification.

This additional verification is identified in ITR-34 and the results are reported in ITR-47.