NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4
Text
COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site- (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 °F specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in Table C2.for greater than the duration specified in the following table.Table C2: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds SecondaryHatu Containment Closure Heat-up RCS Status CONTAINMENTHetu RCS Status Status Duration _________
INTEGRITY Status Duration Intact (but not at reduced Not Established 0 minutes*inventor/PWR]
Not applicable 60 minutes* Not intact -Established 20 minutes Not intact (or at reduced Established 20 minutes* Intact Not applicable 60 minutes *inventor [PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes
- If RJ-R is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than 10 psig.(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific pressure reading). (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.
[PWR])Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 20 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
Table designator C2 assigned to RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table.Justification:
Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document.Difference:
Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Hatch is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6.Information is the same.Justification:
Editorial change for Human Factors considerations
-worst case is presented first.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 RCS Heat-up Duration Threaholds Table refers to RCS heat removal system. Hatch table uses RHR.Justification:
Site termoniology difference from NEI 99-01 Rev 6; RHR is equivalent to RCS heat removal system.Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment VI TS Table 1.1-1 Modes and VI4 RCS Pressure Indications.
21 COLD SHUTDOWN:/IREFUEINGNYSE MALFUTINCTOS CSEL CA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake) 0 Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event 0 Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike 0 High winds or tornado strike* FIRE 0 FIRE* EXPLOSION 0 EXPLOSION* (site-specific hazards) 0 Other events with similar hazard characteristics as* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode.needed for the current operating mode.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 22 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EALThreshold (1)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch.Justification:
Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this EAL.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.23 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in (reactor vessel/RCS (1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than a required lower limit for 15 the lower limit of the controlling level band for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer.(2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.
be monitored.
AND AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in any of the following:
- b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) D Drweel Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps levels.I Drywell Equipment Drain Sumps ITurbine Building Floor Drain Sumps Torus Rad Waste Tanks Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (1).Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components.
Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. See V9 Component System Reference.
Justification:
Human factors consideration
-a level increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold.
Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list).24 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. 1/2F, and I /2G is reduced to a single power source for 15 AND minutes or longer.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.Table SI Unit 1 Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR 1D Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
25 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site- (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 0 F.specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit).(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and (reactor vesseliRCS
[PWR] or (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 RPV [BWR]) level indication for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V1 TS Table 1.1-1 Modes.26 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS~CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 1 05/210OVDC on Technical required Vital DC buses for 15 minutes or longer. Specification required 125/250 VDC buses 1/2R22-S016 OR.1/2R22-S0 17 for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) refers to Vital DC buses. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) identifies the specific DC buses applicable to this EAL.Justification:
Editorial change -Human Factors consideration that does not affect EAL.Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V15 DC System Information.
27 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU5: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) _____________________________
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: IPlant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless)(site-specific list of communications methods) Plant pa e (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: I ENN (Emergency Notification Network)Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: IENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)Commercial phones Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS E-HUIl: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NE1 99-0 1 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than ANY value site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation listed in Table El.level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask. ____________________________
Table El Location of Dose Rate Total Dose Rate (Neutron + Gamma mR/hr)HI-TRAC 125 Side -Mid- height 450 Top 11l0 HI-STAR 100 or HI-STORM 100 Side -60 inches below mid- height 80 Side -Mid- height 80 Side -60 inches above mid- height 30 Center of lid 10 Middle of top lid 20 Top (outlet) duct 40 Bottom (inlet) duct 140 Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference:
Added new Table E2 to Hatch EAL Threshold (1). Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V16 ISFSI TS/Dose Reading Calculation.
Justification:
Utilized table to display ISFS! technical specification radiation levels for the different ISFS! modules. Intent of NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL threshold remains satisfied.
30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS BWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 FAI -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel FS1 -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.
FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Clad or RCS barrier. Loss of the third barrier.FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential FS1 -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.
FA1 -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Loss of the third barrier. Clad or RCS barrier.Difference I Deviation I Justification None Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NEI 99-01 Rev 6 1. RCS Activity 1. Primary Containment Pressure 1. Primary Containment Conditions A. (Site-specific Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid A. Primary indications that pressure greater than drop in primary containment reactor coolant (site-specific value) containment pressure pressure greater activity is greater due to RCS leakage. following primary than (site-specific than 300 IpCi/gm containment pressure value)dose equivalent I- rise OR 131). OR B. (site-specific B. Primary containment explosive mixture)pressure response not exists inside consistent with primary LOCA conditions, containment OR C. HCTL exceeded.31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. Activity of 300 ptCi/gm DEI 1 3 1 Not Applicable A. Primary containment pressure greater than 1.85 psig due to RCS leakage.Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid drop in primary containment pressure following primary containment pressure rise OR B. Primary containment pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions.
A. Primary containment pressure greater than 56 psig OR B. Greater than or equal to 6% H 2 AN__DD 5% 02 exists inside primary containment OR C. HCTL exceeded.Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V10 112 and Oz Concentration Calculation/Reference, V11 Primary Containment Pressure Reference
(> 56 psig), and V17 Primary Containment Pressure Reference (1.85 psig).NET199-01 Rev 6 2. RPV Water Level [2. RPV Water Level j2. RPV Water Level A. Primary containment flooding required.A.RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above (site-specific RPV water level corresponding to the top of active fuel) or cannot be determined.
A. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above (site-specific RPV water level corresponding to the top of active fuel) or cannot be determined.
Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment flooding required.32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. SAG entry is A. RPV water level A. RPV water level Not Applicable Not Applicable A. SAG entry is required, cannot be restored cannot be restored required.and maintained above and maintained above-155 inches or cannot -155 inches or be determined, cannot be determined.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required".
Justification:
Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance.Difference:
Containment Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required".
Justification:
Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 20 15-004 guidance.Difference:
Site specific information provided for Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A and RCS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A. See Attachment V7 RPV Level Indication/Display.
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 3. Not Applicable
- 3. RCS Leak Rate 3. Primary Containment Isolation Failure Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break A. UNISOLABLE A. UNISOLABLE direct Not Applicable in ANY of the primary system downstream pathway following: (site- leakage that results to the environment specific systems with in exceeding exists after primary potential for high- EITHER of the containment isolation ,energy line breaks) following:
signal OR 1. Max Normal OR B. Emergency RPV Operating B. Intentional primary Depressurization.
Temperature containment venting OR per EOPs 2. Max Normal OR Operating Area C. UNISOLABLE Radiation Level, primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break in Main Steamline, H-PCI, Feedwater, RWCU, or RCIC OR B. Emergency R!PV Depressurization.
A.UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
- 1. Max Normal Operating Temperature OR 2. Max Normal Operating Area Radiation Level.A. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal OR B. Intentional primary containment venting per EOPs OR C. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
- 1. Max Safe Operating Temperature.
OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area Radiation Level.Not Applicable J ____________________
L ___________________
- j. ___________________
j ___________________
I ___________________
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference:
Site specific listing of systems provided.
See VI2 Secondary Containment Rad Monitors and V18 Secondary Containment Temperature for Max Safe/Normal Rad and Operating Temperature values.NEI 99-01 Rev 6 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment radiation monitor radiation monitor radiation monitor reading greater than reading greater than reading greater than (site-specific value). (site-specific value). (site-specific value).A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater than 1.400 R/hr. than 40 R/hr. {than 26,000 R/hr.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold 4.A for Loss of Fuel Clad and RCS Barriers and Potential Loss of Containment Barrier does not include the following wording -"Primary containment radiation monitor reading...".
Justification:
Human factors consideration
-DWRRM is the site designator for the Primary Containment radiation monitor.Difference:
Site specific informsation provided.
See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation.
NET 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable)
A. Offgas Pre-and Post- Not Applicable A. Drywell Fission Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Treatment Monitors Product Monitor Offscale High. reading 5.0 x 105 cpm.35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation.
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates the Fuel Clad Barrier. Potential Loss of the the RCS Barrier. Potential Loss of the the Containment Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier.A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates the fuel clad barrier, potential loss of the the RCS Barrier, potential loss of the the Containment potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 36 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation 1 Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the Security security shift supervision).
Shift Captain or designee.AND AND b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- b. EITHER of the following has occurred: I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be 1. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained.
controlled or maintained.
- Reactivity control 0 Reactivity control* Core cooling [PWR] / RPV water level [BWR] 0 RPV water level* RCS heat removal 0 RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.IMMINENT.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.37 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS H7INITING CONDITION Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRJSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or involve actual or IMMITNENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than immediate site area. the immediate site area.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 38 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the Security Shift Captain supervision), or designee.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None~THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown from the control room to remote shutdown panels.panels and local control stations).
AND AND b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 minutes.reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes).
- Reactivity control* Reactivity control 0 RPV water level* Core cooling [PWR] / RPV water level [BWR] 0 RCS heat removal* RCS heat removal Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public, effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.
site boundary.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None 41 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAl: INITIATING CONDITONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minutes.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA) as reported by the Security security shift supervision).
Shift Captain or designee.(2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. 30 minutes of the site.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.42 HAZARDANDOHER:
CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas: into any Table Hi plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability identified)
ITable HI AND Building Rooms Applicable Modes b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. -Diesel generator building All All Unit 1/2 130' All Reactor building Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR) All Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) All AND b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
Hatch EAL Threshold (1)a incorporates Table HI to identify applicable site specific rooms/areas.
43 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS~HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS....
NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control room to remote shutdown, panels.control stations).
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. exposure levels.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).
ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Captain or designee.(2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at HNP.(3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. aircraft threat.Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the site' with HNP.Justification:
Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Hatch site.Difference:
Site specific information provided.46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS~HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation/IJustification None~THRESHOLDS NET 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE
- Unit One "Seismic Peak Shock Recorder High G Level" limits) (65 7-066) alarm* Unit Two "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (657-048) alarm* A 12.7 Hz amber light illuminated in the N/S OR E/W column on panel 1H1ll-P701
- A 12.7 Hz red light illuminated in the N/S O__R E/W column on panel 1H1Il-P701 Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V19 Seismic Indications.
47 HAZARDANDOHER:
CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA (PA).(2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode. component needed for the current operating mode.(3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA (PA) is due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., chemical spill or toxic gas release).
an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release).(4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles, prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site in personal vehicles.(5) (Site-specific list of natural or technological hazard events) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (4) -replaced "via" with "in".Justification:
Editorial change.Difference:
Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (5).48 HAZARD ANDOHER CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications:
the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or 0 Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm S Field verification of a single fire alarm AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas.rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE).FIRE). AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas.b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant AND rooms or areas: c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) of alarm receipt.AND (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes of the of alarm receipt. initial report, alarm or indication.
(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside (4) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI the plant Protected A real PROTECTED AREA not extinguished PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication, fire response agency to extinguish.
49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside Table 112 the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires Building Rooms firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.
Control Building CB 147' Cable Spreading Room Ul/2 CB 1 12' Station Battery Rooms A,B Diesel generator building All Primary Containment All Unit 1/2 130'Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR)Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR)Reactor building Unit 1 SW Diagonals (RCIC)Unit 2 NW Diagonals (RCIC)Unit 1/2 HPCI Rooms Intake structure All Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Differences:
EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -added reference to Table 112 instead of listing areas separately for each EAL.Justification:
Human factors consideration
-applicable rooms are the same for each EAL. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing that table in the EAL simplifies the process for identifying applicable rooms.Differences:
EAL Thresholds (3) and (4) -added PROTECTED AREA (PA) after plant.Justification:
Clarifies plant areas that are applicable to these EALs.Differences:
Site specific information provided -added Table H2 with applicable room listing. See V20 Table 112 Basis.Justification:
Human factors consideration.
50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS 11U7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Editorial change that does not change IC.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.
No indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. occurs.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 51 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site- (!) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 specific emergency buses). VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G.AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less
- Restoration of at least one AC essential bus in less than than (site-specific hours) is not likely. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely.* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information and V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level.52 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SG8: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site- (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G for 15 minutes AND or longer.b. Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage AND value) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 b. Indicated voltage is less than 105/210 VDC on ALL minutes or longer. 125/250 VDC Bus 1/2R22-S016 and 1/2R22-S017 for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information, V15 DC System Information.
53 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hlatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SS5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [PWR] Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or/ R.PV water level [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. RCS heat removal.Difference
/ Deviation/IJustification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor.AND AND b. All manual actions to shut down the reactor have b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been been unsuccessful.
unsuccessful.
AND AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: c. EITHER of the following conditions exist:* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately Water Level remove heat from the RCS)
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level and V22 Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) Curve.55 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SS8: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V15 DC System Information.
56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. 1/2F, and 1/2G is reduced to a single power source for 15 AND minutes or longer.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.Table S1 Unit I Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator 1 A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 /Hatch 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.[ BWR parameter list] [ PWR parameter list]Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RCS Level RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary Temperature or Emergency Feed Water________________Flow AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25%thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor scram [BWR] / trip [PWR]* ECCS (SI) actuation* Thermal power oscillations greater than 10% [BWR](1) a.An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25%thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor scram* ECCS actuation* Thermal power oscillations greater than 10%DNferne/Deato/Jsifaio None 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Hatch Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) fails to shut down the Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in are not successful in shutting down the reactor, shutting down the reactor.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor.AND AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. successful in shutting down the reactor.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None 60 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA9: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake) 0 Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event 0 Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike S High winds or tornado strike* FIRE 0 FIRE* EXPLOSION 0 EXPLOSION* (site-specific hazards) 0 Other events with similar hazard characteristics as* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode.needed for the current operating mode.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 61 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch.Justification:
Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold.
Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.62 SSTEM MALFUATNGCODTIONS SUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer.Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G for 15 minutes or longer.Table S2 IUniti I Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMPR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR 1D Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Informaton.
63 SSU2NTEMIALFUNGCODTIONS 5U2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.(1)a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.[BWR parameter list] [PWR parameter listi Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RCS Level RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam________________________
generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific Note: Use the Unit 1 or Unit 2 Pretreatment (Flow vs mR/hr) Graphs to value). determine if the Pretreatment Radiation Monitor exceeds the TV of 240,000 jiCi/sec.(2) Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is (1) Pretreatment Radiation Monitor greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications.
l(2)D11K601 1 (2)DI 1 K602 reading greater than 240,000 for greater than 60 minutes.(2) Sample analysis indicates that the reactor coolant specific activity is EITHER:* Greater than 0.2 and less than or equal to 2.0 ptCi/gm dose equivalent I13J for greater than 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />s* Greater than 2.0 dose equivalent 1131.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) does not include a Note box. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) includes a Note box.Justification:
Editorial change to provide guidance on use of Unit I or Unit 2 Pretreatment Graphs to determine if threshold has been exceeded.Difference:
Site specific information provided for Threshold (1). See V23 TS 3.7.6 Pretreatment Radiation Monitor Reading.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) does not specify a Technical Specification value. Hatch EAL Threshold (2) identifies the coolant activity values that satisfy the EAL threshold.
See V24 TS 3.4.6 RCS Sample Activity.Justification:
Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical Specification limits to plant personnel.
65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than (site- (1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm specific value) for 15 minutes or longer, for 15 minutes or longer.(2) RCS identified leakage greater than (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or minutes or longer, longer.(3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific value is not used for EAL Thresholds (1) and (2). See V25 TS 3.4.4 RCS Operational Leakage.Justification:
HNP Tech Spec leak rate is less than identified EAL threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used.66 SSUNTEMIALFUNGCODTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE199-01lRev 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did not (1) a. An automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor.shutdown the reactor.AND AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] / scram [BWR]) did not shutdown consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.the reactor. (2) a. A manual scram did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. EITHER of the following:
AND I. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the b. EITHER of the following:
reactor.
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control OR consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.2. A subsequent automatic (trip [PWRI / scram [BWR]) a A subsequent automatic scram is successful in shutting is successful in shutting down the reactor. down the reactor.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods)______________________________
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORG communications methods: IPlant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless)(site-specific list of communications methods) Plant pae (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORG communications methods: ENN (Emer ency Notification Network)Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)Commercial phones Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.68 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 2 Vogtle Deviations and Differences Matrix NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units I and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences...........................................................
1 RGI: Initiating Conditions...................................................
2 RG2." Initiating Conditions...................................................
3 RS 1: Initiating Conditions
...................................................
4 RS2: Initiating Conditions
...................................................
5 RAI1: Initiating Conditions...................................................
6 RA2: Initiating Conditions...................................................
7 RA3: Initiating Conditions...................................................
8 RU1: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
i10 RU2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
11 CG 1: Initiating Conditions..................................................
12 CS 1: Initiating Conditions..................................................
15 CAl: Initiating Conditions..................................................
17 CA2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
18 CA3: Initiating Conditions..................................................
19 CA6: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
20 CUI1: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
22 CU2: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
23 CU3: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
25 CU4: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
26 CU5: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
27 E-HUI: Initiating Conditions...............................................
28 PWR Fission Product Barriers Matrix -Initiating Conditions/Thresholds.......................................................
30 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage.......................................
30 2. Inadequate Heat Removal.......................................
32 3. RCS Activity / Containment Radiation
........................
33 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass ...............................
35 5. Other Indications
................................................
37 6. Emergency Director Judgment .................................
37 HG1: Initiating Conditions.................................................
39 HG7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
40 HS 1: Initiating Conditions...........
......................................
41 HS6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
42 HS7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
43 HAl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
44 HAS: Initiating Conditions.................................................
45 HA6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
47 HA7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
48 HUI: Initiating Conditions.................................................
49 HU2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
50 HU3: Initiating Conditions.................................................
51 HU4: Initiating Conditions.................................................
52 HU7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
54 SGI: Initiating Conditions.................................................
55 SG8: Initiating Conditions.................................................
56 SSI: Initiating Conditions..................................................
57 SS5: Initiating Conditions..................................................
58 SS8: Initiating Conditions..................................................
59 SAl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
60 SA2: Initiating Conditions.................................................
62 SA5: Initiating Conditions.................................................
64 SA9: Initiating Conditions.................................................
65 SUl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
67 SU2: Initiating Conditions.................................................
68 SU3: Initiating Conditions.................................................
70 SU4: Initiating Conditions.................................................
71 SU5: Initiating Conditions.................................................
72 SU6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
73 SU7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
74
D W Uses A for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs J Uses R for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Instrument setpoint readings used as threshold values to determine emergency classifications have been verified by Vogtle personnel as being within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument.
Site specific information is highlighted in yellow.RPV used instead of common PWR terminology of RCS.ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document.WOG CSFSTs are used for EAL thresholds as allowed by NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Developer Notes.Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronyms and Abbreviations.
Added additional acronyms as needed.Appendix B -Incorporated Site Specific definitions as appropriate.
1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RG1: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values)(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Plant Vent RE-12444E
]5 aic than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839EI 2.1 x i03 (site-specific dose receptor point).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to the site boundary.continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary: than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS Difference l Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications.
3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values)(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Plant Vent RE-12444E 5.0 than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site- Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839E 2.1 x 102 specific dose receptor point).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the* Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to site boundary.continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary: than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
0 Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALSINITIATING CONDITIONS
..Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None....THRSHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications.
5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None ThRSHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) [Plant Vent RE-12444E 0.50 tCi/cc (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-I12839D 2.1 x 101 tCi/cc than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site- (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater specific dose receptor point). than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or boundary.release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE point) for one hour of exposure.
or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary for one (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hour of exposure.(site-specific dose receptor point): (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to the site boundary: continue for 60 minutes or longer. 0 Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer.than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INIIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None....THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors:
the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: (site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated
____________________________
readings, setpoints and/or alarms) Fuel Handling Building RE-008 (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). CNMT BLDG Low Range*
- RE-0021003
- Mode 6 only during fuel movement Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2532 A/B Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2533 A/B (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 204 feet (Level 2).Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications and V5 Annunciator Response Procedure.
7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA: INITIATING CONDITIONS NET199-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.
operations, cooldown or shutdown.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room* Central Alarm Station* (other site-specific areas/rooms)
(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability identified)
(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room (RE-001)* Central Alarm Station (Survey Only)(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any Table HI plant rooms or areas: Table HI Buildng Rom Nmber Applicable Buildng Rom Nmber Mode ICB-226, ICB-A45, 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 1CB-A77, ICB-B61, ICB-B76, ICB-B79 3 2CB-A79, 2CB-B01I Control Building 2CB-B04, 2CB-B 18 1 CB-226, 1 CB-A45 ICB-B814, 2CB-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 1CB-A48, ICB-A50 2CB-AIS5, 2CB-AI6 AFW Pump AFW Pump Hote Operation and 1,2, 3 House standby Readiness 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS 1AB-A28, 2AB-A72 A-level demin vessel 1, 2, 3 valve galleries 1AB-A24, 2AB-A77 3 1AB-A08,3 Auxiliary 2AB-AI0I Building lAB-C85, lAB-C89 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44 lAB-B15 MEZZ l AB-B 19 MEZZ 2AB-B117 MEZZ__________2AB-BI 119 MEZZ _____Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (1) -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 has bullet for other site-specific areas/rooms.
Vogtle does not identify other areas/rooms applicable to this threshold.
Site specific information provided.
See V6 Annuciator Response Procedure (Control Room) Reference.
Justification:
No additional rooms at Vogtle have been determined to be applicable to this EAL threahold.
Difference:
Vogtle EAL Threshold (2) provides site specific room listing in tabular format (Table Hi).Justification:
Editorial change -Human Factors consideration.
9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS....RU1 IMI~ATTING CONDITIONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (site- Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or limits for 60 minutes or longer.longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None.....THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer: minutes or longer: SG Blowdown Effluent Line (RE-0021) 2 x release permit setpoint (site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 Turbine Bldg Effluent Line (RE-0848) 2 x release permit setpoint (2) mReadingontANoefln oument raiaionmoitor grae hn2tms The rPlnt id Vent , SJAE (RE-123 j 2 x release permit setpoint tim esathegontrllNg document aiaionmoits) grae hn2tms t urieBdheteJA R-2 ) 2xrles emtslon alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge Plant Vent (RE-12442C)
J2 x release permit setpoint permit for 60 minutes or longer. PatVn R-24C ees emtston (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or permit for 60 minutes or longer.longer. I Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (RE-00 18) j 2 x release permit setpoint Gaseous Radwaste (ARE-0014) 2 x release permit set oint (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations.
10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU:IITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None.......THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:
PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific level indications).
Personnel report of low water level AND LSHL-0625 off scale low (ALB05 E02)b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by AND ANY of the following radiation monitors.
- b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by (site-specific list of area radiation monitors)
ANY of the following radiation monitors.RE-0008 in the spent fuel pool building RE-0002, -0003, -0004 in containment
- RE-001 1 at the seal table *RE-0005, -0006 in containment
- Not applicable in Modes 1-4 Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V7 Annunciator Response Procedure (SFP Level) Reference and V8 Rad Monitor Information.
1l COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site- (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 °F specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in Table C2.for greater than the duration specified in the following table.Table C2: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds SecondaryHatu Containment Closure Heat-up RCS Status CONTAINMENTHetu RCS Status Status Duration _________
INTEGRITY Status Duration Intact (but not at reduced Not Established 0 minutes*inventor/PWR]
Not applicable 60 minutes* Not intact -Established 20 minutes Not intact (or at reduced Established 20 minutes* Intact Not applicable 60 minutes *inventor [PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes
- If RJ-R is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than 10 psig.(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific pressure reading). (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.
[PWR])Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 20 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
Table designator C2 assigned to RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table.Justification:
Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document.Difference:
Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Hatch is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6.Information is the same.Justification:
Editorial change for Human Factors considerations
-worst case is presented first.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 RCS Heat-up Duration Threaholds Table refers to RCS heat removal system. Hatch table uses RHR.Justification:
Site termoniology difference from NEI 99-01 Rev 6; RHR is equivalent to RCS heat removal system.Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment VI TS Table 1.1-1 Modes and VI4 RCS Pressure Indications.
21 COLD SHUTDOWN:/IREFUEINGNYSE MALFUTINCTOS CSEL CA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake) 0 Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event 0 Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike 0 High winds or tornado strike* FIRE 0 FIRE* EXPLOSION 0 EXPLOSION* (site-specific hazards) 0 Other events with similar hazard characteristics as* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode.needed for the current operating mode.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 22 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EALThreshold (1)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch.Justification:
Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this EAL.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.23 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in (reactor vessel/RCS (1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than a required lower limit for 15 the lower limit of the controlling level band for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer.(2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored.
be monitored.
AND AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in any of the following:
- b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) D Drweel Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps levels.I Drywell Equipment Drain Sumps ITurbine Building Floor Drain Sumps Torus Rad Waste Tanks Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (1).Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components.
Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. See V9 Component System Reference.
Justification:
Human factors consideration
-a level increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold.
Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list).24 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. 1/2F, and I /2G is reduced to a single power source for 15 AND minutes or longer.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.Table SI Unit 1 Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR 1D Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
25 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site- (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 0 F.specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit).(2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and (reactor vesseliRCS
[PWR] or (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 RPV [BWR]) level indication for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V1 TS Table 1.1-1 Modes.26 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS~CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 1 05/210OVDC on Technical required Vital DC buses for 15 minutes or longer. Specification required 125/250 VDC buses 1/2R22-S016 OR.1/2R22-S0 17 for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) refers to Vital DC buses. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) identifies the specific DC buses applicable to this EAL.Justification:
Editorial change -Human Factors consideration that does not affect EAL.Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V15 DC System Information.
27 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU5: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) _____________________________
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: IPlant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless)(site-specific list of communications methods) Plant pa e (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: I ENN (Emergency Notification Network)Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: IENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)Commercial phones Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS E-HUIl: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NE1 99-0 1 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than ANY value site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation listed in Table El.level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask. ____________________________
Table El Location of Dose Rate Total Dose Rate (Neutron + Gamma mR/hr)HI-TRAC 125 Side -Mid- height 450 Top 11l0 HI-STAR 100 or HI-STORM 100 Side -60 inches below mid- height 80 Side -Mid- height 80 Side -60 inches above mid- height 30 Center of lid 10 Middle of top lid 20 Top (outlet) duct 40 Bottom (inlet) duct 140 Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference:
Added new Table E2 to Hatch EAL Threshold (1). Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V16 ISFSI TS/Dose Reading Calculation.
Justification:
Utilized table to display ISFS! technical specification radiation levels for the different ISFS! modules. Intent of NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL threshold remains satisfied.
30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS BWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 FAI -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel FS1 -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.
FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Clad or RCS barrier. Loss of the third barrier.FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential FS1 -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.
FA1 -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Loss of the third barrier. Clad or RCS barrier.Difference I Deviation I Justification None Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NEI 99-01 Rev 6 1. RCS Activity 1. Primary Containment Pressure 1. Primary Containment Conditions A. (Site-specific Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid A. Primary indications that pressure greater than drop in primary containment reactor coolant (site-specific value) containment pressure pressure greater activity is greater due to RCS leakage. following primary than (site-specific than 300 IpCi/gm containment pressure value)dose equivalent I- rise OR 131). OR B. (site-specific B. Primary containment explosive mixture)pressure response not exists inside consistent with primary LOCA conditions, containment OR C. HCTL exceeded.31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. Activity of 300 ptCi/gm DEI 1 3 1 Not Applicable A. Primary containment pressure greater than 1.85 psig due to RCS leakage.Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid drop in primary containment pressure following primary containment pressure rise OR B. Primary containment pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions.
A. Primary containment pressure greater than 56 psig OR B. Greater than or equal to 6% H 2 AN__DD 5% 02 exists inside primary containment OR C. HCTL exceeded.Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V10 112 and Oz Concentration Calculation/Reference, V11 Primary Containment Pressure Reference
(> 56 psig), and V17 Primary Containment Pressure Reference (1.85 psig).NET199-01 Rev 6 2. RPV Water Level [2. RPV Water Level j2. RPV Water Level A. Primary containment flooding required.A.RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above (site-specific RPV water level corresponding to the top of active fuel) or cannot be determined.
A. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above (site-specific RPV water level corresponding to the top of active fuel) or cannot be determined.
Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment flooding required.32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. SAG entry is A. RPV water level A. RPV water level Not Applicable Not Applicable A. SAG entry is required, cannot be restored cannot be restored required.and maintained above and maintained above-155 inches or cannot -155 inches or be determined, cannot be determined.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required".
Justification:
Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance.Difference:
Containment Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required".
Justification:
Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 20 15-004 guidance.Difference:
Site specific information provided for Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A and RCS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A. See Attachment V7 RPV Level Indication/Display.
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 3. Not Applicable
- 3. RCS Leak Rate 3. Primary Containment Isolation Failure Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break A. UNISOLABLE A. UNISOLABLE direct Not Applicable in ANY of the primary system downstream pathway following: (site- leakage that results to the environment specific systems with in exceeding exists after primary potential for high- EITHER of the containment isolation ,energy line breaks) following:
signal OR 1. Max Normal OR B. Emergency RPV Operating B. Intentional primary Depressurization.
Temperature containment venting OR per EOPs 2. Max Normal OR Operating Area C. UNISOLABLE Radiation Level, primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break in Main Steamline, H-PCI, Feedwater, RWCU, or RCIC OR B. Emergency R!PV Depressurization.
A.UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
- 1. Max Normal Operating Temperature OR 2. Max Normal Operating Area Radiation Level.A. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal OR B. Intentional primary containment venting per EOPs OR C. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
- 1. Max Safe Operating Temperature.
OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area Radiation Level.Not Applicable J ____________________
L ___________________
- j. ___________________
j ___________________
I ___________________
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference:
Site specific listing of systems provided.
See VI2 Secondary Containment Rad Monitors and V18 Secondary Containment Temperature for Max Safe/Normal Rad and Operating Temperature values.NEI 99-01 Rev 6 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment radiation monitor radiation monitor radiation monitor reading greater than reading greater than reading greater than (site-specific value). (site-specific value). (site-specific value).A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater than 1.400 R/hr. than 40 R/hr. {than 26,000 R/hr.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold 4.A for Loss of Fuel Clad and RCS Barriers and Potential Loss of Containment Barrier does not include the following wording -"Primary containment radiation monitor reading...".
Justification:
Human factors consideration
-DWRRM is the site designator for the Primary Containment radiation monitor.Difference:
Site specific informsation provided.
See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation.
NET 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable)
A. Offgas Pre-and Post- Not Applicable A. Drywell Fission Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Treatment Monitors Product Monitor Offscale High. reading 5.0 x 105 cpm.35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation.
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates the Fuel Clad Barrier. Potential Loss of the the RCS Barrier. Potential Loss of the the Containment Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier.A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates the fuel clad barrier, potential loss of the the RCS Barrier, potential loss of the the Containment potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 36 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation 1 Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the Security security shift supervision).
Shift Captain or designee.AND AND b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- b. EITHER of the following has occurred: I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be 1. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained.
controlled or maintained.
- Reactivity control 0 Reactivity control* Core cooling [PWR] / RPV water level [BWR] 0 RPV water level* RCS heat removal 0 RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.IMMINENT.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.37 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS H7INITING CONDITION Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRJSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or involve actual or IMMITNENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than immediate site area. the immediate site area.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 38 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the Security Shift Captain supervision), or designee.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None~THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown from the control room to remote shutdown panels.panels and local control stations).
AND AND b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 minutes.reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes).
- Reactivity control* Reactivity control 0 RPV water level* Core cooling [PWR] / RPV water level [BWR] 0 RCS heat removal* RCS heat removal Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public, effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public.Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.
site boundary.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None 41 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAl: INITIATING CONDITONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minutes.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA) as reported by the Security security shift supervision).
Shift Captain or designee.(2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. 30 minutes of the site.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.42 HAZARDANDOHER:
CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas: into any Table Hi plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability identified)
ITable HI AND Building Rooms Applicable Modes b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. -Diesel generator building All All Unit 1/2 130' All Reactor building Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR) All Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) All AND b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
Hatch EAL Threshold (1)a incorporates Table HI to identify applicable site specific rooms/areas.
43 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS~HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS....
NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control room to remote shutdown, panels.control stations).
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. exposure levels.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).
ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Captain or designee.(2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at HNP.(3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. aircraft threat.Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the site' with HNP.Justification:
Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Hatch site.Difference:
Site specific information provided.46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS~HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation/IJustification None~THRESHOLDS NET 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE
- Unit One "Seismic Peak Shock Recorder High G Level" limits) (65 7-066) alarm* Unit Two "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (657-048) alarm* A 12.7 Hz amber light illuminated in the N/S OR E/W column on panel 1H1ll-P701
- A 12.7 Hz red light illuminated in the N/S O__R E/W column on panel 1H1Il-P701 Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V19 Seismic Indications.
47 HAZARDANDOHER:
CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA (PA).(2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode. component needed for the current operating mode.(3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA (PA) is due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., chemical spill or toxic gas release).
an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release).(4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles, prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site in personal vehicles.(5) (Site-specific list of natural or technological hazard events) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (4) -replaced "via" with "in".Justification:
Editorial change.Difference:
Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (5).48 HAZARD ANDOHER CONDITIOTNS AFFECTINGPLNTSAEYCSAL HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications:
the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or 0 Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm S Field verification of a single fire alarm AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas.rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE).FIRE). AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas.b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant AND rooms or areas: c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) of alarm receipt.AND (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes of the of alarm receipt. initial report, alarm or indication.
(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside (4) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI the plant Protected A real PROTECTED AREA not extinguished PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication, fire response agency to extinguish.
49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside Table 112 the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires Building Rooms firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.
Control Building CB 147' Cable Spreading Room Ul/2 CB 1 12' Station Battery Rooms A,B Diesel generator building All Primary Containment All Unit 1/2 130'Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR)Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR)Reactor building Unit 1 SW Diagonals (RCIC)Unit 2 NW Diagonals (RCIC)Unit 1/2 HPCI Rooms Intake structure All Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Differences:
EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -added reference to Table 112 instead of listing areas separately for each EAL.Justification:
Human factors consideration
-applicable rooms are the same for each EAL. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing that table in the EAL simplifies the process for identifying applicable rooms.Differences:
EAL Thresholds (3) and (4) -added PROTECTED AREA (PA) after plant.Justification:
Clarifies plant areas that are applicable to these EALs.Differences:
Site specific information provided -added Table H2 with applicable room listing. See V20 Table 112 Basis.Justification:
Human factors consideration.
50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS 11U7: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Editorial change that does not change IC.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.
No indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. occurs.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None 51 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site- (!) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 specific emergency buses). VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G.AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less
- Restoration of at least one AC essential bus in less than than (site-specific hours) is not likely. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely.* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information and V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level.52 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SG8: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site- (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G for 15 minutes AND or longer.b. Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage AND value) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 b. Indicated voltage is less than 105/210 VDC on ALL minutes or longer. 125/250 VDC Bus 1/2R22-S016 and 1/2R22-S017 for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information, V15 DC System Information.
53 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hlatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SS5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [PWR] Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or/ R.PV water level [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. RCS heat removal.Difference
/ Deviation/IJustification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor.AND AND b. All manual actions to shut down the reactor have b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been been unsuccessful.
unsuccessful.
AND AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: c. EITHER of the following conditions exist:* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV* (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately Water Level remove heat from the RCS)
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level and V22 Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) Curve.55 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SS8: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V15 DC System Information.
56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. 1/2F, and 1/2G is reduced to a single power source for 15 AND minutes or longer.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.Table S1 Unit I Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator 1 A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See VI3 4160 VAC Essential Buses Information.
57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 /Hatch 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.[ BWR parameter list] [ PWR parameter list]Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RCS Level RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary Temperature or Emergency Feed Water________________Flow AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25%thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor scram [BWR] / trip [PWR]* ECCS (SI) actuation* Thermal power oscillations greater than 10% [BWR](1) a.An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature AND b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.* Automatic or manual runback greater than 25%thermal reactor power* Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load* Reactor scram* ECCS actuation* Thermal power oscillations greater than 10%DNferne/Deato/Jsifaio None 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Hatch Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) fails to shut down the Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in are not successful in shutting down the reactor, shutting down the reactor.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor.AND AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. successful in shutting down the reactor.Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None 60 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA9: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake) 0 Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event 0 Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike S High winds or tornado strike* FIRE 0 FIRE* EXPLOSION 0 EXPLOSION* (site-specific hazards) 0 Other events with similar hazard characteristics as* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode.needed for the current operating mode.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification 61 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch.Justification:
Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold.
Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.62 SSTEM MALFUATNGCODTIONS SUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all offsite AC power capability to essential buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer.Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for IC.Justification:
Terminology difference
-Hatch refers to emergency buses as essential buses.THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to 4160 VAC Essential emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G for 15 minutes or longer.Table S2 IUniti I Unit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMPR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR 1D Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Difference
/ Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V13 4160 VAC Essential Buses Informaton.
63 SSU2NTEMIALFUNGCODTIONS 5U2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.(1)a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.[BWR parameter list] [PWR parameter listi Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RCS Level RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam________________________
generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific Note: Use the Unit 1 or Unit 2 Pretreatment (Flow vs mR/hr) Graphs to value). determine if the Pretreatment Radiation Monitor exceeds the TV of 240,000 jiCi/sec.(2) Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is (1) Pretreatment Radiation Monitor greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications.
l(2)D11K601 1 (2)DI 1 K602 reading greater than 240,000 for greater than 60 minutes.(2) Sample analysis indicates that the reactor coolant specific activity is EITHER:* Greater than 0.2 and less than or equal to 2.0 ptCi/gm dose equivalent I13J for greater than 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />s* Greater than 2.0 dose equivalent 1131.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) does not include a Note box. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) includes a Note box.Justification:
Editorial change to provide guidance on use of Unit I or Unit 2 Pretreatment Graphs to determine if threshold has been exceeded.Difference:
Site specific information provided for Threshold (1). See V23 TS 3.7.6 Pretreatment Radiation Monitor Reading.Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) does not specify a Technical Specification value. Hatch EAL Threshold (2) identifies the coolant activity values that satisfy the EAL threshold.
See V24 TS 3.4.6 RCS Sample Activity.Justification:
Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical Specification limits to plant personnel.
65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than (site- (1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm specific value) for 15 minutes or longer, for 15 minutes or longer.(2) RCS identified leakage greater than (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or minutes or longer, longer.(3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific value is not used for EAL Thresholds (1) and (2). See V25 TS 3.4.4 RCS Operational Leakage.Justification:
HNP Tech Spec leak rate is less than identified EAL threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used.66 SSUNTEMIALFUNGCODTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE199-01lRev 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] / scram [BWR]) did not (1) a. An automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor.shutdown the reactor.AND AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] / scram [BWR]) did not shutdown consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.the reactor. (2) a. A manual scram did not shutdown the reactor.AND b. EITHER of the following:
AND I. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the b. EITHER of the following:
reactor.
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control OR consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.2. A subsequent automatic (trip [PWRI / scram [BWR]) a A subsequent automatic scram is successful in shutting is successful in shutting down the reactor. down the reactor.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions.
Justification:
Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event.67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods)______________________________
(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORG communications methods: IPlant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless)(site-specific list of communications methods) Plant pae (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods)(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORG communications methods: ENN (Emer ency Notification Network)Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)Commercial phones Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.68 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 2 Vogtle Deviations and Differences Matrix NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units I and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences...........................................................
1 RGI: Initiating Conditions...................................................
2 RG2." Initiating Conditions...................................................
3 RS 1: Initiating Conditions
...................................................
4 RS2: Initiating Conditions
...................................................
5 RAI1: Initiating Conditions...................................................
6 RA2: Initiating Conditions...................................................
7 RA3: Initiating Conditions...................................................
8 RU1: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
i10 RU2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
11 CG 1: Initiating Conditions..................................................
12 CS 1: Initiating Conditions..................................................
15 CAl: Initiating Conditions..................................................
17 CA2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
18 CA3: Initiating Conditions..................................................
19 CA6: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
20 CUI1: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
22 CU2: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
23 CU3: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
25 CU4: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
26 CU5: Initiating Conditions
.................................................
27 E-HUI: Initiating Conditions...............................................
28 PWR Fission Product Barriers Matrix -Initiating Conditions/Thresholds.......................................................
30 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage.......................................
30 2. Inadequate Heat Removal.......................................
32 3. RCS Activity / Containment Radiation
........................
33 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass ...............................
35 5. Other Indications
................................................
37 6. Emergency Director Judgment .................................
37 HG1: Initiating Conditions.................................................
39 HG7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
40 HS 1: Initiating Conditions...........
......................................
41 HS6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
42 HS7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
43 HAl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
44 HAS: Initiating Conditions.................................................
45 HA6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
47 HA7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
48 HUI: Initiating Conditions.................................................
49 HU2: Initiating Conditions..................................................
50 HU3: Initiating Conditions.................................................
51 HU4: Initiating Conditions.................................................
52 HU7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
54 SGI: Initiating Conditions.................................................
55 SG8: Initiating Conditions.................................................
56 SSI: Initiating Conditions..................................................
57 SS5: Initiating Conditions..................................................
58 SS8: Initiating Conditions..................................................
59 SAl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
60 SA2: Initiating Conditions.................................................
62 SA5: Initiating Conditions.................................................
64 SA9: Initiating Conditions.................................................
65 SUl: Initiating Conditions.................................................
67 SU2: Initiating Conditions.................................................
68 SU3: Initiating Conditions.................................................
70 SU4: Initiating Conditions.................................................
71 SU5: Initiating Conditions.................................................
72 SU6: Initiating Conditions.................................................
73 SU7: Initiating Conditions.................................................
74
D W Uses A for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs J Uses R for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Instrument setpoint readings used as threshold values to determine emergency classifications have been verified by Vogtle personnel as being within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument.
Site specific information is highlighted in yellow.RPV used instead of common PWR terminology of RCS.ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document.WOG CSFSTs are used for EAL thresholds as allowed by NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Developer Notes.Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronyms and Abbreviations.
Added additional acronyms as needed.Appendix B -Incorporated Site Specific definitions as appropriate.
1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RG1: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values)(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Plant Vent RE-12444E
]5 aic than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839EI 2.1 x i03 (site-specific dose receptor point).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to the site boundary.continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary: than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS Difference l Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications.
3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS~RSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRSHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values)(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Plant Vent RE-12444E 5.0 than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site- Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839E 2.1 x 102 specific dose receptor point).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the* Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to site boundary.continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary: than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
0 Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALSINITIATING CONDITIONS
..Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None....THRSHOLDS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications.
5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS Difference I Deviation
/ Justification None ThRSHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) [Plant Vent RE-12444E 0.50 tCi/cc (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-I12839D 2.1 x 101 tCi/cc than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site- (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater specific dose receptor point). than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or boundary.release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE point) for one hour of exposure.
or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary for one (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hour of exposure.(site-specific dose receptor point): (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to the site boundary: continue for 60 minutes or longer. 0 Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer.than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V30ODCM Site Boundary Reference.
6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INIIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None....THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors:
the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: (site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated
____________________________
readings, setpoints and/or alarms) Fuel Handling Building RE-008 (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). CNMT BLDG Low Range*
- RE-0021003
- Mode 6 only during fuel movement Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2532 A/B Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2533 A/B (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 204 feet (Level 2).Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications and V5 Annunciator Response Procedure.
7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA: INITIATING CONDITIONS NET199-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.
operations, cooldown or shutdown.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None THRESHOLDS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room* Central Alarm Station* (other site-specific areas/rooms)
(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability identified)
(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room (RE-001)* Central Alarm Station (Survey Only)(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any Table HI plant rooms or areas: Table HI Buildng Rom Nmber Applicable Buildng Rom Nmber Mode ICB-226, ICB-A45, 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 1CB-A77, ICB-B61, ICB-B76, ICB-B79 3 2CB-A79, 2CB-B01I Control Building 2CB-B04, 2CB-B 18 1 CB-226, 1 CB-A45 ICB-B814, 2CB-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 1CB-A48, ICB-A50 2CB-AIS5, 2CB-AI6 AFW Pump AFW Pump Hote Operation and 1,2, 3 House standby Readiness 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS 1AB-A28, 2AB-A72 A-level demin vessel 1, 2, 3 valve galleries 1AB-A24, 2AB-A77 3 1AB-A08,3 Auxiliary 2AB-AI0I Building lAB-C85, lAB-C89 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44 lAB-B15 MEZZ l AB-B 19 MEZZ 2AB-B117 MEZZ__________2AB-BI 119 MEZZ _____Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold (1) -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 has bullet for other site-specific areas/rooms.
Vogtle does not identify other areas/rooms applicable to this threshold.
Site specific information provided.
See V6 Annuciator Response Procedure (Control Room) Reference.
Justification:
No additional rooms at Vogtle have been determined to be applicable to this EAL threahold.
Difference:
Vogtle EAL Threshold (2) provides site specific room listing in tabular format (Table Hi).Justification:
Editorial change -Human Factors consideration.
9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS....RU1 IMI~ATTING CONDITIONS NE1 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (site- Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or limits for 60 minutes or longer.longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification None.....THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer: minutes or longer: SG Blowdown Effluent Line (RE-0021) 2 x release permit setpoint (site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 Turbine Bldg Effluent Line (RE-0848) 2 x release permit setpoint (2) mReadingontANoefln oument raiaionmoitor grae hn2tms The rPlnt id Vent , SJAE (RE-123 j 2 x release permit setpoint tim esathegontrllNg document aiaionmoits) grae hn2tms t urieBdheteJA R-2 ) 2xrles emtslon alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge Plant Vent (RE-12442C)
J2 x release permit setpoint permit for 60 minutes or longer. PatVn R-24C ees emtston (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or permit for 60 minutes or longer.longer. I Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (RE-00 18) j 2 x release permit setpoint Gaseous Radwaste (ARE-0014) 2 x release permit set oint (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer.Difference
/ Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations.
10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU:IITIATING CONDITIONS Difference
/ Deviation I Justification None.......THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:
PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific level indications).
Personnel report of low water level AND LSHL-0625 off scale low (ALB05 E02)b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by AND ANY of the following radiation monitors.
- b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by (site-specific list of area radiation monitors)
ANY of the following radiation monitors.RE-0008 in the spent fuel pool building RE-0002, -0003, -0004 in containment
- RE-001 1 at the seal table *RE-0005, -0006 in containment
- Not applicable in Modes 1-4 Difference I Deviation
/ Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided.
See V7 Annunciator Response Procedure (SFP Level) Reference and V8 Rad Monitor Information.
1l