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Revision 17 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 3, Appendix 3I, Report on Analysis of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment
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SEABROOK UPDATED FSAR APPENDIX 31 REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The information contained in this appendix was not revised, but has been extracted from the original FSAR and is provided for historical information.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 APPENDIX 31 REPORT ON ANALYSES OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Prepared for PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMSPHIRE SEABROOK STATION Prepared by United Engineers It Constructors A Raytheon Company Report No. 9763-006-S-N-2 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONTITLE LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES

SUMMARY

1.0INTRODUCTION

2.0METHOD OF ANALYSIS2.1Mass and Energy ReleasesPressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients 3.0HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS3.1Primary Auxiliary Building3.2Containment Enclosure Area3.3Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase3.4Tank Farm Area3.5Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.0 6.0 HWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS Primary Auxiliary Building Containment Enclosure Area Fuel Storage Building Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse Service Water Pumphouse CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES SB 1 E. 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO.TITLE 2.1-1Determination of Mass/Energy Release 2.2-1Design Basis Information 3.1-1Primary Auxiliary Building - High Energy Line Break Locations 3.1-2Primary Auxiliary Building - Summary of Results 3.2-1Containment Enclosure Area - High Energy Line Break Locations 3.2-2Containment Enclosure Area - Summary of Results 3.3-1Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - High Energy Line Break Locations 3.3-2Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - Summary of Results 3.4-1Tank Farm Area - High Energy Line Break Locations 3.4-2Tank Farm Area - Summary of Results 3.5-1Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase - High Energy Line Break Locations 3.5-2Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase - Summary of Results 4.0-1Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations 4.0-2Hot Water Heating Line Breaks - Summary of Results SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FS ARNovember 1985 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE NO.TITLE2.1-1Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples2.1-2Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples2.1-3Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples3.1-1Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations3.1-2ANodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis 3.1-2B 3.1-2C 3.1-2D 3.1-3A 3.1-3B 3.1-3C 3.1-3D 3.1-4A 3.1-4B 3.1-4C 3.1-4D Nodal Parameters of PAB for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE NO.TITLE 3.1-5A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis 3.1-5BNodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary Steam Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis 3.1-5CTemperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line 3.1-5DPressure Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line 3.1-6ANodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis 3.1-6BNodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary Steam Con-densate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis 3.1-6CTemperature Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line 3.1-6DPressure Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line 3.1-7ANodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis 3.1-7BNodal Parameters of PAR for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis 3.1-7CTemperature Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of CVCS Letdown Line 3.1-7DPressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of CVCS Letdown Line 3.2-1AContainment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrange-(Sheets 1 & 2)ment for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis 3.2-1BNodal Parameters of Containment Enclosure Area for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis 3.2-1CTemperature Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line 3.2-1DPressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line 31-iv SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE NO.TITLE 3.2-1EMaximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS letdown Line 3.3-1A 3.3-1B 3.3-1C 3.4-1A 3.4-1B 3.4-1C 3.5-1A Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis Temperature Response of MS/FW Pipe Chase Follow-ing a Small (0.10 Sq. Ft.) Rupture of Main Steam Line Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area Follow-ing a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/

Primary Auxiliary Building Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis3.5-1BTemperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line3.5-1CPressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

SUMMARY

The environmental envelopes that the safety related Class lE equipment will exper-ience following postulated high energy line breaks outside containment have been determined. Systems containing high energy lines for which breaks have been evaluated include the Main Steam, Feedwater, Auxiliary Steam and Condensate, Chemical and Volume Control, Steam Generator Blowdown, and Hot Water Heating.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is necessary to demonstrate that equipment used to perform a required safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station - Units 1 & 2 are capable of functioning properly in the normal, abnormal, or accident environmental conditions to which they could be exposed. As stated in NUREG-0588(1), among these environmental conditions are the elevated temperature, humidity, and/or pressure which could result from the postulated rupture of high energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks outside containment and develop the environmental envelopes for Class 1E equipment.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

2.0 METHOD

OF ANALYSIS Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class lE equipment outside containment were identified and located. Based on this information, the various plant buildings were nodalized and the high energy line break (HELB) locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the Class lE equipment following a postulated HELB.

2.1 Mass and Energy Releases Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2(2) to determine the types, areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class lE equip-ment. The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical flow model(3) and accounting for physical restrictions within the system (e.g. flow and pressure control valves) and the frictional effects of the piping system.

These release rates were taken to be constant, i.e. no decay of the reservoir pressure was assumed, until isolation of the ruptured line was initiated or, as in the case of the closed Hot Water Heating Systems, until the piping inventory was depleted.

The methods and assumptions employed in calculating the mass and energy release rates for each high energy line are outlined in Table 2.1-1. As noted in this table, isolation of many of these lines will be accomplished by the use of redundant temperature detectors in various plant areas that, in the event of elevated temperatures, will send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 high energy lines. The locations of these temperature detectors are provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.

The mass and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure, temperature, and humidity responses throughout the various plant areas are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.

2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high energy line ruptures were determined for the following areas:

1.Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) 2.Containment Enclosure Area (CEA) 3.Fuel Storage Building (FSB) 4.Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase 5.Tank Farm Area (TFA) 6.Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/

PAB) Chase For HELB other than Hot Water heating Line Breaks (HWELB), the envir-onmental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and MS/FW Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4) computer program.

Using the break mass and energy releases and the building nodaliza-tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-sures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the plant building following these ruptures. The methods and assumptions used in these pressure/ temperature calculations agree with those of NUREG-0588 (1).Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions, and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these environmental transients. The ambient and initial conditions were 31-3 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result from these postulated HELB. In addition, the Uchida condensing steam heat transfer correlation is used during the condensing mode while a convective heat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft 2-*F is used otherwise.

The environmental response of the PAB, CEA, and FSB to postulated HWHIB was calculated using a reasonable, yet still conservative, hand calculation method which accounted for mass and heat transfer between the hot water and the room air. Since the HWH subsystems are closed systems which will not be isolated and these plant areas are supplied with ventilation air by non-Class 1E systems, the maximum temperatures and humidities that result from HWHLB are calculated by releasing the total HWH subsystem fluid mass into the initial room air mass.

The building initial conditions were determined based on the histor-ical distribution of ambient conditions which occur during the time of the year when the HWH system is in operation (September through May). These conditions are defined in Table 2.2-1.

SB 1 E. 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 3.0 HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS The environmental response of the plant buildings to postulated high energy line ruptures were calculated using the methods outlined in Section 2.0.

The results of these HELB analyses (other than HWHLB) are presented in the following sections.

3.1 Primary

Auxiliary Building From an evaluation of each of the high energy lines in the PAR and their operating conditions, it was concluded that the break locations listed in Table 3.1-1 would provide environmental envelopes for the Class lE equipment.

Figure 3.1-1 shows the layout of the PAR and the zone designations which were useful in defining the environmental parameters throughout the PAB. Zone 32A, which is not shown, represents the PAR below the the (-)6' elevation and includes the piping tunnels, Zone 32E repre-sents the 2' and (-)6' elevations, and Zones 32 and 33C, 32 and 33D, and 32 and 33E represent the 7', 25', and 53' elevations, respective-ly. Zones 47 and 48 represent the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) equipment vaults and contain no Class lE equipment.

Table 3.1-2 summarizes the peak and enveloping temperatures and pres-sures that would occur in each of these zones for each postulated high energy line rupture. All areas can be taken to experience 100%

relative humidity, condensing environments, however, air displacement and thus essentially pure steam environments would be expected to occur only in the general vicinity of the postulated breaks.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 For each of the ruptures considered in these tables there follows a series of four figures, lettered A though D. The A series of these figures (e.g. Figure 3.1-2A, 3.1-3A) physically defines the nodal arrangement which was chosen to analyze the rupture's effect on the PAB environment. The B series provides the flow diagrams and physical parameters (volumes, heat sink areas, flow areas) for this nodal arrangement. Figures C and D provide the calculated temperature and pressure transients for each of the nodes defined in the A and B series figures.

3.2 Containment

Enclosure Area The Containment Enclosure Area contains several high energy (CVCS) lines, however, only the letdown line operates at an elevated tem-perature. Therefore, only a rupture of this line has been considered as stated in Table 3.2-1.

The layout of the Containment Encosure Area, which includes the Mechanical Penetration Area, the Charging Pump Cubicles, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Safety Injection (SI), and Containment Spray (CBS) Vaults, is shown in Figure 3.2-1A, Sheets 1 and 2. These figures also show the nodal arrangement used, while Figure 3.2-1B provides the corresponding flow diagram and physical parameters.

Table 3.2-2 summarizes the pressures and temperatures experienced in the various areas of the enclosure volume following a postulated CVCS letdown line break. Figures 3.2-1C and 3.2-1D show the transient temperatures and pressures in the CEA. By a variation of the assumed initial conditions (10% vs. 95% relative humidity), an additional investigation was made which determined the maximum pressure response of the CEA. This result is shown in Figure 3.2-1E. For the HELB SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to approximately 95 seconds after the break. These peak pressures are listed in Table 3.2-2. The relative humidity throughout all CEA compartments would reach 100%.

3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase The breaks evaluated for the Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase are listed in Table 3.3-1. It was concluded that the MS line breaks will result in more severe environmental conditions than the FW line breaks.Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the MS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and nodalization. The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a maximum of 325

F for a spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft

2. The tem-perature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break is provided in Figure 3.3-1C and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.

3.4 Tank Farm Area The break evaluated for the Tank Farm Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.

Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank Farm Area, the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the operator detects the break and isolates the line.

Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parameters used for the Tank Farm Area HELB analysis. The resulting temperature and pressure transients are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak values summarized in Table 3.4-2.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

3.5 Waste

Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase The WPB/PAB Chase, which is located between the WPB and Column Line A of the PAB, contains both Class lE equipment and several Auxiliary Steam and Condensate lines. The line ruptures which have been eval-uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.

Figure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated HELB. Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C provide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the enveloping HELB. The peak values for pressure and temperature are summarized in Table 3.5-2.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FEARNovember 1985

4.0 HWHLB

ANALYSES AND RESULTS The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated for those plant buildings with Hot Water Heating (HWH) systems which operate in the high energy region, i.e. pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-ature greater than 200

F. The HWBLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.

The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually in the follow-ing sections and are summarized in Table 4.0-2.

4.1 Primary

Auxiliary Building The peak environmental conditions at the 53' elevation of the PAB due to postulated HWHLB were found to be 110

F with a relative humidity of 100%. These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAR.

4.2 Containment

Enclosure Area The HWH system piping which serves the PAR and FSB passes through the CEA. A postulated rupture of one of these lines results in tempera-tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately 106*F and 100%, respectively. Due to the location of this piping, very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to a certain extent. With the exception of these localized effects the environmental conditions that result from a CVCS letdown line break will envelope those resulting from a HWHLB.

4.3 Fuel Storage Building Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the FSB, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are 100*F with a 100% relative humidity.

4.4 Emergency

Feedwater Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are 88*F with a 100% relative humidity.

4.5 Service

Water Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the SWP11, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures. The maximum temperature that would be expected to result in the SWPH is 90

F. Due to the relatively large room volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPH, the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a RWELB is 90%

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

5.0 CONCLUSION

S The analysis of high energy line ruptures outside containment has yielded a realistic evaluation of the elevated temperatures, pressures, and humidities that can result in the various buildings of Units 1 and 2. These results provide the HELB environmental envelopes for evaluation of the Class lE equipment. These envelopes should be evaluated along with the conditions that result following postulated moderate energy line breaks, loss of ventilation air flow, and any other events which may cause adverse envir-onmental conditions to develop.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

6.0 REFERENCES

1.NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment", August, 1979.

2.NUREG-0800, U.S. NRC Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, July, 1981.

3.Moody, F. J., "Maximum Two-Phase Vessel Blowdown from Pipes", Journal of Heat Transfer, August 1966.

4.UEC-TR-004-1, "COMPRESS- A Code for Calculating Subcompartment Pressure Responses", July, 1976.

5.Appendix E attached to ANSI Standard N176, "Design Basis for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture".

6.Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F03 7.Calculation Set No. MSVCS-FAG-07 8.Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F01 TABLE 2.1-1 DETERMINATION OF MASS/ENERGY RELEASE Line CVCS Letdown Line Steam Generator Blowdown Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines Main Steam Line Feedwater Line Hot Water Heating Line Plant Condition Heatup Phase Hot Standby Full Power Full Power Full Power Full Power Line Conditions P = 435 psia T = 380*F P = 1100 psia T = 550*F P = 165 psia T = 358*F P = 1000 psia T = 545*F P = 1100 psia T = 440*F P -157 psla ir = 250*F Break Flow Limited by CVCS Letdown Line Con-trol Valves Moody critical flow with piping system frictional effects included (Method-ology of App. E attached to ANSI Std. N176(5))Limited by upstream pressure control valves Releases calculated using Westinghouse information package methodology Releases calculated using Westinghouse information package methodology Moody Critical Flow Model Isolation Mechanism Dependent on Loc-ation: HELB Temp-ature Detection System or Operator Action at 30 min.

HELB Temperature Detec-tion System Dependent on Loca-tion: HELB Tempera-ture Detection Sys-tern or operator ac-tion at 30 minutes.

Reactor Protection System and Emergency Feedwater Discon-tinued at 30 min.

Reactor Protection System No Isolation Occurs Isolation Valve Closure Time 10 Seconds 5 Seconds 15 Seconds Isolation Valve in Faulted Loop Fails.

Isolation Valve in Faulted Loop Fails No Isolation Occurs SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 2.2-1 Design Basis Information A. Ambient Conditions 1.HELB, other than HWHLB:14.7 psia/88

F/100% RH 2.HWHLB:14.7 psia/70

F/95% RH B. Building Initial Conditions 1.HELB, other than HWHLB:14.7 psia/104

F/952 RH 2.HWHLB:14.7 psia/86

F/56% RH C. HELB Temperature Detection System 1.Temperature at Isolation Signal Initiation:130*F (Intended to cover setpoint plus instrument error margins of up to 10

F)2.System Response Time-time delay:8.1 Seconds until signal at isolation valves D. Ventilation System Operation 1.No credits are taken for energy removal or air exchange by non-Class 1E ventilation systems.2.Credits are taken for Class 1E ventilation systems according to their performance characteristics following postulated HELB.

E. Unit Trip

1. A concurrent loss of offsite power or unit trip has not been assumed.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.1-1 Primary Auxiliary Building High Energy Line Break Locations 1.Steam Generator Blowdown Line (Lines No. SG-1301-5-3", SG1304-5-3", SG-1307-5-3", or SG-1310-5-3")

a. At 53' elevation of PAR in vicinity of blowdown flash tank.

2.Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines 4.LineNo.2302-2-8"-between Columns A & B.

At 53'elevationof PAR alongColumn Line5 b.LineNo.2303-1-6"-At 7'elevationof PAR between Column Lines 5 & 6.c.LineNo.2404-2-3"-At (-)6'elevation of PAR along Column Line C.d.LineNo.2406-1-4"-At (-)6'elevation of PAR along Column Line 2.3. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line (Line No. CS-360-9-3")

a. At 7' elevation of PAR in the CVCS equipment vault area.

ZONE DESIGNATION SG-1310-5-3" Break @Zone 32E AS-23O2-2-8 Break @Zone 33E AS-2303-1-6" Break @Zone 33C AS-2404-2-3" Break @Zone 32B AS-2406-1-4" Break @Zone 32B CS-360-9-3" Break @Zone 47 Enveloping Conditions Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.*F psig*F psig psig*F psig*F psig*F psig*F psig 32A 108.0.4 104.04 104.0.1 220 0.4 190.0.3 114.05 220.0.4 32B 108.0.4 104..04 104.0.1 220 0.4 190.0.3 114..05 220.0.4 32C 108.0.4 104..04 104.0.1 132 0.1 136.0.1 112..05 136.0.4 33C 108.0.4 104..04 163.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107..05 163.0.4 32D 111.0.4 105..04 113.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 108..05 113.0.4 33D 111.0.4 105..04 113.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 108..05 113.0.4 32E 165.0.5 112..04 104.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107..05 165.0.5 33E 131.0.5 158..06 104.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107..05 158.0.5 47 108.0.4 104..04 134.0.1 105 0.1 120.0.1 185..15 185.0.4 48 108.0.4 104..0 4 134.0.1 105 0.1 120.0.1 185..15 185.0.4 TABLE 3.1-2 Primary Auxiliary Building Summary of Results SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.2-1 Containment Enclosure Area High Energy Line Break Locations

1. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line (Line No.

CS-360-9-3")

a. In Mechanical Penetration Area (MPA) at (-) 34'-6" elevation near containment wall penetration.

SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.2-2 Containment Enclosure Area Summary of Results Compartment Mechanical Penetration Area Remainder of Enclosure Volume (Including Charging Pump Cubicles &

Ventilation Equipment Area)CVCS Letdown Line Rupture (CS-360-9-3")

Peak Temperature (*F) Peak Pressure (psig) 0.35 0.35 134 108 SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 3.3-1 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase High Energy Line Break Locations 1.Main Steam Line

a. At 21' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase 2.Feedwater Line

a. At 3' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase Amendment 56 November 1985 SB 1 6 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.3-2 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase Summary of Results Main Steam Line Rupture Peak Temperature (*F)Peak Pressure (psig) 325 Pressure Varies dependent upon location with respect to break location and has been studied in detail in a separate analysis.

Maximum Pressure:

4.8 SB 1 & 2 FSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 TABLE 3.4-1 Tank Farm Area High Energy Line Break Locations

1. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines

a. Line No. AS-2302-32-8" Auxiliar Steam Line Ru ture Peak Tem erature ( F) Peak Pressure SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 3.4-2 Tank Farm Area Summary of Results Amendment 56 November 1985 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.5-1 Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase High Energy Line Break Locations

1. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines

a. Line No. 2339-1-1 1/2" - At 53' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase B. Line No. 2341-1-1 1/2" - At 25' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 3.5-2 Waste processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase Summary of Results Compartment AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break

@ 53' elevation AS-2341-1 -1 1/2" Break

@ 25' elevation WPB/PAB Chase 53' elevation Temp. (*F)Pressure (psig)

Temp. (*F)Pressure (psig) 175 0.05 168 0.05 WPB/PAB Chase 25' elevation and 15' 5" elevation 168 0.05 175 0.05 NOTE: Due to the general arrangement of the WPB/PAB Chase area, the results obtained for a break of Line No. AS-2339-1-1 1/2" have been extrapolated to be repre-sentative of the environmental conditions that would result from a break of Line No. AS-2341-1-1 1/2".

SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 4.0-1 Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations 1.Primary Auxiliary Building

a. At 53' elevation of PAB 2.Containment Enclosure Area

a. At 21'-6" elevation of CEA 3.Fuel Storage Building a'. At 21'-6" elevation of FSB 4.Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse

a. At 27' elevation of EFWPH

5. Service Water Pumphouse

a. At 21' elevation of SWPH Amendment 56 November 1985 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 TABLE 4.0-2 Hot Water Heating Line Breaks Summary of Results 1.Primary Auxiliary Building:

110*F/100% Rh (53' elevation) 2.Containment Enclosure Area:

106*F/100% RE 3.Fuel Storage Building:

100*F/100% RH 4.Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse:

88*F/100% RH 5.Service Water Pumphouse:

90*F/90% RH A FA ci C LI El'furl III A FA B a. ?CC; rx's F.Inlet Heaters

k. .tir Lock q. boric Acid Tanks v.b. Blel3own Flash Tank g.Inlet Filters

n. Storage Ares

r. CV CS Vaults w.c. PAS ithrust tan Roos b. RAACT Pipe Chase

n. Electrics1 Chase s.Charging Pump Vaults s.8. Ale lock N. Valve Aisle la. 480 V. Loma Ct.Letdown ilegssitier y.e. PAR inlet B Containment I. CPCS Tank

p. PCCW Pumps U. tan-RAACT Pipe Chase z.*II Denotes Thermocouple Location)HVAC Opening Boron Injection Tank Chiller Surge Tank Ans. Steam Condensate Tank Pipe Trench PSNli SEABROOY STATION FRINARY AUXILIARY BUI1DINC Elevation 53 11 Elevation 25 FTElevation 7 FT Elevation 2 FT 6 -6 FT Figure 2.1-1: Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples c.Charging Pumps d.Containment Enclosure Cooling Units containment No Temperature Detectors Located in These Areas CHARG/NC rums AREACONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREA ZONE 3233 CZONE 41 B El. 7.-0" to 23.- 0"El. 21..6" to 49'-0" Figure 2.1-2: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples MECHANICAL PENETRATibN AREA ZONE 29 A El. (-)8'-0" to (4)I'-0" MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA ZONE 28 A

11. 8 El. (-) 96

.-6" to (4) 1

.-0" Containment Building Spray Pump

b. Re L siclual Heat Removal Pump Thermocouple Location RHRSI VAnTS 2014E 30 A, 13 C, A 0. El. (-)6I'-0 to (4)23'-6" Figure. 2.1-3: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples 0.0b 5p- -I MO IMO 13L-ir-Z-41111.1 Elevation 55 FT Elevation 25 FT Elev.tion 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT AIIFAAA III A*irAABA S.PCCW Neat Exchangers P.Inlet Nesters k.Air Lock q.Boric Acid Tanks V.NVIC Opening I,.Slowdown Flash lank B.Inlet Filters 6.Storage Area r.CVCS Vaults V.Boron Injection Tank C.PAD Exhaust Fan Room I,-RAACT Pipe Chose n.Electrical Chase s.Charging Pump Vaults x.Chiller Surge Tank d.Air Lock i.Valve Aisle 0.6110 v. Load Centers t.Letdown Degessiller Y.Aux. Steam Condensate Tank U.PAB Inlet A Containment J.CVCS Tank P.PCCW Pumps U.Non-RAACT Pipe Chase C.Pipe Trench Purge Fans Figure 3.1-1: Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations Elevation 2-6 FT Elevation 7 FT col 3*4*5*A Boric Acid Tanks v.to/AC Openieg CVCS Vaults is.Boron Injection Tank Charging Pump Vaults x.Chiller Surge Tank Letdown Degessifier p.Aux. Steam Condensate Tank Non-RAACT Pipe Chase Ir.Pipe Trench 0 4'0'M M 0 0 W M M 0 N M a.PCCW Nest Exchengets F.Inlet Nesters k.b.Slowdown Flash Tank S.Inlet Filters A.C.PAB Exhaust Fen Room h.RAACT Pipe Chose n.d.e.Air Lock FAB Inlet 1. Containment 1.J.Valve Aisle CVCS Tank o, p.Purge Fans Air Lock Storage Area Electrical Chase 480 v. Load Centers PCCW Pumps A A Elevation 53 FT A VIM 3 *Line No. SB-1310-5-3

Sta. Can. hoedown Elevation 25 FT cL P" 6 5 III A CO LA Li., cm Figure 3.1-2A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Steam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis 3 MJE 2 4 5 6 VOLUMEBEAT SINK NODE(ft3)AREA(ft2) 195,49018,000 223,520560 353,9308,000 4243,40042,670 5108,07018,500 638,23515,900 7ATMOSPHERE FLOW PATH' CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTOR MI NNE AREA(ft2)INERTIA(ft)Kc expK fr1cKtotal 1215.0.05.781.0.011.79 13128.7.45.42.85.171.44 149.40.88.781.0.201.98 2431.5.09.781.0.011.79 2720.05.00.781.03.505.28 3410.65.40.781.02.224.00 4'544.8.80.781.0.302.08 4720.0.50.781.01.603.38 565.98.50.781.03.24.98 Figure 3.1-2B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Steam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis COMPHRTMF N1 ETJ 2Y A 3 Li5 6 u_c CICD a:-J Cr CI C)0-1I1T T 1 3 23 4 5 6 789'10

1TT T FTiiI2 1 023 4 5 6 789j0'3 4 5 6 789 10 TIME r SEC J Figure 3.1-2C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following A Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line COMPARIMEN1 1171 2Y 3/\4 II 3 e;a_7--TT T 1023 4 5 6 8 9 1 1T-TTT1Tr 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 TIME (SEC)-TT-T 13 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Figure 3.1-2D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line 1*2*3*5 EI 0 Elevation 52 FT Elevation 25 FTElevation 7 FTElevation 2 6 -6 FT AAAFA IIIII A C I II FAA11C D A8C 0 a.PCCW Heat Exchongets R.Inlet Hester,k,Air Lock4-Boric Acid Tanks v.HVAC Opening b.C.Slowdown Flash Tank PAS Exhaust Fen Room g.h.Inlet Filters6.Storage Aresr.CVCS Vaults RAACT Pipe Chasen.Electrical Chasea.Charging Pump Vaults v.x.Boron injection Tank Chiller Surge Tank 0 4 t d.Air Lock I.Valve Aisleo480 v. Load Centerst.Letdown Degaseifier y.Aux. Steen Condensate Tank 1D fD e.PAR InletContainment J.CVCS Tankp.PCCW Pumpsu.Hon-RAACT Pipe Chase s.Pipe Trench

=Purge Fans Ce M r?%JD Figure 3.1-3A:

Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at CO Ln ln cr Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis M/E NODE VOLUME (ft 3)HEAT SINK AREA(ft 2) 1 3 6 5 1 2 3 4 5 653,9308,00095,49018,00023,520560243,40042,670146,30034,400 ATMOSPHERE 12128.7 1410.6 2315.0 249.4 3431.5 3620.0 4544.8 4620.0.45.42.85.171.445.40.781.02.224.00.05.781.0.011.79.88.781.0.201.98.09.781.01011.795.00.781.03.505.28.80.781.0.302.08.50.781.01.603.38 FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS LOBS FACTOR AREA(ft 2)INERTIA (1t

-1)KcKexpK frittotal FROM TO NODE NODE Figure 3.1.-38: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis CI 246 1111 -1 702 TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.1-3C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line TT 3 4 5678910 I3 4 5678910 3 COMPARTMENT 1El 2 0 3 A 4 X 5 <>6 1'CD COMPARTMENT 1[II 2 0 3 A 4 X<>5 6+fl-"IMAWMI Ti'111, h 4, ,.1' . ;!flf,f*0.11011114/01,11.4.1M)#11111TIPP"Irrill11.1!.1 I*IR"'r 1 oII11111 4 5 6 78910" I 314- ',!.)- 6 3TI i 0'1T111 iTly2(3 I, 2234 5 6 789'10e.TIME 1 SEC J Figure 3.1-3D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line A A III Elevation 25 FT ElevatIOn 53 FT 1 3 5 III 1 irA A k.AL M.o.P.Air Lock Storage Ares Electrical Chase 480 v. Load Centers PCCW Pumps q.r.s.t.U.Boric Acid Tanks CPCS Vaults Charging Pump Veults Letdown Degasstfier Hon-RAACT Pipe Chase Tank HVAC Opening Boron Injection Tank Chiller Surge Tank Aux. Steam Cond Pipe Trench EleVatIon 7 FT Elevation 2 & -6 FT A A 1 23 1 Auxiliary Steam line No. 2303 6

--trtr&57-1 PCCW Heat Exchengets Blowdown rush 'Conk PAB Exhaust Fan Room Air Lock PAP Inlet & Containment Purge Fans Figure 3.1-4A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis 6 --I V. Inlet Heaters

1. Inlet Filters

h. RAACT Pipe Chase

1. Valve Aisle

j. CPC! Tank o 1--1 775.1- - -f-1 II NODE VOLUME (ft 3) HEAT SINK AREA(ft?)

1 38,200 8,500 2 49,700 10,000 3 243,400 42,670 4 172,940 26,560 5 38,235 15,900 6 ATMOSPHERE 3 01 FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTOR rarpf_PISME TO HOPE AREA(ftl)INERTIA (ft-1)-KcK expKfric Ktotal 1 3 60.0.04.781.0.02 1.80 2 3 44.8.80.781.0.30 2.08 2 5 5.9 8.50.781.03.20 4.98 3 4 51.5 1.33.781.0.33 2.11 3 6 20.0.50.781.01.60 3.38 4 6 20.0 5.00.781.03.50 5.28 0< t m M El0 0.M 9 M 6 Figure 3.1-4B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis 0 rt ui s.CO cn os C)I C3 COMPARTMENT

[fl 2D 3 L 4 X 5 6+CD a_CD oiti------6111CD (1)Cf t<0 =cr Ia.I-7t1IIIII.1T-- --1* T- I till 2 IIme 1(D 234 5 6 78910234 5 6 7891023---r-I 1 i i13 5 6 78910 VD 00 VI ,...n 4:ts Figure 3.1-4C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line TIME ' SEC)

CT1 C OMPARTMENT 1 FA 2 0 3 A r1i 111 1III11111 12111111113 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 023 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 023 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 TIME I SEC)Figure 3.1-4D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line II FA A 3 A 2 Auxiliary Steam Line No. 2404-2-3"5 6 r P.Inlet Nesters k.Air Lock q.Boric Acid Tanks v.NVAC Opening s.Inlet Filters fi.Storage Area r.CFCS Vaults V.Boron Injection Tank h.NAACP Pipe Chase a.Electrical Chase m.Charging Pump Vaults x.Chiller Surge Tank t.Valve Aisle 0.480 v. Load Centers t.Letdown Degassifier 7-Aux. Steam Condensate Tank J.CVCS Tank P-PCCW Pumps U.Non-RAACT Pipe Chose C.Pipe Trench pccw Neat Exchangeta Blowdown Flesh Tank PAB Exhaust Fan Room Air Lock PAB InletContainment Purge Fans 0.0 h111...1 Elevation 53 FT A Elevation 25 FT-Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT A A A III Figure 3.1-5A: Nodal Arragement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis 6 7 5 2 VOLUMEHEAT SINK NODE (ft3)AREA(ft2)

I8,6454,180 229,70011,700 349,70010,000 438,2008,500 5243,40042,670 6172,94026,560 7ATMOSPHERE FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTOR AREA(ft 2)INERTIA (ft-1)EcexpKfricKtotal 122.115.0.781.01.53.28 133.010.3.781.01.43.18 235.9'8.5.781.03.204.98 3544.8.80.781.0.302.08 456.3.32.781.0.101.88 5651.51.33.781.0.332.11 5720.0.50.781.01.603.38 6720.05.00.781.03.505.28"mom 1M NODE MME Figure 3.1-5B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis IIIII12 4 5 6 789 10 t3 4 5 6 78910 3 4 5 6 789103 Mr COMPARTMENT 1[Ti.t2 0 w Cl A C-)1X co5 <>6+7 Z C)CO C 4."1 C)TIME f SLCJ Figure 3.1-5C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

(-r o*r 5 6 7 10'l IIIII IITT- T---T I I 1 12,II , 34 5 5 7 9 9

.1 0 14 5 6 7 9 9 El 0L TIME 1 SEC )

Figure 3.1-5D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line COMPARTMENT 1[1]2D 3 A X M 0...Cr)._-.LLI:3 c3 CL Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2-6 FT A A Elevation 53 FT Elevation 25 FT A III.1I FA 3 *4*5 6 En to 3*4*5* 6 D A Irt-.......116J6111J P.3.Inlet Heaters Inlet Filters k.I.Air Lock Storage Are.

4-r.Boric Acid Tanks CVCS Vaults V.V.HVAC Opening Boron Injection Tank (DID Eg 0.h.RAACT Pipe Chase n.Electrical Chase a.Charging Pump Vaults a.Chiller Surge Tank Eif I.Valve Aisle o.480 v. Load Centers t.Letdown Degaselfier Y.Aux. Steam Condensete Tank (I)j.CVCS Tank p.PCCU Pumpe U.Bon-RAACT Pipe Chose C.Pipe Trench 0 rt a.PCCW Rest Exchanges b.Blowdown Flash Tank

e. PAB Exhaust Fen Room d.Al, Lock e.PAB InletContainment Purge Fans Figure 3.1.-6A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis HEAT SINE AREA(ft 2) 4,180 11,700 10,000 8,500 42,670 26,560 VOLUME (ft 3) 8,645 29,700 49,700 38,200 243,400 172,940 ATMOSPHERE FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS ,FROM NODE.TO NODE AREA(ft 2)INERTIA (ft-1)

'Cc LOSS FACTOR r total K e xr Kfric 1 2 2.1 15.0.78 1.0 1.5 3.28 1 3 3.0 10.3.78 1.0 1.4 3.18 2 3 5.9 1.5.78 1.0 3.20 4.98 3 5 44.8.80.78 1.0.30 2.08 4 5 6.3.32.78 1.0.10 1.88 5 6 51.5 1.33.78 1.0.33 2,11 5 7 20.0.50.78 1.0 1.60 3.38 6 7 20.0 5.00.78 1.0 3.50 5.28 6 7 5 NODE 2 3 5 6 7 Figure 3.1-68: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis COMPARTMENT 111]2 C 1)3 A 4 ><5 KT>6+7Z CD CD LU C.) 23 4 5 6789 1,3 O.<M M S Cr fa , mM P rt CO Ln VI ON 1I -T-1T I-7" IIlilt 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 1 023 4 5 6789 1 O TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.1-6C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

4 1 L.17'COMPHRTMF_NT 1 El 2 CD 3 L 4X ItFTi1 ,,- 1-77-7 r c --72t1 ilin3 G- JO/ 89 1 1!s_-I)7 E31 1 0 24 5 6 7 8 q 1 0 TIME ( SET.r. l Figure 3.1.-6D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line 10 0 Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2.6 FT 4 9 2 6I -A A a.b.c.d.C.PCCW Heat Exchangers Slowdown Flash Tank PAS Exhaust Fan Room Air Lock PAS Inlet Containment Purge Fans Elevation 51 FTElevation 25 FT Figure 3.1-7A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis iiPA P.B.Ii.1.J.II Inlet Heaters Inlet Filters RAACT Pipe Chase Valve Aisle CVCS Tank A Air Lock Storage Area Electrical Chase 480 v. Load Centers PCCW Pumps A C II A 4.Boric Acid Tanks V.HVAC Opening r.CVCS Vaults V.Boron Injection Teak O.Charging Pump Vaults x.Chiller Surge Tank t Letdown Degassifier Y-Aux. Steam Condensate Tank u.lion-RAACT Pipe Chase e.Pipe Trench

52 En cr , 4NI DFA A*******11.11,1********1 cut__

6 5 3 HEAT SINK AREA(ft 2) 23,000 15,900 10,000 8,500 42,670 26,560 valmr (ft ) 47,100 38,235 49,700 38,200 243,400 172,940 ATMOSPHERE FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS leCOLEALIDE TOAREA (ft 2)INERTIA (ft

-1) KeKexpK fricK total NODE 12.8045.0.11.11.22.44 171.437.5.34.20.671.21 232.347.0.781.01.803.58 3544.8.80.781.0.302.08 456.3-32.781.0.101.88 5651.51.33.781.0.332.11 5720.0.50.781.01.63.38 6720.05.00.781.03.55.28 ROBI WE Figure 3.1-7B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis NODE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 f--z.4 X t.) + N CCCV Cr) -a- L.0 co a_*(s1 1:n ape.4 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 000EO'OSZ0'00ZO'OST0'00TO'OS]o)=C9C2(=CSO=DSC2I=090Wb41=lid N1b31JI1UNC 1haNdInC3C:N1: H N 1 d COMPARTMENT 1I 2 0 3 L 4X 5 64 7 II-6 UDI a_),AVAPiceA AA411,021A A ri 6i661103 TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.1-7D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of CVCS Letdown Line MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA ZONE 29 A El. (-)8'-0" to (+)1'-0" MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA ZONE 28 A & 8 El. (-) 34'-6" to (+) 1

.-0" I. Containment Building Spray Pump

b. Residual Heat Removal Pump CVCS Letdown Line No.RHR & SI VAULTS ZONE 30 A, B, C, & D El. (-)61'-0 to (+)23' -6" Figure 3.2-1A: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrangement (Sheet 1 of 2) for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

..1=ammi P---n-L C. Charging &imps

d. Containment Enclosure Cooling Units containment CHARGING PUMPS AREACONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREA ZONE 32 33 CZONE 41 B El. P-0" to 23'- 0"El. 21'-6" to 49'-0" Figure 3.2-1A : Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal (Sheet 2 of 2) Arrangement for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis 5 4 2 3 21,400 4,050 61,170 15,000 145,000 166,355 212,000 3144,000 492,570 5524,350 VOLUMEHEAT SINK (ft 3)AREA(1t2)

FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTORS FROMTOAREA (/C 2)INERTIA (ft

-1) R-cK e xpK frictotal_HODE NODE 1 5 20.0.20.78 1.0.02 1.80 2 4 8.0 5.50.78 1.0.74 2.52 3 4 18.9 4.07.78 1.0 7.1 8.88 4 5 28.0.18.78 1.0.10 1.88 Figure 3.2-18: Nodal Parameters of Containment Enclosure Area for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis NODE 1 O'OSIO'OVT00E1O'OZT 0'0110001.1.4 (A C]0) 3111.62dk121 SB 1 & 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985

=C9C1t=t90=C903(=MallWUUOCN4 m1 , 11:411vne IN3Wene3 31 SWO H N S COMPARTMENT 1!J 20 3 4X 5 e>--4 In- 3601014 6 6 360102 6- 6 360103 104 TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.2-1D: Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line COMPARTMENT 1[I 2 0 3 A C30 is tr-4X el 0w4!I<1.',>CI 0tA, 4-1 0_L-3 4-4 4 A1 1 I 11A?ihil301.02 I1111 1 1 45 4 5 6 769'l o43 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 0 3 TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.2-1E: Maximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line A Main Steam &

Feedvater PiPi Chase' Containment SB 1 E. 2Amendment 56 FSARNovember 1985 Control Building Primary Auxiliary Building Figure 3.3-1A: Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/

Feedwater Pipe Chase NODEV0L1MEHEAT SINKNODE(ft )Area (ft 2) 169,27016,9302Atmosphere M/E FLOW PATH CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTORS FROMTO NODENODEAREA (ft 2)INERTIA (ft

-1)K c expK EricKtotal 12856.01.781.0.101.88 Figure 3.3-1B: Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis CI%0 COMPARTMFNT I El 2 0 tr;1A - 1 r o , A U-Li i 1 1 ceA 1 Iii 6 3/ 601 02 TIME (SEC)

Figure 3.3-1C: Temperature Response of

-Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase Following a Small (0.10 Square Feet) Rupture of Main Steam Line A A 1h Ye 02 , 3 NODE 1 2 BEAT SINE AREA(ft 2) 11,000 240,000 Atmosphere Irown (lra_FLOW FATE

-CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTORS FROMTOAREA (ft 2)INERTIA (ft

-1) F e NODE NODE 1210.00.006.78 1.00.011.79 0$P: 1 NJ Hit r exp - E fricKtotal Figure 3.4-1A: Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis COMPARTMENT H CD (r)CD CD CD IIItri 3 4 5 67891O

'r Irill21 1 I r123 4 5 6 7891023 TIME (SEC)

Figure 3.4-1B: Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line COMPARTMENT l[1]LID LID 1 0TIME (SEC)

Figure 3.4-1C: Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line 0 2 k<m m a 0 Cr CI.IIIIIIIlf1I1IIIIIII2IIIIIIIlf3r1ro 2 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 023 4 5 6 789

'1 023 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 023P1 CI)Z 4.....rtD CO 1/4-n k.fi as MIME MME( f t 1)HEAT SINE AREA(f0)119,030 3,890 1 217,500 4,760 3Atmosphere cn DpC/5 OJ 2 3 FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS LOSS FACTORS FROMToAREA (ft 2)INERTIA (ft

-1)K C NODENEexp K fric K total 128.400.24.781.0 0.01 1.79 231.751.14.781.0 0.06 1.84 0 5 COfD Figure 3.5-1A: Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Ce fa , M rT 1/410 Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis CO lA LAO'M/E COMPARTMENT 1111 2C0 1. Op23 4 5 6 7 8 9 124 T- -T 5 -F-6 T 1-r 87-1 0-T3--E1)-761 8

-91 0 3 T1 T i f _1 T IME I SF C Figure 3.5-1B: Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line COMPHR1 MEN]

IPI (I)rn-q` 3-1 4-)6J1861102--rI rill 23 4 5 678910 Tr--rT 1 Tr 1023 4 56789'10 TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.5-1C: Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line SEABROOK UPDATED FSAR APPENDIX 31 REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The information contained in this appendix was not revised, but has been extracted from the original FSAR and is provided for historical information.