NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 4

Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 4

ML16071A166
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110 ML16071A126 ML16071A132 ML16071A136 ML16071A137 ML16071A140 ML16071A144 ML16071A146 ML16071A147 ML16071A149 ML16071A150 ML16071A152 ML16071A153 ML16071A158 ML16071A160 ML16071A166 ML16071A170 ML16071A174 ML16071A176 ML16071A180 ML16071A181 ML16071A184 ML16071A185 ML16071A187 ML16071A188 ML16071A193 ML16071A195 ML16071A198 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4 ... further results
References
NL-15-1898
Download: ML16071A166 (49)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:RUI ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the OI)CM,'site ..... ic r....... c ......... d:-- ......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sho*i,.v ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY o" the effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the ,,-: .....:. .......n ,ca~ cc......... , d": umzr.... ..t)( X 'l limits for 60 minutes or longer: Y '.mct !!_ ____'_ 3)Z (2) Reading on ANY ot" hc fb~olvo ing effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.Iw f(- 3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the ()l )(iM(Atcw..,:' ......... z .......t r.l....... ... .ot~ln dzcm.......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of plant safety efte theplan as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.45 c~~mq~{ ]~ RJ.buitorC~IciiIatjons L ~YZ~R4 ~b~Ia~a~ Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. .--urthz,u ...... ar .administrative controls are established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment "s-ini,4iea4P'e -ofindicatcs degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are to provide a basis for classify'ing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases sheald-will not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL # 1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level -we't-!dbe -a4auses IC RAI.Th.hnV. al ................... (RETS) l ar ...... pla t ht az mpane G nzi ,.-r890'Y h 46 pr...... i n the RE. TS or .C...t... recognized that a calculaqted EAL i valu may..b. blowi ....what .. th m ..nit.r an. ra: i that ....., the ..nit. do n ...... nee to be included inth +l.ist.identify any' limitations on the ase or a-vailability of these monitors.Some,, .ite. may .... .. find it ad:rantageous ta address gaseous and-' liquid releases with+ .....p....atev-. .....in 2:.. times a relas ........ imit_. The controlling document typically de....ibes methodologies. fcr detenniningm ...u.n r.adiatio

m. nit. se ...i..;"" th~es

• e,, should Part 20 and 10 CFR. Part, 59 Appendix I) related guidance.EAL #2 i .alu. in thisEALsuld.......2 times the sctpoint byt'*he radioactivi!ty discharge permit to w;arn of a rele-se that is not in complia-nee -with the specified De .. -velope sho..,..uld" research radiation mo~rtor design documents or other infor-mation displa ...nge. ofu th ........... "d 2) there are no automatic feamares that may render the monitor reading invalid (e.g.. an auto purge trggre at.. p....icular indictioleel)

Itisreogizd ha te onitondecrbe by this .. C may .. rslt in a..rad ...logical.estimate&'ealculated monitor is greater than approximately, 1109% of the highest accurate monitor readring, then may choose not to include the. monitor as an. indication -nd Man licenses...d. not.. have capabi!!i'. For those that do, the capab!!li' may not be within M an l..icensees. do^ not ha.e this capability. For those that do. these" monitors may not b controlled and malnta'ned to the ....e level as pln equipment,..... or within...the...cope .of the.lan Tie T i. n k_^... ...... zr...+- e~fie I me~e. .ecd~ a-. ir. the site emer~rgeny -'~ .c~..... ;--'- h "" dd-" ese 47 TcThnizQI Spzcificatizn~. In addith~n, rz~dingz may b~ influ~nc~d by cmir~nrnznt~ ~r othr foztcr~. A Iizcn~ may rcguzzt tc inzIud~ an EAL using a pzrim~t~r mznit~ring ~y~tcm~up~rz~al ;~1I b~ ~znsidzrcd an a ~a~z b~, ~ b~ziz.t'. L ~zIgnrnznt

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I. i .11 48 RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (I) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: PcSH1,n62 rt~cal (lJ~5E\Q2 AND\b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors..I ~...i:tiF;c!q Ido zfarea radiaticn Basis: I NPI ANNIfl): A parametecr chanec or an cvcnt that is not I ) thc rcsult of an intended cxolution or 2) an expected plant responlse to a transicnt. lhc caosc of thc paramcter change or exent be or urilkno'vn. RI I- I: 12 ,N( i P l\ IIIWAY: "I]his includes the reactor retucl cavits the tfuct trans l'r canal. and thc s pcnt Iidc pooi. canals and pools through wvhich irrad iatcd lmci may be mno\ d. but not including the reactor xessel.This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition eeuld-can be a precursor to a more serious event and is-a4so inieaJ4'e-efndicatcs a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety -f the -pant.A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation. Other sources of level indications fmay-include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available). A significant drop in the water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

• i i iiiiiii : Ji! i ii: iiii!iiiii i i l 49 The effects of planned evolutions shead-ill be considered.

For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level "-'au14be -'!=uses IC RA2.applicabiliry ef a indi.cati.n if it is noet a-ailabl!e in all modes.i.Ther "sth e ....p.epcifc lis of ar" raditi. monit.r.. sh.ould ccnta..in ths a ..... radi..ation... dep~enden~t, or o~ther con~trolled but temporary, radiation= moni.to~rs. Speif ..h. md...... apli..bility of: a articula.r monitor i.f it is net a-vailable in. all mode's.ECL Assia.:nent A.ttributes: 3.1.! .A an.d 3.1.1 .B 50 74 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CGI Loss of(-r'eeeoe CSI Loss of~ceeete* CA1 Loss CUI UNPLANNED.. ..[ PW, '?rU ; ] cr v e e !/'.C S [oP W ] ... .... tz o,'R [ D !I R ] C r l s f e a e inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory. ...o>RPt4~wmRt1 RPV fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold inventory for 15 containment removal capability. Shutdown, Refueling minutes or longer.challenged. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all but offsite and all onsite one AC power source AC power to to emergency buses for emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.15 minutes or longer. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled De fueled CA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCS cold shutdown, temperature. Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling,_____________ _____________ _____________De fueled CA6 Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Op. Modes:" Cold__________________________Shutdown, Refueling 51 CG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition: Loss of (eco .............. [PR ... r .P.[....... inenor affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheoitdwill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. (Racz .......... 1/R [.... t er-J RP .[B.HuR1) P level less ta j 4 js~petel~e)for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table C l-(see-.ee... (2) a. ...... .'eccL'RCS. .. [ ..... r RP .. [B ,RJ)R\" level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: fl41~ -*Err:atic ccuarcc rnnae monitor indicatioen

• UNPLANNED inercooc magnitude to indicate e-s~eei*1~

~Fe-uRee~efy oump anoor IpOL) te 'eto or ouuieient* tUttier cite syccitic indications) AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table C lI -beow*...(:onitainmenit Challenge T[able C!I tiONTAINM!NT 1+(I.OSURI7 NOT established* E:xplosi, e mixt~ure inside containment (.iliiciPresur 52

• If CON FAINMENT CIOSURE is re-cstabtished prior to exceeding the 30 minute time limit, then declaration ofta General Emerg~ency is not required.* CONTAINMENT CLOSUR.E nat
• UNPLANNED rnzr;:-,=

in Fre~are CON AI 'N Ml I:;' CI ,()S IRB: ler ( )perating Procedure 14210->1/2, Containment Btuilding Penetrations Verification --Retueling NI NLANi -.tl) A parameter changc or an1 eve.nt that is n/otl It)he result of an intended e\,ohluioti or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or e'~enlmnay be or unknow'n.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.[~he site-specific pressure at xshicht CONI AINMNINl is considered ehallenged may ehangc based on the condition of the ('ONIAINM!SNI'. If the Unit is itt the eold shuttdo~xn mode and the CON I'AINMENTf is fully intact then the site-sp~cific set point is the CONTAINMENT design pressure (52 psigt. This is consistent with typical owsner's groups Emergeney Response Procedures. With CON I'AINMENT CLOSURE established intentionally' by the plartt staff in preparations for inspection. maintenance, or refueling the set point is based on the penetration seals desigtn of 13 psis.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity. In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be 53 possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading. as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether ef-oe-containment is challenged. in [!Al, la. RVI ,IS is used to determine when reactor wat cr level is less than I'OAlF. RVIIS indieation is only axailable during Mode 5 up to the point of reactor head disassembly, prior to Mode ( entry Once RVI IS becomnes una\x ailable classiiecation of IC ((il is accomplished in accordance o ith l;A I 2.In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for perfer -*.nee e4Lactions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/ or makeup equipment. and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitorx. ,~ ........... t'oiPR" Z'r .DR.P ... [B Rl \P level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they e in.ia4'e-:e .......ondicatc leakage from the (r............rt '.'s,,/RC [ -'S .... RPV [BIIhRl)R\.; These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Acciden:t analyses that fuel damage may aecur within ane hcur of unees cry depending upan, ,th .....moun chime since shutd.-ow-m"'- re.fcr tc G.n.r. Lett, 8 1. SE,- CY, 91 283 RF G interrupFted. Trh instrumentation range .......'......pp... implem....t..

-- ap ......n For cedre in

.. C:l Sutw i ... refueling.,ades may ... differen t. n than.54 F'or 2.b fir. b..I. t k.l A s wat.. r +. in- the r,...+, ...... I I ....., the dA..... rat a.i, e th.el.uneovor and-!m_.-! th assoit_ ,r+i.c spcifi ....lu..... iniatv .... corg unc, .It.. i£ r.....gniz-ed.. dipa rneo th ....!e redtia monitor+.... In hoe cse, EAL....+ values ..h.uld b+ e xampleadn EAL monitor+ reading! bn.e sEtAtL0 to 9',5' of the highest acr~ate mniet or r. dn... Thi... r.. i.i.n............... ... i....h............ ....cflte torg r..ading .. i .,r , than Appoimatel 110%+ ofll. the++ highes .:accurat ++.nitor readingA.tk+ then.devloper may ho alternate pcificcclel indications fc f care neeysoudb.sdifaal Far- E A 1f. second:. bu.llet Post..-. TMJ1* acciden stude indiated the-I. instlle PWR, nuc...lea... i-r....mnata will ....r... !ratcally wh~en th. caru~'eris uancovred n tha thi: ...... d Fa+'r EAL #2.b thirdh bu-let Ener any citr spcific:um leel!ab nb+s tha t caldb expetedt change... if we.... lo... s af ffieien -- to i+ndiat core.u.............Spifclvlvuema be....in... luded... if de-sitred. ar!fc-ctca .. E........u.t bullet. De...........h.uld dt. er- in- i... .. ot : r....able .nd ator.: exist i..entif...fuel un:r (e.g.. + -" .... remote ......n using cam ,,ras.. :'Theoai identify uni:*:....ite..peci....indi.ation.. nat=- ..lr.ady us ...d le hee that.. ill.p....t..ti ..l ..and .a ..urat emergency cla.i.. cti.... ... ........ .......... ...... ....ECL Assienment Attributes: 3.1 .1.B 55 CS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition: Loss .. ........~ cel~R~CS [oPWo] cr x RPM[BYR)R nvntr affecting core decay heat removal capability. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)SNote: The emergency director sl,,o4dwill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. AND b. ,. ... ......, (R. ttct c- vc,,cL',CS [PI.'? c RPM~t level less than 4'(2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. AND b. (R......... /c,-,S [Pr] cr RPM on B J .... level less than U IO', P $VLI qi eeie-le (3) a. (Rac .............. tP~ ... zr ...PM ... [B ,RI)V level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• - Erra-tic zourcz ranga .m.ni'tcr i:ndiaeticn Basis: C )NlIAINNIIIN CLOSl. Rt-: Per Operating Procedure 14210i-12, ( ontaiiinent l~uildiing Penetratio~ns Veri lication-Refiueling m 4 56 I !NPI,.A.'NNl:

A parariicir change or an exceiit hat is not I )thc result of ani intended exolution (of 2) an expected plant rcsponse to a lransicnt. Thc causc of thc parameter change or event ma3, hc knoxx n or unknoxx n.This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of (reactar .... IPU' o?,,, ar R.PtM'inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed fet-to protectii-e~f the public and 4k*,s-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup,'decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.In lIAtos I.a and 2.a thc specified levels rcprcscni rcactor vesscl lcvels that arc loxxer tharn thc mnonitoring capahility of R( S Itxel instrumcntation a.nd thcrclorc must hc' ionitorcd using RVI.IS, Ilhis level xxill only hc obscrvable in Mlode 5 xx ithi RV I IS in opcration. In Mlodc 6 or xx hin RVI IS is not ini opcration thc It) should bc cevaluatcd suing I-Al. 3.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs 1 .b and 2.b reflects, heflaet--cthat with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment. In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for pre:aneefactions to terminate leakage, recover inventory controll/(r makeup equipment. and/or restore level monitoring. Th nblt omonitor (rac ............... t .....J .r.... [B,',*lR , IV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they a':-nd;e-*-'e-......e~f-indicate leakage from the (reaoctr [PWRP] or RP" [Bu"hlR])RPV. These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-! 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... 4-n-,cx ICCIorRl dcpni..... upc tc ............. ..... idncc htda;;n; rcf'cr tz .....i L:tz 8 , 17. SE -zCY,, 91"2,O/ "Url ID I]AR9 06 ~ 57 The~v ....... n... r......f R,,, .......... l .in Olru .......... may var dur. n on .... s the plant~procedures in the Cold Shutdown'. and Refueling modes may be d......nt (-e .g......... than-PWR is the level! at 6" below the bottom ID af the reactor ves~sel penetration and n~ot thes low paint at dependent and,'or configu-ration during which the le...l is applicable. lf the dete..rmine at..+ .... tim d~zuring Cold shudw rRfuln , then do n+ + +ot include E... #1, For EAL #2b The ".: ite specifiA level" should.. be'- appr... imat..l. th top... of actv fuel. If the...i-availabilit .. f "on:- scal +'+ICmy indctnisuh tat th diseve v'alueca beydeo rind " du.. rin coesudw oe rcniin.bt171 natothrsthe pe ify themod dependent ani...n..iguainsatdrn whic tht leve indic+ aton_ c o/appl I d ...i.. an .p.ration during Cold ShutdL onitor Refuelng mod.,.th.n.d.......n.lud .... #, ................ wi.l.be in.. acordance.. with+ .... #3).fh ot÷o cdm i+...ForEA #3.b first bullet AcO water h:level i them react. vesel lowe1r- the- .. dc .. .rate abov the.cTr will4k+ incr... Ene a... "cite radiation ..nit. r b uced to.. detect; cor un'-cery and ":.it cpceifie va=lue"% indicatv lof care u=1ncovezry. In tt is ! recognizd thaindce appoxmael u 110%' of thecihighct!v vacue+ mniay re i!ading, the d~sievd. er a co 58 Far EAL ItIt tourtfl tutL~t UV.'etaiwrc chauld determine The goal Ic ...... :n....identify fuel uncavery (e.g., rernate viewina ucir.s cameras).Far EAL il l.b "site specific level" is the Law: Lav L~w' ECCS a.o'-.t.an !L.... I... Th-e Bra:.' Law.. L....ow -..... atu:at.c ....in /.-: .Lee ....w.... cha~cn beas ti injeetian sy:t~em.s "aul-d au-tamatically and a~empt te restore RPV level. This is a RP.P--ater la-vel -alu..e that is observable belovw the Lcw- LwLe'v,,.el, 2 specified in IC CAl1, hut si!grifieant-

l. .. .a -ave th Ta af ., A ctiv , Funel (TAF epecifled in EAL/#2.For EAL "#2.b The "site specific !c-vel" shoul:d be for the tap af active f'-el.F:.uar EA 4#3 .b firct bu.llet. Ac wa1..-.te le... in the reato r vecce.,~l law.., the dase. the un..........r.y.

and' ,the. a.... "cite. ......i ..'" indicativec of crer unce-very,. It ic recagnized dipay m ng!-e afthe ienctalldrao .=!di:ation moia.Ind thoentf c=as~ec, EAL valueshau!d.b d Ftrmined with- a magi cufent to-'e ncur!ed thadot an accurate mapiarbreadfingdicaatilale Far Fr EAdig Th.c prvca. e'natwiHthBctaudise if the esour e~cac lne ...... an..t.. r ueadig reae na t.....in...lu -de thecntoras are indicatian an~cd idetif an... alerat EAL.. thr° aibl idcabntion of mor ntae ca'uld ber eWpec ldi h ALt ul na pp.raelvl For...' thatrd- "n.at hav installed 'tian monitorscapbez magntde indicating, core Cr cite epecifie indicatians, emergency claaciflctaian. ReId ilready uced elcewbere, that will pramote timely and accurate ECL Accignmer.t Attributec: 3.1 .3.B 59 CA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Loss of (eco ............. tRC m, [ --'R or R-- [Bt.... )RPV inventory. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director ehouldxs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of (reactor v'eo:eL'.RCS [P or RPM [3W!,RI)RPV inventory as indicated by level (2,. Raco ......... eozR~CS [PwR or RPM ,/p])RpV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND b. UNPLANNED increase in IR L~Tw....@ T : j:;; zit" "pzf m a4o a levels due to a loss of' (r..t. ,- ...... ,o,.- [PIUR1 or RPMt... IBJ ,RI)RP inventory. Basis: U.N~qlANN!EI) A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the rcsuli of an intended exolution or 2) an expected plant rcspxmse to a t'ansient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be knowvn or onknoxxn.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below ,he bottom It) of the RC8 l~oop setpoint ( 6"') indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and(r....ct ..r vzoe.l/RCSc, [P1RIou,,,r [Bll/P])RPV water level. The 187' 6" level specified in the [AIL is the minimum RCS level fbr RIIR operation as outlined in the procedure fbr mid-loop operations, lelow this level, loss of RI IR pump net positive suction head (N P8t1)may occur resulting in a loss of'decay heat removal capability. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a Residual Heat Removal suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor (reactor .....oeL'R-[DCS t[PuOlJ .. e"DOlr 0M[RR1RP lee a be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an 60 Sli '~t~ C0ua is~ueS ~T w~tr inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they e............. indhcatw leakage from the (reactor ye cel/RCS PR r or+ R. M [, WR]t... ~)RP.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CSI If the, ... (raco [tIR] o.o,,- r RP. Mz o, 131R1)Pv inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency wveu44-be-v4euses IC CS1I.For EAL If I the "cite .epecifc lev'c' chould be baed on either: standard operationally significant cetpcint .at .whicht .... (typicall pr...... E~~rCCS cysctems, wVoul.d aut+omaticlly t.a rt and- is a.. 1au ...ignifiant÷ly bcla th.e l RP..MDt w ,ater lev'el RPS aetuatior. in IC CU!1.[Pru~l "rThe minimu ... l.wa..l. +tha ........ .p.rati. of !!aly uc~ed deca h... at remov-al cysterns (e.g., PRccidu.al Heat++ Remo.-al or Sh'utdo-,n Cooling). If,"mu'ltiple levels exict ...... ifyh each-< al...g wih ...the.. ..... ;.. apr1r..t.m.d or conigr.ation ...peI.,+ncy For DI! EA ....Th. :+,e and range t of- RCS++- 1÷.el i....m..a... m"ay÷+I vary duI.gan out.IIAg ac ...... plant + movec ;,+, .. .+- through a,,ouc pcrat.n .......and.refueling ........nc palicl f +or+. a PWR .Ac app.prat to+ thei~ plan deign..,+,, , alternat meanc deterinin RCS level a difer- t (.g., narr....er). tha that_ requir..ed during modec higher than Cold cS.,,t ....Enter any, "scite epecifiec ump and/r tank" le;'elc that cou.ld be expected to inerc-c if there w'ere a !occ of in.ventory (i.e., the lost inventory wo'uld enter.th li.te sum_ ...... ECL AXscienment At'tributec: 3.1.2.B 61 CA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sheJviII declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1I Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ("e ...specif-ic I2AAI2Q1 or 15 minutes or longer.2 DL usest() Ill_.l Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sec [able S I abowc) that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Pt~is-wWhen in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety -f the-plant. Fifteen minutes wtcz zze~etcd az ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level weald be-*iauses IC CSl1 or RSl1.Develeper Netes: minmu numbwer sofur ertat hin....g .geetr .......... fa th.t.................................... an A.C emergency bue. Fc ........ ifo b"ekup powe ............ ic compriced af tw-e .......... 62 that, supply paw:.cr ta thc c!lcctrical d'ctri-atian zy,'tcm thazt p.o-.c.r: SAFETY SYSTEMAS. Th~rc.that. cpr"a.in af this sc'.rce i's eont.rclld in with abnarnus! zr emerg~ncy opcruting pracedres, "-' or... ",. ignt-. ba~,sis acidentG... rpn uilns ........... FLEX~t supr udln...SuA!... ch [++++ pewer sources sh+ul gcncra......t th "A terat ..... scrc ...e+f+"Initi prc+idd 10 Atm liu i ttc s t.... ....... s........ crdi .ape sar ........... ..hat ...a ..[CLI A Attribut1s: 3.. 2.1"I, 63 CA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheatdwill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than Tz~chnical Specification cold. s~hu-tdow:n temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in the following table.Table (2: R1(S leat-up Duration Thresholds R(S Status Uontainmenct Closure Status Ileat-up D~uration Not Intact Not Established (0 minutes (or at reduced inventors I Established 2(0 minutes*~Intact ihut not at reduced iniventory) Not applicable hi minutcs** If an RCS heat renmoxal sy'stem is in operation within this time frame and [RCS temperatture is being reduced, the EAL. is not appticable. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (aite, zpccific prcaaurc rcad'ing) I 0)psig. (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.-{4rWR) Basis: CI,( SlIRtE: Per Operating Procedure 14210-1/2. Containment B~uilding Penetrations Verification -Refueling , NPI,.ANNE:I): A parameter change or an evenut that is not I ) the restult of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, the catuse of the parameter change or event ma3 he knowan or unknow~n.This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of patat safety e4 he plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion, above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. l he [RCS tteat-tip lDuration Thresholds table addresses the case w\here there is an increase in R(CS temiperature, the [RCS is not intact or is at reduced inventory, and CON fAINMN N'I CILOSURE is not established, In this ease, no heat-up duration is allowed (i~c.. 1) minutes). This is becatuse I ) the evaporated reactor coolant ma3 be released cdireeth3 into the Containment 64 atmosphere and subsequently to the env ironment, and 2) there is reduced reactor cool'ant inventory ahoxe the top o1 irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e~g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.Finally~. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame shudwill allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the ease w'here there is an ine~ase in RCS temperature, the RCS is nat intact or is at dur..... is ! allow;ed (i.e., 0 -minut..) This is. becu. ....) the ev'aporated r........ coolan ..ay b.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level ..... IC CSl1 or RS 1.For EAL #! Enter the "'site specific Specification zcold shu:tdo;; temperature limit"".where indicated. The P.CS shoul:d be c.ensidered intact or n.et intact in acee~rdanee site For PWRs, this IC an"d its asse~ciated LALs address the co~ncerns raised by, Generic Letter 88 17, Lo~ss ~f Decay Hea: Remov-'!. A numbe of.,.t pheno.n....h.a pesr i ....... e., ........, steam..g......r tubel dr.ai.ning RCS leae!difeel e epeatingata mid ee condition';. decay.decay heat rme=;'a! is leet a~nd core unce;'eU .an....... NRC .na.y.e sho... that..there..ar. .... by Generic Lec 1o,7 belie.e..t. be eenscr.'ati;ve given that a lo~w preseure ECL As;signment Anrinute.s: 3.l.i 65 CA6 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)

• Intemnal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:
• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: tLXPIi:OSION:

A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment duc to combustion. chemical reaction or o\erpressurization. A release of steam (fr~om high energy lines or components) or" an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding. arcing.etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events mayv require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes ohma explosion are present.FIRIL: Combustion characterized by' heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute H'RES. Observation of tiame is preferred but is NOV required if large quantitis of smoke and heat are observed.SAFELfY SYSTIA'E: A system required for sate plant operation, cooling dossn the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the 3C.CS+ Tllese arc typical ly systems classified as safety-related. V ISI 1B1E DAMA~t : lDamage to a component or structure that is readily observable wvithout meaksurements. testing, or analysis, t'he visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.Damage-to a :;tractate containing SAFETY SYS'TEM,, ef+uf..eiet

visual impact toena d.. ubt a b.e. t the..+, operability' SAFETY SYSTEMS, ..'thin the c,- ....... Exa.... ino "ud p.a.tial er total 66 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety 1'he Birst threshold tbr EAL 1.b4 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation since indications for it will be readily available.

The indications of degraded performance shi v-ill be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.lThe second threcshold for EAL 1 .b,2 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the-tete~ity"-efall available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level w¢,e'ad-be

"4euses IC CSl1 or RS 1.Nu-cle.?r pa--er plant SAFETY are eamprised .ftwf at'- r mere separate and redu-nda.nt trains af equipment, in accarda.noc

":ith ci.te epecifiedc iesg:. criteria.ECL Assc.gnment Attribu.toc: 3.1! .2.B 67 CUl ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of ............. t'zc/C [..... jr R.... [BRb,, inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)Note: The emergency director 4i0*Idwill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in (r.......... [PR ro r RP Mz f-441R-)RPV level less than a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. (R....t.r .......... [PR ..r. RP... [Bw.RI),RV level cannot be monitored. AND b. UNPLANNED increase in t~ R o t ri~Tn*i0 W tI T)levels.Basis: lN P1 ,ANN t): A parameLter change or an event tha t is not I ) the result ofan intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. I he cause of the parameter change or eventlnmay he known or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor (reactor .....o'cetc'RCS. I-P UJR. " etr RPVf[4lR])RtPV level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef*.he plait.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required (raL .......... [.....]J ....r om tRP [uSWjRf)PV' level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.68 EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine r....... S [PJVRJ c D vr, RP level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are............ finhcatw leakage from the (r.......r .....RC [o,- RI r RP .. [WJRP V.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level either IC CAl or CA3.69 CU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels:[Note: The emergency director sl,,otdwil, declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability to {she~ sp.ezitic emergency busez)B!jll ~l2AP is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.~~uiaM4ppI mM~W~Bm.DRwm8 I* iil J Basis: 'SAIlt1. I SY S f l M: A s stem required htr sa1b plant operation. cooling the plant and or placing it in the cold shudo tdx~n condition. inclIodine the ICS f ( hesc arc t\picalix systnms classilfied as, safeix -related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources (see I1 able S1 ahovel any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e4f thpe. Fa+.70 An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Seffl-e! xamples of this condition ar epre~e1nted

• A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
• A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
• A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selectcd as ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA2.

For a pc~ve ..urc that has mulipl gener-ater-, th A ....d........i.................r.f...t.th. The "site specific em'e.rgen:cy buset'" are the busecs by offsite er emergency AC pew-er sources is typically I em'lergen'c, bus pr train...S..ET.SYSTE.S to reflect their site specific pla'nt desigrns and ..p.bilities The EALs Basis should reflect that each independent otfe'ite p.....r :ircui ...n.titut... a Inc.m.n po...er. lines) comprise three sepa,"ate ..... Independence mnay b-e dete...ined frema rvie oC! f .si:tc: spci SHO:' ....si r..la.ted ls o-f';, el.uectcrical p ..er that!rg` gop cr"tinofs ethiesorpc isr z'recgnze in ArO',.s and EO, ora r beyod esignr b~casis cidn r....pen..... guidline (e.g .FLE.. spp... guidelines) t-': ...... Such poweC p-vr sore sol tenel mee affected unit -via a cress tie to a cempacio!n unit may credit this pow;er source in the EAL 71 LEUL ^A-i ..... ..... ..I.A 72 CU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shetaldv.ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 200OO ....... peeifl Technical epcifizaticncl a udwn................. limit)....... (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and ............. [t .... ar .... [ ..... RRt level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: 1N I',AN NII): A parameter changc or an cx cat that is not I1 t thc rcst It of anII intended cx'oluation or 2) an c\pcctcd plant rcs posc to a transicn I I he cat sc ot thc paramecter changec or cx cnt max hc knlown or an~kno\ ni.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-eaf*he plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the emergency director &hou*I4xx ill also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, s~eh4hatxx hcrc reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. 41~t Vt T$IW t,1-t Mo4c~73 ifenminutes ............. the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation to Alert 4ed--be-! 5, 4euscs IC CA I based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.w'here ir.dizacd. ECL A~signment Attributez:

3. !.I!.A 74 CU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director sheu44~ilI declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Indicated voltage is less than y st pzfzbu ztg tle on required Vl aK~bss 11 CI,12i for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power ,,hieb-that compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode.In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-...... -.....As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification. Fifteen minutes wa.z. ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level we**ld be-v~au~,cs IC CA1 or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Nc'.elepce ThUc "gite :cltagzg value" zhzuld bec b-.. cn tz hc mi=:nimumn b'.: v.omgc neccs~a.r f" ' .... Fcr azut ac~ tizn 3f SAFETY SYSTEM eguipmcnt. Thi: ....ag , ...... , ... u^,d inzww.rp....... a margin af at ... .r'n inute; bcfcrc the c.nzc, .... ifnability tea cpratc thz-c Thic ;vcltagc i= u...... " c ...... minimum: ..... t..... .L... ";hen battcr'1 c.izkrgi:= peffffierd.typical .vo,... cr .... entir baU.r ..... ic appr....... ,05 wriC" Fcr. a0 cell zng ECL Accienment Attributes: 3.!.1! ..A 75 CU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: Inl plant telephones Public address syisteml Plant radio systems (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: L NN Notification Netx~ork)(Commenrcial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods:[ INS on I-cdcral Tclccommuntnicatious System ([HTSt ('omrnrcial phones Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC shoudd-xx ill be assessed only when extraordinary means are being to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are thei states of (Georgia and South C'arolina; B~urke (iounty. Gleorgia: Aiken County. South Carolina: tBarwell and Allendale. Sottth Carolina;and the Savannah River Site in South ('aolina(acDc L'e'ezpzr Nctc ...EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration. 76 9e~epe~-Nete~i ee*, EAL # 1 The "site .spcaific list --f emmu nmu'nieatisns methed:; used fcr reutins plant oc nicatiens metheds" sheuld include a!!eff T u'ifal " arie '(e.g., commercial er alit cEAL # Th 'ate nsp.cifi~cgly. fomnctes ehd"sel nluealmuiain Emergency, Plan. The listing sho'uld include inst=alld plant. equ.ipment and com.Tponen:ts, and net items o,-n.ed main~tainead by methcds: are d-wndedcated teehn ie. omriltlchn ierais aeltetlpoe nditre ae comm uncr~rc :.atostcnlogy. ... ... .. ....... ...... .... .......ECL Assirnment Attribu.:tes: 3.!.1 I.C 77 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS UN USUAL EVENT E-HUI Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Op. Modes: All 78 ISFSI MALFUNCTION E-HU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (I) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 ti;~ ...hc zit .....fi caak .... t- .... values listed inm 4 43~Y1~LSF~ LoHa Basis: CONfIINEMI BN[I BOUNDARY: l he barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the en' iromnent.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of one or more fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The radiation reading listed in the table represent 2 times the site-specitie ca~sk specit:ic technical specification allowable radiation lcvel on] thic designated surface of the spcnt fuel cask. The technical 79 specification multiple of"2 times", w.hich i; atsz used in Reccgn~tin Categery R IC RUl!, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask ..... if the "on-contact" dose rate limit is exceeded may be ............. based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HAl.13eve~eper N~ete5: Th~ zfthc ISFS ....t A--,..zL R ... cf (SR) [pcr NUP.EG 1536'], -- a AR rcfcr..... in tk .... Cfi, t ,fCa:.n .-.ncz and4 ,thc tc , .... Sac ............ Rcc, ,., ...... thc CONFINf,.EMENT BOUNI,.DARY. This EAL addrc='zc' damagc that/ could rc='-lt from thz range cf EAP.ThQUKE,-* ct. PaIhrDuT2,.5: ,* .:.80 Be FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Ta~ eonto Category "F" Initiating Condition Matrix I GENERAL EMERIGENCY -\ /1Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.FGI Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby,__Startup, Hot Shutdown SITE AREA EMERGENCY Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.F1IOp. Modes:" Power Operation, Hot Standby,___Startup, Hot Shutdown ALERT Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.FAl Op. Modes:" Power Operation, Hot Standby,___-Startup, Hot Shutdown..... T I- ....... ....... ...... .... la^.at:: ..... ad: ..... z:a fic.. dig .pa c ico POS F U E -t-SS1-KDYL~,,.ANYes...eu,~fl.a:rap WoaL~ a:tac aaa:t, L=c!uSc tp;.e.z.f :e t.=:c.3 aad,'ar iaatzatial Ia. S.ah aidatyp:aall:,aaa~paiaad at tae;ia ta..d............ , " ,.... .... .. .....thaet af tha adjaaaa't 81 .Ur.x.x.IE ...tIC~. ...~..... ii ithfi ~.J..t lx...... X. Rzzcj't"~ CJ.~...y S.Fz az.d.x~t 4 .fj~ p. -.j.....----- ..~X.Ii ...JI ....jtG bz ~frzizz p:zd:.zt bzzz. it .~zUz ta,' :z.it Liz .\rzz Et z~,zzzy ~ .. d..... ~ 'x1:at tbzt EAL for GzI Eoo.~oooy IC ROt tzo hooz z.o.2od.3. Th.. fizoLo pr.. ... .... ... ..... .~.. ~ t~ .fl~t ~t~u o;no ol -.Tt~~'~' ihzt ~ ~ it~~~h~tJ-tI~~ ~ :o ito ~1. .XtIo~ot.oopr.~.r.Lti..n ....t.:L f... ~ ~ F ICo ~d fi~ .Jotb ttrtdo~zzoooptotIz x~d iooIo~L tloo.ztz.-t~, tlo~h diagramo, zod ohzot.tioi iypz tzttzo. Dz~.zlopzro r.or.i zo.ro ltd 1hz zOo o~zozifiz ozltod addrz~ozo zil p....LLL th.....hid ~ ito'~RorPWR EAL floo:oo prodozi tzo~zr totizo. Tho NRC o~atL..oo:doro ttz o~.oo ozzitod of Ito ~..iX.. C.t.~.., F i..f ..ztoo to to on ~opaioot ..oor zjd zod zoy ro rnothod if, amoog zthzr rozoono, 1hz ohoago io r.zooooary to prornotz zooo:otonoy ozzoza thz indootry.5. Ao .ooi ir itio Rozogoidon Cato~ory, 1hz loam RCS loakago onzzr.pzoooo not joot ihooe typoo dofinod iz Tootoizol Sp fitiono hut aizo ir.zkdoo tho boo of RCS mozo to zoy bozation ;~ido oootinnrnzt, z ozzoad~y oidz oyotzoi ~i.z., PWR otoam gznzrato: totz I.akagn), zn ioiorfhoiog o,.... or ti f ooatairoooo~. Ttz rzboaoz of 14 ~ frooz It.. ECS doz to 1hz no d.ogo~I' id hioo ot g ..ti..f-.ozl;o ... ....i ....... d... id to hz RCS looko~,...

5. Aith.Sit.AozoEozoo

-~ h~t1zoo.fizztooi.,..,.... ~hxiId ozz to:.: o.r......~..ft... f~przooot ooodt,-~-~f~ z dwzohotd itot zzoold reqniro 0 Genorol Ema~go,~ d~' 1--ati~ For z-ozmplz. if 1hz FozI Cizi and RCS fioo~on produ~t boo~zro ozro tolt toot, thzr. itiro ohonid ho ft.o~..znt zoxootno4zio of oontoinmcot rzd t.ir nt yzod ir.tz~t; AhzozztWuly, if toit ito Fixol Clod zod RCfr~~. ..d...Ah...

... .. .... p.t...tlI.

Loi ti' E .D,....A... .. ...tdh..... .......... ,........ iLt iL... ...... ... edt zozoloto to 0 Gozorol E~---7. Tt.z obitity to ....od..i.,t.. h.~. .....~ ..1...ozifiootion to .oI io r~poooo to do~dir.g ozoditiozo ohoold ho ~oiotoiood. For o..omplo, z otood'.' inorzxo ir. RCS IooL~. .. ..Jd ........... i an mc n~I. io public taalih and zofei~82 Fission Product Barrier Table Thresholds for LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of Barriers FGI GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of any two barrers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.FSI SITE AREA EMERGENCY FAl ALERT Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage l. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Not Appltcable A. A. An automatic or A Operation of a A A leaking or Not Appltcable manual ECCS f-g 4.- standby charging RUPTURED SG is actuation ts required 4 is FAULTED outside by EITHER of the required by of containment ".ease:! ',l-. les's following: EITHER of the* ,os .... ii 1 UNISOLABLE following. lete.*. RCS leakage 1. UN1SOLABLE OR RCS leakage 2. SG tube OR RUPTURE 2 SG tube leakage OR B.a 83 FuelClad Barrie RCS Barrier Contanment Barrier LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS ]POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS 2. lnadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal A o plcbe A -Not Applicable A A onanet NtAppical A..Containmen Not ApplicableNo Applcale ACotien raito ontrrdato oio radiation monio*lndications that reactor~~conlant _________________....._______ ____________ 84 FuelClad Barrer ,, RCS Barrir Containment Bar~rier SLOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS [POTENTIAL LOSS activity is greater than 300 piCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131*.85 Fuel Clad Ba~rre[ RCS Barre C, LOSS I POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS I POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containmsent Integritye Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER of the following: 1 Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Director judgment OR 2 UJNISOLABLE pathway from the containment to the environment exists OR B Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment OR B OR Cl1 AND 2 Less thsan Iouone full trau of fsate-operating per design for 15 minutes or tnticer-,i,

5. Other Indications j5. Other Indications

5. Other Indications 86

..... Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Contana-eni Ba~rrier LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS JPOTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS Nt,' atp! catthcA. N o.t uppi ccblc-A- Not ;tppi ipptic<bieA-Not appl ic bhA.- .tpplitcabhA-

6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment SA ANY condition in A ANY condition in A ANY condition in the A ANY condition in A ANY condition in A ANY condition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the emergency emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director director that that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates indicates loss of potential loss of the the RCS Barrier potential loss of the the containment potential loss of the the fuel clad fuel clad barrier RCS Barrier barrer containment bamer barrer. __________

87 Basis Information For Fission Product Barrier Table-9-F-3 Tab'c rcflc.ct that arc cpccifically addrcaed in EOPc (e.g.. a 'cas of heat remov'al chauldua the. paaa. ......... and '.'au, ....... within,:u thcir EOPc that align.. .,Ith. .... canditin ensure ccncictcncy be :.'ccath'a s+it specific EOPs and emergency claca'ificatian schcme, and Functiana arc prcacntcd belaw.m SCeft~seliflg R-CareflCfffe,!4n E-RlHeat Sin!ti mannc. antt c urgndcrym caicticr. at t aeCaSFSTa ma...y,.,' ..... directly'n fra a.. CSF............. ... .~cly drvng acmcurgte epertige pacucuae a h rcgncy c-a:cta.Ti+-e~~~ ~ '.! canadirtian afinerct. thea t ....ld wi ...the ccc PWR[ CFiSTi Praduct Barre Tabic ap :eeiI!'thc a +,o.88 ari.ing frcm user rulcz applicablct e gcc re............. pr........ (c...., ... ia... tz...Thce CSFST th.t'reha!d: may bc .an cnqc zf2 3:;': Wi!th ane exception. if a decician is made t in.clude.the bae h.,r. th-en all ....h all.....d t.reehelde mu..t be .... in the table (e.g., it is ...t per:..iblet. ...... eny th.e C Ora....ter.in~UC a petential 1ees ef the fuel clad barrir thresholcd and dizregerd al! ether CSFST b.a.-ed threeh,,alds.l' The.a ene e +ception ica theRC (P) C"S1ST. Becqueca ef the-cemple::ty of the P Red decicion pe'nt that relies o a a' .......... preur t...m...r.atu.... Incerperate the e~ther CSFST threahelde. 89 IV-R-FUEL CLAD BARRIER THRESHOLDS: The Fuel Clad Barrier consists of the cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage There is no Loss threshold associated with RCS or SG Tube Leakage.Potential Loss I .A This fedigcondition indicates a reduction in reactor vessel water level sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.Ent.r the oit .p....i rea.....t.... ,'ze ..ater. lc'e ...,ntlue u... by EOPs te identify a For plants that har'e implemented W.estinghouse O:-nerso Greup Emergency Response Cooling Orange e~ntri cendi.tiens

nat" in aceerdaneo with the guidance at the. front ef this section.~2. Inadequate Heat Removal Loss 2.A This r~adi~g-condition indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to cause significant superheating of reactor coolant.Potential Loss 2.A This fedfi-ondit ion indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.Potential Loss 2.B This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

90 UWR U lI I EL LlA BAUUl]LR I~ HrE'IJDHULIJTI Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to RCS Barrier Potential Loss threshold 2.A; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and increase RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.criteria the numb.-ner er ether a.ttri:bu.tec of thc.rmoeeouple readinge ."nece.sary"ta drie a..i.. 5 r.ad.n gr: ..t..r than.. l,,OOc. i require"d, befcre tr....iti:ning ta d..........ma.in. crit..ri. may b ....d..n the care exit the."naccuple r....ing .....ad.....Enter a cite, specific temperature value that correcpcndc to, significant in care cuperheating e thant.t l, .C0 may :nalet ced.a:*a'ocsd GiElner , ten:ter thecfi parameters and 'alucc ucad dein te Car eln Redcm Pha!ng oth.P-otnitilLae .Acup rhsated eateanaecumingcrthatotlh eRCS ic iintuct n a tOG~F may al e c abe ucd o Guideina , nte r h prmces n ale ue-i"heCr Cooling ... .: ... .....: PWRY FUEL B ARRIR I tI-...gHOLD_: 91 The oraditionr mntoCrc Ceading corresponds to an ~intacn mta neu ardlanse ofiah theao ginclant thss finto e the c containmet.suigta eco oln ciiyeul tan tat epetctedl for iodienien sz'piksadcorespoul cncds r toin pproimgath ranehof th2%m aper cimn! to, 5°/ eret fuenkcRad datmager. Snetioditiommtin icodndcaes ithath asgnidiante atmhfount of thel claeaaet hsocurdit ersnt ros fteFulCa.Brir

3. RCS Bartiityr.

Cotetaint Radom inationoftewomnoreaigaporael Loss 3.A Thes trasodidiationsmonito reSadingtiit correspodsatoon insatnos grelaser ofhall reaCtorm 30p~mdose equivalent 1-13 1. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greaterthnha tathtexpected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2°--lreit °%pecn o5-percent fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant aon ffe amuto ulclad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.IThe radatongmnitoradngi thtsml olcisn thesod nayis hihe thancthrcoat spciied forRCS Blearrer Lossthrleelshould 3eqiA sineiniaeseralhosrs of boplth. NntheFe laBriers an thmpe rCSlarrer.Nt th atsol as icomedabiation tof thertw monditcradiongs aporitl TheeisnPoetaLss threshold indiciates that RCS raioctivity cocnrto isgratrthainm30ent g Rdos qivaleont.-3.Ratrcoatatvt bv hslvli raehnta v!expetdfr ioie sie n orspnst napoxmt ag f2%:ecn o5 92 DlWR FULt! CLI D B' ADDRIER THRE]SHOII/IILDS:i 4.5.Dcc -'r ....g upe..... site s":p:cific this threshol!d may ha.e sam'ple analys'is eola, wit. ;h highly e' .....d acti;vit le-veL could require .....al her to...........'* Containment Integrity or Bypass Not Applicable (included for numbering consistency) Other Indications Not Applicahle (included for numbecring consistency) net censidered in the generic guidance.6. Emergency Director Judgment Loss 6.A This threshold addresses any other factors thftt-ffiy-be-used by the emergency director in determining whether the fuel clad barrier is lost.93 RUI ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the OI)CM,'site ..... ic r....... c ......... d:-- ......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sho*i,.v ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY o" the effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the ,,-: .....:. .......n ,ca~ cc......... , d": umzr.... ..t)( X 'l limits for 60 minutes or longer: Y '.mct !!_ ____'_ 3)Z (2) Reading on ANY ot" hc fb~olvo ing effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.Iw f(- 3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the ()l )(iM(Atcw..,:' ......... z .......t r.l....... ... .ot~ln dzcm.......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of plant safety efte theplan as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.45 c~~mq~{ ]~ RJ.buitorC~IciiIatjons L ~YZ~R4 ~b~Ia~a~ Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. .--urthz,u ...... ar .administrative controls are established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment "s-ini,4iea4P'e -ofindicatcs degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are to provide a basis for classify'ing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases sheald-will not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL # 1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level -we't-!dbe -a4auses IC RAI.Th.hnV. al ................... (RETS) l ar ...... pla t ht az mpane G nzi ,.-r890'Y h 46 pr...... i n the RE. TS or .C...t... recognized that a calculaqted EAL i valu may..b. blowi ....what .. th m ..nit.r an. ra: i that ....., the ..nit. do n ...... nee to be included inth +l.ist.identify any' limitations on the ase or a-vailability of these monitors.Some,, .ite. may .... .. find it ad:rantageous ta address gaseous and-' liquid releases with+ .....p....atev-. .....in 2:.. times a relas ........ imit_. The controlling document typically de....ibes methodologies. fcr detenniningm ...u.n r.adiatio

m. nit. se ...i..;"" th~es

• e,, should Part 20 and 10 CFR. Part, 59 Appendix I) related guidance.EAL #2 i .alu. in thisEALsuld.......2 times the sctpoint byt'*he radioactivi!ty discharge permit to w;arn of a rele-se that is not in complia-nee -with the specified De .. -velope sho..,..uld" research radiation mo~rtor design documents or other infor-mation displa ...nge. ofu th ........... "d 2) there are no automatic feamares that may render the monitor reading invalid (e.g.. an auto purge trggre at.. p....icular indictioleel)

Itisreogizd ha te onitondecrbe by this .. C may .. rslt in a..rad ...logical.estimate&'ealculated monitor is greater than approximately, 1109% of the highest accurate monitor readring, then may choose not to include the. monitor as an. indication -nd Man licenses...d. not.. have capabi!!i'. For those that do, the capab!!li' may not be within M an l..icensees. do^ not ha.e this capability. For those that do. these" monitors may not b controlled and malnta'ned to the ....e level as pln equipment,..... or within...the...cope .of the.lan Tie T i. n k_^... ...... zr...+- e~fie I me~e. .ecd~ a-. ir. the site emer~rgeny -'~ .c~..... ;--'- h "" dd-" ese 47 TcThnizQI Spzcificatizn~. In addith~n, rz~dingz may b~ influ~nc~d by cmir~nrnznt~ ~r othr foztcr~. A Iizcn~ may rcguzzt tc inzIud~ an EAL using a pzrim~t~r mznit~ring ~y~tcm~up~rz~al ;~1I b~ ~znsidzrcd an a ~a~z b~, ~ b~ziz.t'. L ~zIgnrnznt

.ttr

cut.~:

I. i .11 48 RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (I) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: PcSH1,n62 rt~cal (lJ~5E\Q2 AND\b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors..I ~...i:tiF;c!q Ido zfarea radiaticn Basis: I NPI ANNIfl): A parametecr chanec or an cvcnt that is not I ) thc rcsult of an intended cxolution or 2) an expected plant responlse to a transicnt. lhc caosc of thc paramcter change or exent be or urilkno'vn. RI I- I: 12 ,N( i P l\ IIIWAY: "I]his includes the reactor retucl cavits the tfuct trans l'r canal. and thc s pcnt Iidc pooi. canals and pools through wvhich irrad iatcd lmci may be mno\ d. but not including the reactor xessel.This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition eeuld-can be a precursor to a more serious event and is-a4so inieaJ4'e-efndicatcs a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of plant safety -f the -pant.A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation. Other sources of level indications fmay-include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available). A significant drop in the water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

• i i iiiiiii : Ji! i ii: iiii!iiiii i i l 49 The effects of planned evolutions shead-ill be considered.

For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level "-'au14be -'!=uses IC RA2.applicabiliry ef a indi.cati.n if it is noet a-ailabl!e in all modes.i.Ther "sth e ....p.epcifc lis of ar" raditi. monit.r.. sh.ould ccnta..in ths a ..... radi..ation... dep~enden~t, or o~ther con~trolled but temporary, radiation= moni.to~rs. Speif ..h. md...... apli..bility of: a articula.r monitor i.f it is net a-vailable in. all mode's.ECL Assia.:nent A.ttributes: 3.1.! .A an.d 3.1.1 .B 50 74 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CGI Loss of(-r'eeeoe CSI Loss of~ceeete* CA1 Loss CUI UNPLANNED.. ..[ PW, '?rU ; ] cr v e e !/'.C S [oP W ] ... .... tz o,'R [ D !I R ] C r l s f e a e inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory. ...o>RPt4~wmRt1 RPV fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes: Cold inventory for 15 containment removal capability. Shutdown, Refueling minutes or longer.challenged. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all but offsite and all onsite one AC power source AC power to to emergency buses for emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.15 minutes or longer. Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled De fueled CA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in increase in RCS cold shutdown, temperature. Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling,_____________ _____________ _____________De fueled CA6 Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Op. Modes:" Cold__________________________Shutdown, Refueling 51 CG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition: Loss of (eco .............. [PR ... r .P.[....... inenor affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheoitdwill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. (Racz .......... 1/R [.... t er-J RP .[B.HuR1) P level less ta j 4 js~petel~e)for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table C l-(see-.ee... (2) a. ...... .'eccL'RCS. .. [ ..... r RP .. [B ,RJ)R\" level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: fl41~ -*Err:atic ccuarcc rnnae monitor indicatioen

• UNPLANNED inercooc magnitude to indicate e-s~eei*1~

~Fe-uRee~efy oump anoor IpOL) te 'eto or ouuieient* tUttier cite syccitic indications) AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table C lI -beow*...(:onitainmenit Challenge T[able C!I tiONTAINM!NT 1+(I.OSURI7 NOT established* E:xplosi, e mixt~ure inside containment (.iliiciPresur 52

• If CON FAINMENT CIOSURE is re-cstabtished prior to exceeding the 30 minute time limit, then declaration ofta General Emerg~ency is not required.* CONTAINMENT CLOSUR.E nat
• UNPLANNED rnzr;:-,=

in Fre~are CON AI 'N Ml I:;' CI ,()S IRB: ler ( )perating Procedure 14210->1/2, Containment Btuilding Penetrations Verification --Retueling NI NLANi -.tl) A parameter changc or an1 eve.nt that is n/otl It)he result of an intended e\,ohluioti or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or e'~enlmnay be or unknow'n.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.[~he site-specific pressure at xshicht CONI AINMNINl is considered ehallenged may ehangc based on the condition of the ('ONIAINM!SNI'. If the Unit is itt the eold shuttdo~xn mode and the CON I'AINMENTf is fully intact then the site-sp~cific set point is the CONTAINMENT design pressure (52 psigt. This is consistent with typical owsner's groups Emergeney Response Procedures. With CON I'AINMENT CLOSURE established intentionally' by the plartt staff in preparations for inspection. maintenance, or refueling the set point is based on the penetration seals desigtn of 13 psis.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity. In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be 53 possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading. as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether ef-oe-containment is challenged. in [!Al, la. RVI ,IS is used to determine when reactor wat cr level is less than I'OAlF. RVIIS indieation is only axailable during Mode 5 up to the point of reactor head disassembly, prior to Mode ( entry Once RVI IS becomnes una\x ailable classiiecation of IC ((il is accomplished in accordance o ith l;A I 2.In EAL 2.b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for perfer -*.nee e4Lactions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/ or makeup equipment. and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitorx. ,~ ........... t'oiPR" Z'r .DR.P ... [B Rl \P level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they e in.ia4'e-:e .......ondicatc leakage from the (r............rt '.'s,,/RC [ -'S .... RPV [BIIhRl)R\.; These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Acciden:t analyses that fuel damage may aecur within ane hcur of unees cry depending upan, ,th .....moun chime since shutd.-ow-m"'- re.fcr tc G.n.r. Lett, 8 1. SE,- CY, 91 283 RF G interrupFted. Trh instrumentation range .......'......pp... implem....t..

-- ap ......n For cedre in

.. C:l Sutw i ... refueling.,ades may ... differen t. n than.54 F'or 2.b fir. b..I. t k.l A s wat.. r +. in- the r,...+, ...... I I ....., the dA..... rat a.i, e th.el.uneovor and-!m_.-! th assoit_ ,r+i.c spcifi ....lu..... iniatv .... corg unc, .It.. i£ r.....gniz-ed.. dipa rneo th ....!e redtia monitor+.... In hoe cse, EAL....+ values ..h.uld b+ e xampleadn EAL monitor+ reading! bn.e sEtAtL0 to 9',5' of the highest acr~ate mniet or r. dn... Thi... r.. i.i.n............... ... i....h............ ....cflte torg r..ading .. i .,r , than Appoimatel 110%+ ofll. the++ highes .:accurat ++.nitor readingA.tk+ then.devloper may ho alternate pcificcclel indications fc f care neeysoudb.sdifaal Far- E A 1f. second:. bu.llet Post..-. TMJ1* acciden stude indiated the-I. instlle PWR, nuc...lea... i-r....mnata will ....r... !ratcally wh~en th. caru~'eris uancovred n tha thi: ...... d Fa+'r EAL #2.b thirdh bu-let Ener any citr spcific:um leel!ab nb+s tha t caldb expetedt change... if we.... lo... s af ffieien -- to i+ndiat core.u.............Spifclvlvuema be....in... luded... if de-sitred. ar!fc-ctca .. E........u.t bullet. De...........h.uld dt. er- in- i... .. ot : r....able .nd ator.: exist i..entif...fuel un:r (e.g.. + -" .... remote ......n using cam ,,ras.. :'Theoai identify uni:*:....ite..peci....indi.ation.. nat=- ..lr.ady us ...d le hee that.. ill.p....t..ti ..l ..and .a ..urat emergency cla.i.. cti.... ... ........ .......... ...... ....ECL Assienment Attributes: 3.1 .1.B 55 CS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition: Loss .. ........~ cel~R~CS [oPWo] cr x RPM[BYR)R nvntr affecting core decay heat removal capability. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)SNote: The emergency director sl,,o4dwill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. AND b. ,. ... ......, (R. ttct c- vc,,cL',CS [PI.'? c RPM~t level less than 4'(2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. AND b. (R......... /c,-,S [Pr] cr RPM on B J .... level less than U IO', P $VLI qi eeie-le (3) a. (Rac .............. tP~ ... zr ...PM ... [B ,RI)V level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

• - Erra-tic zourcz ranga .m.ni'tcr i:ndiaeticn Basis: C )NlIAINNIIIN CLOSl. Rt-: Per Operating Procedure 14210i-12, ( ontaiiinent l~uildiing Penetratio~ns Veri lication-Refiueling m 4 56 I !NPI,.A.'NNl:

A parariicir change or an exceiit hat is not I )thc result of ani intended exolution (of 2) an expected plant rcsponse to a lransicnt. Thc causc of thc parameter change or event ma3, hc knoxx n or unknoxx n.This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of (reactar .... IPU' o?,,, ar R.PtM'inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed fet-to protectii-e~f the public and 4k*,s-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup,'decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.In lIAtos I.a and 2.a thc specified levels rcprcscni rcactor vesscl lcvels that arc loxxer tharn thc mnonitoring capahility of R( S Itxel instrumcntation a.nd thcrclorc must hc' ionitorcd using RVI.IS, Ilhis level xxill only hc obscrvable in Mlode 5 xx ithi RV I IS in opcration. In Mlodc 6 or xx hin RVI IS is not ini opcration thc It) should bc cevaluatcd suing I-Al. 3.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs 1 .b and 2.b reflects, heflaet--cthat with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment. In EAL 3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for pre:aneefactions to terminate leakage, recover inventory controll/(r makeup equipment. and/or restore level monitoring. Th nblt omonitor (rac ............... t .....J .r.... [B,',*lR , IV level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they a':-nd;e-*-'e-......e~f-indicate leakage from the (reaoctr [PWRP] or RP" [Bu"hlR])RPV. These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-! 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... 4-n-,cx ICCIorRl dcpni..... upc tc ............. ..... idncc htda;;n; rcf'cr tz .....i L:tz 8 , 17. SE -zCY,, 91"2,O/ "Url ID I]AR9 06 ~ 57 The~v ....... n... r......f R,,, .......... l .in Olru .......... may var dur. n on .... s the plant~procedures in the Cold Shutdown'. and Refueling modes may be d......nt (-e .g......... than-PWR is the level! at 6" below the bottom ID af the reactor ves~sel penetration and n~ot thes low paint at dependent and,'or configu-ration during which the le...l is applicable. lf the dete..rmine at..+ .... tim d~zuring Cold shudw rRfuln , then do n+ + +ot include E... #1, For EAL #2b The ".: ite specifiA level" should.. be'- appr... imat..l. th top... of actv fuel. If the...i-availabilit .. f "on:- scal +'+ICmy indctnisuh tat th diseve v'alueca beydeo rind " du.. rin coesudw oe rcniin.bt171 natothrsthe pe ify themod dependent ani...n..iguainsatdrn whic tht leve indic+ aton_ c o/appl I d ...i.. an .p.ration during Cold ShutdL onitor Refuelng mod.,.th.n.d.......n.lud .... #, ................ wi.l.be in.. acordance.. with+ .... #3).fh ot÷o cdm i+...ForEA #3.b first bullet AcO water h:level i them react. vesel lowe1r- the- .. dc .. .rate abov the.cTr will4k+ incr... Ene a... "cite radiation ..nit. r b uced to.. detect; cor un'-cery and ":.it cpceifie va=lue"% indicatv lof care u=1ncovezry. In tt is ! recognizd thaindce appoxmael u 110%' of thecihighct!v vacue+ mniay re i!ading, the d~sievd. er a co 58 Far EAL ItIt tourtfl tutL~t UV.'etaiwrc chauld determine The goal Ic ...... :n....identify fuel uncavery (e.g., rernate viewina ucir.s cameras).Far EAL il l.b "site specific level" is the Law: Lav L~w' ECCS a.o'-.t.an !L.... I... Th-e Bra:.' Law.. L....ow -..... atu:at.c ....in /.-: .Lee ....w.... cha~cn beas ti injeetian sy:t~em.s "aul-d au-tamatically and a~empt te restore RPV level. This is a RP.P--ater la-vel -alu..e that is observable belovw the Lcw- LwLe'v,,.el, 2 specified in IC CAl1, hut si!grifieant-

l. .. .a -ave th Ta af ., A ctiv , Funel (TAF epecifled in EAL/#2.For EAL "#2.b The "site specific !c-vel" shoul:d be for the tap af active f'-el.F:.uar EA 4#3 .b firct bu.llet. Ac wa1..-.te le... in the reato r vecce.,~l law.., the dase. the un..........r.y.

and' ,the. a.... "cite. ......i ..'" indicativec of crer unce-very,. It ic recagnized dipay m ng!-e afthe ienctalldrao .=!di:ation moia.Ind thoentf c=as~ec, EAL valueshau!d.b d Ftrmined with- a magi cufent to-'e ncur!ed thadot an accurate mapiarbreadfingdicaatilale Far Fr EAdig Th.c prvca. e'natwiHthBctaudise if the esour e~cac lne ...... an..t.. r ueadig reae na t.....in...lu -de thecntoras are indicatian an~cd idetif an... alerat EAL.. thr° aibl idcabntion of mor ntae ca'uld ber eWpec ldi h ALt ul na pp.raelvl For...' thatrd- "n.at hav installed 'tian monitorscapbez magntde indicating, core Cr cite epecifie indicatians, emergency claaciflctaian. ReId ilready uced elcewbere, that will pramote timely and accurate ECL Accignmer.t Attributec: 3.1 .3.B 59 CA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Loss of (eco ............. tRC m, [ --'R or R-- [Bt.... )RPV inventory. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director ehouldxs ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of (reactor v'eo:eL'.RCS [P or RPM [3W!,RI)RPV inventory as indicated by level (2,. Raco ......... eozR~CS [PwR or RPM ,/p])RpV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND b. UNPLANNED increase in IR L~Tw....@ T : j:;; zit" "pzf m a4o a levels due to a loss of' (r..t. ,- ...... ,o,.- [PIUR1 or RPMt... IBJ ,RI)RP inventory. Basis: U.N~qlANN!EI) A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the rcsuli of an intended exolution or 2) an expected plant rcspxmse to a t'ansient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be knowvn or onknoxxn.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below ,he bottom It) of the RC8 l~oop setpoint ( 6"') indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and(r....ct ..r vzoe.l/RCSc, [P1RIou,,,r [Bll/P])RPV water level. The 187' 6" level specified in the [AIL is the minimum RCS level fbr RIIR operation as outlined in the procedure fbr mid-loop operations, lelow this level, loss of RI IR pump net positive suction head (N P8t1)may occur resulting in a loss of'decay heat removal capability. The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a Residual Heat Removal suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor (reactor .....oeL'R-[DCS t[PuOlJ .. e"DOlr 0M[RR1RP lee a be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an 60 Sli '~t~ C0ua is~ueS ~T w~tr inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they e............. indhcatw leakage from the (reactor ye cel/RCS PR r or+ R. M [, WR]t... ~)RP.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CSI If the, ... (raco [tIR] o.o,,- r RP. Mz o, 131R1)Pv inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency wveu44-be-v4euses IC CS1I.For EAL If I the "cite .epecifc lev'c' chould be baed on either: standard operationally significant cetpcint .at .whicht .... (typicall pr...... E~~rCCS cysctems, wVoul.d aut+omaticlly t.a rt and- is a.. 1au ...ignifiant÷ly bcla th.e l RP..MDt w ,ater lev'el RPS aetuatior. in IC CU!1.[Pru~l "rThe minimu ... l.wa..l. +tha ........ .p.rati. of !!aly uc~ed deca h... at remov-al cysterns (e.g., PRccidu.al Heat++ Remo.-al or Sh'utdo-,n Cooling). If,"mu'ltiple levels exict ...... ifyh each-< al...g wih ...the.. ..... ;.. apr1r..t.m.d or conigr.ation ...peI.,+ncy For DI! EA ....Th. :+,e and range t of- RCS++- 1÷.el i....m..a... m"ay÷+I vary duI.gan out.IIAg ac ...... plant + movec ;,+, .. .+- through a,,ouc pcrat.n .......and.refueling ........nc palicl f +or+. a PWR .Ac app.prat to+ thei~ plan deign..,+,, , alternat meanc deterinin RCS level a difer- t (.g., narr....er). tha that_ requir..ed during modec higher than Cold cS.,,t ....Enter any, "scite epecifiec ump and/r tank" le;'elc that cou.ld be expected to inerc-c if there w'ere a !occ of in.ventory (i.e., the lost inventory wo'uld enter.th li.te sum_ ...... ECL AXscienment At'tributec: 3.1.2.B 61 CA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director sheJviII declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1I Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to ("e ...specif-ic I2AAI2Q1 or 15 minutes or longer.2 DL usest() Ill_.l Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (sec [able S I abowc) that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Pt~is-wWhen in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety -f the-plant. Fifteen minutes wtcz zze~etcd az ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level weald be-*iauses IC CSl1 or RSl1.Develeper Netes: minmu numbwer sofur ertat hin....g .geetr .......... fa th.t.................................... an A.C emergency bue. Fc ........ ifo b"ekup powe ............ ic compriced af tw-e .......... 62 that, supply paw:.cr ta thc c!lcctrical d'ctri-atian zy,'tcm thazt p.o-.c.r: SAFETY SYSTEMAS. Th~rc.that. cpr"a.in af this sc'.rce i's eont.rclld in with abnarnus! zr emerg~ncy opcruting pracedres, "-' or... ",. ignt-. ba~,sis acidentG... rpn uilns ........... FLEX~t supr udln...SuA!... ch [++++ pewer sources sh+ul gcncra......t th "A terat ..... scrc ...e+f+"Initi prc+idd 10 Atm liu i ttc s t.... ....... s........ crdi .ape sar ........... ..hat ...a ..[CLI A Attribut1s: 3.. 2.1"I, 63 CA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: The emergency director sheatdwill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than Tz~chnical Specification cold. s~hu-tdow:n temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in the following table.Table (2: R1(S leat-up Duration Thresholds R(S Status Uontainmenct Closure Status Ileat-up D~uration Not Intact Not Established (0 minutes (or at reduced inventors I Established 2(0 minutes*~Intact ihut not at reduced iniventory) Not applicable hi minutcs** If an RCS heat renmoxal sy'stem is in operation within this time frame and [RCS temperatture is being reduced, the EAL. is not appticable. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (aite, zpccific prcaaurc rcad'ing) I 0)psig. (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.-{4rWR) Basis: CI,( SlIRtE: Per Operating Procedure 14210-1/2. Containment B~uilding Penetrations Verification -Refueling , NPI,.ANNE:I): A parameter change or an evenut that is not I ) the restult of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient, the catuse of the parameter change or event ma3 he knowan or unknow~n.This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of patat safety e4 he plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion, above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. l he [RCS tteat-tip lDuration Thresholds table addresses the case w\here there is an increase in R(CS temiperature, the [RCS is not intact or is at reduced inventory, and CON fAINMN N'I CILOSURE is not established, In this ease, no heat-up duration is allowed (i~c.. 1) minutes). This is becatuse I ) the evaporated reactor coolant ma3 be released cdireeth3 into the Containment 64 atmosphere and subsequently to the env ironment, and 2) there is reduced reactor cool'ant inventory ahoxe the top o1 irradiated fuel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e~g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.Finally~. the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame shudwill allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the ease w'here there is an ine~ase in RCS temperature, the RCS is nat intact or is at dur..... is ! allow;ed (i.e., 0 -minut..) This is. becu. ....) the ev'aporated r........ coolan ..ay b.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level ..... IC CSl1 or RS 1.For EAL #! Enter the "'site specific Specification zcold shu:tdo;; temperature limit"".where indicated. The P.CS shoul:d be c.ensidered intact or n.et intact in acee~rdanee site For PWRs, this IC an"d its asse~ciated LALs address the co~ncerns raised by, Generic Letter 88 17, Lo~ss ~f Decay Hea: Remov-'!. A numbe of.,.t pheno.n....h.a pesr i ....... e., ........, steam..g......r tubel dr.ai.ning RCS leae!difeel e epeatingata mid ee condition';. decay.decay heat rme=;'a! is leet a~nd core unce;'eU .an....... NRC .na.y.e sho... that..there..ar. .... by Generic Lec 1o,7 belie.e..t. be eenscr.'ati;ve given that a lo~w preseure ECL As;signment Anrinute.s: 3.l.i 65 CA6 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition: Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)

• Intemnal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:
• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: tLXPIi:OSION:

A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment duc to combustion. chemical reaction or o\erpressurization. A release of steam (fr~om high energy lines or components) or" an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding. arcing.etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events mayv require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes ohma explosion are present.FIRIL: Combustion characterized by' heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute H'RES. Observation of tiame is preferred but is NOV required if large quantitis of smoke and heat are observed.SAFELfY SYSTIA'E: A system required for sate plant operation, cooling dossn the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the 3C.CS+ Tllese arc typical ly systems classified as safety-related. V ISI 1B1E DAMA~t : lDamage to a component or structure that is readily observable wvithout meaksurements. testing, or analysis, t'he visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.Damage-to a :;tractate containing SAFETY SYS'TEM,, ef+uf..eiet

visual impact toena d.. ubt a b.e. t the..+, operability' SAFETY SYSTEMS, ..'thin the c,- ....... Exa.... ino "ud p.a.tial er total 66 This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety 1'he Birst threshold tbr EAL 1.b4 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation since indications for it will be readily available.

The indications of degraded performance shi v-ill be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.lThe second threcshold for EAL 1 .b,2 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the-tete~ity"-efall available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level w¢,e'ad-be

"4euses IC CSl1 or RS 1.Nu-cle.?r pa--er plant SAFETY are eamprised .ftwf at'- r mere separate and redu-nda.nt trains af equipment, in accarda.noc

":ith ci.te epecifiedc iesg:. criteria.ECL Assc.gnment Attribu.toc: 3.1! .2.B 67 CUl ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of ............. t'zc/C [..... jr R.... [BRb,, inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)Note: The emergency director 4i0*Idwill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in (r.......... [PR ro r RP Mz f-441R-)RPV level less than a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. (R....t.r .......... [PR ..r. RP... [Bw.RI),RV level cannot be monitored. AND b. UNPLANNED increase in t~ R o t ri~Tn*i0 W tI T)levels.Basis: lN P1 ,ANN t): A parameLter change or an event tha t is not I ) the result ofan intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. I he cause of the parameter change or eventlnmay he known or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor (reactor .....o'cetc'RCS. I-P UJR. " etr RPVf[4lR])RtPV level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-ef*.he plait.Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required (raL .......... [.....]J ....r om tRP [uSWjRf)PV' level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.68 EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine r....... S [PJVRJ c D vr, RP level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are............ finhcatw leakage from the (r.......r .....RC [o,- RI r RP .. [WJRP V.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level either IC CAl or CA3.69 CU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels:[Note: The emergency director sl,,otdwil, declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC power capability to {she~ sp.ezitic emergency busez)B!jll ~l2AP is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.~~uiaM4ppI mM~W~Bm.DRwm8 I* iil J Basis: 'SAIlt1. I SY S f l M: A s stem required htr sa1b plant operation. cooling the plant and or placing it in the cold shudo tdx~n condition. inclIodine the ICS f ( hesc arc t\picalix systnms classilfied as, safeix -related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources (see I1 able S1 ahovel any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-e4f thpe. Fa+.70 An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Seffl-e! xamples of this condition ar epre~e1nted

• A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
• A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
• A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selectcd as ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA2.

For a pc~ve ..urc that has mulipl gener-ater-, th A ....d........i.................r.f...t.th. The "site specific em'e.rgen:cy buset'" are the busecs by offsite er emergency AC pew-er sources is typically I em'lergen'c, bus pr train...S..ET.SYSTE.S to reflect their site specific pla'nt desigrns and ..p.bilities The EALs Basis should reflect that each independent otfe'ite p.....r :ircui ...n.titut... a Inc.m.n po...er. lines) comprise three sepa,"ate ..... Independence mnay b-e dete...ined frema rvie oC! f .si:tc: spci SHO:' ....si r..la.ted ls o-f';, el.uectcrical p ..er that!rg` gop cr"tinofs ethiesorpc isr z'recgnze in ArO',.s and EO, ora r beyod esignr b~casis cidn r....pen..... guidline (e.g .FLE.. spp... guidelines) t-': ...... Such poweC p-vr sore sol tenel mee affected unit -via a cress tie to a cempacio!n unit may credit this pow;er source in the EAL 71 LEUL ^A-i ..... ..... ..I.A 72 CU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shetaldv.ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 200OO ....... peeifl Technical epcifizaticncl a udwn................. limit)....... (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and ............. [t .... ar .... [ ..... RRt level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: 1N I',AN NII): A parameter changc or an cx cat that is not I1 t thc rcst It of anII intended cx'oluation or 2) an c\pcctcd plant rcs posc to a transicn I I he cat sc ot thc paramecter changec or cx cnt max hc knlown or an~kno\ ni.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-eaf*he plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the emergency director &hou*I4xx ill also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, s~eh4hatxx hcrc reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. 41~t Vt T$IW t,1-t Mo4c~73 ifenminutes ............. the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation to Alert 4ed--be-! 5, 4euscs IC CA I based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.w'here ir.dizacd. ECL A~signment Attributez:

3. !.I!.A 74 CU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director sheu44~ilI declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Indicated voltage is less than y st pzfzbu ztg tle on required Vl aK~bss 11 CI,12i for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power ,,hieb-that compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode.In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of plant safety-...... -.....As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification. Fifteen minutes wa.z. ais thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level we**ld be-v~au~,cs IC CA1 or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Nc'.elepce ThUc "gite :cltagzg value" zhzuld bec b-.. cn tz hc mi=:nimumn b'.: v.omgc neccs~a.r f" ' .... Fcr azut ac~ tizn 3f SAFETY SYSTEM eguipmcnt. Thi: ....ag , ...... , ... u^,d inzww.rp....... a margin af at ... .r'n inute; bcfcrc the c.nzc, .... ifnability tea cpratc thz-c Thic ;vcltagc i= u...... " c ...... minimum: ..... t..... .L... ";hen battcr'1 c.izkrgi:= peffffierd.typical .vo,... cr .... entir baU.r ..... ic appr....... ,05 wriC" Fcr. a0 cell zng ECL Accienment Attributes: 3.!.1! ..A 75 CU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: Inl plant telephones Public address syisteml Plant radio systems (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: L NN Notification Netx~ork)(Commenrcial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods:[ INS on I-cdcral Tclccommuntnicatious System ([HTSt ('omrnrcial phones Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC shoudd-xx ill be assessed only when extraordinary means are being to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are thei states of (Georgia and South C'arolina; B~urke (iounty. Gleorgia: Aiken County. South Carolina: tBarwell and Allendale. Sottth Carolina;and the Savannah River Site in South ('aolina(acDc L'e'ezpzr Nctc ...EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration. 76 9e~epe~-Nete~i ee*, EAL # 1 The "site .spcaific list --f emmu nmu'nieatisns methed:; used fcr reutins plant oc nicatiens metheds" sheuld include a!!eff T u'ifal " arie '(e.g., commercial er alit cEAL # Th 'ate nsp.cifi~cgly. fomnctes ehd"sel nluealmuiain Emergency, Plan. The listing sho'uld include inst=alld plant. equ.ipment and com.Tponen:ts, and net items o,-n.ed main~tainead by methcds: are d-wndedcated teehn ie. omriltlchn ierais aeltetlpoe nditre ae comm uncr~rc :.atostcnlogy. ... ... .. ....... ...... .... .......ECL Assirnment Attribu.:tes: 3.!.1 I.C 77 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS UN USUAL EVENT E-HUI Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Op. Modes: All 78 ISFSI MALFUNCTION E-HU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability: All Emergency Action Levels: (I) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 ti;~ ...hc zit .....fi caak .... t- .... values listed inm 4 43~Y1~LSF~ LoHa Basis: CONfIINEMI BN[I BOUNDARY: l he barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the en' iromnent.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of one or more fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The radiation reading listed in the table represent 2 times the site-specitie ca~sk specit:ic technical specification allowable radiation lcvel on] thic designated surface of the spcnt fuel cask. The technical 79 specification multiple of"2 times", w.hich i; atsz used in Reccgn~tin Categery R IC RUl!, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask ..... if the "on-contact" dose rate limit is exceeded may be ............. based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HAl.13eve~eper N~ete5: Th~ zfthc ISFS ....t A--,..zL R ... cf (SR) [pcr NUP.EG 1536'], -- a AR rcfcr..... in tk .... Cfi, t ,fCa:.n .-.ncz and4 ,thc tc , .... Sac ............ Rcc, ,., ...... thc CONFINf,.EMENT BOUNI,.DARY. This EAL addrc='zc' damagc that/ could rc='-lt from thz range cf EAP.ThQUKE,-* ct. PaIhrDuT2,.5: ,* .:.80 Be FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Ta~ eonto Category "F" Initiating Condition Matrix I GENERAL EMERIGENCY -\ /1Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.FGI Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby,__Startup, Hot Shutdown SITE AREA EMERGENCY Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.F1IOp. Modes:" Power Operation, Hot Standby,___Startup, Hot Shutdown ALERT Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.FAl Op. Modes:" Power Operation, Hot Standby,___-Startup, Hot Shutdown..... T I- ....... ....... ...... .... la^.at:: ..... ad: ..... z:a fic.. dig .pa c ico POS F U E -t-SS1-KDYL~,,.ANYes...eu,~fl.a:rap WoaL~ a:tac aaa:t, L=c!uSc tp;.e.z.f :e t.=:c.3 aad,'ar iaatzatial Ia. S.ah aidatyp:aall:,aaa~paiaad at tae;ia ta..d............ , " ,.... .... .. .....thaet af tha adjaaaa't 81 .Ur.x.x.IE ...tIC~. ...~..... ii ithfi ~.J..t lx...... X. Rzzcj't"~ CJ.~...y S.Fz az.d.x~t 4 .fj~ p. -.j.....----- ..~X.Ii ...JI ....jtG bz ~frzizz p:zd:.zt bzzz. it .~zUz ta,' :z.it Liz .\rzz Et z~,zzzy ~ .. d..... ~ 'x1:at tbzt EAL for GzI Eoo.~oooy IC ROt tzo hooz z.o.2od.3. Th.. fizoLo pr.. ... .... ... ..... .~.. ~ t~ .fl~t ~t~u o;no ol -.Tt~~'~' ihzt ~ ~ it~~~h~tJ-tI~~ ~ :o ito ~1. .XtIo~ot.oopr.~.r.Lti..n ....t.:L f... ~ ~ F ICo ~d fi~ .Jotb ttrtdo~zzoooptotIz x~d iooIo~L tloo.ztz.-t~, tlo~h diagramo, zod ohzot.tioi iypz tzttzo. Dz~.zlopzro r.or.i zo.ro ltd 1hz zOo o~zozifiz ozltod addrz~ozo zil p....LLL th.....hid ~ ito'~RorPWR EAL floo:oo prodozi tzo~zr totizo. Tho NRC o~atL..oo:doro ttz o~.oo ozzitod of Ito ~..iX.. C.t.~.., F i..f ..ztoo to to on ~opaioot ..oor zjd zod zoy ro rnothod if, amoog zthzr rozoono, 1hz ohoago io r.zooooary to prornotz zooo:otonoy ozzoza thz indootry.5. Ao .ooi ir itio Rozogoidon Cato~ory, 1hz loam RCS loakago onzzr.pzoooo not joot ihooe typoo dofinod iz Tootoizol Sp fitiono hut aizo ir.zkdoo tho boo of RCS mozo to zoy bozation ;~ido oootinnrnzt, z ozzoad~y oidz oyotzoi ~i.z., PWR otoam gznzrato: totz I.akagn), zn ioiorfhoiog o,.... or ti f ooatairoooo~. Ttz rzboaoz of 14 ~ frooz It.. ECS doz to 1hz no d.ogo~I' id hioo ot g ..ti..f-.ozl;o ... ....i ....... d... id to hz RCS looko~,...

5. Aith.Sit.AozoEozoo

-~ h~t1zoo.fizztooi.,..,.... ~hxiId ozz to:.: o.r......~..ft... f~przooot ooodt,-~-~f~ z dwzohotd itot zzoold reqniro 0 Genorol Ema~go,~ d~' 1--ati~ For z-ozmplz. if 1hz FozI Cizi and RCS fioo~on produ~t boo~zro ozro tolt toot, thzr. itiro ohonid ho ft.o~..znt zoxootno4zio of oontoinmcot rzd t.ir nt yzod ir.tz~t; AhzozztWuly, if toit ito Fixol Clod zod RCfr~~. ..d...Ah...

... .. .... p.t...tlI.

Loi ti' E .D,....A... .. ...tdh..... .......... ,........ iLt iL... ...... ... edt zozoloto to 0 Gozorol E~---7. Tt.z obitity to ....od..i.,t.. h.~. .....~ ..1...ozifiootion to .oI io r~poooo to do~dir.g ozoditiozo ohoold ho ~oiotoiood. For o..omplo, z otood'.' inorzxo ir. RCS IooL~. .. ..Jd ........... i an mc n~I. io public taalih and zofei~82 Fission Product Barrier Table Thresholds for LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of Barriers FGI GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of any two barrers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.FSI SITE AREA EMERGENCY FAl ALERT Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage l. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Not Appltcable A. A. An automatic or A Operation of a A A leaking or Not Appltcable manual ECCS f-g 4.- standby charging RUPTURED SG is actuation ts required 4 is FAULTED outside by EITHER of the required by of containment ".ease:! ',l-. les's following: EITHER of the* ,os .... ii 1 UNISOLABLE following. lete.*. RCS leakage 1. UN1SOLABLE OR RCS leakage 2. SG tube OR RUPTURE 2 SG tube leakage OR B.a 83 FuelClad Barrie RCS Barrier Contanment Barrier LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS ]POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS 2. lnadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal A o plcbe A -Not Applicable A A onanet NtAppical A..Containmen Not ApplicableNo Applcale ACotien raito ontrrdato oio radiation monio*lndications that reactor~~conlant _________________....._______ ____________ 84 FuelClad Barrer ,, RCS Barrir Containment Bar~rier SLOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS [POTENTIAL LOSS activity is greater than 300 piCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131*.85 Fuel Clad Ba~rre[ RCS Barre C, LOSS I POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS I POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containmsent Integritye Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER of the following: 1 Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Director judgment OR 2 UJNISOLABLE pathway from the containment to the environment exists OR B Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment OR B OR Cl1 AND 2 Less thsan Iouone full trau of fsate-operating per design for 15 minutes or tnticer-,i,

5. Other Indications j5. Other Indications

5. Other Indications 86

..... Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Contana-eni Ba~rrier LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS JPOTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS Nt,' atp! catthcA. N o.t uppi ccblc-A- Not ;tppi ipptic<bieA-Not appl ic bhA.- .tpplitcabhA-

6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment SA ANY condition in A ANY condition in A ANY condition in the A ANY condition in A ANY condition in A ANY condition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the emergency emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director director that that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates indicates loss of potential loss of the the RCS Barrier potential loss of the the containment potential loss of the the fuel clad fuel clad barrier RCS Barrier barrer containment bamer barrer. __________

87 Basis Information For Fission Product Barrier Table-9-F-3 Tab'c rcflc.ct that arc cpccifically addrcaed in EOPc (e.g.. a 'cas of heat remov'al chauldua the. paaa. ......... and '.'au, ....... within,:u thcir EOPc that align.. .,Ith. .... canditin ensure ccncictcncy be :.'ccath'a s+it specific EOPs and emergency claca'ificatian schcme, and Functiana arc prcacntcd belaw.m SCeft~seliflg R-CareflCfffe,!4n E-RlHeat Sin!ti mannc. antt c urgndcrym caicticr. at t aeCaSFSTa ma...y,.,' ..... directly'n fra a.. CSF............. ... .~cly drvng acmcurgte epertige pacucuae a h rcgncy c-a:cta.Ti+-e~~~ ~ '.! canadirtian afinerct. thea t ....ld wi ...the ccc PWR[ CFiSTi Praduct Barre Tabic ap :eeiI!'thc a +,o.88 ari.ing frcm user rulcz applicablct e gcc re............. pr........ (c...., ... ia... tz...Thce CSFST th.t'reha!d: may bc .an cnqc zf2 3:;': Wi!th ane exception. if a decician is made t in.clude.the bae h.,r. th-en all ....h all.....d t.reehelde mu..t be .... in the table (e.g., it is ...t per:..iblet. ...... eny th.e C Ora....ter.in~UC a petential 1ees ef the fuel clad barrir thresholcd and dizregerd al! ether CSFST b.a.-ed threeh,,alds.l' The.a ene e +ception ica theRC (P) C"S1ST. Becqueca ef the-cemple::ty of the P Red decicion pe'nt that relies o a a' .......... preur t...m...r.atu.... Incerperate the e~ther CSFST threahelde. 89 IV-R-FUEL CLAD BARRIER THRESHOLDS: The Fuel Clad Barrier consists of the cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage There is no Loss threshold associated with RCS or SG Tube Leakage.Potential Loss I .A This fedigcondition indicates a reduction in reactor vessel water level sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.Ent.r the oit .p....i rea.....t.... ,'ze ..ater. lc'e ...,ntlue u... by EOPs te identify a For plants that har'e implemented W.estinghouse O:-nerso Greup Emergency Response Cooling Orange e~ntri cendi.tiens

nat" in aceerdaneo with the guidance at the. front ef this section.~2. Inadequate Heat Removal Loss 2.A This r~adi~g-condition indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to cause significant superheating of reactor coolant.Potential Loss 2.A This fedfi-ondit ion indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.Potential Loss 2.B This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

90 UWR U lI I EL LlA BAUUl]LR I~ HrE'IJDHULIJTI Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to RCS Barrier Potential Loss threshold 2.A; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and increase RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.criteria the numb.-ner er ether a.ttri:bu.tec of thc.rmoeeouple readinge ."nece.sary"ta drie a..i.. 5 r.ad.n gr: ..t..r than.. l,,OOc. i require"d, befcre tr....iti:ning ta d..........ma.in. crit..ri. may b ....d..n the care exit the."naccuple r....ing .....ad.....Enter a cite, specific temperature value that correcpcndc to, significant in care cuperheating e thant.t l, .C0 may :nalet ced.a:*a'ocsd GiElner , ten:ter thecfi parameters and 'alucc ucad dein te Car eln Redcm Pha!ng oth.P-otnitilLae .Acup rhsated eateanaecumingcrthatotlh eRCS ic iintuct n a tOG~F may al e c abe ucd o Guideina , nte r h prmces n ale ue-i"heCr Cooling ... .: ... .....: PWRY FUEL B ARRIR I tI-...gHOLD_: 91 The oraditionr mntoCrc Ceading corresponds to an ~intacn mta neu ardlanse ofiah theao ginclant thss finto e the c containmet.suigta eco oln ciiyeul tan tat epetctedl for iodienien sz'piksadcorespoul cncds r toin pproimgath ranehof th2%m aper cimn! to, 5°/ eret fuenkcRad datmager. Snetioditiommtin icodndcaes ithath asgnidiante atmhfount of thel claeaaet hsocurdit ersnt ros fteFulCa.Brir

3. RCS Bartiityr.

Cotetaint Radom inationoftewomnoreaigaporael Loss 3.A Thes trasodidiationsmonito reSadingtiit correspodsatoon insatnos grelaser ofhall reaCtorm 30p~mdose equivalent 1-13 1. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greaterthnha tathtexpected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2°--lreit °%pecn o5-percent fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant aon ffe amuto ulclad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.IThe radatongmnitoradngi thtsml olcisn thesod nayis hihe thancthrcoat spciied forRCS Blearrer Lossthrleelshould 3eqiA sineiniaeseralhosrs of boplth. NntheFe laBriers an thmpe rCSlarrer.Nt th atsol as icomedabiation tof thertw monditcradiongs aporitl TheeisnPoetaLss threshold indiciates that RCS raioctivity cocnrto isgratrthainm30ent g Rdos qivaleont.-3.Ratrcoatatvt bv hslvli raehnta v!expetdfr ioie sie n orspnst napoxmt ag f2%:ecn o5 92 DlWR FULt! CLI D B' ADDRIER THRE]SHOII/IILDS:i 4.5.Dcc -'r ....g upe..... site s":p:cific this threshol!d may ha.e sam'ple analys'is eola, wit. ;h highly e' .....d acti;vit le-veL could require .....al her to...........'* Containment Integrity or Bypass Not Applicable (included for numbering consistency) Other Indications Not Applicahle (included for numbecring consistency) net censidered in the generic guidance.6. Emergency Director Judgment Loss 6.A This threshold addresses any other factors thftt-ffiy-be-used by the emergency director in determining whether the fuel clad barrier is lost.93}}