ML16260A124

Revision 17 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Evaluation and Comparison to BTP Apcsb 9.5-1, Appendix A. Redacted Version

ML16260A124
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/29/2016
From:	NextEra Energy Seabrook
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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SBK-L-16048
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Text

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Revision 1 5

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page i A. INTRODUCTION A-1 B. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

1. General B-1 2. Design Features B-1 Table 1 Fire Detection and Suppression Methods by Fire Area & Zone B-5 Figure 1.2

-1 Station Layout Figure 9.5

-4 Fire Protection Yard Piping Figure 9.5-5 Fire Protection Fire Pump house Detail C. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS C-1 D. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND COMPARISON D-1 E. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

1. Methodology E-1 Figure I Fire Protection System Review Flow Diagram E-3 2. Review Assumptions E-4 3. Designation Of Fire Areas And Zones E-8 Table 1 Tab Index E-9 Table 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings E-10 F.

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS

1. Evaluation And Comparison Matrix F-1 2. Results Of Fire Hazard Analysis F-8 Containment Building (Tab 1) 9763-F-805051-FP 9763-F-805052-FP 9763-F-805053-FP Emergency Feedwater Pump Building (Tab 2) 9763-F-202065-FP Main Steam And Feedwater Pipe Enclosure (Tab 3) 9763-F-202063-FP 9763-F-202064-FP RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equipment Vault (Tab 4) 97 63-F-805060-FP 9763-F-805078-FP SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page ii Control Building (Tab 5) 9763-F-310431-FP 9763-F-310452-FP 9763-F-310455-FP 9763-F-310461-FP 9763-F-500090-FP Electrical Tunnels (Tab 6) 9763-F-310453-FP 9763-F-310454-FP 9763-F-310465-FP 9763-F-310466-FP 9763-F-3 10468-FP 9763-F-310469-FP Diesel Generator Building (Tab 7) 9763-F-202068-FP 9763-F-202069-FP Primary Auxiliary Building (Tab 8) 9763-F-805060-FP 9763-F-805061-FP 9763-F-805062-FP 9763-F-805063-FP Fuel Storage Building (Tab 9) 9763-F-805058-FP 9763-F-805059-FP 9763-F-805084-FP Waste Processing Building (Tab 10) 9763-F-805661-FP 9763-F-805882-FP Service Water Pump House (Tab 11) 9763-F-202476-FP 9763-F-202478-FP 9763-F-300245-FP Service Water Cooling Tower (Tab 12) 9763-F-805068-FP Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area (Tab 13) 9763-F-805051-FP 9763-F-805052-FP 9763-F-805053-FP 9763-F-805055-FP 9763-F-805056-FP 9763-F-805059-FP SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page iii Fire Pump House (Tab 14) 9763-F-300831-FP Turbine Building (Tab 1 5) 9763-F-202052-FP 9763-F-202053-FP 9763-F-202054-FP Mechanical Penetration (Tab 16) 9763-F-311429-FP Non-Essential Switchgear Room (Tab 17) 9763-F-310289-FP Condensate Storage Tank (Tab 18) 9763-F-310828-FP Make-Up Air East And West (Ta b 19) 9763-F-310248-FP Ductbanks (Tab 20) 9763-F-300245-FP 9763-F-310248-FP 9763-F-310249-FP 9763-F-310254-FP 9763-F-310828-FP 9763-F-320251-FP 9763-F-320252-FP 3. Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A F-14 A. Overall Requirements Of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program F-15 Personnel F-15 Design Bases F-17 Back-up F-17 Single Failure Criterion F-18 Fire Suppression System F-20 Fuel Storage Areas F-21 Fuel Loading F-21 Multiple-Reactor Sites F-22 Simultaneous Fir es F-22 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page iv B. Administrative Procedures, Controls And Fire Brigade F-23 Fire Protection System And Personnel Administrative Procedures F-23 Bulk Storage Of Combustible Materials F-24 Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or Other Anticipated Operations F-24 Public Fire Department Support F-26 Plant Fire Brigade Guidance F-26 Coordination With Local Fire Department F-28 NFPA Standards F-29 C. Quality Assurance Program F-30 Design Control And Procurement Document Control F-30 Instructions, Procedures And Drawings F-31 Control Of Purchased Material, Equipment And Services F-31 Inspection F-32 Test And Test Control F-32 Inspection, Test And Operating Status F-33 Non-Conforming Items F-33 Corrective Action F-3 4 Records F-34 Audits F-35 D. General Guidelines For Plant Protection F-36 Building Design

- Plant Layouts F-36 Building Design

- Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis F-37 Building Design

- Cable Spreading Room F-37 Building Design

- Non-Combustibility Requirements For Interior Construction F-38 Building Design

- Metal Deck Roof Construction F-39 Building Design

- Suspended Ceilings F-39 Building Design

- High Voltage, High Ampere Transformers F-40 Building Design

- Oil-Filled Transformers F-40 Building Design

- Floor Drains F-41 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page v Building Design

- Floors, Walls And Ceilings F-43 Control Of Combustibles F-44 Protection Of Safety

-Related Systems F-44 Bulk Gas Storage F-45 Use Of Plastic Materials F-48 Storage Of Flammable Liquids F-49 Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays And Cable Penetrations F-50 Cable Tray Construction F-50 Cable Spreading Rooms F-50 Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms F-51 Cable And Cable Tray Penetration Of Fire Barriers F-52 Fire Breaks F-52 Flame Test Of Electric Cables F-53 Corrosive Gases From Cables F-54 Content Of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit

, Trenches And Culverts F-54 Smoke Venting Of Cable Tunnels, Culverts And Spreading Rooms F-55 Control Room Cables F-55 Ventilation F-56 Discharge Of Products Of Combustion F-56 Evaluation Of Inadvertent Operation Or Single Failures F-57 Power Supply And Controls F-58 Protection Of Charcoal Filters F-59 Fresh Air Supply Intakes F-60 Stairwells F-60 Smoke And Heat Vents F-61 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus F-62 Total Flooding Gas Extinguishing Systems F-63 Lighting And Communication F-63 E. Fire Detection And Suppression F-66 Fire Detection F-66 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page vi Fire Protection Water Supply Systems F-67 Yard Fire Main Loop F-67 Multiple Units Fire Protection Water Supply Systems F-68 Fire Pump Installation F-69 Fire Water Supplies F-70 Fire Water Supply Design Bases F-71 Lakes Or Ponds As Sources F-72 Outside Hose Installations F-7 3 Water Sprinklers And Hose Standpipe Systems F-74 Sprinkler And Standpipe Layout F-74 Supervision Of Valves F-75 Automatic Sprinkler Systems F-75 Fire Protection Water Supply System F-76 Hose Nozzles F-78 Foam Suppression F-78 Halon Suppression Systems F-79 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems F-80 Portable Extinguishers F-81 F. Guidelines For Specific Plant Areas F-82 Primary And Secondary Containment - Normal Operation F-82 Primary And Secondary Containment

- Refueling And Maintenance F-84 Control Room F-85 Cable Spreading Room F-87 Plant Computer Room F-89 Switchgear Rooms F-90 Remote Safety

-Related Panels F-91 Station Battery Rooms F-92 Turbine Lubrication And Control Oil Storage And Use Areas F-93 Diesel Generator Areas F-94 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Table of Contents Rev. 12 Page vii Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas F-96 Safety-Related Pumps F-97 New Fuel Area F-98 Spent Fuel Pool Area F-99 Radwaste Building F-100 Decontamination Areas F-101 Safety-Related Water Tanks F-101 Cooling Towers F-102 Miscellaneous Areas F-102 G. Special Protection Guidelines F-103 Welding And Cutting Acetylene

- Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems F-103 Storage Areas For Dry Ion Exchange Resins F-104 Hazardous Chemicals F-104 Materials Containing Radioactivity F-105 H. Deviations from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Code/Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) Listing F-106 I. Fire Proofing For Structural Steel F-110 Table 1, Structural Steel Fire Proofing Analysis Chart F-111 APPENDICES A - Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis B - Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis C - Resumes D - Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Introduction Rev 6 Section A Page 1 On September 30, 1976, the NRC requested the Public Service Company of New Hampshire to conduct a re-evaluation of the fire protection program proposed for Seabrook Units 1 & 2, and to compare in detail the fire protection provisions proposed for Seabrook with the guidelines in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. The request also stated that the re-evaluation would require the preparation of a fire hazards analysis, with assistance and technical direction from a qualified fire protection engineer.

The above request resulted in a report which incl uded an evaluation and fire hazards analysis originally performed by United Engineers and C onstructors under the direction of UE&C's Mr. Alfred S. Bocchino, P. E. Mr. Bocchino's resume is included in Appendix C of this report. The operational aspects of the re-evaluation were conducted by a Yankee Atomic Electric Company task force under the direction of Mr. E. A. Sawyer, whose resume is also included in Appendix C.

The above evaluation of the fire protection provisions was based on the guidelines contained in Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 (plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit) and fully addressed

the issues, criteria and concerns presented by the NRC. The major changes incorporated in the above evaluation included: 1. Various changes resulting from the review and evaluation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. 2. Incorporation of Safety Evaluation Report (SER) commitments.

In the course of the above evaluation, the concep t of "defense-in-depth" was applied and fire protection was treated from this viewpoint. Simply stated, this concept is: 1. Preventing fires from starting; S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Introduction Rev 6 Section A Page 2 2. Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and 3. Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed. When this report is updated, the philosophy of the methodology remains unchanged. The following discussion describes the philosophy of the above report and any subsequent updates.

Plant design was reviewed and design provisions we re included to provide protection of essential plant safety systems by physical barriers or spatial separation. Combustibles were identified and minimized as much as is practicable. Additiona lly, provisions were included for early detection of possible fires, with primary systems and back-up fire fighting systems available in the safety-related plant areas. The plant was designed to be constructed of non-combustible materials, where practical. The fire protection systems described in this report are those required for protection of structures, systems and components required fo r safe reactor shutdown and safety-related systems. Other fire protection systems not descri bed in this report are available for protection of non-safety-related structures, systems and components.

For prompt extinguishing of the fires associated with major electrical cables, efficient use of water is made from fixed systems spraying directly on the fires, as well as manual application with fire hoses.

A description of the fire protection system is provided in Section B. Included are pertinent general arrangement and P&ID system drawings, and a plot plan, as well as a tabulation of suppression and detection means by area and zone.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Introduction Rev 6 Section A Page 3 A brief discussion on safe shutdown systems and pr ocedures is presented in the Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR, Appendix R) Report. The criteria used in the evaluation program are pr esented in Section D of the report, and include the applicable general design criteria as well as criteria for single failure, defense-in-depth, fire suppression systems capacity and capability, and o ccurrence of fire coincident with other accidents, events or phenomena.

The method of review and analysis is described in Section E of the report.

The basis for the fire hazards analysis is de fined and the scope of the evaluation, including assumptions and design basis fire conditions, is pr ovided. Designation of fi re areas and zones is also discussed here.

The summary of the results of the evaluation program is set forth in Section F of the report. Subsection F.l presents a brief tabular summary indicating compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance with the BTP positions and page number of the partial compliance and non-compliance items. The bulk of the report is contained in Subsection F.2 which comprises the detailed analyses of the consequences of a fire in each of the designated fire areas/zones, as well as selected general arrangement drawings of the plant areas housing the safety-related equipment and equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant, with the designated fire areas/zones and ingress/egress routes from these areas 5 superimposed. Section F.3 presents the detailed responses to each of the positions of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. This review indicates criteria that are satisfied, partially satisfied and those not satisfied, with an

explanation in each instance.

This report is applicable only to Unit 1. The c onstruction to Unit 2 has been halted and the fire protection program evaluation for Unit 2 has been deleted from this report.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 1 1. General The plant fire protection system is a non-safety-related system designed to detect, control and extinguish potential fires, and to minimize their effect.

The relative location of the various plant build ings is shown on the station layout drawing, UFSAR Figure 1.2-1, sh. 1. The fire protection yard piping system is depicted on UFSAR Figure 9.5-4 and the fire pump house fire protection piping system is depicted on UFSAR Figure 9.5-5.

Fire detection is provided at locations determined by the fire hazard analysis as having significant fire hazards resulting from the presence of combustible liquids, solids or other flammable materials. Detection is also provided in other areas on a case basis. Fire protection system piping and components in the area of safety-related systems required for safe shutdown of the plant are designed so th at neither piping failure, seismic event, nor inadvertent operation of the system components, could result in the loss of safety related systems. 2. Design Features

a. Water Supply and Pumping Arrangements The water supply for the plant fire protection system is obtained from two (2) 500,000-gallon water storage tanks. 300,000 gallons of water from each tank is dedicated for fire protection; the remainder is available for other plant use. During the winter months, the fire protection water is heated to prevent freezing.

Two (2) diesel-driven and one (1) electric motor-driven fire pumps are provided to guarantee an uninterru pted supply of water. Two (2) diesel-driven or one (1) diesel-driven and one (1) electric motor-driven fire pumps have the capacity to serve the maximum predicted demand for a safety related area suppression purposes, plus 500 gpm for hose streams through the yard hydrants or standpipe hose reels. (Reference Deviation No. 9, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986). Deviation No. 9 of SBN-932 indicated that the largest demand safety related area was the Diesel Generator Room. Per EC274103, it has since been determined that the largest demand safety related area is the PAB. Electric motor-driven jockey pumps normally will maintain system pressure.

A diesel fuel storage tank is provided for each diesel engine to supply fuel for a minimum of eight (8) hours.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 2 A flow meter is included with the pump installation for the purpose of testing pump performance. Piping is so arranged that any or all fire pumps can take suction from either water storage tank. The buildings within the protected area are encircled by a 12" underground cement-lined, welded steel pipe fire loop to supply yard fire hydrants and the various fire protection systems in the plant.

Post indicator isolation valves are provided at strategic locations in the underground loop header to allow for sectionalization during maintenance and repair, and to provide flow from the pumping facilities in either of two different directions in the event of a line break. Po st indicator valves are also positioned in the loop header to isolate the loop between the take-offs for primary suppression and secondary systems. Fire hydrants, spaced approximately 250 feet apart and having individual isolation valves, are provided on branches off the underground loop. Hose houses and associated equipment are located at alternate hydrants. b. Stand-Pipe System Wet and dry standpipe systems are installed in the various buildings of the plant, including stair towers and other points of normally accessible areas. Dry standpipes are installed in the containment. Wet sta ndpipes are installed in the control building, primary auxiliary building, fuel storage building, equipment vault, emergency feedwater pump buildi ng, diesel generator building and waste processing building. Wet standpipes are also installed in the administration building and turbine building. Hose stat ions are strategically located throughout the buildings. Hose stations are located in each building or section of building, such that all portions of each elevation of the build ing are adequately covered. c. Sprinkler and Spray Systems Wet pipe automatic sprinkler systems are installed in the administration and

service building, turbin e building, guardhouse, c hlorination building, fire pump house, Alternate RP Checkpoint and Mech anical Maintenance Storage Facility.

Pre-action sprinkler systems are installed in the electrical tunnels from control building to containment, including penetrations, from the control building to primary auxiliary building (PAB), El. 25'-0" and the electrical chase of the PAB, the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks, fuel oil piping in floor trenches in the diesel generator building, diesel generator engine rooms, the PAB (component cooling area), Turbine Generator bearings and oil piping (bearings to guard pipe).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 3 The following equipment are provided with deluge systems: Oil - filled Transformers Lube Oil Storage Tanks Lube Oil Conditioning Equipment Hydraulic Oil Pumping Unit

Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Oil Day Tanks in the Diesel Generator Building Cable Spreading Room Turbine Feedpump Lube Oil Conditioning Equipment Waste Process Bldg. Equipment (Asphalt Metering Pump; Extr./Evap.; Turn Table Area; Full Drum Conveyor) An Automatic fixed Halon 1301 fire suppression systems is provided for the main computer room adjacent to the main control room. Fire barrier walls are provided between the main unit, start-up and station service transformers to limit the spread of fire from one transformer to another. The turbine building wall adjacent to the transformers is also a fire barrier wall. d. Fire Detection and Alarm Thermal, ultraviolet, smoke (i.e. photoelect ric and ionization) and beam type fire detectors are located throughout the plant, as requ ired by the fire hazard analysis. All fire detectors provide alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Carbon monoxide detectors have been installed at certain charcoal filters. See Table 1 for fire detection and suppression methods employed in the various safe ty-related fire areas and zones.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 4 e. Miscellaneous Fire Protection Portable hand-held extinguishers, primarily dry chemical, C0 2 , Halon 1211 and water are provided at stra tegic locations throughout th e various buildings to provide protection against small local fire hazards. Note: The term Halon or Halon 1211 is used to identify any of a family of Halon fire extinguishing gases: Halon 1211 or any of the Halon 1211 replacement gases such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFC's), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) or blended agents such as Halotron.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 5 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 1. CONTAINMENT C-F-l-Z Containment Floor Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke C-F-2-Z Containment Floor Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke C-F-3-Z Containment Floor CAH-F-8 Port. Exting. Port. Exting.

Hose Station

Hose Station None Temp Elements

& Carbon Monoxide Detection in

Filter 2. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING EFP-F-l-A Feedwater Pump Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke 3. MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPE CHASE MS-F-lA-Z Lower Level Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-lB-Z Lower Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke MS-F-2A-Z Upper Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam MS-F-2B-Z Upper Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam MS-F-3A-Z Electrical Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-3B-Z Personnel Hatch Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-4A-Z H 2 Analyzer Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-5A-Z Cable Tunnel Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 6 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 4. RHR. S.I. EQUIPMENT VAULT RHR-F-1A-Z Containment Spray 9B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1B-Z Containment Spray 9A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1C-Z RHR Pump 8B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1D-Z RHR Pump 8A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-2A-Z Safety Injection Pump 6B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-2B-Z Safety Injection Pump 6A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-3A-Z RHR Ht. Exch. 9B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-3B-Z RHR Ht. Exch. 9A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-4A-Z Stairway & Manlift Area -

South Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-4B-Z Stairway & Hatch Area -

North Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 7 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION

5. CONTROL BUILDING CB-F-1A-A Switchgear Room "A" (Includes MG Set Rod Drive Rooms) Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-lB-A Switchgear Room "B" Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1D-A Battery Room A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1E-A Battery Room C Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1F-A Battery Room B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1G-A Battery Room D Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-2A-A Cable Spreading Room Auto. Deluge Port. Exting Smoke CB-F-2B-A Mechanical Rm. North Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-2C-A Mechanical Rm. South Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-3A-A Control Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke & Thermal CB-F-3A-A Computer Engineer's Work Space Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-3B-A HVAC Eqpt. & Duct Rm. Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-3B-A Emerg. Clean-Up Air Unit - CBA-F-38, -8038 Port. Exting.

Hose Station Carbon Monoxide Detect Monitored Temp.

Indication CB-F-3C-A Computer Room Fixed Halon1301 System Port. Exting. Smoke CB-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None CB-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 8 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION

6. ELECTRICAL TUNNELS ET-F-1A-A Upper Electrical Tunnel Train "A" Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke ET-F-1B-A Electrical Tunnel Train "A" Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke ET-F-1C-A Lower Electrical Tunnel Train "B" Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke ET-F-1D-A Electrical Tunnel, Train "B" Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke ET-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 9 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION

7. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING DG-F-1A-A Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area - North Auto. Preaction Port. Exting. Smoke & Thermal DG-F-1B-A Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area - South Auto. Preaction Port. Exting. Smoke & Thermal DG-F-2A-A Engine Room North Auto Preaction (on Oil Piping)

Manual Preaction (area wide for room) Port. Exting. Thermal Smoke Ultraviolet DG-F-2B-A Engine Room South Auto Preaction(on Oil Piping) Manual Preaction(area

wide for room) Port. Exting. Thermal Smoke Ultraviolet DG-F-3A-Z HVAC Equipment Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke DG-F-3B-Z HVAC Equipment Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke DG-F-3C-A Fuel Oil Day Tank Area Auto. Deluge Port. Exting. Smoke & Thermal DG-F-3D-A Fuel Oil Day Tank Area Auto. Deluge Port. Exting. Smoke & Thermal DG-F-3E-A Train A, DG Air Intake Area Port. Exting. Hose Station None DG-F-3F-A Train A, DG Air Intake Area Port. Exting. Hose Station None DG-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None DG-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 10 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 8. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING PAB-F-1A-Z Chiller Pump Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1B-Z Demin. Filter & Vlv.

Maintenance Area Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-1C-A Charging Pmp-2A Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1D-A Charging Pmp-2B Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1E-A Reciprocating Charging Pump Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1F-Z Letdown Degasifier Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1G-A Electrical Chase Pre-Action Dry Pipe Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1J-Z Aux. Steam Cond. Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1K-Z RCA Walkway and Non-Rad. Pipe Tunnel Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-2A-Z Resin Fill Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-2B-Z Boric Acid Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-2C-Z Primary Component Cooling Pump Area Pre-Action Dry Pipe Port. Exting. Smoke PAB-F-3A-Z Water Cooler Heat Exch.

Area CAP-F-40 Port. Exting.

Port. Exting.

Hose Station Hose Station Smoke Temp Elements

& Carbon Monoxide Detection in

Filter PAB-F-3B-Z PAB Supply & Exhaust Fan Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 11 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION PAB-F-4-Z Filter Area PAH-F-16 Port. Exting. Port. Exting.

Hose Station Hose Station Smoke Temp Elements

& Carbon Monoxide Detection in

Filter PAB-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None 9. FUEL STORAGE BUILDING FSB-F-lA-A Elev. 7'-0", l0'-0", 21'-6", 25'-0",64'-0", 84'-0",

FAH-F-41,74 Port. Exting. Port. Exting.

Hose Station Hose Station Smoke Temp Elements

& Carbon Monoxide Detect. in Filters 10. WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING W-F-1A-Z Truck Bay & Drum Storage Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke W-F-1B-Z Decontamination Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke W-F-2A-Z Extruder/Evap. Area Deluge System Hose Station Smoke & Thermal W-F-2B-Z Crystallizer Pump Rm. Port. Exting. Hose Station None W-F-2C-Z Asphalt Meter Pump Room Deluge System Hose Station Smoke & Thermal W-F-2D-Z Turntable & Drum Conv. Areas Deluge System Hose Station Smoke & Thermal W-F-2E-Z Waste Solidification Control Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke TF-F-1-0 Tank Farm (RWST) Port. Exting. Standpipe/ Hose Reel None S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 12 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 11. SERVICE WATER PUMP HOUSE SW-F-1A-Z Circulating Pump Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None SW-F-1B-A Electrical Control Room "A" Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-1C-A Electrical Control Room "B" Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-1D-A Fan Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-1E-Z Service Water Pump Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-2-0 Service Water Intake & Discharge Structure Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None

12. SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER CT-F-1C-A Switchgear Room #3 Unit

1. 1 Train "B" Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke CT-F-1D-A Switchgear Room Unit #1 Train "A" Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke CT-F-2B-A Ventilation & Mech. Room for Unit #1 Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke CT-F-3-0 Top of Cooling Twr. Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None 13. CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE VENTILATION AREA AND CONTAINMENT ANNULUS CE-F-l-Z Cont. Encl. Ventil.

EAH-F-9, -69 Port. Exting. Port. Exting.

Hose Station

Hose Station Smoke Temp Elements

& Carbon Monoxide Detect. in Filter S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 13 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 14. FIRE PUMP HOUSE FPH-F-1A-A Diesel Pump Rm.-West Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal FPH-F-1B-A Electric Pump Room Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Smoke FPH-F-1C-A Diesel Pump Rm.-East Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal

15. TURBINE BUILDING TB-F-1A-Z Ground Floor Auto Sprinkler Hose Station None TB-F-1B-A Battery Room Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke TB-F-1C-Z Relay Room Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke TB-F-2-Z Mezzanine Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. None TB-F-3-Z Start-Up & Turbine Erector's Office Electronic Work Area SAS Computer Room Port. Exting

Port Exiting Hose Station

Hose Station Smoke Smoke 16. MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA PP-F-1A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-2A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-1B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-2B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-3A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-3B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-4B-Z Non-Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-5B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection System Description Rev. 13 Section B Page 14 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME Primary Secondary DETECTION 17. NON-ESSENTIAL SWITCHGEAR ROOM NES-F-1A-Z Non-Essential Swgr. Port. Exting Yard Hydrant Smoke 18. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK CST-F-1-0 Cond. Stor. Tank Port. Exting Yard Hydrant None

19. MAKE-UP AIR MUA-F-1-0 Make-Up Air East Port. Exting Yard Hydrant None

20. DUCTBANKS DCT-F-1A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-1B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-2A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-2B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-3B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-4A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-4B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-5A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-5B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A NOTE: This listing does not include the Administration Building, part of Turbine Building, Chlorination Building, RCA Storage Facility, Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility, Supplemental Emergency Power System and Guard House which do not contain safety-related equipment.

SEABROOK STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (APPENDIX A) Station Layout Rev. 15 Figure 1.2-1 Sh 1 of 2 SEABROOK STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (APPENDIX A) Station Layout Rev. 15 Figure 1.2-1 Sh 2 of 2 Fire Protection Yard Piping S EABROOK S TATION UPDATED F INAL SAFETY ANALYSIS R EPORT Figure 9.5-4 See PID-1-FP-B20274

Fire Protection Fire Pumphouse Detail S EABROOK S TATION UPDATED F INAL SAFETY ANALYSIS R EPORT Figure 9.5-5 See PID-1-FP-B20266

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Safe Shutdown Systems Rev 6 Section C Page 1 For details relating to safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown capability, refer to the Seabrook Station report, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)", latest revision.

Section F.2, Tabs 1 through 17, contain tables labeled "Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone" (Item 12.0.) These tables denote the safety related equipment and systems in each plant Fire Area/Zone.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Rev 8 Section D Page 1 The criteria listed below served as the basis for the overall evaluation and comparison of the fire protection system against the guidel ines of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A:

1. Safe shutdown analyses for the areas listed in this report have been superseded by analyses included in the "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R" report. Operation of the Fire Protection system for safe shutdown scenarios, as described in paragraph 3.2.2.3 of the Appendix R report, supersedes the BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A exclusivity usage requirement. 2. For the purposes of this fire hazard an alysis evaluation, a cons ervative approach was utilized in determining what could be found in any specific fire area or zone. This especially holds true in the electrical design area where the following conservative criteria were applied: a. Use of cable with low auto-ignition temperature of 750 F. b. Use of cable trays 40% filled for control, instrumentation and low voltage medium power, or a spaced single layer for high voltage power and low voltage power cables. c. Use of average size cables for cab le tray loading and fire loading. d. Interlocked armored cable will be used for all 15 kV cables and all 5 kV cables, except the condensate and start-up feed pumps, which are routed in duct and conduit runs and the Supplemental Emergency Power System feeders which are routed in dedicated metal raceways.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Rev 8 Section D Page 2 3. The fire hazard analysis and evaluation was generally limited to those systems required to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. According to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, safety-related systems and components are systems and components required to shutdown the reactor, mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents or maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. 4. A single failure of an active component in a fire detection or fire support system will not impair both primary and backup pl ant fire protection capability.

5. Fire barriers between redundant cable separation groups and/or automatic sprinkler systems for cable raceway systems were used as a primary protection means from

common mode failure by fire. The cabling raceway design meets the spatial separation requirements of Attachment "C," Physical Independence of Electric Systems, to the AEC letter dated Dec. 14, 1973, a fo rerunner of Regulatory Guide 1.75 (hereinafter referred to as Attachment "C"). Fire stop locations in vertical cable tray runs were selected on the bases of limiting materially 1) the spread of fire via a vertical cable tray run and 2) the resultant damage due to a fire in a vertical cable tray run. The following guidelines were employed: a) Horizontal offsets >1 foot were considered to end vertical cable tray runs. b) Fire stops were not installed where cable tray fire suppression was present regardless of vertical run.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Rev 8 Section D Page 3 c) In vertical cable tray runs >25 feet, fire stops were placed to limit the spread of fire to not more than 35 feet. In fact more than two thirds of the vertical runs between fire stops are approximately 25 feet or less. The remaining vertical runs between fire stops vary from about 28 feet to about 35 feet. Where practical in vertical cable tray runs greater than 25 feet, fire stop locations were adjusted to floor elevations. 6. The majority of the cable used meet the fire test requirements of IEEE-383-1974 with the exception noted in Section F-3. 7. For each area containing significant fire hazard material, fire protection in the form of appropriate fire detec tion has been provided. 8. In areas where the fire haza rd analysis indicates that a credible fi re, should it occur, would adversely affect a safety-related or safe shutdown function, automatic fire suppression capability is provided. 9. Although the fire hazard analysis has indicated that no fire hazard exists, detectors and automatic suppression have b een provided in electrical t unnels, chases and the cable spreading room. Also, in other selected electrical areas as shown by Table 1 (Section B), appropriate fire detec tion has been provided. 10. Fire is not considered to occur simultaneous ly with other accidents, events or phenomena such as a design-basis accident. Capability is provided to safely shut down the plant in the event of any single fire.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Rev 8 Section D Page 4 11. The fires postulated in this fire hazard analysis and evaluation are presented in Subsection F.2, Results of Fire Hazard Analysis. The heat of combustion values used are as follows: Combustible Heat of Combustion Auto - ignition Temperature Oil (any type) 150,000 BTU/gal 300°F Grease 18,000 BTU/lb. 800°F Class A (paper, wood) 8,000 BTU/lb. 800°F Electrical cables 10,500 BTU/lb. 750°F

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 1 1. Methodology The organization of the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, A ppendix A, is broken down into overall fire protection requirem ents, general guidelines for both building design and specific systems, specific requireme nts for fire protecti on and suppression and general guidelines for specific plant areas. Fo r the purpose of review, this fire hazards analysis and evaluation is sub-divided into two major areas in accordance with the above requirements, as follows: o General fire protection review (f ire hazard analysis and evaluation) o Specific subject review These two areas of review are detailed in the following paragraphs:

a. General Fire Protection Review The purpose of this review is to evaluate the fire hazards associated with the plant, the capability to achieve safe reactor plant shutdown and to prevent a single fire from adversely affecting a safety function.

Figure depicts the flow path used for comple ting this analysis. As can be seen, this was basically accomplished on an area by area and system by system approach.

b. Specific Subject Review Once the general review was completed, it was further necessary to review the specific requirements for those system s described in the Branch Technical Position, as well as review the guide lines for specific plant areas.

Figure also shows the flow path of this review.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 2 Note that this review is repeated for each individual plant area requirement. In addition, there is an inter-relationship between these flow paths, such that upon completion of the overall plant review, sp ecific and feasible solutions are derived that may or may not completely comply with the guideline s of APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. The results of these reviews are contained in this report. A summary of these results are found in Subsection F.1, Evaluation and Comparison Matrix. The specific subjects under review are enumerated as follows: o Plant Area Requirements o Fire Detection o Fire Suppression (including water supply system)

o Electrical o Ventilation o Lighting and Communications o Construction (fire walls, etc.)

Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A Section E Analysis Procedure Page 3 Figure I S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 4 2. Review Assumptions The assumptions listed below were utilized during this review.

a. Fire areas were established based on plant design and floor levels, and designated as that portion of a building separated from ot her areas by barriers (walls, floors and ceilings) having designated fi re ratings of one, one and one-half, or three-hour, as required by the fire hazard analyses. Fire areas, in some cases, were further sub-divided into fire zones for purpos es of fire protection evaluation.

b. Credit was taken for spatial separation of combustibles within a given area such that the "maximum credible fire" was established as the postulated fire in each zone. This postulated fire may consist of multiple fires within a given area only if such fires

could credibly spread with no suppression.

c. While fire barrier walls may have fire resistance capability in excess of that required for fire protection (because of shielding or structural requirements), the penetrations are designed for the fire resistance rati ng designated for the fire barrier.

d. For purposes of this report, outside walls and ceilings of the top floors were not considered as requiring a fire rating.

e. It is assumed that a postulated fire cannot exist if only electrical cables are involved. The material selection and construction of the electrical cable insulation meet IEEE 383-1974 (except as noted in Section F-3).

In addition, electri cal faults will be mitigated by selective tripping of breakers or blowing of fuses.

f. The cable construction and insulation material of the safety related and non-safety related cables meet the requirements of I EEE 383-1974. This will certify the cable's non-propagational and fire re sistance capabilities.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 5 However, it is noted that the cable will burn when subjected to external flame or high temperature (greater than 750°F). Therefore, if a design basis fire is determined to be hot enough and burn long enough, cabling in the immediate vicinity is assumed to burn, incapacitating the system the cabling serves and forming another heat source that is analyzed for addi tional fire possibilities.

(1) The additional heat source is considered as part of the original postulated fire.

(2) To become an additional heat source, the cab le is considered to auto-ignite at an ambient temperature of approximately 750°F when heat of the original postulated fire is applied for five (5) minutes or longer.

(3) Once auto-ignition has taken place, the enti re stack of cable trays is considered to be involved in the fire.

(4) It is assumed that any cabling system enclosed in conduit, which also passes through a postulated fire ar ea, would not provide additional combustibility to the postulated fire. The cabling is assumed to fa il as the heat of the fire destroys the insulation, however, the fire and damage is contained within the conduit. The heat contributed is considered insignificant.

g. Electric motors are not considered as combustibles due to their metal enclosures, and do not add to the intensity of the original postulated fire. They could, however, be damaged by a postulated fire if situated in the cone of fire influence.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 6 h. It was assumed that electrical equipment such as switchgear, unit substations, motor control centers, etc., do not contribute to a fire due to their metal enclosure. Electrical equipment, however, could be damaged by a fire. Electrical equipment specifications required that organic insulating materials used in the equipment construction be qualified as being self-exti nguishing and non-propagating when exposed to fire and flame. It was also assumed that miscellaneous combustible materials mounted on the electrical equipment, such as operating coils, relays, control switches, etc., are of such small quantities that the heat released is insignificant.

i. In many cases small quantities of grease are contained in valves, motors, fans and pumps. Since these small quantities are contained within a packing gland or a bearing, it is not considered as contributing to a fire.

j. Air cleaning units, which contain roughing filters, HEPA filters and charcoal filters, are contained in heavy metal casings and are not considered in the fire hazard analysis for total Fire Loading in the Fire Area and the total combustibles. However, an individual Fire Hazard Analysis wa s conducted on CAH-F-8, CAP-F-40, EAH-F-9, 69, FAH-F-4l, 74 and PAH-F-l6, to be used for the Appendix "R" to 10CFR50 Safe Shutdown Study. See Appendix "D" for analysis. All filter units have early Fire Warning Detection Systems, i.e., Carbon Monoxide detectors and temperature elements within the filter units.

k. Pipe and its insulation are not combustible a nd are not considered in the fire hazard analysis, however, if the pipe is in the cone of fire influence and the temperature of the fire is greater than 2000°F. for a duration greater than ten (10) minutes, the pipe is considered to rupture, incapacitating the system that it is a part of.

l. Bare structural steel is not combustible but tends to degrade structurally when an ambient temperature of greater than 1100°F. is maintained for longer than ten (10) minutes. Fireproof-coated steel maintains its integrity for at le ast three (3) hours.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 7 m. The fire hazard analysis of each fi re area/zone is conducted as follows:

1. The original postulated fire is a fire that starts through the ignition of combustibles and covers a certain floor area. The effects of this fire forms a vertical shaft of fire influence over th e fire which extends to the ceiling. For Class "A" fires, the temperature of the vertical shaft is assumed constant

throughout its entire height, and is determ ined with the use of the NFPA heat potential and time/temperature curves or w ith the use of other published literature on the subject.

2. Effects of the postulated fire on cabling with in 3'-O" of the shaf t are re-evaluated if the temperature or duration of the fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumptions of the cabling. A time/temperature value is determined by forming a cone of influence over the fire covering an area 20 degrees from the vertical edge of the fire, with the fire acting as a flat tened vortex of the cone. The new time/temperature value is determined by dividing the BTU value of the original fire by the area of the cone at the intersection of the combustible and the cone. If the temperature and duration of the re-evaluated fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumptions of cabling, then the BTU contents of the cabling are added to the original BTU value, and a s econdary fire is postulated. The secondary fire has a time duration equal to that of the postu lated fire, and its fire loading is determined by dividing the total BTU value by the area of the entire zone. If the temperature and duration of this secondary fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumption of cabling, then the remainder of the cabling in the fire area-zone auto-ignites and also burns.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 8 n. Bulk storage of combustible materials, includ ing spare parts, adjacent to or in safety-related buildings during operation, maintenan ce or refueling periods is controlled by administrative procedures.

3. Designation of Fire Area and Zones As part of the fire hazard analysis effort, applicable plan t general arrangement drawings were modified by superimposing on them the perimeters of fire areas and zones. Heavy solid lines were used to denote 3-hour minimum fire-rated walls, thin slanted lines were used to show 1- 1/2 hour fire-rated walls, hea vy dashed lines were used to identify fire zone boundaries, heavy slanted lines were empl oyed to define outside walls of buildings, and arrows were used to indica te the route to a fire exit.

Designations assigned to the various fire areas and zones denote the name of the building or structure, the floor level and whether the location is an area or zone. As an example, C-F-1-Z = Containment, Fire Analysis, Floor level 1 and Fire Zone. Another example, CB-F-1A-A = Control Building, Fire Analysis , Fire Subdivision A of Floor Level 1 and Fire Area. The Containment was treated as a single fire area comprised of a number of fire zones. Some other designation such as PAB-F-S1-0, Primary Auxiliary Building, Fire Analysis; stairwell has been assigned for convenience. This Suffix "0" designated area may or may not have fire rated boundaries.

A listing of the various fire areas and zones which were subjected to the fire hazards analysis, together with their app licable drawings, is presented in TABLE 2. Abbreviations for the various buildings, structur es and locations used in the fire area and zone designations are tabulated below:

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 9 TABLE 1 - Tab Index Tab. Abbreviation Name of Building/Structure 1 C Containment 2 EFP Emergency Feedwater Pump Building 3 MS Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Enclosure 4 RHR RHR, S.I., Equipment Vault 5 CB Control Building 6 ET Electrical Tunnels 7 DG Diesel Generator Building 8 PAB Primary Auxiliary Building 9 FSB Fuel Storage Building 10 W Waste Processing Building 10 TF Tank Farm 11 SW Service Water Pump House 12 CT Service Water Cooling Tower 13 CE Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area 14 FPH Fire Pump House 15 TB Turbine Building 16 PP Mechanical Penetration Area 17 NES Non-Essential Switchgear Room 18 CST Condensate Storage Tank 19 MUA Make up Air Intakes - East & West 20 DCT Ductbanks S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 10 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Containment Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805051-FP Containment Structure Plan El. (-) 26'-0" - Gen. Arrg't.

C-F-1-Z 805052-FP Containment Structure Plan El. 0'-0" - Gen. Arrg't.

C-F-2-Z 1 805053-FP Containment Structure Plan El. 25'-0" - Gen. Arrg't.

C-F-3-Z Emergency Feedwater Pump Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 2 202065-FP Emergency Feedwater Pump Building Plan & Sections, Gen.

Arrg't. EFP-F-l-A Main Steam and Feedwater Pump Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202063-FP Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase - Plan General Arrg't MS-F-1A-Z, MS-F-1B-Z, MS-F-2A-Z, MS-F-2B-Z, MS-F-3A-Z, MS-F-3B-Z, MS-F-4A-Z, MS-F-5A-Z, EFF- 1A-A 3 202064-FP Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Enclosure - Sections General

Arrg't MS-F-1A-Z, MS-F-1B-Z, MS-F-2A-Z, MS-F-2B-Z, MS-F-3A-Z, MS-F-4A-Z S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 11 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation RHR Containment Spray Vault. SI Equipment Vault Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805060-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I.

Equip. Vault - General RHR-F-lA-Z, RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, RHR-F-3A-Z, RHR-F-3B-Z, RHR-F-4A-Z, RHR-F-4B-Z 4 805078-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I.

Equip. Vault - General Arrg't

- Sections RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, RHR-F-3A-Z, RHR-F-3B-Z, RHR-F-4A-Z Control Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310431-FP Control Building El. 21'-6" Electrical General Arrg't CB-F-lA-A, CB-F-1B-A, CB-F-S1-0, CB-F-S2-0, CB-F-1D-A, CB-F-1E-A, CB-F-1F-A,CB-F-1G-A 310452-FP Control Building El. 50'-0" Cable Tray Layout - Plan CB-F-2A-A, CB-F-2B-A, CB-F-2C-A, 3l0455-FP Control Building El. 21'-6" Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 1 CB-F-lA-A, 310461-FP Control Building El . 50'-0" Cable Tray Layout - Sections

Sheet 1 CB-F-2A-A, CB-F-2B-A 5 500090-FP Control Building Control Room Arrg't Plan at El.75'-0" CB-F-3A-A, CB-F-3B-A, CB-F-3C-A S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 12 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Electrical Tunnels Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310453-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Plan ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A, ET-F-S1-0 310454- FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Plan ET-F-1C-A, ET-F-1D-A 310465-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections

Sheet 1 ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A 310466-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections

Sheet 2 ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A 310468-FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections

Sheet 1 ET-F-1C-A, ET-F-1D-A 6 310469-FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections

Sheet 2 ET-F-1D-A Diesel Generator Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202068 -FP Diesel Generator Building

-Plan & Sections - Below Grade General Arrangement DC-F-1A-A, DG-F-1B-A, DG-F-S1-0, DG-F-S2-0 7 202069-FP Diesel Generator Building -Plan Above Grade

- General Arrangement DC-F-2A-A, DG-F-2B-A, DC-F-3A-Z, DC-F

-3B-Z, DC-F-3C-A, DC-F-3D-A, DC-P-3E-A, DG-F-3F-A S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 13 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Primary Auxiliary Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805061-FP Primary Auxiliary Building - Plans at El. 7'-0" and Below - General Arrangement PAB-P-1A-Z, PAB-F-1B-Z, PAB-F-1C-A, PAB-F-1D-A, PAB-F-1E-A, PAB-F-1F-Z, PAB-P-1G-A, PAB-F-1J-A, PAB-F-1K-Z 805062-FP Primary Auxiliary Building Plans at El. 25-0"

-General Arrangement PAB-F-2A-Z, PAB-F-2B-Z, PAB-F-2C-Z, PAB-F-1G-A, PAB-F-1K-Z 8 805063-FP Primary Auxiliary Building

-Plans at El. 53'-0" & 8l'-0" General Arrangement PAB-F-3A-Z, PAB-F-3B-Z, PAB-F-4A-Z, PAB-F-1K-Z, PAB-F-S1-0, PAB-F-S2-0 805060-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I.

Equip. Vault - General PAB-F-1G-A Fuel Storage Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805058-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at El. 7'- 0" 10'-0"

-General Arrangement FSB-F-1-A 805059-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at El. 21'-6" & 25'-0" -General Arrangement FSB-F-1-A 9 805084-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at. El. 64'-0" & 84'-0"

-General Arrangement FSB-F-1-A S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 14 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Waste Processing Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805661-FP Waste Processing Building- Plan at El. 25'-0"

-General Arrangement W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1lB-Z, TF-F-1-0 10 805882-FP Waste Processing Building

-Plan & Sections El. 42'-5" & 65'-0" - General Arrangement W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z, W-F-2D-Z, W-F-2E-Z Service Water Pump House Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202476-FP Service & Circ. Water Pump House - Plan & Section - General Arrangement SW-F-1A-Z, SW-F-1B-A, SW-P-1C-A, SW-F-1D-A, SW-F-1E-Z 202478-FP Service & Circ. Water Pump House - Sections - General Arrangement SW-F-1A-Z, SW-F-1B-A, SW-F-1D-A 11 300245-FP Underground Duct Plan - Circ. & Service Water Area SW-F-2-0 Service Water Cooling Tower Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 12 805068- FP Service Water Cooling Tower - General Arrangement CT-F-1C-A, CT-F-1D-A, CT-F-2B-A, CT-F-3-0 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 15 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805059-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at El. 21'-6" & 25'-0" General Arrangement CE-F-l-Z 805053-FP Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 25'-0" General Arrangement CE-F-l-Z 805052-FP Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 0'-0" General Arrangement CE-F-l-Z 805051-FP Containment Structure Plan at Elev. (-)26'-0" General Arrangement CE-F-l-Z 805056-FP Containment Structure Elev.

"D-D", "E-E", "F-F" General Arrangement CE-F-l-Z 13 805055-FP Containment Structure Plan at Elev. (-)44'-9" CE-F-l-Z Fire Pump House Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 14 300831-FP Fire Pump House Tray Plan and Grounding FPH-F-1A-A, FPH-F-1B-A, FPH-F-1C-A S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 16 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Turbine Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202052-FP Turbine Building Plan Ground Floor, Elevation 2l'-0", General Arrangement TB-F-1A-Z, TB-F-1B-A, TB-F-1C-Z 202053-FP Turbine Bldg Plan, Mezzanine Floor, Elevation 46'-0" and 50'

-0", General Arrangement TB-F-2-Z 15 202054-FP Turbine Building Plan - Operating Floor, Elevation 75' -

0", General Arrangement TB-F-3-Z Mechanical Penetration Area Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 16 3l1429-FP Main Steam Tunnel-West Lighting Plan-Lower Levels PP-F-lA-Z, PP-F-2A-Z, PP-F-1B-Z, PP-F-2B-Z, PP-P-3A-Z, PP-F-3B-Z, PP-F-4B-Z, PP-F-5B-Z Non Essential Switchgear Room Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 17 310289- FP Non Essential Swgr. Room Electrical General Arrangement

and Grounding NES-F-1A-Z Condensate Storage Tank Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 18 310828-FP Condensate & Demineralized Water Stor. Tks. Conduit, Ltg.

& Ground. Plan CST-F-1-0 Make-Up Air, East and West Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 19 310248-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center MUA-F-1-0 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Analysis Procedure Rev 6 Section E Page 17 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawin gs Fire Area or Zone Designation Duct Banks Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 32025l-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center DCT-F-5A-0 DCT-F-5B-0 310254-FP Underground Duct &

Grounding, Misc. Area Plans, Details & Elevations DCT-F-7-0 310248-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center DCT-F-4A-0, DCT-F-lB-0, DCT-F-5A-0, DCT-F-4B-0, DCT-F-7-0, DCT-F-1A-0, DCT-F-3B-0 310249-FP Underground Duct Plan - South DCT-F-1A-0, DCT-F-2B-0, DCT-F-lB-0, DCT-F-2A-0 300245- FP Underground Duct Plan - Circ. & Service Water Area DCT-F-6-0 320252-PP Underground Duct Pl an - South DCT-F-2A-0 DCT-F-2B-0 20 310828 -FP Condensate & Demineralized Water Storage Tanks Conduit, Lighting & Grounding Plan DCT-F-7-0 NOTE: Refer to controlled equipment drawings for most up to date equipment locations S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Summary of Findings Rev 6 Section F Page 1 This section summarizes the results of the fire analysis performed on Seabrook Station. The information is presented under the following major headings: F.1 Evaluation and Comparison Matrix F.2 Results of Fire Hazard Analysis F.3 Responses to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A:

o Overall requirements of Nuclear plant fire protection program o Administrative procedures, controls and fire brigade o Quality assurance program o General guidelines for plant protection

o Fire detection and suppression o Guidelines for specific plant areas o Special protection guidelines

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 1 F.1 EVALUATION AND COMPARISON MATRIX The Evaluation and Comparison Matrix, Table 3, correlates the requirements of each position of the BTP with each fire area/zone, and summarizes the areas of compliance, basic compliance and non-compliance with APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 2 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program 1. Personnel X F.3-15 2. Design Bases X F.3-17 3. Back-up X F.3-17 4. Single Failure Criterion X F.3-18 5. Fire Suppression Systems X F.3-20 6. Fuel Storage Areas X F.3-21 7. Fuel Loading X F.3-21 8. Multiple-Reactor Sites X F.3-22 9. Simultaneous Fires X F.3-22 B. Administrative Procedures Controls and Fire Brigade 1. Fire Protection System and Personnel Administrative Procedures X F.3-23 2. Bulk Storage of Combustible Materials X F.3-24 3. Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or Other Anticipated Operations X F.3-24 4. Public Fire Department Support X F.3-26 5. Plant Fire Brigade Guidance X F.3-26 6. Coordination With Local Fire Department X F.3-28 7. NFPA Standards X F.3-29 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 3 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion C. Quality Assurance Program 1. Design Control and Procurement Document Control X F.3-30 2. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings X F.3-31 3. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services X F.3-31 4. Inspection X F.3-32 5. Test and Test Control X F.3-32 6. Inspection, Test and Operating Status X F.3-33 7. Non-Conforming Items X F.3-33 8. Corrective Action X F.3-34 9. Records X F.3-34 10. Audits X F.3-35 D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection Building Design (a) Plant Layouts X F.3-36 (b) Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis X F.3-37 (c) Cable Spreading Rooms X F.3-37 (d) Non-Combustibility Requirements for Interior Construction X F.3-38 (e) Metal Deck Roof Construction X F.3-39 (f) Suspended Ceilings X F.3-39 (g) High Voltage, High Ampere Transformers X F.3-40 (h) Oil-Filled Transformers X F.3-40 (i) Floor Drains X F.3-41

1. (j) Floors, Walls and Ceilings X F.3-43 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 4 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection (Continued) Control of Combustibles (a) Protection of Safety-Related Systems X F.3-44 (1) Diesel generator fuel oil day tank X F.3-44 (2) Turbine - generator oil and hydraulic control systems X F.3-44 (3) Reactor coolant pump lube oil System X F.3-45 (b) Bulk Gas Storage X F.3-45 (c) Use of Plastic Materials X F.3-48

2. (d) Storage of Flammable Liquids X F.3-49 Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a) Cable Tray Construction X F.3-50 (b) Cable Spreading Rooms X F.3-50 (c) Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms X F.3-51 (d) Cable and Cable Tray Penetrations of Fire Barriers X F.3-52 (e) Fire Breaks X F.3-52 (f) Flame Test of Electric Cables X F.3-53 (g) Corrosive Gases from Cables X F.3-54 (h) Content of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit, Trenches and Culverts X F.3-54 (i) Smoke Venting of Cable Tunnels, Culverts and Spreading Rooms X F.3-55

3. (j) Control Room Cables X F.3-55 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 5 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection (Continued) Ventilation (a) Discharge of Products of Combustion X F.3-56 (b) Evaluation of Inadvertent Operation or Single Failures X F.3-57 (c) Power Supply and Controls X F.3-58 (d) Protection of Charcoal Filters X F.3-59 (e) Fresh Air Supply Intakes X F.3-60 (f) Stairwells X F.3-60 (g) Smoke and Heat Vents X F.3-61 (h) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus X F.3-62

4. (i) Total Flooding Gas Extinguishing Systems X F.3-63 Lighting and Communications (a) Fixed Emergency Lighting X F.3-63 (b) Portable Lights X F.3-63 (c) Fixed Emergency Communication X F.3-63

5. (d) Portable Radio Communication X F.3-63 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 6 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion E. Fire Detection & Suppression Fire Detection (a) Conformance to NFPA 72D X F.3-66 (b) Alarm and Annunciation X F.3-66 (c) Distinctive and Unique Fire Alarms X F.3-66

1. (d) Connection to Emergency Power Supply X F.3-66 Fire Protection Water Supply System (a) Yard Fire Main Loop X F.3-67 (b) Multiple Units Fire Protection Water Supply Systems X F.3-68 (c) Fire Pump Installation X F.3-69 (d) Fire Water Supplies X F.3-70 (e) Fire Water Supply Design Bases X F.3-71 (f) Lakes or Ponds as Sources NA F.3-72

2. (g) Outside Hose Installations X F.3-73 Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems (a) Sprinkler and Standpipe Layout X F.3-74 (b) Supervision of Valves X F.3-75 (c) Automatic Sprinkler Systems X F.3-75 (d) Fire Protection Water Supply System X F.3-76 (e) Hose Nozzles X F.3-78 3. (f) Foam Suppression NA F.3-78 4. Halon Suppression Systems X F.3-79 5. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems NA F.3-80 6. Portable Extinguishers X F.3-81 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Rev. 12 Section F.1 Page 7 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Comply With Partially Comply With Do Not Comply With See Following Pages For Discussion F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas Primary and Secondary Containment (a) Normal Operation X F.3-82

1. (b) Refueling and Maintenance X F.3-84 2. Control Room X F.3-85 3. Cable Spreading Room X F.3-87 4. Plant Computer Room X F.3-89 5. Switchgear Rooms X F.3-90 6. Remote Safety-Related Panels X F.3-91 7. Station Battery Rooms X F.3-92 8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas X F.3-93 9. Diesel Generator Areas X F.3-94 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas X F.3-96 11. Safety-Related Pumps X F.3-97 12. New Fuel Area X F.3-98 13. Spent Fuel Pool Area X F.3-99 14. Radwaste Building X F.3-100

15. Decontamination Areas X F.3-101 16. Safety-Related Water Tanks X F.3-101 17. Cooling Towers X F.3-102 18. Miscellaneous Areas X F.3-102 G. Special Protection Guidelines 1. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene - Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems X F.3-103 2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins X F.3-104 3. Hazardous Chemicals X F.3-104 4. Materials Containing Radioactivity X F.3-105 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 8 F.2 RESULTS OF FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS This section presents the detailed results of an analysis of the consequences of a fire in each designated fire area and zone. These details are presented on standardized "Fire Hazard Analysis" forms which consolidate all desired information for each designated area and zone. Information provided includes, as applicable to a particular fire area or zone, the type of construction, combustibles, fire protection/detection, safety-related systems

• and description of equipment within the area, radioactivity within th e area, consequences of a fire with and without suppression, consequences of inadvertent operation or rupture of fire protection equipment, means for containing and inhibiti ng fires, and protection of redundant equipment within the fire area. The fire load within the total fire area or zone can be found on line 13.2 of the form; the worst fire load within the floor area covered by the com bustibles is found on line 14.1. For-areas which do not include any safety-related system components, analyses were still made to determine if the effects of a fire within such areas could jeopardize adjacent areas containing safety-related systems. Table 4 identifies by tab the various fire areas and zones located in each building. Abbreviations of equipment and system used in the fire hazard analysis are as follows: Abbreviation System ASH Auxiliary Steam Heating CAH Containment Air Handling CAP Containment Air Purge CBA Control Building Air Handling CBS Containment Building Spray CC Component Cooling Water - Primary CL Chlorination COP Containment on-line Purge CP Rod Control and Position CS Chemical and Volume Control DAH Diesel Generator Air Handling DF Drains - Floor DG Diesel Generator System

• See page C-1 for the criterion used for "safe shutdown.

"

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 9 Abbreviation System DM Demineralized Water EAH Containment Enclosure Air Handling ED Electrical Distribution EDE Electrical Distribution - Emergency FO Fuel Oil FP Fire Protection FPA Fire Pumphouse Air Handling FW Feed Water or Emergency Feedwater HWS Heating Water System IA Instrument Air MS Main Steam NG Nitrogen Gas NI Nuclear Instrumentation PAH PAB Air Handling PW Potable Water RC Reactor Coolant RH Residual Heat Removal RM. Radiation Monitor RPI Rod Position Indicator SB Steam Generator Blowdown SI Safety Injection SS Sampling System SW Service Water WLD Nuclear Equipment/Floor Drains S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 10 The details on the specific areas and zones anal yzed are found behind the tabs listed below:

Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab 1. Containment Bldg.

C-F-1-Z C-F-2-Z C-F-3-Z 1. 2. Emergency Feedwater Pump Building EFP-F-1-A

2. 3. Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Enclosure MS-F-1A-Z MS-F-1B-Z

MS-F-2A-Z MS-F-2B-Z

MS-F-3A-Z MS-F-3B-Z

MS-F-4A-Z MS-F-5A-Z 3. 4. RHR Containment Spray, SI Equipment Vault RHR-F-1A-Z RHR-F-1B-Z RHR-F-1C-Z RHR-F-1D-Z RHR-F-2A-Z RHR-F-2B-Z RHR-F-3A-Z RHR-F-3B-Z RHR-F-4A-Z RHR-F-4B-Z

4. 5. Control Building CB-F-1A-A CB-F-1B-A

CB-F-1D-A CB-F-1E-A CB-F-1F-A

CB-F-1G-A

CB-F-2A-A

CB-F-2B-A

CB-F-2C-A CB-F-3A-A CB-F-3B-A

CB-F-3C-A

5.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 11 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab 6. Electrical Tunnels CB-F-S1-0 CB-F-S2-0 ET-F-1A-A

ET-F-1B-A ET-F-1C-A ET-F-1D-A

ET-F-S1-0

6. 7. Diesel Generator Building DG-F-1A-A DG-F-1B-A

DG-F-2A-A

DG-F-2B-A DG-F-3C-A DG-F-3D-A

DG-F-3E-A

DG-F-3F-A

DG-F-S1-0

DG-F-S2-0 DG-F-3A-Z

DG-F-3B-Z

7. 8. Primary Auxiliary Building PAB-F-1C-A PAB-F-1D-A

PAB-F-1E-A

PAB-F-1G-A

PAB-F-S1-0

PAB-F-S2-0 PAB-F-1A-Z PAB-F-1B-Z PAB-F-1F-Z PAB-F-2A-Z PAB-F-2B-Z PAB-F-2C-Z PAB-F-3A-Z PAB-F-3B-Z PAB-F-4-Z

PAB-F-1J-Z PAB-F-1K-Z

8. 9. Fuel Storage Building FSB-F-1-A

9.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 12 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab 10. Waste Processing Building W-F-1A-Z W-F-1B-Z TF-F-1-0 W-F-2A-Z W-F-2B-Z W-F-2C-Z W-F-2D-Z W-F-2E-Z 10. 11. Service Water Pump House SW-F-1B-A SW-F-1C-A

SW-F-1D-A SW-F-2-0 SW-F-1A-Z SW-F-1E-Z

11. 12. Service Water Cooling Tower CT-F-1C-A CT-F-1D-A

CT-F-2B-A

CT-F-3-0 12. 13. Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area CE-F-1-Z 13. 14. Fire Pump House FPH-F-1A-A FPH-F-1B-A FPH-F-1C-A

14. 15. Turbine Building TB-F-1B-A TB-F-1A-Z TB-F-1C-Z TB-F-2-Z TB-F-E-Z 15. 16. Mechanical Penetration Area PP-F-1A-Z PP-F-2A-Z PP-F-1B-Z PP-F-2B-Z

PP-F-3A-Z

PP-F-3B-Z

PP-F-4B-Z

PP-F-5B-Z

16. 17. Non-Essential Switch-Gear Room NES-F-1A-Z

17. 18. Condensate Storage Tank CST-F-1-0

18. 19. Make-Up Air, East MUA-F-1-0

19.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Rev 6 Section F.2 Page 13 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab 20. Ductbanks DCT-F-1A-0 DCT-F-1B-0 DCT-F-2A-0

DCT-F-2B-0 DCT-F-3B-0 DCT-F-4A-0

DCT-F-4B-0

DCT-F-5A-0

DCT-F-5B-0

DCT-F-6-0

DCT-F-7-0

20.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis C-F-1-Z

1.0 Building

Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-1-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor

2.2 Location

El. (-) 26'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805051-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate

- 3.4 Doors None - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter140' -0" Height 26' 5.0 Volume 400,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear

7.0 Exhaust

Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity No Exhaust 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel (isolated in modes 1-4) 10.3 Detection Ionization

• 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 This zone will be affected by a fire in the zone above (C-F-2-Z) due to the deck grating at the 0' -0" level, therefore s ee zone C-F-2-Z for effects of the design basis fire.

• Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Nuclear Instrumentation

& Cabling NI X X X Piping, Valves, Equipment & Cabling RC X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling SI X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling CS X X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling CAH X X Piping, Instrumentation

& Cabling CBS X X X Piping, Valves, Motors

& Cabling CC X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling COP X X Penetrations, Equipment

& Cabling EDE X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling NG X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling VG X X Piping Valves & Cabling WLD X X Pressurizer Heaters RC X X Cabling CGC X X Instrumentation &

Cabling RM X X Cabling ED X Cabling IA X Cabling SA X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Incore Instrumentation &

Cabling IC X X X Instrumentation &

Cabling FW X X X Instrument Racks MM X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling RH X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis C-F-2-Z

1.0 Building

Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-2-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor

2.2 Location

El 0'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805052-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate

- 3.4 Doors None - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter140' -0" Height 25' 5.0 Volume 385,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear

7.0 Exhaust

Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity No Exhaust 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel (isolated in modes 1-4) 10.3 Detection Ionization

• 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued Pg. 2 & 3)

• Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Rc Pumps RC X Steam Generators RC X Piping, Valves, Fans &

Cabling CAH X X X Piping, Valves, Instruments & Cabling FW X X X Piping, Valves, Instruments & Cabling CC X X X Cabling CBS X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling CAP X X Penetrations EDE X X Cabling CS X X Instrument Racks MM X X X Instruments & Cabling RC X X X Radiation Monitors &

Cabling RM X X X Piping Valves & Cabling SI X X X Cabling NI X Distr Pnl & Cabling ED X Dryer, Contractor &

Cabling IA X X Compressor, Control Pnl

& Cabling SA X X Cabling CGC X X Contm. Coolers CAH X Contm. Coolers CAH X Piping, Valves &

Cabling SB X X Incore Instruments &

Cabling IC X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 3 of 3 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: 1060 (4 Pumps)

Gallons 2580 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

2580 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

39,750,000 Btu 14.0 Design Basis Fire Description See Appendix B of this report.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z

1.0 Building

Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-3-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor

2.2 Location

El. 25'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805053-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr 3.4 Doors * - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter140' -0" Height 164' -0"25'

5.0 Volume

2,165,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear

7.0 Exhaust

Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity None - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detection for CAH-F-8

• • 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Personnel & Equipment Hatches

• • Charcoal loading for CAH-F-8 is 1300 lb. Charcoal. Charcoal fire loading was not considered in total area. See appendix D.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z Rev 6 Sec F.2 Tab 01 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Radiation Element.

Monitors & Cabling RM X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling RC X X X Dampers, Motors &

Cabling CAH X X X Piping, Valves, Recombiners & Cabling CGC X X X Penetrations MM X X Containment Structure Plan at Elev.(-)26'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805051-FP

Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 0'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805052-FP

Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805053-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 2 Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A 1.0 Building Emergency Feedwater Pump Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone EFP-F-1-A 2.1 Area Name Pump Area 2.2 Location El. 27'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202065-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. (Stairwell) 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 2,400Sq. Ft.Length79' Width VariesHeight 18' 5.0 Volume 43,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Supply Fan7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued page 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 2 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Emergency Feed Pump (M) FW X X Emergency Feed Pump (T) FW X X X Flow Transmitters FW X X X Cabling FW X X X Fan FN-47 A & B EPA X X X Damper DP-371, 373 EPA X X Damper DP-372, 374 EPA X X Temperature Switches EPA X X X Instrument Racks IR-49, 50 MM X X X Piping And Valves FW X X X Cabling EPA X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6 Gallons 375 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 32 Pounds 173 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

548 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

1,316,000 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 2 Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Turbine ruptures, oil spills spreading over 78 sq. Ft. Of floor. Oil film is 1/8" thick and burn rate is 5" per hour. 2. Oil ignites and is consumed. 3. One ventilation supply fan (14,000 cfm) is assumed to fail 30 seconds after fire starts. 4. A fire which considers oil to be sprayed over a large area will have the same total heat release but the heat will not be concentrated to a small area. 5. A fire which considers oil to spill over a small area will be more concentrated.

6. The DBF over the small area as postulated is considered to be the most serious as it will damage electrical cables in the immediate area. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,500Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 601 F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Turbine is lost. 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished by use of startup feed pump. For further discussion, refer to the report on "Fire Protection Of Safe Shutdown Capability" (10 CFR 50, Appendix R). 16.0 Consequence of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the turbine due to loss of oil. 17.0 Consequence of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water fire suppression in area).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 2 Page 4 of 4 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 A) Short fire duration. B) Concrete structure. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area is Protected 19.1 Spatial separation between pumps. 19.2 Curb around the turbine base to contain an oil spill.

Emergency Feedwater Pump Building Plan & Sections General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202065-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Lower Level 2.2 Location East El. 3'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, -202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside/- 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /- 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 1220 Sq. Ft.Length74.75'Width 16.25'Height 25' 5.0 Volume 20.740 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Piping, Valves &

Cabling MS X X X Piping, Valves, Instrumentation &

Cabling FW X X X Cabling EAH X X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X

Piping, Valves &

Cabling MSD X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Lower Level 2.2 Location El. 3'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202064-FP, -202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. /- East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 935 Sq. Ft.Length74' Width 14' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 15,900 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2 of 3 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Piping and Valves SB X X X Instrument Rack -

IR-52A, 52B MM X X X Piping, Valves &

Cabling MS X X X Cabling SB X X X Piping, Valves, Instrumentation &

Cabling FW X X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X Piping Valves & Cabling MSD X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1 Gallons 160 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 11 Pounds 153 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 313Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 293,000Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. One of the four (4) steam recirculating pump ruptures, one quart oil spills on floor covering an area of 3 ft. x 4 ft. = 12 sq. Ft. 2. To add conservatism, the oil contents of all four (4) pumps is considered to be spilled on floor (total 1.0 gallon) and burn completely. 3. The ventilating supply fan failed.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 3 of 3 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 125,000Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 712 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2Min. 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the steam recirculation and layup pumps due to loss of oil. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Not applicable (no water fire suppression in area). 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area). 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Short fire duration, less than five minutes. 18.2 Concrete structure.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 The redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in a separate fire area.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Upper Level 2.2 Location East El. 27'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, - 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr/- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 1,220 Sq. Ft.Length74.75'Width 16.25'Height 40' 5.0 Volume 48,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Supply System Only 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Beam 10.4 Other -------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Piping and Valves MS X X X Cabling MS X X X

Piping, Valves &

Cabling AS X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 30 Pounds 320 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 320 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 390,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism, the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward. 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self-sustaining, although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate. 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 10 ft. x 2 ft. = 20 ft.

2. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 19,500Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 152 F 14.3 Duration of Fire >>5Minutes S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station fire protection of safe shutdown capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences . . . Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines or portable extinguishers. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of The Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in The Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How The Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in The Same Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to safe shutdown requirements Table 3.2.7.58 of the report Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdow n Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Upper Level 2.2 Location El. 27'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202064-FP, - 202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr./- West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -/3 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 935 Sq. Ft.Length66.75'Width 14' Height 40' 5.0 Volume 37.400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Beam 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPiping and Valves MS X X X X Cabling MS X X X X Cabling SB X X X X

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Electrical Room 2.2 Location South End of East - MS&FEW - El. 3'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, - 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth 14'-0"Height 17'-6" 5.0 Volume 5145 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related MSIV-Logic Cab.

CP-182 MS X X MSIV-Logic Cab.

CP-184 MS X X Cabling MS X X X Press. Transmitters &

Cabling FW X X X Instrument Racks

IR-51A, 51B MM X X X Control Panels Transf. &

Cabling HT X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Rev. 13 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name Personnel Hatch Area 2.2 Location Northeast of West MS&FEW - N1 12' -0" & 21' -0"Drawing No 9761-F-202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside/- 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./

• 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 1,656 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth VariesHeight Varies 5.0 Volume 40,392 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System

---

7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity ----

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer To Page 2. (Analysis continued pages 2 & 3).

• Personnel Hatch S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Rev. 13 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Cabling MS X X Cabling SB X X Cabling FW X X Cabling AS X X Cabling MSD X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 161 Pounds 1264 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

1264 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

2,093,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism, the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward. 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self-sustaining, although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate. 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 40 ft. x 2 ft. = 80 ft.

2.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Rev. 13 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 3 of 3 Note: Fiberglass ladders previously stored in MS-F-3B-Z were removed per EC 156668, but retained in this fire hazard analysis to support future ladder storage in this fire zone. The plastic components typically contained in the permanent storage area located in this fire zone for a Radiation Protection workstation are not considered to contribute to the design basis fire. Refer to Calc MS-MISC-41 for details and additional discussion.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 18,038 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 219 F 14.3 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines or portable extinguishers. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in The Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How The Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in The Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Safe Shutdown Requirements Table 3.2.7.59 of the report Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdow n Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z 1.0 Building Mainstream & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-4A-Z 2.1 Area Name H 2 Analyzer Room 2.2 Location South End of East MS & FEW - El. 22'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP & 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth 14'-0"Height 16'-0" 5.0 Volume 4,704 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Fan FN-174A & B EAH X X X Cabling EAH X X X

H 2 Analyzer Pnl &

Cabling CGC X X X Temperature Sws EAH X X X

Control Panels, Transf.

Heaters & Cabling HT X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-5A-Z 2.1 Area Name Cable Tunnel 2.2 Location Northwest of East MS & FWE - El. 8'-2" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete - West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside/Partial 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal - /3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 485 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth VariesHeight 12' 5.0 Volume 5,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System

---

7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity -----

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other None 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 3 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownCabling MS X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X

Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase Plan General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202063-FP

Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Enclosure Sections General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202064-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Spray Pump - 9b 2.2 Location Southwest El. (-) 61'-0" to 25' -6"Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside/3 Hr. East Concrete/Open - West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 250 Sq. Ft.Length18' Width 14' Height 84' 5.0 Volume 21,200 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Cont. Spray Pump P-9B CBS X X Instruments & Cabling RH X X

Piping, Valves &

Cabling CBS X X Piping, Valves and

Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.0 Gallons 3000 Btu/Sq. Ft. 7.25Gallons (other zones) Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 5 Pounds 260 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 3,260 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 815,000 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) Fire zones RHR-F-1AZ, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z constitute on large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors, therefore, heat of fire will be disbursed to all 4 zones. (b) Containment spray pump ruptures and oil spills on floor covering an area of 5 ft. x 13 ft. = 65 sq. ft.. (c) The entire 5 gallons of oil in this z one will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic suppression system, entire

oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-2A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as D. B. combustibles). 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 41/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and loss of cabling in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system "A" Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Spray Pump - 9A 2.2 Location Northwest El. (-) 61'-0" to 25' -6"Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside/3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete/Open - West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 250 Sq. Ft.Length18' Width 14' Height 84' 5.0 Volume 21,200 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100 % - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No

9.0 Operational

Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2 of 3.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Cont. Spray Pump P-9A CBS X X Cabling RH X X

Piping, Valves &

Cabling CBS X X Piping, Valves and

Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.0 Gallons 3,000 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 5 Pounds 260 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 3,260 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 815,000 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire zones RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z and RHR-F-3B-Z constitute one fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors. Therefore, heat of the fire will be disbursed to all four zones. (B) Containment spray pump ruptures and oil spills on floor covering an area of 5 ft. x 13 ft. = 65 sq. ft. (C) The entire 5 gallons of oil will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic suppression system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1D-Z and RHR-F-2B-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as D.B. combustibles). 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and loss of cabling in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system "B" Train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, and RHR-F-3B-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1C-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Pump - 8B 2.2 Location South Side - El. (-) 61'-0"Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length20' Width 18' Height 8.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related RHR Pump P-8B RH X X Piping & Valves RH X X Piping & Valves CC X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.75Gallons 729 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 5 Pounds 181 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 910 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 327,500 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1C-Z, 2A-Z, 3A-Z and 1A-Z Constitute One Large Fire Area As They Contain Open Floor Hatches and Doors. (B) RH pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 24 sq. ft. (C) 1.75 gallons oil ignites and is consumed. In addition, because of high temp. remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-2A-Z AND RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as total D.B. combustibles). 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system "A" Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z and RHR-F-3A-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1D-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Pump - 8A 2.2 Location North Side - El. (-) 61'-0"Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length20' Width 18' Height 8.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related RHR Pump P-8A RH X X Piping & Valves RH X X Piping & Valves CC X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.75Gallons 729 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 5 Pounds 181 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 910 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 327,500 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1D-Z, 2B-Z, 3B-Z and 1B-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors. (B) RH pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 24 sq. ft. (C) 1.75 gallons oil ignites and is consumed. In addition, because of high temp. remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-2B-Z AND RHR-F-1B-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons) with 1,875,000 Btu as D.B. combustibles. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system "a" train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z and RHR-F-3B-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Safety Injection Pump - 6B 2.2 Location South Side - El. (-) 50'-0" Train B Vault (Vault #2) Drawing No 9763-P-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete/Open 3 Hr. West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length201' Width 181' Height 15.66' 5.0 Volume 5,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2 (analysis continued Pages 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownSI Pump P-6B SI X X Piping RC X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X Piping & Valves CS X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire (In Situ) 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.5 Gallons 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 825,000 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1C-Z, 2A-Z, 3A-Z and 1A-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors. (B) Safety injection pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 72 sq. ft. (C) The entire 5.5 gallons of oil in this zone will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875 Btu as D.B. combustibles). 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system "A" Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Safety Injection Pump - 6A 2.2 Location North Side - El. (-) 50'-0" Train A Vault (Vault #1)Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete/Open 3 Hr. West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length20' Width 18' Height 15.66' 5.0 Volume 5.600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownSI Pump P-6A SI X X Piping RC X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X Piping & Valves CS X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.5 Gallons 2.292Btu/Sq.

Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 825,000 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1D-Z, 2B-Z, 3B-Z and 1B-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors. (B) Safety injection pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 72 sq. ft.. (C) The entire 5.5 gallons of oil in this zone will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons oil with 1,875,000 Btu total D.B. combustibles). 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor. 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system "B" Train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist). 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train "A" and Train "B" equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered. 19.0 How is the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Heat Exchanger - 9B 2.2 Location South Side El. (-) 31'-10" Train B Vault (Vault #2)Drawing No 9763-F-805060, 805078 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/Open - 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length20' Width 18' Height 55' 5.0 Volume 19,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPiping and Valves RH X X X Piping and Valves CC X X X RHR Heat Exchanger 9B RH X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab4 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Heat Exchanger - 9A 2.2 Location North Side El. (-) 31'-10" Train A Vault (Vault #1)Drawing No 9763-F-805060, 805078 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 1 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/Open - 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./- 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft.Length20' Width 18' Height 55' 5.0 Volume 19,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab4 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPiping and Valve RH X X X Piping and Valve CC X X X RHR Heat Exchanger 9A RH X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-4A-Z 2.1 Area Name Stairway & Manlift Area 2.2 Location South, El. (-) 61'-0" Up to El. 30' -8" Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP & 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. / 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 234 Sq. Ft.Length18' Width 13' Height 91' 5.0 Volume 21,290 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to pages 3 & 4 (Analysis Continued)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPiping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Cabling CS X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X Local Remote Shutdown Panel RH X X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustibles in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: 0.79gallons 118,800 Btu Grease: Pounds Wood 142.5 Pounds 1,140,480 " Charcoal: Pounds Chemicals: Pounds Plastics: 7.5 Pounds 114,796 " Resins: Pounds Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 1,374,076 Btu 14.0 Design Basis Fire Description (a) Oil leaks from both RHR manlift gearboxes onto top of lift cage. (b) Fire starts and burns wood/oil and subsequently plastic of manlift. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 340 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 38.2 Minutes S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as 15.1, above. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (No water suppression in area). 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. Early detection from smoke detectors with alarm to control room.

18.2 Fire Brigade hose stream use will reduce fire duration.

18.3 Fire barriers, doors and dampers will limit fire damage to the zone. 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Protected 19.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-4B-Z 2.1 Area Name Stairway & Hatch Area 2.2 Location North El. (-) 61'-0" Up to El. 30' -8" Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. / 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 234 Sq. Ft.Length18' Width 13' Height 91' 5.0 Volume 21,290 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPiping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CC X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Local Remote Shutdown Panel RH X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 0.79Gallons 118,800 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Wood 142.5 Pounds 1,140,480 Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 7.5 Pounds 114,796 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 1,374,076 Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 4 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) Oil leaks from both RHR manlift gearboxes onto top of liftcage (b) Fire starts and burns wood/oil and subsequently plastic of manlift. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 340 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 38.2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as 15.1, above. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (No water suppression in area). 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. Early detection from smoke detectors with alarm to control room.

18.2 Fire Brigade hose stream use will reduce fire duration.

18.3 Fire barriers, doors and dampers will limit fire damage to the zone. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. Equipment Vault General Arrangement Plans S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805060-FP

RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. Equipment Vault General Arrangement Sections S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805078-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room

" A" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP, 310455

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr.

• South MCG/Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West MCG/Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 2,450 Sq. Ft. Length 58' Width 42' Height 27.5' 5.0 Volume 67,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Switchgear Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 4 (analysis continued pages 2

- 5)

• Door C-100 is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. Ref. Deviation No. 5, Sbn

-904 Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B 4Kv-SWGR-E5 EDE X X 480v-Subst. E51, E52, E53 EDE X X 460v-MCC-E512, E515, E521, E522, E531, 231 EDE X X 120v-AC Distr Pnls EDE X X 125v-DC SWGR 11A, 11C EDE X X 125v-DC Distr Pnls EDE X X Battery Chargers BC

-1A, BC - 1C EDE X X Remote Shutdown Panel CP-108A MM X X Emerg. Pwr. Sequen.

CP-79 DG X X UPS I-1A, I-1C, I-1E EDE X X Cabling & Controls CAH X Cabling & Controls CBA X X Cabling & Controls CC X X Cabling & Controls CS X X Cabling DAH X X X Cabling DG X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling EAH X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling SWA X X X 125v-DC-SWGR 11A EDE X X X Cabling & Controls SWA X X Cabling CAP X X Instruments & Cabling CBS X X Cabling & Controls CGC X X Cabling COP X X Cabling CP X X Cabling FAH X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 4 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling MSD X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RM X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X Cabling & Controls SF X X Cabling SS X X Cabling & Controls SW X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling SA X 460v-MCC-111, 231 ED X X Cabling CAH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 58 Pounds 308 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other:

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1A-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 5 of 5 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

308 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

754,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.

2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.

3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 10 ft. x 2 ft. = 20 ft.

2. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 37,700 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 150 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

>>5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown I Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences - Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability

(10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room

" B" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North MCG/Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside Wall/3 Hr.

East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.(Stairs)

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 2,450 Sq. Ft. Length 58' Width 42' Height 27.5' 5.0 Volume 67,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Switchgear Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 4

S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B 4kv-Swgr-E6 EDE X X 480v-Subst. E61, E62, E63 EDE X X 460v-MCC-E612, E615, E621, E622, E631 EDE X X 120v-Ac Distr Pnls EDE X X 125v-DC Swgr 11B, 11D EDE X X 125v-DC Distr Pnls EDE X X Battery Chargers BC

-1B, BC - 1D EDE X X Remote Shutdown Panel CP-108b EDE X X Emerg. Pwr. Sequen.

CP-80 EDE X X UPS I-1B, I-1D, I-1F EDE X X Cabling & Controls CAH X Cabling & Controls CBA X X Cabling & Controls CC X X Cabling & Controls CS X X 125-DC-SWGR 11B EDE X X X 125v-DC-SWG 11D EDE X X X 120v-AC V Distr. 11F EDE X X X 125v-DC Distr. 112B EDE X X X 125v-DC Distr.111D EDE X X X 480-120v Xfmr 31F EDE X X X Aux Relay Panel GN 0 EDE X X X UPS I-1F EDE X X X S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery Charger BC

-1B EDE X X X Battery Charger BC

-1D EDE X X X Fuse Box CP

-228 EDE X X X Instrumentation & Cabling CBS X X Cabling & Controls CGC X X Cabling COP X X Cabling CP X X Cabling PAH X X Cabling MSD X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RW X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X Cabling & Controls SF X X Cabling SS X X Cabling & Controls SW X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling SA X Msiv, Logic Cabinets

CP-183, CP-185 MS X X Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Cabling CAH X X S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 4 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 58 Pounds 308 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

308 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

754,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.

2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.

3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 10 ft. x 2 ft. = 20 ft.

2. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 37,700 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 150 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

>>5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown I Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences ... Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable

S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 5 of 5 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning detectors alarm in the Control Room and alert the Fire Brigade:

18.2 Fire would be limited to general ladder area and the fire extinguished using hose lines and portable extinguishers.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability

(10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room

" A" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 151' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery A EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.

(b) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned. (c) Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Temperature 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.

18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1E-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1E-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1E-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room

" C" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 15' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1E-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery C EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.

(B) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned. © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1E-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicabl e 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.

18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1F-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1F-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1F-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room

" B" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 300 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 15' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1F-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery B EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.

(b) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned. © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1F-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.

18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1G-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1G-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1G-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room

" D" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 151' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1G-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery D EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.

(B) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned. © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-1G-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.

18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2A-A Rev. 8 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2A-A 2.1 Area Name Cable Spreading Room

2.2 Location

El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP, 310461

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside Wall South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside Wall East Concrete Outside Wall West Metal 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. (Stairs)/

3 Hrs. Others

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 9,200 Sq. Ft. Length 107' Width 86' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 211,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Cable Spreading Room Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2A-A Rev. 8 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling CS X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling EAH X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling DG X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling CAH X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SF X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2A-A Rev. 8 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling SS X X X Cabling VG X X X Cabling WLD X X X Cabling IA X X Cabling SA X X Cabling AS X X X Cabling IC X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Mechanical Room

- North 2.2 Location El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP, 310461

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside Wall South Metal 3 Hr. East Metal 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 43' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 25,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Uses air from diesel generator building

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fan-FN-19 CBA X X Fan-FN-21A CBA X X Damper DP-21A CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X Fan-FN-20 CBA X X Dampers DP

-24A, 24B, 24C CBA X X Cabling EDE X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2C-A Rev .6 Table 5 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2C-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2C-A 2.1 Area Name Mechanical Room

- South 2.2 Location El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Metal 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside Wall East Metal 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 43' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 25,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Uses air from diesel generator building

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-2C-A Rev .6 Table 5 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fan-FN-32 CBA X X X Fan-FN-33 CBA X X X Fan-FN-21B CBA X X X Pressure Switches CBA X X X Dampers DP

-21B CBA X X X Cabling CBA X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3A-A 2.1 Area Name Control Room

• • 2.2 Location El. 75'-0" Drawing No 9763-P-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside*

South Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.

East Concrete Outside West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside

3.2 Floor

Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /1 1/2 Hr.

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 6,492 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 167,560 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Recirculating System

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 4.5% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (analysis continued pages 2

- 5) ________________________

• • (Refer to Comp. Eng. Workspace area description for additional area).

• Door C-300 Leading to Turbine Building Operating Floor is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. Ref. Deviation No. 6, Sbn-904 Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 5 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3A-A 2.1 Area Name Computer Engineer

's Work Space (Part of Control Room)

2.2 Location

Col. A-5 Drawing No 500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East MCG 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 493 Sq. Ft. Length 34' Width 5' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 10,353 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Complex Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to CB

-F-3A-A (Control Room) for fire loading

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Relay Rack CP

-9 NI X X Relay Rack CP

-10 NI X X Cabinet CP

-152A X X Cabinet CP

-152B X X Cabinet CP

-12 X X Cabinet CP

-13 X X Instruments And Controls On Main Control Board And Other SI RH X X X X X X Cabinets And their Associated Cabling CC DG X X X X X X SW CS RM X X X X X X X X X FW MS EPA X X X X X X X X X CAH SWA X X X X X X EAH SB X X X X X X NI RC X X X X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 4 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B ED EDE X X X X X X Process Prot CP-L, 2, 3, 4 X X X Test Cabinets CP

-14, 15 X X X BOP Process Control Cabinets CP

-297A, 297B X X X Isolation Cabinet CP

-470 X X X BOP Process Control Cabinet X RVLIS/HELB Cabinet X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: 15, 464 Pounds 17, 711 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 4, 231 Pounds 7,874 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

25,585 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

17 8 , 715 ,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire starts in a waste basket in an office (B) Fire spreads to desk and files within office.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3A-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 5 of 5 (C) Fire spreads across glass and metal partitions and consumes one half of the office area. (D) Hot exhaust air from the affected area is transferred to the return air plenum which in turn will close the R.A. fire damper.

In short period of time, the heat transfer thru the supply air ductwork into the return air plenum will close the supply air fire damper at which time ventilation is lost.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 7, 199 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Temperature 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 8.1 Min. 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire control room including the computer area could be rendered uninhabitable due to the smoke.

15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished from outside the control room.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The area contains ionization detectors and in addition is occupied 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, therefore the fire will be detected early.

16.2 The use of portable fire extinguishers and hose reels, if necessary, will extinguish the fire before it spreads.

16.3 Damage will be limited to the area where the fire occurs.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early detection due to ionization detection and occupation of space.

18.2 Prompt use of fire extinguishers.

18.3 Three hour fire barrier. 18.4 Major portion of combustibles are contained within steel metal filing cabinets.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable (See 15.2).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3B-A 2.1 Area Name HVAC Equipment & Duct Area

2.2 Location

South West El. 75

'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North MCG 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East MCG 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,330 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 51' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 27,930 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Return air

- no exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in CBA

-F-38, -8038 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Air Conditioning AC-3A&B CBA X X X Dampers 26A&B CBA X X X Dampers 27A&B CBA X X X Damper 52 CBA X X X Cabling CBA X X X Fans 16A & B CBA X X X Fans F-38 CBA X X Filter F-8038 CBA X X Damper 28 CBA X X Damper 1058 CBA X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3C-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3C-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3C-A 2.1 Area Name Computer Room

2.2 Location

El. 75'-0" Drawing No 9763-P-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South MCG 3 Hr. East MCG 3 Hr. West MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,288 Sq. Ft. Length 46' Width 28' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 27,050 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Complex Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System

's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire ProtectionType 10.1 Primary Halon Fixed Gas Extinguishing System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization (Monitored Temp. Indication) 10.4 Outsid Fire Area Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2. (analysis continued pages. 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3C-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Also No Safety Related Equipment in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: 420 Pounds 2,609 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 2,250 Pounds 22,710 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

25,319 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

32 , 610 ,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire starts in a waste basket in an office.

(B) Fire spreads to desk and files within office.

(C) Fire spreads across glass and metal partitions and consumes one half of the office area. (D) Indoor air conditioning unit shuts off on high ambient temperature. The exhaust air path is normally closed and no supply air is provided from the outside, therefore the ventilation is lost.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 6,29 6 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Temperature 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 5.3 Min.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-3C-A Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire computer room could be rendered uninhabitable due to smoke.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The area is protected by a Halon 1301 Fixed Gas Extinguishing System and early warning ionization detectors, therefore the fire will be detected early.

16.2 The use of portable fire extinguishers and hose reels are available for backup.

16.3 Damage will be limited to the area where fire occurs.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 The area is not required for safe shutdown purpose and can be evacuated with no effect on operation of the control room.

17.2 The expended halon and/or products of combustion can be exhausted from the area by manual switch over to the control room complex exhaust system.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early detection due to ionization detection.

18.2 Prompt total flooding of the area by the Halon 1301 Fixed Gas Extinguishing System. 18.3 Pressurization of the adjacent control room prevents exfiltration from the area.

18.4 Major portion of combustibles are contained within steel metal filing cabinets.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protect ed 19.1 Not applicable

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. E-4 Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.4 Doors - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 150 Sq. Ft. Length 18' Width 8'-4" Height 122' 5.0 Volume 18,075 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear - None - 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System

's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-S2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. B-1 Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 226 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 10'-4" Height 50' 5.0 Volume 11,330 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear - None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System

's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CB-F-S2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 5 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area

Control Building - Elev. 21'

- 6" Electrical General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310431-FP

Control Building - Elev. 50'

- 0" Cable Tray Layout - Plan S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310452-FP

Control Building - Elev. 21'

- 6" Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 1 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310455-FP

Control Building - Elev. 50'

- 0" Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 1 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310461-FP

Control Building Control Room Arrangement Plan at Elev. 75'0" S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-500090-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Upper Electrical Tunnel - Train "A"

• 2.2 Location El. 0'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP, 310465-FP, 310466-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 2,137 Sq. Ft.Length48'&VariesWidth 38'&Varies Height25' 5.0 Volume 53,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity -

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Elect. Penetration EDE X X X

Dist. Panel PP-6A, C, D, E RC X X X Dist Panel PP-8J ED X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling SA X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownCabling IA X Cabling SB X X Rad Mon RM X X Cabling CS X X Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Cabling IC X X Transformer ED-X-14J ED X

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Tunnel - Train "A"

• 2.2 Location El. 0'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP, 310466-FP, 310465-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside/3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 1,470 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth VariesHeight Varies 5.0 Volume 33,300 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electric Cable Tunnel Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X X

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Lower Electrical Tunnel - Train "B"

• 2.2 Location North of Containment El (-) 26' -0" Drawing No 9763-F-310454-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Concrete - 4.0 Floor Area 2,137 Sq. Ft.Length48'&VariesWidth 38'&Varies Height25' 5.0 Volume 53,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity -

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 3.

• Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CAH X X Cabling CC X X Cabling EDE X X Cabling EPA X X Cabling FW X X Cabling MS X X Cabling NI X X

Cabling & Instrumentation RC X X Cabling SW X X Cabling SWA X X Cabling SI X X Elect. Penetration EDE X X Dist. Pahel PP-6B RC X X Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Excore Xmtr NI X X Rad Mon RM X X Cabling CS X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling CBS X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 3 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownCabling COP X X Cabling NG X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling CGC X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics:

12 Pounds 104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

222,864 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism all the plastic components of both pumps are assumed to ignite and burn.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 4 of 4

2. To add conservatism, there are three types of plastic in the components. A series of fire loading calculations using the NRC, NUREG-1805 Fire Dynamics Tools Quantitative Fire Hazard Method for each type of plastic was performed. The bounding maximum burning duration and maximum temperature were determined by taking the maximum duration from all the calculations and the maximum temperature.

3. No credit was given to the CEVA wall that separated the fire location from the remainder of the fire area.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 559.7 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

6.6 Minutes

15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Cable will not become involved in the fire. Also, redundant cabling is not in this fire area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area is designed with a water spray system; drain paths will remove water. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in th e control room and actuate the pre-action sprinkler system valve, allowing water to fill the piping to the closed head sprinklers. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire would be extinguished usin g hose lines and/or portable extinguishers and/or area sprinkler system. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in this fire area.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Tunnel - Train B

• 2.2 Location El. (-) 20'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310454-FP, 310431-FP, 310468-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Firestop 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 1,890 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth VariesHeight Varies 5.0 Volume 53,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electric Cable Tunnel Exhausts 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%

8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Safe shutdown cable requires fire protection S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling COP X X Cabling NG X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling CGC X X

Cabling & Instrumentation RM X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownCabling SB X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell

• 2.2 Location El. (-)20 &(-)26' Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete - West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 120 Sq. Ft.Length14'-6"Width 8'-4" Height 64' 5.0 Volume 7,700 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Sump pump in stairwell) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 6 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownNo safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this area

Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Plan S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310453-FP

Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Plan S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310454-FP

Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 1 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310465-FP

Electrical Tunnel - A Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 2 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310466-FP

Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 1 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310468-FP

Electrical Tunnel - B Train Cable Tray Layout - Sections - Sheet 2 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310469-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area

2.2 Location

North - El (-)16'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beam s 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,430 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 33.5' 5.0 Volume 47,900 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity Ventilation

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Redundant Preaction Systems 10.2 Seconda ry Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (Analysis continued page 2)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fuel Oil Storage Tank DG X X

• Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P38A DG X X

• FLEX Electric Fuel Transfer Pump A FLEX X - - Level Switches DG X X

• Cabling DG X X

• Piping & Valves DG X X

• 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Oil: 75,000 Gallons 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

1125 X 10 7 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description See Appendix "A" of this report.

• Required for safe shutdown only on loss of offsite power.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area

2.2 Location

South - El (-)16'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Wa lls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 1,430 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 33.5' 5.0 Volume 47,900 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity Ventilation

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Redundant Preaction Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (Analysis continued page 2)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-1B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fuel Oil Storage Tank DG X X Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P38B DG X X FLEX Electric Fuel Transfer Pump B FLEX X - Cabling DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: 75,000 Gallons 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

1125 X 10 7 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description See Appendix "A" of this report.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-2A-A 2.1 Area Name Engine Room

2.2 Location

North - El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 3,700 Sq. Ft. Length 88' Width 42' Height 29' 5.0 Volume 107,300 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Dg Bldg. Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Manual Preaction Providing Area Protection and Auto Preaction in Oil Piping Trench 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization

& Ultraviolet/Thermal in Trench 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (Analysis continued pages 2

- 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Starting Air Skid 17A DG X X Cabling DG X X Cabling DAH X X Cabling CBA X X Diesel Generator Control Cabinet CP

-75A DG X X Diesel Generator Control Cabinet CP

-75B DG X X 5Kv Non-Seg. Bus Duct EDE X X Cabling SW X X Damper DP-16A DAH X X Temp Switches DAH X X Diesel Generator Control Panel CP-36 DG X X Terminal Box HF7 DG X Diesel Generator 1

-A & Aux DG X X Fan-FN-26A DAH X X Piping & Valves DG X X 460v MCC-E511 EDE X X Cabling & Controls RC X X Disabling Panel MM-CP-450A MM X X Backup Control Air Compressor DG X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,627.5 Gallons 62,397 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 38 Pounds 134 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 55 LF Cable Trays 9,964 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Stacked 3 High 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

72,473 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

268,150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. The diesel engine is located on the 21'

-6" level. The engine is not operating.

2. The fuel oil line connecting the day tank on the 51'

-6" level and the diesel engine ruptures. 3. Fuel oil is siphoned from the day tank at a rate of 24 gpm (30 ft. of head in a 1/2" fuel oil line).

4. Fuel oil is sprayed into the engine room and covers an area of 400 ft.2 with a film of oil 1/16" thick.

5. The oil flows into the trench around the engine. 6. The oil is ignited at the time of the rupture.

7. The oil burns at a rate of 5" per hour and consumes 21 gpm, therefore 3 gpm of unburned oil runs into the trench drain and down to the sump in the fuel oil storage tank vault at the (-) 16' -0" level below.

8. The fuel oil transfer pump at the (-)16'-0" level continues to fill the day tank.

9. The fuel oil in the engine room is heated by the fire (4200°F flame temperature).

The hot oil flowing into the trench will flash upon discharging into the covered sump at the (-)16'-0" level below.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 4 of 5 10. The heat from the fire in the covered sump will activate the sump wet pipe sprinklers and the vaults detection and suppression system and alarm in the control room.

11. It is estimated that a time period of 5 minutes lapses between the oil line rupture and ignition of the oil in the sump.

12. The transfer pump will continue to fill the day tank until either the deluge system deactivates the pump or action is taken by plant personnel in response to the alarm. 13. It is estimated that the detectors in the storage tank vault will alarm in 10 Minutes.

14. It requires 62.5 minutes for the tank to empty after the fuel oil transfer pump shuts down, therefore 1500 gallons of oil drains into the engine room. The engine room fire consumes 1312 gallons while 188 gallons of oil drains into the sump below.

15. Estimated minimum fuel oil consumed by the fire and duration of the fire:

A) Line Rupture to Shut Down of Transfer Pump 15 Min 315 Gal B) Complete Discharge of Day Tank Into the Engine Room 62.5 Min 77.5 Min 1312 Gal 1627 Gal 16. Total combustibles Plastic 494,000 Btu Oil 230,784,000 Btu Cable 36,867,000 Btu Total 268,150,000 Btu 17. A lube oil fire was postulated but found to be less severe than the fuel oil fire, therefore it has not been considered as the design basis fire for the subject area.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 72,473 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire

>5 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1650 °F SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2A-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 5 of 5 1 5.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire area will be engulfed in flame and all equipment and cable will be lost.

15.2 Possible spalling of concrete.

15.3 Only one diesel generator train will be affected and safe shutdown can be Accomplished By the Redundant Diesel Located in Another Fire Area.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the equipment and cabling.

16.2 No damage to engine due to water deluge system on oil piping.

16.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished, if necessary, by the redundant diesel train located in another area.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area floor drains and trenches will prevent buildup of water. Deluge is directed on piping and floor area, therefore it will not affect other equipment.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning ionization detectors alarming in the control room.

18.2 Thermal detectors setting off the deluge system on the oil piping in the event the fire brigade does not respond in time.

18.3 The entire engine room is within a minimum 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated structure.

18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to equipment room above. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable. (see 15.3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Engine Room

2.2 Location

South - El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./Outside/

11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 3,700 Sq. Ft. Length 88' Width 42' Height 29' 5.0 Volume 107,300 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Dg Bldg. Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Manual preaction providing area protection and auto preaction in oil piping trench 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Ultraviolet/Thermal in Trench 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (Analysis continued pages 2

- 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Starting Air Skid 17B DG X X Cabling DG X X Cabling DAH X X Cabling CBA X X Diesel Generator Control Cabinet CP

-76B DG X X Diesel Generator Control Cabinet CP

-76A DG X X 5Kv Non-Seg. Bus Duct EDE X X Damper DP-16B DAH X X Temp Switches DAH X X Diesel Generator Control Panel CP-37 DG X X Diesel Generator 1

-B & Aux DG X X Terminal Box HF8 DG X X Fan-FN-26B DAH X X Cabling SW X X Damper DP-16B DAH X X Cabling EDE X X Piping & Valves DG X X 460v MCC-E611 EDE X X Cabling & Controls RC X X Disabling Panel MM-CP-450B MM X X Backup Control Air Compressor DG X X SFP I Backup Diesel Generator FLEX - - -

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,628.05 Gallons 62,397 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 38 Pounds 134 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 55 LF Cable Trays 9,964 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Stacked 3 High 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

72,495 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

268,230,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. The diesel engine is located on the 21'

-6" level. The engine is not operating.

2. The fuel oil line connecting the day tank on the 51'

-6" level and the diesel engine ruptures. 3. Fuel oil is siphoned from the day tank at a rate of 24 gpm (30 ft. of head in a 1/2" fuel oil line).

4. Fuel oil is sprayed into the engine room and covers an area of 400 ft.2 with a film of oil 1/16" thick.

5. The oil flaws into the trench around the engine.

6. The oil is ignited at the time of the rupture.

7. The oil burns at a rate of 5" per hour and consumes 21 gpm, therefore 3 gpm of unburned oil runs into the trench drain and down to the sump in the fuel oil storage tank vault at the (-)16'-0" level below.

8. The fuel oil transfer pump at the (-)16'-0" level continues to fill the day tank.

9. The fuel oil in the engine room is heated by the fire (4200 °F flame temperature). The hot oil flowing into the trench will flash upon discharging into the covered sump at the (-)16'-0" level below.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 4 of 5 10. The heat from the fire in the covered sump will activate the sump wet pipe sprinklers and the vaults detection and suppression system and alarm in the control room.

11. It is estimated that a time period of 5 minutes lapses between the oil line rupture and ignition of the oil in the sump.

12. The transfer pump will continue to fill the day tank until either the deluge system deactivates the pump or action is taken by plant personnel in response to the alarm. 13. It is estimated that the detectors in the storage tank vault will alarm in 10 minutes.

14. It requires 62.5 minutes for the tank to empty after the fuel oil transfer pump shuts down, therefore 1500 gallons of oil drains into the engine room. The engine room fire consumes 1312 gallons while 188 gallons of oil drains into the sump below.

15. Estimated minimum fuel oil consumed by the fire and duration of the fire: A) Line Rupture to Shut Down of Transfer Pump 15 Min 315 Gal B) Complete Discharge of Day Tank Into the Engine Room 62.5 Min 77.5 Min 1312 Gal 1627 Gal 16. Total combustibles Plastic 494,000 Btu Oil 230,867,000 Btu Cable 36,867,000 B tu Total 268,230,000 Btu 17. A lube oil fire was postulated but found to be less severe than the fuel oil fire, therefore it has not been considered as the design basis fire for the subject area.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 72,495 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire

>5 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1650 °F SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-2B-A Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 5 of 5 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The area will be engulfed in flame and all equipment and cable will be lost.

15.2 Possible spalling of concrete. 15.3 Only one diesel generator train will be affected and safe shutdown can be accomplished by the redundant diesel located in another fire area.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the equipment and cabling. 16.2 No damage to engine due to water deluge system on oil piping.

16.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished, if necessary, by the redundant diesel train located in another area.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area floor drains and trenches will prevent buildup of water. Deluge is directed on piping and floor area, therefore it will not affect other equipment.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning ionization detectors alarming in the control room.

18.2 Thermal detectors setting off the deluge system on the oil piping in the event the fire brigade does not respond in time.

18.3 The entire engine room is within a minimum 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated structure.

18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to equipment room above. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.

(See 15.3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name HVAC Equipment Area

2.2 Location

North El. 51'

-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Open - East Concrete 3 Hr. West MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 1,555 Sq. Ft. Length 42' Width 37' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 38,880 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization

& Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 of 4

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fan FN-25A DAH X X Cabling DAH X X Damper DP-15A DAH X X Fan FN-27A CBA X X Chiller E-230A CBA X X Fan FN-211A CBA X X Damper DP-53A CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X X Fan FN-27B CBA X X Pumps P-434A/P-435A CBA X X Flow Switch DAH X X Damper DP-53B CBA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 10 Gallons 482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*

Total Combustibles:

1,500,000 Btu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A) Due to a lack of physical boundary both fire zones, DG 3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z constitute a common fire area.

B) The oil content of control building HVAC system compressor/condensing unit spills over floor and catches fire and burn, completely.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1231 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of both air conditioning trains of control room a/c system because of lack of oil. 15.2 Loss of HVAC system to both diesel generator areas as both ventilating fans are located in the affected area and, both fans take suction of hot air from the same plenum. *Based on floor area of zones DG

-F-3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z (3100 sq. ft.).

15.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.

SBC-173). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of both trains of control room HVAC system because of lack of oil.

16.2 Possible loss of cooling capability of both diesel generator areas as both train ventilating fans are located in the affected area.

16.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.

SB C-173).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 4 of 4 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable, no automatic water suppression system exists.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The design base fire will be contained in the fire area bounded by fire rated structures. Both affected zones are contained in the same fire area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Redundant safe shutdown equipment if any, may be lost. For safe shutdown requirements, refer to Table 3.2.7.41 of the report "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability" (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3B-Z Rev. 9 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Na me HVAC Equipment Area

2.2 Location

South El. 51'

-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Open - South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 1,555 Sq. Ft. Length 42' Width 37' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 38,880 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 4

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3B-Z Rev. 9 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fan-FN-25B DAH X X Cabling DAH X X Damper DP-15B DAH X X Fan FN-211B CBA X X Chiller E-230B CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X Pumps P-434B-435B CBA X X Flow Switch DAH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 10 Gallons 482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 27 Pounds 113 Btu/Sq. Ft.*

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

595 Btu/Sq. Ft.*

Total Combustibles:

1,851,000 Btu Based on floor area of zones DG 3A-Z and DG-1-3B-Z (3110 Sq. Ft.)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3B-Z Rev. 9 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A) Due to a lack of physical boundary both fire zones, DG

-F-3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z constitute a common fire area.

B) The oil content of control building HVAC system compressor/condensing unit spills over floor and catches fire and burn completely.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1231 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of both air conditioning trains of control room A/C System because of lack of oil. 15.2 Loss of HVAC system to both diesel generator areas as both ventilating fans are located in the affected area and take suction of hot air from the same plenum.

15.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.

SBC-173). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of both trains of control room HVAC system because of lack of oil.

16.2 Possible Loss of Cooling Capability of Both Diesel Generator Areas As Both Train Ventilating Fans Are Located in the Affected Area.

16.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.

SBC-173). 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable, no automatic water suppression system exists.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3B-Z Rev. 9 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 4 of 4 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The design base fire will be contained in the fire area bounded by fire rated structures. Both affected zones are contained in the same fire area.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Redundant safe shutdown equipment if any, may be lost. For safe shutdown requirements refer to Table 3.2.7.41 of the report "Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability" (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3C-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3C-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3C-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Day Tank Area

2.2 Location

North - El. 51'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 200 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5' Width 8.5' Height 11.0' 5.0 Volume 2,200 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity None 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued Pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3C-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fuel Oil Day Tank DG X X Instruments DG X X Cabling DG X X Level Switches DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,500 Gallons 1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

225 X 10 6 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. The diesel oil day tank ruptures and oil spills on the enclosure floor. Floor drain will remove some of the oil. It is conservatively assumed that some of the oil will burn in the enclosure.

2. The maximum rate of burn equals 5" per hour.

3. The oil may burn in excess of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, at which time the enclosure is assumed to fail. Consequences of failed enclosure is beyond the scope of this appendix A "FHA" report.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3C-A Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 3 4. During the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before the failure of the enclosure, 900 gallons of oil is consumed and the remaining oil will be contained within the bottom or stamp section of the enclosure.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 675,000 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire 3 Hours (Five hours without any 14.3 Peak Temperature 2,650 °F means of fire protection) 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the diesel oil day tank and oil.

15.2 Loss of the instruments, lighting and cable in the tank vault.

15.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel fuel oil day tank which is located outside the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. (The redundant fuel oil day tank may be lost if fire is not controlled within three hours).

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the day tank, instruments and oil.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel train which is located outside the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Vault contains a floor drain which discharges into the sump in the storage tank vault at the (-) 16'-0" level, therefore damage due to water is of no consequence.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the

fire brigade.

18.2 In the event the fire brigade cannot extinguish the fire the rate of rise detectors will set off the water deluge fire protection system.

18.3 If deluge system fails then fire will be put out by stand pipe and hose reels.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 There is no redundant safe shutdown equipment in this fire area. (Refer 15.3 above). If in unlikely event both diesel generator day tanks are lost as fire burns beyond three hours, safe shutdown of reactor will be achieved either from control room or RSS panel.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3D-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3D-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Day Tank Area

2.2 Location

South El. 51'

-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 200 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5' Width 8.5' Height 11.0' 5.0 Volume 2,200 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity None 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detectional Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safet y Related A B Fuel Oil Day Tank DG X X Instruments DG X X Cabling DG X X Level Switches DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,500 Gallons 1,125, 000 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

1,125,0 00 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

225 X 10 6 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. The diesel oil day tank ruptures and oil spills on the enclosure floor. Floor drain will remove some of the oil. It is conservatively assumed that some of the oil will burn in the enclosure.

2. The maximum rate of burn equals 5" per hour.

3. The oil may burn in excess of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, at which time the enclosure is assumed to fail. Consequences of failed enclosure is beyond the scope of this Appendix A "FHA" report.

4. During the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before the failure of the enclosure, 900 gallons of oil is consumed. The remaining oil will be contained within the bottom part or sump section of the enclosure.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 3 of 3 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 675,000 Btu/Sq.Ft.

14.2 Duration of Fire 3 Hours (Five hours without any 14.3 Peak Temperature 2,650 °F means of fire protection) 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the diesel oil day tank and oil.

15.2 Loss of the instruments, lighting and cable in the tank vault. 15.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel fuel oil day tank which is located outside the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. (The redundant fuel oil day tank may be lost if fire is not controlled within three hours).

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the day tank, instruments and oil.

16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel train which is located outside the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Vault contains a floor drain which discharges into the sump in the storage tank vault at the (-) 16'-0" level, therefore damage due to water is of no consequence.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 In the event the fire brigade cannot extinguish the fire the rate of rise detectors will set off the water deluge fire protection system.

1 8.3 If deluge system fails then fire will be put out by stand pipe and hose reels.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 There is no redundant safe shutdown equipment in this fire area. (Refer 15.3 above). If in unlikely event both diesel generator day tanks are lost as fire burns beyond three hours, safe shutdown of reactor will be achieved either from control room or RSS panel.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3E-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3E-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3E-A 2.1 Area Name Train A, D.G. Air Intake & Exhaust Silencer Area

2.2 Location

El. 51'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. East Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. West Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.

3.2 Floor

Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

- - 4.0 Floor Area 2,050 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Heig ht 25' 5.0 Volume 51,250 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3E-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Air Intake Filter F

-36Z DG X X Exhaust Silencer MM-8A DG X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3F-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3F-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3F-A 2.1 Area Name Train B, D.G. Air Intake & Exhaust Silencer Area

2.2 Location

El. 51'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. West Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.

3.2 Floor

Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

- - 4.0 Floor Area 2,05 0 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 25' 5.0 Volume 51,250 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity

- 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No Further Analysis Required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-3F-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Air Intake Filter F

-36B DG X X Exhaust Silencer MM-8B DG X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. A-9 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 137 Sq. Ft. Length 16'-4" Width 8'-4" Height 43' 5.0 Volume 5,890 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. E-9 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside Eas t Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 137 Sq. Ft. Length 16'-6" Width 8'-4" Height 11'-6" 5.0 Volume 9,795 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- DG-F-S2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 7 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area

Diesel Generator Building Plans and Sections Below Grade General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202068FP

Diesel Generator Building Plans Above Grade General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202069-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Chiller Pump Area

2.2 Location

North Side El 7'

-0" Drawing No 9763-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

• 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete/Open 3 Hr./- 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 5,100 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 16'-0" 5.0 Volume 81,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to pages 2 and 3.

• The ceiling of piping tunnel and walkway between Fuel Storage Building and PAB 7' elevation which is also a floor of fire zone CE

-F-1-Z (Tab 13) is 3 hr. fire rated.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling SW X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling PAH X X Piping, Valves & Instrumentation CC X X X Piping, Valves & Instrumentation CS X X X Instrument Rack IR

-L7 MM X X X Cabling RC X X Cabling SI X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6.0 Gallons 176.5 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastic s: 28 Pounds 71.4 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

248 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

1,264,000 Btu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Conservatively assume both chiller pumps, chiller, both makeup water pumps and chromated water connection tank pump skid rupture simultaneously and spill over an area of 77 sq. ft. and burn.

(B) To add additional conservatism consider ventilation supply/exhaust air has been isolated. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,6 88 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 585 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Min. 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The chiller, chiller pumps, chromated water pump, and the reactor makeup water pumps will be lost upon loss of oil.

15.2 Possible loss of some instruments and control devices.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The chiller pumps, chromated water pump, and the reactor makeup water pumps may be lost.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system is provided in the zone.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Total combustibles will burn in less than five minutes. all surrounding zones/area are separated by concrete structures (many walls are fire rated), and hence the oil fire on 77 sq. ft. of the total 5100 sq. ft. area will be contained in the affected zone. 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in the same fire zone.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Demin. Filter and Valve Maint. Area

2.2 Location

West Side

- El. (-) 6'0" To 7'0" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete - South Concrete - East Concrete - West Concrete 3 Hr./- 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling

- 4.0 Floor Area 2,900 Sq. Ft. Length 82' Width 35.5' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 61,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipmen t System System Train Safety Related A B No equipment required for safe shutdown in this zone also, no safety related equipment here.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Charging Pump

- 2A Area 2.2 Location East Side

- El. 7'0" Drawing No 9763-F-80506l-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West MCG 1 1/2 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 318 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 12' Height 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,850 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2, 3 & 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Charging Pump P

-2A CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Pressure Switches CS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 61 Gallons 28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

28,744 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

9,150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Oil reservoir rupture, oil spreads over the entire floor area of the room (318 sq. ft.). The thickness of the oil film is 1/4" over the entire floor area.

2. The oil is ignited, burns and is consumed.

3. The space temperature is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space will fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,524 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.

14.3 Peak Temperature 5959 F (High temp. spike in short duration).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 1 5.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

15.2 Loss of the cabling due to fire.

15.3 The adjacent fire area containing a redundant unit is separated by a 3

-hour barrier; therefore safe shutdown can be accomplished.

15.4 The structural steel beams and metal partition are covered with a fire protective coating, therefore no damage.

15.5 There will be possible spalling of the concrete.

15.6 The fire will be contained within the area due to its short duration.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.

18.3 Concrete walls and fire proofing on metal partition and exposed steel will limit the fire to the subject area.

18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to adjacent areas.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1D-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Charging Pump

- 2B Area 2.2 Location East Side

- El. 7'0" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 318 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 12' Heig ht 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,850 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2

- 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1D-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Charging Pump P

-2b CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Press Switches CS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire (In Situ) 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 61 Gallons 28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

9 ,150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Oil reservoir rupture, oil spreads over the entire floor area of the room (318 sq. ft.). The thickness of the oil film is 1/4" over the entire floor area.

2. The oil is ignited, burns and is consumed.

3. The space temperature is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space will fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,524 Btu/Sq. Ft. (3.23 gallons oil consumed in 318 sq.

ft.) 14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.

14.3 Peak Temperature 5959 F (High temp. spike in short duration).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1D-A Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

15.2 Loss of the cabling due to fire.

15.3 The adjacent fire area containing a redundant unit is separated by a 3

-hour barrier; therefore, safe shutdown can be accomplished.

15.4 The structural steel beams and metal partition are covered with a fire protective coating, therefore no damage.

15.5 There will be possible spalling of the concrete.

15.6 The fire will be contained within the area due to its short duration.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The Control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.

18.3 Concrete walls and fire proofing on metal partition and exposed steel will limit the fire to the subject area.

18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to adjacent areas.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1E-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1E-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1E-A 2.1 Area Name Reciprocating Charging Pump Area

2.2 Location

East Side

- El. 7'0" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. East Concrete Outside West MCG 1 1/2 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling 1 1/2 Hr. 4.0 Floor Area 272 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 10.25' Height 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,100 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PA B 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2

- 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1E-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Piping Valves CBS X X Piping Valves CC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 14.0 Gallons 7721 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

7721 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

2,200,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Pump ruptures, oil spread over floor covering 605 sq. Ft. Of area (1/8" thick).

2. Oil is ignited and is consumed.

3. The space temperature in the area is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space is assumed to fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 2,275 Btu/Sq. Ft. (2.73 gallons oil consumed in 318 sq. ft.)

14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.

14.3 Peak Temperature 5958 F (High temp. spike in short duration).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1E-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

15.2 Loss of cabling due to fire.

15.3 The adjacent fire area containing safe shutdown equipment will not be affected.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.

16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the fire barrier walls will prevent the spread to adjacent pump areas.

18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1F-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1F-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1F-Z 2.1 Area Name Letdown Degasifier Area

2.2 Location

East Side El. 7'0" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr. South Concrete - East Concrete Outside West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating

- 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 9,400 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5' Width 13.33' Height 30' 5.0 Volume 9,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes (Minimal) No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1F-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No equipment required for safe shutdown in this zone also, no safety related equipment here. 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.0 Gallons 478 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

478 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The letdown degasifier reciprocating pump will rupture, the entire contents of oil spills on the floor covering approximately a 13 sq. ft. area and burns completely.

14.1 DBF fire loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak area/zone temperature during fire 505 F 14.3 Duration of fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of degasifier pump due to loss of oil.

15.2 Possible loss of the cabling and instrumentation/controls in the area.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The consequences are the same as 15.1 and 15.2.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system is provided.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1F-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.

18.3 Because the subject fire zone is bounded by a concrete structure and the duration of the fire is less than 5 minutes, the design base fire will be contained in the area.

However, with the lack of fire dampers in the supply or exhaust air system, the hot air and smoke will travel through PAB normal exhaust filter unit to the outside. (The air has not been transferred from this zone to any other zones in PAB). 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. No safe shutdown equipment in the area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1G-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1G-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F- 1G-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Chase & Elec. Tunnel Between Control Bldg

& PAB* 2.2 Location El. (-) 26'-0" To El. 35'

-3" & 30'08" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP. 805062

-FP & 805060

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete/MCG 3 Hr. East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside

3.2 Floor

Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 80'-0" Width 14'-0" Height 20'-0" 5.0 Volume 22,400; 31,400; 9000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Safety Related Cable Requires Fire Protection.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1G-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling CC X X X X Cabling CS X X X X Cabling EAH X X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling PAH X X X X Cabling SW X X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling CBS X X X Cabling FAH X X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling SF X X X Cabling VG X X Cabling SS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling CAH X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1J-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1J-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1J-Z 2.1 Area Name Aux. Steam Condensate Tank Area

2.2 Location

North End PAB El. (-) 6'-0: & (-) 26'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete - /Outside East Concrete - /3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside

3.2 Floor

Concrete/Grating

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./- 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 1,980 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 11' & 18' 5.0 Volume 23,782 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAH 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 4

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1J-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling CAH X X X Cabling VG X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling WLD X X Temperature Elements & Cabling MM X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.0 Gallons 76.0 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 5 Pounds 33 Btu/Sq. Ft

. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

109 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

215 ,000 Btu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1J-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The condensate pump oil reservoir will rupture and oil spills on an area of 13 sq. Ft., ignites and burns completely.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 309 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of condensate pump as a result of the loss of oil content.

15.2 Because of the non

-ducted exhaust air from the area and the lack of fire dampers, smoke and fire will spread into the upper zones of PAB, via PAB

-F-1A-Z, PAB-F-2C-Z, PAB-3B-Z. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the condensate pump as a result of the loss of oil content.

16.2 Area detection system will alarm in control room and early response of the fire brigade will minimize the spread of smoke and fire to the upper zones.

1 7.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system exists.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The subject pumps are located in a pit at elevation of 26'

-0". The localized zone is bounded by a concrete structure and most of the fire will be contained.

However, because of the lack of isolation of ventilation air and non

-ducted exhaust air, fire and particularly smoke will spread to the other parts of the building, including the component cooling heat exchanger and pump area.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected

1. Not applicable. The separation of the safe shutdown equipment is discussed in the report "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability" (10 CFR 50 Appendix R).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1K-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1K-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1K-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Radioactive Pipe Tunnels & Pine Chase

2.2 Location

Northwest Corner

- El. (-)6'-O" Up Thru 53'

-O" Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP, 809062

-FP & 805063

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

East Concrete 3 Hr./ - West Concrete 3 Hr.

• 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 4,620 Sq. Ft. Length 68'-0" Width 9'-0" & 15' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 75,350 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X (El (-)6',5' & 53') Non-Nuclear 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAH-FN-L47 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None - SBN-439, Dated 1/21/85 10.4 Other -----------

• Door No. W

-400 Leading Into Waste Process Building is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated Door. Ref. Deviation No. 7, SBN-9o4, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-1K-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required) 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Piping & Valves SW X X X S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Resin Fill Tank Area 2.2 Location South-East El. 25'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Open - South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/Metal

- 3.2 Floor Plt/Concrete/Grating

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Plt

- 3.4 Doors Metal - /3 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 1,550 Sq. Ft. Length 43.5' Width 38.5' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 40,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued page 2 & 3).

S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling PAH X X X Damper DP-35A PAH X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling FAH X X Cabling CC X X Cabling SF X X Sample Panel CP

-482 SS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft

. Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 76 Pounds 637 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

637 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

988 ,000 Btu S EABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2A-Z Rev 7 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.

2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate. 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladder and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 30 ft. x 2 ft. = 60 sq. ft.

14.1 DBF fire loading 16,467 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak area/zone temperature during fire 147 F 14.3 Duration of fire

> 5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Refer To Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Boric Acid Tank Area

2.2 Location

South-West El. 25'

-O" Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Metal

- South Concrete Outside East Concrete/Metal

- West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 1,300 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 26' 5.0 Volum e 33,800 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Piping & Valves CS X X X X Cabling CS X X X Boric Acid Tanks CS X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 4 PAB-F-2C-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2C-Z 2.1 Area Name Primary Component Cooling Pump Area

2.2 Location

North - El 25'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

South Concrete/Metal/Open

- East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr./ - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 7,200 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 26' 5.0 Volume 187,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectri c 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued pg. 2

- 4)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Pump P-11A, P-11C CC X X Cabling CC X X X Pump P-11B, P-11D CC X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves SW X X X Instrument Rack IR

-93 MM X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EAH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RM X X X Terminal Boxes &

Cabling EDE X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Fan-FN-42A PAH X X Fan-FN-42B PAH X X Dampers PAH X X X Instruments PAH X X X Instruments PAH X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Radiation Monitors RM X X X Cabling CBS X X X Cabling CAP X X X PCCW HX-CC-E-17A & B CC X X X Boron Injection TK-SI-TK-6 SI X X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling COP X X X Control Panel CP-443A, B CC X X X Temperature Elements & Cabling MM X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.25 Gallons 26.0 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Ar ea: 26.0 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

187,500 Btu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-2C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 4 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Oil reservoir ruptures, oil spreads over 16.0 sq. ft. of floor (1/8" thick).

2. Oil ignites, burns and is consumed.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Temperature 132 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump due to rupture.

15.2 Possible loss of pump cable.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of pump due to rupture.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 A double failure would be required to inadvertently spray water in area.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short.

18.2 Total fire loading in zone is light (26.0 Btu/Sq. Ft).

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Spatial separation and metal shield wall.

19.2 The design base fire has neither the duration or intensity to ignite cable or damage equipment.

19.3 Water shields are installed over PCCW pump motors.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3A-Z Rev. 10 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Water Cooler Heat Exchanger Area 2.2 Location North El. 53'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

South Metal/Open

- East Concrete Outside West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concre te - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - /Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 4,000 Sq. Ft. Length 53' Width 75' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 103,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in CAP

-F-40 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 of 4

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3A-Z Rev. 10 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Piping & Valves SW X X X Cabling SW X X X PCCW Head Tanks Tk

-19A & 19B CC X X X Piping & Instruments CC X X X Cabling CC X X X Dg Heat Exchangers E-42A & 42B DG X X X Cabling CAP X X X Cabling COP X X X Cabling CS X X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X X Temperature Elements & Cabling MM X X X Pressure Switch &

Cabling PAH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 2.25 Gallo ns 84 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: 6,600 Pounds

• Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

84 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

37,500 Btu

• Charcoal Fire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix D.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3A-Z Rev. 10 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The flash tank distillate pump oil reservoir fails and the entire 2.25 gallon of oil spreads over 29 sq. ft. and will ignite and is assumed to burn completely.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,638 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 240 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the flash tank distillate pumps as a result of the loss of oil

. 15.2 Failure of instruments, controls and cabling within the area of immediate vicinity of the fire.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the flash tank distillate pumps as a result of the loss of oil.

16.2 The possible loss of instruments, controls and cabling within the area of immediate vicinity of the fire.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system exists.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is less than five minutes. The fire location is in the north east corner of the zone and is surrounded by outside fire rated concrete structures.

Hence, the bulk of the fire will be contained within the zone. However, due to the lack of ventilation exhaust system isolation, the smoke will spread to fire zone PAB-F-3B-Z. 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. For the separation requirements refer to report "Fire Protection Of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)".

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3B-Z Rev 15 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name PAB Supply and Exhaust Fan Area

2.2 Location

South Side El. 53'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Metal/Open

- South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

East Concrete Outside/3 Hr.

• West Concrete Outside/ - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - /Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 6,600 Sq. Ft. Length 88' Width 75' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 171,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Y es No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization

& Photoelectric 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)

• 3 Hr. Fire Damper Has Not Been Provided in Exhaust Duct at the Point of Connection To Unit Plant Vent. Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN

-904 Dated 12/2/85

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3B-Z Rev 15 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X Instruments & Cabling CAP X X Instruments & Cabling COP X X X Instruments & Cabling PAH X X Temperature Elements & Cabling MM X X X Instruments & Cabling CC X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil and Class A Fire Oil: 0.5 Gallons 231 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: 50 Po unds 1,231 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 71 Pounds 140 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

1,602 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

1,398,000 B tu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-3B-Z Rev 15 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. Oil reservoir in the monorail crane hoist ruptures and 1/2 gallon of oil spills covering 6.4 sq. Ft. of the boric acid storage area floor. The oil runs under two stacked wood pallets, which has a burning area of 24 sq. Ft 2. The oil is ignited and burns along with the pallets.

3. Design basis fire is separated from the fan area by metal partitions.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 28,386 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Temperature 1,560 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4.8 Minutes. 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of monorail crane.

15.2 Loss of the boric acid storage area.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of monorail crane due to loss of oil.

16.2 Possible loss of boric acid storage area.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.

18.3 The fire rating of the structure exceeds the duration of the fire.

19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (equipment is not required for safe shutdown).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-4-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-4-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-4-Z 2.1 Area Name Filter Area

2.2 Location

El. 81'-0" Drawing No 9763-P-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 2,650 Sq. Ft. Length 54' Width 49' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 66,000 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Mechanical Room

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Temperature Elements in Filters/ Carbon Monoxide Detection in PAH

-F-16

• 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Charcoal Loading For PAH

-F-L6 is 25750 Lbs. of Charcoal. CharcoalFire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix "D'.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-4-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone

• Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone

• 3 Hr. Fire Damper Has Not Been Provided in Exhaust Duct, 81'

-0" Elev. at the Point of Connection To Unit Plant Vent.

• Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN- 904 Dated 12/02/85

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-S1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. C-1 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hrs. East Concrete 3 Hrs. West Concrete 3 Hrs. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hrs. 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 127 Sq. Ft. Length 15'-4" Width 8'-4" Height 37' 5.0 Volume 4,700 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear - 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-S1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-S2-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. D-6 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hrs. South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hrs. West Concrete 3 Hrs. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 130 Sq. Ft. Length 15'-8" Width 8'-4" Height 66' 5.0 Volume 8,600 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear - 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- PAB-F-S2-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 8 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone

RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. Equipment Vault General Arrangement Plans S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805060-FP

Primary Auxiliary Building Plans at Elev. 7'-0" And Below General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805061-FP

Primary Auxiliary Building Plans at Elev. 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805062-FP

Primary Auxiliary Building Plans at Elev. 53'-0" & 81'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805063-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 9 Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A 1.0 Building Fuel Storage Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FSB-F-1-A 2.1 Area Name ----- 2.2 Location El 7'-0", 10"-0", 21'-6", 25"-0", 64"-0" & 84'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805058-FP, 805059-FP & 805084-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West MCG/Concrete 3 Hr./Outside** 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 5,350 Sq. Ft.Length93' Width VariesHeight Varies 5.0 Volume 579,100 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System FSB Normal Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in FAH-F-41, 74 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued on pages 2, 3, 4).

• Walkway and piping tunnel between column A of FSB and column D of PAB has 3 hr. fire rated ceiling. ** 3 hr. fire rated fire damper has not been provided in exhaust duct to the point of connection at plant vent. Ref. To Deviation No. 1 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 9 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Spent Fuel Pool P-10A SF X X Spent Fuel Pool P-10B SF X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Controls & Instruments FAH X X X FAH - FN - 11A & 124 FAH X X FAH - FN - 11B FAH X X Heaters FAH X X X Filters 41, 71 FAH X X X Dampers FAH X X X Cabling FAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Spent Fuel Pool P-10C SF X Note 1 X Note 1 X Note 1: Capable of being powered from either Train A or Train B S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 9 Page 3 of 4 13.0 Total Fire Loading in Area 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: 304.7 Gallons 8543 Btu/Sq.

Ft. Grease: 10 Gallons 280 Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: 0 Pounds 0 Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: 21,750 Pounds

• Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: 0 Pounds 0 Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 108 Pounds 263 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

ML-2 Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Hydraulic Fluid 17.5 Gallons 491 Btu/Sq. Ft. 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

9577 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

51,234,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. One of the four (4) Spent Fuel Pool pump s ruptures, lubrication oil spills on floor. For conservatism, the lubrication oil from the other three (3) adjacent pumps are also considered as combustible; therefore, all four (4) gallons of lubrication oil are assumed spilled on floor covering an area of 40 sq. ft. The entire four (4) gallons of lubrication oil ignite and are consumed. The normal exhaust system fails. Oil thickness is 1/6 inch. 2. Maximum peak temperature throughout the entire fire area will reach 160.6°F based on (T 60.6ºF + 100ºF ambient temperature).

Note 1: Fiberglass ladders not included sin ce ladders will not ignite at the DBF peak temperature. Note 2: Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor lubrication oil not included since the lubrication oil is contained in a metal reservoir and the RCP motor is not in-service or available for service.

Note 3: Cask crane lubrication oil and hydraulic fluid not included since crane not normally energized and location of lubric ation oil reservoir and hydraulic fluid.

• Charcoal fire loading was not considered in total area. See App. "D".

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 9 Page 4 of 4 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 15,000 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Temperature 160.6 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 6 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of spent fuel pool pump due to loss of oil. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Fire duration will be short with peak temperature of 160ºF; hence, spent fuel pool pump might be lost. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic supp ression system exists in the area. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire duration is short and will be contained in the subject fire area of concrete structure. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as pump is not required for safe shutdown.

Fuel Storage Building Plan at Elevations 7'-0" & 10'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805058-FP

Fuel Storage Building Plan at Elevations 21'-6" & 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805059-FP

Fuel Storage Building Plan at Elevations 64'-0" & 84'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805084-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 3 W-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Truck Bay and Drum Storage Area 2.2 Location South Side El. 25'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete - South Concrete Outside East Concrete - West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 2,050 Sq. Ft.Length81.5' Width 25' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 87,400 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WPB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

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11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: 1,400 Pounds 5,464 Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 600 Pounds 4,402 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

9,866 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

20,224,076 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-LB-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z and W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread ove r 1598 sq.ft. (f ire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.2). (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 17,743 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 1,877 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 36 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 None S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Rev. 12 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no water fi re suppression in the subject area. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Spatial separation and the PAB's 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier prevents loss of any safe shutdown, or safety-related function. 18.2 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.3 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or hose reel, as necessary. 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Is Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1B-Z Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 2 W-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Decontamination Area 2.2 Location South Side El. 25'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete - South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 500 Sq. Ft.Length25'-6"Width 19'-6"Height 26'-0" 5.0 Volume 13,000 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WPB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity .01%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

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11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1B-Z Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 3 W-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Extruder/Evaporator Area 2.2 Location 42'-5" Elev. Cols. "A" To "B" - "2" To "3"

+ Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs. South 1'-6" & 2'-6" Concrete None East 2'-6" Concrete None West 1'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-6" Concrete

& Open None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-6" Concrete None 3.4 Doors Open Access None 3.5 Others Ladder None 4.0 Floor Area 491 Sq. Ft.Length27'/14'Width 18'/10'Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 5,156 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 3% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other

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11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2, 3 & 4)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Fire Oil: 2.2 Gallons 672 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 672 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 330,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft. (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.

2). (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 F 14.3 Fire Duration 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of extruder/ev aporator function. 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 3 W-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Crystallizer Pump Room 2.2 Location 4.2'-5" Elev. Cols. A-3 Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 1'-6" Concrete 3 Hrs. South 2'-6" Concrete None East 1'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-3" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete None 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 187 Sq. Ft.Length17' Width 11' Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 1,964 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 3.3%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Stand Pipe System Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire Note: Oil Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.5 Gallons 1,203 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1203 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 225,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z and W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft. (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.

2). (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of crystal recirculation pumps. 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of cryst. Pumps.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no water fire suppression in the subject area. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 3 W-F-2C-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2C-Z 2.1 Area Name Asphalt Meter Pump Area 2.2 Location 42'-5" Elev. Cols. A-3 Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs. South 1'-6" Concrete None East 1'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete Outside Wall 3.2 Floor 2'-6" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-6" Concrete None 3.4 Doors One (1) 3 Hrs. 3.5 Others One (1) Locked Mesh Door None 4.0 Floor Area 150 Sq. Ft.Length10'-0"Width 15'-0"Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 1,575 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 8.5%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 4.25Gallons 4250 Btu/Sq. Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: Asphalt -5Gallons 5,000 Btu/Sq. Ft. 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

9,250 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 1,387,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft. (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.

2). (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of metering function. 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 3 W-F-2D-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2D-Z 2.1 Area Name Turntable and Drum Conveyor Area 2.2 Location 25'-0" Elev, Cols. "A" - "B" & "2" - "4" Drawing No F-80566l-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs. South 3'-0" Concrete None East 2'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-0" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete

& Open None 3.4 Doors 5" Lead None 3.5 Others Ladder None 4.0 Floor Area 507 Sq. Ft.Length39'-0"Width 13'-0"Height 17'-0" 5.0 Volume 8,619 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 70% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 41.25Gallons 12,204 Btu/Sq.

Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 12,204 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 6,187,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-LB-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft. (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.

2). (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of drum conveyor.

15.2 No safe shutdown or safety-related equipment in the area. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basi s Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences -- fire will be extinguished.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Rev. 7 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Space Protected

1. Not applicable (see 15.2).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2E-Z Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 2 W-F-2E-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2E-Z 2.1 Area Name Waste Solidification Control Room 2.2 Location 25'-0" Elev. Cols. "A-B" & "3"-"4" Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs. South 3'-0" Concrete None East 2'-0" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor 2'-0" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete None 3.4 Doors One (1) 3 Hrs. 3.5 Others None - 4.0 Floor Area 477 Sq. Ft.Length26'-6"Width 18'-0"Height 14'-6" 5.0 Volume 6,917 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WAH-AC-76 Air Conditioning Unit 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No Further Analysis Required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2E-Z Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - TF-F-1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 1 of 2 TF-F-1-0 1.0 Building Tank Farm (RWST) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TF-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Area 2.2 Location Between PAB & Waste Processing Building Drawing No 805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 22'-0" H x 2'-0" Conc. W/Siding to Roof 3 Hr. South 22'-0" H x 2'-0" Conc. Dike - East 2'-0" Concrete 3 Hr. (PAB) West 2'-0" Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Buildup Roof - 3.4 Doors None - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 3,120 Sq. Ft.Length65'-0"Width 48'-0"Height 60'-0" 5.0 Volume 187,200 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WAH-FN-59A&B7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type Ref. Deviation No. 2 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - TF-F-1-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 10 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Piping, Valves & Instruments CBS X X X Cabling CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X

Waste Processing Building Plan at Elev. 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805661-FP

Waste Processing Building Plan and Section Elev. 42'-5" & 65'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805882-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 1 of 3 SW-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Circulating Water Pump

2.2 Location

North Side El 21'

- 0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476 - FP, 20247 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal Outside South Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.* East Metal Outside West Metal Outside 3.2 Floor Grating/Concrete

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Fiberboard Outside 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 14,800 Sq. Ft. Length 125' Width 118.67' Height 29.83' 5.0 Volume 442,500 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Grating) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ---- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.

• 2' -0"X1' -8" Trash Through Penetration Is Not Fire Rated.

Ref. Deviation No. 3 SBN

-904 Dated 12/2/85

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 145.5 Gallons 1,475 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 3,54 2 Pounds 3,111 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

4,586 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

67,880,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) One of the three (3) circulating water pumps ruptures and the entire contents (32.5 gallon/unit x 1 = 32.5 gallons) of oil will spill down and be contained in the cubicle at pit floor at elevation 4

' -0". This will cover an area of approximately 16' -0" x 26' -0" = 416 sq. Ft. The entire contents will ignite and burn.

(B) The oil from one of the three circulating water pump traveling screens spills on the floor and the total of 70.5 gallons of oil will ignite and burn covering an area of 15' -0" x 60' -0" = 900 sq. ft. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11, 719 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 47 6 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of affected service water pump due to loss of oil. Fire duration is less than 5 minutes and affected pit is separated from adjoining pit by a concrete structure.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1A-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Not applicable (neither automatic suppression system nor fire detection system is present). Effect will be the loss of affected pump.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The pit of each pump is surrounded by a concrete structure. The fire duration is less than 5 minutes and the pit is 16.0 feet deep.

A fire involving a traveling screen will not spread to other fire zones. The subject fire zone is separated from other zones by a concrete structure. The exception is an opening in the trench loading to SW

-F-1E-Z. Exhaust air moment, however, is away from SW

-F-1E-Z and therefore the fire will not spread to this fire zone.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in Same Area Protected 19.1 There is no safe shutdown equipment in the affected area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Control Room "A"

2.2 Location

Southwest El 22'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete 11/2 Hr. West Concrete 11/2 Hr./Outside

3.2 Floor

Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceilin g Concrete 3 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 725 Sq. Ft. Length 31' Width 23.3' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 12,700 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1B-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B 460 Motor Control Centers E514 EDE X X Cabling EDE X X Cabling SW X X Cabling SWA X X X Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling CW X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1C-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Ta b 11 Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Control Room "B"

2.2 Location

Southwest El 22'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete Outside East Concrete 11/2 Hr. We st Concrete Outside/11/2 Hr.

3.2 Floor

Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.

3.5 Others

Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 375 Sq. Ft. Length 23.3' Width 16' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 6,530 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactiv ity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1C-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Ta b 11 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling SWA X X X X 460v-Motor Control Centers E614 EDE X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Fan Room 2.2 Location Southwest El 22'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete 11/2 Hr. West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 110 Sq. Ft. Length 16.5' Width 6.6' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 1,925 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electrical Room Vent System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1D-A Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Fan-FN-40A SWA X X Cabling SWA X X X Fan FN-40B SWA X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1E-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 1 of 3 SW-F-1E-Z 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1E-Z 2.1 Area Name Service Water Pump Area

2.2 Location

South Side El 21'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP & 202478

- FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.

• South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr. 3.2 Floor Grating/Concrete

- 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 8,500 Sq. Ft. Length 114.6' Width 74' Height 27.25' 5.0 Volume 231,250 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Grating) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3.

• 2' -0" X 1' -8" Trash Through Penetration Is Not Fire Rated.

Ref: Deviation No. 3 SBN

-904 Dated 12/2/85

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1E-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Pump P-41A SW X X Cabling SW X X X Pump P-41C SW X X Piping, Valves & Instruments SW X X X Pump P-41B SW X X Pump P-41D SW X X Instrument Rack IR

- 73 MM X X X Fans FN - 38A & 38B SWA X X X Dampers DP

- 39A &

39B SWA X X X Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling SWA X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 73 Gallons 1,288 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 4,122 Pounds 6,304 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

7,592 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

64,536,000 Btu SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-1E-Z Rev. 15 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Two out of a total of four service water pumps rupture. Total oil content of 26.5 gallons spills to the pit floor at elevation 4'

-0" and burns completely, covering an area of 342 square feet.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,623 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 804 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

4.5 Minutes

15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The affected circulating water pumps are lost due to loss of oil.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Because of the remote location from the control room, the short duration of fire (less than five minutes and manual fire protection systems consisting of fire hydrant and fire extinguishers, only the affected circulating water pumps may be lost. 17.0 Consequences of in Advertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The subject zone is surrounded by a concrete structure which separates adjoining fire zones with the exception of the opening however, is away from SW

-F-1A-Z, and therefore, the fire will not spread to other fire zone.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 There is no safe shutdown equipment in the subject fire zone.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 1 of 2 SW-F-2-0 1.0 Building Service Water Intake

& Discharge Structure 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-2-0 2.1 Area Name Service Water Intake

& Discharge Structure

2.2 Location

E - 6500, N-10,000 & N

-9,990 Drawing No 9763 - F - 300245 - FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Grating Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Tornado/Missile

- 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 2,086/1,876 Sq. Ft. Length 75'/67' Width 74'/67' Height 101'/101' 5.0 Volume 210,686/189,476 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydran t 10.3 Detection None* 10.4 Other ----- 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Ref.: Deviation No. 2, SBN

-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- SW-F-2-0 Rev. 6 Section F.2 Tab 11 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B SW-V-44 SW X X X SW-V-63 SW X X X Piping & Valves SW X X Cabling SW X Service & Circ. Water Pump House Plan and Section General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202476-FP

Service & Circ. Water Pump House Sections General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202478-FP

Underground Duct Plan Circ. & Service Water Area S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-300245-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1C-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 1 of 2 CT-F-1C-A

1.0 Building

Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room Unit #1 Train "B" 2.2 Location East Side El 22' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 11/2 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 615 Sq. Ft.Length25' Width 24.5' Height 22' 5.0 Volume 13,500 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1C-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownTemp. Switches SWA X X 480v Subst. E64 EDE X X Cabling EDE X X

460v - Motor Control Centers MCC-E-641 EDE X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 1 of 3 CT-F-1D-A

1.0 Building

Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room Unit #1 Train "A" 2.2 Location East Side El 22' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -805068 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 11/2 Hr./Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 11/2 Hr. 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 615 Sq. Ft.Length25' Width 24.5' Height 22' 5.0 Volume 13,500 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown 460v Motor Control Centers E-513 EDE X X Cabling EDE X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X Temp. Switches SWA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 27 Pounds 571 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 571 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 351,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.

2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire

is not severe and has a low heat release rate.

3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladder and about 2 feet from the

wall for an area covering 20 ft. X 2 ft. = 40 sq. ft. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 8775 Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. Fire 165 F 14.3 Duration of Fire >> 5 Minutes S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Train a service water may not be available due to smoke damage. Thermal damage is expected to be minimal. 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 The redundant Train B equipment and cables are located in a separate fire area.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 1 of 3 CT-F-2B-A

1.0 Building

Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Ventilation & Mech. Rooms For Unit #1 2.2 Location East Side El 46' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 11/2 Hr./ - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams - 4.0 Floor Area 3,575 Sq. Ft.Length71.5' Width 50' Height 29.5' 5.0 Volume 105,460 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Roof Ventilators 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2 & 3).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownPump - P - 110A SW X X Cabling SW X X X Pump - P -110B SW X X Piping & Valves SW X X X X Fan FN - 64 SWA X X Cabling SWA X X Fan FN - 63 SWA X X Damper Dp - 65, 66 SWA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: 26.5 Gallons 1,112 Btu/Sq.

Ft. Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Plastics: 43 Pounds 156 Btu/Sq. Ft. Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,268Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles: 3,975,000Btu S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Rev 8 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. One of the two (2) Service Water Pumps rupture, oil spills on the floor. For conservatism, the oil from the other pump is added to the spill, therefore a total of 26.5 gallons of oil is assumed spilled. 2. This oil is assumed to cover an area of approximately 350 square feet. It ignites and burns completely. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,112Btu/Sq. Ft. 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 1658 F 14.3 Duration of Fire <5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers. 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Op eration or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade. 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or fire hoses. 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-3-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 1 of 2 CT-F-3-0 1.0 Building Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-3-0 2.1 Area Name Top of Cooling Tower 2.2 Location Outside - Top of Cooling Tower El. 77' -0" Drawing No 9763-F-805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North N/A N/A South N/A N/A East N/A N/A West N/A N/A 3.2 Floor N/A N/A 3.3 Ceiling N/A N/A 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area N/A Sq. Ft.LengthN/A Width N/A Height N/A 5.0 Volume N/A Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System N/A 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Approximately 70 gallons of oil in each Train A fan gear reducer and approximately 30 gallons of oil in each Train B fan gear reducer. Outside location no further analysis required.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-3-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 12 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe ShutdownNo Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Fan-FN-1-51A SW X X Fan-1-FN-51B SW X X Fan-2-FN-51B SW X X Fan-2-FN-51A SW X X Cabling SW X X X

Service Water Cooling Tower General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805068-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CE-F-1-Z Rev. 1 5 Section F.2 Tab 13 Page 1 of 4 CE-F-1-Z 1.0 Building Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CE-F-1-Z 2.1 Area Name Cont. Encl. Ventilation Area & Cont. Annulus

• • 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-P-805051-FP, 805052

-FP, 805053

-FP, 805055-FP, 805056

-FP, and 805059

-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs)

3.5 Others

Fireproofed Cols

- 4.0 Floor Area 1,633 Sq. Ft. ( x 130' x 4') x 125' = 40,825 Cu. Ft.

3,060 Sq. Ft. Length 112' Width Varies Height 29.5' Total 4,693 Sq. Ft. = 90,270 Cu. Ft.

5.0 Volume

131, 095 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Normal Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 30% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Photoelectric/

Ionization/None* /Carbon Monoxide Detection in EAH - F- 9. 69. 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 *** (analysis continued pages 2

- 4) ** Cont. Encl. Vent Eq. Area and Cont. Annulus Are in Communication with Each Other Thru Structural Openings.

• Cont. Annulus Portion Has No Detection.

Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN

-904, Dated 12/02/85

• • • Charcoal Loading For Both EAH

-F-9, 69 Total Is 2100 Lbs. Charcoal. Charcoal Fire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix D.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CE-F-1-Z Rev. 1 5 Section F.2 Tab 13 Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cooling Unit AC

-2A EAH X X Cabling EAH X X X Cooling Unit AC

- 2B EAH X X Damper DP

- 3A EAH X X Damper DP

- 3B EAH X X Fan FN - 31A EAH X X Fan FN - 31B EAH X X Damper DP

- 25A EAH X Damper DP

- 25B EAH X Cabling PAH X X Damper DP

- 35B, 36b PAH X X Filters F

- 9, 69 EAH X X X Fan FN-4A, B EAH X X X Dampers DP

- 30A, B EAH X X X Dampers DP

- 29A, B EAH X X X Cabling SF X X X Cabling FAH X X X Cabling CC X X X FN FN - 5A, B EAH X X X Damper DP-37A, B EAH X X X Instruments EAH X X X Piping, Valves, Instruments & Cabling CAP X X X Damper DP

- 13A, B FAH X X X 13.0

• No 3 hr. Rated fire damper provided in exhaust duct at the point of connection to the unit plant vent.

• • No Automatic Detection in Containment Annulus Area.

• Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN - 904 Dated 12/2/85

• • Ref: Deviation No. 2 SBN - 904 Dated 12/2/85

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CE-F-1-Z Rev. 1 5 Section F.2 Tab 13 Page 3 of 4 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: 2,100 Pounds

• Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

35 Pounds 97 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

97 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

455.000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.

2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.

3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 24 ft. X 2 ft. = 48 ft.

2. 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 7313 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp.During Fire 290 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

>5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R). 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable

• Charcoal Fire Loading was not considered in total area. See Appendix D.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- CE-F-1-Z Rev. 1 5 Section F.2 Tab 13 Page 4 of 4 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.

18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.

19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).

Containment Structure Plan at Elev.(-)26'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805051-FP

Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 0'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805052-FP

Containment Structure Plan at Elev. 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805053-FP

Containment Structure Plan at Elev. (-) 44 o-9" Elevation "A-A", "B-B", & "C-C" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805055-FP

Containment Structure Elevation "D-D", "E-E" & "F-F" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805056-FP

Fuel Storage Building Plan at Elevations 21'-6" & 25'-0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-805059-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 14 Page 1 of 3 FPH-F-1A-A

1.0 Building

Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Diesel Pump Room - West

2.2 Location

EL 21'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Metal Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 825 Sq. Ft.Length30' Width 27.5' Height 17' 5.0 Volume 14,025 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Thermal 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 14 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment - No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 7 Gallons 1,272 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics:

732 Pounds 11,535 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

12,807 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

10,566,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. The engine lube oil system ruptures and the entire contents (7 gallons of oil) are sprayed over the pump room covering an area of 91 square feet. Oil film thickness is 1/8". 2. Oil is ignited, burned and consumed.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Fire Area Peak Temperature 2,164 ºF 14.3 Fire Duration 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine.

15.2 Loss of controls to pump engine.

15.3 Redundant pump, located in separate fire area.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 14 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine due to lose of oil. 16.2 Possible loss of engine controls.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Possible loss of engine controls.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is short, therefore, the structure will contain the fire. The consequences of fire are mitigated further by operation of the sprinkler system.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. (see 15.1) fire pumps are not required for safe shutdown nor are they safety related.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1B-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 14 Page 1 of 2 FPH-F-1B-A

1.0 Building

Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electric Pump Room

2.2 Location

El 21' -0" Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 480 Sq. Ft.Length 16' Width 30' Height 17' 5.0 Volume 8,160 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1B-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 14 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment - No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Rev 6 Section F.2. Tab 14 Page 1 of 3 FPH-F-1C-A

1.0 Building

Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Diesel Pump Room East

2.2 Location

El 21'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Metal Outside West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ - 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams

- 4.0 Floor Area 825 Sq. Ft.Length30' Width 27.5' Height 17' 5.0 Volume 14,025 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Thermal 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Rev 6 Section F.2. Tab 14 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment - No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 7 Gallons 1,273 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft. Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics:

33 Pounds 520 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

1,793 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

1,479,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description

1. the Engine Lube Oil System Ruptures a nd the Entire Contents (7 Gallons of Oil) Are Sprayed Over the Pump Room Covering An Area of 91 Square Feet. Oil Film Thickness Is 1/8". 2. Oil Is Ignited, Burned and Consumed. 3. Duration of Fire Is 1 1/2 Minutes.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Fire Area Peak Temperature 2,105ºF 14.3 Fire Duration 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine.

15.2 Loss of controls to pump engine.

15.3 Redundant pump, located elsewhere, is unaffected.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Rev 6 Section F.2. Tab 14 Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine due to loss of oil. 16.2 Possible loss of engine controls.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is short therefore the structure will contain the fire.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3). Fire pumps are not required for safe shutdown nor are they safety related.

Fire Pump House Tray Plan & Grounding S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-300831-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1A-Z Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Ground Floor

2.2 Location

El 21' -0" Southwest Drawing No 9763-F -202052-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Block

- South Concrete/Metal 3 Hr./Outside East - - West Concrete/Block 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Grating - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 21,185 Sq. Ft. 4.0 Floor Area 7,852 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Wid th Varies Height 25' 21,675 5.0 Volume 196,312 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Power Roof Ventilators

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Fire Extinguisher(s) 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3

.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1A-Z Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Cabling EDE X X Non Seg Bus Feeder For 4160v Swgr E5 EDE X Non Seg Bus Feeder For 4160v Swgr E6 EDE X Air Compressor SA-SKD-137A, SA-SKD-137B, SA-SKD-137C SA X X Instruments SA X X Piping & Valves SA X X Dryer SKD-18A, 18B IA X X Cabling SA X X Cabling IA X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X 125 V Dc Switch Gear 12A, 12B EDE X Pump P-113 FW X Cabling CO X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1A-Z Rev. 14 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 3 of 3 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 961 Gallons 3,372 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 98 Pounds 2 9.8 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Hydrogen 2,860 Cubic Feet 22 Btu/Sq. Ft.

13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

3,4 23.8 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

146, 367 , 4 5 0 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) The single largest quantity of oil, 680 gallons, which is associated with hydrogen seal unit, is spilled over a curbed area of 320 square feet and burned completely.

(b) Ventilation supply air thru open louvers and exhaust air thru roof ventilators is passing over the fire area providing oxygen for burning.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 318,750 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 204 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 125 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Hydrogen seal unit is lost because of loss of oil leading to eventual trip.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Hydrogen seal unit may be lost because of loss of oil possibly leading to reactor trip.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Inadvertent actuation of deluge sprinkler system will cause minor flooding. Hydrogen seal unit is unaffected. Floor is sloped for drainage.

18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The entire spill of oil is isolated by a curbed area from surroundings. The fire will be contained locally.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment in the vicinity of the affected zone.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1B-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room

2.2 Location

El 21' -0" SW Corner Drawing No 9763-F-202052 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Block 3 Hr. South Concrete/Block 3 Hr. East Concrete/Block 3 Hr. West Concrete/Block 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr. 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others Fireproof Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.

• 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft. Length 28'-0" Width 16'-0" Height 14'-4" 5.0 Volume 6,422 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear N one X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust Fan

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3

• Fire Proofing Not Required By Steel Analysis.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1B-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Battery B-2A, B ED X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 1,888 Pounds 67,568 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

67, 568 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles: 30,405,532 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire Starts Involving the Battery Cells.

(B) the Fire Spreads To Involve All Battery Cells.

(C) This Area Is Cut

-Off From the Main Turbine Ground Floor By Fire Rated Construction. A Fire Is Not Expected To Propagate Beyond This Area.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 67.568 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire

>750 F 14.3 Duration of Fire

>5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of batteries.

15.2 Refer to Seabrook Station Safe Shutdown Capability "Appendix R" analysis.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of one of two batteries.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1B-A Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 3 of 3 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Area is separated from the main turbine building ground floor by fire rated barriers.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 See 15.0 above.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1C-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1C-Z 2.1 Area Name Relay Room

2.2 Location

Northwest El. 21'

-0" Drawing No 9763-F -202052 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Block

- South Concrete/Block

- East Concrete/Block

- West Concrete/Block 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Plank

- 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 2, 600 Sq. Ft. Length 80'-0" Width 32'-6" Height 14'-0" 5.0 Volume 36,400 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System TAH-FN-127 & TAH-FN-67 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 7.6% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Control Panel CP

-84 SY X X X Cabling EDE X X X Control Panel CP

-85 SY X X X Control Panel CP

-86 SY X X X Control Panel CP

-87 SY X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: 544 Pounds 32,650 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

32,650 Btu/Sq. Ft. Total Combustibles:

8,800,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A. Fire starts in one of the two battery rooms.

B. The fire spreads to involve all the battery cells within the room.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 36,300 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 1,040 F 14.3 Duration of Fire 41 Minutes SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-1C-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery function.

15.2 Refer to Seabrook Station Safe Shutdown Capability "Appendix R" analysis.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of one of two batteries.

17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in zone.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Batteries are not separated from relay room by fire

-rated construction. Effects from battery fire may propagate to relay room. See 15.0 above.

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 See 15.0 above.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-2-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 1 of 2 TB-F-2-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-2-Z 2.1 Area Name Mezzanine (Hallway*) 2.2 Location El 50' -0" SW Corner (El 75' -0" SW Corner)

Drawing No 9763-F -202053-FP (9763-F -202054-FP) 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North - / (Concrete)

- ( - ) South Concrete/Metal (Concrete/Metal) 3 Hr./Outside (3 Hr./Outside)

East - ( - ) - ( - ) West Concrete (Concrete) 3 Hr./Outside (Outside) 3.2 Floor Grating (Concrete)

- ( - ) 3.3 Ceiling Concrete ( - ) - ( - ) 3.4 Doors Metal (Metal) 3 Hr./ - (3 Hr.) 3.5 Others - - ( - ) (650) (10') (65') (25') 4.0 Floor Area 3,250 Sq. Ft. Length 50' Width 65' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 81,250 (16,250) Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Power Roof Ventilator

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No (X) 9.0 Operational Radioactivity (Hallway

& Mezzanine) 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Entries for Hallway in parenthesis and italicized for differentiation

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-2-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B Control Panel CP

-414 Control Panel CP

-558 FP X Cabling CBA X Cabling EDE X Cabling SA X Cabling MS X X X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-3-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 1 of 3 TB-F-3-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-3-Z 2.1 Area Name SAS & Computer Rooms, Start

-Up & Turbine Erector's Office

- Electronic Work Area

2.2 Location

El 75' -0" SW Corner Drawing No 9763-F -202054-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete - South Concrete - East Concrete - West Metal Outside/3 Hr.

3.2 Floor

Concrete - Class I Interior Floor Finish

3.3 Ceiling

Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 4,030 Sq. Ft. Length 62' Width 65' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 100,750 Cu. Ft. 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Office Air Conditioning System

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 10% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type (Sprinkler system above rooms) 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------ 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 &

3)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-3-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required For Safe Shutdown Equipment System System Train Safety Related A B No Safety Related Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Zone 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ)

Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.

Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Class A: 4,500 Pounds 12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Chemicals:

Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.

Other: 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area:

12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.

Total Combustibles:

36,000,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A. Fire starts in an office waste paper basket.

B. Fire spreads throughout the entire fire zone consuming all combustibles (class a material).

C. The affected zone is isolated from ventilation air by the fire damper, allowing only partial combustibles to burn.

14.1 DBF Fire Loading 12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.

14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 690 F 14.3 Duration of Fire Eight (8) Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of occupancy of the offices and electronic work room.

15.2 There is no safe shutdown nor safety related equipment in the zone. Therefore, the consequences of a design basis fire will not be serious.

16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of occupancy of the subject area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis

- TB-F-3-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 15 Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in area.

18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Separation from the control room by a three

-hour-rated fire barrier prevents loss of any safety

-related function..

19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2)

Turbine Building Plan - Ground Floor - Elev. 21' - 0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202052-FP

Turbine Building Plan - Mezzanine Floor - Elev. 46' - 0" and 50' 0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202053-FP

Turbine Building Plan - Operating Floor - Elev. 75' - 0" General Arrangement S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-202054-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-1A-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

Northeast Corner - El. (-) 34' -6", (-) 20' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -311429-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete - East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/Open

- 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft.Length36' Width Varies Height 22' 5.0 Volume 9,900 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Piping & Valves CS X X X X Piping & Valves RC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CS X X X X Cabling RC X X X Instrumentation SI X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-1B-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

El. (-) 26' -0" & (-) 34' -6" Drawing No 9763-F -311429-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Open

- South Concrete/Open

- East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete/Open

- 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 441 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth Varies Height 16' & 22' 5.0 Volume 7,704 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves RC X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling RC X X Instruments SI X X Piping & Valves VG X X Cabling VG X X Piping & Valves WLD X X Instrument Rack IR-13A MM X X Temperature Elements &

Cabling MM X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-2A-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

Northwest Corner - El. (-) 34' -6" Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete 3 Hr. South Concrete/Open

- East Concrete/Open

- West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors None - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 252 Sq. Ft.Length18' Width 14' Height 35'-6" 5.0 Volume 8,946 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling SI X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X Cabling RC X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-2B-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

Southwest - El. (-) 26' -0" Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Open

- South Concrete - East Concrete/Open

- West MCG 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 157 Sq. Ft.Length16'-6"Width 9'-6" Height 16' 5.0 Volume 2,512 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X X Cabling RC X X Cabling SI X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-3A-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

Northeast Corner, El. (-) 11' -2 1/2 "

Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Open 3 Hr./ - South Concrete - East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete - 3.2 Floor Concrete - 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Open

- 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft.Length36' Width Varies Height 12' 5.0 Volume 5,400 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CS X X X X Instrumentation SI X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CBS X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-3B-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

West Central - El. (-) 34' -6" To (-) 11' -2 1/2 ", (-) 26' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete - South Concrete/Open

- East Concrete - West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 199 Sq. Ft.Length26'-6"Width 7'-6" Height 35'-6" 5.0 Volume 7,065 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-4B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-4B-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-4B-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

El. (-) 8' -0" & (-) 11' -2 1/2 "

Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Open

- South Concrete/Open

- /Outside East Concrete 3 Hr./ - West Concrete/MCG

- /3 Hr.

3.2 Floor

Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Open

- 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 555 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 5,307 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-4B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown Piping & Valves CC X X X X Cabling CC X X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CS X X X S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-5B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 1 of 2 PP-F-5B-Z

1.0 Building

Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-5B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area

2.2 Location

South End - El. (-) 34' -6" , (-) 26' -0" & 8' -0" Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Open

- South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr. West Concrete 3 Hr. 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - 3.4 Doors - - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft.LengthVariesWidth Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 4,629 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted)

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 33% 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-5B-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 16 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Required For Safe Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Zone Piping & Valves CS X X Instrumentation SI X X Cabling CS X X Cabling SI X X Main Steam Tunnel - West Lighting Plan - Lower Levels S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-311429-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - NES-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 17 Page 1 of 2 NES-F-1A-Z

1.0 Building

Non-Essential Switchgear Room 2.0 Fire Area or Zone NES-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Essential Switchgear Area

2.2 Location

North of Control Buil ding, El. 21' -6" & 37' -6" Drawing No 9763-F -310289-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete/Block 3 Hr. South Concrete 3 Hr.

• East Concrete/Block 3 Hr. West Concrete/Block Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Plank Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./Outside

3.5 Others

- - 4.0 Floor Area 3,552 Sq. Ft.Length96' Width 37' Height 27' 5.0 Volume 95,904 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (El. 37' -6" Only)

7.0 Exhaust

Ventilation System SGA 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other

---

11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Door C-100 Is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. (no further analysis required) Ref. Deviation No. 5, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - NES-F-1A-Z Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 17 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Cabling EDE X Cabling ED X Cabling RC X Non-Essential Switchgear Room Electrical General Arrangement and Grounding S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310289-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CST-F-1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 18 Page 1 of 2 CST-F-1-0

1.0 Building

Condensate Storage Tank 2.0 Fire Area Or Zone CST-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Condensate Storage Tank

2.2 Location

E-6, 100 N-10, 200 Drawing No 9763-F -310248-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal - 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 468/150 Sq. Ft.Length 48'/30'Width 8'/3' Height 13'/7'5.0 Volume 6,084/1,050 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes XA No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None* 10.4 Other 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985 S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - CST-F-1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 18 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related CO-LT-4096 A CO X X X CO-LISL-4052 A & B CO X X X Instrumentaion &

Cabling CO X Condensate Storage

Tank TK-25 CO X X X Piping & Valves CO X X X

Condensate & Demineralized Water Storage Tanks Conduit Lighting & Grounding Plan S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310828-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MUA-F-1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 19 Page 1 of 2 MUA-F-1-0

1.0 Building

Make Up Air - East 2.0 Fire Area Or Zone MUA-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Make Up Air East

2.2 Location

E-6, 300 N-10, 200 Drawing No 9763-F -310248-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Manhole Cover Outside 3.5 Others - - 4.0 Floor Area 205 Sq. Ft.Length14'-4"Width 14'-4"Height 8'-9" 5.0 Volume 1,790 Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Building Make Up Air

7.1 Percentage

of System's Capacity 100%8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None

• 10.4 Other 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)

• Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - MUA-F-1-0 Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 19 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related RM-RM-6506A CBA X X X RM-RM-6506B CBA X X X Radiation Monitor RM X X X Cabling RM X X X Cabling CBA X X X Underground Duct Plan Center S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310248-FP

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - DCT-F-*

Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 20 Page 1 of 2 DCT-F-* 1.0 Building Ductbanks 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DCT-F-1A-0, 1B-0, 2A-0, 2B-0, 3B-0, 4A-0, 4B-0, 5A-0 5B-0, 6-0, 7-0 2.1 Area Name Ductbanks

2.2 Location

Site Drawing No 9763-F-310 828-FP; 320251-FP; 300245-FP; 310254-FP; 310248-FP; 310249-FP; 320252-FP

3.0 Construction

of Area Material Min. Fire Rating

3.1 Walls

North N/A N/A South N/A N/A East N/A N/A West N/A N/A 3.2 Floor N/A N/A 3.3 Ceiling N/A N/A 3.4 Doors N/A N/A 3.5 Others N/A N/A 4.0 Floor Area N/A Sq. Ft.Length Width Height 5.0 Volume Cu. Ft.6.0 Floor Drains N/A 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System N/A 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No 9.2 Airborne Yes No 10.0 Fire Protection Type Ref: Deviation No. 2 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 10.1 Primary N/A 10.2 Secondary N/A 10.3 Detection N/A 10.4 Other

___

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Hazard Analysis - DCT-F-*

Rev 6 Section F.2 Tab 20 Page 2 of 2 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required) 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Equipment System A B Safety Related Cabling EDE X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling CC X X Cabling SI X X Cabling RC X X Cabling CS X X Cabling PAH X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling CBA X X X Cabling RM X X X Underground Duct Plan Circ. & Service Water Area S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-300245-FP

Underground Duct Plan Center S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310248-FP

Underground Duct Plan South S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310249-FP

Underground Duct & Grounding Misc. Area Plans, Details & Elevations.

S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310254-FP

Condensate & Demineralized Water Storage Tanks Conduit Lighting & Grounding Plan S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-310828-FP

Underground Duct Plan Center S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-320251-FP

Underground Duct Plan South S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A 9763-F-320252-FP

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 14 F.3 RESPONSES TO BTP APCSB 9.5-1, APPENDIX A This section presents a detailed comparison of the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A, on a position by position basis, with the approach taken in the design of Seabrook Station. Positions found in the left

-hand column of each page of Appendix A are restated followed by a discussion as to how closely the plant design complies with the particular Appendix position. Each position and its corresponding response have been presented on a separate page(s). It should be noted that Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5

-1 requires that plants for which applications for construction were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit, address the positions presented in the left hand side of each page of Appendix A, whereas those plants for which construction permits were issued discuss the positions on the right hand side of the pages. Since the Licensing Board's Initial Decision awarding the Seabrook construction permits is dated June 29, 1976, whereas the permits themselves are dated July 7, 1976, it was debated whether the responses should be to the positions in the right

-hand side of the pages. The decision reached was to address the left

-hand side and, thereby, provide, in many cases, a more conservative response.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 15 A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 1 A.1 Personnel Responsibility for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated. Such delegation of authority should be to staff personnel prepared by training and experience in fire protection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants. The qualification requirements for the fire protection engineer or consultant who will assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the system, develop the fire protection program, and assist in the fire

-fighting training for the operating plant should be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and the updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire protection equipment.

The fire protection staff should be responsible for:

(a) Coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fire, (b) Design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression and extinguishing systems, (c) Fire prevention activities, (d) Training and manual fire fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.

(NOTE: NFPA 6 - Recommendations for Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention , contains useful guidance for organization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program). The ultimate responsibility for the overall fire protection program for Seabrook Station rests with the Site Vice President.

The responsibility for various parts of the program has been delegated to other staff personnel and organizations prepared by training and experience in fire protection and in nuclear plant safety in order to provide a balanced approach in direction of the program.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 16 The initial design, construction and basic engineering responsibility for building layout and systems design of Seabrook Station relative to fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, fire detection, suppression and extinguishing systems, was assigned to the architect

-engineer, United Engineers & Constructors Inc. This included responsibility for design of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems.

Coordination of this effort at UE&C was handled by a representative of UE&C's fire protection group which was responsible for ensuring that all applicable fire protection and prevention codes and NRC regulatory requirements were complied with. The representative directed the conduct of the fire hazards analysis to verify that the effects of postulated fires were correctly evaluated and protected against. Final review and approval at UE&C of the fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Reevaluation Report was performed by a staff

-level fire protection engineer, an individual with an extensive background in fire protection design and evaluation. A copy of his resume has been included in this report.

During the initial design, construction and basic engineering, final review and approval of the layout and design came under the cognizance of Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Nuclear Services Division, who represented the owner. The responsibility for final review and approval of this effort with respect to fire area requirements was assigned to the Fire Protection Coordinator, who was also assigned the responsibility for the ultimate review and approval of the Seabrook fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Re

-evaluation Report. A copy of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company Fire Protection Coordinator's resume has been included in this report. The responsibility for the fire prevention program during construction of Seabrook Station was assigned to the Resident Construction Manager. He and his staff were assisted in these activities by the YAEC Fire Protection Coordinator. Subsequent to construction completion and core load the corporate fire protection program responsibility has been assigned to the Director of Engineering. The Director of Engineering has assigned this responsibility to the Manager of Design Engineering to coordinate all fire protection activities and to perform technical reviews and evaluations of modifications and program implementation. Lead responsibility for fire protection engineering is assigned to corporate Design Engineering.

The responsibility for the maintenance of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems has been assigned to the Seabrook Station Director. In addition, he has been assigned the responsibility for fire prevention activities at the plant, including training and manual fire fighting activities of plant personnel, including the fire brigade. He is assisted in these activities by his plant staff. The development of the in

-plant program, plan and procedures is more fully addressed in responses to Paragraph B.1 through B.7.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 17 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.2 Design Bases The overall fire protection program should be based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safety shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.

Response The overall fire protection systems for the Seabrook plant are based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.3 Back-up Total reliance should not be placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate back-up fire suppression capability should be provided.

Response Total reliance has not been placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. In all instances, there is at least one back

-up system available to suppress a fire. Additional back

-up capability is provided by the fire brigade as well as response by an outside fire department.

Portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the plant for use on small fires.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 18 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.4 Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, redundant fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should be provided.

Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena. However, in the event of the most severe earthquake, i.e. the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the fire suppression systems should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown. The fire protection system should, however, retain their original design capability fo r: (1) natural phenomena of less severity and greater frequency (approximately once in

10 years) such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms or small intensity earthquakes which are characteristic of the site geographic region and (2) for potential m an-created site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes which have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.

Response The fire suppression system includes three redundant fire water pumps; each pump designed to handle 50% of capacity. One of the fire pumps is electrically driven while the other two are individually diesel engine driven. The electric power for the motor-driven pump is provided with two independent power supplies. Each diesel engine

-driven pump has its own controller. Each controller has two independent batteries. Upon loss of power from one battery, the other battery is available to supply the required power for starting the diesel engine

-driven pump. Each controller is furnished with a battery charger for charging both batteries simultaneously.

The yard fire water main piping is supplied from the three independent discharge lines from the fire pumps. These lines feed the fire main piping in two directions.

The fire tanks are grounded; the fire pumps are housed within a grounded building; the fire lines are run underground and are free from the effects of lightning. Adequate grounding in plant

buildings provides assurance that the effects of lightning strikes will not degrade the performance of fire detection systems.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 19 Those portions of the fire suppression system which are underground or contained in seismic Category I buildings are protected against tornadoes and tornado driven missiles. The potential for damage of other portions of the fire suppression system by tornadoes is low because of the low incidence of tornadoes in the Seabrook area.

The entire fire suppression system including the fire pump house structure and fire protection storage tanks is designed to withstand the effects of the 100 year hurricane

-110 mph. (See FSAR, Section 3.3). This wind could possibly cause the removal of some of the steel siding of the fire pump house, but would not otherwise cause the building structure to fail.

Since the elevation of the fire pump house floor slab is 21'

-0", the 100 year flood which results in a still water elevation of 20.6' would cause no damage to the fire suppression system components here. Seabrook FSAR Section 3.4.1 describes the flood protection provided for Category I structures and their contents.

All buildings containing fire suppression systems are designed to withstand the 100 year snow and/or ice storm, which is equivalent to a roof loading of 75 psf (see FSAR Section 2.3).

In general, the fire suppression system is not designed as a seismic Category I system. However, those portions of this system within seismic Category I structures necessary to deliver water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown are designed to withstand the effects of the SSE. Three exceptions are certain hose stations serving the Control Building, "A" Train Electrical Tunnel, and "B" Train Electrical Tunnel. These hose stations were added so that the served areas could be reached with an effective water stream using a maximum hose length of 100 feet. For physical reasons, they are connected to the non

-seismic part of the fire protection system. During a fire, however, the fire brigade can add additional hose to other seismic hose stations serving these areas to provide satisfactory coverage if the non

-seismic stations are unavailable. The fire pump house, as with all non-seismic Category I buildings, is designed to the requirements of the Uniform Building Code. Thus, the pump house structure will not fail as a result of an earthquake with a ground acceleration up to approximately 0.12g. In the Seabrook area, the 10 year earthquake is estimated to have a ground acceleration of approximately 0.05 g.

In the event of the most severe earthquake, the SSE, the fire suppression system is capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the following manner:

All such areas (except as noted above) are provided with standpipes (Category I design) which are connected through an administratively controlled valve to plant service water system, also seismic Category I designed.

The potential for man

-created, site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes and explosions which could adversely affect the fire suppression system is of a very low probability.

The details pertaining to these events are given in the FSAR Section 2.2 and in the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report for the Seabrook station.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 20 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 A.5 Fire Suppression System Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety related systems or components. Fire suppression systems that are pressurized during normal plant operation should meet the guideline specified in APCSB Branch Technical Position 3

-1, "Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment".

Response The failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression systems will not incapacitate safety related systems or components.

The fixed fire suppression system for safety

-related areas consists of standpipes and hose reels and automatic water spray systems. All standpipes are pressurized except those in the containment building which are dry. The automatic pre

-action sprinkler systems are pressurized with air but are not wet until actuated by the Fire Detection System. The automatic water spray deluge systems are not pressurized. The standpipes in the containment building are not pressurized until the water supply valves are opened.

Standpipes and automatic water spray deluge piping systems in safety

-related areas are designed and supported as required for a Category I system to prevent pipe failure and subsequent pipe whip.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 21 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 A.6 Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection program (plans, personnel and equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire zones which could affect the fuel storage zone should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site. Schedule for implementation of modifications, if any, will be established on a case

-by-case basis.

Response The fire protection system for the fuel area and the adjacent fire areas was operational prior to receiving fuel on site. The portion of the fire protection program required to protect the new fuel storage building, including implementing procedures and personnel training, was in effect prior to receiving fuel on site.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.7 Fuel Loading The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit. Schedule for implementation of modifications, if any, will be established on a case

-by-case basis.

Response The fire protection program was operational prior to initial fuel loading.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 22 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.8 Multiple-Reactor Sites On multiple

-reactor sites where there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.

Response Seabrook 2 construction activities have been stopped. The fire protection program developed for Seabrook 1 provides for a continuing evaluation and the administrative controls necessary to protect the operating unit from fire hazards. The provision of additional fire protection capability is based upon the results of this continuing evaluation. The response to Paragraph A.1 provides the responsibilities applicable to the post

-construction operational phase.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.9 Simultaneous Fires Simultaneous fires in more than one reactor need not be postulated where separation requirements are met. A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.

Response A fire involving more than one reactor has not been postulated. Construction on Seabrook 2 has been stopped.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 23 B. Administrative Procedures, Controls and Fire Brigade APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 B.1 Fire Protection System and Personnel Administrative Procedures Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the performance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be provided.

Guidance is contained in the following publications:

NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades Response Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the performance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants is provided using the guidance contained in the appropriate NFPA publications. These procedures are described in the Station Fire Protection Manual.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 24 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 5 B.2 Bulk Storage of Combustible Materials Effective administrative measures should be implemented to prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39, "Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants", provides guidance on housekeeping, including the disposal of combustible materials.

Response Effective administrative measures are implemented to govern the storage of materials and the housekeeping of the plant. The plant "Station Maintenance Manual" shall be the governing administrative document for housekeeping. The "Station Fire Protection Manual" is the administrative manual to control combustible materials. APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 5 B.3 Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or Other Anticipated Operations Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modifications (e.g.,

breaking fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and refueling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of management and appropriate special actions and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety. In particular:

(a) Work involving ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely controlled conditions. Procedures governing such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in fire protection. Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and equipped to prevent and combat fires. If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire protection should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 25 (b) Leak testing, and similar procedures such as air flow determination, should use one of the commercially available aerosol techniques. Open flames or combustion generated smoke should not be permitted.

(c) Use of combustible material, e.g., HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins or other combustible supplies, in safety related areas should be controlled. Use of wood inside buildings containing safety related systems or equipment should be permitted only when suitable non

-combustible substitutes are not available. If wood must be used, only fire-retardant treated wood (scaffolding, lay down blocks) should be permitted. Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.

Response Any plant modifications, engineering design change requests, and plant design change requests are reviewed for fire protection concerns. Plant procedures are reviewed by plant management.

Maintenance procedures, except for routine jobs in non

-controlled areas, are reviewed by plant management.

(a) Work involving welding, cutting and brazing is controlled and covered in the Station Fire Protection Manual.

(b) Open flames or combustion generated smoke will not be used for leak testing or air flow determinations.

(c) Storage of combustible supplies are controlled in plant areas. Use of wood is controlled by the Station Fire Protection Manual. In

-situ combustibles are considered in the fire hazards analysis. Transient combustibles used during maintenance or refueling are controlled by the Station Fire Protection Manual.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 26 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 6 B.4 Public Fire Department Support Nuclear power plants are frequently located in remote areas, at some distance from public fire departments. Also, first response fire departments are often volunteer. Public fire department response should be considered in the overall fire protection program. However, the plant should be designed to be self

-sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.

Response The plant fire protection systems plus the fire brigade allow the plant to be self

-sufficient with respect to fire fighting. Reliance on the local fire department is for backup capability.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 7 B.5 Plant Fire Brigade Guidance The need for good organization, training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be implemented to assure proper discharge of these functions.

The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants",

should be followed as applicable. (a) Successful fire fighting requires testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communication, as well as practice as brigades for the people who must utilize the equipment. A test plan that lists the individuals and their responsibilities in connection with routine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connections to water systems.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 27 (b) Basic training is a necessary element in effective fire fighting operation. In order for a fire brigade to operate effectively, it must operate as a team. All members must know what their individual duties are. They must be familiar with the layout of the plant and equipment location and operation in order to permit effective fire fighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself in the major areas of the plant. The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be pre planned and post

-critiques to establish the training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met. These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications within the fire brigade and with the on scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the offsite command post.

Response (a) Effective measures for training and equipping fire brigades, testing and maintaining fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communication have been implemented to cover the above subjects.

Testing and inspections of fire detection and protection systems have been covered by established procedures. (b) Fire brigade training is accomplished in a manner to include all of the above concerns.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 28 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 8 B.6 Coordination With Local Fire Department To have proper coverage during all phases of operation, members of each shift crew should be trained in fire protection. Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the local fire department so that responsibilities and duties are delineated in advance. This coordination should be part of the training course and implemented into the training of the local fire department staff. Local fire departments should be educated in the operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites. Local fire departments should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.

Response Selected shift crew personnel are trained in fire protection. Shift crew fire protection training is by job classification which is directed towards those individuals who are at liberty to leave the control room during various phases of plant operation.

The plant fire protection training program is offered annually to local fire departments where practicable. Local fire department training curriculum includes the pertinent aspects of:

a. Station layout

b. Operational precautions

c. Radiological and other hazards

d. Types and locations of probable fires

e. Responsibilities and limitations of authority

f. Other topics, as necessary

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 29 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 9 B.7 NFPA Standards NFPA 27, "Private Fire Brigade" should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills.

This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equipment.

Among the standards referenced in this document, the following should be utilized: NFPA 194, "Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings", NFPA 196, "Standard for Fire Hose", NFPA 197, "Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks", NFPA 601, "Recommended Manual of Instructions and Duties for the Plant Watchman on Guard". NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on page 27

-11 of Volume 8, 1971

-72 are also applicable for good training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.

Response Fire brigade training is formulated around the recommendations in NFPA 27. Other NFPA manuals are used as they apply to the plant fire protection program.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 30 C. Quality Assurance Program Quality Assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, and testing and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the Oversight organization. The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the following:

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.1 Design Control and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to assure that all design related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.

Response During initial design and construction UE&C engineering organization prepared fire protection design engineering and procurement documents which met the guidelines of the Branch Technical Positions. The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) reviewed design and procurement documents to ensure compliance. The above functions are currently the responsibility of Engineering.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 31 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.2 Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.

Response Detailed, written operational test, inspection, fire drill, training and administrative control procedures for the fire protection program have been prepared by the plant staff. These activities are audited by the Oversight Organization.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.3 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Measures should be established to assure that purchased material, equipment and services conform to the procurement documents.

Response The Operational Quality Assurance Program (OQAP) defines and establishes the application of the OQAP to Fire Protection Program.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 32 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.4 Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.

Response The Oversight organization performs audits to verify implementation of the fire protection progra m. APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.5 Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.

Response A fire protection test program has been established and implemented to assure that the fire protection systems are in conformance with the design requirements. Current station procedures provide for tests and inspections to assure readiness of the systems and its components. The fire protection surveillance program is audited by the Oversight organization.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 33 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.6 Inspection, Test and Operating Status Measures should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.

Response Procedure documentation is provided for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections. The Oversight organization performs audits to verify documentation.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.7 Non- Conforming Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installation.

Response The OQAP provides measures to control the use of items and to prevent inadvertent use or installation of non

-conforming items.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 34 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.8 Corrective Action Measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.

Response Measures have been established and implemented via the Fire Protection Program per the responsibilities discussed in the response to Paragraph A.1.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 C.9 Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.

Response Records for fire protection activities are prepared and maintained per Administrative Procedures.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 35 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 C.10 Audits Audits should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection program including design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.

Response The Oversight organization provides audits to verify the above activities.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 36 D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 D.1 (a) Building Design

- Plant Layouts Plant layouts should be arranged to:

(1) Isolate safety

-related systems from unacceptable hazards, and (2) Separate redundant safety

-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard.

Response The above stated design requirements of "isolation and separation" have been adhered to in the layout of the plant, to the maximum extent practical. Where safety

-related systems cannot be isolated from potential fire hazards, additional detection, barriers and/or automatic fire suppression methods with appropriate backup are provided.

Those safety

-related systems which are required to safely shut down the plant consist of separate and independent flow trains. No portions of these systems are located near or in any area which could potentially become a significant fire hazard. In those cases where redundant safety

-related equipment (e.g. the primary component cooling water heat exchangers) are not separated from each other by a physical barrier, no combustible materials of any significant quantity are present within the immediate vicinity of the equipment, precluding the possibility of damage to redundant equipment due to a potential fire. Where necessary, an adequate barrier is provided to prevent the propagation of a postulated fire caused by combustible material contained in one safety-related component (e.g. component cooling pump) from jeopardizing the operation of a redundant component.

Electrical and instrument layouts are arranged to isolate safety

-related systems from unacceptable fire hazards by eliminating the use of combustible materials to the greatest extent possible. Redundant safety

-related electrical equipment are separated from each other by physical barriers or distance to prevent both systems from damage due to a single fire hazard.

Each diesel generator has been structurally segregated from its redundant adjacent unit. The wall which separates the units on the main level and below is constructed of two

-foot thick reinforced concrete with a fire rating in excess of three hours. Upper floor walls, which are one

-foot thick reinforced concrete, have a three hour fire rating.

The circulating and service water areas are separated by a two

-foot thick reinforced concrete wall whose fire rating is in excess of one and one-half hours. (Reference Deviation #3, SBN

-904).

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 37 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 D.1 (b) Building Design

- Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis In order to accomplish l.(a) above, safety related systems and fire hazards should be identified throughout the plant. Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should be made. The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary.

Response A detailed fire hazards analysis of all areas which include safe shutdown systems has been provided in this report. The need for additional hazard analyses will be determined based on the type and extent of proposed plant modifications.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (c) Building Design

- Cable Spreading Room For multiple reactor sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers (walls and floors) having a minimum fire resistance of three hours. Cabling for redundant safety divisions should be separated by walls having three hour fire barriers.

Response The cable spreading room is designated a "fire area" and is separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a fire resistance of three hours. Three hour fire barrier walls are not provided between redundant safety

-related cable trays in the cable spreading room because the space allocation of the station design makes it physically impossible. However, the redundant safety-related cables are located in the cable trays which are separated by distance, and this distance meets or exceeds that required by "Attachment C, Physical Independence of Electric Systems" of AEC letter dated 12/14/73, which is generally in agreement with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 38 In addition, the cable spreading room does not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformers or potential sources of missile or pipe whip, and is not used for storage of flammable materials. Circuits in trays are limited to control and instrument functions. Those

power supply circuits serving the control room are routed in embedded conduits. All cables are self-extinguishing and non

-propagating and, as a minimum, pass the IEEE

-383 1974 flame test. See response to D.3(c) for justification of design.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (d) Building Design

- Non-Combustibility Requirements for Interior Construction Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials and radiation shielding materials and sound

-proofing should be non

-combustible. Interior finishes should be non-combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. for flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its configuration (ASTM E

-84 Test, "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials").

Response Thermal insulating materials meet the non

-combustible definition in Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." They have flame spread/smoke developed/fuel contributed rating of 25/50/50, as tested by Underwriters' Laboratories Inc. in its use configuration, ASTM E

-84 test "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials."

Interior walls and structural components, radiation shielding materials and sound

-proofing and interior finishes are non

-combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. for flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration, ASTM E

-84 Test, "Surface Burning Characteristics Building Materials" Prior to 1978 the ASTM E

-84 Test reported flame spread, smoke developed and fuel contribution. However, fuel contribution is no longer reported. Therefore, materials tested prior to 1978 must report flame spread, smoke developed and fuel contribution. Materials tested in 1978 and after must only report flame spread and smoke developed.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 39 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (e) Building Design

- Metal Deck Roof Construction Metal deck roof construction should be non

-combustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Guide.

Response Metal deck roof construction is non

-combustible or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (f) Building Design

- Suspended Ceilings Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of non

-combustible construction. Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles.

Response Suspended ceilings and their supports are non

-combustible construction.

Concealed spaces in safety

-related areas are devoid of combustibles. Such spaces, however, may contain metal

-sheathed lighting cable type "ALS", which is not considered combustible.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 40 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (g) Building Design

- High Voltage. High Ampere Transformers High voltage

- high ampere transformers installed inside buildings containing safety related systems should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with non

-combustible liquid.

Response The only high voltage

- high ampere transformers installed inside buildings containing safety related systems are 480 volt unit substations which utilize dry type transformers.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (h) Building Design

- Oil Filled Transformers Buildings containing safety related systems should be protected from exposure or spill fires involving oil filled transformers by:

locating such transformers at least 50 feet distant; or ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil filled transformers are without openings and have a fire resistance rating of at least three hours.

Response The generator step

-up transformers, unit auxiliary transformers and reserve auxiliary transformers are the only oil

-filled transformers, and are located outside along the north wall of the turbine building. The north wall has a three hour fire resistance rating. Refer to Tab 15. All oil-filled transformers are protected by automatic water spray systems, and are located at least 50 feet from any safety related systems.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 41 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 15 D.1 (i) Building Design

- Floor Drains Floor drains, sized to remove expected fire fighting water flow should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire suppression systems are installed. Drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area. Equipment should be installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain water and direct it to floor drains (see NFPA 92M "Waterproofing and Drainage of Floors"). Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout the drain system. Water drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environment.

Response Floor drains are located in those areas where automatic sprinkler and spray systems are installed. These drains are sized to pass the expected flows resulting from automatic system actuation, as well as that produced by manual hose application if employed.

In areas where hand hose lines are the only water sources utilized to combat a fire, drains are provided if accumulation of fire fighting water could result in unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment in the area. In such areas, the operator can use the hose to control the quantity of drain water to avoid unacceptable damage to equipment. Water drainage from buildings with potential for radioactive contamination will be routed to the waste processing building, where it is sampled and analyzed for radioactivity.

Drainage within the diesel generator building is designed to prevent the spread of fire from one area to another. Other areas with combustible liquids have normally closed shut

-off valves in the drain lines or drain directly to the oil/water separation vault.

A fire in the primary auxiliary building, should it occur, may require large amounts of fire fighting water, which could result in the PAB floor drain sump overflowing and spilling over into the pipe tunnel between the vault area and the containment building. The combined pipe tunnel area and the PAB sump can hold up to 14,000 gallons of fire fighting water. Water in excess of this would overflow into the vault No. 2 floor drain sump. This contained water would not jeopardize the operability of safety

-related equipment and equipment required for a safe plant shutdown. Contaminated drainage is processed through the liquid waste system. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building. Provisions for sample analysis are available at the waste test tank prior to discharge to the environment.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 42 In the event of a fire in either the waste processing building or the fuel storage building, the fire fighting water could drain to the lowest elevation of the building, where it would be contained.

Any resulting flooding in either building would thus not jeopardize the operability of safety-related equipment or equipment required for the safe shutdown of the plant. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building.

If a fire requiring large amounts of water should occur in the containment building, there exists a possibility of flooding the reactor instrument cavity. However, the cavity can hold more than 47,000 gallons of water without jeopardizing the operability of safety

-related equipment or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building.

All safety

-related equipment, except draw

-out switchgear and local control panels are mounted on pedestals to avoid water damage, or provided with curbs or other barriers, as required, to contain the water and direct it to floor drains. The draw

-out switchgear and local control panels are capable of withstanding a minimal degree of floor flooding without damage.

The electrical tunnels contain no sources of flood water other than the fire protection syste m piping. The fire protection system piping are zoned pre

-action dry pipe systems with the zone valves located external to the tunnel areas. The individual fire protection system zones will be actuated by ionization fire detectors. Fire detectors are provided in the areas zoned to provide for local indication and for an audible and visual alarm in the control room and the guardhouse.

Water from the fire protection system will be drained from the tunnel zones to a sump external to the electrical tunnel areas. Redundant pumps have been installed in the sump to pump the water collected from the tunnel fire water drains to the storm drain system.

The electrical tunnel areas are zoned for fire protection. It is highly improbable that a fire will occur in more than one zone at any time; therefore the capacity of each pump is based on the flow of the largest tunnel zone. Each pump is connected to a redundant emergency bus. The installed pump capacity is capable of handling the flow requirements from two zones at all times except in the event of loss of power on one emergency bus.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 43 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 15 D.1 (j) Building Design

- Floors, Walls and Ceilings Floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Penetrations for ventilation system should be protected by a standard "fire door damper" where required. (Refer to NFPA 80, "Fire Doors and Windows".)

Response Except for exterior walls and ceilings, floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas have a minimum 11/2 hour or three hour fire rating. Stairwells have three hour rated walls and 11/2 hour rated doors.

Penetrations in fire barriers having a fire resistance of three hours, including conduits, piping and sleeves, are sealed or closed with materials providing a fire resistance rating at least equal to that designated for the fire barrier itself, with the exception of bus duct penetrations in the east wall of the non essential switchgear room and bus duct penetration in the north wall of turbine building. Refer to Deviation 14, SBN 970, dated March 18, 1986.

Door openings, except where noted above, are protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Only doors providing access to the buildings from outside or doors providing access to vital areas are locked and alarmed.

Penetrations for ventilation ducts are protected by a standard "fire door damper", where required, with a fire rating equal to fire barrier itself.

For compliance of 3

-hour rated double leaf pressure doors in fire zones GB

-FI 2B-A, CB-F-2B-A, CB-F-2C-A and PAB-F-2B-Z, refer to Deviation No. 11, SBN 932, dated March 18, 1986. Refer to the following letters for additional deviations: Deviation 5, SBN

-904; Deviation 6, SBN

-904; Deviation 7, SBN

-904; Deviation 8, SBN

-904. The sub units of multi

-section type rated fire dampers, CBA

-DP-l3l (CB-F-4A-A); DAH-DP-163 & 164 (DG-F-3A-Z & 3B-Z) have been independently tested and UL certified. Refer to Deviation No. 12, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986; and Deviation 8, SBN

-970.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 44 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 16 D.2 (a) Control of Combustibles Protection of Safety

-Related Systems Safety related systems should be isolated or separated from combustible materials. When this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special protection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function. Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression and construction capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present. Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:

(1) emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks (2) turbine generator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems (3) reactor coolant pump lube oil system Response All safety related systems are isolated or separated from combustible material wherever feasible.

Where isolation is not feasible, as noted below, the fire protection system supplies suppression, based on the fire hazard analysis, to insure that a fire does not defeat the safety system function.

(1) The redundant emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tank and associated piping are separated from each other by three hour fire rated barriers. No combustible materials other than the fuel oil in the day tank and piping is stored in the area. Each system is protected by an automatic deluge water spray system which is actuated by a detection system. (2) The turbine

-generator lube oil tank and reservoir, even though a non safety

-related system, is separated and protected as described above.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 45 (3) The reactor coolant pump oil systems are provided with an oil collection system and are isolated by virtue of spatial separation and would, should a fire occur, only involve one reactor coolant pump area. The fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix B of this report demonstrates that during a design basis fire, except for the vertical shaft of fire influence, the operation of the containment fan coolers and the heat sink of the steel and concrete would limit the temperature of the general containment area to 253°F. The associated pressure at this time in the containment would be 4.0 psig. This temperature and pressure throughout the containment would not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. The vertical shaft of fire influence, while being much hotter than the general area (flame temperature of 4000°F), does not impinge on, nor would it damage, any system or components required for safe shutdown of the reactor.

Based on the results of the fire hazard analysis, no fire suppression system is provided in these areas.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 16 D.2 (b) Bulk Gas Storage Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic), should not be permitted inside structures housing safety

-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety

-related systems or equipment. (Refer to NFPA 50A, "Gaseous Hydrogen Systems".)

Care should be taken to locate high pressure gas storage containers with the long axis parallel to building walls. This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event of a container failure. Use of compressed gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings should be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, "Industrial Fire Loss Prevention".)

Response There are no large bulk containers (non

-DOT cylinders) of flammable gas inside structures near safety-related equipment. Bulk Hydrogen storage is located outdoors and remote from any safety related equipment. The bulk gas storage located within the Turbine Building is the

non-flammable, low pressure 2

-3/4 ton, carbon dioxide storage tank for the generator purge system. Also stored in the Administration Building are DOT approved cyrogenic containers of Argon and Nitrogen. The containers are equipped with DOT required and approved pressure relief valves. The containers are installed per Station requirements. The gases are non-flammable and are used by Chemistry and Health Physics.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 46 Many of the different gases being utilized within the administration and service building are stored outdoors located within a roofed over storage area south of the administration and service building (See Table 1 for the gases being used).

Seabrook Station requires the installation of several DOT approved compressed gas cylinders inside structure housing safety

-related equipment. These DOT cylinders are seismically mounted and/or restrained in seismic buildings and restrained in bottle racks in non

-seismic buildings. The DOT cylinders are fitted with an approved safety device to allow gas to escape, preventing an explosion, of the normally charged cylinders if they are exposed to a fire.

The following is a description of the general location and purpose of the DOT cylinder installations:

(A) West Feedwater Pipe Chase

- nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 3'

-0", to provide a backup safety

-grade supply of control "air" for the atmospheric steam dump valves (MS

-PV-3001 and MS

-PV-3004). (B) Personnel Hatch Area

- nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 21'

-0", to provide a refill supply of control "air" for the West Chase Feedwater and Main Steam Isolation valves. (C) East Feedwater Pipe Chase

- nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 3'

-0", to provide a backup safety

-grade supply of control "air" for the atmospheric steam dump valves (MS

-PV-3002 and MS

-PV-3003). (D) Primary Auxiliary Building

- nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 25'

-0", to provide a safety

-grade backup "air" supply for each Train of primary component cooling water temperature control valves (CC

-TV-2171-1,2 and CC

-TV-2271-1). (E) Diesel Generator Building - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed in each stairwell, elevation 21'-6", to provide an "air" supply for the preaction sprinkler system, installed over the diesel generators.

(F) Primary Auxiliary Building Sample Room

- Argon cylinder(s) are installed in the Sample Room for an inert gas supply for the Flush Tank (SS

-TK-197). Nitrogen Cylinders are installed for purging the hydrogen sensor.

(G) Hydrogen Analyzer Room

- Oxygen cylinder(s) are installed in the room to provide reagent gas for the analyzers.

(H) Turbine Building

- Carbon dioxide and hydrogen cylinders are installed at the generator pedestal, elevation 21'

-6", to provide a backup supply of gases for the generator hydrogen and purge systems.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 47 (I) Turbine Building

- Air cylinder(s) are installed in the vicinity of the generator pedestal, elevation 21'

-6", to provide a backup supply of air, during maintenance to the generator breaker air receivers.

(J) Turbine Building

- Nitrogen cylinder(s) are located on the northwest side of the Generator Stator (GSC) Coolant Tank, elevation 21'

-0" to provide a supply of purge gas for calibration of the coolant tank vent hydrogen monitor.

(K) Turbine Building

- Oxygen cylinder(s) are located on the northeast side of the Generator Stator (GSC) Coolant Tank, elevation 21'

-0" to provide a supply of oxygen for maintaining an oxygen saturated environment within the GSC cooling water.

(L) Fuel Storage Building - Nitrogen cylinder(s) are located on the south side of the spent fuel pool near the spent fuel pool heat exchangers, to provide a supply of Nitrogen for tools and accessories used on the Spent Fuel Bridge Crane.

(M) 345kV Switchyard Equipment Enclosure and Overhead Crane Structure

- SF 6 Gas Cylinders are located in the southwest corner of the enclosure at elevation 55'

- 1 1/4" to provide a supply of gas for the Gas Insulated Substation equipment located in the 345kV Switchyard.

Table 1 Gas Cylinder Volume (Ft 3)* Storage Condition (psi)

Number of Cylinders Acetylene 300 250 2 Argon 331 2400 9 Argon/Methane 240 2200 10 Helium 291 2400 6 Nitrogen 301 2400 12 Propane 172** 516 3

• At 70 ºF, 14.7 psi

• • 20-pound cylinders

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 48 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 17 D.2 (c) Use of Plastic Materia ls The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In particular, halogenated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute non

-combustible materials are not available. All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant materials, will burn with an intensity and BTU production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons. When burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA. The halogenated plastics also release free chlorine and hydrogen chloride when burning which are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.

Response Usage of plastic materials (except that employed as insulating materials on electric cabling, see Section D.3.(g)) is as follows:

The use of plastic materials, especially PVC and neoprene, has been minimized. In electrical specifications, all materials are required to be self

-extinguishing and non

-propagating when exposed to fire and flames, to the extent practical. Fiberglass

-reinforced plastic (FRP) floating covers are used in the boric acid, recovery test and reactor makeup water tanks. The FRP skin on the polyurethane foam core has a flame spread rating of 100 which is equivalent to that of redwood. In normal operation the tanks will be at least partially filled with water and the covers will be in full contact with water. The probability of initiating combustion in the cover under this condition and having the combustion spread is extremely low.

Fiberglass

-reinforced plastic is used for the chemical drain, chemical drain treatment, and seal water supply tanks. Each tank is located in a separate cubicle. In the highly unlikely event of combustion igniting the tank, the flame would be extinguished at the tank water level.

Plastic spent fuel pool and reactor cavity skimmers are partially immersed in water and, therefore, not a fire hazard.

Batteries in the four battery rooms of the Control Building, one battery room in the Turbine Building and two battery rooms in the Relay Room are fabricated with plastic. The containers will contain the electrolyte solution.

Fibercast Factory Manual (FM) approved pipe and fittings are being used in the fire protection underground piping system. This use of Fiberglass

-reinforced pipe does not create an unacceptable fire hazard.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 49 PVC piping and polyethylene containers are used in the Fire Pump House as part of the chlorine addition system for the Fire Protection Water Storage Tanks. These materials are used because the Sodium Hypochlorite is not compatible with carbon steel equipment. This material is being installed in a sprinkler area. Therefore, it does not create an unacceptable fire hazard.

Fiberglass

-reinforced plastic (FRP) piping is used in the Air Removal System from the Waterbox Priming Drop Out Tank to the Priming pumps to eliminate the corrosion experienced with carbon steel equipment. This piping is only installed in sprinkler areas of the Turbine Building.

Therefore, it does not create a unacceptable fire hazard. Polyethylene (plastic) high integrity containers (HIC) in steel overpacks are used to hold spent resins in the drum storage area of the Waster Processing building. Because the HICs are contained in the steel overpacks, the HICs are not a fire hazard and will not add to the combustible loading of the building.

Vendor-supplied Leased Makeup Water Treatment System piping and conduit is plastic. The room has sprinklers and is cut off from the Administration Building by CMU block walls. The installation is therefore acceptable.

The Waste Processing Building air filters 1

-WAH-F-11 and 1-WAH-F-170 contain filter cores that are three

-inch, schedule 40, PVC. The PVC cores may be installed on the filter supply and take-up reels if metal filter cores are not available. A filter fire would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain shutdown in the event of a fire. It is preferable to install

non-PVC roll filter cores in these filters.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 17 D.2 (d) Storage of Flammable Liquids Storage of flammable liquids should as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code".

Response Storage of flammable liquids complies with the requirements of NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code" in the design and venting of tanks.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 50 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (a) Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations Cable Tray Construction Only non-combustible materials should be used for cable tray construction.

Response All cable trays are of unpainted galvanized steel construction except for cable trays used in the 345 kV switchyard enclosure area which are of unpainted aluminum construction.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3(b) Cable Spreading Rooms See Section F.3 for fire protection guidelines for cable spreading rooms.

Response See response to APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A, Section F.3 on cable spreading room.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 51 APCSB 9.5-1; App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (c) Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as backup.

Safety related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays, that does not itself require water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage from sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction.

Response Water based fire protection systems are provided for cable trays except for trays containing only instrumentation cables, in the cable spreading room, cable chases, electrical tunnels, penetration areas outside of containment and elevation 25'

-0" of the primary auxiliary building. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as backup in these areas and all other areas.

However, automatic water sprinkler systems are not provided in other areas for the reasons stated below. The cables to be used will be self extinguishing, non

-propagating and, as a minimum, will pass the IEEE-383-1974 flame test. Control and instrumentation cables cannot ignite from overloading or grounds since the maximum fault is insufficient to heat the insulation to the flash point. Power cables can carry sufficient fault current to reach the flash point of the cable insulation; however, protective relaying on the switchgear circuits will respond to fault currents and open the circuit before enough heating has occurred to damage the cable insulation and start a fire. For additional protection, interlocked armored cable will be used for all 15 kV cables and those 5 kV cables which are routed in trays except cables for the Supplemental Emergency Power System (SEPS). Cables for the SEPS are triplex cables routed in solid bottom trays with solid covers. The redundant safety divisions are separated in accordance with Attachment "C" of AEC letter dated 12/14/73 "Physical Independence of Electric Systems and the fire hazard analysis has assured that both divisions can not be incapacitated by a single fire.

Cables are designed for wet and dry locations without electrical faulting.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 52 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (d) Cable and Cable Tray Penetration of Fire Barriers Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) should be sealed to give protection at least equivalent to that fire barrier. The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays should, minimum meet the requirements of ASTM E

-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials", including the hose stream test.

Response Penetrations of fire barriers by cable and cable trays are sealed with materials providing a fire resistance rating at least equal to that designated for the fire barrier. The fire seals, as a minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E

-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials".

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (e) Fire Breaks Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by the fire hazards analysis. Flame or flame retardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped electrical cables to limit spread of fire in cable ventings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of such coating materials must be considered during design.)

Response Fire breaks are not provided in horizontal tray runs between the fire barriers, based on fire hazard analysis. Fire stop locations in vertical cable tray runs were selected on the bases of limiting materially

1) the spread of fire via a vertical cable tray and 2) the resultant damage due to a fire in a vertical cable tray run.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 53 The following guidelines were employed:

a) Horizontal offsets >1 foot were considered to end vertical cable tray runs.

b) Fire stops were not installed where cable tray fire suppression was present regardless of length of vertical run.

c) In vertical cable tray runs >25 feet, fire stops were placed to limit the spread of fire to not more than 35 feet. In fact more than two thirds of the vertical runs between fire stops are approximately 25 feet or less. The remaining vertical runs between fire stops vary from about 28 feet to about 35 feet. Where practical in vertical cable tray runs greater than 25 feet, fire stop locations were adjusted to floor elevations.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (f) Flame Test of Electric Cables Electric cable constructions should as a minimum pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test. (This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection.)

Response The majority of the control cable construction used is at a minimum qualified to the IEEE -383 (1974) flame test. Non

-IEEE 383 control cable and wiring is used in some locations and is considered to be insignificant.

Examples of non

-IEEE 383 cable and wiring uses include vendor supplied wiring under the computer room floor; detector cable for Lubricating Oil and Turbine Bearing running above elevation 75' of the Turbine Building; Excore Neutron Monitoring Cable Assemblies; various telephone wiring; and wiring within some pre

-wired cabinets, such as the Main Plant Computer System Cabinets in the Computer Room.

Power cable is qualified to the IEEE -383 (1974) flame test.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 54 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (g) Corrosive Gases from Cables To the extent practical, cable construction that does not give off corrosive gases while burning should be used.

Response There is no objective standard corrosion test available. From the presently available tests, results are subject to individual judgement and are not repeatable. Available copper mirror test date was reviewed prior to award of the cable order.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (h) Content of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit, Trenches and Culverts Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches, or culverts should be used only for cables. Miscellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in these areas.

Response Electrical cable trays, raceways, conduit, or trenches are normally used exclusively for cables. No piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases are installed in these areas. The introduction of combustible materials into these areas are reviewed by Engineering and administratively controlled to ensure that safety related systems will not be impacted. The use of combustible materials has been minimized to the extent practical. The use of combustible materials in these areas is as follows:

Nylon 11 tubing (Imperial Eastman Nyl o-Seal) has been installed in conduits and junction boxes with cables which service non

-safety related plant equipment. This tubing supports the Chemical Analysis System Hydrogen detection sensors which monitor the Excess Letdown Hx and Letdown Hx compartments, and the Valve Room in containment for Hydrogen concentrations below 50% of the lowest explosive limit. Since the tubing is routed in conduit which does not service equipment required for accident mitigation or post accident monitoring, the probability of initiating combustion and having the combustion impact a safety system is extremely low.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 55 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (i) Smoke Venting of Cable Tunnels, Culverts and Spreading Rooms The design of cable tunnels, culverts and spreading rooms should provide for automatic or manual smoke venting as required to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.

Response Manual smoke venting is provided in the cable spreading rooms and cable tunnels, but not for the containment electrical penetration area. The present ventilation system in this penetration area consists of recirculation air cooling units which have no exhaust capability. Portable fans will be used by the fire brigade for smoke removal if necessary.

The design of cable tunnels and spreading room provides for manual smoke venting, as required to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (j) Control Room Cables Cables in the control room should be kept to the minimum necessary for operation of the control room. All cables entering the control room should terminate there. Cable should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room.

Response The control room is not used as a raceway for cables between other rooms or buildings. Cables entering the control room are terminated there. Cables routed to the control room are the minimum necessary for operation of the units.

A floor trench, less than one square foot in cross section, connects the computer room to the control room and leads to a trench under the main control board. It accommodates low voltage signal cables.

A second floor trench, less than one square foot in cross section, connects the computer room to the control room and leads to auxiliary control consoles in the control room. It accommodates low voltage signal cables. Both of the above trenches between the computer room and the control room total less than one square foot in cross sectional area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 56 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (a) Ventilation Discharge of Products of Combustion The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled. Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be automatically discharged directly outside to a safe location. Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine if release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant technical specifications.

Response The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area have been evaluated as part of our fire hazard analysis.

All fire areas are exhausted through the normal plant ventilation system, if available and practical, in the event of a fire. Portable exhausters are available to remove smoke and corrosive gases from fire areas in case of closure of ventilation fire dampers. The exhausts from the radioactive areas are monitored by permanently installed radiation instrumentation. High radiation is alarmed in the control room. Additionally, portable radiation instrumentation can be used if necessary. Should the products of combustion contain radioactivity above the permissible limits of the plant technical specifications, the exhaust of the products of combustion will be terminated until adequate cleanup can be conducted.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 57 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (b) Evaluation of Inadvertent Operation or Single Failures Any ventilation system designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability of operations personnel.

Response There is no ventilation system designed specifically to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases; normal ventilation is designed so there is no possibility for an inadvertent operation or single failure to violate the plant controlled areas.

The plant ventilation system is designed to ensure containment capability during a single failure or inadvertent operation without violating the controlled areas or endangering the public or operating personnel.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 58 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (c) Power Supply and Controls The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system.

Response All mechanical ventilation equipment is located in mechanical equipment rooms. The power supply and controls for the mechanical ventilation systems are generally run outside the fire area served by the system, with the following exceptions:

The power supply and controls of the ventilation system for the A Train switchgear room is supplied from a motor control center in that room. A similar system fed from a B Train motor control center ventilates the B Train switchgear room. The control cables are routed in separated paths through the cable spreading room.

Ventilation of the cable spreading room is controlled by cables passing through the cable spreading room, but its power feed is routed outside the spreading room. The control cables for the cable spreading room ventilation fans are run through the cable spreading room since it is not feasible to bring the control cables into the main control room except via the cable spreading room. It is necessary to locate the power supply to each 4 kV switchgear room ventilation fan in its switchgear area because it is not feasible to do otherwise. In addition, fire detection and manual fire protection are provided in the areas.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 59 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (d) Protection of Charcoal Filters Fire suppression systems should be installed to protect charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, "Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Clean

-Up Air Filtration".

Response Charcoal filters provided for this project are not equipped with fire suppression systems.

Ref.: SBN-1208, dated October 9, 1986 and SBN

-97O, dated March 18, 1986.

Revision Regulatory Guide 1.52, dated July 1976, states that a single failure

-proof low flow air bleed system or other cooling mechanisms is acceptable to prevent excessive temperature rise in the charcoal filter bed.

A low flow air bleed system, which meets the requirements of R.G. 1.52, is provided for the following safety

-related charcoal filters:

Filter No.

System Low Flow Air Source EAH-F-9 & EAH-E-69 Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust (Redundant Filter and Fans)

By-Pass Air from Redundant Fan FAH-F-41 & FAH-F-7 4 Fuel Storage Building Exhaust Unit (Redundant Filter and Fans)

By-Pass Air from Redundant Fan CBA-F-38 & CBA-F-8038 Control Room Emergency Clean Up Unit (Redundant Filter and Fans)

By-Pass Air from Redundant Fan The following non

-safety-related charcoal filters do not meet the guidelines of R.G. 1.52. However, per Reference SBN

-970, Deviation No. 13 and SBN

-l208, no fire would result from loss of air flow across these charcoal filters.

Filter No.

System CAH-F-8 Containment Recirculation Unit PAH-F-16 PAB Nominal Exhaust Unit CAP-F-40 Containment On

-Line Purge Unit All the charcoal filters, both safety and non

-safety, are provided with temperature alarms and carbon monoxide alarms in the Control Room.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 60 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (e) Fresh Air Supply Intakes The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.

Response All buildings satisfy the above requirements. In addition, the fresh air intakes for the control room which provide air for ventilation and pressurization are obtained from two locations remote from exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas. These are the only sources of supply air to the control room.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4 (f) Stairwells Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire. Staircases should serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. Fire exit routes should be clearly marked. Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building. Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies.

Response Stairwells are designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire, and to serve as escape and access routes in the event of a fire. Fire exits are clearly marked and established by pre

-fire plan. Stairways, designated as fire access or egress routes, except in the primary containment structure, are enclosed with fire barriers having a designated fire resistance rating of at least three hours (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the Administration Building), and have approved automatic fire door assemblies rated at a minimum of one and one

-half hours.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 61 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4(g) Smoke and Heat Vents Smoke and heat vents may be useful in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switchgear rooms. When natural

-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of 1 square foot of venting area per 200 square feet of floor area should be provided. If forced

-convection ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 square feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control.

Response Smoke and heat vents have generally not been used since the normal ventilation system for potentially affected area can be manually controlled and can be used for smoke and heat venting, unless the fire damper in the fire wall closes due to excessive heat. Portable exhausters are available to remove smoke and heat upon closure of the ventilation fire dampers.

The normal ventilation exhaust system for the cable spreading room and switchgear rooms can be utilized for smoke and heat relief. The cable spreading room and each switchgear room is supplied air from its own supply fan, and air is exhausted from each area by its own exhaust fan.

Ventilation air can be drawn into the cable spreading room or switchgear rooms by opening doors. Air would be exhausted through the affected room exhaust system.

The supply air system will be manually shut down if smoke or radiation is detected in the supply plenum of the PAB.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 62 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4 (h) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

-approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half hour for the self

-contained units.

At least two extra air bottles should be located on

-site for each self

-contained breathing unit. In addition, an on

-site six hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and containments.

Response Self-contained breathing apparatus using full face positive pressure masks and approved by NIOSH have been provided for fire fighting, damage control and control room personnel. These units have a minimum operating life of one

-half hour and have been distributed in the control room and the fire brigade lockers. At least two extra air bottles for these units, each with a minimum operating life of one

-half hour, are located on

-site. The plant also has a respiratory air compressor for recharging the air bottles on

-site. The air compressor is located in an area free of dust and contaminants.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 63 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 2 D.4(i) Total Flooding Gas Extinguishing Systems Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should close upon initiation of gas flow to maintain necessary gas concentration. (See NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide System" and 12A, Halon 1301 Systems).

Response Areas having Halon 1301 gas extinguishing systems are provided with automatic damper closures in the supply and exhaust ducts, initiated from the Halon control panel upon actuation of the system in conformance to NFPA

-12A. APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 22 D.5 Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:

(a) Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units with individual 8

-hour minimum battery power supplies.

(b) Suitable sealed beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use.

(c) Fixed emergency communication should use voice powered head sets at pre

-selected stations. (d) Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure fire damage.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 64 Response (a) The following tabulation identifies lighting systems available at each area required to be manned for safe shutdown of the reactor.

Area Normal Lighting Essential Lighting Emergency Lighting

1. Control Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train A & B) per deviation request transmittal by letter SBN

-932 Battery Packs (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

2. Train A Switchgear Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train B) per deviation request transmitted by letter SBN

-932 Battery Packs (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

3. Train B Switchgear Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train B) per deviation request transmitted by letter SBN

-932 Battery Packs (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

4. Diesel Generator Room A Yes Train A & B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

5. Diesel Generator Room B Yes Train A & B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

6. PAB Boric Acid Tank Room Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

7. PAB Charging P ump Rm. CS-P-2A Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

8. PAB Charging P ump Rm. CS-P-2B Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

9. PAB DG Heat Exchanger Area - Valve SW-V-l7 Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

10. Mechanical Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

11. Turbine Bldg. Main Fl. Valves SCC

-V138 and SCC-Vl39 Yes Train A Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

12. Condensate Storage Tank NW Valve Room Yes None Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

13. Non-Essential Yes Train A Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

14. Control Rm.

HVAC Equip. Rm.

Yes None Battery Packs (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 65 In compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III

-J, all the above areas are also provided with eight

-hour-rated self

-contained battery packs with sealed beam units for access and egress lighting. All other plant areas are provided with 11/2 hour rated self

-contained battery packs with sealed beam units for egress lighting.

The extent of the compliance to above requirements refer to Deviation No. 10, SBN

-932, dated March 18, 1986.

(b) Fire brigade and operation personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown have been provided with suitable battery

-powered, portable hand lights.

(c) For those events which require Control Room evacuation, we have identified the following areas as requiring manning to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

Switchgear Rooms A and B Diesel Generator Control Panels A and B In addition, there are other areas (e.g., Boric Acid Tank Room) where one time actions (e.g., valve operation) may be necessary.

The remote shutdown locations identified above share a dedicated sound powered telephone channel (headphones are provided as necessary to assure effective communications). Each location also has access to a dedicated paging station. There is also an extension from the station telephone system near each location.

(d) The station trunked radio system is designed to provide communications between all areas of the station via hand

-held portable radios. The radio system would provide communication to those areas noted in (c) as requiring one time actions.

The trunked radio system equipment (trunking controller, repeaters, and RF mixing rack) is powered from Unit 1 non

-safety power system. Back

-up power is provided by the Train A emergency diesel generator and a dedicated battery rated for 2

-hour use. Portable units are powered by rechargeable batteries.

The trunked radio system equipment (trunking controller, repeaters, and RF mixing rack) is protected from exposure to possible fire damage.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 66 E. Fire Detection and Suppression APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 23 E.1 Fire Detection (a) Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, "Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems."

(b) Fire detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room. Local audible alarms should also sound at the location of the fire.

(c) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique. They should not be capable of being confused with any other plant system alarms.

(d) Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply. Response (a) The fire detection system will comply with NFPA 72D as follows:

The fire detection system provides in the main control room distinctive displays of either fire or trouble for each fire control panel. Each change in status is recorded on hard copy for record purposes. The record identifies time, date, and occurrence.

Inspection and tests of automatic fire detectors is conducted in accordance with Chapter 8 of NFPA 72E (1987). Due to the lack of combustibles, detectors have not been provided above the suspended ceiling in the control room. Reference Deviation 16, SBN

-970, dated March 18, 1986.

The electronic fire detection and alarm system employs a multiplexed reporting system using a multi

-conductor data bus to interconnect different fire zones. Circuits have been arranged such that a single break or a single ground fault in the wiring will not result in a false alarm signal.

An open circuit will not prevent transmission on either side of the fault. The system is checked against open circuit by means of periodic maintenance tests.

A ground or a short circuit will be alarmed automatically as a system trouble alarm.

Fire detecting equipment is installed in accordance with Paragraph 2

-6 of NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 67 The circuit arrangement, system equipment and trunk capacities of the multiplexed fire detection system complies with the requirements of Table A of Article 430.

(b) The fire detection system gives an alarm locally at its control panel and an audible and a visual alarm in the main control room. Furthermore, the plant PA system will be utilized to warn personnel for a fire in an area. The trouble signals are similarly annunciated at the same locations.

(c) Fire alarms are distinctive and unique. They are not capable of being confused with any other plant system alarms.

(d) The fire detection alarm panels on Main Control Board are fed by the 120V A

-C uninterruptible power bus. Alarm data loop is powered by the emergency diesel. Power to local detectors and local panels is provided by the 120V A

-C emergency diesel bus where available. Each local panel has built

-in battery backup.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 23 E.2 (a) Fire Protection Water Supply Systems Yard Fire Main Loop An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated fire water requirements. NFPA 24, "Standard for Outside Protection", gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other design codes and standards developed by such organizations a s the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWA). Lined steel or cast iron pipe should be used to reduce internal tuberculation. Such tuberculation deposits in an unlined pipe over a period of years can significantly reduce water flow through the combination of increased friction and reduced pipe diameter. Means for treating and flushing the systems should be provided. Approved visually indicating sectional control valves, such as post indicator valves, should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system.

The fire main system piping should be separate from service or sanitary water system piping.

Response The underground fire main loop was designed to furnish the anticipated fire water requirements using published codes and standards for guidance as enumerated above.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 68 The pipe material is cement

-lined welded steel pipe, (except the feed to the General Office Building outside the Protected Area which is plastic pipe and the underground feed to the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility, and the RCA Storage Facility which is Fibercast, Factory Mutual (FM) approved, Class 1614, pipe.) to reduce internal tuberculation, coated and wrapped on the outside with bituminous coal tar paint and paper wrapping.

Water from the town of Seabrook water system is used to fill the fire water tanks. A metering pump automatically injects sodium hypochlorite into the fire water tank fill line as required.

Flushing of the entire system will be accomplished by discharging water through selected hydrants. Sections of the main can be isolated, during periods of maintenance and repair, by closing, approved visually

-indicating, sectional post indicator valves. The fire main system piping serves the fire protection system exclusively.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 24 E.2 (b) Multiple Units Fire Protection Water Supply Systems A common yard fire main loop may serve multi

-unit nuclear power plant sites, if cross-connected between units. Sectional control valves should permit maintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit. For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expecte d flow. For multiple reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or so), separate yard fire main loops should be used.

Response The yard fire main system consists of a single loop with cross

-connection between units. Unit 2 construction has been stopped, however some Unit 2 buildings have active water suppression systems installed for property loss conservation. Post indicating valves are provided to allow maintenance of a portion of the loop, if required. The water supply is sized for the largest single expected flow including 500 gpm for manual hose streams. The fire water piping main is supplied from three independent discharge lines, one from each fire pump. These lines feed in two directions to supply water to each half of the looped plant fire main piping.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 69 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 25 E.2 (c) Fire Pump Installation If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow requirements, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided so that 100% capacity will be available with one pump inactive (e.g. three 50% pumps or two 100% pumps). The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant.

Each pump should have its own driver with independent power supplies and control. At least one pump (if not powered from the emergency diesels) should be driven by non

-electrical means, preferably diesel engine. Pump and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a minimum three

-hour fire wall. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the control room.

Details of the fire pump installation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20 "Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps".

Response The fire protection system has three 50% pumps. During a fire, water is supplied by operation of one (1) motor driven pump and one (1) diesel engine

-driven pump with the second diesel engine-driven pump functioning as a spare. At all times 100% capacity is available with one 50% pump inactive.

Fire pump discharge connections to the yard fire main loop are not located on opposite sides of the plant. Each fire pump discharges to an outside manifold with independent sectional valves. The yard fire main loop is supplied in two directions from the outside manifold arranged to discharge to either half of the loop.

Each pump has its own driver with independent power supplies and control. There are 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier walls between each of the three fire pumps. Each of the fire pumps with its controller is in a separate fire area.

Remote indication and alarm is provided in the control room for engine failure to start, low lube oil pressure, high engine jacket water temperature, engine overspeed, A

-C power failure and battery failure.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 70 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 25 E.2 (d) Fire Water Supplies Two separate reliable water supplies should be provided. If tanks are used, two 100% (minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply capacity should

be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.

Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by means of a vertical standpipe for other water sources.

Response The water supply for the fire protection system is stored in two 500,000 gallon tanks.

300,000 gallons in each tank is reserved exclusively for fire protection by means of vertical standpipes for other water sources. This standpipe extends up to the 300,000 gallon level in each tank and provides a source of water for non

-fire protection service. The Technical Requirement minimum volume of water in each tank is 215,000 gallons.

The suction piping to the three fire pumps is arranged to permit suction from either or both of the two fire water storage tanks.

The manual valves in the suction piping to the fire pumps and in the relief valve header permit isolation of either storage tank.

The plant's fire water supply system is capable of refilling either tank in eight hours to the 300,000 gallon level.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 71 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 26 E.2 (e) Fire Water Supply Design Bases The fire water supply (total capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the

largest expected flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1,000 GPM for manual hose streams plus the greater of:

(1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating.

Response The two (2) 500,000 gallon tanks, with 300,000 gallons per tank dedicated for fire protection supply capacity meet the above requirements for hose streams plus the largest demand on a safety related area. Reference Deviation No. 9, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986.

Deviation No. 9 of SBN

-932 indicated that the largest demand safety related area was the Diesel Generator Room. Per EC274103, it has since been determined that the largest demand safety related area is the PAB. This does not alter the conclusion of this paragraph or the commitment of this response. The flow from two fire pumps, each sized to deliver 1,500 GPM at a discharge head of 125 PSI, exceeds the above requirements.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 72 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 26 E.2 (f) Lakes or Ponds as Sources Lakes or fresh water ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied.

(1) the additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2) failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink. Response Lakes or fresh water ponds are not utilized as a source of fire protection.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 73 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 27 E.2(g) Outside Hose Installations Outside manual hose installation should be sufficient to reach any location with an effective hose stream. To accomplish this hydrants should be installed approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system. The lateral to each hydrant from the yard main should be controlled by a visually indicating or key operated (curb) valve. A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection," should be provided as needed but at least every 1000 feet.

Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers.

Response Factory mutual approved, or UL listed fire hydrants equipped with 6" inlet and two (2) 21/2" hose connections are located throughout the plant site. These hydrants are supplied from the main fire loop through a 6" branch line with shut

-off valve and valve box to grade. The hydrants are so located that no structure is jeopardized by hydrant spacing, due to plant layout, in excess of 250 feet, since they are within 50 feet of any structure. Hose houses are provided at designated hydrant locations.

Each hose house is equipped with 250 feet of 21/2" woven jacket lined fire hose and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA No. 24, "Outside Protection."

All 21/2" and larger threads used on standpipe risers, hose couplings and hydrants are American Standard (National) threads and all 11/2" threads are Iron Pipe Thread (IPT). The threads are compatible with equipment used by the local fire department.

There is a wall hydrant with two 21/2" hose connections located on the west side of the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 74 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 27 E.3 (a) Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems Sprinkler and Standpipe Layout Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe should have independent connection to the plant underground water main. Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and standpipe systems. When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system. The header arrangement should be such that no single failure can impair both the primary and backup fire protection systems.

Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. Safety related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles.

Response All automatic sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes located throughout the plant are connected to the plant underground water main. Sufficient isolation valves are provided in the distribution piping to insure flow to both the primary and backup systems. Each of the above systems is equipped with an OS&Y gate valve.

The sprinkler and hose reels in the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility are controlled by a common OS&Y gate valve. The wall hydrant could provide a supply for backup protection.

The Administration building has a combined sprinkler manual hose station system.

Automatic sprinkler systems and automatic water spray deluge systems alarm and annunciate in the main control room where location of a fire is readily identified. Water flow alarms are not provided in standpipe systems since hose stations must be manned by fire fighting personnel before water flow could signal an alarm. Since fire fighting personnel are already at the site of the fire, an alarm serves no useful purpose.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 75 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (b) Supervision of Valves All valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room and other appropriate command locations in the plant (See NFPA 26, "Supervision of Valves").

Response Valves for automatic sprinkler systems and hose standpipe systems are either electrically or administratively supervised.

Post indicator valves in the yard loop show "open" or "shut" and are supervised by the administrative control.

With valves supervised as described above, and with the administrative control supervised by the plant operators, adequate control is provided for fire protection.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (c) Automatic Sprinkler Systems Automatic sprinkler systems should as a minimum conform to requirements of appropriate standards such as NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems" and NFPA 15, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems".

Response The automatic sprinkler systems conform to the requirements of NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler System" and NFPA 15, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed System".

An exception is face bushings that were installed in the piping. A limited number of face bushings were permitted on condition that they were installed without screwed automatic sprinkler heads. See also Deviations 1 and 6, SBN

- 970. An additional exception is the Administration Building which has a combined sprinkler/manual hose station system.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 76 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (d) Fire Protection Water Supply System Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any location with at least one effective hose stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximum 100 feet of 11/2 inch woven jacket lined fire hose and suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not more than 100 foot intervals. Individual standpipes should be of at least 4 inch diameter for multiple hose connections and 21/4 inch diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, "Standpipe and Hose Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements.

Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas and inside normally occupied areas. Standpipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety related equipment should have shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area. Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual fire fighting in areas within hose reach of equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The standpipe system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to assure system pressure integrity. The piping and valves for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirements should at least satisfy ANSI Standard B31.l, "Power Piping". The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valve(s) in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal Seismic Category I water system such as essential service water system. The cross connection should be:

(a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 GPM/hose station) and, (b) designed to the same standards as the Seismic Category I water system. It should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I water system.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 77 Response Interior manual hose stations are spaced at approximately 100 foot intervals, and will reach any location with an effective hose stream.

Each hose station consists of a 21/2" hose connection with 21/2" valve, 21/2" 11/2" reducer, 100 feet of 11/2" (minimum) woven jacket lined fire hose and nozzle. In some cases 13/4" fire hose with 11/2" couplings may be used in lieu of 11/2" hose.

The hose stations are supplied by standpipes with a minimum diameter of 4" (except for those hose stations, in non

-safety related buildings, connected to sprinkler systems). Also, a 2.5" bypass line with a restricting orifice is included in the 6" Fire Protection header supplying the Control Building and Diesel Generator Building hose stations to limit flooding in the event of a pipe rupture. The bypass line pipes flow around a normally closed 6" butterfly valve. The restricting orifice and bypass line have an inner diameter of less than 4", but have been sized to allow the required flow and pressure to the downstream hose stations. If additional flow or pressure is desired, the 6" valve may be opened.

With the ability to open the 6" valve and provide a large diameter flow path, the system complies with NFPA 14, "Standpipe and Hose Systems.

" Hose stations for normally unoccupied areas are located at the outside entrances and for normally occupied areas at the inside of the entrance, except containment and control room. Hose stations in the containment are located to provide complete coverage of the areas.

The basic fire protection system is designated as an NNS system, and is designed so that failure of the system will not induce failure of any safety-related system or equipment.

Standpipes located in buildings containing safety

-related equipment though not safety related are supported in the same manner as a Seismic Category I system, except as noted in the response to paragraph A.4 of Appendix "A" to BTP 9.5

-1. These standpipes are connected through an administratively controlled valve to a safety

-related service water system having the capacity to supply 150 gpm flow, which will be available for use following an SSE. The required amount of water flow and pressure in the Seismic Category I standpipe system is assured by a seismically qualified booster pump which is powered from a diesel backed seismically qualified motor control center.

If this backup fire protection water supply is placed in service, the 6" butterfly valve described above is opened to ensure full flow capability to the downstream hose stations.

The safety

-related equipment, structure and/or components in the Cooling Tower East Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chases, Service Water Pumphouse, Intake and Discharge Structures are protected by hose houses provided at yard fire hydrants located near these structures.

Reference Deviation No. 15, SBN 970, dated March 18, 1986.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 78 Hose reels in the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility are supplied by the building's sprinkler system. Each hose station consists of a 1 1/2" hose connection and a one hundred foot length of 1 1/2" hose.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 30 E.3 (e) Hose Nozzles The proper type of hose nozzles to be supplied to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray/straight

-stream nozzle may cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located.

Response Standpipe hose racks or reels are equipped with adjustable spray (fog) nozzles that are Factory Mutual approved and/or Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. listed. Only spray type nozzles have been provided for use on energized electrical equipment and on energized cabling. Solid stream nozzles are not provided for use on energized electrical equipment or cabling.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 30 E.3 (f) Foam Suppression Certain fires such as those involving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression.

Consideration should be given to use of any of the available foams for such specialized protection application. These include the more common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF). Response The design of the fire protection system does not include the use of foam suppression. Tanks and transformers containing flammable liquids that are within or near buildings are protected by automatic deluge systems actuated by thermal detection. Detectors alarm in the main control room.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 79 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 31 E.4 Halon Suppression Systems The use of Halon fire extinguishing agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA l2A and l2B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems", Halon 1301 and Halon 1211. Only UL or FM approved agents should be used.

In addition to the guidelines of NFPA l2A and l2B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly.

Particular consideration should also be given to:

(a) minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) toxicity of Hal on (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.

Response Halon 1301 fixed gas extinguishing systems used in the plant facilities meet the requirements of NFPA l2A and are UL listed or FM approved.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 80 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 31 E.5 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems".

Particular consideration should also be given t o: (1) minimum required CO2 concentration and soak time; (2) toxicity of CO 2 (3) possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; (4) offsetting requirements for venting during CO2 injection to prevent over pressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (5) design requirements from over pressurization; and (6) possibility and probability of CO2 systems being out

-of-service because of personnel safety consideration. CO2 systems are disarmed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found with CO2 systems shut off.

Response No carbon dioxide suppression systems, except for portable extinguishers, are used in the plant fire protection system

.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 81 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 32 E.6 Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be provided in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 and 10A, "Portable Fire Extinguishers, Maintenance and Use". Dry chemical extinguishers should be installed with due consideration given to clean

-up problems after use and possible adverse effects on equipment installed in the area.

Response Portable fire extinguishers are provided in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 and 10A, "Portable Fire Extinguishers, Maintenance and Use".

Extinguishers (Halon, CO 2, dry chemical or pressurized water) are selected and installed with consideration given to 1) combustibles in the area, such as paper and wood, liquid fuel and electrical equipment and 2) the avoidance of detrimental effects on equipment installed in the area of possible usage.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 82 F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 32 F.1 (a) Primary and Secondary Containment

- Normal Operation Fire protection requirements for the primary and secondary containment areas should be provided on the basis of specific identified hazards. For example:

Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps.

Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations.

Charcoal filters.

Because of the general inaccessibility of these areas during normal plant operations, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. Automatic sprinklers should be installed for those hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression.

Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise integrity of the containment or the other safety

-related systems. Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in conjunction with total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation.

Fire detection systems should alarm and annunciate in the control room. The type of detection used and the location of the detectors should be most suitable to the particular type of fire that could be expected from the identified hazard. A primary containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection. To accomplish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters.

Automatic fire suppression capability need not be provided in the primary containment atmospheres that are inserted during normal operation. However, special fire protection requirements during refueling and maintenance operations should be satisfied as provided below.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 83 Response An automatic water spray deluge system is not provided for the reactor coolant pumps lube oil systems located in the primary containment, since the fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix B of this report demonstrates that a suppression system is not necessary to prevent damage to safety

-related systems or components. An automatic pre

-action system is provided for the electrical penetration areas of the secondary containment.

The cable tray arrangement inside the primary containment is not provided with fixed suppression or detection systems, since there are no combustibles stored in this area. The cable used is a fire retardant, non

-propagating type, meeting the fire test requirements of IEEE -383. Cabling for redundant safety divisions is separated by distance or barrier, as described in response D.1. (c). Fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are readily available for use in the unlikely event of a fire.

Each of the reactor coolant pump areas in the containment is provided with high voltage ionization fire detectors.

The primary containment is accessible for manual fire fighting during normal operation.

Control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release is ensured by the primary containment ventilation purge system.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 84 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 34 F.1 (b) Primary and Secondary Containment

- Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance operations in containment may introduce additional hazards such as contamination control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply). Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems.

Management procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in Section 3a.

In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be permanently installed in containment.

Standpipes with hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations.

Adequate self

-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.

Response The permanent fire detection and suppression systems in the containment are discussed in the response to Section F.1 (a).

It is realized that refueling and maintenance operations in the containment could introduce additional transient loads, such as decontamination control materials, decontamination supplies and temporary wood staging, as well as introducing additional hazards such as welding and cutting and temporary wiring. Procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection during this time period have been developed. These are more fully discussed in the response to Section B.3.

Standpipes with hose stations have been permanently installed in the containment for use as required in any fire fighting operations during a refueling or maintenance outage. In addition, portable fire extinguishers are available at strategic locations in the containment.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 85 APCSB 9.5-b. App. A Page Paragraph 35 F.2 Control Room The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. It must be protected against disabling fire damage and should be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls and roofs having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours.

Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from two distinct fire hazards:

(a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles in the general room area.

Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both hazards. Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the control room. An additional hose piping shutoff valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room. Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.

Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.

Fire detection in the control room cabinets and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annunciation should be provided in the control room. Fire alarms in other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and annunciated in the control room.

Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available. Control room floors, ceiling, supporting structures, and walls, including penetrations and doors, should be designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetration seals should be air tight.

The control room ventilation intake should be provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operation by preventing smoke from entering the control room. Manually operated venting of the control room should be available so that operators have the option of venting for visibility. Cables should not be located in concealed floor and ceiling spaces. All cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control room. That is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from one area to another.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 86 Safety related equipment should be mounted on pedestals or the control room should have curbs and drains to direct water away from such equipment. Such drains should be provided with means for closing to maintain integrity of the control room in the event of other accidents requiring control room isolation.

Response The control room complex is separated from other areas of the plant by floors and walls having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. All penetration seals have a minimum fire resistance rating equal to that designated for the wall and floor they penetrate. Manual hose stations are located outside the control room. Nozzles were chosen for the hose stations to satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to the electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. Portable fire extinguishers are located in the control room. Breathing apparatus is provided for the control room operators.

Fire detection in the control room complex is provided by ionization detectors. Alarm and annunciation is provided in the main control room. Fire detection from other parts of the plant is also alarmed and annunciated at the same location.

The control room ventilation intake is provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm and permit isolation of the control room ventilation so as to protect operators by preventing smoke from entering the control room. A recirculation system with charcoal filters has been provided. This system can be started manually by the control room operator from the Main Control Board to remove smoke. Additional venting of the control room could be accomplished by opening the doors.

All cables that enter the control room terminate in the control room. There is no cabling routed through the control room from one area to another.

Metal jacketed lighting cable (Type ALS) is used in the control room ceiling spaces. This cable has an aluminum sheath which is not a combustible material. No other cables are located in ceiling spaces.

Control room electrical equipment is not provided with pedestals, and floor drains are not provided. These features are not required, as hose stations and standpipes are located outside the room and up to 4 inches of flooding can be tolerated without damage to any safety

-related equipment. Drainage can be maintained through the open door to the turbine building or the stairwell to the outdoors.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 87 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 37 F.3 Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as closed head sprinklers, open head deluge, or open directional spray nozzles. Deluge and open spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation. Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability.

The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).

An automatic water suppression system with manual hoses and portable extinguisher backup is acceptable, provided:

(a) At least two remote and separate entrances are provided to the room for access by fire brigade personnel; an d (b) Aisle separation provided between tray stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight feet high.

Alternately, gas systems (Halon or C0

2) may be used for primary fire suppression if they are backed up by an installed water spray system and hose stations and portable extinguishers immediately outside the room and if the access requirements stated above are met.

Electric cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in IEEE Std 383, "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

Drains to remove fire fighting water should be provided with adequate seals when gas extinguishing systems are also installed.

Redundant safety related cable division should be separated by walls with a three

-hour fire rating.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 88 For multiple

-reactor unit sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional cable separation as stated above and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a wall with a minimum fire rating of three hours. (See NFPA 251, "Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials", or ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials", for fire test resistance rating.) The ventilation system to the cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any gas extinguishing system in the area. In addition, smoke venting of the cable spreading room may be desirable. Such smoke venting systems should be controlled automatically by the fire detection or suppression system as appropriate. Capability for remote manual control should also be provided.

Response The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room consists of several automatic fixed spray dry pipe deluge systems. Automatic water sprinkler systems are provided for cable trays except for trays containing only instrumentation cables. Instrumentation cables would not ignite from over loading since the maximum fault current is insufficient to heat the insulation to the flash point. Provisions are made to preclude inadvertent operation by having two or more fire detection heads actuate the automatic spray systems. Location of spray nozzles considers cable tray sizing and arrangement to assure adequate water coverage. Cables are specified to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.

Spray systems are zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability. Manual hoses and portable extinguishers are provided in adjacent areas for back-up use in the cable spreading room. Access to the cable spreading room is provided through two remote and separated entrances. Aisle separation between stacked cable trays meets

the three feet wide by eight feet high, except in limited cross

-over locations which do not limit personnel access. Electric cable construction, as a minimum, pass the flame test in IEEE Standard 383.

Cabling for redundant safety divisions is separated by distance or barrier as described in Attachment "C" Physical Independence of Electric Systems of AEC letter dated 12/14/73, which is generally in agreement with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

Cable spreading rooms are not shared between reactors. Construction on Unit 2 has been stopped. Unit 1 cable spreading room is designated a "fire area" and is separated from other areas of the plant by a fire barrier having a fire resistance of three hours.

The cable spreading room does not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformer or potential sources of missiles or pipe whip, and is not used for storing flammable materials. Circuits in trays are limited to control and instrument functions. Those power supply circuits serving the control room are routed in embedded conduits. There are no combustible materials other than cable in the cable spreading room and all cables are self

-extinguishing and non-propagating; therefore, the fire hazard evaluation shows that a postulated fire will not occur in the cable spreading room.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 89 Smoke venting of the cable spreading room is available by use of the normal Ventilation system.

This system is not controlled automatically by the fire detection or suppression system but by remote manual control. Portable fans can be used for smoke removal upon closure of ventilation fire dampers. Automatic fire detectors provide an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room.

Drains are provided to remove fire water from actuation of the deluge system.

See D.3(c) for justification of adequacy of separation without the use of three hour fire rated walls. APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 39 F.4 Plant Computer Room Safety related computers should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum three

-hour fire resistant rating. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Manual hose stations and portable water and Halon fire extinguishers should be provided. Response The plant computer does not perform any safety function, and the total failure of the computer will not prevent the safe and orderly shutdown of the plant. The plant computer room is a portion of the control room complex but is separated from the main control room by three hour fire rated walls. Automatic fire detectors with fixed Halon 1301 system are provided in the computer room to provide an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Manual hose stations are located outside the control room. Halon hand-held extinguishers are located in the computer room. Portable water extinguishers are not provided.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 90 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 40 F.5 Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms should be separated from the remainder of the plant by minimum three

-hour rated fire barriers, if practicable. Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Fire hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available.

Acceptable protection for cables that pass through the switchgear room is automatic water or gas agent suppression. Such automatic suppression must consider preventing unacceptable damage to electrical equipment and possible necessary containment of agent following discharge.

Response Switchgear rooms are separated from the remainder of the plant by minimum three

-hour rated fire barriers. Automatic fire detection is alarmed and annunciated in the main control room.

Even though switchgear rooms are unoccupied, alarms are provided. Alarm and indication in the main control room readily identify the fire control panel in alarm. Portable extinguishers are provided in the area with hose stations located outside in an adjacent area and yard fire hydrants readily available for use if and when required.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 91 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 40 F.6 Remote Safety

-Related Panels The general area housing remote safety related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided.

Response The remote safety

-related shutdown panels are housed in the control building at floor elevation 21'-6" and in the diesel generator building at floor elevation 2l'

-6". (See drawings F

-3l0431 and F-202069.) Automatic fire detectors are provided in the control building at floor elevation 21'

-6" and in the diesel generator building at floor elevation 21'

-6". These automatic fire detectors provide local indication plus alarm and indication in the main control room. In addition, the diesel generator building at elevation 21'

-6" is protected by a manual preaction sprinkler system.

Combustible materials are minimized in all of the above areas. Portable extinguishers are provided inside these areas, and manual hose stations are provided outside these areas.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 92 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 41 F.7 Station Battery Rooms Battery rooms should be protected against fire explosions. Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three-hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings. (See NFPA 69, "Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.")

Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration. Standpipe and hose and portable extinguishers should be provided. Alternatives:

(a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load contained in the room.

(b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier capability of 11/2 hours.

(c) Provide a remote manual actuated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 11/2 hour fire barrier separation.

Response Battery rooms are separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The exhaust ventilation system for the battery rooms is capable of maintaining a hydrogen concentration well below 2% by volume. The exhaust system is redundant, and powered from independent safety related electrical trains. Each exhaust fan is provided with a flow switch which indicates loss of flow in the control room.

Portable fire extinguishers are located nearby, and a hose station is available within hose reach of the battery rooms.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 93 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 41 F.8 Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire wall having a minimum resistance rating of three hours should separate all areas containing safety related systems and equipment from the turbine oil system.

Response The turbine lube oil tank is located adjacent to the exterior wall of the turbine building inside a one (1) foot thick concrete wall enclosure whose fire rating is in excess of three (3) hours. This enclosure is capable of containing the contents of the tank. Although there are no safety related systems located in the vicinity, the fire protection system in this area consists of an automatic deluge suppression system and back

-up protection with local hose stations.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 94 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 42 F.9 Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.

Automatic fire suppression such as AFFF foam, or sprinklers should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided. Day tanks with total capacity up to 1,100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under the following conditions:

a. The day tank is located in a separate enclosure, with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks. The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil fumes.

b. The enclosure should

-be protected by automatic fire suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers.

Response Each diesel generator, along with its associated auxiliary equipment, is separated from the adjacent redundant unit by a wall having a fire rating in excess of the designated rating of three hours. Doors in these walls are Class A with a three hour fire rating.

Each fuel oil day tank (1500 gallons) is installed in a separate enclosure which is located on the floor above the diesel generator served. This enclosure is designed with walls, floor and ceiling having a fire rating in excess of the designated rating of three hours, and sized to contain the contents of the tank. Doors servicing these enclosures are Class A.

Redundant automatic preaction water systems are provided in each of the two Fuel Oil Storage Tanks areas. Automatic deluge water systems are provided in each of the two fuel oil day tank areas. Automatic preaction water system in fuel oil piping trenches is provided in each of the two engine rooms. Manual preaction water system for area wide coverage is provided in each of the two engine rooms. Drainage is provided to remove fire protection water.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 95 Automatic fire detection has been provided in the fuel oil storage areas and trenches and in the diesel generator area, with an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Sufficient detection devices are available to detect that a fire exists in the area and alarm. Local fire hydrants are available to extinguish a fire outside the range of the fixed water spray system.

The normal ventilation systems have the capacity to exhaust the area during and after a fire, unless heat from the fire closes the fire damper in the system. A gravity vent system is provided for the diesel fuel oil vapor, but will not provide sufficient air for sustaining combustion should a fire start. This restriction of combustion air is more important than smoke and heat removal from this area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 96 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 42 F.10 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons should not be located inside the buildings containing safety related equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three

-hours fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, for additional guidance.

When located in a separate building the tank should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system such as AFFF or sprinklers.

Tanks, unless buried, should not be located directly above or below safety related systems or equipment regardless of the fire rating of separating floors or ceilings.

Response Although the design of the fuel oil storage areas differs from the design Specified above, the results of the fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix A of this report demonstrates the adequacy of the provided construction, even under the most extreme condition of failure of the water spray system. The design provides fire protection comparable to that recommended in the above guidelines.

Each of the SEPS diesel fuel tanks is in excess of 6,000 gallons. The SEPS diesel generators with their fuel tanks are located less than 50 feet from the Cooling Tower that contains safety related equipment. The generator enclosures are not fire rated. However, the south wall of the Cooling Tower, adjacent to the SEPS installation is three

-hour fire rated. The construction of this wall would prevent a fire in the non

-safety related SEPS diesel generators from adversely affecting the operation of the safety related equipment in the Cooling Tower. This design meets the intent of these guidelines.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 97 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 44 F.11 Safety-Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing safety

-related pumps should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety

-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Early warning fire detection should be installed with alarm and annunciation locally and in the control room. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should also be provided.

Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains should be provided to remove and direct water away from safety

-related equipment.

Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual fire fighting operation.

Response The equipment vault areas and the charging pump areas which house safety related pumps and heat exchangers are each divided into fire areas separated by fire barriers having at least 11/2 or 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ratings. Each fire area contains only one of two redundant components in a safety relate d system. The fire hazard analysis demonstrates that any postulated fire in one fire area will not affect safety related equipment in an adjacent fire area. These areas are equipped with portable fire extinguishers and have standpipe hose stations available. Both of the redundant primary component cooling water pumps are located in one fire area. A metal barrier partition has been placed between the two pumps and a preaction sprinkler system has been provided above the pumps.

Both the motor driven and turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps are located in one fire area. Our fire hazard analysis indicates there are minimal combustibles, other than pump lubricating oil and fiberglass ladders, located in this area. The pumps are separated by 15 feet.

Ionization detectors have been provided for early warning of a fire and portable extinguishers and hose station for manual firefighting.

The service water pump and the circulating water pump areas are separated by a 11/2 hour fire wall. Our fire hazard analysis indicates that combustibles located in these areas consist of pump lubricating oil and fiberglass ladders. Ionization detectors have been provided in the service water pump area and portable extinguishers supplemental by yard hydrants for manual firefighting.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 98 Normal ventilation equipment can be used to facilitate smoke removal, as it can be manually controlled from the main control room until the fire dampers close.

All safety

-related pumps and equipment are supported on curbs or pedestals. Floor drains in these areas will direct all water to either the radioactive liquid waste or non

-radioactive liquid waste system, as required.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 44 F.12 New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers should be located within this area. Also, local hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area. Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the new fuel area. The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water.

The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.

Respons e Portable extinguishers are located in the fuel storage building. A local hose station is located outside the area but within hose reach.

There are minimal combustibles in the fuel storage building. A fire detection system has been provided. Sumps and sump pumps are provided to prevent accumulation of water. New fuel is stored to preclude criticality should unborated water accumulate in this area.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 99 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 45 F.13 Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable extinguishers. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.

Response Portable fire extinguishers are provided, and a local hose station is within hose reach of the spent fuel storage area.

There are minimal combustibles in the spent fuel area. A fire detection system has been provided.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 100 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 45 F.14 Radwaste Building The Radwaste Building should be separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three

-hour ratings. Automatic sprinklers should be used in all areas where combustible materials are located. Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. During a fire, the ventilation systems in these areas should be capable of being isolated. Water should drain to liquid radwaste building sumps.

Acceptable alternate fire protection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and portable extinguishers consisting of hand held and large wheeled units.

Response The radwaste building is separated from other areas of the plant by fire barrier having 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating. Automatic deluge systems are provided in the extruder/evaporator area, asphalt meter pump room and turn table/drum conveyor area. Ionization type fire detectors are provided in the waste compactor area, decontamination area, extruder/evaporator area (thermal detection also), asphalt meter pump room (thermal detection also), turntable/drum conveyor area (thermal detection also) and waste solidification control room to indicate locally at the control panel and to initiate visual and audible alarm in the main control room. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are available for use. The ventilation system is capable of being isolated during a fire. All water from the fire suppression systems will drain to the waste processing building sumps.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 101 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.15 Decontamination Areas The decontamination areas should be protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. The ventilation system should be capable of being isolated. Local hose stations and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as back

-up to the sprinkler system.

Response No flammable liquids are stored in the decontamination area nor are other combustibles stored in the decontamination area, therefore no automatic sprinklers are provided. However, smoke detectors have been installed and portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are available.

With the aid of early detection, the operator has the capability for shutting down the ventilation system and manually fight an unlikely fire.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.l6 Safety-Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of fire. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose houses. Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks. A minimum of 50 feet of separation should be provided between outdoor tank and combustible materials where feasible.

Response Combustible materials should not be stored near safe shutdown water storage tanks in such a manner that the operability of the tanks could be compromised by the effects of a fire. Hose reels and/or hydrants and portable extinguishers are provided as fire protection.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 102 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.17 Cooling Towers Cooling towers should be of non

-combustible construction or so located that a fire wall not adversely affect any safety

-related systems or equipment. Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.

Response The service water cooling tower is constructed of non-combustible material. Concrete is used for the superstructure. The fill material is a hard burned clay which is chemically inert, and the mist eliminators are fiberglass.

APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 F.18 Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as records storage areas, shops, warehouses, and auxiliary boiler rooms should be so located that a fire or effects of a fire, including smoke, will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers should be buried or provided with dikes to contain the entire tank contents.

Response The record storage, shops, storage room, and auxiliary boiler room within the Administration and Service Building are separated from other buildings by barriers having a three (3) hour fire rating. Due to their remote location relative to safety related systems and equipment, a fire in these areas could not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment. The fuel oil tank for the auxiliary boilers is provided with a dike to contain its entire contents.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 103 G. Special Protection Guidelines APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 G.1 Welding and Cutting Acetylene

- Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various areas throughout the plant. Storage areas should be chosen to permit fire protection by automatic sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and portable equipment should be provided as backup. The requirements of NFPA 51 and 51B are applicable to these hazards. A permit system should be required to utilize this equipment (also refer to 2f herein). Response Flammable welding gas equipment is generally stored in the Administrative Building

- Machine Shops, Chlorination

- Machine Shop, Circulating Water Pumphouse. Portable extinguishers, hose stations, and/or hydrants with hose houses are provided in these areas. Administrative procedures have been generated for the use of this equipment; hot work permits are required for utilization of this equipment.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 104 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 G.2 Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins Dry ion exchange resins should not be stored near essential safety related systems. Dry unused resins should be protected by automatic wet pipe sprinkler installations. Detection by smoke and heat detectors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should provide backup for these areas. Storage areas of dry resin should have curbs and drains. (Refer to NFPA 92M, "Waterproofing and Draining of

Floors.") Response Dry ion exchange resin is not stored near essential safety related systems. Long term storage of dry ion exchange resin will be in the service building and/or warehouses. The storeroom in the service building and warehouses are protected by sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and hydrants are provided as backup fire protection. Fire protection flow alarms would indicate fire conditions in the warehouses. Curbs are not provided for these storage areas. Drains are provided. APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 48 G.3 Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49 "Hazardous Chemicals Data". Chemical storage areas should be well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with water to produce ignition. Response Chemicals are stored in the chemical storage room and storeroom of the service building and in the warehouses. These areas are well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions.

Small quantities of chemicals are also stored for use in the chemical laboratories which are well ventilated and protected against flooding.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 105 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 48 G.4 Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well. Consideration should be given to requirements for removal of isotopic decay heat from entrained radioactive material.

Response Materials that have collected and contain radioactivity are stored in metal tanks or containers which are located in the waste processing building. The storage area is free from ignition sources and combustibles and is separated from fires in adjacent buildings by a three hour rated fire wall. Decay heat emanating from the containers is removed by the building ventilation system.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 106 H. Deviations from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code/Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) Listing Ref.: -SBN- 970, dated 3/18/86 Section 9.5.1.1 from Seabrook's FSAR states:

The Fire Protection Systems have been designed using the general guidelines of the following codes and standards:

(a) American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)

- Specifications for Fire Protection of New Plants.

(b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and ABS Codes as Listed in Table 9S

-I. (c) Uniform Building Code (UBC).

The following are deviations from NFPA:

1. Low Point Drain Valves in Sprinkler Systems

Most of the low point drain valves, used throughout the sprinkler systems, do not meet NFPA 13, Section 3

-14 since they are not UL listed. These drain valves, United Brass Series 125 S Globe Valves, have all the same characteristics as United Brass UL listed valves, except for the flow characteristics. Since these valves are only used as low point drains, the flow characteristics are not of a concern. The use of non

-UL listed valves in this application is acceptable.

2. The test flow meter for Fire Pumps 1

-FP-P-20A, 20B, and 20C does not meet NFPA 20

NFPA 20 states that the test flow meter must be capable of up to 175%

of rated pump capacity. The pumps have a rated capacity of 1,500 gpm. One hundred seventy

-five percent (175%) of this is 2,625 gpm, but the flow meter is only capable up to 2,600 gpm.

These pumps will only be tested to a maximum 150% of their rated capacity which is well within the range of the flow meter. The capacity of the flow meter is also only 1%

lower than what is required by code.

Because of the above stated reasons, the test flow meter is acceptable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 107 3. Audible evacuation alarms do not meet NFPA 72A: NFPA 72A, Section 2

-5.4, "Distribution of Evacuation Signals," states that fire alarm systems provided for evacuation of occupants shall have one or more audible alarms on each floor divided by a fire wall. Areas of the plant which are protected by preaction sprinkler systems do not have audible alarms throughout the area for the evacuation of occupants. However, if there is a fire problem, the Control Room will receive an alarm from the area detection and/or the water flow alarm valves on the sprinkler systems. Plant operating personnel and the fire brigade will be immediately dispatched to the area in question.

Because of this reason, lack of the audible alarms within the fire area is acceptable.

The areas which do not have audible alarms throughout the area include the Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms, the Mechanical Room on El. 5l'

-6", the Diesel Generator Rooms, and the Fuel Oil Storage Rooms in the Diesel Generator Building, the Turbine Building. El. 25' in the PAB, the electrical tunnels Trains A and B, the cable spreading area in the Control Building, and the extruder/evaporator area, the metering pump area, and the turntable/conveyor belt area in the Waste Process Building.

4. Fire tanks were not built to AWWA Standards as required by NFPA 22, but instead, to API 650: The requirements for a tank built to American Petroleum Institute Standard 650, for storage of petroleum, are more stringent than the requirements in AWWA Standards for water tanks. The tanks are, therefore, acceptable.

5. HVAC fans do not shut down upon detection of smoke as required by NFPA 90A

For safety

-related ventilation systems, there is a conflict between the nuclear safety-related HVAC System and NFPA 90A. It is necessary to keep the ventilation system operational (depending on area heat loads). This is especially true for a ventilation system serving multiple areas. If a damper in a branch duct for one fire area closes due to fire in its respective fire area, it is necessary to continue operating fans to provide cooling air to other areas served. This design philosophy is also applied to nonsafety-related HVAC Systems at Seabrook.

Seabrook Station relies on area detection for early warning of fire problems. These detectors alarm in the Control Room. Plant operating personnel will take immediate action to determine the magnitude of the fire problem and will, at that time, decide if it is necessary to shut down fans.

For these reasons, not shutting down the fans is an acceptable deviation.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 108 6. Sprinklers for area coverage over the PCCW pumps in the PAB El. 25', do not strictly meet NFPA 13

Due to severe congestion at the ceiling and the thickness of the beams at the ceiling, several sprinklers over the PCCW pumps could not be located in strict accordance with NFPA 13, Section 4.3. The ceiling beams, extending down to 42 inches from the ceiling, do not physically allow sprinkler location to meet Table 4

-2.4.b in NFPA 13. The sprinklers are, however, placed in the beam pockets to compensate for the obstruction of the spray patterns due to the beams. There are also areas in the PAB in which the ceiling is heavily congested with supplementary steel, supports, and conduits not allowing the sprinklers to meet the maximum distance from the ceiling criteria in NFPA 13. In these cases, the sprinklers were placed in the best location possible to allow for complete coverage of the floor. For the above reasons, the locations of the sprinklers are an acceptable deviation.

7. Fire protection booster pump does not meet NFPA 20

Per Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A, Position C3(d)

- A backup to the normal Fire Protection System was provided for the standpipes servicing safety equipment in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). A permanent connection between one train of service water and the Fire Protection System (safety

-related area standpipe) is provided with a booster pump to supply the required pressure.

The fire protection booster pump is an Aurora Series 350, stainless steel pump that is not UL listed, nor FM approved. The pump controller is a non

-automatic (manual) controller which includes a local on

-off push button with status lights. There is a gate valve and a pressure gauge in both the suction and discharge lines to the pump. A relief valve is located at the pump discharge. An orifice plate is located in a test line connecting the suction and discharge of the pump so that pump flow may be tested. A permanent flow meter is not being provided, but there are connections for a portable flow meter.

One requirement in NFPA 20 is that fire pumps shall be listed for fire protection. Even though the FP booster pump is not UL/FM, it has similar characteristics to a UL/FM pump. UL/FM pumps, however, are made from cast iron which cannot be seismically qualified.

The FP booster pump is made from stainless steel and, therefore, can be seismically qualified.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 109 NFPA 20 also requires that fire pumps shall have an automatic controller which would start the pump upon a low pressure reading. The pump is also required by NFPA 20 to have remote reading. The pump is also required by NFPA 20 to have remote alarm and signal devices at a point of constant, attendance to indicate such items as that the controller has operated into a motor running condition and loss of line power on the line side of the motor starter. NFPA 20 also requires to galvanize or paint the suction pipe to prevent tuberculation.

The FP booster pump is not, however, the main fire pump. It is a small (150 gpm) backup fire pump which only supplies the standpipe (hose reel) systems in certain areas of the plant in the unlikely event that SSE damages the normal fire protection supply.

The plant operating personnel will be immediately dispatched to the FP booster pump to open the isolation valve between the Service Water System and the Fire Protection System, and to start the pump. Due to these circumstances, an automatic controller is not necessary. The alarms required by NFPA 20 are also not needed since plant operating personnel will be at the pump if there is a problem with it. Since tuberculation is also not seen as being a problem due to the limited use of the pump, lining of the suction piping is not required.

For these reasons, the deviations stated above are acceptable.

Equipment in the Fire Protection Systems, except as noted in the FSAR, conforms to the standards of the NFPA, and is Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) listed and/or Factory Mutual (FM) approved. The following is a deviation from UL listed:

1. Teflon used to enhance closure of UL listed fire damper: A Teflon coating has been applied to the blade guide flange of the fire dampers to improve their closure characteristics under flow. Although the dampers are not tested with the Teflon coating, this coating will not prevent the dampers from meeting the test requirements of UL 555. In the damper closure part of the test, the dampers were tested under no flow conditions. The untested, per UL, Teflon modification allows the damper to close under a flow condition.

UL 555 under "Corrosion Protection," allows after a damper is tested the use of epoxy or alkyd-resin type or other outdoor paint in the surface of the damper. Since the Teflon coating is, in essence, the same as a paint coating, it will not affect the rating of the damper. The use of Teflon on fire dampers is acceptable.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5

-1, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 110 The following is a deviation from the FM approval requirements:

1. Fibercast fittings used in the underground sprinkler supply line to the Alternate RP Checkpoint

During installation of the underground sprinkler supply line to the Alternate RP Checkpoint, it was discovered that FM approved Fibercast pipe and fittings were no longer available from the manufacturer. There was sufficient inventory of FM approved Fibercast pipe in stock to complete the installation. However, fittings (tee, flanges and elbows) were not in stock. Fibercast fittings made from the same material, with the same dimensions and the same engagement as the FM approved Fibercast fittings were available without the FM stamp. Engineering reviewed the form, fit and function of the substitute Fibercast fittings and allowed their installation in this application only.

I. Fire Proofing for Structural Steel (Ref.: Letter to NRC SBN

-lOl7, dated April 24, 1986)

Professional Loss Control, Inc. (PLC) conducted a Seabrook Structural Steel Survivability Analysis for those areas noted in Table 1. Wherever PLC indicated structural steel needed to be fire proofed, a structural integrity review was conducted on the fire areas as indicated by PLC temperatures. In most cases, the structure can withstand the potential loss of structural steel. No fireproofing will be done on these beams and/or columns. A few limited cases, some steel was fireproofed in a fire area but only steel indicated by PLC and needed to maintain the fire areas structure.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 111 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIR E PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART Fire Area/Zone PLC Analysis of Area Shows no Structural Steel Fireproof Required PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed UE&C Has Determined Structure Can Accept Steel Losses Miscellaneous Notes EFP-F-l-A X MS-F-1A-Z X MS-F-1B-Z X MS-F-2A-Z MS-F-2B-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low Loading. MS-F-3A-Z X MS-F-3B-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low Loading. MS-F-4A-Z X MS-F-5A-Z Exposed steel used for cable tray supports. Concrete slab is self

-supporting.

RHR-F-1A-Z X RHR-F-1B-Z X RHR-F-1C-Z X RHR-F-1D-Z X RHR-F-2A-Z X RHR-F-2B-Z X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 112 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIR E PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART Fire Area/Zone PLC Analysis of Area Shows no Structural Steel Fireproof Required PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed UE&C Has Determined Structure Can Accept Steel Losses Miscellaneous Notes RHR-F-3A-Z X RHR-F-3B-Z X CB-F-3B-A X CB-F-S1-0 CB-F-S2-0 Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low Loading. ET-F-1A-A ET-F-1B-A ET-F-1C-A ET-F-1D-A ET-F-S1-0 Slab is self

-supporting. Do not need structure steel. DG-F-3A-Z X DG-F-3B-Z X DG-F-3E-A X DG-F-3F-A X PAB-F-1A-Z X PAB-F-1B-Z X PAB-F-1F-Z X PAB-F-1G-A X SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 113 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIR E PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART Fire Area/Zone PLC Analysis of Area Shows no Structural Steel Fireproof Required PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed UE&C Has Determined Structure Can Accept Steel Losses Miscellaneous Notes PAB-F-S1-0 PAB-F-S2-0 Does not contain exposed PAB combustibles. Low loading.

PAB-F-2A-Z X PAB-F-2B-Z X PAB-F-2C-Z X PAB-F-3A-Z X PAB-F-3B-Z X PAB-F-4-Z X PAB-F-1J-Z X PAB-F-1K-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low loading. FSB-F-1A X SW-F-1A-Z Structure is separated from fire area used for safe shutdown by seismic gap. Can accept loss of structure.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Appendix A Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5

-1 Rev. 1 5 Section F.3 Page 114 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIR E PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART Fire Area/Zone PLC Analysis of Area Shows no Structural Steel Fireproof Required PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Limited Fireproofing of Structural Steel is Needed UE&C Has Determined Structure Can Accept Steel Losses Miscellaneous Notes SW-F-1B-A SW-F-1C-A SW-F-1D-A SW-F-1E-Z SW-F-2-0 Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining fire areas.

CT-F-1C-A CT-F-1D-A CT-F-2B-A CT-F-3-0 Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining fire areas.

CE-F-1-A X FPH-F-1A-A FPH-F-1B-A FPH-F-1C-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining fire areas TB-F-1B-A TB-F-1A-Z TB-F-1C-Z TB-F-2-Z TB-F-3-Z Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from fire areas used during safe shutdown by seismic gap.

NES-F-1A-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from fire areas used during safe shutdown by seismic gap.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Rev 6 Appendix A Page 1 Design Basis Fire

1. Diesel oil spills onto the floor of the storage room and is ignited. 2. The flame spreads in all directions (unless obstructed) from the point of ignition at a rate of 3 in./sec. (1). 3. The burning rate is 8.3 inches of depth per hour (2).

4. The fire burns at the rate until 50% of the initial oxygen supply is gone (3).

5. The burning rate decreases linearly from the 50% moment to zero when 100% of the initial oxygen supply in exhausted. Assumptions

1. The heat value of the oil is taken a 19,000 Btu/lb. (4).

2. The specific heat of all gases is taken as that of air at standard conditions.

3. The products of combustion are taken to be carbon monoxide and water. This is a very conservative assumption in that it uses oxygen at a slower rate than would an assumption of carbon dioxide product. The heat value in such a case would be much lower in this case than 19,000 Btu/lb., which assumes complete combustion. 4. Heat transfer to passive heat sinks has been considered. Heat transfer coefficients were calculated on the basis of blackbody radiation fo r the bare concrete walls and ceiling and steel fuel oil tank directly exposed to the flame, turbulent convection for the remainder of the tank, 1 Btu/hr Ft.

2 - °F outside the room. Dimensional Parameters

1. Room size is 40.5 ft. x 40 ft. and 33.5 ft height. 2. Diameter of the tank is 20 ft. and the length of the straight part is 28 ft.

3. Area of the vent is 4 sq. ft.

4. Heat transfer surfaces exposed to direct radiation are 1,429 sq. ft. concrete ceiling (4 ft.

thick), 1,393 sq. ft, concrete walls (3.5 ft. th ick) and 909 sq. ft. steel ( 1/2 inch thick), convective heat transfer being considered for the rest of the tank surface.

Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 S EABROOK S TATION Appendix A Appendix A Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Page 2 Method Of Analysis

1. Flow to and from the room is calculated based on room pressure by the computer code CONTEMPT, which also calculates the room temperature and pressure transients, as well as the temperature profiles in the concrete. 2. Credit is taken for the depletion of oxygen due to venting during the early, maximum burn, stage of fire in the following manner: (a) Based on assumptions listed above, the rate of heat addition to the room is 39.17t 2 Btu/sec. (t in seconds), and at 19,000 Btu/lb, the mass addition rate is 2.06 x 10

-3 t 2 lb/sec. (b) Conservatively using standard conditi ons, there are 3,058 lbs. air initially of which 710 lb. is oxygen. (c) The mass and energy addition rates in (a), above are inputted to CONTEMPT which is run 100 or so seconds of fire at maximum burn. From the output of this run R(t) the venting rate from the room, and M(t) the total lbs. of air in the room are ascertained as tabular functions of time. (d) Based on the oil consumption rate, 2.06 x 10

-3 t 2 lb/sec., a typical diesel fuel oil composition (5) and combustion products consisting Of CO and H 2 O, the oxygen consumption rate due to combustion is found to be 3.96 x 10

-3 t 2 lb/sec. (e) The equation: )(0)()(231096.3)(0 ttMtR t dttd X which determines 0(t), the time-dependent mass of oxygen in the room, is numerically integrated to find the time at which 50% of the initial amount of

oxygen is exhausted. (f) The period of maximum burn rate is thus obtained as the time of 50% oxygen remaining in the room.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Rev 6 Appendix A Page 3 3. After the maximum burning time, although the venting rate is considerable at that time, no credit is taken for further loss of oxygen through this means. The fire burns at a linearly decreasing rate until the remaining oxygen is consumed. It is recognized that during the late stages of the fire, as the room cools, air will actually be drawn into the room through the vent sustaining some combus tion. It should be noted, however, that the mechanism is self-defeating and that air can enter only when the temperature of the room is dropping, thus the peak temperatures will never be approached again. A slow, smoldering condition will result.

RESULTS Case I: Without Spray Actuation In the case when the spray fails to actuate, the room pressure reaches a maximum of 4.2 psig at 29 seconds when 50% of the oxygen is exhausted, and the room temperature

peaks at l,582°F at 41 seconds. Figure 1 shows the transient pressure/temperature responses. The ceiling concrete temperature reaches a maximum of 774°F at 135 seconds. The fire continues to burn till 237 seconds. Figure 2 shows the temperature

profiles through ceiling concrete. Case II: With Spray Actuation In the case when the spray with a flow rate of 625 gpm at 90°F temperature actuates automatically when the room temperature reaches 200 °F, the situation greatly improves.

The spray starts at approximately 18 seconds when the rate of rise of pressure/temperature is significantly reduced resulting in much less severe transients. No credits have been considered for removal of heat due to vaporization of spray water which is expected to reduce the consequences further. The room pressure reaches a maximum of 0.9 psig at 37 seconds when 50% of the oxygen is exhausted, and the room temperat ure peaks at 611°F at 41 seconds. Figure 3 shows the transient pressure/temperature responses. The fire continues for 157 seconds.

The ceiling concrete temperature reaches a maximum of 316°F at 70 seconds and the temperature profiles are presented in Figure 4.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Rev 6 Appendix A Page 4 References

1. Mackinven, R., Hansel, J.G., and Glassman, I., "Influence of Laboratory Parameters on Flame Spread Across Liquid Fuels". Combustion Science & Technology, Volume 1 - pp.

293-306, 1970 2. Blinor, V.1., and Khidiakor, G.N., "Certa in Laws Governing Diffusive Burning of Liquids", Fire Research Abstract and Review, Volume - 1 pp. 41-44, 1958 3. Zabetokis, G.M., "Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases and Vapors", Bulletin 627, Bureaus of Mines, U.S. Dept. of Interior, 1965 4. Perry, J.H., et al.; Chemical Engineering Handbook , 4th Edition, pp.142-143, McGraw-Hill 1963 5. Marks' Handbook of Mechanical Engineering , p. 7-22, California Fuel Oil (other oils with higher carbon and hydrogen fractions consume oxygen more rapidly). (The corresponding heat rate for this oil was not used.)

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis Rev 6 Appendix B Page 1 Design Basis Fire

1. RCP lube oil leaks from the pump, is heated close to its flash point while traveling over piping, falls to the floor of the containment and is ignited. 2. The oil spill is limited to an area of 150 ft

2. 3. The entire 265 gallons of lubricating oil in the pump burns. Assumptions

1. The heat value of the oil is 150,000 Btu/gal.

2. The burning rate is equivalent to 5.0 inches of depth per hour.

3. Heat transfer to passive heat sinks has been considered. A heat transfer coefficient of 2 Btu/ft 2-hr-0F, characteristic of laminar convection, wa s conservatively used for transfer to the steel and concrete within the containment and to the containment walls. No radiative heat transfer has been accounted for. 4. Heat removal by active heat sinks (Fan cooler s) was also considered. The five fan coolers just balance the containment sensible heat generation rate (5.85 x 10 6 Btu/hr) at 120°F containment atmosphere temperature. At a temp erature of 300°F, the total capacity of the fan coolers is 25 x 10 6 Btu/hr (or 19.15 x 10 6 Btu/hr in excess of containment sensible heat generation rate). In actuality, the capacity is somewhat higher, thus that used is conservative. 5. The burning of the oil would add approximately 1900 lbs. to the containment atmosphere mass. This is neglected. Doing so yields a slightly higher peak temperature and an insignificantly lower peak pressure. The temperature transient is more severe and therefore the omission is conservative. 6. The initial temperature and pressure of the containment atmosphere are 120 0 F and 15.2 psia, respectively.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis Rev 6 Appendix B Page 2 7. Each Seabrook Station reactor coolant pump contains approximately 240 gallons of oil.

Each collection tank has a capacity of 320 ga llons. The tanks were sized to hold the entire inventory of one pump plus 25%. However, if the lube oil systems for two pumps were to fail simultaneously, there would be an excess of 160 gallons of oil per tank. In order to contain this excess oil, a seismically designed dike will be built around the tank.

The tanks and their dikes are located such that the excess oil does not present a fire hazard to any safety-related equipment. Add itionally, there is no ignition source near the diked area. (Ref.: SBN-762, dated February 8, 1985.)

Method of Analysis

1. Based on the assumptions above, the duration of the fire is calculated to be 34 minutes with a constant heat addition rate of 1.169 x 10 6 Btu/hr. 2. The computer code CONTRAST-S was used to calculate the temperature and pressure transients due to the fire.

Results The maximum temperature obtaining in the containment is 253°F and the maximum pressure is 4 psig. Both peaks occur at 34 minutes, at which time the fire burns itself out. The temperature transient is shown in Figure 1 and the pressure transient is shown in Figure 2. Both temperature and pressure decay rapidly as soon as burning stops.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 1 RESUME ALFRED S. BOCCHINO United Engineers & Constructors Inc.

EDUCATION B.S.M.E., 1939, University of Alabama PROFESSIONAL Delaware New Jersey ENGINEERING Missouri Pennsylvania REGISTRATION New Hampshire MEMBERSHIPS American Society of Mechanical Engineers New Jersey Society of Professional Engineers National Society of Professional Engineers Society of Fire Protection Engineers

SUMMARY

Over thirty-three years of experience in the engineering and design of power plants, manufacturing facilities, chemical plants and oil refineries. Developed the scope of various projects, specified equipment and supervised the engineering and design of fire protection systems and mechanical facilities, both process and service. Especially competent in

plant fire protection including water supply, fire pumps, yard mains, automatic sprinkler system, etc. and the plant service area consisting of plumbing and drainage, waste treatment facilities, dust collection, central vacuum cleaning systems, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and special nuclear related air cleaning systems. Responsible for the coordination of the engineering and de sign for complete service and fire protection facilities of several power plants, both fossil and nuclear, and manufacturing plants. Responsibilit y in the nuclear field included preparation of preliminary safety anal ysis reports, final safety analysis reports, environmental reports, fire protection system design, and other licensing activities for pressurized water reactors (PWR) and High Temperature Gas-Cooled React ors (HTGR) power plants.

EXPERIENCE United Engineers & Constructors Inc.

Philadelphia. Pennsylvania 19101

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 2 October 1975 to present Consultant - Mechanical Services Engineer

Responsible for the review, comm ent and approval of Mechanical Services related work, including plant fire protection, on fossil and nuclear power plants designed by UE&C. The Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and Regulatory Guide 1.120 are used as guides in

the review of fire protection for safety-related systems and equipment.

May 1972 to

October 1975 Supervising Discipline Engineer Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Summit Power Station, Summit Bridge, Delaware, two 770 Mw HTGR Units No. 1 and Unit

No. 2.

Responsible for engineering the heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems; plant fire protection system, including yard hydrant system complete with water storage and pumping facilities, building standpipe systems, sprinkler systems, pre-action sprinkler systems, deluge systems, specified use of CO 2 and Halon extinguishers. This project was not completed.

January 1971 to November 1974 Supervising Discipline Engineer

Project - Philadelphia Electric Company, Eddystone Generating Station, two 400 Mw crude oil-fired peaki ng generating units Nos. 3 and 4. Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. In addition, engineered automatic foam fire protection system for crude oil spill areas resulting from possible oil pipe rupture.

July 1970 to

January 1974 Supervising Discipline Engineer

Project - Atlantic City Electric Company, B. L. England Station.

Conversion of Low existing coal-burning units to burn crude oil.

Design of new 150 Mw crude oil-fire d plant. Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. In

addition engineered (1) foam fire pr otection system for crude oil storage tanks; (2) a combustible gas detection system for continuously detecting and indicating the presence of combustible gas fumes in selected plant areas; (3) special ventilating systems for removal of gas fumes from burner areas.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 3 December 1970 to July 1973 Supervising Discipline Engineer

Project - Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Sewaren Generating Station; two 400 Mw oil-fired peak ing units, Unit Nos. 7 and 8. Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. This project was not completed.

March 1971 to

February 1973 Supervising Discipline Engineer Project - Puerto Rico Water Reso urces Authority, Aguirre Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1, P.W.R. units.

Provide consulting engineering services on plant service facilities. This project was not completed.

April 1969 to

June 1972 Supervising Discipline Engineer Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Vienna Power Station;

150 Mw oil-fired generating unit, Unit No. 8.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment.

August 1967 to September 1969 Supervising Discipline Engineer Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Indian River Power Station; 150 Mw coal-fired Unit No. 3.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action systems, Halon extinguishing equipment water supply or pumping equipment. September 1966 to

February 1971 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Alleghony Power System, Ha tfield Power Station, three 500 Mw coal-fired units, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment. November 1965 to December 1973 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Consolidated Edison Comp any of New York, Indian Point Generating Station, Units Nos. 2 and 3, P.W.R. units. Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment. Fixed foam systems used on turbine oil storage tanks and associated equipment.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 4 April 1965 to July 1966 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Pickands Mather & Company, Taconite Harbor Power Station, Unit No. 3, coal-fired.

Extended yard fire protection and building standpipe system. Specified deluge spray system for transformers.

April 1964 to

March 1968 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Union Electric Company, Si oux Power Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2, 500,000 kw capacity coal-fired units.

Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment.

June 1964

to February 1965 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - United States Steel Corporation, Clairton Works. Addition to Boiler House No. 3.

Extended yard fire protection system, added transformer deluge water spray systems.

March 1961 to November 1962 Mechanical Supervising Engineer

Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Norwalk Harbor Station; 165,000 kw capacity, Unit No. 2, coal-fired.

Responsibilities same as for period JuLy 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems, Halon extinguishing equipment or water supply and pumping equipment.

May 1961 to March 1962 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Texas Electric Company, Handley Station; 35,000 kw capacity, gas-fired outdoor plant.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems, standpipe systems or Halon extinguishing equipment. September 1960 to

May 1961 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - National Aniline Division, Allied Chemical Corporation, Polyamide Fiber Plant, Hopewell, Virginia.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 5 February 1960 to September 1960 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Western Electric, Kansas City, Missouri, Electronic Facilities covering l 1/2 million square feet of building area.

Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.

October 1957 to

February 1960 Mechanical Supervising Engineer

Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Norfolk Harbor Station, 150,000 kw capacity, Unit No. 1, coal-fired.

Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.

June 1957 to

October 1957 Mechanical Supervising Engineer

Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Devon Generating Station; 112,000 Kw capacity, Unit No. 8, coal-fired. Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.

May 1955 to June 1957 Mechanical Supervising Engineer Project - Delaware Power & Light Company, Indian River Power

Station; two 85,000 Kw units, Unit s Nos. 1 and 2, coal-fired. Responsibilities same as for peri od May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.

August 1939 to

May 1955 This time period is no longer relevant to the matter at hand and is not included in this resume.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 6 RESUME EDWARD A. SAWYER Fire Protection Coordinator Yankee Atomic Electric Co.

EDUCATION 1977 - Series of short intensiv e courses on Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Fire Protection fo r Nuclear Power Plant Operating Personnel, and Fire Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Power Plant. All given by NATLSCo and Professional Loss Control, Inc.

September 1976 - December 1976 - Wor cester Polytechnical Institute. Engineering Methodology for Building Fire Safety Evaluation.

August 1976 - University of Wisconsin-Extension. Fire Safety Design for Buildings.

1965 - Northeastern University - BS in Electrical Engineering.

MEMBERSHIPS Society of Fire Protection Engineers National Fire Protection Association EXPERIENCE Yankee Atomic Electric Company July 1976 to

Present Fire Protection Coordinator dire ctly responsible for the overall preparation and implementation of the fire prevention and protection programs for three operating nuclear power plants - Yankee Rowe, Vermont Yankee, and Maine Yankee. Specifically responsible for the performance of the fire hazard analysis at the plants, and the development and implementation of recommenda tions concerning the updating and backfitting of the plants to the applicable requirements contained in Appendix A to the Branch Technical Position on Fire Protection, APCSB

9. 5-1, Regulatory Guide 1. 120, and any further NRC requirements in the area of fire protection. Responsible for insuring, the development of fire

prevention and protection procedures, including programs for the training of the plant staff and plan t fire brigade. Responsible for ultimate review and approval of the design of Seab rook Station and NEP 1 and 2 with respect to coordination of design with fire protection requirements.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 7 Responsible for the ultimate review and approval of the fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Reevaluation Report. Responsible for dealing with the insurers for the operating plants in matters relating to fire

protection.

August 1974 to

July 1976 Project Manager on the Central Maine Power Company Nuclear Project directly responsible for coordinating the development of project design and engineering schedules with the principal contractors, administration of the Project Engineers under my direction, developing, monitoring and controlling project costs: including dealing with insurers of the project; generally responsible for the licensing of the project and for engineering, design, and quality assurance activities re lated to the work of the principal contractor organizations associated with the project.

January 1972 to

August 1974 Electrical Project Engineer on the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. Duties consisted of supervision of the Electrical Engineering effort of the A/E and Yankee in PSAR submittal and in plant design, and

responsibility to the Project Manager for licensing activities, engineering coordination, notification of any cost or schedular problems, including dealing with NELPIA in areas of fire protection design.

Project Engineer on the engineeri ng, construction and testing of an Advanced Off-Gas Control System for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Duties consisted of su pervising the engi neering, scheduling and cost control efforts of the A/

E and Yankee personnel; and following of the construction effort and test effort for the system. November 1971 to January 1972 Assistant to the Project Engineer for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Duties consisted of aiding in plant licensing, plant licensing, writing of plant Environmental Report. September 1970

to November 1971 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant

Technical Assistant to the Plant Maintenance Supervisor. Duties consisted

of aiding Maintenance Department personnel in preparing the p-l-ant for commission, ranging from work on Microwave Communications, Metering, and Relaying to work on large motors, switchgear, and power transformers.

S EABROOK S TATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Resumes Rev 6 Appendix C Page 8 January 1968 to September 1970 Yankee Atomic Electric Company

Engineer in the Project group for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Plant. The Project group coordinated the work done on the plant by the Architect Engineer, Nuclear Steam Supplier, and the various other vendors and suppliers. Work was mainly in the Electrical and Instrumentation coordination and design, with some excursions into Nuclear and Mechanical areas, in cluding working with NELPIA in developing fire protection systems.

April 1963 to

June 1965 New England Electric System

Brayton Point Generating Station, Somerset, Massachusetts. Co-op employment as Assistant to the Electrical Department Foreign of a 500 M Thermal Generating Plant - Mainte nance planning, job planning, parts ordering, responsibility for maintenance of fire protection systems.

- -. ... , . : - . d h m d 0 kl C r UURDS ANALYSES Or SEABROOK STATION CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS Seabrook Station Publtc Service Company of New Bampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division Revision 1 . , . November 1991 .. -

• Prepared b \ - 043-8 & Date .. .. _. 10.8- W- Date , z- r. .-_-_* -. -- - - ..-C - I - ' - . . -. Yankee Atomic Electric Coupany , Hucleer Services Division .. - 1671 Worcester Soad . . --... . Eramingha~, klassachusetts 01701 - -. I Rev. 9 Appendix D Page i SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis SEABROOK STA'llON*.::.:.....Evaluation BTPAPCSB 9.5-1.',/

.';,.

Hazard Alntilysis HAZARDS ANALYSES OF SEABROOK STATION CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS Seabrook Station Public Service Company of New Hampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division Revision 1 November 1991 Prepared rC\Reviewed by Klein Approved

.

J.Cloutier!REVISION 1 Rev.9 AppendixD Page'i'")0-3-8'=.Date 10.t-!r_Date PREPARED BY\DATE BY\DATB APPROVED DY\DA'rE Yankee Atomic Electric Company Nucleer Services Division 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 u*tt-'"

This document was prepared by Yankee Atomic Electric Company (*'Yankeee')

The we of inforration contained in this docmmt by 8nyQne other tban Yankee, or the Organization for which the document was prepared, is not authorized ard neither Yankee nor it. officers , directors, agents, or employees assme any' obligation, nspmrsibility.

or liability or makes any warranty or representation of the material contained in the document.

Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis Rev. 9 Appendix D Page ii SEABROOK STATION to'BTPMC8B 9.5-1,.............

".....ixA Analysis OF RESPQNSIBUITY This document W&S prepared by Yankee Atomic Electric Company ("Yankee").

The use of iflformation contained in this document by anyone other than Yankee.or the Organiz&tion for which the document was prepared.is not authorized and with respect to any uoAUthori;ed usc.neither Yankee nor its officers.directors, agents, or employee.

any'obligation.

responsibility.

or liability or makes any warranty or representation of the material contained in the document../-ii-WP1'l9/181

,..

Evaluation of Charcoal Filer Unit Fires at Seabrook Station - PLC SEABROOK STATION Iodine Adsorber Fire Test - Nuclear Consulting Services, Jnc. PBEL 1 1 1-6 6 Appendix I Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis Appendix 11 Rev. 9 Appendix D Page iii SEABROOK STATION SUBJEct Evaluation and

,......i\ppeQdixA Analysis TAELE OF CONIENIS i\ppep.d.ix

• 0 Page iii In traduction

Backgro1JI1d.

It"**";***,,-*"**"*" DisCU5Sion

Conclusion

Evaluation of Charcoal Filer Unit Fires at Seabrook Station-PLC Iodine Adsorber Fire TestNuclear Consulting Services.Inc.-iii-WFP19/181 1 1 1-6 6 Appendix I Appendix II

y. This report describes a Bazardo Analysis conducted on Seabrook Ststion96 filter units, which contain charcoal bedsfcells.

Table 1 identifies Seabrook's nine (9) filter units snd their location.

I SEABROOK STATION Seabrook's approach to a charcoal fire within the filter units is fire preventian 4 and detection as outlined within the guidelines of Item II.B(3) of 1OCm0, Appendix R, which states, "specify measurer for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, &ad fire containment, and alternative shutdown capability a6 required for each fire area containing structures, systuns, and components important to safety in accordance with NRC guidelines and regulations." I To address internal charcoal fires, an analysis was conducted on all Seabrook . filter units, which contain charcoal beds/cells, to determine the mexhum temperatures of the charcoal adsorber sections, due to decay heat from iodine and I its daughter product decay wdthout air flew. Thia analysis showed that tbe overall maximum temperature would be limited to 170~~. Additional analyses indicate that the maximum temperature for the HEPA filters (due to decay beat from the particulate iodine5 accumulated in these filters) will be limited to 1870~. These temperatures are well below the maximum limit of 300'~ recommended in ANSI-N509-1980.

Thus, there is no possibility of an internal charcoal fire due to decay heat. A Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Seabrook's charcoal adsorber fil tcrs are also protected from external fires ~ince they are contained in a combination of heavy metal casing, wire debris screens, and fire retardant BEPA filters as recOmaended in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Deslgn, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered - Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Wattr-CoolCd 1 ~uciear Power Plants, Revifiion 2, March 1978. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 1 Further, transient combustibles are limited administratively.

Any welding or open flame sources vlll be controlled and limited. A fire watch will be maintained per 1 plant administrative procedure6 during these activities.

These precautions will prevent external sources from taming internal combustion to the charcoal beds/cells . I However, a fire hazard analysis is developed in this report to address the effects of a postulated charcoal fire in the filter units mad its impact on equipment needed for safe shutdown.

A realistic, but conse~ative approach was used to model I the charcoal fires since charcoal is a slow burning medium. I2uuwma - The following assmptiona were wed in this hazard analysi6.

1. Fire will be. detected by reliable and early warning system. I 2. From detection, which is alarmed in Control Boom, Operations per Operating I 0: Procedures will shutdown air flaw to the filter units. Assume five .. .._ minutes time from alarm conditions to shutdown of air flow. Charcoal is . -- .. assumed to be ignited in this time frame.

BTP MeSH JJ:5"" J',."":'.

A.INTRODUCTION

• • ..J D'

.!.;:,: " This report describes a Hazards Analysis conducted on Seabrook Station's filter units.which contain charcoal Deds/cells.

Table 1 identifies Seabrook's nine (9)filter units and their location.BACKGROUND Seabrook's approach to a charcoal fire within the filter units is fire prevention and detection as outlined within the guidelines of Item II.B(3)of lOCFRSO, Appendix R,"hieh states,"specify Dleasures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire contafament, and alternative.hutdown capability as required for each fire area containing systems, and components important to safety in ac!=ordance with NRC guidelines and regulations." To address internal charcoal fires, an analysis was conducted on all Seabrook filter units, which contain charcoal beds/cells, to determine the maxtmum temperatures of the charcoal adsorber sections, due to decay beat from iodine and its daughter product decay without air flow.This analysis showed that the overall.aximurn temperature would be limited to 170°F.Additional analyses indicate that the maximum temperature for the HEPA filters (due to decay heat from the particulate iodines accumulated in these filters)will be limited to 187 c F.These temperatures are well below the maximum limit of 300°F recommended in ANSI-N509-1980.

Thus, there is no possibility of an internal charcoal fire due to decay heat. Seabrook's charcoal adsorber filters are also protected from external fires since:,:.\.:.: they are contained in a combination of heavy metal casing.wire debris screens, and fire retardant BEPA filters as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design.Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered

-Safety Feature'1 Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Nuciear Power Plants, Revision 2, March 1978.I Further.transient combustibles are limited administratively.

Any welding or open flame sources will be controlled and limited.A fire watch will be maintained per plant administrative procedurel during these activities.

Theae precautions will prevent external sources from causing internal combustion to the charcoal beds/cells.

However, a fire hazard analysie is developed in this report to address the effects of a postulated charcoal fire in the filter units and its impact on equipment needed for safe shutdown.A realistic.

but conse;vative approach was used to model the charcoal fires since charcoal is a slow burning medium.DISCUSSION The following assumptions were used in this hazard analysis.1.Fire will be detected by reliable and early warning ,ystem.2.From detection.

which is in Control Room, Operations per Operating Procedures will shutdown air flow to the filter units.Assume five minutes time from alarm conditions to shutdown of sit flow.Charcoal is assumed to be ignited in tbis time frame.-1-WPP19/18l

3. The Fire Brigade will respond to the charcoal filter within 20 minutes from notification by the Control Room for all protected plant areas except I Containment. This notification is per Operating Procedures. For a fire within Containment, the Fire Brigade will respond within 90 minutes. (See Engineering 1 Evaluation EE-05-033, Revision 00.) 4. Ignition of the charcoal starts at the top of the charcoal bedlcell.

This is assumed conservative since a fire located lower in the bedlcell wouId burn the retaining mesh and drop the charcoal from the air flow path precluding rapid fire propagation.

Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 2 SEABROOK STATION 5. Since a fire cannot be started due to internal decay heat, the fire must be started from an external source. Assume an outside source is carried into the filter unit. All the units have HEPA filters on the inlet before the charcoal bed. Each HEPA filter section assembly is made up of a grouping of HEPA filter elements 24" x 24" x 11-112". Each element is a throwaway, extended medium, dry-type filter, which are open face, rectangular, fire-resistance type design for radioactive service. Assume the source carried internal by air flow totally ignites one HEPA filter element, 2' x 2'. This 2' x 2' filter element is assumed to ignite a 4 ftS2 area of the charcoal bedlcell.

Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A 6. Air flow through the charcoal bedlcell is assumed to be from the start of ignition.

4 ft? area of charcoal will bum under air flow condition for a period of 5 minutes time. At this point forced air flow has stopped and the resulting fire will be analyzed under natural draft air flow.

7. Air flow velocity through the charcoal during forced ventilation is 40 feet per minute which is Seabrook's charcoal bedlcell design velocity.

8. Further assumptions are used in Appendix I, "Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit Fires at Seabrook Station," 9-29-86 by Professional Loss Control, Inc. and are noted in that Appendix.

The Hazard Analysis consist of 3 parts, (1) Determination of charcoal bed burning rates, (2) a heat transfer model of the charcoal bedslcells and (3) effects of the heat transfer on safe shutdown equipment.

(1) Determination of Charcoal Bed Burning Rates A charcoal fire test was conducted by NUCON in their ASTM D3466 Test Rig. Data from this test was used by Professional Loss Control, Inc. (PLC) in their unsteady state heat transfer model of each of Seabrook's filter units, which contain charcoal bedslcells, excluding CBA-F-38 and CBA-F-8038. Each Seabrook filter was reviewed separately.

NUCON's ASTM D3466 Test conducted for Seabrook used the same type of charcoal used in Seabrook's charcoal bedslcells. The test normally is performed at 100 feet per minute air velocity, however, 40 FPM velocity was used which is Seabrook's filter design velocity.

The bed depth is normally 1.0 inch deep. SEABROOK STATION Evaluation BTP APCSB9.5.:I,.

A.iltev:<9.:

iD 3.The Fire Brigade will respond to the charcoal filter within 20 minutes from notification by the Control Room for all protected plant areas except Containment.

This notification is per Operating Procedures.

For a fire within Containment, the Fire Brigade will respond within 90 minutes.(See Engineering Evaluation EE-05-033, Revision 00.)4.Ignition of the charcoal starts at the top of the charcoal bed/cell.This is assumed conservative since a fire located lower in the bed/cell would bum the retaining mesh and drop the charcoal from the air flow path precluding rapid fire propagation.

5.Since a fire cannot be started due to internal decay heat, the fire must be started from an external source.Assume an outside source is carried into the filter unit.All the units have HEPA filters on the inlet before the charcoal bed.Each HEPA filter section assembly is made up of a grouping ofHEPA filter elements 24" x 24" x 11-1/2".Each element is a throwaway, extended medium, dry-type filter, which are open face, rectangular, fire-resistance type design for radioactive service.Assume the source carried internal by air flow totally ignites one HEP A filter element, 2'x 2'.This 2'x 2'filter element is assumed to ignitea4 ft.2 area of the charcoal bed/cell.6.Air flow through the charcoal bed/cell is assumed to be from the start of ignition.4 ft.2 area of charcoal will burn under air flow condition for a period of 5 minutes time.At this point forced air flow has stopped and the resulting fire will be analyzed under natural draft air flow.7.Air flow velocity through the charcoal during forced ventilation is 40 feet per minute which is Seabrook's charcoal bed/cell design velocity.8.Further assumptions are used in Appendix I,"Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit Fires at Seabrook Station," 9-29-86 by Professional Loss Control, Inc.and are noted in that Appendix.The Hazard Analysis consist of 3 parts, (l)Determination of charcoal bed burning rates, (2)a heat transfer model of the charcoal beds/cells and (3)effects of the heat transfer on safe shutdown equipment.(l)Determination of Charcoal BedBurningRates A charcoal fire test was conducted by NUCON in their ASTM D3466 Test Rig.Data from this test was used by Professional Loss Control, Inc.(PLC)in their unsteady state heat transfer model of each of Seabrook's filter units, which contain charcoal beds/cells, excluding CBA-F-38 and CBA-F-8038.

Each Seabrook filter was reviewed separately.

NUCON's ASTM D3466 Test conducted for Seabrook used the same type of charcoal used in Seabrook's charcoal beds/cells.

The test normally is performed at 100 feet per minute air velocity, however, 40 FPM velocity was used which is Seabrook's filter design velocity.The bed depth is normally 1.0 inch deep.WPP191l81 For Seabrook's test a 2.0 inches deep bed was used which is the limit. of 'the ASm . ~3466 apparatus.

Seabrook's bed depth is b.O inches. of the test data by PLC is conservative since the test was conducted mder forced air flow' over a me how period. Seabrook's filter unit heat transfer nodel assumes five minuter time from I charcoal 3gnition to shutdown of air flow; where-as air flow will be shutdown five minute6 after detection of a potential fire, which.most likely OccWs before sufficient temperature is available to ignite the c+rcoal. SEABROOK STAT~ON A fire wind tunnel (EWT) test was conducted by NUCON an a 20 inch x 24 inch face area carbon adsorber specimen.

The depth of the bed tested was 4.0 inches- Again, the charcoal used was the same type used st Seabrook, 2% KZ and 2% TEDA impregated carbon. The charcoal was ignited by preheating inlet air to the charcoal specimen.

The specimen started burning approximately 6 minutes afttr CO production levels of 50 ppm were measured.

Air flow was then continued for an additional 5 minutco, then stopped. Inlet and outlet temperatures were then moaitored for one hour. Seabrook's anticipated alarm setpoint for CO is 50 ppm and the normal background level is 2 ppm. - Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A The purpose of the FWT test was to look at the actual test size modeled by PU: under fire conditions.

Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 3 Air flow conditions under forced ventilation were the same for the FWT test versus Seabrook's filter unit design velocity.

Once the ventilation was stopped and natural drafting began, the FWT test was no longer similar to Seabrook because of duct configuration differences.

Seabrook's f fl ter units bavt outlet dampers, long RVAC duct rtms, and in some cases inlet dampers which are isolated once the filter fans are shutdown.

Thus, natural drafting through Seabrook's filters would be small. The FWT test with natural drafting indicates the charcoal fire will contain itself to a limited fire with decreasing temperature after atopping forced

• vehtilation.

C Result6 of the EWT test show, under conditions used in the PIX model, carbon lose " for a test duration of one hour was 4.53 lbs which is approximately la of the test dry carbon weight. Also that CO levels increase well above normal mvironmcnt levels long before a fire starts. The PLC unsteady heat conducUon analysis looked at each charcoel filter unit, except C5A-F-38 and CBA-F-8038, to determine tkie.net heat trenrfer to the filter housing surface based on charcoal temperature da'ta supplied by NUCQN. Radiation and convection heat transfer was also considered in PLC'a analysis.

Radiation Heat Trsn~fer from the fire was considered, taking into eccount the geometry of each of the filter units. The KEPA filters have a nominal 24" x 24" outside dimensions with a 22" x 22" steel mounting frame opening, which limits the : burning material to one REPA filter oize. The burning charcoal surface area was conservatively assumed to be a 24-inch square. The larger burning surface area accounts for any fire propagation under the five minute forced ventilation period. The taperatures used in the analysis were measured within the charcoal bed on the outlet side. The highest of any of the temperatures measured was also used. Radiation Beat Loas from the ateel housing to its surroundings was also considered.

SEABROOK STATION.:':'::":.:::.'.::':'.E 9.5-1,.,

A." Rev: 9 Section F.3 D For Seabrook's test a 2.0 inches deep bed was used Which is the limit-of'the ASTM D3466 apparatus.

Seabrook's bed depth is 4.0 inches.Use of the test data by PLe is conservative since the test was conducted under forced air flow'over a one hour period.Seabrook's filter unit beat transfer model assumes five minutes time from charcoal ignition to shutdown of air flow;where-as air flow will be shutdown five minutes after detection of a potential fire, which.most likely occurs before sufficient temperature is available to ignite the eharcoal-A fire wind tunnel (FWT)test was conducted by NUCON on a 24 inch x 24 inch face area carbon adsorber specimen.The depth of the bed tested was 4.0 inehes.Again.the charcoal used was the same type used at SeabrOOk, 21 Kl and 2%TEDA impregated carbon.The charcoal was ignited by preheating inlet air to the charcoal The speci.en started burning approximately 6 minutes after CO production levels of SO ppm Were measured.Air flow was then continued for an additional 5 minutes, then stopped.Inlet and outlet temperatures vere then monitored for one bour.Seabrook's anticipated alarm setpoint for CO is 50 ppm and the normal background level is 2 ppm..The purpose of the FWT test was to look at the actual test size modeled by PLC under fire conditions.

Air flow conditions under forced ventilation were the same for the FWT test versus Seabrook's filter unit design velocity.Once the ventilation was stopped and natural drafting began, the FWT test was nO longer similar to Seabrook because of duct configuration differences.

Seabrook's filter units have outlet dampers, long BVAC duct runs.and in some cases inlet dampers which are isolated once the filter fans are shutdown.Thus, natural drafting through Seabrook's filters would be small.The FWT test with natural drafting indicates tbe charcoal fire will contain itself to a limited fire vith decreasing temperature after stopping forced ventilation.

Results of the FWr test show, under conditions used in the PLC model.carbon losl for a test duration of one hour vas 4.53 lbs which is approximately lot of the test dry c:a.rbon weight.Also that CO levels inerea.e well above normal environment levels long before a fire starts.(2)Heat Transfer Model The PLC unsteady heat analysis looked at each charcDal filter unit.except CBA-F-38 and CBA-F-8038.

to determine the ,net heat transfer to tbe filter housing surface based on chareoal temperature data supplied by NUCON.ltadiation and convection beat transfer vas a180 considered in PLC's analyGis.Radiation Beat Transfer from the fire vas considered.

taking into account the geometry of each of the filter units.The REPA filters have a nominal 2.4" X 24" outside dimensions with a 22" x 22" steel mounting frame opening, which limits the burning material to O11e HEPA filter size.The burning charcoal surface area"'a.cODservatively assumed to be a 24-incb square.The larger burning surface area accounts for any fire propagation under the five minute forced ventilation period.The temperatures used in tbe analysis were measured within the charcoal beel on tbe outlet side.The highest of any of the temperatures measured was also used.Radiation Beat Loss from the ateel housing to its surroundings vas also considered. , WFP19/181 For, convectiv,e heat transfer, neglected.

If accounted for, beat removal from the housing. convection heat transfer was considered on the outside of the filter housin.ng.

SEABROOK STATION Attachment 11 gives the detailed methodology and results of the analysis, The following concl~ims are drawn frm a fire involving the charcoal bed6lcells 1 in the filter units, Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A 1. The worst case maximum localized steel plate housing temperature was calculated to be 704OF. This temperature is substantially below that required for structural failure of the steel housing. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 4 ' 2. Structural failure of any steel beam or column in the vicinity of these filter units cannot be cawed by beat transfer from the filter hous5ng. 3. 73. nmhmm radiant heat emissive $la from the housing at 704"~, calculated to be less than 10 KW/m , is 1ess.than half the critical radiant flux necessary to ignite the worot case cable jacket materfals as determined by EPRI eponsored tests at Factory Mutual Research Corporatia (EPRI NP-1200, Part 1). (3) Safetdown mt Rwiew From the conclusions of the heat transfer model there would be no structural stee fatlures in the vicinity of Seabrooklr's charcoal filters. mu6 no .sf e shutdo= @-.:+ ........ equipment would be effected due to steel failures.

Equipment further than three feet from the filter units also would not be effected based on the maximum heat "' i' flux from the how ing . t ! An evaluation of safe shutdown equipment was conducted looking at the equipment within and including three feet from each of the filter units. 1 2.. - - o.ia - No charcoal fire modeling wm done un these filters. It is assumed'that a charcoal fire will cauee loss of all equipment within it6 fire area (i-e., C3-F-3B-A).

Seabrook's present Appadix R Saf a Shutdown Study shows this to be acceptable-Also there is no concern of damage to structural steel since ell I this steel in this fire are8 is fire proofed- CAP-F-4Q - There is no safe shutdown equipomt wed during a fire in this fire area, PAB-F-3A-2, withfn and including three feet/.of CAP-F-40.

m-F There is no safe shutdown equipment wed during a fire in this fire area, C-F-3-Z, within and including three feet of CAH-F-40.

69 - There is no safe shutdown equipment wed during a fire in this fire area, CE-F-1-2, within and including three feet of 15AB-F-9.69.

74 - There is ao safe shutdown equipment used during a fire in this fire area, FSB-F1-A.

ST1\mION Evaluat.io

• • .n.(;tn.d.: ComP.*.**a.ris.*.o.

Il*.;.t.o.*...*.B":::.T.:*:.,.

p..A.*.P*.*.****..S.B..*.:95.:1*".....,:..:.,:'........,

..Rev.9 SectionF.3 m Page 4 For convective heat transfer, forced convection within the filter housing wes-.;...neglected.

If accounted for.the forced air stream would be beated and enhance the o,;:i?heat removal from the housing.Therefore, this as.umption is cODservative.

Freeconvection heat transfer was considered on the outside of the filter housing.Attachment II gives the detailed.ethodology and results of the analysis.The following conclusions are drawn from a fire involving the charcoal beds/cells in the filter units.1.The vorst case maximum localized steel plate housing temperature was calculated to be 704°F.This temperature is substantially below thet required for structural failure of the steel housing.2.Structural failure of any steel beam or column in the vicinity of these filter units cannot be caused by heat transfer from the filter housing.3.The maximum radiant heat emissive!lux from the housing at 704 0 F t calculated to be less than 10 KW/m*i.leas.than half the critical radiant flux necessary to ignite the worst case cable jacket materials as determined by EPRI sponsored tests at Factory Mutual Research Corporation (EPRI NP-1200.Part 1).(3)Safe Shutdown EQuipment Review From the conclusions of the beat transfer model there would be no structural failures in the vicinity of Seabrook's charcoal filters.Thus no.afe sbutdovn w;:.\equipment would be effected due to steel failures.EquipUlent further th8II three 0.:;::::.:

feet from the filter unit.also would not be effected based on the maximum heat.I flux from the housing.!An evaluation of safe shutdown equipment vaS conducted looking at the equipment within and including three feet from each of the filter units.CBA-F-3B 8038-No charcoal fire modeling vas done on these filters.It is a charcoal fire viII cause 10**of all equipment vithin its fire area (i.e**CB-F-3B-A).

Seabrook's present Appendix R Safe Shutdown StUdy.hows this to be acceptable.

Aleo there is no concern of damage to structural steel since all this steel in this fire area is fire proofed.CAP-F-40-there is DO safe ShUtdOWD equipllleJ1t used during a fire in thil;fire a.rea.PAB-F-3A-Z, within and including three CAP-F-40.CAB-F-40-There is no safe shutdOwn equipment ued during a fire in this fire area.C-F-3-Z.within and including three feet of CAH-F-40.EAH-F-9 69-There is no safe shutdown equipment used during a fire in this fire area, CE-F-l-Z, vithin and inclUding three feet of EAB-F-9.69.

FAH-F-4l.74-There is no.afe shutdown equiJDeDt used during a fire in this fire area.FSB-Fl-A.-4-WPP19/181

- - There is no safe .hutdown equipmt used during a fire in fhis"fire area ' * %-~~~Z,wItbfnandineludingthreefeetofPM-F-16.

SEABROOK STATION Tbe hazards posed by the beating of the steel housing from a charcoal bed/cell filter fire. under the operational guidelines to shutdown forced ventilation of the filter in question, will not jeopardize the safe shutdown of Seabrook Station. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 5

..,.....Rev>9 Section F.3*1D Page 5 1'65-F-16 is nO safe equipment used during a fire in this"fire area PAB-F-4-Z, within and including three feet of l'AB-F-16.

CONCLUSION The posed by the heating of the ateel housing from a charcoal bed/cell filter fire, under the operatiDnal guidelines to forced ventilation of the filter in question, will not jeopardize the safe shutdown of Seabrook Station*./-5-W1'1'19/181 .--A_- -_..-... -1, .. .. . . -. I.. - . _--_- .-- ---a- . --. . . . - . . -. .- . . . . . . - . . I WID Saf e_tv/Non-etg RG 1 . ::--e Area EAR-F-9 Safety Yes Yes CE-F-1-2 Containment Enclosure EL 21' 6" EM-F-6 9 Safety Ye6 Yes CE-F-1-2 Containment Enclosure EL 21' 6" FAH-F-41 Safety Ye8 Yea FSB-F1-A Fuel Building EL 84' ON FAH-F-74 Safe tp Yes Yes FSB-F1-A Fuel Building EL 84' 0" CAM-F-8 Non No Yes C-F-3-2 Containment PM-F-16 Non I No CAP-F-40 Non CBA-F-38 Safety No Yes Yes PAB-P-4-2 Primary Auxiliary Building EL 81' 0 Yes PAB-F-3A-Z Primary Auxiliary Building EL 53' 0" Yes CB-F-3B-A Control Room AVAC Equipment Room EL 75' . CBA-F-80 38 Safety ' Yes Yes CB-F-3B-A Control Room HVAC . Equipment Room EL 75 ' IADLL1 Filter ID Safety/Non Meeta BG 1.52**Area Detectign Fire Area EAH-F-9 Safety Yes Yes CE-F-I-Z Containment Enclosure EL ZI'6" EAH-F-69 Safety Yes Yes CE-F-l-Z Containment Enclosure EL 21 t 6" FAH-F-41 Safety Yes Yes FSB-Fl-A Fuel Building EL 84'0" FAH-F-74 Safety Yes Yea FSB-Fl-A Fuel Building EL 84'0 01 CAH-F-8 Non No Yes C-F-3-Z Containment PAH-F-16 Non No Yell PAB-F-4-Z Primary Auxiliary Building EL 81'0" CAP-F-40 Non No Yes PA8-F-3A-Z Primary Auxiliary Building EL 53'0" CBA-F-38 Safety Yes Yes CB-F-3B-A Control Room HVAC Equipment Boom£L 75', CB-F-3B-A Control Room HVAC CBA-F-8038 Safety"-Yes Yes Equipment Room EL 75'>=:-°0 0 Z.........*.*.sa'.eo*;:s='q..(j o;>3 ,,'"0

S'(/)0..0....::s X....,..;><0'"enYJu**.

,:..:.:.,:,::-6-<,},

.. (JQ 0..*.(I)..=t*.!......O'\g*.'i¢loT:j W'd Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit Fires st Seabrook Station Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 7 SEABROOK STATION - . September 29, 1986 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A . Attachment I to Hazards .Aarlyses of : Ium~almlDNAL WIm CDmbL. lRJc* Scrbrook Station .. 9 Charcoal Filter Units YAEC 1571 9 SEABROOK STATION**;Evaluation and ,Comparison to BTPAFCSB.9.5-1;Appendix A..JllO......ONAL LO**cCNTROL." 1Ne.Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit fires at Seabrook station September 29, 1986 ,

D Attachment I to of Seabrook Station Units I'YAEC lS71 lteviewed by:*'/

Prepa red by:

_ A.Milke, P.E.

Michael E.Mowrer, P.E.P.o.446*001: Ridge.Tcnncucc 3iR31*(615)482*3541 Table of Contents Subject Pagg ' Intr~uction........~o~..~o.o......b.o~.........e....o.

1 B~~k~~~~nd..-*....e-.mt..m*~e..~e~....*.-~..oe..**e**...*...*....

1 Discussiono,b,~.,...~mD.bb~..~b....e..bb..m.bbm.o...o.m...

5 Conclusions

..........................m...........................

11 Anrlysls kth~d~l~gy.~..........~~~~~.~.~.~.~~.......~.Appd~

A ...............................

Canbustfm of Mood Charcoal Ap pendix B Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 8 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A SEABROOK STATION Comparison

'to BTP APCSB 9.5-1,'..Appendix A lib" of Contents Section Ed:])i

• Subject Page 1 lac.t;round.

.***..********.***..*********...*.***.****

• .****.*******1 Discussion.......................................................

5 tonc1us1ons

• • • • ,*************************************************

11 Analysis Methodology

Append1x A Combustion of Wood Ch.rco.l*******************************

Appendix B**

IKTRODUCTI ON Thls report desctlbes an tngfneerfng analysis conducted to characterlre the, hazard if a fire inrolrlng the chrrcorl filter mftr rt the Seabrook st.- tlon. An unsteady-state heat conduction rnrlysfs has been perfom* to pndict the local temperature rlrt In tht plate stet1 busing uposed to. s charcoal filter ffn for tach of seven air hrndlfng unlts. SEABROOK STATION

• OACK6ROUND Charcoal filter beds art installed tn the sevtn (7) rlr handltng mlts idtntllled 4n Tabfe 1. Inside the houstng @re nunemus charcoal filter bed cells, The number of cells within r buslng tnclosurt ranges fra 4 to 28. The charcoal Ignitfon source IS assumtd to be external to tk unit.. The configuration of rlr cleaning systetns Is such that the charcoal absorb- ers are preceded by HEPA filters. The HEPA fllter muntlng frame is a steel structure with 22 inch x 22 Inch openings.

Therefore, no larger burning rnaterlrl than one HEPA filter size could enter the carbon bed. Anything larger muld be stopped by tk HEPA nounttng frame rtructutt wen if it would penetrate the ptsccdlng cunponents.

Thls was the reason for the selectfon of a 24 Inch x 24 inch exposure to a single carbon cell for both the FST test and subsequent engineering analysls.

r An unsteady-state heat conductibn analysls was performed on the stet1 hous- ing. Since the heat eonductlon wlthln the steel plate occurs very rapfdly, r lumped heat capacity approach could be applied to simplify the mathma- tics Involved.

The steel housdnp was considered to &eive radiant bat fran the burning charcoal bed. Radiative and convcctfuc heat losses from the steel buslng to the surroundings were Included.

Adetalled descrip- tion and the tquations for the analysis am Included In Appendix A. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 9 SEABROOK'STATION Evaluation and:(t:o ll1 parison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, ,

A"',":.""..,.: ,r*..Rev.9, Section ,F.3 D Page 9'," ,,:****IttTROOUCTION ThIs describes In engineering analysis conducted to characterize.

the,'hazard ofa fire involving the chircoal filter Wlits tt thet1on.Art unsteady-stlte heat conduct ion analysis has been performed to predict the locil temperature rise in the plate steel hous1ng exposed to I chuco.'filter fire for elch of stven 11r handling units.

Charcoal filter beds Ire insUlled in the!seven (7)air handl1ng""its 1dent1 fied in Tab'e 1.Inside the

.""ualr'OUS charcoal filter bed cells.The nUllber of cells within I musing enclosure ranges fram 4 to 28.The charcoal ignition source is uSUlied to be external to the unit., The configuration of air cleaning systems is such that the chareoalerspreceded HEPA filters.The HEPA filter llOunting frame isstee1 structure tt1th 22 inl;t!x 22 inch openings.Therefore.

no larger burning ,nterhl than ene HEPA filter size could enter the carbon bed.Anything larger d be stopped by the HEPA Ilount 1ng frlllle structure even if it would penetrate the preceding components.

This was the reason for the selection of I 24 inch x 24 inch ellj)csure to*single carbon cell fer both the FST test Ind subseque"t engineering analysis*An unsteady-stat!

heat conduction analysis was perfon1led on tre steeling.Since the heat conduction withfn the steel pllte occurs very rapidly.I 1 urnped heat capacity approach could be applied to simplify thetics involved.The steel housing was considered to rioctive radiant from the burning charcollRadiative lnd c:onvectin heat losses from the steel tDus1ng to the surroundingsincluded.A detailedtion Ind the equations for the Ina1ys1s Ire included in Appendix A*./1 TABLE 1 - DIMENSIONS OF CHARCOAL SECTION OF UNITS Unl t --- A 0 C PAH-F-16 5'1' - 12'2" 26'7' EAH-F-9 5'1" 5'6' 3'6" EAH-F-69 FAH-F-41 5'1" 10'3" 14 '8" FAH-F-74 Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 10 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A '.,.Evaluation BTP

-1,

........, ,SEABROOK STATION I,"....B ,.'...A 2./.;.Rev.9 Section F.3 D Page 10...**

TABLE 2 (Table 1 fron September 15, 1986, 'Iodine Msorbcr Flrt Test' by Huclear Consulting Services, lnc.) Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page I1 SEABROOK STATION i rut Dmtr 3 Sapt 1986 : Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A arbon I~lition follwmd by r~sidurl butiw (1.0. rir flw continued but beat err 1. ktbod: EiW D3456 OXcapt: 40 FPII, 2 inch bad depth and rut but up . kteri.2: Dry air mud WSORB UTE XI Lot 45/10 Starting eondltimn:

25.C IgitLon accurnd at m upper bed (outlet 1 temperrtrrre of appr~xi~at*l7 400'C, lover bed (inlet) temperature of L85*C, mir inlet temp. 285.C. f empenturts after iml tion: Ylthln Carbon Bed Outlet Side (*C) Xnht Sldm (*CI 255 920 850 * ,800 800 805 , 790 780 790 790 . 780 73 800 purplr .sake 450 250 19 135 SEAIJ:R<JOK, STATI<JN:;.

"..',.Rev.9.Section F.3 D Page 11*(Tlble 1 fran September 15, 1986.*Iodine Adsorber Fire Test-by Nuclear Consulting Strvices.Inc.)test Date 3 Sept 1986 Carbon 1&n1t1on follovec2 b1 residual beat1J11: (1.e.&1..nOli conUDUed but beat orr).Hetbod: AS1ll D3U6 uc:ept:.0 rPM, 2 lDch bec2 deptb and rut lI_t up Hater1al: Dr,.air a.acS IftJSORB IITEO II toot.5/10 arte..

lenition at an upper bed t**

or approz1matelr.OO*C, lover bed (inlet)te.peratvre of 28S*C, air inlet 2eS*C.*Time{tUn.)Within Carbon led Outlet Sid.(*C)Inlet Side (*e)*0: 15 1:00 2:00 3:00 5:00 6:00 1:00 9:00 10:00 12:00*15:00 20:00'0:00 60:00 790 700 650 6_0 730'160.no 135 160 920 950 ,aD 1050TlO 375 210 100 3 255 920 850.800 800.8OS_190 T80 190 190 TID T30 800 pul"Jlle a80ke-so 250 150 1:35 FIGURE 1 SEABROOK STATION from NSC, Inc. test of Sept. 3,1986 Tl ME (MlN.]?,, Ternperof un History in Charcoal Bed Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 12 -u o-1200 1000 Evaluatiotl and ComparisontOl$rfPAPCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A FIGURE 1 from NSC, Inc.test of Sept.3, 1986 Rev.9 Section F.3 D Page 12**o 10 2040 Tl ME (MINJ/'60 Temperature His1or1 in Charcoal Bed 4*

osscussro'n TI% tunparaturn rise of the steel housing on th seven charcoal fllier unfts Of Concern Is presented Yri tables 3 through 7. k noted in the SEABROOK STATION tables, the rnaximun localized housing tmptratue for Lhfts PAH-F-16 (see Table 3). CAP-F-40 (see Table 5). FAH-F-42 and FCH-F-74 (see Table 6).-are within 50°F of one rnothcr (betmen 4'11 and 461.F). . Tk surfrce tunptra- tuns present 8 slnfmal hazard to fixed equipment or cabllng mltss mounted dfnctly em the houslng. as well as to personnel, unless they came Into contact with the enclosure Itself. The maximum local l zed temp raturt predicted for Units EAH-F-9 and EAH-F-69 Is 704.F (see Table 4). The increased temperature is dw to tk reduced sfze of the houslng, which includes less steel through which the kat can be diffused.

Still, thls temperature would not appear b be at a lwel or exfst for r sulficiently long duration to post r xrfous exposure condi- tion, unless the materials of concern are In dlrect contact with tk bus- ing. . Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A finally, because of the difft rent alr flow arrangement, tk plaximm temper- Itult to tk top of th. C~C~OSUR for CAH-F-8 4s 638.F Table 7). fhj~ temperature Is due to the relativtly~

small size of'thh enclosure unjt as well as the location of the exposed side being tk top of th? enclosure.

Being located on the top, the eonvectfve kat losses an substantially reduced fra that of a sqde. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 13 k noted .in tk tables, tk analysis was tennfnated at 60 minutes. Extend- lng the duration beyond 60 minutes 4s not necessary s4nce the steel temper- ature Is decllnlng IS to 20 mlnutes Into the qncident ulth no actim othcr than thuttlng down the related fan withfn 5 minutes.of the flte Inttlatlon.

SEAB_t:>OK STATiON Evaluation and Cdmparisoll to 9.5-1,

'.\..Rev.9.Section F3D Page 13***DlSC\lSSIO'N The temperature rise of the steel housing on the seven charcoll filter units of concern is presented fri Tables 3 through 7.As"oted in the tables, the localized housing temperltu" for Untts PAJi-F-16 (see Table 3).CAP-F-40 (see T.ble 5), FAH-F-41 and(see Table 6),"are within 50-F of one.nother (between 411 and 461 e F)*.The surflutures present&.iniml'bazard to fixed equipment or unless eount.d directly on the housing, AS wen as to perscmne', unless they into contact.nth the enclosure ftself, The.u1mUll localized temperature predicted for Unfts EAH-F-9 and EAH-f-69 is 704-F (see Table-4).The increased temperature is due to the reduced size of the housing, which includes less steel through which the can be d1 ffused.St ill.tht 5 temperature woul d nGt appear to be It I 1 eyel or exist for I 5uff\ciently long duration to pose*serious exposuretion.unless the materials of concern are in di red conUct withhous-ing*.Finally.because of the air flow arrangement, theature to th!top of the enclosure for CAH-F-8 is 638 e F (see Table 7).lhis temperature is due to the relatively*

51l1al1 size of*tlle enclosure unit 15 well as the lotation of the exposed side being tt.top of tt'e enclosure.

Being located on the top.the convective heat losses are substantially reduced frcn that of a side.As noted1n the tables.the Inalys1s was tenninated at 60 minutes.Extend*1n;the duration beyond 60 minutes is not necessary sinc.the steelature is dec11ning 15 to 20 minutes 1ntoincident withactie-t other thin shutting down the related fan within S Ilinutesof the fire'initiation.

s TABLE 3 - SEABROOK STATION LOCAL HOUSING EMPERATWE VS. TIM IN UNIT PAH-F-16 UNIT PAH-F-16 T 1% (MINI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 ' 17 18 19 -20 . 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2 8 29 30 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A MXIHUM LOCAL HOUSING TEnP. (DEG F) 94 104 115 128 14 2 159 178 199 223 24 9 2 78 310 337 359 376 390 399 406 409 411 - 41 0 408 404 400 394 388 381 374 366 359 Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 14 UNIT PAH-F-16.

TIME [WIN) 3 1 3 2 3 3 34 35 36 37 38 3 9 40 4 1 42 4 3 44 45 46 - 47 48 $9 50 51 52 53 54 55 . 56 57 38 59 60 HAXICIV# LOCAL HOUSING TEMP. (DEG F) 351

.Section F.lD Page 14 Evaluation and Comparison toABCSB\9.5 1 1,;:/>.'.Appendix A..'.',>.,..SEABROOK**STATION*LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS.TIME IN UNIT PAH-F-16 UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM PAH-F-16 LOCAL.PAH*f*16 LOCAL TIME HOUS ING TEMP.TIKE t()US I NG TEMP.(MIN)(DEG F)(MIN)(DEG f)1 94 31 351 2 104 32 342 3 115 33 33.4 128 34 326 5 142 3S 318 6 159 36 309 7 178 37 301 B 199 38 293 9 223 39 285 10 249 40 277 11 278 U 270 12 310 42 26Z 13 337 43 2SS 14 359 44 248 15 376 45 241*16 390 46 234 17 399 47 227 18 406 48 221 19 409 49 214-20 411-50 208 21 410 51 rot 22 408 S2 197 23 404 53 191 24 400 54 186 25 394 S5 181 26 388 56 176 27 381 57 171 28 374 58/167 29 366 59 163 30 359 60 158*Ii TABLE 4 LOCAL HOUSING TEUPERATURE rS. TIME IN UNITS EAH-F-9 and EAH-F-69 UNITS WXIWUH fAH-F-9, EhH-F-69 LOCAL T 1?4E WUSING TEMP. {?!IN) (DEG f) 1 121 Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 15 SEABROOK STATION UNITS wxmun - EAH-F-9, EAH-F-69 LOCAL - TIME . HOUSING TEMP. . (WIN) (DEG F) 3 1 544 32 53 2 33 5 20 34 508 3 5 4 97 36 486 3 7 475 38 464 3 9 454 40 444 4 1 434 42 324 43 415 44 406 45 398 46 390 4 7 382. 48 374 4 9 367 5 0 360 51 - 353 52 347 5 3 34 1 54 3 35 5 5 329 56 324 57 319 $8 315 59 ' 310 60 306 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A SEABROOK$'!tATION*lASt!4 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE YS.TIME IN UNITS EAH.F*9 and EAH-F-69 UNITS MAXIMUM UNITS K'UMUM EAH-F-9.EAH-F-69 LOCAL EAH-F*9.EAH-F-69 LOCAL TIME tlJUSING TEMP.TIME t<<)USING TEMP.(HIN)(OEG F)(MIN)(OEG F)1 121 31 544 2 152 32 532 3 186 33 520 4 222 34 508 5 261 35 497 6 303 36 486 7 349 37 US 8 398 38 464 9 449 39.54 10 503 40 444 11 5S9 41 434 12 617 42 424 13 657 43 415 14 684 44 406*15 6!J8 45 398-16 704 46 390 17 704 47 382 18 699 48 374 19 691 49 367 20 682 SO 360 21 670 51 353 22 659 52 347 23 646 53 341 24 633 54 335 25 620 SS 329 26 608 56 324 27 595 57 319 28 582 58 315 29 569 59'310 30 5S6 60 306 9"SeQtjon,F

.3D

• 7 TABLE 5 SEABROOK STATION LOCAL HOUS 16 TEMPERATURE YS. TIHE IN UNITS FAH-F-41 and FAU-F-74 UNIT MXIHUFI UNIT MAXIMUM .' FAH-F dl, FAH-F-7 4 LOCAL FAH-f -4 1, FAH-F-74 LOCAL TIME tlOUSING TEMP. TfWE . HOUSlNG TEMP- (PI1 N) (DEG F) (WIN) (DEG F) 1 96 31 . 369 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 16 Ritw.9'Section F3 D Page 16 SEAiBR.OOK STATION.ill.b..U.

• LOCAL HOUS!NG VS.TIME IN UNITS FAH-F-41 and FAH-F-74 UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT FAH-F-41.FAH-F-74 LOCAL FAH-F-41.FAH-F-74 LOCAL TIME tCUSIHG TEMP.TIME Jl)USJlCG TEMP.(MHO (DEG F)(MIN)(DEG F)1 96 31.369 2 106 32 359 3 118 33 350 4 132 34 340 5 148 3S 331 6 167 36 321 7 188 37 312 e 212 38 303 9 239 39 294 10 269 40 2BS 11 302 41 276 12 339 42 267 13 369 43 259 14 394 44 251 15 412 45 243 16 426 46 235*17 436 47 227 18'42 48 220 19.45 49 213 20 US SO 206 21 443 51 199 22 UO 52 192 23 435 53 186-24 428....54 180 2S 421 55 174 26 41" 56 169 27 405 57 163 28 397 58 158 29 388 59 153 30 378 60 148 8*

UNIT CAP-F :E, 1 2 3 ' 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 - 37 18 ' 19 20 2 1 22 23 24 25 2 6 27 28 2 9 30 TABLE 6 .; Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 17 SEABROOK STATION LOCAL HOUS I NG TEMPERATURE YS. 71% IN UNIT CAP-F-40 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A WXIEIUH LOCAL WIJSIHG TEMP, (DEG F) 97 109 122 137 155 17 5 197 222 251 282 316 354 3 85 410 429 443 452 458 461 - 460 458 454 - 449 44 3 435 427 419 410 401 391 UNIT ,CAP-F -40 TIME . (WIN) 3 1 WXPUM LOCAL WUSING TEMP. (DEE F) 382 SEAUROOK STATION and to BTP AP*)SB 9.5-1, Appendix A.

Sediptl F.3 D Page J7*.:'ABLE 6 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE YS.TIME 1M UNIT CAP-F-.O UIlIT MAXIMUM U"IT CAP-F-40 LOCAL ,CAP-F-40 LOCAL TIME)()USIHG TEMP.TIME tIlUSING TEMP.(MIN)(DEG F)(MIN)(DEG F)1 97 31 382 2 109 32 372 3 lU 33 363 4 137 34 353 5 155 35 343 6 175 35 334 7 197 37 325 8 222 38 316 9 251 39 306 10 282 40 298 11 316 41 289 12 354 42 280 13 385.3 272 14 UO 44 264*15.29 4S 256 16 443 46 248 17 452 47 241 18 458 48 234-19 461-49 227 20 460 50 220 21 458 51 213 22 454 52 207 23 449 53 201 24 443 S4 195 25 435 55 189 26 427 56 184 27 U9 57 178 28 410 58 173 ,-29 401 59'169 30 391 60 164*9 LOCAL HOUSING TEHPERATURE YS. TIME IN CAH-F-B UNIT SEABROOK STATION UNIT HAXIMUM UNIT WXIMUN CAH-F-B LUC AL ' CAH-F-B . LOCAL

• TIHE HOUSING TEMP. TIHE WUSING TErlP- _(M1N) (DEG F) . (HIN) (DEG F) 1 106 3 1 486 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 18 SEABROOK STA1010N APCSB 9.5-1,

'Rev.9"

.3'D Pagei:8,'.TABLE 7*LOCAL MOUSI NG TEMPERATURE YS.TIME 1" CAH-F-B UNIT UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM CAH-F-8 LOtAl.CAH-f-8 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP.TIME teUSI"G TEMP.(MIM)(DEG F)(MIN)(DEG F)1 106 31 486 2 124 32 472 3 144 33 459..168 34 445 5 197 35 432 6 229 36 419 7 266 37 406 8 307 38 393 9 354 39 380 10 40S 40 368 11 460 41 356 12 42 344 13 565 43 332 14 597.4 321 15 619 45 310*16 632 46 299 17 637.7 ,BB-18 637-48 278 19 633.9 26B 20 626 50 2SB 21 617 51 248 22 606 52 239 23 594 53 230 24 582 S4 221 2S 569 55 213 26 555 56 204 21 542 57 196 28 428 58'189 29 514 59 181 30 500 60 174*10 CONC LUS 1 ONS &I& uph conrmatlve, nrrr rare ~al~ulrtlonr.

the following conclusions an dram from r flre tnuolvlng -the charcoal cells in the air hndlfng SEABROOK STATION unl ts: 1. The rotst caw mlximun 1 ocrl 1 zed -steel plate houslng tsa~crature was calculated to be 704.F. ThIs tcmpe;aturc ts substmtirl\r below that requlred for structural faflure of the steel hausing. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A 2. Structural failurn of any steel beam or colm tn the vicinity of thest filter mits cannot k caused by )rat transfer fran the fllter houslng. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 19 3. The maxlmum rndlant heat nisslve flux frcm tk housing rt 704.F. calculated to be less than 10 k~/m2, Is less thn half tk crttl- crl radlrnt flux necessary to Ignite the worst case cable Jacket nrterlals 8s detennfntd by EPRI sponsored tests at Factory ht~al Research Corper~tf on (EPRI HP-1200 part 1). Therefore, the hazards posed by the h'eatlng of the steel houslng trm a charcoal bed filter cell fire dl 1 not jeopatdlze tht safe shvtdorn of the plant. b Fi I e Ref: SE-02-02-103 Evaluation and 9.5-1,

'SEABROOK STATION ,"*.,.*,.i'".'Rev.9 Section F.3 D Page 19*CONCLUSIONS Based up"on tonserut1n.

cue the fDllowing conclusions Ire drawn frClfl I fire in\'D1v1ng""the chartOI'cells in the air blndl1ng units: 1.The worst use llax1mlJll loc:aHzed'stee' phte housing teaperature was ciltulaud to be 704*F.This temperature is substantially

"'0-that required for structural

!Inure of the steel Ntusing.2.Structural flil ure of any steel beam or col ltII'I in the vicinity of these fUter",its cannot be caused by Nat transfer frc:rn the filter housing.3.lIu1mum radiant heat emisshe flux frcrn the housing at 704-,.cllcuhted to be less than 10 tW/m 2*is'ess tNt\half thecal racSilnt flUI necessary to ignite the worst case c.able jacket IlIiter'llls as detemined by EPRI sponsored tests.t factory"""tual Research CDrporation (EPRI NP-1200 plrt 1).*Therefore.

the hazards posed by the heating of the steel housing frem I eharcoal bed filter cen fire will not jeopardfzesafe st.Jtdown of the plant.*File Ref: SE-02-0Z-103 11 Section F-3 Appendix D Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units SEABROOK STATION APPENDIX A EvaIuation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 20 SEABROOK*S;trATU>N**Evaluation and 9;;5.:1:'AP.Fi.entlixA.

...,.." Section F-3 Appendix D Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units APPENDIX A:R;¢v.9*SectionF3 D Page 20 APPENDIX A -- ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY SEABRQOK STATION 1 i The unsteady heat tonductlon malysfs used for thls study is dcscrlbed in I drtrIl 1n thls eppendlx.

A lumped heat capacfty approach was rrtllfzcd, ! -lid as long as the fieat conduction Is ruff!clently fast. as canpared to i thc rate of heat transfer to tk object (the rpproprtateness of th lumped i heat capacity approach is'nviemd later In thls appendix).

Figure kl depicts tk heat transfer to the steel heustng. The net heat transfer to tk steel acts to Increase the internal energy of tb steel, resulting In a temperature rf se. This can be described In equation [l] as: Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A where : Ow ' Radiatlve heat transfer fran fire (U) Q, r Radiat!ve heat loss frun steel to surroundings (W) Q, 1 Convectlve heat loss fron steel to surroundings (W) Ts * 'steel temperature

(.C) Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 2 1 t 8 Time (sec.) e = Steel density (7700 kgh3) C, Steel speclflc hat (520 J/kg 'C) Y =Steel volme (m3) It should be noted that conductive losses thrbugh tk steel to the rmafn- dtr of the howlng have ken neglected.

This assumption Is conservrttve by jgnoring heat which diffuses throughout the assembly.

....:$¢ction'F.3D JRage2.1 EyaluaUon atid Cdltlpatlson toBTPAP@SB:9 ,)Appendix A.

STATI0N A ANALYSIS M[THOOOlOGY The unsteady heat conduction analysis used for this study is described in deUn in this appendix.A lumped heat cipac1ty approach was utilized.nHd IS long IS the conduction is sufficiently fut.IS alIlPlred to the rite of heat transfer to the object (the of tte lumped helt capacity approach is'rev1twed later in this appendiX).

Figure 1.-1 depicts the hut transfer-to the sUel housing.The net heat transfer to the steel lets to 1nc:rease the inhmal energy of the steel*.resulting in I temperature du.This c:an be described in equation[lJ IS: where: Q u*Radiative heat trlnsfer frCJ1l f1 re (W)Qft4,*Radhti,ve!'eat loss from stee'to surroundings (W)Qc:*Convective heat loss fran steel to surroundings (W)T s*Steel temperature

(*e)t*Time (sec.)e*Steel density (7700 kg/m 3)C,*Steel specific heat (5Z0 J/kg ec)V*Steel vol Ulle (m 3)It should be noted that conductive losses through the steel to theder of the hous'ng have been neglected.

This.ssumption is eonserv.ttve by 19 n o r1n 9 heat which diffuses throughout the assembly.A-1 Figure A - 1 Heat Transfer Process . . Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 22 SEABROOK STATION st eel HouSl ng Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A t 0, = convect !on heat loss Q,, - radirtlon Feat loss Qw radlatlon frm flm . SEABROOK STATION aridCompatlson to BTPAPCSB9j,:,1;

"" Appendix A Figure A*1 Heat Transfer Process LRev.,.9"*'

D Steel HDusing Oc*convection heat loss 0...*ndiation hut loss Q u*f.dht ion fran fire A-2 ChlrCDal The three tenns fnvolvfng radiation or convuti~n hat transfer will now be R~dlrtion Heat Transfer fra Fln In general, radiation heat transfer between two finite. non-black bodfes is glvrn by: where: 6 - Stefan-Boltmann Constant (5.67 x 10-8 u/~**K) T, = Charcoal temperature

('K) 7, = Steel tmperature

('K) tc - Charcoal missivlty (assume -75) - Area of burning charcosl (m2) Fcs = View factor (assume 1.0) es = Steel missivlty conservatively approximated as 0.8 (1) . AS Area of steel (m2) The surface area of steel directly exposed to the cadfant bat from the charcoal filter bed cell fire varied for tht five dfstinct Unlt typcs. For each unit, the area can be calculated as the product of dimensions "A" md "8" from Table 1, except for Unit CAH-F-8 where tk area Is the product of dimensions

'Aw md *Cn, The view factor can be detennined uslng graphs and vfew factor algebra. Because of ttr steel area belng rpprcclsbly greater than th exposfng char- coal bed area, the view factor was approximated 8s 1.0. It should k noted that since tk ~teef and charcoal 8- ffnite in slze, the view factor is actually slightly less than 1.0. Estimation of the view factor of 1.0 is conservative.

1.e.. this wlll lead to r greater stet1 temperature.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluati?n and doipparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, NPpendixA Page 23**The three tems involving rldlltfon or connction...t t.ransfer will now bt dlScr1bed*Radiation HeAt Transfer fra-Fire In general.radiation heat transfer between two finite.non-black bodies is 51.1van b.Y:[23 where: IS*Stefan-Boltzmann Constant (5.67 x 10-8 w/mZ.X,)T c*Charcoal temperature

(*K)T s*Steel temperature

(*K)t,*Charcoal emissivity (assume.75)'"*Area of burning chlrco,'(m 2)F cs*View factor (lSsume 1.0)*s*Steel emissivity ConStNlt;vely approlCf.aUd IS 0.8 (1)*As*Area of steelThe surface area of steel directly exposed to the radiant helt from the charcoal filter bed cell fire varied for the five distinct Unit types.for tach unit.the area can be calculated as the product of MAlO and"8" from Table 1.except for Unit CAH-F-8 where tte area is the product of dimensions"A" and"eM.The view ficto" can be detennined using graphs and view factor algebra.Because of the steel area being appreciably greater than the exposingcoal bed area.the view factDr was approximated IS 1.0.It should be noted that since the steel and charcDal Ire finite in siu.the view is.ctuilly slightly less than 1.0.Estilllation of thefactor of 1.0 is conservative.

i.t**this win'.ad to a greater steel temperature.

A-3 The charcoh~ aissivity 1s assumed to be 0.75, rs suggested by Evans and Emnons (2). The burning charcoal surface area (Ac] was conservatively assumed to be 0.465 m2 (26 fnches 'square) whfc h 1s larger than the mxlmurn posslble flm exposum (22 fnches square) to tbe charcoal bed. The char- coal temperature 1s a functlon of time, as prwldtd in the test report sum- marlzed In Table 2 of thls report (3). Tk ttmperatums used In thls rnal- ysls were measured wlthln thc charcoal bed on the outlet side. Thfs set of temperatures was tk hlghtst of any of tk temperrtuns measured.

thereby yielding a conscrvatlve predlctlon of the steel temperature.

This Is also conservrtfve sfnct tk temperatun used 1s m Interlor tmperature as opposed to a surface temperature (whtch the radiation is dependent on) which would be cooler. SEABROOK STATION Radiative.

lkat Loss Since the temperatun of tk surroundfngs of the steel housing. other than the burnfng charcoal fllter bed cell. Is assumed to be unaffected by the fin, the surroundings rill remain cool fn comparison to the steel plate.. As r result, radiation kat transfer wlll occur frm the steel to the sur- roundings, nsultIng in a net heat !ass fran tht steel. Slncc the sur- roundfngs are inftnfte in size as compared to the busing. the radiative heat loss Is given by: Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A where: T = Roan temperature

('K) Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 24 Ts,es ands were defined previously for equatfon 123. A room tesperrtute of 27.C (81°F] was arbltrarlly select& for use fn )he calculations.

Tk radlatlvt heat loss Is assuned to occur on both sides of the steel hous 1 ng . A' SEABROOK STA:TleN 95-1, The charco'l 8IItssiv1ty is assume<!to0.75, IS sU9gested by Evans and EJmrcns (2): The burning charco.'surface are.(A c)was conservatively assumed to be 0.465 m 2 (26 inches:square)which is'arger thin the Illaxt/lllllTl possible fire exposure (22 inches square)to tbe charcoal bed.Thecoal is a function of IS provide<!in the test report.ariled in lable Z of this report (3).The tenperatur.es used in this)'115 were_asured within the chircoal bed en the outlet side.This set of telllperatures WIS the highest of Iny of the temperatures.enured, thereby yielding a conservathe prediction of the steel temperature.

This 15 also conseNlthe since the tllllperature used is In interior temperature IS opposed to I surface temperature (which the radilt ion 15 dependent on)which would be eoohr.Since the temperature of the surroundings of the steel housing, other than the burning charcoal filter bed cell.1$assumed to be unaffected by the Ii reo the surround ings fitll remain cool in comparison to the steel pl ate,.As I result.radiation heat transfer will occur frtJII the steel to theroundings.

nsulting in a net heat from the steel.Since theroundings are infinite in size as compared to tl'le h:lusing.the rad1athe heat loss is given by: where:*Room temperature

(-K)TStes and If were defined previously for equation (2).A room temperature of Z7-C (81-F)was arbitrarily selected for vse in}he calculations.

The radiative heat loss is assUllled to occur on both sides of the steel housing.A-4**

convective Heat Loss 3r SEABROOK STATION As long as thc surrounding air tr;riptraturt is less than tk steel tmpera- ture. free convection kat transfer dl1 occur. Dut to the forced air flow mf 40 ft/mln. thmugh th charcoal filter bed and wlthln tk burlng duilng the first five minutts after ignftion.

forctd convection hat transfer a1 so can be expecttd.

The rddftlon of forced convectlon~

will lead to m en- hanced conv~tlve kat loss frun the steel. For the purpose of this analy- sis, the forced convection was neglected, since tk forced alr stream can be expected to be bated, as documented in the test report. It should be noted that the heated air temperature is expected to be less than th?? Steel temperature.

Thus, neglecting the forced convution hat transfer fs con- servative.

The free convection heat t,ransftr wlll occur due to th heatfng of th air adjacent to the steel plate, resulting In air rnovemcht due to r buoyancy change. Equation 141 descrlbes thc free convection heat loss. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9 51, Appendix A h - Convection kat transfer coefficient

(~/m2 'K) AT = Tmperatum dlffercnce between steel and ambient air ('K). Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 25 The convection coefficient can be approximated as 4.5 y/m2 'K (1). This value can be checked ne apf rically derlved values for the coefficient.

where thc convectfng fluid is rlr (1). 0.95 (AT)~I~ for vertical plate 1.43 (~~)1/3 for horlzontrl plate tS1 The condition of a horlzmtal plate is present for unit CAH-F-8. The value of the convection coefficient will be revfewed after the steel temperature is estimated, so that tht ,temperature difference can be evaluated.

SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and APCSB 9.5-1,;\ppendix A.Rev.9 Secti(m F.3rQ Page*25 As long AS the surrounding air is less than the steelture, free convtetion heat transfer will occur.Due to the forced 11r flow of through the charcoll filter bed Ind M1th1n the housing during the first five.1nutes after 19nit1on, convection halt trlnsfer.150 can be expected.The addft10n of forced convection*

,,111 had to anhanced convective helt loss frCJll the shel, for the purpose of thissis.the forced convection was neglected, since the forced air strum cln be expected to be heated.IS doc""ented 1 n the test"port.It shoul d be noted that the heated lir temperlture is expected to be less than the stul temperature.

Thus.neglecting the forced convection heat trlnsfer is con-servative.

• eonvectiwe Heat Lon***The free convection heat transfer will occur due to the heating of the ai r adjacent to the steel phte.resulting in air IIlOvement due to a buoyancy thlnge.Equation[4]describes the free convection heat loss.Qc (4]where: h*Convection heat transfer coefficient (W/m ZT*Temperature difference between steel and ambient air (-le).The convection coefficient can be approxillated IS 4.5 W/1l 2-" (1).This value can be ctlecked use empirically derhed values for the coeffic;1e n t.where the convecting fluid is Ifr (u.T)1/3 for vertic.'pl.te h*1.U1/3 for hod zontll pllte (5)The condition of I horizonta' plate is present for unit CAH-F-8.The value of the convection coefficient Mill be rev1ewed after the steel temperature is so thlt the.temperature difference tan be evaluated.

A-5 In the CaSf of the MI~S ~hert tht exposed housing surface IS vertlca\ (PAH-F-16.

&AH-F-9, EAH-F-69, FAH-F-41, FAH-F-74 and C~p-F-40), tk free convection hat transfer is assumed to occur m both sides of the huslng. Unit PH-F-8. wlth tk exposed hotirontal rutfrcc. tk fm convection ts rssumed to occur only fra the top surface. Free convectlon dl1 also exlst frm tk lower surface, but at a much reducgd rate due to the con- vectlng air mdng In opposltlon to smoke' produced -by tht burnlng rhar- coal. In all casts, tk ambient air temperature Is rrbltrarlly assumed to be not (8lof). SEABROOK STATION So1 utfon for Steel Temperature The steel temperature can be &tennined by substitutfng equations 123. 133 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A and [4'J Into equatlon [I]. Tk derivative, dTs can be replaced by a. dt' at Ln Iterative solutlon technlqvc can be applied to determine Ts after a time duration of interest.

For this study, a total time of 60 minutes was con- sidered. In general. the equatlon for Ts Is given as: Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 26 Since est~matts for the stetl temperature an now rvailable, tk validity of two key assumptions can be checked. One assumpion considered the rate of on duct ion heat transfer within tk steel to be nuch.'greater than the rrdfrtion and convectlon bat transfer on tk stetl boundary.

The second assumptton stated that the convection heat transfer cocfficfent .was 4.5 ~/m2 *Y. The second assumption dl1 be addressed first, since the exrmlns- tion of the first assumption nqulres the convect~on .coeff~cltnt to be known. ./ The convection heat transfer coefficient can be dettnnlned frm equation 151. Considering the temperature difference to be 2MI.C (an approximate SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTl>, APCiSB 9.5-1, Rev.9 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 D , Page 26 In the use of the&m1ts where the exposed housing surface 1$"rtica'(PAH-F-16*.£AM-F-9.EAH-r-69.rAH-F-4I, rAH-F-74 and CAP-F-40).

ttl!free convection t'elt transfer 15 assumed to occur lltl both sides of the musing.Unit CAH-F-S.with tl'e exposed horizontal surface.the free convection 1$

to occur only frCllll the top surface.Free convection

.,.,11 also exist fron tt'e lower surhee, but at I.ueh reduced rate due to thev.feting 11r lIlOving in to smoke*produced*by the burningco.l.In.11 c:ases.the IIIlbfent a1r temperatun h arbitrarily assumed to be 27-C (81-F).Solution for Steel Temp!rature The steel temperature can bt dettnnined by SUbstituting equations[2).[3)and[4)into equation[1).The derivative.

efTs.tin be replaced by.!...!1. M iterative solution tecMique un be applied to detem1ne 1$after a time duration of interest.For this study.a totll time of 60 minutes was In general.the equation for 1, is given IS: Since estimates for the sbel temperature are now available.

the validity of two assumptions cln be One the rate of conduction heat transfer within the steel to be lIIuch.*greater than the radhtion and con'iectfon telt transfer on the steel bound.ry.The second.assumption stlted that the cDnvection heat transfer coefficient.

was 4.5 W/m 2.1(.The second assumpt ion-nll be addressed fi rst.since the euminl*ticn of the first USUIlptfon the convection.coefficient to be known../The convection helt transfer coeffident cln be determined frCJll equation (5).Considering the temperature di rference to be 200*C (an approxiaate A*6 average temperature dffhnnce durlng the 6O-mlnute exposure), the eonvec- tlon coefficient is actually 5.5 ~/m2 *K for -the vertical plate and 8.43 w/mZ *K for the brlzontal ptate..' Thus, use of the value ef 4.5 ~/m2 *K for the convutlon coefftcfent undtrestlnrtat tk convective haat !ass. yleldlng greater steel temperatures.

Since the ~ssunptlon of 4.5 ~lm* *K Is shon ta be consenative, wltfiout grossly undenstlmatlng tht tonvactlvt heat loss.

tht assumption 1s umsldcnd valid. SEABROOK STATION The' valldlty of the first and more Important rssmptton an now k assessed.

Tk cmparlson of rates of eonductlon to convection and radia- tion bat transfer can be prformed by evaluating thc parameter, #/k as noted In equatton C7 3: where: H = Combined radiatfon and convectlon hat transfer coefficient

~/m2 *K ) = Characteristfc dimcnslon of steel (m) kl Steel themal condurtfvtty (N/m *K) -- Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A I @ :: cunblnd radiation and convection heat transfer coefflclent is given H =k+hu+hw [B] Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 27 h,, can be re-expressed as: Slml1arly, hw Is: SEA.bROOK'STATION

.Section'F.3D'Page 27*average temperature difference during the 6o-minute exposure}, thetion is actually 5.5 W/1112-K forth!vertical plate and 8.43 W/m 2.K for the t'Ori:z:ontal Thus, use of the value of 4.S'11m 2-I(for the convection coeffie:ient underesti.ated the convective heat yielding greater steel telllperatures.

Since the IssUllption of 4.5 W/.2-" is she"", tel be c:onser'VIt1Ye, without grossly underestimating the convective loss, the Issumption is considered valid.The'validity of the first and assumption can now be ISsessed.The cCllllparhon of r.tes of conduction to convection andtion heat transfer cln be performed by evllulting the parlllete.., tl./k IS noted 1n equation[7J: f<L r<0.1[7)*Combined radiation and convection heat trlnsfer coefficient (W/m2 ax,)*Characteristic dimension of suel (m)*Steel thermal conductivity (W/m*K)H*tit++raJ where: he:*.c.s W/m 2 ale hlU.*0".,*Q..I,-TS where: H L Ie The combined radiation and convection heat transfer coefficient is given IS:**can be re-ellpressed as:**esA s ,.(1 5--T,*)h....is-'T, Similarly, h u h:*r(T c 4-T$4)h", (I-ec*1+l-e S)(1c_Ts)At Is"s A-7 Assuming m average steel temperature of 500 .K, average charcoal tempera- turn of 1000 *K, and roan teMptfatun of 300 .K h,, and hy can k walu- atcd, sff fig the values for all other parameters which en previously pre- sent ed. h , - 56.8 Y/~ZK hRF - 36.4 U/~K SEABROOK STATION Thus, tk sun of thc heat transfer coefflclentr Is 97.7 ~/m2 OK. Tk characterlst~c dlmenslon of thc steel (L) Is the ratlo of thc volw to the surface area. In this use the charrctertstic dimenslon Is th plate thlckness, I.@., 0.601 m (1/4 Inch). Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APC SB 9.5 - 1, Appendix A Assdng tk steel conductivity Is estimated as 25 Y/mK, Rev. 9 Section F.3 D I Thus, tk assumption of the rate of heat conduction being subst8ntfally greater than that of the convection and radiation kat transfer Is appro- prf 8te. Page 28 The convectfve and radlativr losses can also bt canpared to assess tk sen- sltlvity of the malysls to the selected roan temperature. For fllustra-tlon purposes If tk assumed room temperature tr increased from 81 'F to 120 'F (27 *C to 49 'C), the maxIrnurn localized busing temperature Increases by only approximately 20 OF. SEABR(i)OK.

STArrlt!jN

.-...,:..Evaluation andComparisonto BTP APC$:B9.5;.1,

.Rev.9*..SectiOh i'F;3 I)...Page28 Assuming an averlge steel tl'llperature of 500-K.lverlge charcoalture of 1000*K.and roan temperature of 300*.: h...and h.., can beated.usiftg the values for al1 other parameters which weresented.h IL.*56.8 W/1ll 2 K tt.,*W/III Z K ThuS, the sum Df the heat transfer coefficient5 is 97.7 W/m 2 eK.The characteristic dilllension of the steel (l)is the ratio of the yolUllle to the surflCe area.In this case the characteristic dimensiDn is the plate thickness.

i.e**0.001 III{1/4 inch}.Assuming the steel conductivity is estimated as 25 W/mK.*Hl*97.7 x.001 r 25*0.004<0.1 Tnus.the assumption of the rate of heat conduction being subst,nthl11 greater th.n that of the convection and radiation heat transfer ispriate.The convective and radi ative losses can al so be compared to assess thesitivity of the In,lysis to the selected roOlll temperature.

Fortion purposes if the room temperature is from 81-F to 120 er (27*C to 49-C).the IIIaximum localized hOusing temperature increases by only approximately 20*F../A-8*

Selected Reftrtnces SEABROUK STATION . . 1. Holman, J.?., Heat Transfer, 6th Edltlon, Ykw York, ktrm Hill. 1986. 2. Evans, 0.0. ~nd Emons. 'Cambustfon of Mood Charcoal ,' Pln Resea~h, 1, (1977). p. 57-66. (sac Appendix 8) . Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A 3.. hclear Consulting Services.

Inc., olodlne Msorbcr Flre Test,' Sep- tember 15, 1986 (unpubl lshed). Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 29 *1.2.3.*..:

Appendix A Selected References Holman.J.P**Heat Transfer.6th Edition.N!w York.McGraw Hill.1986.Evans, D.O.and Emmons.*Combustion of Wood Charcoal,-

Fire Research.1, (1971).p.57-66.(see Append1lt B).Nuclear Consulting services.Inc**-Iodine Adsorber Fire Test:tember 15.1986 (unpublished).

./Rev.9 0

F11e Ref: 5E-02-02-103 A-9 Section F-3 Appendix D Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units SEABROOK STATION APPEMDIX B Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A T Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 30 SEAlBR00:H STATION*Section F-3 Appendix D Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units APPENDIX B nrs R*u*I~.~ (1977) 67 - 66 O bier MuoL SA. L-nr - Miad h tbm NeLbriLaL . . . . Combustion of Wood Chrrorl' The dynamics of burning of wood chd in an air ctnm it ermined both uprimen- Wy md Lheoreiiully.

To simplify the tbeory. an uperimentd urrngement approximating a one dimensional phenomenon was rdopted. Tbe theory includes conduction in the aolid, themid ructions and heat releue at the arrlxe. md heat md mru tnnsfer in the gu bounduy layer above She surface. The mohr COIC02 ntio L rncuund. The theory pre dicta surface trcmpemture, solid tcmpenture distribution and burning ral within uperi- mental error. An effective rrsction nt* for. mula k developd.

This ~tudy is r step towud undenfrnding the details of the extinguishment of wood fires by water. To avoid the complitrtions in chemistry during the pyrolysis that wood undereocs u it burns, the initial study reported here is for the buming of wood chued. The buming of wood charcoal offen a simplified chemistry while maintaining r physical raw. tun closely related to the orilinrl wood, wid -' is an imporbnt process in a wood ti u wtll. The wood chucod used in this experiment was cornmenidly 8Milrblc md produced from basswood (Tiilia americana).

When wod charcoal is burned, the burning surface k- toma complicated by a system of en* generated in the combustion pronu, md by a fiberour may of residual ash (cn Fig. 1). Cansidering these comp~icrtions, it & not m- prisinp that little quantillive work oo the - *hr~rnlly nt: Ccnier for Fn"w, Rcunrch. Nntionrl eombwiian of wood chucoJ hu ban done ia the put. Mort Wc rldiH of =boa corn- buttion utilize graphilc which is easily ob Wed more chemicdy pure md physicrtly uniform. Notable unong the studies of mph- itc combustion is the extensive work per- formed by Nagle md Stricklmd-Corntable 111 in which an expression for the chemical mtc of rerction of pyro graphite with oxygen wu dweloped.

One rnight consider initially buminp gnphitc to avoid the uh and acking problem. However the low porosity [relative to chucorl) md the conrcquent luge chvnges af properties makes such tcrts of little due for the present problem. In kt, gmphite will not burn in the present apparatus.

The primary tad of this investiption ir to predict tht buming chamctcristirr of wood tharcoal from hasic physical principks.

Hope fdly this we model will prove adequate Sa describe more complex cases and in puticvlu will be helpful in Ule study of extinguishment.

Thus it k dvantrgeous to wt up m upcri- mcnt that is e=Uy modeled. One fmdr thrt if an isolated piece of wood chucd is ig- nited, it will not continue w bum unless one blows m oxidizer.

Lc. air, on to it A putitu- luly useful way b blow rir on It md at the same time ta produce r neuly one dimedon- d phenomenon.

is to toate the burning sur. face in r rbpnatioh point now field. in the laminar crsc. the rbgnation paint now field develops a uniform boundary layer thicknen over lhe impingement plrnc and thus uniform tnnsport phenomenon cm h cxpectrd. . Unfortunately, in order to miinWn comb- tion, air must be blow at the chucod bum inp ~rface at high mainsham veloeiticc; vr- locitics thrt are high enough t4 make the now turbulent.

The degree Lo which Lhc bunduy layer thickness for 8 turbulent tlrpnaiion paint flaw field remains unifonn. 5 in the Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 31 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A SEABROOK STATION to BTP APCSB9;?*-l, Rev.9 SectionE'.3Ll

• e"rc 1f....

(11'")51*II e E2wticr'-qlloil ,.......La.........-PriII"'d ia t1a1t NclJllriuda Combwt.iOD of Wood QwocoaJ.D.IlI'VAHS*..II H.W.DtMONSUniw,.II)'.

D'o" of.ypl;'t1#'It)'...C....brilWe.II...(V.s.....)(Jl,ecitlftcl Ju..21.117')., The dynamics of buminC of wood charcoal in an lit stream is esamined both tally and theoretically.

To simplify the tlIeory.an experimental artancementapproximatina a one dimensional phenomenon WILl adopted.The theory includfl conduction in the.cUd, chemical reaction.and heat release at the lUlface, anef heat and mass transfer in the ,as bouncl&ry layer above the lW1ace.The molar CO/C0 2 ratio iI meuured.The theorydic1.Iludac:e toemperatule,lolid t.emperatwe cliftribution and bu.minc rate within uperi*mental error.An effective reaction rate for*mwa ia developed.

INTRODUCflON This ltudy is a step toward u.ndentandinc ttl.details of the extinl:\1ishment of....ood fires by waler.To avoid th.complications in chemistry durinC the pyrolysis that wood underCDes a it bums, the initiIJ ltudy npotlcd here is lor the buminc ot wood charcoal.The buminr DC wood charcoal offen a simplified chemistry while maintainin, a physical struc:.ture closely relaled to the oricinal....ood.and is an important procea in.wood f1ft!IS well.The wood charcoal used in this experiment was commercially available and produced from basswood (Tilia americana).

When wood charcoal is burned, the burnincsurfacecom6 complicated by a system or craw eenented in the combustion process, and by a liberous azray 01 residual ash (let!Fl*.1).Considerinc theH complications, it l&not 1\11.prisins: that litO.quantitative work OD the*h.'Ully It:

fo, r...Jl....N.li-.l a"relll of Sland.,da, W.dliIlClon.

I).Co 20234 c:ombwtion or.ood chalcoal hu been done in the put.MOlt basic.tudies of carbon com*bUJtjon utilize IBPhit.e which iI easilytained molt chemlca1Jy pure and physically wWorm.Notable&monE the Itlolditf 01 pph*11.e combustion ls\he utensive....orkformed by Nar1e and Strickland-<:Onatable (1]in whieh an expreuion for the chemic:al zate of reaction of pyro er&pbite with OXYIen wu dneloped.One mirht consider initilJly buminr&nphite to avoid the ash and cnckinr problems.However the 1o"", porosity (relative to charcoal)and the consequent luIe clwllel or properties maJces such tests 01 IiUle value for the present problem.In fact, II'Iphite will not burn in the present apparatul.

The primary loal or this investipUon it to predict the buminc chanet.erisUc:s of wood charcoal from basic physical principles.Mly thilume model will prove adequate kl describe InOrt complex eues and in particular will be helpfw in the ltucly or extineuishmenL.

Thus it iI advantaieow to let up anment\hat is eally modeled.One fmcU th..t U an ilolat.ed piece or woodnited.it will not continue to bum unJea one blows an oxidi:ttr, h.air, on to iL A1arIy ustlu)way to blow air on it and at the same time to produce a nearly one al phenomenon, 11\0 locate the bumine SUf*tace in a sUl:f\atiori point now field.m the laminar case.the point now field develops a uniloMn boundary layer thicknesl over the impinJ:ement plane and thus unilorm transport phenomenon can be expedecl.Unfortunately.

in order to maintaintlon, air must be blown.t the charcoalIns: Nflace at hirh mainstnam velocities;locities that are hieh enourh to make the now wrbulent.The to which the bounduy layer thickness lor a turbulent 1tas:natioD point now field remains uniCOMn, IS in the

1. Burnihg wrfae* of a rbmrtod cyiindtr rbering meL mad ram ub raur. fa. 6d.r or the .urIac. appun elliptid buuu rhm t.mcra ru held mL BD rntlr ko the uh d the ryliadu Lo krrp it out of tbm ab Row fidd. SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, STATION Appendix A art of the luninu now was not invesligrltd, but the uperimenbl results were found to k well approximated by a one dimeruiorul (he ory- The model of the burning proctu wd here rrtumes that an ovenlt reaction &;ween urbon md oxygen takes plse on the pre jeeted surfact uea (i.r. not counting the ad- ditional ueu within cab or porn; tbe cracks cover about 0.5% of the projected ma while the porn uc very rmdl complex and conru'tub abut 80% of the volume) b pm duce carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, The energy and mass balances ~t the cutlace =quire a knowledge of the convective hert md mw transfer nkr, the radiative hut exchulpe, and the conduction inb the rolid. Hert transfer cocMcienlr wee meuund by the cooling of copper slug in the place of the charcoil sample. The results ur.pmcnUd Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 32 md ue edmp& with tht hert trrnzler N~Q. The ndiation is cornwtrd bv usurnin? r CUI~~S value I*IIs wjlhin the wge oiltenturc values for "rough cubon" u for example mt. 2. The heat conduction into the chvcod it the heat required to heat the ehucd from the rmbient brnperrturc to the surface tern- peratlam.

Finally the ratio of cubon monoxide to rubon dioxide produced during chueorl combustion wu measured by r mus specWe metct analysis of grab umplcr. The radU f uc compared with litemturt vduu BURNING RAm AND SURFACETE!!lPERATURL:

f XrWllblENTAL APPARATUS AND In dimensionless form. - Mu transfer cocSficicn&

were mtmurd The wood chucd obl.inrd from b by tt!e evapontion of w8lu born 8 wet parmu. wood used in his experiment iS that coat- slug In the place of the charcoal sample. The rncrcially told by WiHiarn &on Co. of multr are presmlcd in dimemionleu forin Carlrtadt, New Jemy. in solid blocks with SEABROOK STATION it Evaluation and Comparison to BTP'APCSB 9.5-1, AppeI)dix A Rev.9 Section*F.3 D Page 32 rIC-1**"mill'&II'r....or.charcoal QliJult, Ibowlll'crKU***_w c_.na.cim&lar..--c&loo 01&10.aurCec**ppun baca_110._,a_!leld.L**aft,l.\0&1M....at Ute.,.liN"&0 keep I'DiaL of\be ait now I'iUe!.cue 01 the laminar now was not inyestiClted.

but the uperimentaJ reswts were found\0 be well apprO¥.ima\ed by*one dimeNionaJory.The model 01 the buminc proeas wed hue ISsumes that an overall reaction between carbon and oxnen takes place on thejected sunace area not theditional areas within or pores;the cracks cover about01 the projected an.while the porn an very.mall complu and conltiluu about01 the volume)\0 pfl>duee carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide.The enereY and mass balances at the lW'lace require a knowledce 01 the convecUve heat and mass transr., raLes, the radiative heat excbance.and the conduction into the lOUd.Heat trander coefficients were measured by the coolinl 01 I copper Ilul in the place of the charcoal sample.The results a,re'presenWd In dimensionless lorm..'Mass transfer coetrieients were measured by the evaporaLion of waur rrom I wet porous slul in the place or the ch:ucoal lample.The h!Sults are prnenLed in dimensionless form BURNINC JIlATE AND SUJl.FACETEM'EJlATUJIlE:

EX'EJllJ.1ENTALAP'ARATUS AND RESULTS The wood charcoal obtained rromwood used in this experiment is thatmertially sold by William Dixon Co.01 Carliladt, New JUKy.in.olid blocks with

! i bFh Fi. 2 Schematic digrun ofappuatru.

approximate dimensions 17 X 10 X 3.5 em. Bulk densities nnged from 0.26 to 0.34 ~ltm' md uh content from 0.5 to 1.3% by weight. No comlrtion of rsh concenhtion with the c~od density wu o~KNC~. The densities of the test chucod fdl in the ume mge u the densities which mult from a fire, although the latter are usually riddled with cracks-luge and rmd--while the uptrimen-tpi umplo were free of cracks kfort the test and druing the test only undl dce sack ~PP&. To make the measurements of buming rate, surface tempcr;rture, and inkrnd temperature distriburion of r wood charcod cylinder burn. ing in a stagnation point flow, Lhc apparatus rhematidly represented in Fig. 2 wu wm- bled. A charcoal cylinder approximately 2.7 cm in diarnewr and initially 11.4 em in beight is rhown burning surrounded by insulating mattrid. This insulation is astatid if lhe phenomenon L to be one dimensional.

The chucod cyiinder is cut from 8 larger block of ehucoal cuch Lhal Lhe prin direction is ptr- taendieulu to the uis of the cvlinder.

Al the Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 33 SEABROOK STATION burning surfoec regresses bw;ds the bottom of the cvlinder.

the motor driven ~IrUorm Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A wrnbl; with kmud~~ ~~cnlcd~i~d con- trol pushes the core up at the rune rate u the Budace is repzing. The burning surface b . thus maintained at the same level u the top surface of the insulation on which lhe air flow d mw';o';o';o'bb m vgL#iT~ r&u F'ie. 5. -411 burnlng nLI au malnalrrsm dr .r kity; k, aprrimraul dru;-, pdicud bumins ntr for ruiovr be Lic puw~.tn T~UU imp- utlini up th. st&*rion point flow field. M.instrrm Jr velocities measured ~t the exit of the nozzle up to 45 misee were nvulable.

The innulation plate vlr held a 6;xtd diztmce of two nozzle dimeten from the exit of (he nozzle by r lugu rluminum pktc with r circular owning cantered on the axis of the now. The internal tempemtun diitn'bution in the burning chsrcorl mple was musund by thennocouples irnplmted near the bottom tnd of the cylinder.

A, Lhe buming suhe rrpessed, the thermocouples would come closer to the buming surface rventudly pru- ing through it. From meuurernentr of the wrfact positions, internal kmpenture infor- mation from the thumocouplu.could be related to their distance from the burning curfnn. To measure the rurfrce position with respect to the platfoxan, the pin on the end or r wale was lowered periodidy to the nu- face. Contact 4f the pin was determind virudy by obsening the pin throu& the magnifying opticr rystem of the pyrometcr.

U'hen the pin was not in rut. it wu swung out of the flow field since its wake in the now when located more than r few pin diametln above the burning nulrce wlr .n unampt ably luge disturbance.

kide from Wing used u a ttlescopt, a disrppcving filament type pyromeler was one of Iht pytornchn used b measure Lht tcmpcnturc of the burning mar- , Evaluation and COn'lt'ari$otiBTP.S-},**Appendix:A::

• SEABROOK

• A**r.......t aa,.....-..-..............,-.............

.,.Rev.9 SectionF.3.

D Page 33*approximate dimensions 17 X 10 X 3.5 em.Bulk densities ranced from 0.26 to 0.34 II/ems and ash con&ent from C.!>toby weilM.No correlation of ash concentration with the cban:oal density wu observed.The densities of the&elt charcoal fal)in the urne Janee as the densities which ftSult from a fire, althollih the lat&er lie llSually riddled with crac:ks-Iulle and small_hile the tal samples were free of cracks belore the test and durinC the test onl)'UDalllUlface cnelu appeared.To make the measurementl of buminc rate.lurlace t.emperatllre.

and internal t.emperature distribution of a wood chucoal cylinder bum*ine in a stalnation point now, the apparatus ac:hemalic:aJl)'

represcn&.ed in Fil.2 was assem*bled.A charcoal cylinder.pproximat.ely 2.7 em in diameler and initially 11.4 em in heicbt Js.hown buminelurrounded by maul.tine malA!rial.

This insulation is essenti&lll

&be phenomenon II to be one dimensional.

The charcoal cylinder is eut trom a l&rler block of charcoal such that the enin direction is per*pendicylar to the axis oC the cylinder.At.the buminl lurface relresses towards the bottom of the cylinder.the motor driven platform assembly with manually operated ipeedtrol pushes the core up at the same rate u the IUdlce is rel:feuinl.

The bumin£surface II.thw maintained at the same level as the top aurCace of the insulltion on which the air now*0 10 10 so.0 10_¥lLDCln.,..Fi,.I.CIMft_1 bumillf na.IlL aa1Mlftam airk1Cily;11:.aperim.D&&I ctl1.a;-.pnllicLacl bllra.i1\'

n'.lor""Dill kiJlu;c ,.,..._yalllM.impinces.Uin, Upstqn.tion point flow field.Mainstream air velocities measured at the e.z.lt of the noule up to 45 m/t.ec: were available.

The inl\uation plaIA!..u held a fixed distance of two noule diameters from the exit or the nozzle by alar,er aluminum plate with a circular opeDin&cent.ered on the uis of th.flow.The internal temperature distribution in the bumine chazeoal aamp1e was measured by thennocouples implanted near the bottom end of the cylinder.A$the buminc surface th, thermocouples wowd come doser to the burnincllU'face eventually pua.ine throu,h iL From measurementl of the IUrface poaitions, internal temperature infor*mation from the thumocouples.could be nlated to their distance from th, buminc Nrlace.To meuwe the IUrfac, position wUh respect to the platrorm.the pin Oil the end 01*ac:al, wu lo,..red periodically to the AU*face.Contact or the pin wu det.ermined visually by observine the pin throu&b the InIl:nifyine optiCll)'ltem of the pyrometer.

Y.'hen th, pin was not in use.it WIS awunC out or the now field lince III wak, in the tlow when locat.ed more than a few pin diamet.en above the bumln!: surface 11'11 an ably llllf disturbance.

Allde from used as a telescope.

a disappearinc filam,nt type pyrometer was one of the pyrometlrs used to meuure the temperature 01 the buminllUr-

?it 4. Surf- wmpwmtun u rMiIU-Um dr d* hy; 0, fidamcnk pymmrlw; 0,Lnfrsrrd pyran*lrr;

• . Lhrrlb#ouplc;-.

pdicwd wmpsratuu for ruirur kine& purm.t*r rdur SEABROOK STATION hce independent of the rudinip obtained from the thermocouples.

Figure 3 shorn the experimmtrl r-ult for the steady state buming nte of the chvcod rr B function of the mlinstrtun

& velocity.

The burning rate of the chucorl i8 ulcul~ted r the product of the rate of regmrion of the bumhg rurfaee md bulk density of the chu- cod cylinder measured in morn ah. The cu- ' bon conttnt of the chutort wu determined io be approximately 93% by weigh^ Them munder ineluded residual hydrogen and oxy- pn in the chucod structure, rnouturc, ad. aorbtd guer, and uh. Thus the ehucod bum iny nLc mcrrured differs slightly &om cul. bon burning mtr. The lowest xrcorded mdnstrelm air velocity at which the chucorl would 8elf-rurWn Itr awn eornburtion waa 7.7 mlrec. Repeated trim to bum cylinders ri 8 mdnstmun vdocity of 4.4 m!rc fulled. After ignition en uth of Utse trials, cxLinpirhrnent bepn at.the & cumfetenee of Lhe burning curlace ncu the insulrtion md progressed inward bwud~ the , nnkr. This sequence of rvenb revtalr the . influence of some heat loss CojhtiPuikI1QI ring. For the purpose of urdysir of that data, &f extinction vdocity oi 5.5 m/t+c will be wd. The corrspoading rneuurrmenlr of the buming surf- kmpcnture rnsvurtd wfth . the themocouplu md two pyrometczr r, a hrnction of the rnlinstm!am rL velocity ue &own in Fig. 4. Pyromttrr mcuurcmenL are bed on a dm cmiruMty of 0.75, which is reprwnCItive of crrbon auf- it iemper- 8tum muad 900 'C. The maximum temper- .tun mtud by an implanted thermocou-ple mr genenlly Mow the mt.rurmrtntr nude by the pyrometen.

This ir not unar. pectrd u ntu the surface it wn common for the lu& of Ult 0.025 cm diameter chromel-' - Jumel wh threaded rrdirlly through the cylinder to be exposed by nul.cc hgukr- ititia to the cooling efltttr of the rir now. The dkappeuing filament type optical pyzomtter manufactured by Fymmetcr In- rtrurnent Comp8ny wu u8ed b mertum the (crnpcrrture of apecac ad rreu of the buminf surfue where ub cover wu a mini- mum. The uu cborcn to be munucd and Maricing of the inrtmmmt wrs left fp the judgcrnenl of the opentor. The infmd pyromebr was. Bmu En- gineering Co., Infmscopt Muk I. Thi8 hrcN. . rnent was set up b fie r continud reding of the rvemge temperature in r U cm' + in the cenhr of the burning rudacc. IU racord provided ur indiestion of m effective rurimcc iemperature including the influence of the .th laver. Becaue of fluxmtionz cad by Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A of ash ewer wing wept awry in th; air flow and changing rurI.ce crack pt&mr, Rev. 9 Section F.3 D some judgement wu exercised in urigning one value of tempentun chmclerizing the outnu+ Cenerrllv the uncerkinitv woci8ted wi& *ese mewemenis in t 15 'c. - Close urrninaCion of. the pyrometcr data ' me& that the meiruremenb made with the infrared pyromrlt.

influmeed by the uh tyer, ue rpproximrkly 25 'C lower tb~ tbo~ made with the filuaent pyrometu, mea- miring tempenhret in ue.r of minimum .rh concentration, for low .ir velocitia.

With trcreving sir velocity, the two utr of drtr blend together.

This trend jndicatm the dt creasing influence ol the rth layer at higher JI velocitin.

as it is swept tom tJw rurfrcr more easily than at lower velocilier.

At Lh* highest air velocity, 49 rnlsec, the me- menu with the infrucd pyromter ue re SEA BROO It STATION.0 Evaluation

..and Appendix A.."..,

..9 Sebtjon*r 3 D Page 34 Fie*4.hrlKe"'J*III"" IlL_ilYtrnJD airtty;0, ralamftll pynItnalltr; 0, Int,aM

• .cMl"IIMIeDUple;

-.JW-dic&ecl

&eInJW,aluflI lor YariOUI ltiMlic JaU'8_lft.a1....flce independent of the readinp obtained from the thermocouples.

FilUn 3 shOWI the experimental resulu tor the steady st.at.e bumin, rate of the chucoal as.function ot the mainltream air velocity.The buminC rate of the charcoal 11 calculated

..the product of the nte DC reerasion of the buminC surface and bulk density ot the char*coal cylinder meuund in room air.Thebon cont.ent ot the charcoal wu detumined 10 be approximately 93!l by wei,hL Themainder included residual hydrosen and o&y' in the charcoalstnltt.ure.

moisture, ad.IOrbed rues, and uh.Thul the charcoalin!, raLe meuured dilters sUChUy from*bon bumin, rate.lownt mainstream air velocity at which the charcoal wovld aell-iUltain itl own tombustion wu 7.7 rza/sec.Repeated tries too bum cylinden at a mainstnam ,elocily of",t./see tailed.Alter i,mUon OJ!each of these t.ri&Is, extinruishment bepn at th.

of the humin, surlace near the inJulation and procressed inward towards the cenl.er.This DI evenu nveals the.iDnuence of lome beal Joss line.For Ihe purpOle 01 analysis or lh"e data.o 10 10 JO 40.,.wofUICrn.,_a ee1t extinction ftlocity of 5.5 mit<<will be uaed.The c:orraponc1inc m.asurements ot the buminc lurface temperature mlUured with the thermocoupl.

and two pyrome&eJl_a func:tion 01 the mainstrum air velocity are Ibown in Fir.-t.

measurementl are based on alWiace emiuMty of 0.75, which ill repreHntauve 01 carbon aufaca It tamper*atwoes around 900*C.The Dlaximum temper*atw't mlUlUlld by an implanted ple'WU lenenl1y below the meuurementl mad.by the pyromet.en.

This is Jlot unex*pected u neU'the JUdace it was common for the leads of the 0.025 em diameter chromeI-'.alumel wire t.bruded ndially tbroulh the cylinder 10 be upOled by IWfac:e inel\llar*

jues to the coolinC effec:tl of them Bow.The dilappearin&

filament type optical pyrometer man\l1'ac:twed by Pyrometer In*ItrUment Company wu wed to measure the temperature of specific arWlutu of the buminlsurface where uh coyer w_a mini*mum.The area c:holen 10 be measured and balanc:inc of the inltNment wule!t\0 the jud,ement of the operator.The infrared pyrome1.er wu a BarnapnHrinl CO.,lnfrucope Mark 1.This inlU\l*ment was let up to pe a continual readine ot the averqe\amperatun in." em'&rea in the of the huminlsurl'ace.

Ita reCord provided an indication ot an et!ec:1ive aurtace Semper.ture the ln1]uence 01 the ub llyer.BecauN of l1wnDtions caused by pieen 01 ash coyer beinC Iwept aWIY in the air flow and chanpnc lurtace crack patt.efn$, some judcement wu exercised in usilJ'inl one value ot t.empel'llt.ure characteri&inc the output.Generally the uncertainity

...ociat.ed with these mealUJ'erMnts is t 16*C.Clole examination or*the J'1'rometer data reveall that the meUUfemenLl made withintrared pyrometer, inthaenced by the lib 18)'er, are approximately 25*C lower&h&D thOle made with the rJIameDt pyrometer,NrinC t.empent.ura in areu ot minimum uh cont'mtntioD, tor low air nloeiUes.With lncnasin, air nJoc:fly, the two NU 01 data blend iolltber.TbiJ&lend Indicates the d..ereasinc innuence of the ash layer at hilhel'I1r velocities.

u it is swept trom the l\Uface more easily than at lower velocities.

At the aitvelocity.

43 millc, themenu with the infrared pyromet.er all reo*

corded u higher thrn thocc with the Iilrment pyroxz~elu.

This rodd indicnte hat Yn chp. . m emirrivity for the buming nuface is too bw. h~~ming that tbe influence of the .rh L negligible rt this high air velocity.

the value d the surface ernissivity that bring^ botb pyromettr meuurtmtntr into ag?eemmt at . 43 m/m md 1055 'C ir 0.85. It t dm likely thrt the dillerenccs In G-bnture morded ' ut ahply the mult of uncerLrintiec in the wmurcrnents as they rpproacb the Limitr of uewuy for tbe meuurcmmb.

SEABROOK STATION lVRNlNC RATE AND SURFACE ?aa?ERATURR TnEORmCAL MODU At menlionrd in the introduction, r one dimensional model is rdeqrutc for these ex- primenu muIla. It is desirable to how the Atriled chemical kinetic mechrnbm involving rractions at the cubon turfact, in cracks md pores, and in the gas phm. Unfortunately mf- ficienUy detailed chemical dab wu not found. The graphite reaction kinetic formula of Nagle and SMcklmd-Conruble

[I] wu tried but as expected w wholly inadequate (low by a factor of about 50). A rneuunment of Ie Id density near the durtd surfue mg~ests tome burning in the porn and erackr (up to 10%). With charcoal there ic no rignif- iunt burning out in the bounduy layer or else Lhe fire could be "blown out" u il the case with burning polymethylmethrtylatt.

me absence of such major bounduy layer burning doer not preclude minor mrctionr in Be boundary layer nor major reactions in the gu phase very dose Lo the charcoal &act. In the absence of applicable chemical data, we will usume m oved nution and reaction kinetics formula applicable to the &mod projeckd turface uer. Thus we ruume an effective curfrce reaction:

Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A =-l+& 2 I (3) As discussed 1rLr Ihe CD b COI mblu ntio is given by Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 35 and the ruction rate -ed in the form' of 8 fixst older Arzheniur ruetion. *ZrAPq,,rrp(-E/RTImdlpq,, . (5) Mcfion of tbe burning ntc .nd adace temperature of the chrrarl in rtudy tt.k combustion L done by robing dmdtmtow ly two indtpmdenl equation, dating the burning nte md &ace kmptntue.

The kt equation bvolvtr m energy balance rt the burnihg ~rface cgluting the energy gen- mM in the rbwe chedul &on to tbrt lort throub heat Wet. The buming ntc of the cbucd bucd on the energy hlmce is @en by: In cqn. (6). tbe value of h t given shown later by: NU = hdh 9.5 (~e4)0" (7 I The second equation dating the burning rrk and surface ttmpenture b eqn. (5) which. howwer rtquircl the oxygen partid pnsrrve at the buming rurfnce. The oxy Ben putid presswe at the nrrface pea, b dttennimd

&om the conservrtion of spcci~ quationr rt the burning rurfact. For oxygen this takes the form: Similu balm& for dl the other specie needed to determine the comporitien of Lhe mixture of ~uer nt the burning surface in order to fmd the oxygen pulid prcwurr. For this cdculation the trrnrporL rrk per wit concentration difference of exh rpceies b considered equal to Chat for oxygen. A, d* scribed hkr, the mw trrnsfer coefficient is given by Eva.luation and Comi'arison toBtP 54, Appert<.JixA BURNINC RATE AND SURFACE TDlPERATUR!::

THEORETlCAL MODEl.z_!...b (3)2 AI discussed Jater the CO to CO.molar raUo is liven by.Ib*.c.3 exp(-3390/T)

(.c)

..hieher ihan thClH with the1UUDent pyrometer.

This cowd indicate that the cho-.*n emissivity for the bumine auntee i&&.00 low.Aaawninl that the influenee of the ah iI at this biih air'HlocUy, the vaJue 0(the Iydaee emiuinty that brinp both p)'rometer mHSUrements into acreement at"3m/Me and 1055*C iI 0.85.It is also likely that U,e diUereneelln kmPeraWrt recorded..limply the..Illt of W1eert&inti

..in the measuremenu as they approach the limits or-=cuney lor the measwementa.

AI znen1ioned i1l the introduction, lone dimenuonal model is adequate for these u*perimental reswu.It II desirable to know the detailed chemical kinetic mechmiam involvine reactions at the carbon sudace, in cracks and pores.and in the cas phase.Unfortunately IIlf*ticienUy detailed chemical data wu not found.The sraphite reaction kinetic fonnula af Nae1e and Stric:ltland*Const.able (1)WII tried but as expected was whoUy inadequate (low by*factor 01 about 50).A measurement of the local density near the charcoal lurface Wllests lome burnin(in the pora and cracu (up,,>10',;).With charcoal there iI no aicniJ*icant buminc out in tne boundary layer or else the fire could be"blown out" as is the case with buminr polymethy)methacrylate.

The absence of such major boundary layer buminc does not preclude minor reactiOl'll in the boundary layer nor inajor reactions in the ,as phase very close to the charcoal surface.In the absence of applicable chemical data.we will assume an overall reactioD and reaction kinetics formula applicable

\0 the charcoal projected lurface uea.Thus we us\Une an effeet.ive

'urface reacUon: and the ruction rate is uaumed in the form or a fint order Arrhenius ruction.a1-me:*ApO)**ap(-EIRT)-.lPOa..(5)Prediction of the bumiD&rate and lurface temperature of the charcoal in ltady nate combustiOll 1I done by ly two",dependent.

equat.lona relatiD.the bwnin&rate and lUrlaee wmpezatwe.

The fint equaUon involves Ul eneqy balance at.the bumine IUrface equatinl the entfIYera ted in the above chemical reaction t.o that lost throulh beat tDn1Ier.The buminC llte of the charcoal based on the I\Uface enellY t-lance is pen by:-me-[h(T.-T a)+eG(T':-T:>>I

-"bH eoa+, Jlo M eo Cc+Z_2 COJ-C1-M Ceo Me c M co1)

X X (T.-T*)-:-cc(T

..-1'10)](6)In eqn.(6).the value of Ia illiven as Ihown later by: Nu*hd/lr.-3.5 (ltePt,)ul (7)The second equaUon reJat.i.nc the buminr rate and surface tempellwre 11 eqn.(5}which howeover requires the oX)"Ien partial preuwe at the buminlsurface.

The oxnen partial presswe at the surface Pa".is determined from the conservation of.pecies equatiON at the bummllurface.

For oXoYEe" this takes the form: 1':)......MOl JI.(YO,.a-oa.*+mc 0,...--mc Me:r (8)SimUa: balanm for all the other species ue needed to determine the compDlIUon o!the mixture o!IlSes at the buminllurface in order to rmd Ule oxnen partial pt!S5ure.For this calnJlation the transport.

rate per unit.concentntion di!ferenee of each'pecies is considered equal\0 that for ox)'ren.Asscribed lal.er.the mass transfer coefficient Is liven by Sh*1l.dlp,..D

-2.1 (ReSe)-**(9)(1)(2)C+:rO.aCO+bCO.where.+b-l*

SEABROOK Eva~uation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 STATION Appendix A / Section F.3 D I me oxygen pA.1 prc- d the m.cc is thus found to k . . -1 M!!,u,, 3 Ph,- mi [l+mna Mc dl.,.% + h.Yo*. Nc I . Suhtitution of thk updon into qn. (5) yid& the mond equation relating tbc burn- ing nk md the wire bmptntruc dkr rome manipulrtlon as: *A MoZ(=-1) [ (fi~~~+~.~~,..*~h.~~,..)

MN* Solutions for the steady burning nte and surface temperature utisfying eqnr. (6) and (11) were found u r function of the mrin- rtrr~ rt velocity md values for dl the pus- mttcn h the reaction nte expression eqn. (5). In dl the predictions, r prcuurt of 1 ~tm and ur unbitnt kmpenture of 20.4 .C rep* wnting the mnpe vdue durjng rLI the tests yitlding the dab recorded in Figs. 9 and 4 wm uwd. The most powerful pie= of infonnrtion obtrined from the dab in Wnns of predicting v Jua of the nte punmeten A md &/R WJS Lht determination of Lhc relf-extinction vt. locity. From experimentc, the minimum air velodty at which the chucad will rutlain itc own tombwtion can only be mid to be be- tween 4.4 md 7.7 mlrrc. Fot de~rmkring approptisk vduts of the panmeten A md E/R, assumed la be constant, the due of he air vtloeity cct a% the &elf-extinction velocity was 5.5 ni/sec. Choosing a value for &/R, a corresponding value for A can be found nrch that no solution to eqm (6) and (11) rcpm sentine steady burning exists st rir vtlociCi~

below 5.5 mlcec. Following Lhic procedure, the lines on Fip. 3 and 4 show the cdculatcd muits for burning rak and surface temp atute for three valuer of E/R-8000,9000 md lO,OO+assuming m tmirsivity for the burn- ing surface of 0.75. The comspondinc vdue of A is given in each case. Compuing the calculrtjon b Uit txperirntnLJ dab, one re that in dl cases the general agreement k good. The combination or &/R - 9000 (OK) md A - 25.42 (alema rcc 8tm) rrrulU in the best agrtement considcrkrg both wt of at- @mental daL. %cause fht extinction vt1DEity L imp-t jn Lhr determination a? the comtanLr A ~d E/R, some malytis wrr ptdomtd b deter- mine fhc dlcct of the uncertainty in thic value on the results. Vuying thc extinction velocity rbove and blow 5.5 mlclc by 1.5 m/scc for ,a vdue of E/R equd to 9000. changed the vdue of A to 24.19 md 2731 respecrively.

In tc& of an wedl futt order readion ocnvring on the curfree, the form of the upnvion for the effective cherniul kinetic ntc of maction applicable

%o wood chvcorl oxidized in rir. ir: The due dE/R ot 9000 found rpplicablt b wood chucod compun fwonbly witb 8 vdue of 8160 found useful for Austrian brown cod chu in a work by Hamor, Smith md Tyler [31. Botb of these vaJun do not we well with Ute 15,200 vdue of E/R found - applicable to the oxidiution of pyro graphite in the work of Nqle and Strickland-Cunst.blt 111. A possible uplanation for the difference

' between Iht mults for graphite and UI~K for coal cbu md charcod could be the cncr of r rubrtmt3d mount of burning 0~- curring in portl openine onto the surface. Under ccdn conditions.

combustion h poru .c opposed to that on an expared rurfrcc can lower the observed activation energy by r facbr or two fmm the actud value usochtcd Comparison to.

9'.5-1;".Appendix A.'nt, oSYJen partial pftU\U'e at the lUlface iI thus found to be

'Section F.3 D 36'*(10)(11)SolutiON tor the.1.eady buminl rate.and wmperature uwtyinl eqru.(6)and (11)W,rt found as a function of the ma.in*atream air velocity and nh.lft for all themeters in the ruction raw uJ)rewon eqn.(S).In.I1 the a pressun of 1 a1m and an ambient i.emperature ot 20.4'eaentinc th, avera!:.value dunnr: a1J the tests yie.ldinC the data recorded in Fip.3 and 4 was 1&IeI1.The most powereul piece at information obtained trom the data in Lenns ot

",haes of the faLe parameters A and EIR was the determination ot the telt-utinc:tion y...Joc:ity.From experiments, the minimum air nJodty at which the charcoal will.ustain its own combustion can only be Did\0 betWHn 4.4 and 1.1 m/see.For cM\.Irmininr appropriau values ot the panm.ten.A and E/If, assum.d to be constant.the YaJu.of th.air velocity_t as the**It-extinction nloc.ity was 5.5 Choosinc a value lor£IB,*comspondinc value for A can be lound Iw:b that no.olulion to eqru.(6)and (11)aentine steldy bumine exist.s at air YeJociUes below 5.5 m/nc.FoUo"'inr this procedUJ"e.

the lines on Fip.3 and..show the calculated JOnulti tor buminc ni.e and surfaceature lor three values of£111-8000.

9000 md 10,OOO-USuminlan emissivity for theInl;wrCace of 0.15.The C:OfTfSpondinr value DC A is riven in.Ich rISe.Comparinl th.calculation to the experimental data, one can aee that in all cues\he renen!aCteement is lood.The combination or E.IR*9000 ("lC)and A*25.42 (Ilcm s lee a1m)nsult.s in tne best IJI'Hmmt considerin&

both stt.s o,tperimenw data.Becaus.the utinc:tion velocity is important in the determination of the constanta.A and£/R**OIM anal)'lis was performed\0mine the aftect.af the uncel1ainty in thil value on the resu.lts.Varyinc the estinction velocity above and below 5.S m/ac: by 1.5'fIl/sec tor.a.value 01 EIR.qual\0 9000.chlneed the value of.A to 24.19 and 27.31 respectively.

In UnM ot an overall first ord.r ftaction ote:urrinC on the lUlface, the lorm ot the exprfllion tor the effective chemical kinetic rate of reaction applicable

\0 wood charcoal oxidized in air.is:*(25.4}po,****(I em-a.-J)(12)The valu.01 EIR of 9000 lound applicable

\0 wood charcoal compares favorably with*value oC 8160 found uldullor Awtric brown coal char in a work by Hamor, Smith and Tyler (3J*80th 01 these values do not acree w.n with the 15.100 value of E.111 found applicable to the oxidization ot pyro It&philC In the work of Naa:1e and Strickland-eonltab1e (1]*A pOSlibl.upllnaUon lor\he ditr.rtnet between the relult.s tor crap)Ute and&hON tor coal chu and charroal could be theenc.01**ubstantial amount ofbuminreurrinl in pores openinr on\o the.uriace.Under eeNin condiLioN, combustion In potu*opposed to that on an IItpolld.udace can lower the observt'd activation ene1D'by a tac&or of two from the actual value associated

• with tbe ruction ocaming at the bumin? mrfaec. A detdtd dircuvion of thk dfut . . L given by Wheeler (41. THE iMIERATURE DISTR1IVZI;ON rXt UNBURNED SOLID To model the tcmpenturt dbtritnation kr tbe cblrrd Mow the buming nrrirn, r ady 8trte solution to tbe on~enaional beat conduction equation in a wmi-Wite mlid wlr sought. The burning ru* WAS rrruwd to bve eonstant tempenbuc T, md to travel d 8 consat velocity V. (with rrtpcct to a coordinate system rued to the base 02 the chucoal cylinder) into !he unburned -lid, initially at uniform ternpentwe To. No rterdy Mte solution rxista in r frame of rrference in which the curface mwcs; but with respect b a syrlcm in which the burning auface remains fired in spice, the study rtAb ~ution it: (T-To)D(T,-T~)~p(-YX/~)

(13) To obtain eqn. (13) dl the properties of the drucorl foming the thermal cliifuivity a, (Q - Wpc), were assumed constant, and heat flux only in the uid dimtion was allowed. The exponential form of the anticipated temperature profile nrggcrtr that r wful way io plot the experimental results would be in the form of ln(T - To) or. X. From eqn. (13) it would be expected that a straight-line wi* slope -V/a would result Figure 5 tho- the aperimcntd mul* for a charcoal cylinder with density 0.329 glcm8 md initial tempcnture of 19.7 *C burned in mainstream air velocity of 21 mfwc. The tem- peraturn outputs from Iwo thtrmocoupla located on the urir of the cylinder md initially 99.2 mm md 104.3 mm tom the end of tbt cylinder to be burned, (1 and 2 mpcctivsly in Fig. 2), ur hown u functions of the db hncc from the burning dace. The plot yieldc a rough straight-line with mark deviations at luge dirturccl horn the burning surface md in She range of krnpentun difference qud to 100 'C. At Iup distances from the burning wrfrce, the deviation m tsused by termination of the insularion uound Ule cylinder at 56 . cm. The dwirtion in lht npion of a tempem- ture difference of 100 'C k bcliwcd due b 11; t~iwn~m~-i~n~*~k I Cnvctrroru.Ly.cul-~

ng. 8. IpcrinunuJ

&u lor Ib. amdy ute LaL.rnol bmpenlum dmLribution k a &arc4 c~crfi(ldm with kmity O.JZ9 glcma. and iaitid LrmpmrPn (To) of 19.7 'C burad in r auinotrroa, air wloci~y d 21 m/m mu ahown from La. tbemaeoupk

(+)and (0) idiidly IP.2 mm mnd 101.3 mm from Lbc burning nrface mpcclinly.

Linr: rtmig!tl lim fit of &la wu burniw murfatc. desorption ot adsorbed geso from the cbu- cod ttsucturr.

From r knowledge of the rurfrce velocity, V, (for this test 0.138 cm/min) and the dope of the data new the burning &dace, a due of the thtmrl diffwivity of wood chrrcod appropriate to that ttmpembm met un k found rs indicated by the resultr of the iunple conduction model. The straight-ine fit of the data shown in Fig. 5, yieldr r value for the thermal diffusivity, ct, of 0.0026 cm'ls. UW of the dope of the data at lower temptntunr b predict the them J diffusivity hag the mult of the rimple conduction modd. eqn. (13) would be inappropriate becrure of the influence of the duorpLion region, Lhe termi- nation of the insulation, urd consequent ndiil heat lou A modest rtttmpt was made to dcul.tc the thennd dilfwivity .from rneuurement, of the basic propertiu of then& conductivity, dentity and specific beat. Tbe Lhermd ton- ductivity of wqgd chucd was meuured and Ssgivmby . applicable at room ttmpenturt, .nd the rpt cific heat wu measured d room ternpemtrrrc md was found to k 0.24 (4 g-1 %'.I). The resultant Shennrl diffusivity wu 0.0045 cmS/tec to k compucd with 0.0026 ccm'lrcc found from the burning upcrirnmt.

Se,ctI011' F 3 D to'BTP , Appendix A'SEABROOK, STATION*.nth the ruction oceurrin&at the bumin(surface.A detai1ed d.iscuuion of UUa effect II riven by Wheeler 14 J.'!'HE TDI'ERA1URE DlSTRBtmON WITHIN THE umuJUfED SOUD:f'......._......,...........*To model the temperature distributioD 1ft Ibe charcoal below the blUTlinl Nrf&ce.**ady.taw.oll.ltion to the onHlimensional heat conduction equation in*lemi*lnfmite IOlid w.IOUPlt.The buminCwas"uJ!Nd to bave constant temperatun T..and to travel at*constant veloeity V.(with respect to a coordinate SYltem med to the bue of the tharcou cylinder)into the unburned lOUd.lniually at uniform tempentwe To.No lteady S1ate lolution uuu in a frame ot I'dereMe in which the lUrlace JDOV.;but with rupeet&0*'Yltem in which the b\lD\inC lUdace remains fixed in space, the.teady atate solutiOD iI: (T-T.)*(T.-T.)exp(-VX/e)

(13)To obtain eqn.(13)aU th.properties of the cha.rcoal fonnine the thermal dilluaivtty e, (e*Jc/Ile), were auumrd constant, and heat nux only in the axial direction was allowed.The exponential form of the anticipated temperature prome SUrfelu that I useful way to plot the experimental results would be in Ibe lorm ot In(T-To)PI.X.From eqn.(13)Jt would be expected that**tnipt*lin.

with dope-VlQ would result.FilUre 5 IhOWI the experimental tor a charcoal cylinder with density 0.329 a/em'and initial temperature of19.'*Cbumed in mainstream air velocity of 21 m/sec.The tem*perature outputs from two thermocouples located on the axil ot the cylinder and inUil1Jy 99.2 mm and 104.3 mm from Ibe end of the cylinder to be bumed.(1 and 2 nspect1vely in Fie.2), are shown as functions 01 lb.diIo tance from the buminf NrC.ce.The plot yieldl a rDuCh l1raicht*line with mark dt\liationa at lara'distances from the bumlnc INrfaa and in the ranee of temperature dilference equal to 100*C.At larr;e distances from the bwninl 5urface, the deviation is caused by termination of the Insulation around the cylinde, a&&6.em.The dpiltion in the reeion of atun dirrerence of 100'C is believed due ia..'........nlO IO..IO..'" 1..___0<1*-FIt.6.!&ptrillM"ul da IOIIJII aleady&&all illLer1la1

".pera'lIn t1i&\ribution ill*cyliadn.nUl.1II11y 0.32',fCrll'*aIId ial'ial&nIs--lJIn ITo)of 1'.7*C blll'Md ill.aainatrttUl air...Iocil)'0121..fMc.Pa...&O.alrom&Il..&11..,...-...(.)aatl (0)ialtiall)'

".2 1IIc1104.3

....11'01II thl buminl...,Ian I)'.LiM: au-ip, Ii..lit.r cia.......bllmine IlIrfU".dftorption of adsorbed IUeI from the char*coal It.Netwe.From a!mowletiCIe of the a.mace velocity, V.(for tllis test 0.138 em/min)and ahellope of the data near the bwninc aurface.a value oC the thermal difCusivity ot wood cha.rcoal appropriate to that temperature ranee can be found u indicated by the results ot the simple conduction model.The ItraiKht*line fit of the diU shown in fie.5, yieldl a value for the thermal diffusivity, ct, of 0.0026 emilio Use ot tM dope ot the data at Jower temperatures to predict the thermal diftu$1vily usinc the result of the 5implt conduction model, eqn.(13)would be inappropriat.t because ot the innuence 01 the desorpUon rerian.thenation ot the insulation, and consequent ndia1 hut lOlL A modest attempt wu made to c:a1culat.t the thennal.lrom measurementl of the basic properties or thermal cDnductivity.

density and specific: heat.The thermalductivity ot wD9d charcoal wu meuured and II liven by" It*0.0016,11-0.0001'1 (c:aJ em-I.-1.c-1)(14)applicable at room temperature, and&.hecitic heat wu measured at.room temperature and wu found to be 0.24 (cal ,-1-C.,l).The resultant thermal diflusivity wu 0.0045 cms/set: t.o be compared with 0.0026 cml/HC found Irom the burninc experiment.

me aut reason for the discrepancy wo not urught but ia probably awociated with the . fact tbat the bunrtng kt vJue ir In a hiber ' ' tempmtum mpe where the adsorbed be ksn upclled from the chutprl. SEABROOK STATION To measure the convective heat tsuvfw nl u r function of tbe mainstream rir vdoc- Ity. a copper cylinder the rune diameter as the chatcod eylindcn king wd nu net iato the inrulrrion BO that it occupied the ume position the chrrcwl would nody. The nu of energy lait o it cooled from 350 to 250 'C was detcrmintd.

This memu*ment wu corrut@d for heal lost to the insulation to find the com~tivc heat 1ou nk !ram the exposed torlrce. The mur trw1e.r ch-r- ttim of the flow field were determined from mevurements of Lbe mk of evrpontion of water from r rintercd dirk of the me dir- meter and locmted in the rune podtion in the air flow u a charcoal cylinder.

The non-dirnencionrlited results af the exptrimtnL are shown in Figure 6. The dts for Che heat mad mass tmfer rates uc fit by eqni. (7) and (91 mptctively.

All of the . propertics used in the non-dimeruion.lirrtion rrc evaluated at the film tamperatuxe, the avurge between the surface and ambient Sem- pctrlures.

The binuy dinusion coefficient for water into rir, DHIhh was dculated from m expression developed from kinetic theory by Chrpmrn and Enskog (51. Good agreement mong the two reL of mersuremtntr in tumr of the andow between convectivt heat tmm- fer and mass transfer ntcr is mded. Abo rhown in Fig. 6 we the mulu lor heat tmnsftr in r turbulent sLgnaLion point flow trken horn Garden md Cobonpue [6] md fakob 171. h selecting mults from thee courccr m effort was made to pmewe the ratios of the distance of the st.gn&tion plu~ from the nozzle exit b the nozzle diunebr (I/$) and diameter of the nozzle to the dim- ekr of the circulu heat truuftr surface (dl# ). CARBON MONOXIDE PomAnoN cuxma BURNING Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A To dtltrmi~ the energy telcued In the. eornbu!tion of lhe charcoal, it is necctryt to Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 38 deermine the ntio of urbon monoxide to carbon dioxide formed in tba reaction.

sun- ples of ps utractrd from r teaon j~t above the kvel of the &ace and at the cirnrmfer.

ence of the burning mrfm, were dyxed for the CO/COI ntio wirh r rnut spcetto- metar. figure 7 shows the results plotbd 8s I function of the surface tempcnmre.

original.

ly the dat. wm collcc,ted u r function of tbe rnlinstrtm air velocity of the now indicated at the 'top of Fig. 7. Chua~lcrbtic nuface krnpenturei u r function 02 the air vdocity shown in Fig. 4 from the infrared pyrornetcr wen ud lo conver( the data from an rir velocity dependence b curface tempenture dependence.

Also indicated in Fig. 7 b Uat mull of Mhur 181 for the CO/COs ntio produced in the combustion of graphite md cod chrt pnules in r quartz rc~clinp.

vessel. The rela- tionXcolXtor

= lo'-' up(-12,4001T) he determined from rnrlytir of the producU of the urban reaction with r now of oxygen nitrocen, and 8 mrf) mount of phosphoryl chlatide (POCl;) vapor. Tht POClr ws rddcd b inhibit the gu phuc matlion of arbon monoxide ta tubon dioxide. In a preview study 191, tJ~e effect of this Inhibitor on the mtio of cubon monoxide te cubon dioxide form& during the oxidation of graphite *ru examined.

It was found that 8 concentrafion of POCl* of less Ulah I% in the sir now miiir+d the CO/COz ratio In the products of cornb~ tion to 8.4 from a value of 0.05 (shown in SEABROOK'.

STATION

'to BTPAPCSB91,..,.'..**AitlRe9clix A..'!be uact reuon for the discrepancy W.Dot IOlollh t but is proMbly aNOCiated with the'tact that the bw1Un1 vaJue isln a biJher Wl'llpentuR ranre where the adsorbed IUU baYe been expelled trom the charcoal.HE:'T AND WASS TaAHSfU COEPT1CJENTi To measure the convective heat tnnIfer ntoeua function of tile mlinatrnm airIty**copper cylinder the&ame diameta u the charcoal cylindm beinC uaed wu Nt mID the insulation 10 that It.occupied the lUDe position the charcoal would normally.The nte of enero'10it u it cooled!rom 350 ID 2!iO*C was determined.

This meuwement...corrected for heat lost to the inlulation to find the COnvectivf heat lou ratoe from the apoud surface.The mass tzanslu chara.der*

utica 01 the Dow field were determined from meuuremenu of the rate ot evaporation ot wawr from.sinterd disk of the sam.meter and located in the same poaUon in the air flow u a charcoal cylinder-.

The non-dimensionaJiud of the experiment are shown in FiIUft 6.The resu)u for the heat and mass tranJler rata are fit by eqns.(7)and (9)respectively.

AU of the.properties used in the non-dimensionaJintioh are eva!\Iated at the rUJn t.mperature.

the aVUlee between the.urrace and ambient tem*peratures.

The binuy diftusion c:oertic:ient for water into air, DHto-.an wu calculated from an expression developed trom kinetic theory by Chapman and Enskol (5).Good acreement amonl the two Hts of lIleUllrementa in t.ermI of the analol:)'between convective heatfer and mISS transfer raLes iI mruJed.Also shown in FiC.&Ife U'I.

for heat transfer in a turbulent stacnltion point now taken from Garden and Cobonpue (6)and Jakob 11}.In aelfl:Une!Hults from theN&curee.an effort was made to preserve the ratios of the distance of the staenation plane from the nozzle uit to the nozzle diameter (lId)and diameter 01 the nozzle to theeter of the circular heat transfer surface (d/.).CARlON.,ONOXJD£FORMATION DUlliNG aURNlNC-To determine the enerl)'released ill the.

of the chareoal.iI necessary to.............-_....,.-..--...--r""'

........, detoermine the ratio 01 carbon monoxide to carbon dioxide formed in the reaction.ples of cas extracted (rom a repon just above the level of the surface and at the circumfer*

ence 01 the burnin, Nrface.were analyzed for the CO/CO, ratio with a mass.pectro*meta.FilUre'I shows the results a funcUon of the I\Idac'temperature.

OrillnaJ*Jy the data were c:oUKted IS a function of the mainsueam air velocity of the now indicated at the iop of FiC.1.Characteristic aurlace temperatures as I function of the air velocity&bown in Fia, 4 (rom the infrared pyrometer used to convert the data (rom an air velocity dependence to IUdace temperature dependence.

" Also indicated in Fil., it the tuult of Arthur (81 for the COfeO, ratio produced in the combustion of pphite and coal char lfal'Iules in a quaru relctinc: nssel.Th.tion XcofXco,*IOU ap(-12.4001T>

he determined trom anaJysia of the producu of the carbon reaction with a flow of oxyc en rdtro.:en, and*amaD amount of phosphoryl chloride"apor.The was added\D inhibit the IU phase relc:Uon of carbon monoxide to<<:arbon dioxid*.In a previous ItUdy 19).the effect of this inhibitor on the raUo of carbon monoxide to cubon dioxide formed dIAnne the oxidation of CTlphiteexamined.It.was found that.concentration 01 POOJ of less than 1'J.in the lir now raised the CO/CO.ratio in the producu oftion ID 8.4 from a value of O.O!i (shown In**

Pi. 7. Molar nlio of CO/COz u inwma rrfm warpentun.

SEABROOK STATION Fig. 7 with no inhibitor prewnt). Also rhom in Fig. 7 is one vdue for the COICOI mtio meuurtd in the combustion of chucod by Parker and Hotul [lo]. Comparing the rmul~ of the measurements reported here b those of Arthur would rugpert that Eome grr phrv naction is involved in our combustion of wood charcod. Because of the hieh drvelocitiu used in this experiment, if a gas phw reaction docs exist it rnust be confied to a region very dw to tbe burning surface. CONCLUSIONS Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A The simple surfrce combustion model pre- wnted in this work can be used Lo predict the . burning nte .nd surface Lmptnture of wood cfiutod burned in r stagnation point flow d - rk. An expression for the effective chemical rate of naction of wood charcoal oxidized kr air has ken developed.

Since lbir mult is empirical and no; based upon delailcd ehem- kJ mechanismr.

further work is ttcuired b Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 39 determine the t&nt of itr rpplicibkty.

Predictions of the internal temperature . distribution in the burning mmpl; can be made based on r simple onedimensional conduction model in 8 wmi-Wmite solid, K r vdut for the thermal diffurivity rpproprirt*

b wood the bryning umplc. bultr of tu study imply m.t bath. b ' phase reaction and rub6~ntirl combustion in porn may k involved h the midation of wood drutorl in'&. Thcv dead mh- nifrns nill need elucldrtioa, This wotk ir a result of the thesis study af BY- md wrr support4 in put by the Na- tional Science Foundation under Gmt NSF G134734, and by the Division of Enpinetring and Applied Physics, Hwud Univenity.

UST OF SYMBOLS Moles of CO pdud per mole C bumd pnuponentid factor. clcrna see run molcr of COa produced pa mole C burned cpecific but, dk *C diameter of the air node binuy diffusion cwfficicnt.

rp~ie i into lir, assumed dl tqurl to oxygen in dculation, cms/rcc =tivation enem. d/g-mole heat Wer coefficient, cdfcm' K negative of the heat of combustion of chucoll to product i, dlg wbon mus trmsfer coefficient, c/crns rcc thermal conductivity, d/cm see *C A exp (-.&/Rl')

distance from'nozrle exit to impinge. ment plane, em ah of increase of rnw per unit time per vnit uc., gtcm' aec rnoleculu weight Nusrell number, lid/) prCINm, atm putid prtvure of specie i, ntm Meal ps conrtmt, cdfg-mole

• K product of Reynolds md PrmndU numhn, u$/a product of Reynolds urd Schmidt numben, ud/D SEABROOK STATION IS

., SectionF3D Page 39*....*1:'1........"""":1:,....1

..................'......t U'7.Molu noli<>01

....iJI..._..rfaee-"lIIpeRl\l

....Fia.7 with no inhibitor preMnt).Also Ibown in Fi,.1 is one value for the CO(CO a ratio measured in the combwtion of charcoal by Parker and Hottel[10].Comparin&the multi of the rneasuremenu reported hen to thOle of Althur would JURest that lome ,as phase reaction is involved in our combustion or wood charcoal.Because of the hilh air velocities wed in thi5 experiment, if a IU phase reaclion does exist it must be conflned w*recion veIY ciON to the buminr JUrlace.CONC1.USIONS

'nIe simple l\u!lce combustion model_nt.ed in thil work can be to predict the bumin, rat.e and surface of wood charcoal bumed in*stal:nalion point flow of air.An lor the e!1ecliye chemical rat.e 01 reaction of wood charcoal oxidized in air has been Since Shu result it empirical and not based upon del.alledleal mechanisms, further work 11 re!iuir'ed

&0 det.ermine the extent or ita applicabiJity.

Predictions of the internal temperawft

.distribution in the humin!: sample can be made based on I simple one-dimensional conduction model in*aemi-wlnit.e lOUd, it a yaJue for the thermal dilllA1ivity appropriat..

to wood d:larc:oa1 at elevated temperature.

can betained II\d insulation willed around the bu,tninl IImple..Baulta of thia ltudy imply tbat both*IU pbue reaction and aublt.ult.i.IJ CODlbuslion in pores may be Ul\'Olved in She OXidaUOD of wood cbucoa1 in-air.These detailednismllt1ll Deed elucidation.

ACXNOWLEDOEMENTJ This work is a JeSwt of the thesis Wldy of EVani and wu supported in part by thetional Science Foundation under Grant NSF (U34734, and by the Divilion of Enlineerina md Applied Pbysics, Huvud University

.LIST or snlIOl"S*Moles of CO produced per mole C burned A pre-exponential factor.I/em'sec: aun b moles of COl produced per Dlole C burned c*lpecific hul, wlc*C d diameter of the air nowe D binary diffusion coefficient,.

specl, i into air.assumed all equal to oX)'Ien in cakullUon, em'/tee£activation enero.calla-mole II heat transler coetfU:ienl, c:aJ(cm'sec: K 4H, Maalive of the heat of c:ombustion of charcoal to product i.callI carbon h.mass transfer c:oef'ficient.

a/em'sec: , thermal conductivity, cal/cm aec:*C 1C A exp (-*E/BT), distance lrom'nozzle nil to impince.menl plan., em 1ft" rate of incnale of mass per unit.time per unit area, clem!He M molecular weip.t Hu nwnbex.hdli II preuurt,_tm III partial prea\lrt ollpecw i, a1DI R ideal pi constant.c:&J/l-mole

• X JlePr product.ollleynolds and PrandU numben, Pd/.ReSe product of Reynolds and Schmidt num bers, IJdID 66 . B dhek of hut flux wn~or, em ~~ZRENCE!~

Sh Shewood number, h,d/p.,,D u dl vdo~ity, ' . ' 1 J. Wad. ~d R F. ttr*kkad6N&blc, Oxidation I' &ace velocity, deuben klwms I000 and 2000 'C, hoc. Fifrh X + b [m eqn5. (1). (2). (3)) Cubon Coal.. 1 (1961 J 154 - 164. x ~~~O.~ebumkl~.ccint.

aGC.~bff,+Eh-mmd~l~&g.

the solid, cm Tkraul Radtlan hm Suq, Rontyrcll C.~MT. Yhpdb, Mi-. bd dm. XI mole hction of rpcdm i (ISWL Yr masshctionof~i a1LJ.w LW.&ilbmdIa.~ykr

~timclicr dco.rbw~L or pvlrrriud bawa rorl 'h be Greek tunr 630 rad 2200 1(, CcmbwUoa .ad hr. 21 (ll731153 - 162 8 thennd diffuivity, &/PC, cma/rsc c wfacr tmirtivily 4 A. Wbccler, haden ntm .nd &Wiry La crlJyat porn, Mr. CItd.)y.i. .sd Retared Sub r density, g/cma he&. Vd 5. hdsmie ~rms, kw York. 1151. Stcfm-Boltrmmn oonrtmt, & /cma pp. 27 5 182. 8ec K' 8 k Bird, w. bud and E. Lightfmot, Tm~pon ?k-menm. Wiley, N.r. Yark. lB60, pp. 110 - Su bdytt 812. 8 ambient I It Oldon and J. Coboopw. Heat tmuler ktwrn air 8ir l fit plrk and jeb of vr Impinging on 1% Inurn. Heat hnrlrr bar.. Unirmily of Cdomdo. 1961. C urban f L6 hkob. 6em inmti~rlionr In ~ht fidd of hem; CO arbon monnxide hder, ?roc Myr k London. 59 (1 017) Cot &on dioxide 726 765. m property of the mhtun 8 J. R Rw, R.ulioni krrrccn cuboa and ory- N2 nitrogen sen. h.nr randry Sac., 47 (ID5 1 ) 164 - X78. B J. L Arrhur, O. H. %ragham urd J. R bollrring.

Ot ayeen ~imtit ~pccu or thr tornbwrioa or nolid turk. w burning rutface ?hied Symp. on Combrubion, hmmt, md Ltple 0 injtid VUUC don tbra~lcna.

Willurru sad Wikiar Co., Wtimorr. Ylylsnd. 1949. pp. 466 474. supencpt 10 A 6. Parkor md H. C. Hotr.1 Combvrtion nta rr the kfercnct tempemturn for the of carborn study of gh~m iicture by mino- uhpling. lnd. En6 Chrm.. 11 (1936) 1334 - . . heats of fonnrticrrl8

• C Jail. .. .-. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 40 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Evaluation

and 9:.5-1,.

I'Rev.9 Section F3D Page 40*diameter of hut tJux Ieft.or, em Sh Sherwood Dumber, h.dlp.-J)It maillltrum alr velocity, em/Me V Nrface veJDCity, c:m/HC z (crf2)+b (lee eqm.(1), (2), (3)]X dilt.ance from the bumJnC aur1'ace into&be.olid, em XI mole fraction of special 2'..maa!raction o!species i GI'Hlt*th.rmal diflumvity,lIlpc, eml/Me t lUreac.emiuivit)'

, demit)', Clem'*Stefan*Bollzmann constant, caI/cm l aec: X t

• ambient air air C carbon CO carbon monoxide CO.carbon dioxide m property of the mature N.niuo_en O.oxycen W bum in" surface o initial value

• at the temperature for the heats of form.tion-18

• C BV'EJU:HCES 1 J."'11.IUI4 R.F**&ricldalllf,C_labk.

., earN.IIe'W"1I 1000 a"d 2000*C.hoc.Fjflh c.rboll Coal., 1 (1111)1$4.J Go C.0."'-".J.E.la-.aad Jl.H.TorbCU'c.RadiaUCNI""""""11""7.

HOIWyWtiICoin.M__JNll..MilIA..lad"D.(1160).IL J.Hutor.L W.'-11.1I PcIIL J.T,Iu, JU..&.iu et....llla-.fpulftn-d bro.....cb&r....*--no uel 2100 k, e-Aua&loa ud Flam**21 (U71)15J*112.*A.WMeI." a..cu..Ill.a.MillC&lyj" IIIJIOftI, Ad,.CaW,..ud Jlalaledjecl&, Vol S."'-.N.w York.UU.,,.211*112.*L Iird, W.J&-anI..If r..Lichll_l, TraMJlOrtN_York.IHO.JlP.110*112-*JL Gartloa aad.3.Coboap,...

Heal Lraaar.r"1_." a ftlt pl...aJMI jew or air I.,pinelnc

....11,.....m.H**t TNllIfer CoDr., Un;Yel'lily or CoIorado.lNt.

7 M.Jakob.Jo..Ut,,"liC'I.iOlll In tl...r..ld of h.., lnMf.r.hoc.Ph)'L Soc.l.oallon.

51 (1147)U6*765.*l.Il ArtJuu.Il...ct.ioni 1Ie,...ftn eatboll and liZ),'.en.Tnll&.Farada, Ioc., 47 (1ISJ)154-1.71.IJl ArtlIvr.D.H.IuChans Md J.R.Jknrrinc.KllMlic.pec&a 01&h.cOIIlb...t.ioll o'lOlld r...l&.'nllrcl S,mp.OIl COtftbul.lll'll.

F1.me.andaiOtI PINDDIM....1rillia_aDd WillLi...Co**Jlallialon.

N.rylaftd, 1'4', pp.."*4".10 A.S.'uker ud H.C.HoU.I, CaftlbvaUOIl rate.t carbolla1vdy a'......rlinl.wellin by Nl'llp li"l.lnd.Me.Cbftll.*21 (136)1334*1341./

Nuclear Consulting Rz SBW~CBS, Inc. performed for Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 41 SEABROOK STATION under PO No. 46114 Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A fAEC: D.H. Pepe (3) + (1) by.Telefu PLC: H.B. Hawter (1) br Fad. Exp. NUCOI: P.G. frfyatir 1 H.N. Hagnus 3.n. srtphe~ - Y.P. frtemn J.L. foraeh O8PS902 w Attachment I1 to Hazards Analyses of Seabrook St8 tion Charcoal Filter Units , YAEC 1571 SEABRboK STATION Evaluation and BTl>

A Rev.9 SeetiQIl F.3 D l?;Cjlge:.*Nuclear Consulting Services, Inc.ro'0&HIS'COLUW'U$.OHIO UU'Attachment II to Hazards ADalyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal FilterUnlts, YAIC lS71 Iodine Adaorber Fir.tut.pertormed tor Janke.Atomic Electrio Co.lev RampBh1re laDk**15 Sept 1986 DISTJlIBUnON tAte: D.H.Pep.(3)+(1)b1.%e1etas PLC: H.E.Mowrer (1)b1 Fed.Izp.NUCOr:: P.G.Lat1atu/H.H.Halnua J.H.Stephena V.P.Free.n J.L.lo.,.cb 08f'S91&2 HF' The impremated crrbon umad In tbe varlour .LP Oleaning ryrtm lm typic8llj . protected from fire by water deluge rystams. me laitiatfon of the water deluge normally takes plate br tcaperature rirr a15ll. This type or fire control bas mevmral Inherent problams : . 8) tempenture rSra vill indicate only rjor, full^ daraloped fire Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 42 SEABROOK STATION b) wter dlrtribution In pluted carbon beds l~ aon unlfor~ Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A C) vey large amunts of potentlrlly conkdmted uater are ~rnented.

To avoid these problems a mystem test uaa performed to evaluate the detection of urbon axidmtion by C0 monitoring and to throttle carbon fires by mtopping forced airflou throu~h the carbon bed. Tuts uerm perframed in both the AS'f?! ignition test rig and In the Firs Wind Tunnel (FYT) to mvaluate CO pcnetI=tlOn and temperature generation.

Description of the Equipment L Procedures

1) The ASTH 03466 Test Rig which consists of heated aIr flw through 8 carbon bed With fnlet air, inlet carbn bed and outlet urbon bed temperature measurement.

The test Is normlly perroracd at 100 PPH relocity, however, for these tests the airflow urs reduced to 40 fPH whicb is the design velocity of the Seabrook air cleaning rystemr. The bed depth normally 18 1.0 Inch deep for theJe tests. Two inch deep beds of 50 dl -5g) of carbon w~s wed. 2) the WCON fire wind tunnel (FUT) consists of an adjurtible flov blower followed by an IndZrect llred natural gas furnace to heat the air, and 8n adjustable plenum to hold m 29 inch X 24 inch fact area rdsorber Ipeclmen, and the commensurate reductton lor outlet ductiry. For these tats a 4.0 inch deep carbon bed uas used filled with 2% fI and a TEDA laptegnated carbon. The inlet temperature to the carbon bed was monitored at 8 aingle point in the center are8 four inches from Inlet face of the adsorber.

The outlet face of the rdrorber war instrumented at 4.0 inches WRY from the adsorber with five thermocouples.

The CO sonltor (an Infrared sensor type) was taking armplcr 2 feet down stream from the filter outlet face in the 10 inch reduced duct section.

me mdsorber full weimt before fire v8n 65.8 lbr empty weight ) 18.4 Ibd as is carbon waifit 47.1 lba dry carbon weight (less FI2O] 13.6 ltn When the test was performed, the gas heater was turned on mxinua heat to accomplish ms fast heat-up as possible.

Air flow mas maintained for five mhutes after fire was detected, then airflow was ~topped and the carbon bed inlet and outlet temperatures monitored for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. ?he carbon bed was removed from Lhe PUT and weighed, SEABROOK.":Evaluation and Coniparison to BTP APeS1l9.5-1, Rev" 9 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 D Page 42*08P59112101

.;.1-lDt,roducUOD The 1.preenated carbon und ln thl nriou.alr elaarUnl I,,_tea h t,,,p1callr prot.ctad rrom tire bl watlr delule 11lteas.The initiation or the water delule takes place by t.perature rl..11p1al.nil t,,.pe ot tlre coatrol bas****r.l lnherent

.b)vater dlstrlbution ln pleated carbon beda 1a DOD e)**ry larle UIOUftts or potenUally cont&a1nated water......n....ted.To a.oid these proble=s a.,stem teat was pertormed to eYaluate tbe det.ction or carbon oXidation by CO and to throttle carbon tlr**br atopplnc torc.d airflow throulh the carbon bed.Test.vere perfroaed In both the 15TH lenltion t.st r11 and 1n the F1re Wind Tunnel (FWT)to.,aluate CO penatration and temperature lenerat10n.

DescriptIon or the Equlpment , Procedures 1)Tbe lSTH Test RII vhlch or halted al,.rlow tbroulh a carbon bed with inlet alr, inlet carbon bed and outlet carbon bed temperature measurement.

The test Is normalll pertormed at 100 FPM ,eloclt)', howe.e,..tor these testa the aIrflow was..educld to.0 FPM which 1_the deslan Yeloclty or the Seabrook all'cleaninc The bed depth Dormally II 1.0 Inch deep tor then tests.TlIo lnch deep beds or 50 IlI1 f"-2Sc)or carbon used.2)the NUCON tire wind tunnel CFVT)consists ot an adjustable tlow blower rollowed by an Ind1rect tired natural'IS turnace to heat the air.and an adjustable to hold*2-IDch Xinch race area ICSsorber apecl.an, and the co.-enaurate reduction lor outlet ductlnc.For tbese te:sts a 1&.0 inch deep carbon bed vas uud tilled with 2J n and 2J TEDl 1.prelnated carbon.The 1nlet teaperature to the carbon bed vaS monitored at a 11nlle point ln the center ara.tour inches Ire.inlet race or tbe adsorber.lbe outlet taci or the adsorber was Instru.ented at_.0 Inch.1 avay trom the Idsorber with tlye thermocouples.

The CO.enitor Can Infrared.Insor t7pe)vas taklng 2 teet down_tr...trc.tbe tilter outlet taci ln the 10 Inch reduced duct.ectlon.lbe aeborber tull we1lht bltorl tire vu ellpt)'weicht'as is ca,.bon ve1&ht dr.y carbon vel&ht (less R 2 0)65.8 lbl 18.1&lbe-1.'lb."3.6 Ills When the test vas perror.ed, tbe las beater was turned on heat to aa fast heat-up as possible.Air flow was aaintalned ror tl.1 arter tire vas detected, then alrrlow was Itopped and the carbon b.d inlet and outlet temperatures monltored tor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.The carbon bed was..emoved trom thl FWT and veilhed.

tbm tent (result of tbe arbon burning test) In the Am rig war waduotbd ~tll all .of the carbon wm wnuuwd @t 40 FPH re1ocity.

the tenperaturu of the inlet mnd outlet clrbon bed are shown on Table 1. SEABROOK STATION Tbt mults of the fire wind tunnel (m) tut ape rhowa on Tmble 2 and On Figure No. 1. The pertinent mlues 8m ma followa: - Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A CO of 50 ppm at 11 minutes CO off meale (ZOO+ ppm) at 19 minutes Fire in carbon bed at 19 : 15 - 19 :45 aimte~ Ai~riow stopped at 24 minutes Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 43 H.xfmum Tempermture

4.0 inches

from outlet face 375.~ Temperature at I .D bour after ignition with no air flow 20Q.C 4.0 inches from outlet face arbon loss, total test duration ' (excluding moiaturt and 21 TEDA which would evaporate in test) h.53 lba Carbon nonoxlde signal sharply increasing at inlet temperature of 175-C 081.59112101 rpt.Juulloa Evaluation and 9.5-1, , Appendix A.., .Section F:3 D;, Pa.ge 43 n.telt.(result or\.be oarboD burtUns test)1a tbe ASTH ril va.

ant.l1 all.of ttl.carbon vu con,uHd.t 110 rPM..locH)'.n.t.uperatu1'e8 or\.be inlet and outlet carbon bed are.bown on Table 1.TH....ults or ttle t1re vlad tUDnel (FVT)tut.are.hown aD Table 2 and 012 F1IUre 110.1.Tbe pertinent.alues are al tollow8: co or 50 PpIII at" mnutes CO orr lcale (200+ppm)at 19 ainutes Fire in carbon bed.t 19:15-19:-5 a1nutes Airflow.topped at 211 unutes HaxillUll Te.per.ture 11.0 inebes trell outlet!ace te.perature.t 1.0 bour.1'tel'lenition wlth no.1r flow**0 inches I'rom outlet race Carbon loss.total test duration (excludlns lIIo1sture and 2J TEDA whlch would evaporate in test)Carbon

.1snal.h.rply inereaslns at lnlet temperat.ure or Filter Crame (3011 SS)brllbt red at 11.53/'

Emlumtion of the Taat Iwulta tbe confi~rrtion of 8ir cleaning systems 18 nu& tbrt tbe ioblne rdsorkn are preceded by HEPA filter8. The BEPA filter moimtlng frame fs a steel atructurt - uit6 22 lncb X 22 inch openlags, therefore, ao larear burnlng rterial than one BEPA filter rize could enter from tbe wbon kd, maything larger would be rtopptd by the REPA mounting fr- 8truotu~ even if it would pmetmte tbe pnceding~component8.

Thla was the ruson tor the relectlon of a 24 inch X 24 inch arbon 8ection Tor the M taat. Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 44 SEABROOK STATION the Subrook procedure la baed on rhut down ai the airflw 5 minuter after a CO alarm. Iwaver, to .8aiatafn conservatirm la the tert, the airflow was rhut dqvn HOT 5 linute3 after CO elam, but 5 minute8 after actual burning of the Carbon In the test mection. Even under tbcse conditions the maximum temperature at 4.0 laches from the outlet face of the adsorber uar only 375*C, and tbe temperature started to drop as Boon as the blower was rhut off. It la lmpcrtmt to note that no isolation dampers were closed in tbe inlet and outlet of tbe TWT, tbus natunl air convection ms arintained during the test even with the blouer rhut off, which is mother ccnservrtism because most air cleaning rysttma are equipped with outlet dampers and aarerrl we imolatabla on both inlet and outlet ride. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- I, Appendix A The ASTU tert rig data indlortcs (from Table 1) that even with atmow mnintained, approximately one hour h needed ta burn 2.0 inch depth of carbon. While the results from the TWT test indicate that If airflow ir rtopped fire minuter after carbon burning only approdrmtrly 10% of the carbon 1. buraed in one hour. Vhlle if the carbon aJnoxide aignal I8 used for ayrtem isolation, the fire ltstlf Will probably be prevented.

The sharp increase in W concentratioa at 17SeC inlet air temperature uar also determined in the ASTM telt rig at 40 FM and it indicated sharp riac at 175.C inlet air temperature while autoignition did not take place until in excess of 25OWC inlet mir temperature.

C8rbon monexidc monitoring im vary ~od detection method of carbon oxidation PRIOR TO ACTUAL ael~suskined burninc of the carbon. Iaolrtion of the myatem lndimting fire within fire mlnutes of #) aignal ulll probably prevent development of selfsustaining carbon fire. Isolation -of the system can, after the fire develops during LLr flow, result in #harp temperature drop upon isolation of the air flow. ne maximum tamperaturc 4 lnches dounstream of the burning earban bed vitb air now at 40 FPH vas 375.C. hsed on these results It is recommended that CO mnlt0r8 be installed in the housing at outlet of the housing and another preferably in the inlet .re8 (Just upstream from carbon beds mt the top of housing, mince CO 1s llghter than .It) The system should be isolated within five minutes or a a signal of 50 ppr SEABROOK 08PS9112101.tvaluationand Comparison A;ppendixA-3-Rev.9 Section F.3 D Page 44*e_...-InluaUon of the Tut luyUa fbe conflcuraUon of air clean1nC a,.atem 1a auch fobat the 10eUne adsorbera are preceded by HEPA fl1tera.The SEPA f'Uter tra.e i.a ateel atructure with 22 inch I 22 inch open1DI', tberef'or., DO larcer burainE..terlal tban one BEPA rUter.lze could enter troll tbe carbon bed, al:lyth1nl larler would be atoppt4 the BElA.auntlnK rr...*tructure Iyen it It vould penetrate tbe ,reo.dinE,componenta.

Thl.was tbe r".OD tor the**lectlon of a 2ll incb%lllch oarbon aection tor the FVT t.**t.The Seabrook procedure 18 based on abut down or the a1rt1ov 5 dilutes atter a CO ala1'll.HoveYer, to.uint81n oonservatlell 111 tne test, the airflow vas ahut dC!"n JOT 5 ainutas Arter CO alarm, but 5 II1nute.after actual or the carbon In the teat aeetlon.Even under tb.ae conditions tbe"XlI1UII temperature at 4.0 Inche, tr-Oll the outlet face or the adsorber va, on17 375-C, and tbe tnperature.tarted to drop as aoon as the blower-vas ahut ort.It i8 lIIportant to note that no isolation dampers vere clo.ed In tbe inlet and outlet ot the FWT, tbus natural air convection va, malntained durinl the teat even w1tb tbe blower orr, whlch 1, another coDserTatlam because.a.t alr cleanlnl 8yStems are equlpped wlth outlet dampers and****ral are i.01atable on both inlet and outlet.ide.The ASTH test ril data indicates (trOll Table 1)that evenw1tb airflow maintained, approximately one hour is needed to burn 2.0 inch depth of carbon*Whlle the results trom the FWT test indicate that if airflov 11 atopped riye mnute, Arter carbon burdn" onl,.appronllllltelr 10J of the carbon 1a bUMled 1n one hour.While If the carbon monoxide a1anal 18 used tor system 1s01ation, the tire itselr will pr-obably be pre.ented.

The sharp incr.ase In CO concentration at 17S*C 1nlet air va.alao deterDdned in the A5tH test ril at_0 FPH and it indlcated aharp riae at 175-C inlet air temperature While autoicnit1on did not take place until In exces.of 2S0*C 1nlet air temperature.

Concluslons and RecommendatloDi Carbon.onox1de monitorinl i.a very lOod detection method of carbon oxidatlon PRIOR to ACTUAL aelfsustained burninl of'the carbon.IaolatioD or the ayat**Sndieat1ns tire within ri.e alnutes of CO ailnal V111 probabl1 prevent develop**nt of aeltausta1nlnc carbon fire.Iaolat10n the system can, after the rire develops durinl air flow, result in aharp tellp.r-ature drop upon 1s01at1on or the air flow.the maximum temperature

• inch**downstream of the burninl carbon bed vi tb air flow at"0 rPK vas 375-C.Based on these results 1t 1s recommended that CO monitor.be Installed ID fob.hous1ns at outlet or the housins and another prer.rab11 In the inlet area (just upstrea.troll carbon beds at the top or houslnl,.1nce co 18 11&hter than air)The syatem should be isolated vlthin tiye minutes or*co.1enal ot SO ppa mxl.u**

Table 1 Test Date 3 Sept 1986 Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 45 SEABROOK STATION Carbon lgnltion Tollowed by rtsldual beating ti.@. mir flow continued but beat 0rr 1. Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A Hethod: ASTH P3466 except: $0 FPU, 2 inch bed depth and fast beat up H8teri.l:

Dry air and NUSORB KXTEG XI tot 45/10 Startlng condition:

25.C Ignition occurred at an upper bed (outlet) temperature of 8pproxLmntely h00*C, lover bed (inlet) temperature of 285.C. air inlet temp. 285'C. Temperatures after ignition:

Within Carbon Bed Time fun. Outlet Side ('C) Inlet Side ('C) Evaluation and ComparisoIvto BTP APCSB 9}5 i l,j>Appendix A table 1 t**t Date 3 Sept 1986 Carbon 11niUon tolloved b7 reddual beat1nc U.e.air tlow continue" but beat ott).Method: ASTH D3-66 except:.0 FPM, Z inch bed depth and last b.at up Haterial: Dry I.1r and NUSOIUI JCUte II Lot.lJ5/10 Startina condition:

2S*C<'<v" Rev.9 ,*Sectiop;,;R.3 D Pag¢4;;;*Temperatures.rter icn1t1on: lenition occurred at an upper bed (outlet)temperature or approxi..telr.OO*C, lower bed (inlet)temperatura of 285-C, air inlet temp.28S-C.Time (Kin.)Witbin carbon Bed OUtlet Side (-e)Inlet Side (*e)*.-7'0:15 1:00 2:00 3:00.lJ:oo 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00":00'2:00 15:00 20:00 30:00 60:00 790 700 650 6"'0 730 760 no 835 860 920 950 980 1050 T80 375 210 100./255 920 850'800'800 80s 790.180 790 790 780 730 800 purple allOlce.50 ZSD 150 135*

Table 2 2 5 10 30 28 38 44 60 7 6 102 146 172 Off Safe Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 46 SEABROOK STATION Smoke coming out or test rig exbauat Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A 17 5 250 Shut dovn fan and furnace Filter frame top (glowing red Both inlet and outlet temperature; at 4.0 inches from filter face in the flow direction.

SEABROOK STATION*01!PS911210 1 Evaluation to BTP APCSI39',Appendix A , Re;Vi9 ,

table 2 m rut nata t1lle CH1n.)co Lenl(PP"")Inlet Tap C*C}0 2 28.II 5 15 T 10 125*0'0" 28 150 12 38 13 14 60 160 15 78 16 102 17 1.116 170 18 172 19 Ott Scale*Smoke comine out or tut ,.1&ezhauat 20 175 23 250 2!1 Shut down ranturnace Fl1ter trame top&1owln&red 26 375 28 350 30 33 320 35 300 36 300 38 280.0 215.II, 260'7 250 75 205 Kaxim&D or the (5)Outl.t t**ps.(*e)28 35 35'0'0 40 50 50 200 315 320 260 250 225 225 220 195 Both inlet and temperatures at**0 inches trom f11ter race 1n the flov direction**

Rev. 9 Section F.3 D Page 47 SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Appendix A SEABROOK STATION.-

J3TP APCSH9 5-1, A'"'.i.'Rev.9," SectioRF3 ID, Page 47**