NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8

Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8

ML16071A187
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110 ML16071A126 ML16071A132 ML16071A136 ML16071A137 ML16071A140 ML16071A144 ML16071A146 ML16071A147 ML16071A149 ML16071A150 ML16071A152 ML16071A153 ML16071A158 ML16071A160 ML16071A166 ML16071A170 ML16071A174 ML16071A176 ML16071A180 ML16071A181 ML16071A184 ML16071A185 ML16071A187 ML16071A188 ML16071A193 ML16071A195 ML16071A198 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4 ... further results
References
NL-15-1898
Download: ML16071A187 (45)

Text

RS2[(1'orc Ari Lctrclcrcnc\

initialing ( ontdition:

Spcna{ fue pool cevel at (scite cpeeitie'

.. Lee "3 dec,,rip,.,,,l\xcl'4...:, ., 3.1()p rat in c M ode cn pplcbi pool \!c1 o(it peteLec .lu~ I3[his I( add~resss a sic]i licantys iof !:nt >nrfoci pool in' color> control and nakcup cap;ahil ii>leading to 1 MI1NI N I foci daniagc. lhIn condition eittads-tems From niaHo tafl nrcs of plant Fonctimsn nccded For pr-otccrion ot rhc p01>1' and t-hu&-x~ r nt a Site \rcrr I 'nici cncx dccIa ration.Ii i> rccorrni/cd that rifts I(' xsonid Iikcl> not bc ncr nntli rclI ai'tcr anothcr Nlic \rca lnmrcoecnc\

I ( xas nict iht o c r, it is inclu dcd to idc ci a> ifiLcnion!

di ~crsi0.I ,,cafLnion

.oi thc crncra-cnc

.ciant icar ion lcI e **v e ..........

'

I(' Rn I or R.io2... ....... .. ..... ... .. ..e,.......

.:N.... ..... .. .. eMcn : e 112/e 1 A cernica wun inc accrnn Cr ~crauen Cl jn~1rumcnurucn ucee IC aei~eec~ceI I 36 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL # 1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 1 5 minutes or longer: t ~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond i ,sker t dce receptcr i~ii~iMilD~updafT (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point) for one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hs* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1%4,-pcrcent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an 37 t t actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety ef4ie phlant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are atse-included to provide a basis for classiflying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose a~ssessment method thai hack calculates from the dose values specitied in the IC. The meteorology and source term Inoble gases. particulates, and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RGiI and RS1 IThis protocol maintains intervals betwe.en the threshold

\,alues fbr the three classitications, Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and that the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 1t0 mR/hour whole body' or 50 ink,/hour thy roid, er is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weel-!dbe -iatuses IC RSI1.providec:

clacci.leatian diversity.

and may be uced to claczig' eventz that wou'ld not. reach the.ame ECL- baoed cn plant ztatuz or the fizsion product matrix -pl.n.. Far.man...

f the rBn and the c.mm... effectiv.

e .doze equivalent (CEDE),t:

or ac the thyro'd e..mitted doze e -ilet. .... E), apiCc definied in , 10 FR 20.isuz,.d ino lieu, o"._..u o E.D. E :.an CEDE+ .Tha~e"Xn EPf PAe guid'ne poie-frth-z o dlttyoi oe ovrgo:aeo hoevr cmezatz ae ecdd o ae rtetieaeiczonchl tyri CE3Ncl8

• The effluent meniter readingc cheuld ee~recpcnd te a dece cC 10 rnrem TEDE cr50 mrem thyre~d CDE at the ~'cite epecitie dccc recepter peint" (cencictent with the ealeulatien methedelegy emplayed) fcr ene heur efexpecure.

• Meniter readingc will be calculated ucing a cet of accumed meteerolegical data or atmeephene diepercian faetcc'c:

the data er f~eterc celeeted for uce eheuld be the c~c ac thece en~leyed te calculate the menitor readingc for ICc RS I and RG 1. Acceptable ceureec efthic infcrmatien include, but are net limited to, the RETS!ODCM and valuec uced in the cite'c emergency dece aececement methedelegy.

• The calculation efmenitor readinge will alec require uce cf an accumed releace icetcpie mix: the celected mix chould be the came aa that empK'ed to calculate monitor readingc fcr lC~RSI and RGI Acceptable ceureec efthic informatien include, but are net limited te, the RETS'ODCM an! valuec uced in the s~tcc emergency dee: accecement methedelegy.

• Depending upen the methedelegy uced to e~e ulate the EAL valuec. there may be everlap et came valuec between different ICs. Develeperc will need te addrecc thic everlap by adjusting thece valuec in a manner that encurec a legical ecealatien in the ECL.The "site cpeei fie decereceptorpoint" is the distance(s) andior lecatiene used by the liecacee te dictinguich between en cite and ctTcite decec. The celected dictanee(c) andier lecaticac cheuld reflect the centent ef the emergency plan, and the precedural methedelegy uced te determine effcite decec and Pretective Aetien Reeemmendatier.c.

The variotien in celeeted dccc recepter peints meane there may be came diffcreneec in the dictanee frem the releace point te the calculated dccc paint frem cite tc cite.Developers cheuld research radiatien menitor design decuments er ether infc~ation coureec te encure that I) the [AL value being considered is within the ucable recpence and display range ef the instrument, and 2) there are ne autematie features that may render the moniter reading in'.'alid (e.g.. an auta purge feature triggered at a particular indicatien level).It is recegnized that the cenditien deccribed b~ thic IC may result in a radialegical emuent value beyond the operating er dicplay range of the inctalled effluent menitor. In these eaces, [AL valuec cheuld be deteni~ined with a margin cufficient te ensure that an accurate meniter reading ic available.

Fer example, an [AL meniter reading might be set at 90% te 95%ef the h~ghcct aeeumtc meniter reading. This previcien natwithctanding, if the estimatedicalculated menitar reading ic greater thai appreximately 110% cC the highect accurate meniter reading, then develepers ma~ ~ n~t ta include the meniter ac an indicatian and identify an alternate EAL thresheld.

the IC ~ TOfl~2 generally

~ .ini..-Ajtheugh ~ .~, ~ r~uu~ are ~ as a"~hele bedy" dese rate. Far thic reacen, the field sur.ey [AL specifies a 'elaced windew"§af~ey-reedffig~

Indicatienc frem a real time ~ pr~j~tI~n system are net included in the generic EALc.Many lie.. n....d.,n.A have thic capability.

Fer these that do, the capability may net be ithin the ceope cf the plant Technical Spceifieationc.

A licencee may requect to include an [AL ucing red time dccc prejeetien system recults; appreval will be cencidered an a cace by ease becic.lndieadcnc from a perimeter menitering syctem are net included in the generic EALc.Many Ileenceec do not have thic capability.

Far thoce that do, thece monitars may net be contrelled and maintained to the came level as plant equipment, er within the ceepe of the plant Technical Specificatiane.

In additia~ readingc may be influenced b~ environmental or ether 39 0O'JZIt :~ngu~~ iUZWU~i ~' 133 o~uz n uc ~ IH~ jOAOJddU RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY efthe Ile!winT~l RI radiation monitors:[~ps~,tpd( U3~ V4AIamoseP~e~a~

R~ qr.4r~tM~4j ItiitM~ i~rs_______________________________

Ft Pop#re~4-l~ Pluit t~-Kt ~PY~tc~IRI3~tS4I 121 Y4 Mann poP 4~reJ~.f~nnce I~MW~(3) 1 mcdinu of" spent foci pool cxi t~eo ..... pecific Le', l 2 v,,,luz)Leel, _.4 See D-e'cieper Basis: RI FW 'l IN(i lPA IiIlWAY: I his includes thc rceator caOit;\, the transfecr canal, and the spcnl Iuel pool.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, or a signifi cant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool+(ae-Dei'ael,9p Not-*. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety cefhe plat.41 This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU 1.Escalation of the emergency weldbii based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1I This EAL escalates from RU2. ifr ha-the- ...... Ilhc loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as-welIas-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readingsbe considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors shoud4-w ill be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).poM'I X~JtCI It\eI &ii ihbi, x ailc K. \\ilhiil Ihe I}\\cr ndR u{th ilcI\CI ncgc nccc~>ziI t.2\ci ti s.nicnIti]a~

dn>;c li,.n dircct galm i to pclsoll pcl'o' IIifl opcral nns in ll>c i icinitx of thc >pcnl l'bcl pool. ihis Cofldilion wetlccts it >ii~iii liciltt los ol'Ilnfl ftid pool xxab.ir mi-i Celho .mod ta*is--i4-b:

alse--a prtKurorU tI a los ohc zbi[ll> to 8dcqatdl\lI cool thec irrmdtnl.d fuel stored in lkc poo1.

of the emergency classification level woild-,be-viaeusc.

ICs RSl1 or RS2 .P2Dc'gclapcr Nores}."FzrEAL1~

I4 Far EALU2 42 andurce alre" chudnotanth",rdato ntre that couldA cnie~ : ;'~ be, ".ed!to idesntif damagt.....r.adi natmnt ad f21acmby(~.

tnei m ator nof r....... of fc...n..roduat gacec ...rom.For EALc ftIard#coreec.to encurc tha avi)athe [Ar "-a. Te being spncidi ered 2c vihnue"i s!. the ucbe epnte run monitor r.a.in. inald e., sadq ate n .. :aut ..o... pur , fe atutrgere:

a.. .tn. a patclr indicanting level)d It is..!n the cgnced tha thle. cniindcrbdb hsI a euti aito a LCtrl Aece .....t Attrt..t., c: .I .2 .k t an

• J. "12 43 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.(I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas: C ontrol area radiation moninor 1!D 2 :C 't 5AamtSposPoduo1a I,.entral Akirm ontaion sur\,* Ccntrcl R, or* Central Alar.m Statian (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any efthe-fo!!ewifngl able Ill plant rooms or areas: Buihling Rooms~ Appicable M1odes l)iesel acencrator building All A\ll lJnit h.2 130" All Reactor building I, nitd 112 SI l)ia onals (RI tR) Alt initl 12 NI D~iagonals (RI IR) All Basis: l INIPtANNtIlI):

A parmneter change or an c~ cut that is not !i t he result of an i ntcndcd c\ oR uttion or 2) an expected plant responsec to a transicnt.

I]hc cause of thc palra.meter chanlc o~r ecntl max/h. knoxxn or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. "

i-represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-of he--pIant.

The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.

For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected 44 room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level weal~d-be-44auscs Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.Th-e "other si!te specific areasz/reoms"'

should include any, ar"ea or rooms requiring coantinuoue's occupancy' to maintain normal pant operation, or to peror a.......a..............an.

1sA! Th... ...sit.e* specific list. ef plant rooms or a....a. ... th .. nt.ry, rel ........'*at applicability' identified" a.. spe..if..d.in operating procedures u...d fo n ..m..! plant operatic,"...

.......n nd shtown.. ...perfor.ed. (e.g., an ectian to .add san off.. norm.. or em.'ergency

...iio. " su:chae as emerge:ncy pl, m.. de as) during whiche entry w-ould be required for ..a.h.r..m.or area.of an administrativ'e or record keeping nature (.e.g.. norma' rouands or rou.tine inspct~ions).

If the equipment in ,th. li:ted room or ...ea.wa. alread, : ....... c, or... .u ^f ... : advearse impact beyo'ndq~

that alre'ady, alloe;:d by, Technical Specifications at the ti!me. of te eveont.Cefitf! ReeR.45 EUL A~zgnrnznt Attrltutzz:

2.12.C 46 RU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (-site-effluent redease ccentrolling dccument)OI)CM' limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the OIX R'l,.sie-wseei'*

ffluznt-+

....... zontr........

....). lihmits for 60 minutes or longer: Rq&[ $4]: ~T ZRad Mon or C~Ici~tion J~Ah~imu~(2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.(3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times th )IX zt zp " fi cf: untrz.zaz

.............

d.........)

limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.47 Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.

Further, there r... adr:i-o,,atv:,, in* .,v cotrlsar established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment i&-. !die'ativ'e iindi cat cs 0f-degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classify'ing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases should not be prorated or averaged.

For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL #1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuildbe-viauses IC RAI.De~ep.-No48 value f.. r thcse m. nit. r sh..u. d d' ermi.. :d using the most applicable dosc/rc'cosc limits pr-c-"---d in.;

RET or^ ODrC,. It. is rcccgnizcd that a calclataedl EAL v'alue may be below.;th. m. nit. a r.....ad; in tha ...... thc monitor does not need to b" i:cluded in the list.related r....irc....t.;

theref.r., it is important that the a...ociate EAL rand basis ideti. an ..... aticas on th... use .... avahiaiit of these monitore......in 2:- time a1 r.l.... cntr... limi. ll- The controlling document typically describes be used to dctcrmine EAL values. In cases where a methodology is not adequately defined, cevelopers-snoul.a ocerm,"',line valudes eon-istc~inx -w,1t" contirol rcguianansr, (e.g., tU For EAL #2 Valuecs in this EAL should be 2 times the secpoint established by the Develcpers shouald research radiation monitor design documents or other infor,'at.icn sources.to.ens....that..).the......alue.being.conside.ed.is.within.the.usabl response rand displway' of the instrument, and 2) hr a. re......-

no a-atmatic features that may rende *'..monito re..ading invalid (e.g., an auto purge feature- trigere at ...a par.icula indiation:-

l...l It is reegn.ized that the condition described by this IC may result in a of the highest accurate monitor reading. This provsison notw;ithstanding, if the Indications from a real time dose prjetin ysemar not......

included~

in generic EA^s.Iniations

.. om a. .. ri.ete monitoring sstem....

r n..... included in the generic EALs."D:evlapecr chzudd kcsp in rnind t1e rcquirzmsntz of ! 0 CFR ..... c a hs guidance 1 os.:'ided by, !NPO rch~tcd ts ssmsrgsny rzspznsc equiprrenrt "WhS," sscn!ierirng ihs additics zf zthrx sifus'-e~nitzmnt.

49 Tzchnicai Sp~iticati3n~.

In additicn, r~adingz ma; bz influzn~zd by ~nv~rcnmznt~

zr zthzr taztcrz. A II~cnzzz may rc~uz~t tz incIu~L an EAL u~m~ ~ Dcrirnctcr rncnitcrin~

~y~tzm: ant~rcvaI will bz ccr.~idzrc~l zn a c~ b;' Z~Z.... I .....EUL A~wnmcr.t AttrItutc~:

J.I.l.B 50 RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:

I 'ersonneil CO 01or flon ,,ater le'el c:pccitiz lv.-el indicaticn4).

AND b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.cPPSRWItSd{

~5~: V6 SF~ J~veI .owAw~wsoia~r

~jWI-Mfl A -R LI~atIL lop Atea~J-~4 Rp1P~so~N ~lStot ca~1~I 3 ll~ fl 2 fialFtqor22W;Ii ii~ ~l l i~ i i .. .2! $1i i V2R$M~iutor~afruiauon Basis: R!1H1I pool IVN~ PAll tl\VA\: Ihis includes the reactor tac itv. the translibr canal. and the spent fuel[N P1AN NI ): A parameter change or an event that is not t ) the resnit 01'an i mended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

I he cause ol the paranctetr change or e'vent may he kno\\ru or unrkno\\sn This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is also indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety-ef the-plan',.

A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation.

Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel 51 (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available).

A significant drop in the water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

The effects of planned evolutions should be considered.

For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly.

Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance w.ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wvou4 be "-'4uc IC RA2 i Th, e "z', e , peci tic lEUELindiaic PATHWAY ' .......i. n tha ..... be-' ..... :^ta moniterl....l..n..the...................

of .... ..U.....G....T......

Seef the m ded. .b!: applicability ,of a partkultr indcait,"on it ia! r:'.ctaalbe i al nc.TEL 'Asit ,:eaecfc t A f ,reatc:3.!

rai.Ation' 3.ni1.a 1.1 dcoti tocarardi 52 74 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CG1 Loss of RPV CS1 Loss of RiPV CA1 Loss of RPV CUI UNPLANNED inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory, loss of RPV inventory fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold for 15 minutes or containment removal capability.

Shutdown, Refueling longer.challenged.

Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all but offsite and all onsite one AC power source AC power to to emergenieysscntial eimer~genycyssecniiaI buses for 15 minutes or buses for 15 minutes or longer.longer. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled______________De fueled CA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCS cold shutdown, temperature.

Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, De fueled CA6 Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling 53 CG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (l or 2)INote: The emergency director eheudd-wx ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. RPV level less than sI5 ~A~ ite specific le-vel) for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (se-e.....lew+( , '!(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• UNPLANNED level increase in (cite ....fi cum..... andc .....in Wthc, fol Iox\ ing Iev'els-of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery: 1~Iua~17I:V7RPV1*v~1

(-t~~') I a ~utner cite specine :noiepwcncj AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table 4eee °"- .... .- 'Containment Challenge Table (Ii£ Secndac.-

....a.n. n .....adiati meaniter rea.ding abov (..ite:. cpe:,e ...lue)54

• If CONTAINMEN'.T CLOSURLEccondar)

(()N I AINMFNI IN fI is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.Basis: (ON ['AlNMI'N I INl[I ERIlIY: lPrimary Containment OPI-LRABI.I-per Technical Speciticat ion 3.6. I I. See ndar. (ontainment O)PERAI, I.[ per Technical Specitication 3.6.4. I tJNPI ANNH)l: A parameter change or an cx nt thai is n01 I )the result of an intended cx olution or 2t an expected plant response to a transient, [he cause of the parameter chancge or e3ve.nt [/a.I he known ot unk nowxn.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged.

This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Water lex el toar top of active fuel is calculated at -1I58.4"'.

Although slightly moore e.the -I155"' t()P o'r top of actise fuel is provided for this [A/\1 to aid in operator recognition of" the ex ent.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-g&reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURESecondaix ( ONi AINMENI IN ILEiRI I Y not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment.

If CONTAtNMENT CLOSURESecondarx

(( ONTAIN MI[NI IN UI ~(iRI IFY is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity.

It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.

In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment.

If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment is challenged.

In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time 55 for pcri'ermaieneeef-actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/ or makeup equipment, and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG- 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

1119 and NUMARC 91 06~....r.ugh ......u. aproin ...... and... re..u.ling eva'lutians.

patiularly for a PWR. As thoat.th ability to manitor lee ....':;:thin the range required b perat...n.

pro.. d.r.. will.... n, t be pr..dur. n therCodae Sh -tdh And Reuln oesmyb2).cet(~.

nroe)ta tan ailobil f nsaley level idcfhh!hatins auchthate

'nthis leel alueg ten bedet'ecr mine during d Tin Cl fi:hur orom Refacumeln modifesthen, daenot iclue E : hI'~ (classificationf, il.be 56 Far BWR~ that da nat ha~e in~taIled rad;atkrn manitar~ capable afir.dieoting care unco~ery, alternate aite epecific level indicoxian5 of core uneovery ehould be uzcd if available.

Far EAL ft2.b aecand bullet Pac~t IMI accident ztudi.x indicated that the inctalled PWR nuclear trumentatian will aperate erratically when the care ic uncavered and that thic chauld be uced ac a teal fcr making euch determinatiaca.

Becauce BWR Scurce Range Monitor (SRM)nucleor inatrumentotiar.

detectara arc typically lacated belac; care mid plane, thia may nat be a viable indicatar af care uncavery for BWRe.Far EAL #2.b ~ird bullet Enter ~y "eitc epecific cump cn~'or t~k" levels that could be pected ta c~ge if there were a lace of inventary of cufficient magnitude to indicate core uneovery.

Specitie level valuec may be included if desired.For EAL #2.b fourth bullet Develapers chauld determine if other reliable indieptara exist ta identi~' fuel wleavery (e.g.. remote vie~ing ucing c~nerac).

The gcal Ic ta identify any unique or cite epecific indicatianc, nat already uced elce~vhere.

that will pramate timely and accurate emergency elaccificatian.

Far ~e Containment Challenge Table: Site chutda~ car.tingeney plane typically prcvide fcr re ectabliching CONTAINMENT CLOSURE fol!awing a lace afRCS heat remaval ar inventa~'

central functione.

Far "Explacive mixture", developer:;

may enter the minimum ear.tainment atmoepheric hydragen eaneentratian neecee~ ta cuppurt a hydragen bum (i.e.. the la~r deflagmtion limit). A caneurrent eantamment oxygen eancentratian may be included if the plant hac thia indicatiar.

available in the Central Roam.Far BWRs, the uce af eccondary cantainment radiatian manitarc chould pravide indication at increaced releoce that may be indicative af a challenge ta aecandary cor.tair.ment.

The "cite epecitic value enoulo ne cacco on tne nut'eacily recognizable and have a defined bacic.ECL Aceignment Attributee:

3. l.1.B ria'umum sate vaiucs cecauce mccc vajue.. are 57 CS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheoild-\vill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. ....N....I ....E ...T CL SU~ Ctndar) (CON I'AINMLNTI IN'I LI' IU Y not established.

AND b. RPV level less thanL~ ~jte-speeific lev).(2) a. C......................Secondary CON FAINMXN I INTI (GRITY established.

AND b. RPV level less than I (I F4 ....

(3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• JNPlANNl4D leveI increase in aim ofrthc hdlowving of suf'ficient utagnitude to indicate core uncover}':

• (Site epecifie rZdiaticn monitar) reading greater than (site zpeeifie ',alue)* Ermtie ceuree range manitor indicatien

[PWRJ I LrUN PLANNED riEn.cr e ae in *zt petc~m n/rtn)i~~

tztiin* i~utner site ~peeiiic Inalepuens)

Basis: (ON IAINMN'ILI INTEiRIIFY:

IPrimary Containment per iTehnical Specification 3.6.1. t. Secondary Containment OPFRAHILL per Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.58 I NP I ANNt I): A parametecr change or an evecm thai is I to I ) thc rcsu It of an intended ev olutiion or 2) an expected plant rcsiponsc to a transient.

lhc caose of thc parameter changc or evecnt ma)bc known or unknowxn, This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of RPV inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control, or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant.These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and 4itis-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

\\ atci evel ibr top of activc fuecl is calcnlatcd at -1 58.44" Although slightiy niorc conscrxiitivc.

thc -1I55- li()P v'aluc tbr top of actix c Fetc is prox idcd Ibr this FAI, to aid in opcrator rccognition of thc evecnt.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-C-reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying..O....I....NT..........Sccondar) (ON I AIN MEN I' IN I E(IRIlY following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions.

The difference in the specified R-C--reactor vessel levels of EALs 1.b and 2.b reflects #the-fee~tlhat with CO1ITAP RTMEN~T..........

cc dax CON IAINMEN I IN I l;(RlI Y established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment.

In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time for pef~:c factions to terminate leakage, recover inventory contro1¢ or makeup equipment.

and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

Escalation of the emergency classification level ......d-be-;i4*uscs IC CG1 or RG I.dzp....n upan the a.'..unt of timzainc °:...u..d

..... r.z.cr t-, ....ri Lctz 17. SE nCY~ 91 2°8. N1JREcG 111~9 an-dI N! rMARC 91 06.59 that the a~biit t... :onito l .... ..ithin th. r....g .. r :.ire by. operating prs.cedures wi'll not be int........

Th"ie instrumentation ran'ge necessary3 to ....... implem..n...ti:n of opcrating prcdurermine y th me C dSutdong and,. Refuelin may. beo di cn (.g.., narrow.cr th ,n tht equi;Sctr, dwing moe higp!her thn aColdae Stdwn. Fcr AL #b th "sie spcifi levl'~ i.- " bee th otmI ftcRSlo.Ti doe wign andpertioEnte af "tcre ~cvfel ntramcn.tatn isnsuch tha.t thi-s leve valuc tnodeet b~e thasiiatithe c illben ac....mplisby hed! a',.... in acrdse .aith , E ... ft3... ... ...:...v.ail-a"biligy of tnhae lev.. l indicatin i... such tha thi level... valu can be.. deter,,n durin saete'..e shu !than mdesgor c'e~ndtios bto enatrethar.then spcifya nther meadeiepndent a- nd!abeFr cnfigurtoian stte drin ic the ls~.r- t n~evtel niaini phal.I h ein and opntf a aratian-'eEA trsb!acmplisr:ee!dhe

~ed in acodnewthe EAL te ).:d naaprree!-e f :'bminbtwe core... wil ,.incras.Ene a' ..sit... sp..ci.c radition m.......".th..ticould.be.

us df u detect cagnrde unoe;ad h saite iesecfcvle indicatecr ceey eee ;e"-.....ive

.a, are uncover. I s eagi 60 ide.tify'.

fel.......

un ......... .i.wi .u:I .amras... The geal. is t.a i..n.if. an uni. .. "ue ar site ....p:eifi indiAtiar;....

na already usedA elsewher,+.

t1,at w.ill pr.m.t tim÷ely. ond accurat For EAL il !.b "site specific le...el" is the, L... L, .... E ..CCS, ...uati. setpoint /Levetl I. Tha e I 1.. I ..L.. La L... [CCSP setaint; I ... l 1 w.... chesen beauseo it is a inetion systedmats w ould autm.tihaghesta and... ttmon tor readtor, RP. le.el. T .i.. ... a ....smignifcatly auv the Tiapr eaf! AcieFulTOFtrehd specified in teELt ul na EapLpr #e2.ForobrEato 2bTetwe monitor rpeadifi level thaudb ohe tap actiesfuelt.

F Fr[A # P.b fthat bullet Ashater lt!eve rinathen rea t-or vse lawarse hef !doseaten boreth care will incree. ... Ente n...site sp..cifi.

radiatian mecangter mothatcoul eue eetcr indiator and thre asnciatrd "sit spcfc au"iniaie fcr uRvr. ti ecie eCamLe Aa3n [Lmanito rending: mih e.'.t90 o9% fte ihs a.rt mni 61 CA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheould-w'ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level less than (Lv2 aeualt (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in (zit ......i :¢u..... anda .....i.a. of the follow ing 1evels-due to a loss of RPV inventory=:

Basis: U NPI ;kNNI)D: A4 paramleter change or an event that ik not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

I he cause of the parameter change or exent nay be knowxn or nnknoxxn.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).

This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below (zt pcfi zz)35" (lecxel 2 actuation setpoint) indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a residual heat removal suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing~04 2~~enR~62 changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS I If the RPV inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency IC CSI.D:vz!oper L-njeetisn systrems w.'ukl autamaticatty t.art. and is a ;valu.e significanqtly below: the Lw:, RPYP Fo.r EAL "ft,, The. typ and range ..f............i...trum .ntati ..n ma .ar durin... an outage as the planto mo-ves thro~ugh -various pe~rating modcs an'd.-r"fueling., ......luti+.on,"+....v--:'

partiularl imnplementation of operating provecdurcs in the Cold Sh'atdo';.an

".d Recfueling mo..des may be different (e.g., nr:"..rower) than that requi:red

.. durin .node than Cold. Su...÷. ..Enter any ...it. speci..c sump n/rtn" eesta c....... uld.......

be e.p..t.d.to.........i.ther..werAssig...ent Atr;ibutes:

3.1 .2I".B 63 CA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergencycsscential buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ACsent~iaBse l2E, 1il s I~ ite specifie emergency buses) for !15 minutes or longer.I ~ 17~J; Vu4IO~AC~

D~ueeIdoimation I D Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sCC 1-abic S 1 abho~c) that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power. including those necessary for eInerge~eycs, enrial core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergeaeyessential bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. 4-wsr-,When in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe-plwi.nt Fifteen minutes was' as n.i' flu threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level "¢,o,'ad-be

ian ses IC CS 1 or RS i.minimu,...m,, .. number cf aperating, gcncratzr

fur that .......t. pr-'idcaequae

.............

(. ... t oz .....pcit : ncrctcr .+izcd t fed AC" ..........

bu., the EAL md Ba+/-i 64 tAttup~ p'-cr tan th clactrinol diztrEA tio mayztcmrtd a S~aFETrY SYSt aEMS h that apertinc fthie anrd i can tr-al-le...

in .:a.:erdanc

i.,th ,-bnarmc. , ...r..n .apt.i......

prc-ducr , becn d" ei: n ; ba l a. .. id ent " r cpen:ee g:u:ideit (eay .FLEX~ eu pp.........

guieli LtL/.~eIgnmenL;uErInute;:

J.i.e.u 65 CA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheii4d-xs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than f2I2 F~site-speitfie Technical Spcif....

e ce.ld+ ...

.... pcr..... limit)"-:

for greater than the duration specified in the-f..........

bl I .. able (:2.... ......~ t~ .... .... -... .... o d .... ... .Table(k: RCS leal-nup Duration T~hreshohls R~-4M ~ CotINmt I C(;RI : Stautus "eat-up-iav o INtact butabc it reuced minutes*vR04PR1 eEstablished 2t mntes* If R aR RCist e a yte ci operationn ithim this time frame andPC teprteisbngcdcdte RAI, tips ueicbig Itueth A i e applicable.

(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site epci~fic preceure S(Thie EAL d-ces+ net apply duriSng "water :elid plant cenditie~n:.

[PIJR°])Basis: (t N I A INMI NI IN I lE(iRI I Yt Primary tontaiuntent

()I'l-RABI3II pcr Ilechnical Speciticat ion 3.6.1I I Secondars (ontainienct OlPI R \Itl I per "I ethnical Specilication 3,h.4, I, INPI .A\Nl~t).

A paranicter changc or an ev ent 1thu:t is nlot I ) thc rcsult of an intended cevolution or 2) an expelctd plant response to a transient, I he cause of the paramecter ehange or c,,cut nia)he k noss il or unlknqossn+

Vt4R~tsdtu&w*

66 This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety efhe-plan+.

A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

Ihe RtiS I leat-up Il)uration lhresholds table addresses the case wshere there is an increase in R(TS temperature.

the RCS is not intact, and Secondary (iO N 1 AINMIN 1 INrt!GRl IFY is not established.

In this case, no heat-uip duration is ici~.. (0 minutes).

Ibhis is because ! t the ev aporated reactor coolant max be released directly into the containment atmosphere and s ubsqtientlly to lie eiiviro me nt. and 2) Ihere is redutced reactor coolant invent ory abhove th~e top: of irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when.....T......E........SURE (O(N I AtNMI N I IN I EGRI INY is established but the RCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.tinal lx. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of C..N..AIN...E.T

..C ...SURE condar y (ON lAINMEN I INI K( R, I Y is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.

iin thc ease .hecre there is, an increas:e in RCS tem.'perature, the RCS is nct intact er is at redu...ced

..........

[PflR]. ,an CONrTAINM ENT CLOSU RESecandar'y CONTAINrMENT rINTEG"R-ITY is neat establishc ed, no h....at up .. duri is alle,;wed (i.e., 0 Thi:s is because subse....ntl.

to th.. "n.ir. nm..nt. and 2) there is, recd r...act...r ceolant inv'entoty abave th-e t-p ef ir"radaiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level wevu~d-be

ia*uses IC CSl1 or RSl1.* ,here indicateda.

The RCS sheuld beo eansidared intact ar net intact in acccrdaaaee with site Far EAL fi2 The ....spcii resue radng shud he thea..........

chng in. pressu....t..t e~ be acc.ratel determine usingur insalld nstruenttin bu etls ta 0 67 Lo3 ^of .H o: ...... A number o.f

.... t. ..........

icn :-o:--;'cxing.

atcam cay h....t. ......... ,o loot and. co.rc unco;'cr, .......ur. NR.C a:nay::c ohbo;w that there arc rcq:ucncco that con oause core unco~very in 15 t o 20 minutco, _an .......... ,or ........ :ithin n pro-"ded by Goncric Lc,".cr 88. 17 anrd bclie-ved to bc conocr.-Containment barrier to fiooicn pro~duct relceoc io comb!iohed.

'ative niven that a low prezoure ECL Aooizrnment Attributeo:

3.1.2.13 68 CA6 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)

• Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:

• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: tl;XPIOSIO)N:

A rapid. ,,iolent and catastrophic failure of a piece of cquipment due to cobtfl stion. chemical reaction or ox erpressuriiation.

A release of steam tfl'oi high energy lines or components) or an electrical component ihilure (causcd by short circuits, grounding, arcing, cet. I should not autoalnuicallx, be considered an explosion.

Such exenis may require a post-es cot inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FRIRF,: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drixe belts or ox erheated electrical equipment do not constitute F'IRES. O)bscrx ation of" flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed.SA.FEVTY SYS l'IM: A system required tor safe plant operation, cooltng doxsn the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdoxxt condition, including the [('CS. These are typically systemts classified as saztyt-related.

VISIBIJ," I)AMA(iE:

D~amage to a component or structure that is readily observable ,aithout measurements, testing, or analy sis. I he visual impact olf the damage is sufticient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected comtponent or structure.

69 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product harrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety[Al. 1.a identifies hazardous events that could result in damage to plant systems. A seismic event is indicated

")3 entry into IC 11t12. Flooding is indlicatedl by a significant increase in w,\ater levels (external or internal).

I ligh winds are indicate~d by sustained winds at the site meteorological tower exceeding 35 mph, The first threshold tbr EAL l.b4- addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation, since indications for it will be readily available.

The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.[he second threshold for EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.

Operators will make this determination based on...........

e~h I .l available event and damage report information.

This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level ;weu44.be-;'4auses IC CS 1 or RS I.For (ait' peeifie hazards).

devc!per:

sha'uld ecen:der including e~ther zignifiean , ..... owp..ifie-hazar-dz te the bul!eted !Iist eantained in EAL l.a (e.g., a seieh4)",uc..ar .........

pln SAET SYSvcvTEM are comprised zfw r+ m.... r... epame .ad trains c~f e.3uipmnt in accordance -with site desig7n criteria.ECL Assig:7nment Aifributes:

3.1 .2.B 70 CUl ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shejild-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than lower limit ot'lhc controlling lcvel band for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.

AND b. UNPLANNED lcve! increase in (site. specific sump :and/r tank) lcvcaany, oF the folloxxing:

Basis: UN P1 ANNE[): A paraneter change or an ex cnt that is no t I) ihc result oFan intended cvohloion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, lhc cause of thc parameter change or cvcnt otax be knlownt or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef the. ~a~t.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled.

An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented.

This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.71 The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level 4ia-using either IC CAl or CA3.the generic warding i.s adequaec t.. ene ure anda timcy ar if .....nt ca b... includ,..ed

..thcut m..raking the EAL ............

un:iely e- pat....a..

i"ea .... t.....wi:th atien. tha.t may be take durin"'g an outage. If epci~ti.e zetpei~nte are incude,d+...

th.z..,aul EA ft 2.b Enter any et pcteem "nd:or tank..l.....that

..................

be ...............

eth.r. we're a Ieee Cf (i.e.. t.he Let inv....nt

..ry .woul ...t.r t.he hated. .... ar tank!).I.lCl Ae" ......t A-ttri-u,,*

..... .1 72 CU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all but one AC power source to effiege~ieyc.>scnhial buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: INote: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability to 4160VA E I 1JE12, J/(*ie s ...cific ...........

b,.u., is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.c~n~fled( 3~;V~ 416OVAsm~atInf~m~a~n Gqsu~au~md ( 33~ vi~ 4160 vAC ~uuili~ ~uies 1nfcm~at~oo]

Basis: SA!I;IY SYS'I t".: A s) stc~m required Ibr salb plant npcration, cooling dm>xn thc plant andior placing it in Ihc cold condi ion, inclidingi th t!CC S. Those arc tvpic:al!\

S~ VScms classilied as saVL'ny-rc~latcd.

This IC describes a significant degradation of off'site and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source ( scc lablc S1 ahtwci may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.

When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. 44t*When in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe pl--n:.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an effergefe.%ycsscnlial bus. 8eime-Examples of this condition rFerte belew,includc:

73

• A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emefgelieyesscnti~al power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).

• A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emefgencyy.sscntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emrgene~ycsscntial buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.

• A loss of merege*neycsse~ntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of em~ergenyessniaI buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen ' .... ..., minutes ...........

d as ai, the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA2.mi'!im~um number of operating gcneratars nec;c."y~

f,.ar,. t.....t .....our.e to pr-..:idc required po;;er to T-h..e ..it. speci.....

em-erg'en........ -b,-a,.. e .s, are the buses fod by, offeite or emergency, AC power sources is typiFcally I emergency bus per train cf S.AFETY SYSTEMS.De-'elopers should the bulleted examples pro; ided in the basis ...ti.n above. as. n eeded to reflect their site specific pl-+ant ; d ..i.n .and ..pabilitie.

..ingle pow.er source, For examplFe, three independent 315k-V' offite powver circuits (i.e., that operation cf this sorc L: regnized in AOPc and E.... or byn einbssacdn re...p.n...

guideline. (e.g. FLEX guidelines).

Suc..a. v r .....ud c~cayme the "Alternate ac sou.rce"'

definition pro-vided in 10 CFP. 50.2.At multi": .... unit stations, the........

ma c......t comp......~

m .easures that arc-and._affected unit via a cross ne to a companion u-nit may credit thL pe..er surce in the EAL arov'!ded that the planned cross tic stratce-v meets the recui~remnts .of 10 CFR. 50.63.ECLP .A,-".......

n 3.1.1 .A 74 CU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheould-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than

-4" v' !(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: IINPI ANNI ): A parameter change or an ce' nt that is not I) thle result of an intended ceolution or 2) an expected planm response to a transient.

The cause oF the parameter change or event nay he known or unknown.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-of~he-plant~.

If the RCS is not intact and COT-'xrA

...... )ONlAIN LNT IN I'EWRI I'Y is not established during this event, the emergency director shoai4-will also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, sieh-tbowhcer reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications.

During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled.

A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions.

and operators wvild-heare unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

Fifteen minutes wa-s' eleeted-asis a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

75 Escalation to Alert ..... i d-,be-........

ses IC CAI based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.ECL Asignment, 3.1. i.A 76 CU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: INote: The emergency director shetdd-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Indicated voltage is less than i.~~ilcbsvltg

'lc on Spc 52 ~1Z2~ for 15* minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. T-usv-,This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e~f he-plan:.As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.

For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.

Fifteen minutes selected nz ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level w, il4-dbe-;4auses IC CA I or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Develeper Nete=: ncaeaary fcr adequate opera~tian af SAFET SYSTEMvequipment.

This alto'age "alu' ....uld; .... .....arl.. e a margin" ..... at leact... 15 minutes of aperatian bfcfre the aneet af to. operte m~nlmu'.m valtage ic apprax:matel, 1......l..

per cell.Li'~aaIgnmemAttrIcutea:

a.i.i.r'.77 CU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: Plhnt telephones (Includes lardo ired and nA ireless)Plant page Plant radio systems (,gite apeczfic !!'t eaf czmm:,n'i:ntoan:

methndea)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: INN (I t enrgneQ Notification Newo ork)( ommerejal phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: I-NS on Federal Iclecornmunecataon., Sxstem (F Commercial phones (o.it"'

liat cf cemmunicntizna raetheadL)

Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.

While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipments-relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-; individuals being sent to offsite locations,-ete.).

EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.

EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration.

The OROs referred to here are the State of~ieorgia.

Appling ('ount\..left l)avisC (oont\. I atnallI Count) and I oombs (ountmt. .........

v-.pc .......), EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.

78 EAL ft I The "cite cpeeifie lict cf concmunieaticnc methcd' ehoold include all communicatione metho&~ uced far routine plant communicatione (e.g., commercial or Site telephones.

page party zyetcmc, radioc, etc.). Thiz licting ohould include inztal!ed plant equipment and componente, and not itemo owr.ed and maintained by indkidualo.

EAL #2 1k "cite epecific lict of communicationo methode" Thould include p1! communicatione methode uced to perform initial cmergdnoy notificatione to OROc no deocribed in the cite Emergcney Plan. 1k licting chould include inatalled plant equipment and componento.

and not:temo owned and maintained by individuaL.

Eeainpl~ methodo are ring duwn'dedieated telephone linco. commercial telephone linec, radioc, oatc!litc telephonec and interact baced communicationo technology.

In the Bacio section, incefl the cite opecific licting of the OROc requiring notification of an emergency declamtion from the Control Room in accordance with the cite Emergency Plan, and typicalh' within 15 minutec.EAL #3 The "cite opecifie Hot of communicationo methodo" chould include all eammunicationo methodo uced to perfcrn'i initial emergency notiticatieno to the NRC ~ deocribed in the cite Emergency Plan. The licting chould include inc~Ilcd plant equipment and component.

and net itemo owned and maintained by individualo.

Thece methodo are typically the dedicated Emergency Notificatlen Syctem (ENS) telephone line and commercial telephone linec.EC L Ac:ignme~nt Attribuate,:

3.l.1.C 79 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS UNUSUAL EVENT E-HUI Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Op. Modes: All 80 RS2[(1'orc Ari Lctrclcrcnc\

initialing ( ontdition:

Spcna{ fue pool cevel at (scite cpeeitie'

.. Lee "3 dec,,rip,.,,,l\xcl'4...:, ., 3.1()p rat in c M ode cn pplcbi pool \!c1 o(it peteLec .lu~ I3[his I( add~resss a sic]i licantys iof !:nt >nrfoci pool in' color> control and nakcup cap;ahil ii>leading to 1 MI1NI N I foci daniagc. lhIn condition eittads-tems From niaHo tafl nrcs of plant Fonctimsn nccded For pr-otccrion ot rhc p01>1' and t-hu&-x~ r nt a Site \rcrr I 'nici cncx dccIa ration.Ii i> rccorrni/cd that rifts I(' xsonid Iikcl> not bc ncr nntli rclI ai'tcr anothcr Nlic \rca lnmrcoecnc\

I ( xas nict iht o c r, it is inclu dcd to idc ci a> ifiLcnion!

di ~crsi0.I ,,cafLnion

.oi thc crncra-cnc

.ciant icar ion lcI e **v e ..........

'

I(' Rn I or R.io2... ....... .. ..... ... .. ..e,.......

.:N.... ..... .. .. eMcn : e 112/e 1 A cernica wun inc accrnn Cr ~crauen Cl jn~1rumcnurucn ucee IC aei~eec~ceI I 36 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL # 1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 1 5 minutes or longer: t ~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond i ,sker t dce receptcr i~ii~iMilD~updafT (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point) for one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hs* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1%4,-pcrcent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an 37 t t actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety ef4ie phlant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are atse-included to provide a basis for classiflying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose a~ssessment method thai hack calculates from the dose values specitied in the IC. The meteorology and source term Inoble gases. particulates, and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RGiI and RS1 IThis protocol maintains intervals betwe.en the threshold

\,alues fbr the three classitications, Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and that the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 1t0 mR/hour whole body' or 50 ink,/hour thy roid, er is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weel-!dbe -iatuses IC RSI1.providec:

clacci.leatian diversity.

and may be uced to claczig' eventz that wou'ld not. reach the.ame ECL- baoed cn plant ztatuz or the fizsion product matrix -pl.n.. Far.man...

f the rBn and the c.mm... effectiv.

e .doze equivalent (CEDE),t:

or ac the thyro'd e..mitted doze e -ilet. .... E), apiCc definied in , 10 FR 20.isuz,.d ino lieu, o"._..u o E.D. E :.an CEDE+ .Tha~e"Xn EPf PAe guid'ne poie-frth-z o dlttyoi oe ovrgo:aeo hoevr cmezatz ae ecdd o ae rtetieaeiczonchl tyri CE3Ncl8

• The effluent meniter readingc cheuld ee~recpcnd te a dece cC 10 rnrem TEDE cr50 mrem thyre~d CDE at the ~'cite epecitie dccc recepter peint" (cencictent with the ealeulatien methedelegy emplayed) fcr ene heur efexpecure.

• Meniter readingc will be calculated ucing a cet of accumed meteerolegical data or atmeephene diepercian faetcc'c:

the data er f~eterc celeeted for uce eheuld be the c~c ac thece en~leyed te calculate the menitor readingc for ICc RS I and RG 1. Acceptable ceureec efthic infcrmatien include, but are net limited to, the RETS!ODCM and valuec uced in the cite'c emergency dece aececement methedelegy.

• The calculation efmenitor readinge will alec require uce cf an accumed releace icetcpie mix: the celected mix chould be the came aa that empK'ed to calculate monitor readingc fcr lC~RSI and RGI Acceptable ceureec efthic informatien include, but are net limited te, the RETS'ODCM an! valuec uced in the s~tcc emergency dee: accecement methedelegy.

• Depending upen the methedelegy uced to e~e ulate the EAL valuec. there may be everlap et came valuec between different ICs. Develeperc will need te addrecc thic everlap by adjusting thece valuec in a manner that encurec a legical ecealatien in the ECL.The "site cpeei fie decereceptorpoint" is the distance(s) andior lecatiene used by the liecacee te dictinguich between en cite and ctTcite decec. The celected dictanee(c) andier lecaticac cheuld reflect the centent ef the emergency plan, and the precedural methedelegy uced te determine effcite decec and Pretective Aetien Reeemmendatier.c.

The variotien in celeeted dccc recepter peints meane there may be came diffcreneec in the dictanee frem the releace point te the calculated dccc paint frem cite tc cite.Developers cheuld research radiatien menitor design decuments er ether infc~ation coureec te encure that I) the [AL value being considered is within the ucable recpence and display range ef the instrument, and 2) there are ne autematie features that may render the moniter reading in'.'alid (e.g.. an auta purge feature triggered at a particular indicatien level).It is recegnized that the cenditien deccribed b~ thic IC may result in a radialegical emuent value beyond the operating er dicplay range of the inctalled effluent menitor. In these eaces, [AL valuec cheuld be deteni~ined with a margin cufficient te ensure that an accurate meniter reading ic available.

Fer example, an [AL meniter reading might be set at 90% te 95%ef the h~ghcct aeeumtc meniter reading. This previcien natwithctanding, if the estimatedicalculated menitar reading ic greater thai appreximately 110% cC the highect accurate meniter reading, then develepers ma~ ~ n~t ta include the meniter ac an indicatian and identify an alternate EAL thresheld.

the IC ~ TOfl~2 generally

~ .ini..-Ajtheugh ~ .~, ~ r~uu~ are ~ as a"~hele bedy" dese rate. Far thic reacen, the field sur.ey [AL specifies a 'elaced windew"§af~ey-reedffig~

Indicatienc frem a real time ~ pr~j~tI~n system are net included in the generic EALc.Many lie.. n....d.,n.A have thic capability.

Fer these that do, the capability may net be ithin the ceope cf the plant Technical Spceifieationc.

A licencee may requect to include an [AL ucing red time dccc prejeetien system recults; appreval will be cencidered an a cace by ease becic.lndieadcnc from a perimeter menitering syctem are net included in the generic EALc.Many Ileenceec do not have thic capability.

Far thoce that do, thece monitars may net be contrelled and maintained to the came level as plant equipment, er within the ceepe of the plant Technical Specificatiane.

In additia~ readingc may be influenced b~ environmental or ether 39 0O'JZIt :~ngu~~ iUZWU~i ~' 133 o~uz n uc ~ IH~ jOAOJddU RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY efthe Ile!winT~l RI radiation monitors:[~ps~,tpd( U3~ V4AIamoseP~e~a~

R~ qr.4r~tM~4j ItiitM~ i~rs_______________________________

Ft Pop#re~4-l~ Pluit t~-Kt ~PY~tc~IRI3~tS4I 121 Y4 Mann poP 4~reJ~.f~nnce I~MW~(3) 1 mcdinu of" spent foci pool cxi t~eo ..... pecific Le', l 2 v,,,luz)Leel, _.4 See D-e'cieper Basis: RI FW 'l IN(i lPA IiIlWAY: I his includes thc rceator caOit;\, the transfecr canal, and the spcnl Iuel pool.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, or a signifi cant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool+(ae-Dei'ael,9p Not-*. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety cefhe plat.41 This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU 1.Escalation of the emergency weldbii based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1I This EAL escalates from RU2. ifr ha-the- ...... Ilhc loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as-welIas-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readingsbe considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors shoud4-w ill be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).poM'I X~JtCI It\eI &ii ihbi, x ailc K. \\ilhiil Ihe I}\\cr ndR u{th ilcI\CI ncgc nccc~>ziI t.2\ci ti s.nicnIti]a~

dn>;c li,.n dircct galm i to pclsoll pcl'o' IIifl opcral nns in ll>c i icinitx of thc >pcnl l'bcl pool. ihis Cofldilion wetlccts it >ii~iii liciltt los ol'Ilnfl ftid pool xxab.ir mi-i Celho .mod ta*is--i4-b:

alse--a prtKurorU tI a los ohc zbi[ll> to 8dcqatdl\lI cool thec irrmdtnl.d fuel stored in lkc poo1.

of the emergency classification level woild-,be-viaeusc.

ICs RSl1 or RS2 .P2Dc'gclapcr Nores}."FzrEAL1~

I4 Far EALU2 42 andurce alre" chudnotanth",rdato ntre that couldA cnie~ : ;'~ be, ".ed!to idesntif damagt.....r.adi natmnt ad f21acmby(~.

tnei m ator nof r....... of fc...n..roduat gacec ...rom.For EALc ftIard#coreec.to encurc tha avi)athe [Ar "-a. Te being spncidi ered 2c vihnue"i s!. the ucbe epnte run monitor r.a.in. inald e., sadq ate n .. :aut ..o... pur , fe atutrgere:

a.. .tn. a patclr indicanting level)d It is..!n the cgnced tha thle. cniindcrbdb hsI a euti aito a LCtrl Aece .....t Attrt..t., c: .I .2 .k t an

• J. "12 43 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.(I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas: C ontrol area radiation moninor 1!D 2 :C 't 5AamtSposPoduo1a I,.entral Akirm ontaion sur\,* Ccntrcl R, or* Central Alar.m Statian (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any efthe-fo!!ewifngl able Ill plant rooms or areas: Buihling Rooms~ Appicable M1odes l)iesel acencrator building All A\ll lJnit h.2 130" All Reactor building I, nitd 112 SI l)ia onals (RI tR) Alt initl 12 NI D~iagonals (RI IR) All Basis: l INIPtANNtIlI):

A parmneter change or an c~ cut that is not !i t he result of an i ntcndcd c\ oR uttion or 2) an expected plant responsec to a transicnt.

I]hc cause of thc palra.meter chanlc o~r ecntl max/h. knoxxn or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. "

i-represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-of he--pIant.

The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.

For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected 44 room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level weal~d-be-44auscs Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.Th-e "other si!te specific areasz/reoms"'

should include any, ar"ea or rooms requiring coantinuoue's occupancy' to maintain normal pant operation, or to peror a.......a..............an.

1sA! Th... ...sit.e* specific list. ef plant rooms or a....a. ... th .. nt.ry, rel ........'*at applicability' identified" a.. spe..if..d.in operating procedures u...d fo n ..m..! plant operatic,"...

.......n nd shtown.. ...perfor.ed. (e.g., an ectian to .add san off.. norm.. or em.'ergency

...iio. " su:chae as emerge:ncy pl, m.. de as) during whiche entry w-ould be required for ..a.h.r..m.or area.of an administrativ'e or record keeping nature (.e.g.. norma' rouands or rou.tine inspct~ions).

If the equipment in ,th. li:ted room or ...ea.wa. alread, : ....... c, or... .u ^f ... : advearse impact beyo'ndq~

that alre'ady, alloe;:d by, Technical Specifications at the ti!me. of te eveont.Cefitf! ReeR.45 EUL A~zgnrnznt Attrltutzz:

2.12.C 46 RU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (-site-effluent redease ccentrolling dccument)OI)CM' limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the OIX R'l,.sie-wseei'*

ffluznt-+

....... zontr........

....). lihmits for 60 minutes or longer: Rq&[ $4]: ~T ZRad Mon or C~Ici~tion J~Ah~imu~(2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.(3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times th )IX zt zp " fi cf: untrz.zaz

.............

d.........)

limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.47 Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.

Further, there r... adr:i-o,,atv:,, in* .,v cotrlsar established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment i&-. !die'ativ'e iindi cat cs 0f-degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classify'ing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases should not be prorated or averaged.

For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL #1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level wveuildbe-viauses IC RAI.De~ep.-No48 value f.. r thcse m. nit. r sh..u. d d' ermi.. :d using the most applicable dosc/rc'cosc limits pr-c-"---d in.;

RET or^ ODrC,. It. is rcccgnizcd that a calclataedl EAL v'alue may be below.;th. m. nit. a r.....ad; in tha ...... thc monitor does not need to b" i:cluded in the list.related r....irc....t.;

theref.r., it is important that the a...ociate EAL rand basis ideti. an ..... aticas on th... use .... avahiaiit of these monitore......in 2:- time a1 r.l.... cntr... limi. ll- The controlling document typically describes be used to dctcrmine EAL values. In cases where a methodology is not adequately defined, cevelopers-snoul.a ocerm,"',line valudes eon-istc~inx -w,1t" contirol rcguianansr, (e.g., tU For EAL #2 Valuecs in this EAL should be 2 times the secpoint established by the Develcpers shouald research radiation monitor design documents or other infor,'at.icn sources.to.ens....that..).the......alue.being.conside.ed.is.within.the.usabl response rand displway' of the instrument, and 2) hr a. re......-

no a-atmatic features that may rende *'..monito re..ading invalid (e.g., an auto purge feature- trigere at ...a par.icula indiation:-

l...l It is reegn.ized that the condition described by this IC may result in a of the highest accurate monitor reading. This provsison notw;ithstanding, if the Indications from a real time dose prjetin ysemar not......

included~

in generic EA^s.Iniations

.. om a. .. ri.ete monitoring sstem....

r n..... included in the generic EALs."D:evlapecr chzudd kcsp in rnind t1e rcquirzmsntz of ! 0 CFR ..... c a hs guidance 1 os.:'ided by, !NPO rch~tcd ts ssmsrgsny rzspznsc equiprrenrt "WhS," sscn!ierirng ihs additics zf zthrx sifus'-e~nitzmnt.

49 Tzchnicai Sp~iticati3n~.

In additicn, r~adingz ma; bz influzn~zd by ~nv~rcnmznt~

zr zthzr taztcrz. A II~cnzzz may rc~uz~t tz incIu~L an EAL u~m~ ~ Dcrirnctcr rncnitcrin~

~y~tzm: ant~rcvaI will bz ccr.~idzrc~l zn a c~ b;' Z~Z.... I .....EUL A~wnmcr.t AttrItutc~:

J.I.l.B 50 RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:

I 'ersonneil CO 01or flon ,,ater le'el c:pccitiz lv.-el indicaticn4).

AND b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.cPPSRWItSd{

~5~: V6 SF~ J~veI .owAw~wsoia~r

~jWI-Mfl A -R LI~atIL lop Atea~J-~4 Rp1P~so~N ~lStot ca~1~I 3 ll~ fl 2 fialFtqor22W;Ii ii~ ~l l i~ i i .. .2! $1i i V2R$M~iutor~afruiauon Basis: R!1H1I pool IVN~ PAll tl\VA\: Ihis includes the reactor tac itv. the translibr canal. and the spent fuel[N P1AN NI ): A parameter change or an event that is not t ) the resnit 01'an i mended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

I he cause ol the paranctetr change or e'vent may he kno\\ru or unrkno\\sn This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is also indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety-ef the-plan',.

A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation.

Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel 51 (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available).

A significant drop in the water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

The effects of planned evolutions should be considered.

For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly.

Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance w.ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wvou4 be "-'4uc IC RA2 i Th, e "z', e , peci tic lEUELindiaic PATHWAY ' .......i. n tha ..... be-' ..... :^ta moniterl....l..n..the...................

of .... ..U.....G....T......

Seef the m ded. .b!: applicability ,of a partkultr indcait,"on it ia! r:'.ctaalbe i al nc.TEL 'Asit ,:eaecfc t A f ,reatc:3.!

rai.Ation' 3.ni1.a 1.1 dcoti tocarardi 52 74 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CG1 Loss of RPV CS1 Loss of RiPV CA1 Loss of RPV CUI UNPLANNED inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory, loss of RPV inventory fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold for 15 minutes or containment removal capability.

Shutdown, Refueling longer.challenged.

Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all but offsite and all onsite one AC power source AC power to to emergenieysscntial eimer~genycyssecniiaI buses for 15 minutes or buses for 15 minutes or longer.longer. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled______________De fueled CA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCS cold shutdown, temperature.

Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, De fueled CA6 Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling 53 CG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (l or 2)INote: The emergency director eheudd-wx ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. RPV level less than sI5 ~A~ ite specific le-vel) for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (se-e.....lew+( , '!(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• UNPLANNED level increase in (cite ....fi cum..... andc .....in Wthc, fol Iox\ ing Iev'els-of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery: 1~Iua~17I:V7RPV1*v~1

(-t~~') I a ~utner cite specine :noiepwcncj AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table 4eee °"- .... .- 'Containment Challenge Table (Ii£ Secndac.-

....a.n. n .....adiati meaniter rea.ding abov (..ite:. cpe:,e ...lue)54

• If CONTAINMEN'.T CLOSURLEccondar)

(()N I AINMFNI IN fI is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.Basis: (ON ['AlNMI'N I INl[I ERIlIY: lPrimary Containment OPI-LRABI.I-per Technical Speciticat ion 3.6. I I. See ndar. (ontainment O)PERAI, I.[ per Technical Specitication 3.6.4. I tJNPI ANNH)l: A parameter change or an cx nt thai is n01 I )the result of an intended cx olution or 2t an expected plant response to a transient, [he cause of the parameter chancge or e3ve.nt [/a.I he known ot unk nowxn.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged.

This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Water lex el toar top of active fuel is calculated at -1I58.4"'.

Although slightly moore e.the -I155"' t()P o'r top of actise fuel is provided for this [A/\1 to aid in operator recognition of" the ex ent.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-g&reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURESecondaix ( ONi AINMENI IN ILEiRI I Y not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment.

If CONTAtNMENT CLOSURESecondarx

(( ONTAIN MI[NI IN UI ~(iRI IFY is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity.

It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.

In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment.

If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment is challenged.

In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time 55 for pcri'ermaieneeef-actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/ or makeup equipment, and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG- 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

1119 and NUMARC 91 06~....r.ugh ......u. aproin ...... and... re..u.ling eva'lutians.

patiularly for a PWR. As thoat.th ability to manitor lee ....':;:thin the range required b perat...n.

pro.. d.r.. will.... n, t be pr..dur. n therCodae Sh -tdh And Reuln oesmyb2).cet(~.

nroe)ta tan ailobil f nsaley level idcfhh!hatins auchthate

'nthis leel alueg ten bedet'ecr mine during d Tin Cl fi:hur orom Refacumeln modifesthen, daenot iclue E : hI'~ (classificationf, il.be 56 Far BWR~ that da nat ha~e in~taIled rad;atkrn manitar~ capable afir.dieoting care unco~ery, alternate aite epecific level indicoxian5 of core uneovery ehould be uzcd if available.

Far EAL ft2.b aecand bullet Pac~t IMI accident ztudi.x indicated that the inctalled PWR nuclear trumentatian will aperate erratically when the care ic uncavered and that thic chauld be uced ac a teal fcr making euch determinatiaca.

Becauce BWR Scurce Range Monitor (SRM)nucleor inatrumentotiar.

detectara arc typically lacated belac; care mid plane, thia may nat be a viable indicatar af care uncavery for BWRe.Far EAL #2.b ~ird bullet Enter ~y "eitc epecific cump cn~'or t~k" levels that could be pected ta c~ge if there were a lace of inventary of cufficient magnitude to indicate core uneovery.

Specitie level valuec may be included if desired.For EAL #2.b fourth bullet Develapers chauld determine if other reliable indieptara exist ta identi~' fuel wleavery (e.g.. remote vie~ing ucing c~nerac).

The gcal Ic ta identify any unique or cite epecific indicatianc, nat already uced elce~vhere.

that will pramate timely and accurate emergency elaccificatian.

Far ~e Containment Challenge Table: Site chutda~ car.tingeney plane typically prcvide fcr re ectabliching CONTAINMENT CLOSURE fol!awing a lace afRCS heat remaval ar inventa~'

central functione.

Far "Explacive mixture", developer:;

may enter the minimum ear.tainment atmoepheric hydragen eaneentratian neecee~ ta cuppurt a hydragen bum (i.e.. the la~r deflagmtion limit). A caneurrent eantamment oxygen eancentratian may be included if the plant hac thia indicatiar.

available in the Central Roam.Far BWRs, the uce af eccondary cantainment radiatian manitarc chould pravide indication at increaced releoce that may be indicative af a challenge ta aecandary cor.tair.ment.

The "cite epecitic value enoulo ne cacco on tne nut'eacily recognizable and have a defined bacic.ECL Aceignment Attributee:

3. l.1.B ria'umum sate vaiucs cecauce mccc vajue.. are 57 CS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Note: The emergency director sheoild-\vill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. ....N....I ....E ...T CL SU~ Ctndar) (CON I'AINMLNTI IN'I LI' IU Y not established.

AND b. RPV level less thanL~ ~jte-speeific lev).(2) a. C......................Secondary CON FAINMXN I INTI (GRITY established.

AND b. RPV level less than I (I F4 ....

(3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• JNPlANNl4D leveI increase in aim ofrthc hdlowving of suf'ficient utagnitude to indicate core uncover}':

• (Site epecifie rZdiaticn monitar) reading greater than (site zpeeifie ',alue)* Ermtie ceuree range manitor indicatien

[PWRJ I LrUN PLANNED riEn.cr e ae in *zt petc~m n/rtn)i~~

tztiin* i~utner site ~peeiiic Inalepuens)

Basis: (ON IAINMN'ILI INTEiRIIFY:

IPrimary Containment per iTehnical Specification 3.6.1. t. Secondary Containment OPFRAHILL per Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.58 I NP I ANNt I): A parametecr change or an evecm thai is I to I ) thc rcsu It of an intended ev olutiion or 2) an expected plant rcsiponsc to a transient.

lhc caose of thc parameter changc or evecnt ma)bc known or unknowxn, This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of RPV inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control, or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant.These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and 4itis-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

\\ atci evel ibr top of activc fuecl is calcnlatcd at -1 58.44" Although slightiy niorc conscrxiitivc.

thc -1I55- li()P v'aluc tbr top of actix c Fetc is prox idcd Ibr this FAI, to aid in opcrator rccognition of thc evecnt.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If R-C-reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying..O....I....NT..........Sccondar) (ON I AIN MEN I' IN I E(IRIlY following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions.

The difference in the specified R-C--reactor vessel levels of EALs 1.b and 2.b reflects #the-fee~tlhat with CO1ITAP RTMEN~T..........

cc dax CON IAINMEN I IN I l;(RlI Y established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment.

In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time for pef~:c factions to terminate leakage, recover inventory contro1¢ or makeup equipment.

and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

Escalation of the emergency classification level ......d-be-;i4*uscs IC CG1 or RG I.dzp....n upan the a.'..unt of timzainc °:...u..d

..... r.z.cr t-, ....ri Lctz 17. SE nCY~ 91 2°8. N1JREcG 111~9 an-dI N! rMARC 91 06.59 that the a~biit t... :onito l .... ..ithin th. r....g .. r :.ire by. operating prs.cedures wi'll not be int........

Th"ie instrumentation ran'ge necessary3 to ....... implem..n...ti:n of opcrating prcdurermine y th me C dSutdong and,. Refuelin may. beo di cn (.g.., narrow.cr th ,n tht equi;Sctr, dwing moe higp!her thn aColdae Stdwn. Fcr AL #b th "sie spcifi levl'~ i.- " bee th otmI ftcRSlo.Ti doe wign andpertioEnte af "tcre ~cvfel ntramcn.tatn isnsuch tha.t thi-s leve valuc tnodeet b~e thasiiatithe c illben ac....mplisby hed! a',.... in acrdse .aith , E ... ft3... ... ...:...v.ail-a"biligy of tnhae lev.. l indicatin i... such tha thi level... valu can be.. deter,,n durin saete'..e shu !than mdesgor c'e~ndtios bto enatrethar.then spcifya nther meadeiepndent a- nd!abeFr cnfigurtoian stte drin ic the ls~.r- t n~evtel niaini phal.I h ein and opntf a aratian-'eEA trsb!acmplisr:ee!dhe

~ed in acodnewthe EAL te ).:d naaprree!-e f :'bminbtwe core... wil ,.incras.Ene a' ..sit... sp..ci.c radition m.......".th..ticould.be.

us df u detect cagnrde unoe;ad h saite iesecfcvle indicatecr ceey eee ;e"-.....ive

.a, are uncover. I s eagi 60 ide.tify'.

fel.......

un ......... .i.wi .u:I .amras... The geal. is t.a i..n.if. an uni. .. "ue ar site ....p:eifi indiAtiar;....

na already usedA elsewher,+.

t1,at w.ill pr.m.t tim÷ely. ond accurat For EAL il !.b "site specific le...el" is the, L... L, .... E ..CCS, ...uati. setpoint /Levetl I. Tha e I 1.. I ..L.. La L... [CCSP setaint; I ... l 1 w.... chesen beauseo it is a inetion systedmats w ould autm.tihaghesta and... ttmon tor readtor, RP. le.el. T .i.. ... a ....smignifcatly auv the Tiapr eaf! AcieFulTOFtrehd specified in teELt ul na EapLpr #e2.ForobrEato 2bTetwe monitor rpeadifi level thaudb ohe tap actiesfuelt.

F Fr[A # P.b fthat bullet Ashater lt!eve rinathen rea t-or vse lawarse hef !doseaten boreth care will incree. ... Ente n...site sp..cifi.

radiatian mecangter mothatcoul eue eetcr indiator and thre asnciatrd "sit spcfc au"iniaie fcr uRvr. ti ecie eCamLe Aa3n [Lmanito rending: mih e.'.t90 o9% fte ihs a.rt mni 61 CA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of RPV inventory.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheould-w'ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level less than (Lv2 aeualt (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in (zit ......i :¢u..... anda .....i.a. of the follow ing 1evels-due to a loss of RPV inventory=:

Basis: U NPI ;kNNI)D: A4 paramleter change or an event that ik not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

I he cause of the parameter change or exent nay be knowxn or nnknoxxn.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).

This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below (zt pcfi zz)35" (lecxel 2 actuation setpoint) indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a residual heat removal suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor RPV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing~04 2~~enR~62 changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS I If the RPV inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency IC CSI.D:vz!oper L-njeetisn systrems w.'ukl autamaticatty t.art. and is a ;valu.e significanqtly below: the Lw:, RPYP Fo.r EAL "ft,, The. typ and range ..f............i...trum .ntati ..n ma .ar durin... an outage as the planto mo-ves thro~ugh -various pe~rating modcs an'd.-r"fueling., ......luti+.on,"+....v--:'

partiularl imnplementation of operating provecdurcs in the Cold Sh'atdo';.an

".d Recfueling mo..des may be different (e.g., nr:"..rower) than that requi:red

.. durin .node than Cold. Su...÷. ..Enter any ...it. speci..c sump n/rtn" eesta c....... uld.......

be e.p..t.d.to.........i.ther..werAssig...ent Atr;ibutes:

3.1 .2I".B 63 CA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergencycsscential buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ACsent~iaBse l2E, 1il s I~ ite specifie emergency buses) for !15 minutes or longer.I ~ 17~J; Vu4IO~AC~

D~ueeIdoimation I D Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sCC 1-abic S 1 abho~c) that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power. including those necessary for eInerge~eycs, enrial core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergeaeyessential bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. 4-wsr-,When in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe-plwi.nt Fifteen minutes was' as n.i' flu threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level "¢,o,'ad-be

ian ses IC CS 1 or RS i.minimu,...m,, .. number cf aperating, gcncratzr

fur that .......t. pr-'idcaequae

.............

(. ... t oz .....pcit : ncrctcr .+izcd t fed AC" ..........

bu., the EAL md Ba+/-i 64 tAttup~ p'-cr tan th clactrinol diztrEA tio mayztcmrtd a S~aFETrY SYSt aEMS h that apertinc fthie anrd i can tr-al-le...

in .:a.:erdanc

i.,th ,-bnarmc. , ...r..n .apt.i......

prc-ducr , becn d" ei: n ; ba l a. .. id ent " r cpen:ee g:u:ideit (eay .FLEX~ eu pp.........

guieli LtL/.~eIgnmenL;uErInute;:

J.i.e.u 65 CA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheii4d-xs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than f2I2 F~site-speitfie Technical Spcif....

e ce.ld+ ...

.... pcr..... limit)"-:

for greater than the duration specified in the-f..........

bl I .. able (:2.... ......~ t~ .... .... -... .... o d .... ... .Table(k: RCS leal-nup Duration T~hreshohls R~-4M ~ CotINmt I C(;RI : Stautus "eat-up-iav o INtact butabc it reuced minutes*vR04PR1 eEstablished 2t mntes* If R aR RCist e a yte ci operationn ithim this time frame andPC teprteisbngcdcdte RAI, tips ueicbig Itueth A i e applicable.

(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site epci~fic preceure S(Thie EAL d-ces+ net apply duriSng "water :elid plant cenditie~n:.

[PIJR°])Basis: (t N I A INMI NI IN I lE(iRI I Yt Primary tontaiuntent

()I'l-RABI3II pcr Ilechnical Speciticat ion 3.6.1I I Secondars (ontainienct OlPI R \Itl I per "I ethnical Specilication 3,h.4, I, INPI .A\Nl~t).

A paranicter changc or an ev ent 1thu:t is nlot I ) thc rcsult of an intended cevolution or 2) an expelctd plant response to a transient, I he cause of the paramecter ehange or c,,cut nia)he k noss il or unlknqossn+

Vt4R~tsdtu&w*

66 This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety efhe-plan+.

A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

Ihe RtiS I leat-up Il)uration lhresholds table addresses the case wshere there is an increase in R(TS temperature.

the RCS is not intact, and Secondary (iO N 1 AINMIN 1 INrt!GRl IFY is not established.

In this case, no heat-uip duration is ici~.. (0 minutes).

Ibhis is because ! t the ev aporated reactor coolant max be released directly into the containment atmosphere and s ubsqtientlly to lie eiiviro me nt. and 2) Ihere is redutced reactor coolant invent ory abhove th~e top: of irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when.....T......E........SURE (O(N I AtNMI N I IN I EGRI INY is established but the RCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.tinal lx. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of C..N..AIN...E.T

..C ...SURE condar y (ON lAINMEN I INI K( R, I Y is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.

iin thc ease .hecre there is, an increas:e in RCS tem.'perature, the RCS is nct intact er is at redu...ced

..........

[PflR]. ,an CONrTAINM ENT CLOSU RESecandar'y CONTAINrMENT rINTEG"R-ITY is neat establishc ed, no h....at up .. duri is alle,;wed (i.e., 0 Thi:s is because subse....ntl.

to th.. "n.ir. nm..nt. and 2) there is, recd r...act...r ceolant inv'entoty abave th-e t-p ef ir"radaiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level wevu~d-be

ia*uses IC CSl1 or RSl1.* ,here indicateda.

The RCS sheuld beo eansidared intact ar net intact in acccrdaaaee with site Far EAL fi2 The ....spcii resue radng shud he thea..........

chng in. pressu....t..t e~ be acc.ratel determine usingur insalld nstruenttin bu etls ta 0 67 Lo3 ^of .H o: ...... A number o.f

.... t. ..........

icn :-o:--;'cxing.

atcam cay h....t. ......... ,o loot and. co.rc unco;'cr, .......ur. NR.C a:nay::c ohbo;w that there arc rcq:ucncco that con oause core unco~very in 15 t o 20 minutco, _an .......... ,or ........ :ithin n pro-"ded by Goncric Lc,".cr 88. 17 anrd bclie-ved to bc conocr.-Containment barrier to fiooicn pro~duct relceoc io comb!iohed.

'ative niven that a low prezoure ECL Aooizrnment Attributeo:

3.1.2.13 68 CA6 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)

• Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:

• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: tl;XPIOSIO)N:

A rapid. ,,iolent and catastrophic failure of a piece of cquipment due to cobtfl stion. chemical reaction or ox erpressuriiation.

A release of steam tfl'oi high energy lines or components) or an electrical component ihilure (causcd by short circuits, grounding, arcing, cet. I should not autoalnuicallx, be considered an explosion.

Such exenis may require a post-es cot inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FRIRF,: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drixe belts or ox erheated electrical equipment do not constitute F'IRES. O)bscrx ation of" flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed.SA.FEVTY SYS l'IM: A system required tor safe plant operation, cooltng doxsn the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdoxxt condition, including the [('CS. These are typically systemts classified as saztyt-related.

VISIBIJ," I)AMA(iE:

D~amage to a component or structure that is readily observable ,aithout measurements, testing, or analy sis. I he visual impact olf the damage is sufticient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected comtponent or structure.

69 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product harrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety[Al. 1.a identifies hazardous events that could result in damage to plant systems. A seismic event is indicated

")3 entry into IC 11t12. Flooding is indlicatedl by a significant increase in w,\ater levels (external or internal).

I ligh winds are indicate~d by sustained winds at the site meteorological tower exceeding 35 mph, The first threshold tbr EAL l.b4- addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation, since indications for it will be readily available.

The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.[he second threshold for EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.

Operators will make this determination based on...........

e~h I .l available event and damage report information.

This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level ;weu44.be-;'4auses IC CS 1 or RS I.For (ait' peeifie hazards).

devc!per:

sha'uld ecen:der including e~ther zignifiean , ..... owp..ifie-hazar-dz te the bul!eted !Iist eantained in EAL l.a (e.g., a seieh4)",uc..ar .........

pln SAET SYSvcvTEM are comprised zfw r+ m.... r... epame .ad trains c~f e.3uipmnt in accordance -with site desig7n criteria.ECL Assig:7nment Aifributes:

3.1 .2.B 70 CUl ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shejild-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than lower limit ot'lhc controlling lcvel band for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.

AND b. UNPLANNED lcve! increase in (site. specific sump :and/r tank) lcvcaany, oF the folloxxing:

Basis: UN P1 ANNE[): A paraneter change or an ex cnt that is no t I) ihc result oFan intended cvohloion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, lhc cause of thc parameter change or cvcnt otax be knlownt or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef the. ~a~t.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled.

An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented.

This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.71 The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level 4ia-using either IC CAl or CA3.the generic warding i.s adequaec t.. ene ure anda timcy ar if .....nt ca b... includ,..ed

..thcut m..raking the EAL ............

un:iely e- pat....a..

i"ea .... t.....wi:th atien. tha.t may be take durin"'g an outage. If epci~ti.e zetpei~nte are incude,d+...

th.z..,aul EA ft 2.b Enter any et pcteem "nd:or tank..l.....that

..................

be ...............

eth.r. we're a Ieee Cf (i.e.. t.he Let inv....nt

..ry .woul ...t.r t.he hated. .... ar tank!).I.lCl Ae" ......t A-ttri-u,,*

..... .1 72 CU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all but one AC power source to effiege~ieyc.>scnhial buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: INote: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability to 4160VA E I 1JE12, J/(*ie s ...cific ...........

b,.u., is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.c~n~fled( 3~;V~ 416OVAsm~atInf~m~a~n Gqsu~au~md ( 33~ vi~ 4160 vAC ~uuili~ ~uies 1nfcm~at~oo]

Basis: SA!I;IY SYS'I t".: A s) stc~m required Ibr salb plant npcration, cooling dm>xn thc plant andior placing it in Ihc cold condi ion, inclidingi th t!CC S. Those arc tvpic:al!\

S~ VScms classilied as saVL'ny-rc~latcd.

This IC describes a significant degradation of off'site and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source ( scc lablc S1 ahtwci may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.

When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. 44t*When in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-efthe pl--n:.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an effergefe.%ycsscnlial bus. 8eime-Examples of this condition rFerte belew,includc:

73

• A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emefgelieyesscnti~al power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).

• A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emefgencyy.sscntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emrgene~ycsscntial buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.

• A loss of merege*neycsse~ntial power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of em~ergenyessniaI buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen ' .... ..., minutes ...........

d as ai, the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA2.mi'!im~um number of operating gcneratars nec;c."y~

f,.ar,. t.....t .....our.e to pr-..:idc required po;;er to T-h..e ..it. speci.....

em-erg'en........ -b,-a,.. e .s, are the buses fod by, offeite or emergency, AC power sources is typiFcally I emergency bus per train cf S.AFETY SYSTEMS.De-'elopers should the bulleted examples pro; ided in the basis ...ti.n above. as. n eeded to reflect their site specific pl-+ant ; d ..i.n .and ..pabilitie.

..ingle pow.er source, For examplFe, three independent 315k-V' offite powver circuits (i.e., that operation cf this sorc L: regnized in AOPc and E.... or byn einbssacdn re...p.n...

guideline. (e.g. FLEX guidelines).

Suc..a. v r .....ud c~cayme the "Alternate ac sou.rce"'

definition pro-vided in 10 CFP. 50.2.At multi": .... unit stations, the........

ma c......t comp......~

m .easures that arc-and._affected unit via a cross ne to a companion u-nit may credit thL pe..er surce in the EAL arov'!ded that the planned cross tic stratce-v meets the recui~remnts .of 10 CFR. 50.63.ECLP .A,-".......

n 3.1.1 .A 74 CU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheould-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than

-4" v' !(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: IINPI ANNI ): A parameter change or an ce' nt that is not I) thle result of an intended ceolution or 2) an expected planm response to a transient.

The cause oF the parameter change or event nay he known or unknown.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-of~he-plant~.

If the RCS is not intact and COT-'xrA

...... )ONlAIN LNT IN I'EWRI I'Y is not established during this event, the emergency director shoai4-will also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, sieh-tbowhcer reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications.

During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled.

A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions.

and operators wvild-heare unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

Fifteen minutes wa-s' eleeted-asis a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

75 Escalation to Alert ..... i d-,be-........

ses IC CAI based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.ECL Asignment, 3.1. i.A 76 CU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: INote: The emergency director shetdd-will declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Indicated voltage is less than i.~~ilcbsvltg

'lc on Spc 52 ~1Z2~ for 15* minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. T-usv-,This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e~f he-plan:.As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.

For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.

Fifteen minutes selected nz ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level w, il4-dbe-;4auses IC CA I or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Develeper Nete=: ncaeaary fcr adequate opera~tian af SAFET SYSTEMvequipment.

This alto'age "alu' ....uld; .... .....arl.. e a margin" ..... at leact... 15 minutes of aperatian bfcfre the aneet af to. operte m~nlmu'.m valtage ic apprax:matel, 1......l..

per cell.Li'~aaIgnmemAttrIcutea:

a.i.i.r'.77 CU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: Plhnt telephones (Includes lardo ired and nA ireless)Plant page Plant radio systems (,gite apeczfic !!'t eaf czmm:,n'i:ntoan:

methndea)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: INN (I t enrgneQ Notification Newo ork)( ommerejal phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: I-NS on Federal Iclecornmunecataon., Sxstem (F Commercial phones (o.it"'

liat cf cemmunicntizna raetheadL)

Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.

While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipments-relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points-; individuals being sent to offsite locations,-ete.).

EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.

EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration.

The OROs referred to here are the State of~ieorgia.

Appling ('ount\..left l)avisC (oont\. I atnallI Count) and I oombs (ountmt. .........

v-.pc .......), EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.

78 EAL ft I The "cite cpeeifie lict cf concmunieaticnc methcd' ehoold include all communicatione metho&~ uced far routine plant communicatione (e.g., commercial or Site telephones.

page party zyetcmc, radioc, etc.). Thiz licting ohould include inztal!ed plant equipment and componente, and not itemo owr.ed and maintained by indkidualo.

EAL #2 1k "cite epecific lict of communicationo methode" Thould include p1! communicatione methode uced to perform initial cmergdnoy notificatione to OROc no deocribed in the cite Emergcney Plan. 1k licting chould include inatalled plant equipment and componento.

and not:temo owned and maintained by individuaL.

Eeainpl~ methodo are ring duwn'dedieated telephone linco. commercial telephone linec, radioc, oatc!litc telephonec and interact baced communicationo technology.

In the Bacio section, incefl the cite opecific licting of the OROc requiring notification of an emergency declamtion from the Control Room in accordance with the cite Emergency Plan, and typicalh' within 15 minutec.EAL #3 The "cite opecifie Hot of communicationo methodo" chould include all eammunicationo methodo uced to perfcrn'i initial emergency notiticatieno to the NRC ~ deocribed in the cite Emergency Plan. The licting chould include inc~Ilcd plant equipment and component.

and net itemo owned and maintained by individualo.

Thece methodo are typically the dedicated Emergency Notificatlen Syctem (ENS) telephone line and commercial telephone linec.EC L Ac:ignme~nt Attribuate,:

3.l.1.C 79 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS UNUSUAL EVENT E-HUI Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Op. Modes: All 80