Text

Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8
	ML16071A180
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110; ML16071A126; ML16071A132; ML16071A136; ML16071A137; ML16071A140; ML16071A144; ML16071A146; ML16071A147; ML16071A149; ML16071A150; ML16071A152; ML16071A153; ML16071A158; ML16071A160; ML16071A166; ML16071A170; ML16071A174; ML16071A176; ML16071A180; ML16071A181; ML16071A184; ML16071A185; ML16071A187; ML16071A188; ML16071A193; ML16071A195; ML16071A198; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8; NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4; ... further results
References
	NL-15-1898
	Download: ML16071A180 (51)
	v • d • e

RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:

Personnel repor t tl" os,, ' ater level Annunciator~U "SFP LVI tlli[.Ot" AND b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.Basis: RIZI: 11 [,N(, PAllI l\'A\ Ibish includes the reactor refuel ca,,its the fuel canal. the spent tuelI pool canals, and pools t hrough which it-radliatcd mhel mas he moved, hut not itncl udi ng the reactor \se55C[ iN PI.ANN [): A parameter change or an es cut that is not 1 ) the result of an inte-nded e\ ol ut ion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

I he cause of thne parameter chang~e or event tuay he known or unknown.This IC addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition eeod-can be a precursor to a more serious event and is-also indiatiea e-e~ndieates a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level ofsfc'^*,,

-.A water level decrease will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation.

Other sources of level indications ffay-include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available).

A significant drop in the water level may also cause an increase in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

The effects of planned evolutions shoald-will be considered.

For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may increase due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the 49: ,1 reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly.

Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wou~ldbe-v4auscs IC RA2+1~e~ef-'e~rNeteM:

The "cite epecific le-vel indieaticnz" are tho~z i.ndi]catinen that be uced ta monitcr* a-ter in' the v.ari.ous pc:".ias of t~e R.EFUELING PATHWAY. Specify the ma~de The "cite epecifi.e

!iet f area radiatian monitore" shauld ea~ntin tho'ee ar-ea radiatioen monitars+

tha wulmlld be~l e Ueee ta hav rain frollowingV a~ll l~+deee nwae ee dependent, ar other conrtralled but t~empa~rm, radiatinn monitre.rs Specify t.he made applicability of a manitar Wf t ic nat a;vailable in al! ma...ee.50 74 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CG1 Loss CSI Loss of -reeeete*

CA1 Loss CU1 UNPLANNED.....IRDCS ~Pr]U' .. ...... ,RS rPWR] zr vczz!./RCS r[uWJ zr loss of(-eeeetf inventory affecting inventory affecting inventory.

R4.... 8W V'fuel clad integrity with core decay heat Op. Modes:" Cold inventory for 15 containment removal capability.

Shutdown, Refueling minutes or longer.challenged.

Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes:" Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CA2 Loss of all CU2 Loss of all but offsite and all onsite one AC power source AC power to to emergency buses for emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.15 minutes or longer. Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled De fueled CA3 Inability to CU3 UNPLANNED maintain the plant in in RCS cold shutdown, temperature.

Op. Modes: Cold Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, Refueling CU4 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Op. Modes:" Cold Shutdown, Refueling, De fueled CA6 Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Op. Modes:" Cold!Shutdown, Refueling 51 CG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss of (raca ....... el.... f PJ-' r]o, affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.

0fD DlW-f Dt-DI!...t

... Rl V inventory Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (-4-oi--2-)

Note: The emergency director ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) a. ReactcrvcszelRCS IPW] er RP.' [BWI)RVl.....

ta eeato 18 (--( ) a.(Iteacter vceecL'RC~

..... e .... t ..... Rcatctor level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

Erratic source range monitor

UNLANNED rise no ,xet~ oln ~nTn ccTW te T WH it pcfcumaniran)levels

_________________

of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery z AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table 1C l-t .........

t..x.Containment Challenge Table ('I* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*

3e* r hno e..a.%t1 Ep-esve exists" inside containment

UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure* If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.Basis: 52 CO)N1AINM'EN I RIK: Per [NP-l I2)-STP- 18.4, "Containment Integritx Veri tieation and Closure" A parameter chang~e or an event that is not 1) the result ol an intended e'xolution or 2) an expected plant response to a trasient.

The cause of the parameter change or event ma3 be known or unknownl.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged.

This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RS/eaetei' vessetRP~V level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment.

If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity.

It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.

In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery, could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment.

If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether 61r-ae#-containment is challenged.

In EAL 2-1 .b, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time for a..,

to terminate leakage, recover inventory control,L or makeup equipment.

and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to *,.......l, ow ^ twrom monitor (racz ..............

t ,,~ -,I ar RPV [3 ...J,?,J V level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they e in~dieative-ofindicate leakage from the (reactzr ...... ,/,-, [.DWR]O er RPV/ [rWR])Rl"PV.

These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal;53 S ECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

upon. .th ....unt..f time oince shu.tdo..;._ , refer. to Generi .... : r 8 .. 17, SECY , 91.Ot'° 283, NUREG that the ability to monitor !e-vel within the range required by operating precedurec

-,-ll! net be Fr- AL Hl#i , The= "cit .......e level ch.. be apprO-ximnately" the to.p ef active' fe....f..the a.ailab..ity..

en cale... level uc ta eti lefvelale canbedeterm.'*ine during.=thfiuat i ...o:r _ .. st : uin hc the ,:o! leae indicati ic ... ieb. If° th"a~ e deigand , op..... tion duin CldShtdwnorReuein mde, tend ntf, incld A 1 ...............

will° be Fuear EAn12. frsm~tan bulle apmc w ratelevly in 'cr the reao vess lowe-'rs, the deeate above the..l uncov~e; and zthe asofciae "sitee- specific vau"iniaiePfcr ucvr.ti ecgie 54 or sitc' apocific=

indicationa, not alrcad.y uacd clacwhc.Lrc, that w-ill promotc. timoly, accurato emorgcnc cnaziti!.==cain.

Far the. Contain-a~nt Challanga Tabie: Sita ahutdow;'n cntingency plana typically pri f..r.......ngCOTANMN CLOSURE following a loss of RCS bea .........

o r .....n.... cou ..... ti........

Fur "Explaai;'c mistura", de;velopors may enter minimu ..n...n.. nt ...........

hydrogo, ...

nozc,¢aa,-y tO a, 0 aupr a hyogo bu.... (,.e..,.......e,telwrdfaain limit).....

A, a;'ailablc in tho Contro! Room.inrcraza:d rclaac= that may be indicat'i'va uf a cha~llenge ta containncnt.

Th,, "aita L~L/'.aaignmcnIP.urIDuIca:

o.I.'i.n 55 CS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Loss ...............

/RCS m, [ -WR or affecting core decay heat removal capability.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (i or 2-or4)DD-V48WR.... )RI inventory Note: The emergency director declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that 30 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established.

AND b. MRatr~~'C PR rRM[f~)RLSNode

5) level less than (2;a. (JUN IAIP~MLN I CLU~UKE z~tatWflcd.

b.

[PWR ""r' RP .M [BWR,.])RPV ivvl levc than= II Wu (.p" (--4 2) a.(i-(cactcr VZ~CLItL~

[-'w~J or itr~'-r DZI....WRI+RV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:

Erratic source range monitor indicatio-[z4

UNPLANNED rise in* " mk-),levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery utn~r lr~ ~ra~irtz ina:aaricns Basis: CONlAINMfENT Cl.OSSJRL:

Per FNP- 1(2)-S UP- 18.-. %'ontainment Integrity Verification and C los ure'".t NPILANNLI):

A partmleter change or an exent that is not 1 ) the result of an intended e\ olution or 2) an ex(pected plant response to a transient.

[he cause of the parameter change or event may be k itw n or unkn1own.56 This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss ..............

[Pow arRP f-8#-RJ)RPV inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed fef-pfeteetien-eflo protect the public and ith, s-warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If ........ to level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Ihc level specified in LALI. .b represents a lesel in the RPV that is (6 inches below th~e bottom If)of' the reactor vessel penetration.

Ibis level is lower than the RPV monitoring capability of RCS level instrumentation and must he monitored using RVILIS. This level will onlx he observable in Mode 5 with RVI IS operable.

In Mode 6. when RVLIS1 is not operable.

this IC should be exaluated using LAI, #2.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions.

The ...........

in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EAL5 1l.b ead--Zb-reflect t-he-f-t-that without CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a leeehigher probability of a fission product release to the environment.

In EAL g2.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties).

It also allows sufficient time for r .......actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory controlL or makeup equipment.

and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor (reactar ...... DCS [rWR] c.or RPY[wR]P lee ma ecasdb instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they aee leakage from the 'rpea .... z....... [PWcr] ol"o Dtr tRP [Df'R)RP'.

These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of/Decay Heat Removal;SECY 9 1-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG- 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 9 1-06, Guidelines/for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management.

Escalation of the emergency classification level weeld-be-v4auses IC CG1 or RG1.Devoe~Ne~er at ,A' "T c ci dzn A annTyc Tuggec tAt fuel dat71ma1 cr iti oe or f no 57 Th type and rang af1 RCSiv levl loinstrmenttlien~i mayl vcrj duingll a1 autage a thi lat li mave's t.hraugh -'a-icus aprating modes and refueling

.+valu,'tian's, part.icu-arly fer a As procedurca in the Cald Sh'utdown:

and P.cfuaeng modes may .......cn (.g... n--r......r.

th...n hat ....;guir....

d during mdshgCr~ thanCado; o Rehuedln.

oe: ._. .. FFrr [LEft .b.b the " site specific h'a'el Ia 6" beow' thcy botta tF ofatct RCS.Icap.

fThis t;aihe loo , If hn avaiab li-'y of !a!on scal leelidiaoni s that th is;'Iva':

leve nd bein d..t.erm ,ned... drng sam shutdawn odes, ......d....., ut.not athers,....t...n specify..h...od.

dcpendcntIAI,.v4l and/ar canfgurtio state... duIng.. hich tc ....... indi.. tion i.... +applicable.

fthe...I....ssIfiain ilb accmcn a mpn,..ihdeint ac...dan..

with.........

..................

Far.AL.............

a.t specific ,ev'e" v.heuld .'~z be appra!'atc:ed taf afacivcfuc.

It.58 Level! I. The BWP. Low: Lo,-. Lo-w ECCS actua-tion setpoi~nt

/ Lec:! I ...... ch.sen b... au. e it.... is..:" a injct.-,ionc -systhms wouldn autoati~caly tao attempt ton res"t or~e RP leeln. Thi a;aa!. RP r FcoE r 112Pb Theacte sp ncifi-c level cho!!d be.for the mntor o act.ive For EAL 113.b secrnt bu~llt A-wtrlvli the reactr v..........

lowere do.. raeaov h undcatvr an h-"scae ct peii au"idctv f core uncover;.yI iorreogniz.

ecthat th o ito n ..... d y hs C a re...u..t..in......radi....

ti.......alu.-e be ..n ..th ..........

g ..59 CA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of o zz/C ..........

[~PW,, or RPM [- B ...JRRI ', inventory.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director shou4d-xxill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of (reactcr ..... eL',CS rPR z~ r, RPM

.. l... ... VA inventory as indicated by level less than 2 s~-~efel4e)

(2) a. (R............

t'z1C .....I ar R... [B....],.-

level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND b. UNPLANNED increase in rsnTn (RD)o : t IIiipT*izczzfzzm adz ak levels due to a loss of (reactzr .....zze...'rCS*

.o[PJR].. e t cr. t .... ISWR])R inventory.

Basis:

A parameter change or an that is n~ot 1) the iresulh ofaln intended evolntion or 2) an evpected plant response to a transient, the cause of the pamameter change or event may he knnxx, n or unkno\x n.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).

This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.For EAL #1, a lowering of water level below (zkzzii I1" indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and

........ .v ..s.cn/r~C [Wr] cr... ..... t.....,,)RPV water level. h I he .I22 I'" level specified in [iAl. #1 is the minimum RCS level for RI IR operation proxvided in procedure for mid loop operations.

Beclox\ this lex~el, loss of RI IR pump net po~sitive suction head (NPSI I) may occur resuhline in a loss ot deea\ heat removal capahility.

The heat-up rate of the coolant will increase as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing decrease in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL # 1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a residual heat removal suction point). An increase in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA3.For EAL #2, the inability to monitor (reac.zr ............

[P... II~'R zrm RP.'" [R°W.t...,RI)RP level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation.

If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank 60~9 ~4w~

level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they aie,hidicatc leakage from the (r.......

.....RC [/PW I ] or/D RPM [ YI FDR'RpV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS 1.If the (reactor ..... selCS ootr RPM ......t... ... .. [BHR])RP inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency

.,eu .... v4auses IC CS 1.For EAL #2 the tsite sp rne ffPi C leve '¢hul e!bs ont,.n either;a 'y un ECL Assignment Attributes:

3.1.2.13 61 CA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power tz(sit.e bu...).......

410 buse (2 f12 or 15 minutes or longer.rh izS J r Basis: This IC addresses a total loss of AC power (scc rablc S I above) that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. When in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of a..... e......p ....planI sa~3 Fifteen minutes ;;z slected nd ihc threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Escalation of the emergency classification level we**14be-ee 4euscs IC CS 1 or RS I.Fora cu thin has nul:'tip!e gcnratcrms, thz EAL and/ar Baz siccaciern sh-,u.!d rzflczt the minmu n...umber ef operating eresnr e.t...uc...roie d at owrt 62

.......t. zpe..... cmcrgcney, bu.:"i," crc thc bc-zec fc by ffzite Zr ..m.r. e-cy AC pc.--er ecu'-rcc that... upply pe.......

thc ce.trice

........ tht ........ SAFETy. SYSTEMAS.

Ther The.- ---B.])' ....z .....; .... m.ay zpcoify uze -.f* a non zafety related pc"wer mzurce pro;'idJ At multi unit ztatic~ns, the EALe may credit ocmpen~cat.o me~urez that ~e....... raiz... ;and e--. be- implement..

++ .;ithi 15 m --nu...

capab+litiez

..u..h ac EAL rvi.......that.

th p...n.................mect th r..u..........0..F..

5..3....ECL Acz:ignmcrnt A,,'r',butcc:

3.1 .2.B 63 CA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)SNote: The emergency director ste~4d-xvill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than [ 4site-speei~fi T ...............................

t -m.........l.mit) for greater than the duration specified in 'he4 4le'i'": .... [abl' C2.*IablIe (:2: R('S Ilecal-up Duration Thresholds RUS Status (ontainmenat (Ilosurc Status Hieat-up Duration Not Intact Not Elstablished 0I minutes (or at reduced inventorx)

E stablished 20 minutes*In tact No t applicable 60 mlinutets*(hut not at reduced inventorx)

Sf an RCS heat removal s~ stem is in opetation xxithin this time frame and R(S temperature is beine reduceed+

the [AI. is not applicable.

(2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than {(,itz apzcii~c p.........

r.... di.... " psig. (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions).-f.Wj Basis: (iON ItAINM EN I(I ,OStJREh Ier [NtP-1(2~)-STP-I1.4. "+Containment Integrity Vcrilicatioti and tlosure".INPIAN NI'I): A parameter charmge or an cx ent that is not 1 the result of an intended cx olut ion or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

The cause of the paramneter chatnge or exvenl ma3 he k noxx1 or unk nossn.This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level ofst .... # ....pv....tplant staktjx.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

t he RCS Ileat-tup I)uration Thresholds table addresses the case wxhere there is an increase in R(S temperature, the R(CS is not intact or is at reduced inventory, and (ON ['AINMEN I (il OSURE is not established.

In this case. no heat-tip duration is allowved tice.. t0 minutes).

Ibhis is because I ) the cx apo~rated reactor coolant max he released directlx into the Containment 64 t i++i '+ ++:+ ++++ : +++ J ]

atmosphere and subsequently Ito Ihe ironinent.

and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inoentory abo',c the lop of irradiated fhel.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an increase in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact, or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.Finalfix the RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame sholdv.ill allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.rel.eased

-",.+. .. directly ..... the Cant":a-nmente atema pher and .ub..unty............nt an 2 EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level ;weu!d-be-4au" e IC... or.SI For EAL # ! Enter the "site specific Tcchnical Specification cald shutdawn temperature limit"+Far PWP~s, this ICoand its associated EALs addrss the cnernsem.

rais~ed by Generic Letter 88 1 7, Lass of Deea: Hea.: Remoa.x'a A number of phenamena such as pressurizatia.n.....

vctedn,..,-

steam heat removal s;ystcm designadl'c

.......................

pr....m....n...a....................r..au af..li .^. d ' ....... rcaa is la.t alwc ti.. e frames' ..... consistent

"ith th.e guianacl.T hotidc b... .. en ri .........

17.nd...........be.....r.a.........thata.l...r...ur 65 CA6 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:* Seismic event (earthquake)

Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike* FIRE* EXPLOSION-- o(zit:e zpccifxC hazardz)* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager AND b. EITHER of the following:

Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.* The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode.Basis: t[RE: Combustion characterized bs heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping dri' c belts or o, crheated electrical equipment do not constitute t[IRES. ()bserxation of tiame is prefe:rred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heal are LXPI'I(SION:

A rapid. ,,iolcu~t and cat~astrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion.

chemical reaction or o\,crprcssurization.

A release of steam (from high energx, lines or components) or an electrical component tailure (caused by short circuits.

grounding, arcing.etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosior.

Such events may require a post-CeVent inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.SAUI:Y SYS [EM: A system required tbr safe plant Opexration, coolinug dow~n the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdo~xn condition, inctuding the KC{'S. I'hese are ty.pieall\, systems elassitied as safe:ts-related.

VlISI Ill ,[I )A MAGEL: Damage to a component, or structure that is readiltx observable wsithout measurements, testing, or anah~ sis. Thle visual impact of the damage is sufticient to cause concern regarding the operabtlititor reliability of the aftizctdcmoeto tutr This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode. This 66 condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of .....y., .....pIee~plant safety.The first threshold Ikr EAL I.b4 addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is in service/operation since indications for it will be readily available.

The indications of degraded performance sheldd-will be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.[he second threshold tkr EAL I addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is not in service/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components.

Operators will make this determination based on t#he available event and damage report information.

This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level we4ildbe--4euses IC CS 1 or RS 1.Nu..^r ........ plant+ SAFETY SySTEMS r a

'rm.... r'-..........

and r+.d.n,&+-

trrer.:; ,zfzeiuitmznt in a zrdaz.-.'

"fth +ire

........ e':+ ritzriii ECL A~i2nn~nt Attribut~:

3. l.2.B 67 CU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of (reo..........

.....C [ .....] or .... [BWR])PV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: The emergency director sheuld-xx i l declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results ...........

v

[P....J .r....f8W/)RI~R'V level less than a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer.(2) a. (Reacto ........ S [/ P DIJ'R] cr RDP, [B4I-RlJrl!..........t...

...t... Vl level cannot be monitored.

AND b. UNPLANNED rise in innn sm r Waste Hdu nklevels.

~WWcTWT~A Basis: tI NPI ANNILI): A Ipar ctcr chanae or an cx ent that is n~ot I t he result or'an inten~ded cx olut ion or 2) anl expected plant response to a transie'nt.

[he cause of the parameter change or cx ent rnal he knoxx'n or unknoxxnl.

This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor (ra. z .............

[, oR]o~'rP.V -,f,,,WRJ+R level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of sae*,.the-pen Refueling evolutions that decrease RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled.

An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required (rea.ctor

....." IR~CS, [Wr] zo, .Jr [RI 5 R )Rl IV, ,,-level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented.

This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.68 EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine ........ t'C [.... J -r ....f8WRJ)PRPV level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are leakage from the (razz ..... " wv.l/RC..

[PhI',!?..J zr .DrPV. [... W ,Rt V.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level either IC CAI or CA3.69 CU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) a. AC poer capabilt to ..................

enz -vea, BOTIlI 16QV ESE s12AQI is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.~ilIe $~A...... , ,, '" ...... .. ...... ... ., .... ... ... .... .! .... ... .. ..... ... .Basis: SAI:l: IEY ~SYS I [I-M: A systemn rcquircd hir sate plant operation.

coolinlg the plant and/or placing it in the cold shuntdowxn condition.

including Ilk [(C(S. lIhcsc arc typically systems classiticd as saftct,-iclatcd, This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources ~e any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.

When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service.Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Ths-When in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of y-f he-pian4plant sntibty.70 An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus (sec Ilahle S I ahox+e). Se.i-elxamples of this condition a-r, prcs....n.....~L....

clfudtk,* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).

A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from the unit main generator.

A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency busses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes w-ac .......d... ai> thc threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA2.an- AC emergency bus. For if a p.owevr sou,-ce is com:=prised of tw-o. generators

(.e......t

..wo .. 5% .........

genatr .......t...f........C emerenc" bu),th -L-ndBai seTl.rion+

..u.t speif th....t .bot gen.at. r for+ scur... are+k' perating j~++++". .......EALs Basis should+ reflect that+ each independent+

offst p......r circuit c.ntitte a..sigep~. or,, e+,,mp lc, three indepiendent[1 3+15kV ffitep.we circuit that op~erotion of this. source is reeogn.izcd in AO~ EOPS, or beon .... s i: basis ac.ident re..on.. gut.idelines (e.g., FLEX .uppo..

Suc+h p~ta .... .ur k.hou.+d gen...l. meet At multi unit ..tation...

the AZ redit ...mp..........m...ure.

tha re procedur'lized ....be.imple.ented withi 15 .minute ..... Cosie ..pablitie suc .........ce..os te 71 ECL A~igr.rncnt Attrih.t~z:

3.1.1 .A 72 CU3 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2)Note: The emergency director shealdwill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than sOOi*te-speeciei (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature AN (rea~tor ...

L-ro'R], -,cr ,t'RV t ...WRI)Rlv level indication for 15 minutes or longer.Basis: I NPL'X NNqlI): A' parameter change or an evecnt that is not I ) the result of an intended exolution or 2) an expected plant respolnSe to a transient.

Ihe cause of the parameter change or cx cot max be knoxxn or unknoxxn.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and levek-. It represents a potential degradation of the level eafet-the plantplant sal~ly. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the emergency director 5heu14d-a ill also refer to IC CA3.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, stih-he-xxhere reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications.

During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled.

A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid increase in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

{ii = i ,, iiiiiiiiiiiiii i k !i' ; iiii!i!iiii!iii iii)73 Fifeenminteswx~zd .zcz .... the threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

Escalation to Alert "weu'-!be-veuscs IC CA1 based on an inventory loss or IC CA3 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.

74 CU4 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 15 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(1) Indicated voltage is less than 1O .....it sp,-,i .... -ztg 'alue) on Tlechnical Speciflcation required 125 VI)C V-ila4-DG-ital busses for 1 5 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a loss of vital DC power whieh-that compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode.In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions increase the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Tm~his4Iis condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safe',4 satiey.As used in this EAL, "required" means the vital DC busses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.

For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.

Fifteen minutes --selected ais the threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level --e*4d-be -M4uses IC CAI or CA3, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Thc .. :'zi zpeeifiz bu: cletnge -'aluc" shoul-d!bz bed the minimum .... ....neez' orad.....t.

eperation of SAFETY SYSTEM

'u hud The. typical "'alue fo .... entir btt; ..... is ...... :mate,, 105 Fer a60 stlring IE'CL Ac~olan....

Att-nbutec:

iI.I 75 CU5 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability:

Cold Shutdown, Refueling, Defueled Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: Inl plant telephones Public address systeml Plant radio sytems~(2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods:[ FNN (lnicrgcncy Notification Nct~ ork)[Comme~rcial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: I NS rn tecdcral TeleIcommuni ncations S~ stci ItI' S)('ommecrcial phones..... vF~~ ....... z~f cmmun'zatlcna m,,cthcd5)

Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site or offsite communications capabilities.

While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to OROs and the NRC.This IC shoutd-xsrill be assessed only when extraordinary means are bei~ng i,. eduse tos ak communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipments-:

relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points;-;

individuals being sent to offsite EAL # 1 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.

EAL #2 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration.

The OROs referred to here are the states of Alabanm. (Georgaa and F'lorida:

ttouston and I fcnry Counties.

Alabama, and Larly Ciounty, Gieorgia, (aee De-'e~eper EAL #3 addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.

76 EAL ff1 The "site cpecific lict ef ccmmunieatirc, rnc chcu'ld all czmrnunlcatizcns mett~cJc uccd telechzi-.cs.

r~azc cartv c;'ctemc fcr reutine plant communieaticnc (e.g., ccrnmer~radice, etc.). Thic licting chculd include inctalk~ef-s4e 4eIei4 EAL ff2 The "site cpcFlee ic!st of czmmunicaticnc methodc" cheuld inclu-de all cpmmun:i.ationsa methcd'c u:ed to perfor.m.

initial emergency nztificatiznc ta OROc ne described in the site comm'unicatiens technelcgy.

In the Bacic cectican incert the site specific licting cCf the OROc requiring nctificuticn ef, an itemccn ,-;cd an-d maintai!ned by :ndiviulc",,!.

Thece are typically the 77 85 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS UNUSUAL EVENT E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Op. Modes: All 78 E-HU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition:

Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the cite specific ecak specific technical allz'Qble radiatian

!evel) e~n the surface af the epent fu....l ckAN 5 of the salues listed in t~p~ v~1s~s1 m~po &~atpn jl ,yt ~Basis: CON 2 tNLMIiNI" BOLUNDARY:

1lhe barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and thle environment.

This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of one or more fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. T'he radiation reading values listed in the table represent 2 times the site-specific cask specific technical specification allow\able radiation level on the designated surface of the spent fuel cas~k. The technical specification multiple of "2 times", ";,'hieh ic alec. uacd in R~eecgnitie.n Catecgry, R IC RU I, is 79 used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions.

The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact if the "on-contact" dose rate limit is exceeded may be dete:'mifl:ed-based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU 1 and HA I.in. the c... Certifiae

... fCamplian:ee the N.RC Safet. Ev'aluatian Reper't, identify the.natur..l ph ..m...................

id. nt..............

hat... ul..... entialya ctth identified natueral or man made evente (e.g., a drp. da t ipedavr...,..POSON .FRE EAPRTHQUKE, etc.).The allcwable radiatian level bra pent fuel cask can he tbund in the cask's technical~peeificatian lacated in the Certificate of Compliance.

LLL ~'.ZelgnmZnL

.'~ur1vuiee: .i.i.1.n 80 S6 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS eble .......-P--- -.Recognition Category "F" Initiating Condition Matrix 7 SES'~i7~ I LES oESSSIA GENERA!.EMERCFENCV Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.EGI Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby,___Startup, Hot Shutdown__ SITE AREA EMERGENCY Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.FIOp. Modes." Power Operation, Hot Standby,___Startup, Hot Shutdown___ ALERT Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.FAlI Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hat Standby, Startup, Hot Shutdown-LSS~hS.~SS YES SE[fESSTh~S.Y~,.SSSL,,.,, ELEL ELSE S CS EETJSE FoEt CtLD&a Tabla 9 F 3 far PWR EALa EA+/-EEEL,.,,EWEESSSL,~,StJSSES Ua;aI~Nat..:

Thaaijaatlcfla~vdgan'~:zfc~

a a by d alz~arz aad i t ra;.arazl for a~ta zpaifia ia~plrtatiaa; ha:.'a.a., a aria apaa~fia ..ahaaa a,,at af lagia flz~r d:agraora, "aaariag" aritara ar ahaaldaza that af tha ad~aaaat ahagraa.............................

81 Thz F..id Clad ~ z~d tha RCE B~c. ~c:.+/-tad haaIh~ th~. thC t lB...L,..... ...... ..........

.. ... ..... .~ .. ...-+ = L,.- > r+. z:L.........

~.. v I .-.J .K ::, .f:+].. F r:~ r: --.5 2. Fa aaa... 4+d a .. ..J. ' LA .i ..~.. Jaa......

........ .4. .,d^+...tb........ +_y ..I a... +t--a^cr^a^dia^

j..r.... .... d".... .. .... .. ...,.... ..... .......... " ............

tc~l aalain fhaa Ia ..... aifi.....

.izn ... Far ...., an ...............

h"ia:;z przia ba.ciar tn.

..... raa,dt .....St Arca'^++ Eazrgc-- alazi hl" dczcac'aj aataa'laathta E t cE ....azy : IC EGI 1+f+ hac b.'c. .d .-*+.P++ -, lP -` +,++- _,I. h-..+ I .... ki ---..b.r....h .i .icB R~aP R E~ .. .... .. .... .. .. tra.... t..... ....... .... .. f .. ... ..............

t...................................

F.. ..... a... .. ..... .......h a ca ta i ?A c ada ..... ..... .. t.... ..........

....... .. ...................

...... ............

........ccc., I-..ic..........atca....crac..t...

ia...atry c ...................

~....... t.... C ....... ... ...........

.. a. -..... ... , ...ti... \.++ ... tt-.. ac a. thaaa!,at thatM; -xcat aaca:iaar:

ta Gcara Elcaracydctrta.F I t- atC.dan CSfm -di-,,-i....at t c. Gacra-t- ac......c..

"7 Tha^ a-:l:t., tc ..... ala. t^ ^ I;. ... .... cc +.ayctaciicc

., ct.,al; .. .. t. d.. ... .,d. Iti:--+ ld .I+ aci ataicad-;-.I Fa ..... ctc 82 Fission Product Barrier Table Thresholds for LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of Barriers FGI GENERAL EMERGENCY FSI SITE AREA EMERGENCY FAI ALERT Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.

IAny Loss or any Potential Loss of either Potential Loss of the third barrier, the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Not Applicable A A mnaAn automatiCccsOr A stnbOperationhrongf a A A uTUEleaking or Sis Not Applicablecndti~ms actuation is required f-sakeop~punmp is FAULTED outsidee by EITHER of the required by of contairnment.

wsse44e;c!ieces following

EITHER of tse.... , .... p, ....

UJNISOLABLE following.

ls*RCS leakage

UNISOLABLE

SG tube RCS leakage RUPTURE.

SG tube leakage.OR B ~ T coEdtRn r tlC-.. ._+k _ S.+W~iai~83 Fu, l Cld ae CS Bari~erCntimetDre LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS.IndqaeHeat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal--AN Atry *AiteNot4~

Appicbl A e t sirrNotdlApplicablee An 1Vmetor iet n,neq t relrr 5hinrrsO N t.l F ......I ;Nrn ., N(NIIla in 7....r .....not be -h udn tbe. .......corrardered R DDiI" totaa 3r5 gpmr ddeeto raito ontrrdato oi or radiation monito N()ledieatgnOi'S ORsierdR ,7 I ftoa epee.ieiatt@~

rrrrrrrorrhrborrrirrspesse thanl 395 gp due84 Fuel CIi~u Jlarmr i!il R i iiiii

~i!ii~ cs I Bira ii iii ! i!ii!~ !i i~i~~ Conta ini nt¸ Di rt ! iiii i LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS sindications that....-_

, reactor coolant .... ;e^i activity is greater than 300 pCilgmn dose equivalent I-131-).________________________________

85 Fuel Clad Darnr RCSiaie otimn are LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS ]POTENTIAL LOSS 4. Containment Itnterty or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment ntegity or Bypass Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A Containment A A NT isolation is required ...........

AND cniin EITHER of the flitt following:

... .. ..* Containnient w, .....on Emergency Director judgment* UNtSOLABLE m=i-a'-,.eeem,:mta-sna'sd pathway from eoniomnem~

the containment OR to the C 1 enviroinment oS exists cn os OR B Indications of RCS pfessuiee-~ease leakage outside of t-a"pO.....

containnment as .........

f^t-indicated H alium; AND at aiiy of the 2 Less than o)iie III t'iitns and one full train , off *pra is operating per design for 15_______________minutes or longer.5. Other Indications

5. Other Indications

5. Other Indications VIOBi Cam~4nsis~

~gs~qiindjE63iVI6~U~Ttmih.goa V17~4m~binAgjl 86

' Fuel Clad BarrierRC ajeCoaurtBrir LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS ]POTENTIAL LOSS N~l alppthcabLcA-. atppl Not uppli cab' -A- \ut upptIcblA apphal uiIA Nut applicabbeA-

6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A ANY condition in A, ANY condition in A ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in A ANY condition in A ANY condition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the emergency emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director theifelcl ht ta niadtfel cladtbarrierte

{ RCsof barriniaer.

thatmniaer os o nthatinmethricaer idircatelor s th f pthatinalosofthes that indicantesoeta loss of thainctes that idcantanestteta loss of thainctes idtes loss ofa potenl closs ofte thaCmareoential lossofrter thme containment betalrosroiter barrier______________I______

_______ ____ ___87 Basis Information For Fission Product Barrier EIAI,.s Tab!e94F 3 Each PWR zr&.er'g icrainu 1'-=}r.-'j r th"k==i"1-'r fcr th-implementation of EOPs (i.e.. a ..... oprntL atien.....

Many? ..f. th thrshold mntained in th EAL.u.+. Fi ...o Prod

... site+ specific threshold.

decv removal" e, Ce reiiee', eunull.'i,?,n, [tr[ are spcc'incally caabli ) b..h..t.a When.- A shul Cuse rhe araeesns ale pchdwihnterE*sta lg iy h edt dsCorbdbyte Coolnerctrsedadbss n eae eece oe.Ti prahwl enur coneitenybtenth ieseifcE!

n eegnc=siiain ce n thus$ failtte mre ieyadacuaecysfctinassmn

!n ConainentfEPdvlpetadipeetten h etnhueOnr ru WG deveCSl.epedatdondste Ciia aby ucin spale hi megnyRses Guielies.TheWOOappeachod rstructures-O to maintai an/o reser these.. Critcalaf.

t Funeti.n..

an.... te.l.+ de i aK pr +iertie ..nd. systemai ... n.r.Th WOO+"" Cr it- ic..ao -.,- Safety =.Funetiens are pres ,nted belew., ..+^ ...1 ..

a 5-~ubfi~ia~il F..ci. n and+

the: slinifcac of a:,.^ t... functien t hi., s m-- thodlog + yV is impem. te. th....E~s t he.......O gudn einNE 99 roall ,'ts for-' use .......r.a.n ....FST assessmen results* ars.EAls.-

and++ fise preduT loss potential les thresheld.

+-In this+ an em !rene clasifiction' asesen a feDircl re SFTaseset 88 coneult with their claccification deciciar.

mckerc ta determine if inclucion would ~cict with timely and accurate emergency elaccifleation.

Thic decision should conoider the effecto of any site specific changes to the generic WOG CSFST e~'aluation logic and setpoints, as well as those arising frarn user rules ajsplieoble to cmer;er.ey opcrating procedures (e.g.. e~ceptiono to procedure entry or transition due to specific accident conditions or loss of a support system).The CSFST thresholds may be nddressed in one of 3 ways: I) Not incorporated; thresholds will use parameters and values as discussed in the Developer Notes.2) Incorporated along with parameter and value thresholds (e.g., a fuel clad lass wauld have 2 thresholds such as "CETs 1200 F" and "Care Cooling Red entry conditions met".Used in lieu at parameters and values tar a~ thresholds.

With on ...excV'*OeptionI if a.. 1, decison l madel to-: include the CSFST base thr. .e.n sha .OthenTl s baced thre.sholdc).

The one c;ception is the R'CS !ntcgritb' (P) ,CSST. Beas ...f.. the-ecmplexity of the P Red decision paint thatz. relies on an as.essm.."en=t a pressure tempera~ture

$1 ricorporate tne amer w-x I nasco :nresnaios.

89 P-WR-FUEL CLAD BARRIER THRESHOLDS:

The fuel clad barrier consists of the cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage There is no Loss threshold associated with RCS or SG Tube Leakage.Potential Loss l.A This condition indicates a reduction in reactor vessel water level sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.PLtosis Lo.A l dTgais ccecelo gcndition ndicgat reues tremp trteraturesacwithi.

The roeaeeufcin aoctuer signifiant tueheathaeimgpl emanted coolant.ueOnr ru EegnyRses Thin luding-depndntion upiaestmertrs ihn the coreture suffi.iiftapolalable)h onetepr ofhea-nuced clasddrinluig daagthe. hl h aeao iia Cr Potential Loss 2.A FNOTE: Heat Sink C'SF should not be considered REL) if total AFW is less than 395 gprn due to operator action.This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat 90 removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to RCS barrier potential loss threshold 2.A; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and increase RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.criteria concerning the number er ether cf thermeceuple readings neeessm'y tc an inad.'equate ore ..... ng pro..dur...

Te ma....n"tamn consistency with EOPs. these Enter a site specific tempeFrature value that correcsponds to significant in core superheating cf reactor ,.I;- ,,2oorF may .be u.e..ts tha .a.e implemented Westinghouse O;;mers Gru .m.rge. c RePcponse Guidelines, enter the parameters a~nd v'alues u.sed in the Core Cooling Red Path.Enter a site specific temperature v'alue: that carresponds tc core eenditiorns at the onset ef sup-erh---ated, steam assuming that the R.CS is intact). may.. ..... beo° used.... .Far plantc that have implemented Westing,;

ue ..... s G...r-.p Emergen.....y Response ability to reme-ve heat from the RCS via the ste--m generators. wil!l typically be For plants that implemented Westinghouse Oerats Greup ...

Respense thesfetftinhisusectioP~n.s 91 DPWR FUIEI I}ADRIER

3. RS Aeimirtc-4-Contaczinment ng Radition niin mt nacrdncwt h Loss 3.A The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals 300pCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2%percent to 5-%- percent fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the fuel clad barrier.The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCS barrier loss threshold 3.A since it indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and the RCS barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency.

Loss 3.B This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 iiCi/gm dose equivalent I-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2%- percent to 5%-4 percent fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the fuel clad barrier.It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highly ele\,ated actisity levels could require several hours to complete, Nonetheless, a sample related threshold is included as a backup to other indications.

There is no potential loss threshold associated with RCS activity/containment radiation.

92 PWP. FUEL CLAD HAPRPUEP THR.ESHO!LDS+/-

4.5.bess4~Threchald

~alucc chauld be determined occuming RCS radicactivity cancentratian equaL 300 ~iCi'gm dccc equh'alent 1131. Other cite epacific unitc may be uced (e.g., pCi'ee).Depending uper. cite cpecific eapabilitiec, thic threshald may has'e a cample analycic cmpcr.cnt and/or a radiatien manitar reading companent.

Add thic paragraph (cr similar werding) ta the Basis if thc threshold includes a cample analycic component, "It ic recagnized that cample collectian and analycis af reactor ceclant with highly elevated activity levelc eculd require ceveral heure to cemplete.Nonethelese.

a eampie related th~zhcId ic included ac a backup to ether indicaticnc." Containment Integrity or Bypass Not applicable (included for numbering consistency)

Other Indications Not applicable (ii~cludcd For numbcrinu colwislcocx Leec and/cr Pctential Lccc 5.A Thic cubeategery addreccec cther cite specific threshcldc that may be included te indicate Icec cr petential ieee of the Fuel Clad barrier baced en plant epecific dccign Tharacterictice net cencidered

~n the gencrie guidance.De~elope~-NeeM Lece and.'cr Petential Lecx 5.A Dcvelope~

eheuld determine if cthcr relinble indicatore evict te evaluate the etatue of thie ficeica preduct bonier (e.g.. ~vicw accident analycec deceribed in the cite Final Safety~Xnalyeic Repert, ac updated).

The goal ic ta identify any unique or cite epecitie indicatione that will promote timely and accurate aececcmcnt of barrier etatuc.A ~ t~-h~IA,, ..1,.-..,1A

~ annr~imatA" th~ came r~lativ thr~at to the£~I~flL -barrier as the ether threeholdc in this column. Basic infcrmatien fcr the other threchelds m~' he i~A t~ ~nti~ the r~lifr'e hiHer thr~it 1r'~t 6. Emergency Director Judgment Loss 6.A This threshold addresses any other factors that mey ,5e used by the emergency director in determining whether the fuel clad barrier is lost.93 PWR FUEL CLAD BARRIER THRESilOLDS:

Potential Loss 6.A This threshold addresses any other factors 4h-a-eused by the emergency director in determining whether the fuael clad barrier is potentially lost. The emergency director NheaIdwil!

also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored.

94 PR-WRCS BARRIER THRESHOLDS:

The RCS barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Loss Il.A This threshold is based on an UNISOLABLE RCS leak of sufficient size to require an automatic or manual actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). This condition clearly represents a loss of the RCS Barrier.This threshold is applicable to unidentified and pressure boundary leakage, as well as identified leakage. It is also applicable to UNISOLABLE RCS leakage through an interfacing system. The mass loss may be into any location -inside contaimnment, to the secondary-side (i.e., steam generator tube leakage) or outside of containment.

A steam generator with primary-to-secondary leakage of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection is considered to be RUPTURED.

If a RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment, the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency since the containment barrier loss threshold I .A will also be met.Potential Loss l.A This threshold is based on an UNISOLABLE RCS leak that results in the inability to maintain pressurizer level within specified limits by operation of a normally used charging (makeup) pump, but an ECCS (SI) actuation has not occurred.

The threshold is met when an operating procedure, or operating crew supervision, directs that a standby charging (makeup) pump be placed in service to restore and maintain pressurizer level.This threshold is applicable to unidentified and pressure boundary leakage, as well as identified leakage. It is also applicable to UNISOLABLE RCS leakage through an interfacing system. The mass loss may be into any location -inside containment, to the secondary-side (i.e., steam generator tube leakage) or outside of containment.

If a leaking steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment, the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency since the containment barrier loss threshold I .A will also be met.Potential Loss I.B This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the integrity of the RCS pressure boundary due to pressurized thermal shock -a transient that causes rapid RCS cooldown while the RCS is in Mode 3 or higher (i.e., hot and pressurized).

95 DPWRD DRCS BARRDIER THRESHOtLfDS:A be~4~Actuatien ef the ECCS may alec be refcned te ~ Safety Injectien (SI) actuatien er other apprepriate cite epecifie tean.Patential Lece I .A ma.......n RCS leak.+ ra .. ,lue of 50+,"' ...r. ....p :at ..it .spcii ...u. ax .. .. alt.rn.t.RCP sea! leokef~.+,..............

' du t... p..........th........h...

a trancient that cauces rai RCS ceeldew.;n "while' th.e RCS is in Mede~ 3 ar higher (i.e., het preccur-ized).

T!he-se vAPl t}'peally b.....

nd values t..t w;+uld requiroperatrct take'4" promp a4ction- :e+. addressC a, ;t r..fl...t an dep...nd....ci

......u...d.....

EOP.........entr decci ntin er cenditien v.atidatien cr.t.ri. ,e..g., .......u..d... repod .................. .may net beet. ered+. or F pans thrg h avse imP.Plamntedssiges wesGopEegnyRcec Ac+ a potential 1occ d.....er ch....uld4 concider including a threchold, the cam.....c...imilar ................

~C nert e nr cedtn met... in.................th..the wuidance at the frnt...hi..e.ie.......

....note.d a .., deve"r ..hou............t.at..the threshe+

reflet. s any 2. Inadequate Heat Removal There is no loss threshold associated with inadequate heat removal.1'KKtISK~e i

Potential Loss 2.A 96 N(OTE: t leat Sink (StF should not be cosijdered REt) if total AEW flows is less than 395 upm due to operator action.This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the RCS Barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to fuel clad barrier potential loss threshold 2.B; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and increase RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.pamt, ero ... and ...+ ....... that...uld requir oprt~er to tane prmp a, tion to adde thias ct.3. RCS Activity-I-Containment Radiation Loss 3.A The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specified for fuel clad barrier loss threshold 3.A since it indicates a loss of the RCS barrier only.There is no potential loss threshold associated with RCS activity-I-containment radiation.

DipWR RCSg B RI ER Dll Iz De~eIepe~44e4e~*

97 Specification allwableh!

!lmits, into t+he containmenc.t atmosphere.

Using PRCS acti-vity at"aluae of RCS acti"!D' fcr deter,-ininng this "alue..n.s.m...a.es, th.... cit .p..i.. ph-i. a .....ti..n and s-ensitiity of th......nt.i..m.nt can e disting:uished .r.m radiatio .. anating piping and components s.........t....

Loss 5 and.det.rmine.if.n.a.te..ate.indi.t..n.i....ai.ab......

4. Containment Integrity or Bypass Not applicable (included for numbering consistency)

5. Other Indications Not applicable (included f~or numbering consistent~)

This subeategorj' addresses othe r site specific thresholds that may be incl'uded to indicate loss or potentixal loss of the R.CS barrier based on plant specific desi:gn characteristics not considered in th generi. guidance'...

Loss<+---

w 4'or Potenti1 L.ens< 54-.A ....+......i , ..DCS 6. Emergency Director Judgment Loss 6.A 98 This threshold addresses any other factors hft-ea, a.1 4e-used by the emergency director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost.Potential Loss 6.A This threshold addresses any other factors that-ffay-be-used by the emergency director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The emergency director should4 wvill also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored.

None 99 RU2 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition: