NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8
Text
SG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director shtiI4l-x~
ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that e hours-) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power zpecitic emergezncy busz....B0~ll 4160V ESF buse l(2)F AN (2)0.AND b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less than se-pii4 hours-) is not likely.* 40SF RED conditions net.Basis: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency busses. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A prolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of one or more fission product barriers.
In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions.
The EAL sheould-x\
ill require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting the thresholds for IC FGI. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsite protective actions.Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it is projected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the end of the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses and event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihood of challenges to multiple fission product barriers.The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus ehe*4d-ss ill be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation.
Mitigation actions with a low probability of success she~*ld-wiII not be used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize the time available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public.The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC power results in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat from the core.Ca{ i Jd U:V3SF u iwn 139 i..elu',ded tc pra-ide far a mere timely ecealatian af the emergency eIc~zifict"en le-vcl.that eupply, paw-er ta. the ..,e^t.ica, dietribuian
....t... that paw're SAFETY SYSTEMS. ic typicall ... em.r..n..
hu... p -er train of SAFETY SYSTEMS.Site apecifie indicatiocn 3f an inabfiliy to adequately, romav'e heat from the core:[PItR] Inaeer site specific v'alue~s for .n ineabre/corc exit therm.aca'uple temperatu.re and.r.r reactor -eessei !e-ve! that dri-e ent.ry i.nto a core caating reztorat~a.'
pracedure (ar athcr--iee r....r. implementa
.... fprampt rcetomt'an aetioen).
Alternately, a sit may.... uc ..... /cr that eaarat macu:.re da',: ta. appra':imately the middle of acti-,e fuael ahe'aud uce Far plants that hav .... ler.p r...... a eti:-gha.
..... ....ra...p Emergeney Re........
Cuidelinee, enter the .............
in.t.e.C.re.C...ng Re P.......ELtL iD.ae:gnmaen ren:riauiea:
~.%:: 140 SG8 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to B01r 4160V ESIE busses 1( FA1{) (cite cp.ccii em'xerge:ncy bu:cee) for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Indicated voltage is less than (cite tpeeific bue -eltage v'aluez~j0 VDClon ALL12 VI)C G-vitaI busses-) for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and vital DC power. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss of vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. A sustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fission product barriers.Fifteen minutes ..... ceece .... -p- .......s the threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when both EAL thresholds are met.The ... -"it :epetifi ..m.rgen.y bucc ........ the ..... fcd by ie~ite er emergency' AC pewer ........that supply po--er te the electrical dictribu-tion that pae-rer SAFETY There ic typiall~y 1 ..........
buc ....r. rai SAFETY SYS.'TEMS.
The .... tpe..... :hue vo-'ltagc
-*aluc" b'e bae.d. on ,the minimu .... v...ltage.......a.. for adeuat ..p.. a..... ef^ S*¢AFETY SSTEM equipment.
Thi:c veltage "alue ....eul.d in............
magi of" at ....t 15 minute ....f epemticen befere the ncent ef in~ability te eperate minimum......
volag i apprexi:mately
!.81! Vclt; per ell!.cI3~I,~~7oJz V3R~F~msD!awIn8 Vu~~JVt4I3VV~FR*ru~cc
[he '~citc epecitic Vital DC buccee" arc the DC buccec that previde menitermg and centrcl capabilitiec for SAFETY SYSTEMS.141 Tkls[C , and EA ,or adz tc Rin6t d.cs pmig.~inc rmtMrh 2011 accIJcnt at ~u1~ucflim~
Uaucfli.ECL Aczignmcnt Attribatcz:
3.I.'1.B 142 SS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sleaold-w ,ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to(sic pciic ...........
b,... .... ) 801 4160V ESF buse Il2)FN :1 2 Gfor 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions.
This IC represents a condition that involves actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteenminute
~.a ........ aas thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level ......
4auscs ...ICs RGI, FGI or SGI...n...C emrec bu... Fcrg e',arnple, if backup focr soy i ccmprbed~
Af tw.o c generator ecci- mu--et...
epc ,,,y that at gener:-"+-
fo Cethati cor op-erschating.e;rsore...
Th 'eieepciieeereny uee ae h bce fdbyofeieoremrgrcyACpoe14ur3 caimmitOd
[flJ~ v~3 E5F~ussesDmwmj przzcaurz~, cw. rwni~ ma. na;'c a przzz3urauzza capacIiIm.
ma &uppiy CII~1E? !~. pv~r IC Dfl affcctad unit via a arcz~ tia ta a czmp~icn unit may ~rzJit this pawar ~zurcz in tha BAL przvid~ that tha pIann~d .,r~,.,., ti trat.g, rn~L tha rcguirzmar.t af 10 CFR 50.63.ECL ~A.ziznmznt Attribut~z:
3.1.3.B 144 SS5 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Levels: Note: feat Sink (SFI should not be considered RED) it total AIW\ tlo's is Iess than 395 gpm due to operator action.(1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful.
AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: Kot Cooling conditions
-et(Sit ,pecfiei indiaticn
^- anr inabilit to ndamattl'.............fr.........z I~isqw~~~tqdf7JJ; V6 CSf!ST lnfl~m1Miop
~~Jeat Sink CSI~ .- I~ condition', mci (Site zp~ific indicatizn zf an inchility to ad~quatcly remc~ hzat frcm tlw Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator actions to manually shutdown the reactor are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition will lead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and *hms~-warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may be higher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptoms against the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs.
This is appropriate ift-hh~bccausc the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by a failure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timely declaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown the reactor.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.Escalation of the emergency classification level w;e~u44-be-v4ooscs IC RGI or FGI.145 De.,!e.~rNe~teM Oawr c. t.t.~ than er wiul tc.a th, rea,,er pew...r le.vel2 : w "ich defne th.. le- e Ic^aun Power Opeatio:n (Md )wl*edt nld ..t....... u.. (Md 2 .........
th Op.ratin Md...O..rt.. a..... at ..... then t.. he IC ic alce applicable in Startup Site, speeifie indiation
... an- inability to ade~quately remo-e heat fro ..h. c" r...ruin~rec mplntatia tat nnc mefp rernpt ; retert appti~ane).
Ateraey ie md! fca!!:, uce! ineard cer the Iewc:-t onsan l.e^ readi.ng th......n.t.......t.e to ...ct.e.. e...... the..ow..t.on..........a...
Site epec!ifi indicatien af an inability ta adequa.tel-, remov'e heat fream the RCS: via the...main..
c.nd.n.e ...d.the.upprezscin peal te pool water temperature.
[Pr]o/ "' Incer site speifi p ...........
a .aiad with.u -i nadequate RCS heat. removal vi the +.stea "" enera"t"r".
Ths paraeter shculd be+,++ ideticl= tathsue for th Inadequate Heat thr-chld Clad Barrier..-
Pntentl..
Lccc__ 2.B anT hesodRC arirPtet E'/lL sin t Attr ... utec: .J.H --146 SS8 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director shetld-wxill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Indicated voltage is less than (st ..pecif...c bus etg -' al ...... Vh.n LL1I)te .p..i.. ital.....
DC vital for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power ,,,hieb-that compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this condition involves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... au ., I. s R..Fl r58 The ++zit+z epecific bue vc.'tagc :uc" be based en thec minmlmum b'ue vc.!ac.......e..' .for .. adqut .p.....o of^ SAFETY SYSTEM equipment:.
Thie -.'oltag, ale " houl..d.^.
in.corporate a marin .of at least minu-tes of operatieon bfcre the enset ef eperate those load. This v'oltage is u.uall. na th... minimum" ...;eltage selected -"hen battery sizing is+typcl au fra P e ntrebtty ec is apr^ ....... 10 MDC. F e sr.z a60. cell seting...........
,.th. cell veltae is appre..;imael
......7 lt pe el..F.......
ngb...rstth minimu ......tag.. is approximately 1.8 o, lts, per cell" The "site specific Vital DC b'usses':
are the DC b'usses thot previdez monitoring and 147 SA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sheu1d-x\
ilI declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability ..... fi .........
.. u .... BOIlI buse 1L2) AN 1t2) is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.cqmu~!ipB1:
VLt ESiw~sPrawii~
$1 ii MR2A MR 2B~spw~~~I771:
VPEu~sDi~wiag Basis: SAl/I[ I Y SYS IINM: A sy stcm required tbr safe plant operation, cooling doxx n the plant and/or placing it in! ih cold shultdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typicall~r systems class~itied as safety-rclatcd.
This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources t-la'w here any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.
This IC provides an escalation path from IC SUI1.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus (see [ able S I above)I. Some examples of this condition are presented below.* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
148
- A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes woae seleeted na aks thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuil be -4auses IC SS 1.an AC emergency bus. Far e-romple, if* backup pa-wer ...urc. is comprised af ..............(i ... tw.. 50% capacity geert.rs si, bu] ta f'e.'edlc
... A.C.-:' emergecy bus) th EAL~c': andc Basins Th: ci, ..p.........
emrcy bu.... s"+ the b.... fe+ by5k affite ar --mergcincyitC power., uc Thc rEALe thei;r c aite specifi n playt decigfy un erpabitie...
....v......v....
At 'rt ittacathe EALs an ai hudrfettat chridetopendetoD
.'~af '.stc: powe r cir~cuit --ansitut ar~singl p.a_.....ur.
Fa ...:m.: c, iondepdeenr 1k fet paa'wer: wcircu...i" .... (i..e......., incoming pwer..... ..,thr... se: prawdrzier cources.y t Indpendnce may~t be dotcr ti a d+149 SA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director she\d.xill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Wide Range Levels in at least (zit ........ nu .... steam Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor trip* ECCS-(-J4-actuation Basis: I~NPI ANN F): A parameter chainge, or an e~ ent that is not I ) the resuth of an intended e\,ohltion or 2} an expected plant response to a transient.
[he cause oftihe parameter change or event mnay beknovwn or Ul-klno~ln.
This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fission product barrier challenge is reduced. It thirs-represents a potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety-o4the As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s).
For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.150 An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required.
The event reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments.
In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.
This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition.
In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, then the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes wvac :celcted ac ais the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.
Escalation of the emergency classification level be- fauscs ICs FSI or IC RSI1.specif th l...l vau .,
- b. ..id: range, narrow range er both, depending upon the Delap.... ....... cpeeify' either preccurizer ar reatctr .... .ecelle .....e in the. PWR parameter calumn Ait !pee fi plant a'cperating..!!
eham aeri atie and repealted repnaco. ewih1 FP 97arlIr.' In cerlorn ,.m..~r...n,., ~ ~151
~nr.uneiation can be readily implemented and may include increased monitoring of main control boards and more freq~ient plant rounds by non licensed operators.
Their alerting function notwithstanding, annunciotors do not provide the parometer values or specific component status information used to operate the plant, or process through AOPs or LOPs. Based on these considerations, a loss of annunciation is considered to be adequately addressed by reportability criterin, and thcrefcre not included in this IC and EAL.With respect to establishing event soverit,;
the response to a loss of radiation monitoring data (e.g., process or effluent monitor values) is considered to be adequately bounded by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG 1022). The reporting of this event will ensure adequate plant staff and NRC awarcness, and drive the establishment of appropriate compensator 1 measures and corrective actions. In addition, a loss of radiation monitoring dat~ b:.' itse!f. is not a precursor to a more significant event.Personnel at sites that have a Failure Modes and Effcet Analysis (FMEA) included within the design basis of a digital l&C o:.stcm should consider the FMEA information when developing their site specific EALs.Due to changes in the configurations of SAFETY SYSTEMS. ineludina nsooeiated instmmentation and indications.
durine the cold ohutdo~m refueling, and defueled modes, no angle esus IC is included for ~ ~ oceration.
EUL Assianment Attributes:
25.L2.U 152 SA5 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Level: (1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful.
This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of pkant safety-o4fthe plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor is subsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor control consoles since this event entails a significant failure of the RPS.A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, ,,tic-h that causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactor control consoles (e.g., locally opening breakers).
Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the control room, or any location outside the control room, are not considered to be "at the reactor control consoles".
The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolonged enough to cause a challenge to the core cooling or RCS heat removal safety functions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency via IC SS5. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possible via IC FS1I. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC SS5 or FS 1, an Alert declaration is appropriate for this event.It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declaration in accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL are included to ensure a timely emergency declaration.
A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.153 po--ar !c;'cI that ic Icsz than or cgual to the reactor pow;c r ,.....
dcfinco'-° thc..... ...... b.ound. at Applicability'.
For exani.p!e, if thc rectctr ic to bc 3hu.tdo-'n at 3% an.rd Power Opemticn zti a.t~z, th,.en th.. I.Cu izw a' a a!peplicable in Startup .Mede.chutdo::, in an= EAL^. ....... o-m....nt, B==is or beth (e.g., a rcactor po;-'or leve!l).The term, "reactor con'trol gonzales" may.";, be rcplaeed w";th ..h.. ap,, ro.. r..t. zitcv,.: .. .. .. op.--cif...
tcrm (e.g., main control boardo).en, * -----. * ..:~..a 1 I -i U 154 SA9 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: F:IRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of'smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment (10 not constitute F:IRES. Observation of flame is preE~rred but is NOI) required if tlarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.E;XPLOSION:
A rapid, violent and catakstrophic failure ol a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization.
A release of steam (from high energyv lines or components) or an electrical component f'ailure (caused by short circuits, grounding.
arcing.etc.) should not automatically be consideredl an explosion.
Such events max' require a post-event inspection to determine if' the attributes of an explosion are present.SAFE't IN SYSI FM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the FCC/S. These arc typically systems classified as saf~ety-related.
VISIfBLE DAMA(iE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without meas'urements, testing, or analysis.
The visual impact of the damage is su fticieat to cause concern regarding the operability, or reliabilitx of the affected cotuponent or structure.
155 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety T[he first threshold tbr EAL l.b4l addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation since indications for it will be readily available.
The indications of degraded performance i be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.'lhc second threshold tor EAL 1.b-.2 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.
Operators will make this determination based on........... -efa~l available event and damage report information.
This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level .,el-b~ause , .... IorRS1 For (5itc ..........., dzzzpr ........ inzluding ethe~r ..... : ..... t.h Nuclca, ........ plant S AFT SYSTEMSc-c are cemrnprid c twz ..........
ep~arte ,and Cf cquipmzn~t in ..~rn... with... zitz Cp ..... design 156 SU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability tc(eitc specific emergency buses) BOT'll 41 EE siI A Cfor15 minutes or longer.~gan~I7~3~
Vt3 ~SF~zs5cs Dr~wip~Basis: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sources renders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency busses. This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of plant safety-ef the-p~ant.
For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC power source(s) is available to the emergency busses (sec lable $2 above), whether or not the busses are powered from it.Fifteen minutes was selected an. ais the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power.Escalation of the emergency classification level wou4-eu-d ai .se ICS+ l The "site specific ..m.rg.n.y bue" ..... the buses f..... by .or emergency AC power ...ur...is tpi'cally I emergency bus per train of SAFETY SYSTEMS.'+s,,-n-" g.n.r.t.r., eth- powe .........
a....b~ abnorma ...or emergency 3pemting pr..c.d.r.., et..........th...ha....
pr dr"a....d.....
bility t...o .u.pl offsc AC.... poWer to m, 157 i J A LUL /'~s:gnm~nt Attnflu~c~:
- i. I. I 158 SU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Wide Ran~ee Levels in at least apec5cii ....b ....... steam generators Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Basis: tJNPI.ANN L): A parameter change or an exent thai is not I) the result of an intended evolution or .2) an expected plant response to a transient.
['he cause of thle pananeter change or event ma3 he knowxn or unknoxxn.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation in the level of plant safety- efthe-plant.
As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s).
For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required.
The event weoad--eis reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments.
In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures-:
emergency operating procedures;-,:
and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.
159 This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the control room is considered teb more significant than simply a reportable condition.
In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, then the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes ......, selected....
as ai* the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.
Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... e-,4 eus .IC....In the PWR paeter li ....lumn.., th......s.....num.r..huldr
....tth minimum Develoaper may. spcify either pressurizer or reactor vesselc level in the PWP. parameter colu.mn ent.ry fcr RCS Level.hAvbe !os t.o Then in thse-a!L:a and accurate ".mergen10cyR50 clnnansfc~ation assessmet-. fo~ccusn n th indicatin for a.:d subset orgf prmanetenrs byfcuaing the,- avaiabilty of th.... specfiy pur a: .... "vo~aluer.
in.ted thersource
.. f tho valuestheELrcgie n comdtstewd ait fidetosi ula o plntCotolRoms ndcaio yps ndsuresmy e nao o dgia, aftyrlaedo apprepriate ecrnpai~atzr~
mea.urc~ and eerreeti've aet~zn~. In additien, a lcz efradiatien men1tenr~g data, by it~cW ic net preeurezr tea mere ~igr.ifiear.t v.'ent.Persennel at zitee that heve Failure M3de~ and Effcets Analyzie (FMEA) ina!uded within the decign h~is ef a digital I&C zy~tem zheuld eznzider the FMEA i~cnnatian when develeping their site speetfie EALz.Due ta changez in the ecnfigumtienz of SAFE~ SYSTEMS, including
~ceiated in~trurnentatizn and indicatien~, during the celd ehutdown, refueling, and defucled modes, ne analzzeu~
IC i~ ineIud~d fcr these modee ef eceratien.
E-U" "°°ig.....
Attri""......
3.1,IA 161 SU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: #-f2 12( ) RCS coolant sample uctivit\ '\ alue indicatine fueI clad dceoradation
,,rcater than lechnieal allowvable limits as indicated b3 ANY otilhe I'ollowing:
S RCnS' gr~s~s ctivity areator thean lO1 act~i;'gm'
-,- rae at'-a~Basis: This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications.
This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety ceftz~e Escalation of the emergency classification level "w,'u-ldbe-viauses ICs FAI or the Recognition Category R ICs.C.quuwnts4~P]:
Yt9 105 Activity Tech Spec activity lev'els exceed Technical Specifieaticn allc.':able limits.. This EAL may be developed readily implementable conv'ersion calcul!ation capability.
Th-e meonitor reading -valuesc co~rrespond to an RCS activity level ap.ro'ximately at Techni.cal Specific-atin alle~ab'.ae limits.!f there is no existing methog'e-pabil:b*
fcr dete,,'nining this EAL, then it shoul:d net be. included..valuaion w--..ill be based on #24 162 v i*" .... ... e.zguhalcri 1 131 and grc~is ~z1zztcd, all RCS activity activity.
timz dzpzndznt zr tr~sicnt valucc, ctc.). It allcwablc Iirnitc shcUd bc incIud~x1.
LLL P.czlgnmcnt Aflrltutcz:
i.I.1.A aria ii.i.ii 163 SU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheodd-wi iI declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than
"-" ..... gpm for 15 minutes or longer.(2) RCS identified leakage greater than ( 2pziizvauy5 for 15 minutes or longer.(3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses RCS leakage wh.'ieh-mayi.hat could be a precursor to a more significant event.In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicable procedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of p lant safety -f he-pIant.EAL #1 and EAL #2 are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage","pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are defined in the plant Technical Specifications).
EAL #3 addresses a RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through an interfacing system. These EALs to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system (e.g., steam generator tube leakage in a PWR) or a location outside of containment.
The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observable with normal Control Room indications.
Lesser values typically require time-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation).
EAL # 1 uses a lower value that reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of a relief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.
Fef-~r pe-p a n emergency classification ed beik required if a mass loss is caused by a relief valve that is not functioning as designed/expected (e.g., a relief valve sticks open and the line flow cannot be isolated).
The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to isolate the leakage, if possible.Escalation of the emergency classification level vieuscs ICs of Recognition Category R or F.~.umu~t4~1J:
V2Ot~SLk~cTdi5p~
CQ.muutpsit6~]:
V2ORCStkageTerJiSp~c 164 D2
<+i++h e-e. i,..... -s +,4.,k,. Iita:+ sp~ziflz Iaak.. m+.c v'ahz, Cntz.r .... high ']+=. af. 10 gp-.-m ar tha ;'adz =pc'ifiad; Tachnian, Spccificatic:
th. t do+ na ....pccify a Iakaga+ ,ty, for .....,?,:" lsngc,:'.., II A 165 SU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2)(I) a. An automatic trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.(2) a. A manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. EITHER of the following:
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.* A subsequent automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operator manual action taken at the reactor control consoles or an automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition and t-hus-represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e4 the p~aft,.Following the failure on an automatic reactor trip, operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.If an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) on the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip) using a different switch). Depending upon several factors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually trip the reactor, or a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor trip signal. Ifra subsequent manual or automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions,whe that causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron 166 injection strategies.
Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the control room, or any location outside the control room, are not considered to be "at the reactor control consoles".
The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC SA5. Depending upon the plant response, escalation is also possible via IC FAI. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC SA5 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate for this event.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.Should a reactor trip signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpoint testing), the following classification guidance \4 ill be applied.* If the signal causes a plant transient that should have included an automatic reactor trip and the RPS fails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable, and sheulM-v, ill be evaluated.
- If the signal does not cause a plant transient and the trip failure is determined through other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALs are not applicable and no classification is warranted.e-,No......
Tk~e IC ic applicable in an.y .M, de in wk:hic h akc +tual re+actor poewrc le~vel ceuld ex-cee+d the power leve at which the reat iecc.eidcred+
i.hutdzwn
+ .... A ,, wt ehutdow reacter, ..PcvrOprat (Md ) will e hd,. inlud Stru .....ode.. 2) in+-. the Opertin ;Mode+t App!ie:ability.
For e'.ample.
if ."actor coneidered to be ehu.tdo-.wn at 3% and Po-w.er an EAL et-atement., the Bacie! or be7th (e.g., a raca:tor power:. l::'el,.ECL Aceign:7ment Anr.bu-tee:
3.I.l!.A.167 SU6 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: In plant telephones Public address system~Plant radio sy'stemns (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: F!NN (1 nlcrgcnc\
Nutilicatlion Nctvork)Conmmercial plhoncs (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: INS on Federal flelcozonunications SxIcia (I I S Commercial phionesi Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.
While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC should-will be assessed only when extraordinary means are bei -t u~sedsd to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment;-:
relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-: individuals being sent to offsite locations,-ete.).
EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.
EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration.
The OROs referred to here are =th~e slates ol Alabama, Gieorgia, and Hlorida; I louston and I lenry (onimns.
A labaima; and 1 arl? Ciount. (ieorciafee-Dev'elepef EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.
168 rt ... i.... te.T EAL #1 The "site specific list ef cemmunic tien~ metheds" shculd include all mmunicatiens methods used fcr rzutir.e plant communiectians (e.g., commercial er site telephcr.es, page party systems, radics, etc.). This listing should include installed plont equipment
~d coo~ponents, and not items owned and maintained by ind~iduals.
EAL #2 The ~'site specific list of communications methods" shculd include all communications methods used to perform initial emergency notifications to OROs as described in the site Emergency Plan. The listing should include installed plont equipment end components, and not items owned and maintained by indhidunls.
Example methods are ring dov.~'dedieated telephone lines. commercial telephone lines, radios, satellite telephones and internet based communications technology.
In the Basis section, insen the site specific listing af the OROs requiring notification of an emergency deelamtion from the Control Rocm in accordance with the site Emergency Plan, and typically within 15 minutes.EAL #3 The "site specific list of ccrnmunications methods" should include all communications methods used to perform initial emergency notifications to the NRC as described in the site Emergency Plan. The listing should include installed plant equipmcn:
and compor.cnts.
and net items owned and malntnined by indi;'iduals.
These methods are typically the dedicated Emercene; Notification S;stem tENSI te!enhonc line ~d commercial telenhone lines.I. 1 .L.169 SU7 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event!Initiating Condition:
Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control.tfpcg-Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2)(1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an actuation signal.AND b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal.(2) a. Containment pressure greater than 7 psi ite przzur'z).
Js~15vIommtaynzai.Stou AND b. Less than one ti I \1I fhan cooler AM ) one full train oft I MI spralv(-sie-specifie zy:'°tem Cr egui:p.mcnt) is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of one or more containment penetrations to automatically isolate (close) when required by an actuation signal. It also addresses an event that results in high containment pressure with a concurrent failure of containment pressure control systems. Absent challenges to another fission product barrier, either condition represents potential degradation of the level of plant safety-0tl4he p~tnt.For EAL #1!, the containment isolation signal must be generated as the result on an off-normal/accident condition (e.g., a safety injection or high containment pressure);
a failure resulting from testing or maintenance does not warrant classification.
The determination of containment and penetration status -isolated or not isolated -sho**dd-\.
ill be made in accordance with the appropriate criteria contained in the plant AOPs and EOPs. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually isolate the required penetrations, if possible.EAL #2 addresses a condition where containment pressure is greater than the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems are designed to automatically actuate, and less than one full train of equipment is capable of operating per design. A1Ial3 a sinigle ( IM 1 fin cooler with one train ott FM I spray is required pcr desiwn basis.. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually start equipment that may not have automatically started, if possible.
The inability to start the required equipment indicates that containment heat removal/depressurization systems (e.g., containment sprays or ice condenser fans) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner.This event escalate to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC FSI1 if there were a concurrent loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS fission product barriers.170 De~e~No4e~
Enter thc "~itz zp~citic pr~s~urc" ~aIuc that actuates a~acntcirx~cnt zprcy). Aiz .zntzr thc cit cpccitb ccntai that should icc cpcrating pcc dcsign if dcc c~ntainrncnt dccircd, zpccifio cccAi~icn indicaticnc zuch as pararnci cpntninnicnt spray flzw ratc Iccc than a ccrtain calue).EAL 1~2 is r.ct appl~caHc tc thc U.S. Ecciution ECL Azc~gnmcnt Attributc~:
3.l.l.A a~Pe~e~-Reoe
- urc ccntrol systcmz (c.g., czntrcl cyctcnl/cguipmcr.t cn cctpcilct ic rcachcd. It cc icc cntcrcd (c.g., ted~de§ign~
171 SG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director shtiI4l-x~
ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that e hours-) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power zpecitic emergezncy busz....B0~ll 4160V ESF buse l(2)F AN (2)0.AND b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less than se-pii4 hours-) is not likely.* 40SF RED conditions net.Basis: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency busses. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A prolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of one or more fission product barriers.
In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions.
The EAL sheould-x\
ill require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting the thresholds for IC FGI. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsite protective actions.Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it is projected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the end of the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses and event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihood of challenges to multiple fission product barriers.The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus ehe*4d-ss ill be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation.
Mitigation actions with a low probability of success she~*ld-wiII not be used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize the time available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public.The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC power results in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat from the core.Ca{ i Jd U:V3SF u iwn 139 i..elu',ded tc pra-ide far a mere timely ecealatian af the emergency eIc~zifict"en le-vcl.that eupply, paw-er ta. the ..,e^t.ica, dietribuian
....t... that paw're SAFETY SYSTEMS. ic typicall ... em.r..n..
hu... p -er train of SAFETY SYSTEMS.Site apecifie indicatiocn 3f an inabfiliy to adequately, romav'e heat from the core:[PItR] Inaeer site specific v'alue~s for .n ineabre/corc exit therm.aca'uple temperatu.re and.r.r reactor -eessei !e-ve! that dri-e ent.ry i.nto a core caating reztorat~a.'
pracedure (ar athcr--iee r....r. implementa
.... fprampt rcetomt'an aetioen).
Alternately, a sit may.... uc ..... /cr that eaarat macu:.re da',: ta. appra':imately the middle of acti-,e fuael ahe'aud uce Far plants that hav .... ler.p r...... a eti:-gha.
..... ....ra...p Emergeney Re........
Cuidelinee, enter the .............
in.t.e.C.re.C...ng Re P.......ELtL iD.ae:gnmaen ren:riauiea:
~.%:: 140 SG8 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to B01r 4160V ESIE busses 1( FA1{) (cite cp.ccii em'xerge:ncy bu:cee) for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Indicated voltage is less than (cite tpeeific bue -eltage v'aluez~j0 VDClon ALL12 VI)C G-vitaI busses-) for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and vital DC power. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss of vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. A sustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fission product barriers.Fifteen minutes ..... ceece .... -p- .......s the threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when both EAL thresholds are met.The ... -"it :epetifi ..m.rgen.y bucc ........ the ..... fcd by ie~ite er emergency' AC pewer ........that supply po--er te the electrical dictribu-tion that pae-rer SAFETY There ic typiall~y 1 ..........
buc ....r. rai SAFETY SYS.'TEMS.
The .... tpe..... :hue vo-'ltagc
-*aluc" b'e bae.d. on ,the minimu .... v...ltage.......a.. for adeuat ..p.. a..... ef^ S*¢AFETY SSTEM equipment.
Thi:c veltage "alue ....eul.d in............
magi of" at ....t 15 minute ....f epemticen befere the ncent ef in~ability te eperate minimum......
volag i apprexi:mately
!.81! Vclt; per ell!.cI3~I,~~7oJz V3R~F~msD!awIn8 Vu~~JVt4I3VV~FR*ru~cc
[he '~citc epecitic Vital DC buccee" arc the DC buccec that previde menitermg and centrcl capabilitiec for SAFETY SYSTEMS.141 Tkls[C , and EA ,or adz tc Rin6t d.cs pmig.~inc rmtMrh 2011 accIJcnt at ~u1~ucflim~
Uaucfli.ECL Aczignmcnt Attribatcz:
3.I.'1.B 142 SS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sleaold-w ,ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to(sic pciic ...........
b,... .... ) 801 4160V ESF buse Il2)FN :1 2 Gfor 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions.
This IC represents a condition that involves actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteenminute
~.a ........ aas thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level ......
4auscs ...ICs RGI, FGI or SGI...n...C emrec bu... Fcrg e',arnple, if backup focr soy i ccmprbed~
Af tw.o c generator ecci- mu--et...
epc ,,,y that at gener:-"+-
fo Cethati cor op-erschating.e;rsore...
Th 'eieepciieeereny uee ae h bce fdbyofeieoremrgrcyACpoe14ur3 caimmitOd
[flJ~ v~3 E5F~ussesDmwmj przzcaurz~, cw. rwni~ ma. na;'c a przzz3urauzza capacIiIm.
ma &uppiy CII~1E? !~. pv~r IC Dfl affcctad unit via a arcz~ tia ta a czmp~icn unit may ~rzJit this pawar ~zurcz in tha BAL przvid~ that tha pIann~d .,r~,.,., ti trat.g, rn~L tha rcguirzmar.t af 10 CFR 50.63.ECL ~A.ziznmznt Attribut~z:
3.1.3.B 144 SS5 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Levels: Note: feat Sink (SFI should not be considered RED) it total AIW\ tlo's is Iess than 395 gpm due to operator action.(1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful.
AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: Kot Cooling conditions
-et(Sit ,pecfiei indiaticn
^- anr inabilit to ndamattl'.............fr.........z I~isqw~~~tqdf7JJ; V6 CSf!ST lnfl~m1Miop
~~Jeat Sink CSI~ .- I~ condition', mci (Site zp~ific indicatizn zf an inchility to ad~quatcly remc~ hzat frcm tlw Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator actions to manually shutdown the reactor are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition will lead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and *hms~-warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may be higher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptoms against the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs.
This is appropriate ift-hh~bccausc the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by a failure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timely declaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown the reactor.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.Escalation of the emergency classification level w;e~u44-be-v4ooscs IC RGI or FGI.145 De.,!e.~rNe~teM Oawr c. t.t.~ than er wiul tc.a th, rea,,er pew...r le.vel2 : w "ich defne th.. le- e Ic^aun Power Opeatio:n (Md )wl*edt nld ..t....... u.. (Md 2 .........
th Op.ratin Md...O..rt.. a..... at ..... then t.. he IC ic alce applicable in Startup Site, speeifie indiation
... an- inability to ade~quately remo-e heat fro ..h. c" r...ruin~rec mplntatia tat nnc mefp rernpt ; retert appti~ane).
Ateraey ie md! fca!!:, uce! ineard cer the Iewc:-t onsan l.e^ readi.ng th......n.t.......t.e to ...ct.e.. e...... the..ow..t.on..........a...
Site epec!ifi indicatien af an inability ta adequa.tel-, remov'e heat fream the RCS: via the...main..
c.nd.n.e ...d.the.upprezscin peal te pool water temperature.
[Pr]o/ "' Incer site speifi p ...........
a .aiad with.u -i nadequate RCS heat. removal vi the +.stea "" enera"t"r".
Ths paraeter shculd be+,++ ideticl= tathsue for th Inadequate Heat thr-chld Clad Barrier..-
Pntentl..
Lccc__ 2.B anT hesodRC arirPtet E'/lL sin t Attr ... utec: .J.H --146 SS8 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:
Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director shetld-wxill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Indicated voltage is less than (st ..pecif...c bus etg -' al ...... Vh.n LL1I)te .p..i.. ital.....
DC vital for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power ,,,hieb-that compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this condition involves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... au ., I. s R..Fl r58 The ++zit+z epecific bue vc.'tagc :uc" be based en thec minmlmum b'ue vc.!ac.......e..' .for .. adqut .p.....o of^ SAFETY SYSTEM equipment:.
Thie -.'oltag, ale " houl..d.^.
in.corporate a marin .of at least minu-tes of operatieon bfcre the enset ef eperate those load. This v'oltage is u.uall. na th... minimum" ...;eltage selected -"hen battery sizing is+typcl au fra P e ntrebtty ec is apr^ ....... 10 MDC. F e sr.z a60. cell seting...........
,.th. cell veltae is appre..;imael
......7 lt pe el..F.......
ngb...rstth minimu ......tag.. is approximately 1.8 o, lts, per cell" The "site specific Vital DC b'usses':
are the DC b'usses thot previdez monitoring and 147 SA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sheu1d-x\
ilI declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability ..... fi .........
.. u .... BOIlI buse 1L2) AN 1t2) is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.cqmu~!ipB1:
VLt ESiw~sPrawii~
$1 ii MR2A MR 2B~spw~~~I771:
VPEu~sDi~wiag Basis: SAl/I[ I Y SYS IINM: A sy stcm required tbr safe plant operation, cooling doxx n the plant and/or placing it in! ih cold shultdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typicall~r systems class~itied as safety-rclatcd.
This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources t-la'w here any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.
This IC provides an escalation path from IC SUI1.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus (see [ able S I above)I. Some examples of this condition are presented below.* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
148
- A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes woae seleeted na aks thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuil be -4auses IC SS 1.an AC emergency bus. Far e-romple, if* backup pa-wer ...urc. is comprised af ..............(i ... tw.. 50% capacity geert.rs si, bu] ta f'e.'edlc
... A.C.-:' emergecy bus) th EAL~c': andc Basins Th: ci, ..p.........
emrcy bu.... s"+ the b.... fe+ by5k affite ar --mergcincyitC power., uc Thc rEALe thei;r c aite specifi n playt decigfy un erpabitie...
....v......v....
At 'rt ittacathe EALs an ai hudrfettat chridetopendetoD
.'~af '.stc: powe r cir~cuit --ansitut ar~singl p.a_.....ur.
Fa ...:m.: c, iondepdeenr 1k fet paa'wer: wcircu...i" .... (i..e......., incoming pwer..... ..,thr... se: prawdrzier cources.y t Indpendnce may~t be dotcr ti a d+149 SA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director she\d.xill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Wide Range Levels in at least (zit ........ nu .... steam Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor trip* ECCS-(-J4-actuation Basis: I~NPI ANN F): A parameter chainge, or an e~ ent that is not I ) the resuth of an intended e\,ohltion or 2} an expected plant response to a transient.
[he cause oftihe parameter change or event mnay beknovwn or Ul-klno~ln.
This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fission product barrier challenge is reduced. It thirs-represents a potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety-o4the As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s).
For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.150 An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required.
The event reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments.
In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.
This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition.
In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, then the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes wvac :celcted ac ais the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.
Escalation of the emergency classification level be- fauscs ICs FSI or IC RSI1.specif th l...l vau .,
- b. ..id: range, narrow range er both, depending upon the Delap.... ....... cpeeify' either preccurizer ar reatctr .... .ecelle .....e in the. PWR parameter calumn Ait !pee fi plant a'cperating..!!
eham aeri atie and repealted repnaco. ewih1 FP 97arlIr.' In cerlorn ,.m..~r...n,., ~ ~151
~nr.uneiation can be readily implemented and may include increased monitoring of main control boards and more freq~ient plant rounds by non licensed operators.
Their alerting function notwithstanding, annunciotors do not provide the parometer values or specific component status information used to operate the plant, or process through AOPs or LOPs. Based on these considerations, a loss of annunciation is considered to be adequately addressed by reportability criterin, and thcrefcre not included in this IC and EAL.With respect to establishing event soverit,;
the response to a loss of radiation monitoring data (e.g., process or effluent monitor values) is considered to be adequately bounded by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG 1022). The reporting of this event will ensure adequate plant staff and NRC awarcness, and drive the establishment of appropriate compensator 1 measures and corrective actions. In addition, a loss of radiation monitoring dat~ b:.' itse!f. is not a precursor to a more significant event.Personnel at sites that have a Failure Modes and Effcet Analysis (FMEA) included within the design basis of a digital l&C o:.stcm should consider the FMEA information when developing their site specific EALs.Due to changes in the configurations of SAFETY SYSTEMS. ineludina nsooeiated instmmentation and indications.
durine the cold ohutdo~m refueling, and defueled modes, no angle esus IC is included for ~ ~ oceration.
EUL Assianment Attributes:
25.L2.U 152 SA5 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Level: (1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful.
This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of pkant safety-o4fthe plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor is subsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor control consoles since this event entails a significant failure of the RPS.A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, ,,tic-h that causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.
If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactor control consoles (e.g., locally opening breakers).
Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the control room, or any location outside the control room, are not considered to be "at the reactor control consoles".
The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolonged enough to cause a challenge to the core cooling or RCS heat removal safety functions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency via IC SS5. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possible via IC FS1I. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC SS5 or FS 1, an Alert declaration is appropriate for this event.It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declaration in accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL are included to ensure a timely emergency declaration.
A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.153 po--ar !c;'cI that ic Icsz than or cgual to the reactor pow;c r ,.....
dcfinco'-° thc..... ...... b.ound. at Applicability'.
For exani.p!e, if thc rectctr ic to bc 3hu.tdo-'n at 3% an.rd Power Opemticn zti a.t~z, th,.en th.. I.Cu izw a' a a!peplicable in Startup .Mede.chutdo::, in an= EAL^. ....... o-m....nt, B==is or beth (e.g., a rcactor po;-'or leve!l).The term, "reactor con'trol gonzales" may.";, be rcplaeed w";th ..h.. ap,, ro.. r..t. zitcv,.: .. .. .. op.--cif...
tcrm (e.g., main control boardo).en, * -----. * ..:~..a 1 I -i U 154 SA9 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:
Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: F:IRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of'smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment (10 not constitute F:IRES. Observation of flame is preE~rred but is NOI) required if tlarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.E;XPLOSION:
A rapid, violent and catakstrophic failure ol a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization.
A release of steam (from high energyv lines or components) or an electrical component f'ailure (caused by short circuits, grounding.
arcing.etc.) should not automatically be consideredl an explosion.
Such events max' require a post-event inspection to determine if' the attributes of an explosion are present.SAFE't IN SYSI FM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the FCC/S. These arc typically systems classified as saf~ety-related.
VISIfBLE DAMA(iE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without meas'urements, testing, or analysis.
The visual impact of the damage is su fticieat to cause concern regarding the operability, or reliabilitx of the affected cotuponent or structure.
155 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety T[he first threshold tbr EAL l.b4l addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation since indications for it will be readily available.
The indications of degraded performance i be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.'lhc second threshold tor EAL 1.b-.2 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.
Operators will make this determination based on........... -efa~l available event and damage report information.
This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level .,el-b~ause , .... IorRS1 For (5itc ..........., dzzzpr ........ inzluding ethe~r ..... : ..... t.h Nuclca, ........ plant S AFT SYSTEMSc-c are cemrnprid c twz ..........
ep~arte ,and Cf cquipmzn~t in ..~rn... with... zitz Cp ..... design 156 SU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability tc(eitc specific emergency buses) BOT'll 41 EE siI A Cfor15 minutes or longer.~gan~I7~3~
Vt3 ~SF~zs5cs Dr~wip~Basis: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sources renders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency busses. This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of plant safety-ef the-p~ant.
For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC power source(s) is available to the emergency busses (sec lable $2 above), whether or not the busses are powered from it.Fifteen minutes was selected an. ais the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power.Escalation of the emergency classification level wou4-eu-d ai .se ICS+ l The "site specific ..m.rg.n.y bue" ..... the buses f..... by .or emergency AC power ...ur...is tpi'cally I emergency bus per train of SAFETY SYSTEMS.'+s,,-n-" g.n.r.t.r., eth- powe .........
a....b~ abnorma ...or emergency 3pemting pr..c.d.r.., et..........th...ha....
pr dr"a....d.....
bility t...o .u.pl offsc AC.... poWer to m, 157 i J A LUL /'~s:gnm~nt Attnflu~c~:
- i. I. I 158 SU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Wide Ran~ee Levels in at least apec5cii ....b ....... steam generators Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Basis: tJNPI.ANN L): A parameter change or an exent thai is not I) the result of an intended evolution or .2) an expected plant response to a transient.
['he cause of thle pananeter change or event ma3 he knowxn or unknoxxn.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation in the level of plant safety- efthe-plant.
As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s).
For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required.
The event weoad--eis reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments.
In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures-:
emergency operating procedures;-,:
and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.
159 This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the control room is considered teb more significant than simply a reportable condition.
In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, then the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes ......, selected....
as ai* the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.
Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... e-,4 eus .IC....In the PWR paeter li ....lumn.., th......s.....num.r..huldr
....tth minimum Develoaper may. spcify either pressurizer or reactor vesselc level in the PWP. parameter colu.mn ent.ry fcr RCS Level.hAvbe !os t.o Then in thse-a!L:a and accurate ".mergen10cyR50 clnnansfc~ation assessmet-. fo~ccusn n th indicatin for a.:d subset orgf prmanetenrs byfcuaing the,- avaiabilty of th.... specfiy pur a: .... "vo~aluer.
in.ted thersource
.. f tho valuestheELrcgie n comdtstewd ait fidetosi ula o plntCotolRoms ndcaio yps ndsuresmy e nao o dgia, aftyrlaedo apprepriate ecrnpai~atzr~
mea.urc~ and eerreeti've aet~zn~. In additien, a lcz efradiatien men1tenr~g data, by it~cW ic net preeurezr tea mere ~igr.ifiear.t v.'ent.Persennel at zitee that heve Failure M3de~ and Effcets Analyzie (FMEA) ina!uded within the decign h~is ef a digital I&C zy~tem zheuld eznzider the FMEA i~cnnatian when develeping their site speetfie EALz.Due ta changez in the ecnfigumtienz of SAFE~ SYSTEMS, including
~ceiated in~trurnentatizn and indicatien~, during the celd ehutdown, refueling, and defucled modes, ne analzzeu~
IC i~ ineIud~d fcr these modee ef eceratien.
E-U" "°°ig.....
Attri""......
3.1,IA 161 SU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: #-f2 12( ) RCS coolant sample uctivit\ '\ alue indicatine fueI clad dceoradation
,,rcater than lechnieal allowvable limits as indicated b3 ANY otilhe I'ollowing:
S RCnS' gr~s~s ctivity areator thean lO1 act~i;'gm'
-,- rae at'-a~Basis: This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications.
This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety ceftz~e Escalation of the emergency classification level "w,'u-ldbe-viauses ICs FAI or the Recognition Category R ICs.C.quuwnts4~P]:
Yt9 105 Activity Tech Spec activity lev'els exceed Technical Specifieaticn allc.':able limits.. This EAL may be developed readily implementable conv'ersion calcul!ation capability.
Th-e meonitor reading -valuesc co~rrespond to an RCS activity level ap.ro'ximately at Techni.cal Specific-atin alle~ab'.ae limits.!f there is no existing methog'e-pabil:b*
fcr dete,,'nining this EAL, then it shoul:d net be. included..valuaion w--..ill be based on #24 162 v i*" .... ... e.zguhalcri 1 131 and grc~is ~z1zztcd, all RCS activity activity.
timz dzpzndznt zr tr~sicnt valucc, ctc.). It allcwablc Iirnitc shcUd bc incIud~x1.
LLL P.czlgnmcnt Aflrltutcz:
i.I.1.A aria ii.i.ii 163 SU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheodd-wi iI declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than
"-" ..... gpm for 15 minutes or longer.(2) RCS identified leakage greater than ( 2pziizvauy5 for 15 minutes or longer.(3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses RCS leakage wh.'ieh-mayi.hat could be a precursor to a more significant event.In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicable procedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of p lant safety -f he-pIant.EAL #1 and EAL #2 are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage","pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are defined in the plant Technical Specifications).
EAL #3 addresses a RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through an interfacing system. These EALs to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system (e.g., steam generator tube leakage in a PWR) or a location outside of containment.
The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observable with normal Control Room indications.
Lesser values typically require time-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation).
EAL # 1 uses a lower value that reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of a relief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.
Fef-~r pe-p a n emergency classification ed beik required if a mass loss is caused by a relief valve that is not functioning as designed/expected (e.g., a relief valve sticks open and the line flow cannot be isolated).
The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to isolate the leakage, if possible.Escalation of the emergency classification level vieuscs ICs of Recognition Category R or F.~.umu~t4~1J:
V2Ot~SLk~cTdi5p~
CQ.muutpsit6~]:
V2ORCStkageTerJiSp~c 164 D2
<+i++h e-e. i,..... -s +,4.,k,. Iita:+ sp~ziflz Iaak.. m+.c v'ahz, Cntz.r .... high ']+=. af. 10 gp-.-m ar tha ;'adz =pc'ifiad; Tachnian, Spccificatic:
th. t do+ na ....pccify a Iakaga+ ,ty, for .....,?,:" lsngc,:'.., II A 165 SU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2)(I) a. An automatic trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.(2) a. A manual trip did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. EITHER of the following:
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.* A subsequent automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operator manual action taken at the reactor control consoles or an automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition and t-hus-represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e4 the p~aft,.Following the failure on an automatic reactor trip, operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.If an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) on the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip) using a different switch). Depending upon several factors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually trip the reactor, or a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor trip signal. Ifra subsequent manual or automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions,whe that causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron 166 injection strategies.
Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the control room, or any location outside the control room, are not considered to be "at the reactor control consoles".
The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC SA5. Depending upon the plant response, escalation is also possible via IC FAI. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC SA5 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate for this event.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.Should a reactor trip signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpoint testing), the following classification guidance \4 ill be applied.* If the signal causes a plant transient that should have included an automatic reactor trip and the RPS fails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable, and sheulM-v, ill be evaluated.
- If the signal does not cause a plant transient and the trip failure is determined through other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALs are not applicable and no classification is warranted.e-,No......
Tk~e IC ic applicable in an.y .M, de in wk:hic h akc +tual re+actor poewrc le~vel ceuld ex-cee+d the power leve at which the reat iecc.eidcred+
i.hutdzwn
+ .... A ,, wt ehutdow reacter, ..PcvrOprat (Md ) will e hd,. inlud Stru .....ode.. 2) in+-. the Opertin ;Mode+t App!ie:ability.
For e'.ample.
if ."actor coneidered to be ehu.tdo-.wn at 3% and Po-w.er an EAL et-atement., the Bacie! or be7th (e.g., a raca:tor power:. l::'el,.ECL Aceign:7ment Anr.bu-tee:
3.I.l!.A.167 SU6 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.
Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: In plant telephones Public address system~Plant radio sy'stemns (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: F!NN (1 nlcrgcnc\
Nutilicatlion Nctvork)Conmmercial plhoncs (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: INS on Federal flelcozonunications SxIcia (I I S Commercial phionesi Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.
While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC should-will be assessed only when extraordinary means are bei -t u~sedsd to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment;-:
relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-: individuals being sent to offsite locations,-ete.).
EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.
EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration.
The OROs referred to here are =th~e slates ol Alabama, Gieorgia, and Hlorida; I louston and I lenry (onimns.
A labaima; and 1 arl? Ciount. (ieorciafee-Dev'elepef EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.
168 rt ... i.... te.T EAL #1 The "site specific list ef cemmunic tien~ metheds" shculd include all mmunicatiens methods used fcr rzutir.e plant communiectians (e.g., commercial er site telephcr.es, page party systems, radics, etc.). This listing should include installed plont equipment
~d coo~ponents, and not items owned and maintained by ind~iduals.
EAL #2 The ~'site specific list of communications methods" shculd include all communications methods used to perform initial emergency notifications to OROs as described in the site Emergency Plan. The listing should include installed plont equipment end components, and not items owned and maintained by indhidunls.
Example methods are ring dov.~'dedieated telephone lines. commercial telephone lines, radios, satellite telephones and internet based communications technology.
In the Basis section, insen the site specific listing af the OROs requiring notification of an emergency deelamtion from the Control Rocm in accordance with the site Emergency Plan, and typically within 15 minutes.EAL #3 The "site specific list of ccrnmunications methods" should include all communications methods used to perform initial emergency notifications to the NRC as described in the site Emergency Plan. The listing should include installed plant equipmcn:
and compor.cnts.
and net items owned and malntnined by indi;'iduals.
These methods are typically the dedicated Emercene; Notification S;stem tENSI te!enhonc line ~d commercial telenhone lines.I. 1 .L.169 SU7 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event!Initiating Condition:
Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control.tfpcg-Operating Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2)(1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an actuation signal.AND b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal.(2) a. Containment pressure greater than 7 psi ite przzur'z).
Js~15vIommtaynzai.Stou AND b. Less than one ti I \1I fhan cooler AM ) one full train oft I MI spralv(-sie-specifie zy:'°tem Cr egui:p.mcnt) is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a failure of one or more containment penetrations to automatically isolate (close) when required by an actuation signal. It also addresses an event that results in high containment pressure with a concurrent failure of containment pressure control systems. Absent challenges to another fission product barrier, either condition represents potential degradation of the level of plant safety-0tl4he p~tnt.For EAL #1!, the containment isolation signal must be generated as the result on an off-normal/accident condition (e.g., a safety injection or high containment pressure);
a failure resulting from testing or maintenance does not warrant classification.
The determination of containment and penetration status -isolated or not isolated -sho**dd-\.
ill be made in accordance with the appropriate criteria contained in the plant AOPs and EOPs. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually isolate the required penetrations, if possible.EAL #2 addresses a condition where containment pressure is greater than the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems are designed to automatically actuate, and less than one full train of equipment is capable of operating per design. A1Ial3 a sinigle ( IM 1 fin cooler with one train ott FM I spray is required pcr desiwn basis.. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually start equipment that may not have automatically started, if possible.
The inability to start the required equipment indicates that containment heat removal/depressurization systems (e.g., containment sprays or ice condenser fans) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner.This event escalate to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC FSI1 if there were a concurrent loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS fission product barriers.170 De~e~No4e~
Enter thc "~itz zp~citic pr~s~urc" ~aIuc that actuates a~acntcirx~cnt zprcy). Aiz .zntzr thc cit cpccitb ccntai that should icc cpcrating pcc dcsign if dcc c~ntainrncnt dccircd, zpccifio cccAi~icn indicaticnc zuch as pararnci cpntninnicnt spray flzw ratc Iccc than a ccrtain calue).EAL 1~2 is r.ct appl~caHc tc thc U.S. Ecciution ECL Azc~gnmcnt Attributc~:
3.l.l.A a~Pe~e~-Reoe
- urc ccntrol systcmz (c.g., czntrcl cyctcnl/cguipmcr.t cn cctpcilct ic rcachcd. It cc icc cntcrcd (c.g., ted~de§ign~
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